I
MANAGEMEhT SCIMCE
V d . 24 No. 2, Febmuy I982
?rwd ia U.S.A.
ORG
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS:
DETERMINANTS OF THEIR PERFORMANCE AND
BEHAVIOR*
GEORGE HUBERt
This paper is conEmral with organizational infomlation systems. Exampla of such systems
include intelligence system& communic.ations system& management infol7Mtion systems
decision support systems, and administrative control systems. Systems such as these are critical
to UL orgaaixation’s functioning; indeed to its survival.
Tbe paper is intended to be of use to three typed of professionah those who sr+y
organizations; those who h&n information systems; and those whomassage. T’bis fact causa
the paper to differ in a number of ways from earlier works dealing with organihonal
communiutioaa And related topics. For example, the paper draws on three different literatures: the psychological litmrure dealing with perception and cognition, the soci&
psycbologiul litcnturc dealing with tie role of motivation in communications, and the
orgaaixatiooal literature dealing witb behavior in information systems. Further. tbe paper gives
greater attention than do earlier works to logistical determhnts of information system
effectiveness, such as tbe workload of tbc unit procuaing the message or tbe priority assigned
to a mesaage, as wntraated with social-psychological determinants. Fiiy, the explicit
introduction of judgment and argument by analogy
when direct evidence is unavailable isa
third way in which the paper diffm from utlier works.
l-be paper focuses in pallicuhr 00 the de&zminan ts of the performance and behavior of
systems such as those mentioned above. It discussa in some derail the impact of these
detcrmhants on four processes that are of key importance ia tbc operation of information
+ems. Two of these procesacs arr used to increase system efficiency. One. masage routing
causes any padulu message to be distributed to relatively fewo~tionaf unit. and thus
grcdtly reduca tbe informatioo proa&n g load of the auny units that might otherwise be
involved in receiving or relaying tbe message.
The other. musup swfvwrhing. plays a similar
role. It has as its pqose reducing tbe sixc of the message while at the same time faithfully
reproducing its meaning.
The Wmaining Iwo procemes follow from the fact that organizational units necusAly
exercise some discretion in lbe way tlmt they handle messages. M-ge &by ia a wnscqucoa
of the priority assignment given a mege, and in many cases enhances tbe effectiveness not
only of the operating unit but of tbt organktion a~ a whole. Murap nmfiificario refers to
the distortion of meauge meaning. Its source may k either the cognitive limitations or tbe
motivations of the sender or receiver. Modifications may be conscious or unwnscious,
well-intended or malicious.
Each of these four processu is discussed in some depth. More specifically, tbe several
determhanu of tbe probability or extensiveness of each process’s occurrence are identified.
Tbe lituahue related to tbe various proceaAetermhn tpairingsistbenreviewed,andis
summanzd in tbe form of propositions. Severalpluu where additional rcaearcbisoeaiedare
noted and recommendations are made concerning whattbe nature of such raarcb should be.
(ORGANIZATION DESIGN; INFORMATION SYSTJZMS)
1 . IllThis paper is concerned with the performance and behavior of organizational
information systems, (e.g. intelligence systems, communication systems, management
information systems, decision support systems, and administrative control systems).
In their traditional and noncomputer-aided forms, such systems are critical to
l Aacpted by kie Y. L&n; received June2.1980. Tbis paper has been with the autbor 6 mootbs for I
=?ELty of wiiti-Muiison.
organizational functioning
external environments, the
organizational units that “
implementation-related ir
units, and they transmit t
t& monitoring and s&r
performance and behavioing that a number of orga
information processing Nadler, [76]; O’Reilly an
of our knowledge cancer
organizational informati
organizational informatic
Although the concept
it is to design or manage
important to the thcori
whose profession it is tc
standing organizational
conringency rheory (Chik
of environmentally-relat
mental uncertainty, a b
organization’s current
[79); Campbell and Pri
and valences or utilitir
outcome and payoffs a
be affected by the n;
components in theories
of power, the availab
decisions. These varia
important to the field.
organizational conflict
In view of these ma
of information is impc
tional behavior, but tc
that the treatment of i
or design of organkt
GaIbraith, [31]; Tush1
this may be especial&
Jemiscm, [4OD.
Givenallofth.&it
literature dealing wit
systems, and in this v
the world of practice
science. This paper r
The paper differs
uxnmunications (cf.
