MEMORY, 2006, 14 (8), 1001 1011
The role of free choice in memory for past decisions
Kristen Stoll Benney
University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, USA
Linda A. Henkel
Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT, USA
After choosing between different options, people tend to remember the features of the options in ways
that favour the chosen alternative. The present experiment examined how limitations on freedom to
choose between options affected this memory bias. Participants were given a series of two-option choices
and were either allowed free choice between options or were assigned to an option. Participants assigned
to an option were led to believe that either the selection was random or was made in their best interest
based on their personality profile. Results indicated that the choice and best interest conditions
demonstrated memory attributions that favoured their received options, whereas the assignment
condition did not. These findings support the view that memory biases towards received options are
not unique to free choice situations, but may stem from expectations and implicit theories about how and
why the choice was made.
People have been characterised as ‘‘revisionist
historians’’ when recalling their pasts (Ross,
McFarland, Conway, & Zanna, 1983), suggesting
that they may produce distorted recollections of
many aspects of their lives and reconstruct events
according to their current perspective. These
inaccuracies in remembering are a product of
adaptive but imperfect cognitive processes, in
which current opinions, post-event information,
and later rehearsal of an experience exert influence on a person’s recollections (Schacter, 2001).
Previous studies have shown, for example, that
people tend to distort their memories systematically in a self-enhancing and emotionally gratifying direction: People remember SAT scores and
high-school grades as higher than they actually
were, especially if their scores and grades were low
(Bahrick, Hall, & Dunlosky, 1993), and mothers
later remember events and information emphasising the positive aspects of their pregnancy experiences despite the many discomforts and emotional
upheavals documented in their journals (Smith,
1994). Positive biases in autobiographical memories serve to promote satisfaction and well-being
(Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003).
One area in which self-enhancing biases in
memory play an essential role is in a person’s
recollections of past choices and decisions. People
do not always accurately recall information involved in their past choices, but tend to recall in
emotionally gratifying ways. For example, participants who made decisions about situations such
as whether or not to hospitalise a patient, convict
a burglar on trial, or purchase particular stocks,
recalled significantly more information that was
consistent with their decision than information
that was inconsistent, whereas participants who
did not make a decision recalled both types of
information equally (Dellarosa & Bourne, 1984).
People thus tend to recall selectively in ways that
support their decisions. This in turn can promote
well-being because how the options involved in a
Address correspondence to: Linda Henkel, Department of Psychology, Fairfield University, Fairfield, CT 06824, USA.
E-mail: lhenkel@mail.fairfield.edu
Thanks to Mara Mather for her insightful and helpful comments on this paper.
# 2006 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
http://www.psypress.com/memory
DOI:10.1080/09658210601046163
1002
BENNEY AND HENKEL
choice are recollected forms the basis for a
person’s feelings of either satisfaction or regret.
Recent studies examining ‘‘choice-supportive
memory distortion’’ found similar results (Mather
& Johnson, 2000; Mather, Shafir, & Johnson,
2000, 2003). After choosing between two different
options (e.g., two potential roommates), each
associated with positive and negative features
(e.g., likes to cook, easily annoyed), people
tended to recall more positive features being
associated with the selected option and more
negative features associated with the rejected
option, regardless of which option the features
were originally associated with. This systematic
bias can serve to promote satisfaction and contentment with one’s choice.
This finding that objective features of chosen
and rejected options are remembered in a choicesupportive manner is consistent with work on how
people change their initial evaluations of options
after making a choice (e.g., Brehm, 1956), a result
often interpreted in the context of cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Clearly, the
act of choosing has a powerful impact on people’s
cognitions about the past. However, individuals
do not always freely choose for themselves. For
example, students may be assigned lab partners
by a professor and employees may be assigned
specific projects by their supervisors. Are choicesupportive memory biases unique to situations in
which an individual has free choice? Do people
exhibit these biases when an option is assigned,
rather than chosen?
Recent research suggests that freedom to make
choices for yourself leads to different memory
attributions than from having choices made for
you (Mather et al., 2003). Participants who freely
chose between pairs of options based on their
described features remembered in a choice-supportive manner, whereas those who imagined
being assigned to options did not. People expected
the assigned option to be remembered better, and
therefore acted on the expectation that the
features they recalled most vividly were associated with the assigned option. Thus, it is not
only commitment to an option that drives biases in
memory, but the act of choosing for oneself that
may lead to different cognitive operations from
when one does not have free choice, as shown in
other work across a variety of research paradigms
(e.g., Desrichard & Monteil, 1994; Harmon-Jones
& Mills, 1999; Wenzlaff & LePage, 2000). For
example, studies have found better memory for
self-chosen than for assigned or rejected actions,
and a bias in people with an impaired ability to
cope with negative affect to erroneously claim that
they chose to perform an activity that in fact was
not freely selected but was assigned to be
performed (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kuhl &
Kazen, 1994). Presumably this bias serves to
increase positive affect and satisfaction.
Although Mather et al. (2003) provide evidence that arbitrary assignment to an option does
not prompt memory attributions in favour of the
received option, those who were assigned an
option were not provided with any information
about how or why the choice was made. Such
information may be a critical factor in prompting
choice-supportive memory attributions, and that
is the focus of the present study. A large body of
research suggests that memory may be guided by
expectations (Hirt, 1990; Klein & Kunda, 1993;
McDonald & Hirt, 1997; Snyder & Uranowitz,
1978) and implicit beliefs about oneself and
others (see Ross, 1989, for a review). In the case
of memory for past choices, it is possible that
expectations and beliefs about how the choice
was made may guide memory processes. For
example, people who chose an option may hold
a belief that they received the superior option,
and therefore recall features of that option based
on that belief. A person who has been assigned an
option might display similar memory biases if
prompted to hold positive expectations and
beliefs about the received option (e.g., participants who believed an assignment was made with
their best interest in mind might reconstruct their
memory to favour the option received).
Recent work has highlighted the important role
that beliefs play in making memory attributions
about features associated with chosen and rejected
options (Henkel & Mather, in press). Participants
chose between two options in a series of choice
scenarios and were later asked to remember which
options they had chosen and to indicate which
options various features had been associated with.
In one study, participants sometimes misremembered which of the two options they had actually
chosen, and in another study, they were given
misleading reminders suggesting that they had
earlier chosen the option that they had in fact
rejected. Results showed that people made attributions favouring the option they believed that
they chose, even when that belief was erroneous.
In order to further determine the role that
beliefs might play in choice-supportive biases,
the present research placed different limitations
on participants’ freedom to choose during a
FREE CHOICE AND MEMORY FOR DECISIONS
series of decisions. Some participants freely
chose for themselves in a series of two-option
decision scenarios (choice condition), whereas
others were told the computer would randomly
choose options for them (assignment condition).
A third ‘‘best interest’’ group was told the
computer would choose for them based on an
individualised profile of information about their
personal preferences (in fact, the computer
chose randomly). Participants either received
the chosen or assigned items from the decision
scenarios or were entered in a raffle to win
them. This provided a realistic choice with a
direct outcome, rather than a hypothetical or
imagined choice as used in prior research
(Mather et al., 2003).
We expected to replicate findings from previous studies in the free choice and assignment conditions, with participants demonstrating
choice-supportive memory attributions in the
former group and a lack of choice-supportiveness
in the latter (Mather et al., 2003). The best
interest condition was included to provide information about the factors necessary to prompt
choice-supportiveness. Although participants in
this condition did not freely choose for themselves, they were prompted to believe that the
choice was made in their best interest, representing a high-quality choice for them. Thus, if choicesupportiveness stems from expectations and beliefs about the quality of options received, these
participants should demonstrate biases favouring
the assigned option. However, if there is something inherent in the act of choosing for oneself
that prompts a bias towards the chosen option,
they should not demonstrate choice-supportive
memory attributions.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 192 undergraduates (45 males,
147 females) ranging in age from 18 to 52 years
old (M /21.74) at a mid-sized, south-eastern
university. They participated to fulfil course
requirements or receive extra credit.
Materials and procedure
Under the guise of collecting ‘‘personal attribute
and preference’’ information, participants com-
1003
pleted a series of 12 two-option questions on a
computer (e.g., Would you rather watch television
or read a book?; Do you prefer to be spontaneous
or to plan events carefully?).