[I6]; Redding, [63]:
O’ReilIy and Pondy.
logical literature dea
138
‘RadmiBcaacaiin
wiabtorcfertotbetic
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSEMS
139
functioning; they monitor and scan the organization’s internal and
external environments, they transmit the resulting observations and interpretations to
organizational units that “decide” if actions are called for, they relay the decisions and
implementation-related information from these deciding units to the implementing
units, and they transmit the progress and results of these impiem+ations as part of
the monitoring and scanning activities mentioned earlier. Indeed, organizational
performance and behavior are so closely linked to organizational information prm
ing that a number of organizational scientists have advocated viewing organizations as
information processing systems (cf., Simon, (70); Galbraith, [31]; Tushman and
Nadler, (761; O’Reilly and Pondy, [58].’ These thoughts suggest that a summa&ation
of our knowledge concerning the determinants of the performance and behavior of
organizational information systems would be useful, useful to those who design
organi&onal information systems and useful to those who manage such systems.
Although the concept of information is clearly important to those whose profession
it is to design or manage information systems, we should note that the concept is also
important to the theories and concepts employed by those management scientists
whose profession it is to develop, test, and refine theories for predicting and understanding organizational performance and behavior. For example, a major thrust of
conringev theory (Child, [17]; Borsch, [461) concerns the processing and distribution
of environmentally-related information. Other aspects of this theory deal with environmental uncertainty, a variable frequently viewed as a lack of information about the
organization’s current or future environment. Similarly, expecfuncy theory (Vroom,
[79]; Campbell and Pritchard, (14D deals with variables (expectancies or probabilities
and valences or utilities) that are thought to be affected by information about the
outcome and payoffs associated with certain behaviors. Other variables that seem to
be affected by the nature or availability of information and that are important
components in theories of organizational performance or behavior are the distribution
of power, the availability of organizational slack, and the nature and quality of
decisions. Th&e variables in turn have a considerable impact on other variables
important t6 the fields of organization theory and organizational behavior, such as
organizational conflict and organizational effectiveness.
In view of these many linkages, it is perhaps not surprising to fmd that the concept
of information is important not only to the fields of orga.n&tion theory and or@tional behavior, but to that of orgonirpron design as welL Many would argue, in fact,
that the treatment of information may be the key issue to be dealt with in the analysis
or design of organizations (cf. Thayer, [73]; Wile*, [82]; Miller, [56]; Simon, 1701;
Galbraith, 1311; Tushman and Nadkr, [76]; O’ReiIly and Pondy, (58D. It m that
this may be qccially true when designing boundary spanning units (Tushman, [74];
Jemiso~ [4OD.
Given all of this, it seem reasonable and important to examine and summariz the
litem~~~ dealing with the performance and -behavior of organizational information
systems, and in this way enable management scientists to operate more confidently in
the worid of practice and to claim a fuller understanding of their field in the world of
science. This paper reports the results of having attempted these efforts.
The paper differs in three ways from earlier works dealing with organization
communications (cf. Guetzkow, (351; Thaycr [73]; Voos, [78]; Ferencc, [28]; Carter,
[ 16); Redding, [63]; Farace and McDonald, 127; Porter and Roberts, [613; and
O’Reilly and Pondy, (58D. Fit, it draws upon three separate literatures--the psychological literature dealing with perception and cognition, the social-psychologid litera-’
organizational
YSTEMS:
0’“E AND
~mp1c.s of such systems
information system.%
1ch as Lhsc are critical
ld.3: thOSC
Who JtlU+
oqe. This fact causa
ng with organwioMl
n three different litcracognition, the socialnmunications, and the
Further, the paper gives
of information system
or the priority assigned
3. Finally, the explicit
.cncc is unavailable is a
mance and behavior of
3il the impact of the
pclaticm of information
:y. One message routing
liuticmal units, and thus *
chat might othwise be
vnwihg, plays a simihr
the same time faithfully
ational units necuwiiy
is a cmscqucnce
se
nc
, effativenesa not
age wuxiij?cation refers to
gnitive iimitations or the
msciocs or unconscioug
: qxtcifically.
the several
occurrence are idcntifiai.
is thc3 rwicwcd, and is
nal rcs%arch is needed are
,I such .zscarch should be.
ehatior of or-tional
tion systems, management
;trativc control systems).