Next, participants were told they would be
presented a series of choices between two options
and should read the descriptions of the options
carefully to decide which one they preferred.
They viewed four different two-option scenarios
involving restaurants, movie theatres, department
stores, and chewing gum (see Appendix). They
were told they would either receive the chosen/
assigned item (e.g., gum) or be entered into a
raffle to win a gift certificate for it later (e.g.,
restaurant gift certificate). In each scenario, the
two options appeared side by side on the computer screen. Beneath each option was a list of six
to nine descriptive features. Each option in a
pair had the same number of positive and
negative features. Two additional scenarios (involving puzzles and magazines) were presented
last and served as the basis for a later filler task.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions: free choice, best interest, or
assignment. Participants in the free choice condition were instructed to press the key that corresponded with their preferred option. The best
interest group was instructed to press the space
bar because the computer would choose between
the two options based on their answers to the
personal attribute and preference questions, and
would display the option selected for them. They
were informed that the computer had an 85%
success rate for choosing participants’ preferred
option. The assignment group was instructed to
press the space bar because the computer would
randomly choose between the two options and
display the selected option. They were told that
random assignment was necessary to make the
chances of winning each raffled item equal across
participants. For both the best interest and assignment groups, selection of all options was random.
In all conditions, it was emphasised that participants should review the features associated with
each option and decide which of the two options
they preferred before indicating their choice or
hitting the key to view the choice made for them.
The six scenarios were completed one at a
time in a self-paced manner. After each choice,
participants rated their satisfaction with the
choice and their confidence that the decision was
the right one for them on a scale from 1 (not
confident/satisfied) to 7 (very confident/satisfied ).
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BENNEY AND HENKEL
This served to motivate participants in all conditions to attend to and evaluate the options.
Participants then completed several personality questionnaires and engaged in filler tasks
(doing the puzzle and reading the magazine
previously chosen or assigned), establishing a
30-minute delay prior to a surprise memory test.
We administered separate source memory tests
for each of the four scenarios. Each test consisted
of the names of the two options, followed by a
randomised list of the various descriptive features
participants viewed when deciding which option
they preferred. Intermixed with the original (old)
features were three positive and three negative
new features not originally associated with either
option. Participants indicated which option they
had chosen or were assigned, then indicated
whether each feature was associated with Option
A or Option B, or was new.
RESULTS
Of the 192 participants, 20 could not correctly
remember two or more of the four chosen/
assigned options and thus were excluded from
analyses (11 from the best interest condition,
1 from the choice condition, and 8 from the
assignment condition). This resulted in 172 participants (60 in the best interest condition, 55 in the
free choice condition, and 57 in the random
assignment condition). All analyses and post-hoc
comparisons (Newman-Keuls) were conducted
using an alpha level of .05.
Recognition accuracy
Differences were examined across the three
conditions in people’s overall ability to remember
features that occurred, regardless of which option
they were attributed to. An ANOVA on recognition accuracy (i.e., the proportion of original
features recognised as old and new features
recognised as new) showed a significant main
effect of condition, F (2, 169) / 3.14, MSe/ 0.01,
1
An analogous ANOVA on corrected recognition scores
(to factor out guessing biases) revealed similar results. A
greater number of participants in the best interest and random
assignment conditions were eliminated from all analyses
because they failed to correctly remember more than two of
the assigned options. Nonetheless, when their data were
included in the recognition analyses, the patterns and
significance remain the same.
p / 0.046.1 Recognition accuracy in the free
choice condition (M / 0.87) was significantly
higher than in the best interest condition (M /
0.84), but did not differ from the assignment
condition (M / 0.85).
Proportion of items attributed to
chosen and nonchosen options
One way in which to examine choice-supportive
memory biases is to determine whether there are
differences in the proportion of positive or
negative features attributed to either the chosen
or nonchosen option in each of the choice/assignment conditions. A choice-supportive bias would
be indicated by attributions favouring the chosen
option over the nonchosen option (i.e., more
positive features attributed to the chosen than
the nonchosen option; more negative features
attributed to the nonchosen than the chosen
option). Separate analyses were conducted for
old and new items. The proportion of recognised
old items attributed to either the chosen or
nonchosen option was examined for each of the
three choice/assignment conditions.2 As can be
seen in the top panel of Table 1, in both the best
interest and free choice conditions, a choicesupportive bias was shown for positive features:
Participants attributed significantly more positive
old features to the chosen option than to the
nonchosen option, t (59) / 2.45, p / .02; t (54) /
3.20, p / .002, respectively. However, in the
assignment condition, they did not show such a
bias, t (56) / 0.70, p / .49. The bottom panel of
Table 1 shows the proportion of new items
incorrectly attributed to one of the two options,
and a bias favouring the nonchosen option can be
seen. Participants in the random assignment
condition attributed more negative features to
the chosen option than the nonchosen option,
although the effect was only marginally significant, t (56) /1.70, p/ .09. These findings are
consistent with the argument that people make
memory attributions in a manner that favours the
chosen over the nonchosen option, and that the
nature of the choice*whether it was freely made,
made in one’s best interest, or made randomly*
influences the pattern of attributions.
2
Analyses were also conducted in which the proportion of
old items attributed to either the chosen or nonchosen options
was calculated out of the total number of old items presented,
and these analyses yielded identical patterns.
FREE CHOICE AND MEMORY FOR DECISIONS
1005
TABLE 1
Proportion of positive and negative features attributed to either the chosen or nonchosen option as a function of freedom to choose
Positive old features
Negative old features
Attributed to chosen
Attributed to nonchosen
Attributed to chosen
Attributed to nonchosen
.55 (.12)
.53 (.10)
.49 (.10)
.45 (.12)
.47 (.10)
.51 (.10)
.49 (.08)
.51 (.10)
.51 (.06)
.51 (.08)
.49 (.10)
.49 (.06)
Choice
Best interest
Assignment
Positive new features
Negative new features
Attributed to chosen
Attributed to nonchosen
Attributed to chosen
Attributed to nonchosen
.11 (.12)
.15 (.13)
.11 (.12)
.12 (.12)
.16 (.12)
.13 (.12)
.06 (.06)
.08 (.08)
.09 (.10)
.07 (.11)
.09 (.09)
.05 (.09)
Choice
Best interest
Assignment
SD in parentheses.
Asymmetry scores
Another way to examine choice-supportive attributions is through a composite measure that
indicates the extent to which participants remember relatively more positive features belonging to
the selected option and more negative features
belonging to the nonselected option. Asymmetry
scores to measure this bias were calculated using
the method described by Mather et al. (2000) and
Mather and Johnson (2000), following this basic
formula: (Proportion of positive features attributed to Option A / Proportion of negative features attributed to Option B) (Proportion of negative features attributed to Option
A / Proportion of positive features attributed to
Option B). The resulting sums were standardised
separately for the four scenarios such that the
mean value across all participants for each
scenario was zero. A positive value indicated
memory attributions favouring Option A over
Option B, and a negative value indicated memory
attributions favouring Option B over Option A
(standardised scores were multiplied by /1 for
participants who chose or were assigned Option
B). The resulting asymmetry score provides a
measure of whether and how much participants
favoured the options received (either by choice or
by assignment). Positive scores indicate memory
attributions favouring the option people received
(e.g., attributing more positive features and fewer
negative features to the received option). Negative scores indicate that participants favoured the
option they did not receive (e.g., attributing more
negative features and fewer positive features to
the chosen option). A score of 0 indicates that
choices or assignments did not influence memory
attributions.
This particular measure is valuable not only
because it provides a composite score of the
degree of choice-supportiveness but also because
it avoids spurious effects due to unequal numbers
of participants choosing one option over another.