:h systems are critical to
50 with rhe aurhor 6 months for I
‘Readers intetwtal in a ntorc detailed analysis of the role of information systems in oqddoar my
wish IO refer to the articla by Milk 1561 and Hubez (38).
,
-
140
GEORGE HUBER
ture dealing with the role of motivation in communications; and the organizational
literature dealing with behavior in information systems.
Second, it gives somewhat greater attention than do earlier works to logistical
determinants of information system effectiveness, such as the workload of the unit
processing a message or the priority assigned to a message, as contrasted with
social-psychological determinants. This feature does not, of course, limit the scope of
the manuscript to the formal information systems of bureaucratic organixations, as
messages transmitted within informal or ad hoc networks are also affected by the
workload of the people involved and by the processing priorities that these people
assign to the various items of information that they encounter. Obviously both
logistical and so&i-psychological variables affect both formal and informal information systems. In view of this, it seemed important to highlight the importance of
logistical variables, since the earlier works cited above had focused heavily on
social-psychological variables.
The explicit introduction of judgment and argument by analogy when direct
empirical evidence is unavailable is the third way in which the paper differs from
earlier works, although the difference is more one of degree than of kind. The
usefulness of drawing on reasoning by analogy when attempting to identify relationships among variables in organizational information systems is made clear in Miller’s
portrayal of the organization as a living system (Miller, [56D. In this classic work,
Miller argues and demonstrates that the relationships among variables, that hold true
at one level of organizational analysis generally also hold true at other levels. For
example, the effects of stress on the information processing effectiveness, of an
organizational unit are essentially the same whether the unit is a person, an ad hoc
group, or an established organ&tion (cf. Miller, [54], [55]; Meier, [52]; Driver and
Streufert, [25D. As will be seen, the literature review leading to the present manuscript
identified additional support for this position, and identified no evidence to the
contrary. As a consequence, the summarizing statements put forth on the following
pages are not qualified so as to pertain to only the levels of analysis (or organizitional
levels) for which empirical evidence is presently available. For example, in these
statements the word “unit” is intended to be broadly defined, and subject to being
interpreted as an individual, an ad hoc committee, or a formal work group, even a
corporate division.
Thus the statements, which are labeled “propositions” are in general not conclusions
based on empirical studies covering all possible levels of analysis. Rather they are
statements that represent what it seems reasonable to believe, based on the aggregate
evidence available. In a few instances, the literature pertaining to the topic was quite
sparse. In these instances, I have stated and supported with argument what I believe
the literature wilI say when it appears. So that the reader will not be misled, these few
instances are clearly identif&i2
By highlighting these facts, and by referencing under each proposition the supporting evidence, I hope to aid those researchers interested in fiUing the voids in our
knowledge about the treatment of information in organizations. In addition, by
explicating with these propositoins what it seems reasonable to believe, based on the
evidence at hand, I hope to be helpful to those management scientists who are being
asked to analyxe and “repair” malfunctioning information systems, and even to aid in
the design of such systems.
Let us turn now to a discussion of four processes that affect the availability, form,
‘If the ruder would like to reserve the term “propaitions” for relational rt~tanentn that are well
N~bythCempiriullirmtur+hCorrhC~ych~torrudrhCierrwellNpporcsdrrktionrl
statmmnta u “hyp~tha~,” or “cmjcctwa.”
For sume rudera the las well supported rtatenmtr may be
the more intcrutin& as they may identify the mole likely oppommitia for significmt cmpiriul contributions.
0
and meaning of messagperformance and beha.
will be used in this ant
refers to that which U r
in the information the0
ty-reducing potential of
which information is cc
out of the ad hoc or
assess, distribute, alter
“organizational inform.
to a broad scope of act
analyzing a report, a:
includes activities that
as those that take plac:
2 . PA
Organizations acquithe critical functions
requires the processing
other hand, because
cognitive and logistica
the information system
of organizational mess
Two processes that
systems are message
particular message tc
selective distribution
potential receiving un
intermediate units in
summarizing plays a 5
while at the Same tim
numbers are replace
appropriately derivet
reduce the cognitive c
Messages vary car
attributes. As a conse
units responsible for
the way they hand
processing phenomer
message delay and m
There is no value _
delay. Since the prior
time it will be delay
part) a deiegated an
judgments about the
that the sources of
categorized as ex=
categories.