For example, if the great majority of participants
chose the Corner Café over the American Grille
restaurant and also showed attributions favouring
the Corner Café, but the two tendencies were not
correlated, a significant choice-supportive asymmetry score would not be obtained. Unequal
numbers of participants choosing one option
over another would in fact underestimate the
extent of bias when one option is overwhelmingly
preferred, and thus would reduce the likelihood
of revealing a choice-supportive bias (e.g., in the
most extreme case, if everyone in a given sample
chose the same option, the mean asymmetry score
would be zero; see Mather et al., 2003, footnote 3
for further discussion). Because we cannot control which option participants select in the choice
condition, imbalances in choices naturally arise
(unequal numbers of participants chose one
option over the other in each scenario: 21/34 in
the department store choice, 36/19 in the gum
choice, 36/19 in the movie choice, and 20/35 in the
restaurant choice). Furthermore, although in the
best interest and assignment conditions equal
numbers of participants were assigned to the
two options, the elimination of participants who
failed to correctly remember more than half of
the chosen options resulted in unequal numbers
assigned to a given option.
A repeated-measures ANOVA showed no
significant differences in overall asymmetry
1006
BENNEY AND HENKEL
scores between the four scenarios, F(3, 603) /
0.43, p / .73. Therefore, we averaged the asymmetry scores for the scenarios for each
participant, using only scores from correctly
remembered choices/assignments, and weighted
the averages based on number of features per
scenario.
An ANOVA on overall asymmetry scores
indicated a significant main effect for choice/
assignment condition, F (2, 169) / 5.06, MSe /
1.34, p / .007 (see Figure 1). Asymmetry scores
for the assignment group significantly differed
from both the free choice group and the best
interest group, and the best interest and free
choice groups did not differ. Overall asymmetry
scores significantly differed from zero for both
the free choice condition, F(1, 54) / 4.74, MSe /
1.51, p / .03, and the best interest condition,
F (1, 59) / 4.44, MSe / 1.27, p / .04, indicating
that both groups displayed memory attributions
favouring the option received. In contrast, the
mean asymmetry score for the assignment condition was negative and marginally differed from
zero, F (1, 56)/ 3.61, MSe / 0.68, p / .06, indicating that memory attributions tended to favour
the alternative (non-received) option. Thus, the
best interest and choice groups both favoured the
received option, whereas the assignment group
did not.
To further examine biases in memory attributions, a 2 /3/3 ANOVA was conducted on
asymmetry scores, with feature valence (positive,
negative) and attribution type (correct attribu-
tions of old features, misattributions of old
features, misattributions of new features) as
within-subjects factors, and condition (free
choice, best interest, random assignment) as a
between-subjects factor (see Table 2). Overall,
participants were significantly more choice-supportive for positive features than for negative
features, F(1, 169) / 6.06, MSe / 0.30, p / .01. A
significant main effect was also found for the
condition under which choices were made, F (2,
169) / 4.75, MSe / 0.52, p/ .02, replicating the
result found with overall asymmetry scores. The
assignment group significantly differed from both
the free choice and best interest groups, but the
free choice and best interest groups did not differ.
Again, these results indicate that those who freely
chose or had choices made presumably in their
best interest were choice-supportive, whereas
those for whom a choice was made randomly
were not. No difference was found in asymmetry
scores for the different types of attributions,
F (2, 338) / 1.13, MSe / 0.18, p / .32, although a
significant valence / attribution type interaction
was found, F (2, 338) / 3.67, MSe / 0.22, p / .03.
For negative features, asymmetry scores were
relatively low and did not differ in relation to
the type of attribution made; however, for positive features, both correctly and incorrectly
attributed old features resulted in higher asymmetry scores than did incorrectly attributed new
features. Thus people were more likely to attribute (both correctly and incorrectly) positive old
features to the selected option relative to the
0.25
0.20
Overall Asymmetry Score
0.15
0.10
0.05
Assignment
0.00
Choice
Best Interest
-0.05
-0.10
-0.15
-0.20
-0.25
Figure 1. Overall asymmetry scores (9/SE) as a function of freedom to choose. (Positive scores indicate memory attributions
favouring the selected option; negative scores indicate memory attributions favouring the nonselected option; scores of 0 indicate
attributions favouring neither the selected nor nonselected option).