Message wwa?ficaf
either the cognitive
‘The word klit” is tL
pomm;wrr . rr--1 “.--
A;
and the organizational
nrlier works to logistical
Al/
&load of the unit
*a’L rs contrasted with
course, limit the scope of
lucratic organizations, as
are also affected by the
-iorities that these people
counter. Obviously both
al and informal informablight the importance of
had focused heavily on
by analogy when direct
;h the paper differs from
agree than of kind. The
.pting to identify relations is made clear in Miller’s
561). In this classic work,
.g variables that hold true
true at other levels. For
:ssing effectiveness of an
2it is a person, an ad hoc
j; Meier, (521; Driver and
to the present manuscript
tified no evidence to the
put forth on the following
analvsis (or organizational
le
example, in these
net, and subject to being
ormal work group, even a
i in general not conclusions
analy&~ Rather they are
.ve, based on the aggregate
ning to the topic was quite
:h argument what 1 believe
ill not be misled, these few
<h preposition the supportIn filling the voids in our
nizations. In addition, hy
Ae to believe, based on the
:nt scientists who are being
systems, and even to aid in
tffect the availability, form,
rlational statements that arc well
the lcs well supported relational
VJeu sqportcd statements may be
for sigificant empiricaT uxttribu-
and meaning of messages, and that consequently seem important to understanding the
performance and behavior of orgat&Wional information systems. Three definitions
will be used in this and later discussions. “Information” is used in the lay sense a.mj
refers to that which is received by the senses, such as words and numbers, rather than
in the information theory sense where it would refer to the diagnosticity or uncertainty-reducing potential of these words or numbers. “Messages” refer to the vehicles with
which information is communicated, e.g., letters, reports, or phone calls. The carrying
out of the ad hoc or prescribed activities through which organizational members
assess, distribute, alter or use organizationally relevant information is referred to as
“organizational information processing. ‘* The phrase, as used here, is intended to refer
to a broad scope of activities. It includes, for example, intrapersonal activities, such as
analyzing a report, as well as interpersonal activities such as conversing. It also
includes activities that take place in informal networks, or on an ad hoc basis, as well
as those that take place in formal networks or according to prescribed protocols.
2.
processes IntegraI to orga&3tionnl InformatIon systems
Organizations acquire and internally disseminate information in order to carry out
the critical functions of decision making and control. In many cases, this effort
requires the processing of a large number of information conveying messages. On the
other hand, because a large number of messages may cause an overload on the
cognitive and logistical capabilities of the individuals and work groups participating in
the information system, organizations are forced to seek efficiencies in their processing
of organizational messages.
Two processes that organizations use to increase the efficiency of their information
systems are message routing and message summarizing. Message routing causes any
particular message to be distributed to relatively few organizational units3 This
selective distribution greatly reduces the information processing load of the many
potential receiving units having little or no use for the information and of the many
intermediate units involved in summarizing or transmitting the message. Message
summurizin~ plays a similar role. It has as its purpose reducing the size of the message,
while at the same time, faithfully reproducing its meaning. For example, large sets of
numbers are replaced by their average and multi-page reports are replaced by
appropriately derived recommendations or conclusions. Summarization can greatly
reduce the cognitive or logistical load on the units having to process the message.
Messages vary considerably in relevance, length, accuracy, timeliness, and other
attributes. As a consequence of this fact and the need to control their work load, the
units responsible for routing and summarizing necessarily exercise some discretion in
the way they handle messages. Such discretion allows two other informationprocessing phenomena to occur in parallel with summarizing and routing. These are
message delay and message modification.
There is no value judgment or negativism implied in the use of the phrase message
de@. Since the priority assignment given a message is a principal determinant of the
time it wilI be delayed, and since making such assignments is necessarily (at least in
part) a delegated and discretionary act, it would often be difficult to make objective
judgments about the excessiveness of individual delays. This, combined with the fact
that the sources of most delays are the same regardless of whether delays are
categorized as excessive or routine, suggests that we not distinguish between these two
categories.
Messuge nw&ficution refers to the distortion of message meaning. Its source may bi
either the cognitive limitations or the motivations of the sender or receiver. Modifica?hc word “unit” is to be interpreted broadly, and may refer, for example, to an individual, an ad hoc
uxnmittce. a formal work group, or even a corporate division.