FREE CHOICE AND MEMORY FOR DECISIONS
1007
TABLE 2
Mean weighted asymmetry scores as a function of choice condition, feature valence, and type of attribution
Positive features
Correct
Choice
Best interest
Assignment
Total
.29
.19
/.05
.14
(.71)
(.50)
(.50)
(.59)
Incorrect
.17
.21
/.05
.11
(.64)
(.45)
(.47)
(.53)
Negative features
New
.01
.04
/.04
.01
(.41)
(.59)
(.48)
(.50)
Correct
.00
/.03
/.00
/.01
(.52)
(.56)
(.41)
(.50)
Incorrect
.01
.05
/.10
/.01
(.53)
(.57)
(.41)
(.51)
New
.07
.12
/.09
.03
(.42)
(.57)
(.46)
(.49)
SD in parentheses.
Correct/old features attributed to the correct option; Incorrect /old features attributed to the incorrect option; New /new
features incorrectly attributed to either option.
unselected option, but did not do so for new
features.
Satisfaction and confidence ratings
Participants’ ratings of satisfaction with the option received and confidence in the choice/assignment were averaged across the four choice
scenarios. Due to a programming problem, ratings from three participants were not saved. An
ANOVA on average satisfaction rating for the
remaining participants indicated a significant
main effect for choice/assignment condition,
F (2, 166) / 5.91, MSe / 0.93, p / .003. Post-hoc
tests indicated that participants in the free choice
group were significantly more satisfied (M / 4.91)
than those in either the best interest group (M /
4.31) or the assignment group (M / 4.43). The
best interest and assignment groups did not
significantly differ. A significant main effect was
also found for average confidence ratings, F (2,
166) / 10.71, MSe / 0.90, p B/ .001. Those in the
choice condition gave significantly higher confidence ratings that the selected option was the
right one for them (M / 5.06) than did those in
the best interest (M / 4.37) or assignment (M /
4.30) conditions, and the latter two did not differ
significantly.
DISCUSSION
Free choice is not always an option, and choices
made on one’s behalf can either seem arbitrary or
seem to be in one’s best interest. Results from the
present study suggest that people’s memory
attributions about chosen/assigned options depend in part on beliefs about the quality of the
received option, and these beliefs can promote
either satisfaction and well-being or dissatisfaction and regret. Specifically, findings showed that
the act of freely choosing one option over another
prompted memory attributions favouring the
chosen option, whereas being arbitrarily assigned
to an option did not prompt memory attributions
favouring that option. In fact, assignment to an
option actually prompted participants to slightly
favour the forgone option (demonstrated by
negative asymmetry scores and a slightly higher
proportion of negative new features attributed to
the chosen than the nonchosen option).
Unlike prior research, the present study explored a situation in which individuals were
assigned to an option in their own best interest,
paralleling many naturalistic instances, such as a
spouse making a decision about a restaurant for a
partner, or a supervisor deciding which project
the employee is to work on. Participants in the
best interest condition demonstrated a pattern of
memory attributions favouring the received option, similar to the choice group, which indicates
that free choice is not the sole necessary condition
to induce choice-supportiveness. Having a choice
made in one’s best interest is sufficient to prompt
memory attributions favouring the received option.
The findings highlight the fact that people rely
on different heuristics in making attributions
about their memories (e.g., Bayen, Nakamura,
Dupuis, &Yang, 2000; Mather et al., 2003; Sherman & Bessenhoff, 1999), a key point intrinsic to
the source-monitoring framework (Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Participants in
both the choice and best interest groups appear
to rely on a belief or judgement heuristic that
their chosen or assigned option is the superior
one. Conversely, those in the assignment group do
not appear to operate using this belief. Their
tendency to favour the nonchosen option may
1008
BENNEY AND HENKEL
reflect regret or dissatisfaction with the outcome,
prompted by the assignment (as seen in their
reduced satisfaction and confidence ratings), and
hence these participants may rely on a belief *
implicit or explicit *that they received a less than
desirable option or may be forced to base their
source attributions on other heuristics such as
how vividly each feature is recalled (Mather et al.,
2003). This is consistent with recent work showing
that beliefs about which option was chosen are a
driving force behind the attributions people
make, even when those beliefs are erroneous
(Henkel & Mather, in press).
Although care was taken to motivate participants to pay attention to the choices and evaluate
their associated features in all the conditions, by
having them rate their satisfaction with the choice
and their confidence that the decision was the
right one for them, it is possible that participants
in the choice condition simply paid more attention to the features than did those who did not
freely choose, and this differential encoding
influenced subsequent memory. Indeed, recognition accuracy was higher in the choice condition
than in the best interest condition. However, the
choice and assignment groups did not differ in
recognition performance but significantly differed
in asymmetry scores, suggesting that group differences in recognition of old and new features was
not the sole basis for differences in memory bias
toward the received option. These results show
there is not a simple linear relationship between
recognising an option as old or new and making
source attributions that favour the received option, a finding consistent with principles of the
source-monitoring framework purporting that
source identification and old new recognition
can draw on different aspects of memories (e.g.,
familiarity vs specific qualitative features) and
involve different evaluative processes (see Johnson et al., 1993). Past research in which people’s
beliefs about which of the two options they chose
was directly manipulated offers further evidence
that selective encoding alone cannot account for
choice-supportive biases (Henkel & Mather, in
press).
Satisfaction and confidence ratings provide
additional information relevant to understanding
the influence of beliefs about choices on subsequent memory attributions. Directly after choosing or being assigned an option, satisfaction and
confidence ratings were significantly higher in the
choice condition than the other two conditions.
The best interest and assignment groups were not
as satisfied as those in the free choice group,
presumably because they were not afforded free
choice and may have preferred the alternative
option. However, at the time of the memory test
(30 minutes later), the best interest group displayed memory attributions favouring the received option, similar to the choice group. This
finding supports the idea that reconstructive
processes at the time of retrieval and source
evaluation contribute to the phenomenon of
choice-supportive memory (Mather & Johnson,
2000). At encoding, the best interest group was
similar to the assignment group in satisfaction
with the received option, yet at retrieval their
attributions favoured the received option at levels
similar to the choice group.
The fact that the best interest condition and
the free choice condition were dissociated on
every measure (recognition, satisfaction, and
confidence ratings) except the choice-supportive
memory bias is particularly revealing. On each of
these other measures, the best interest condition
closely resembled the random assignment condition, suggesting that the depth of encoding and
initial attitudes about the options were quite
similar in these two assignment conditions. Despite these initial similarities, participants were
subsequently biased in favour of their assigned
option when they were led to believe the assignment was made with their best interest in mind,
rather than being arbitrary. This is important
evidence that beliefs about the quality of the
chosen option relative to forgone options are
what lead to the choice-supportive source attribution bias.
These findings also speak to the well-known
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance reduction.
A rich assortment of studies has shown that
people may alter their behaviours, attitudes, and
beliefs to reduce the discomfort of harbouring
inconsistent ideas or to justify their actions and
choices (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Such
studies generally examine preferences and
changes in one’s attitudes. Memory measures
such as those employed here are an alternative
way to measure how conflicting cognitions (e.g.,
the option I chose is the best option but has some
undesirable features) are shifted to become more
consonant. Both research from the tradition of
cognitive dissonance and the present work converge on the view that our cognitive processes
serve to promote feelings of satisfaction and wellbeing, whether in the context of attitude changes
of which we are unaware or systematic biases in
FREE CHOICE AND MEMORY FOR DECISIONS
recollections of past decisions. The present findings suggest that these biases are not limited to
those who choose for themselves. Rather, people
assigned an option in their best interest display
memory attributions that emphasise the positive
and downplay the negative, thereby making their
memory of the decision consistent with the idea
that the choice was truly made in their best
interest. Participants in the best interest group
would be more likely than those in the random
assignment group to have conflicting cognitions
that would lead to dissonance-reduction processes
when a less appealing choice is selected for them
because, unlike in the assignment group where
the selection was random, the selection in the best
interest group was ostensibly based on a profile of
their preferences and personality. Cognitive dissonance effects are generally stronger in situations that involve the self-concept (e.g., Aronson
& Carlsmith, 1962; Stone & Cooper, 2001).
Several other aspects of the present findings
are worthy of further consideration. As in prior
research showing choice-supportive memory attributions, people in the present study showed
stronger biases favouring the chosen option in
their attributions of positive rather than negative
features (Henkel & Mather, in press; Mather &
Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2000). This is
especially compelling, because in past research
on choice-supportive memory attributions people
tend to better remember negative rather than
positive information, and are more likely to
correctly remember the source of negative information (e.g., Mather et al., 2003). In general,
people weigh negative information more heavily
than positive information when making decisions
and forming impressions (Kanouse & Hanson,
1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). It may be that
in some situations, such as relatively low-consequence choices as in the present paradigm,
positive information is less well remembered
and thus more susceptible to reconstructive
memory processes that promote satisfaction and
well-being. Additional research is needed to more
systematically address this possibility (e.g., by
manipulating the amount, salience, or importance
of various positive and negative features in
conjunction with restrictions of one’s freedom to
make choices for oneself).
Another point to consider from the present
findings is that choice-supportive memory attributions were more prominent for old features
than for new features. Prior research has shown
that attributions favouring the chosen option can
1009
occur for both studied items and for new items
(Henkel & Mather, in press; Mather & Johnson,
2000; Mather et al., 2000). This is likely due to the
fact that fewer new items and a shorter delay
between encoding and retrieval were used here
than in prior research. Again, beliefs are more
likely to guide memory reconstruction when
people’s memory for the original information is
not as strong (see Henkel & Mather, in press).
In conclusion, this study has shown that free
choice is not the sole condition required for
memory attributions that favour a received option; rather, beliefs about the quality of an option
and expectations about the means used to make a
decision may influence a person’s memory attributions. Making a choice or having a choice made
for you in your best interest prompt memory
attributions that support that choice. This may
represent a positive illusion that promotes wellbeing (Mather et al., 2000; Taylor & Brown,
1998). Conversely, being randomly assigned to
an option leads to a different set of cognitions and
memory attributions that tend to favour the
alternative (non-received) option and may emphasise regret and disappointment.
Manuscript received 22 December 2005
Manuscript accepted 21 August 2006
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APPENDIX
Options and Associated Features
Restaurant Choice:
Corner Café
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Salad cost is included with most meals (/)
Has both lunch and dinner options (/)
Some dishes are bland ( /)
Great desserts (/)
Kitchen is noisy ( )
Comfortable seating (/)
Poorly lit (/)
Not much variety (/)
Generous portions (/)
American Grille
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Friendly waiters and waitresses (/)
Delicious appetisers (/)
Long wait for tables (/)
Well decorated, pleasant atmosphere (/)
Slow service (/)
Affordably priced (/)
Uses a lot of canned, processed food (/)
Plays annoying background music (/)
Close to shopping and entertainment areas (/)
Movie Theatre Choice:
Theatretown
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Easy to drive to (/)
Snacks are very expensive ( )
Superb sound quality (/)
Short concession lines (/)
Uncomfortable seats (/)
Always has the most newly released movies showing (/)
Ushers are often rude to customers ( /)
FREE CHOICE AND MEMORY FOR DECISIONS
Cinemaplex
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Plenty of parking (/)
Candy is often stale ( /)
Stadium seating (/)
Popcorn is always hot and fresh (/)
Dirty restrooms (/)
Shows are rarely sold out (/)
Projector occasionally breaks down (/)
Department Store Choice:
Pewter & Lowe
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Sales staff is very helpful (/)
Layout of store is confusing ( )
Carries popular men’s and women’s fragrances (/)
Large, private dressing rooms (/)
Very strict return/refund policy (/)
Nice selection of home decorating items (/)
Some people consider their styles old-fashioned (/)
Never crowded (/)
Clark’s
.
.
Many sizes of clothing in stock (/)
Doesn’t carry many name brands (/)
.
.
.
.
.
.
Large shoe department (/)
Often has big sales (/)
Rarely has advertised merchandise in stock (/)
Wide variety of casual and formal clothing (/)
Difficult to drive to (/)
Close to many restaurants (/)
Gum Choice:
Dentachew
.
.
.
.
.
.
Long lasting flavor (/)
Is a little gritty at first (/)
Pieces are very small (/)
Minty tasting (/)
Low in calories (/)
Tends to get difficult to chew within a short amount
of time (/)
Chewy-licious
.
.
.
.
.
.
Breath freshening (/)
Sometimes leaves a bad aftertaste (/)
Goes stale quickly (/)
Easy to chew (/)
Helps prevent cavities (/)
Contains chemical additives (/)
1011