142
GEORGE HUBER
tions may be conscious or unconscious, well-intended or malicious. They range from
the well-intended correction of minor errors to the extreme modification of substituting one message for another. Message modification differs from message summarktion in that it distorts a message’s meaning, whereas summarization does not. Although
these processes are often thought of as occurring in the context of a formal organkation they occur in informal organizations as well, as anyone’s analysis of the “message
board” in their own household will show.
Let us turn now to examining the variables that determine the availability of
information in organizations. We begin with the process of routing, the process that
determines the organixational location of information.
3. Routing
The red acuxnplkhment of modern Jeicnce and technology coma in taking ordinuy men,
informing them narrowlyand dozply and then, through approptitc organiation, arranging to
have their knowledge combined with that of other spaiakd but equally ordinay men. This
dispcnsa with the need for genius.”
This quote from Galbraith’s 27re New Zndurfriuf Store [30, pp. -611 highlights a
principal rationale for speciaktion and consequent departmentalktion of many
organixationa. A particularly important consequence of such specialization and departmentalization is that all organizationally relevant information does not have to be
routed to all organizational units. Information routing, the process that principally
accounts for certain messages being sent to some units and not to others, is a logical
mechanism for reducing the organizational resources devoted to information processing. This, and the fact that wisely selecting the destinations of messages allows
organizational units to achieve proprietary as well as organizational goals, probably
accounts for the fact that routing is so pervasive that we seldom notice its presence.
Although the term “routing’* is not frequently used in the organizational literature:
it do& capture better than do terms like, “communicating” and “transmitting” the
concepts of direction, route, and destination that are integral to much of this literature,
and so we use it in those propositions where these concepts play a role.
The literature identifies six variables that seem to affect the routing and transmission
of organizational information: (1) costs of communicating; (2) workload of the
message-sending unit; (3) message relevance; (4) repercussions from communicating
“bad news;“Q) relative power and status of the sender and receiver; and (6) frequency
of previous communicationa. Although a particular author may have used terms
different from those of the previous sentence, in all cases the variables referred to were
equivalent to or subordinate to one of these six.
It is important to note that it is the perceived, psychological values of these variables
to which we refer,‘both here and in later sections as well. There are two reasons for the
use of perceived values. One, important to researchers, is that the objective values are
often unmeasurable, e.g., how would one measure “relevance” or “power,” whereas
these variables are almost always scalable. The other, important to managers, is that
the perceived values can often be manipulated when the objective values cannot be,
whereas the opposite is less often the case. Thus it would seem to be most useful to
know the ‘relationships between the system performance variables and the perceived
values of the performance determining variables. Indeed it may be that the perceived
values, in some cases, are the performancedetermining variables.
The following paragraphs summ24rk what the literature says about message routing.
htoPOslTIoN R. 1. The probability that a message will be routed to a unif ir inversely
related to the perceived costs of commamicating with that unit.
OF
In order to conserve L
more frequently with UT
be so if we could exua
directed toward (a) pen.
(c) persons in the Same
a more macro basis, ant
that “In general the fa
longer the channels k:
them” and “the less . _
p. 31). In subsequent e
Bacharach and A&en
determinant of the fre.
The difficulty in c
structural, as observe.
Schwartz [33] and as r
tion from the super%
great deal of informa:
Anticipating these f
nication efficiency of
p. 167. Ference (281 c
as a variable that der
tion medium or inf
Johnston and Gibbs:
PROPoSITION
R-2.
inversely related to I):
It is reasonable tL
would be affected b!
“destroy lowest pric
supporting this h>Tc
and Driver and Sue
The empirical stt
under high load con
processing capa+
appropriate than +A
highlight the fact ti
will cause occasion
transmission withir
beyond the unit’s c
Proposition R.2 1
especially multiple
one another.
PRo~osmo;u R.related to the perct
T h e literanUr +
contractual grieva
that achieves 0rg.a
message-sending 1
tional penaltie% p.
in determining u
relevance critcti:
ORGANIZATION A L INFORMATION SYSTFMS
ticious. They range from
modification of substitutrom message sueration does not. Although
:ez
a formal or-, arhysis of the “message
mine the availability of
routing, the process that
9 in ding ordinary men,
,rganizacion, arranging to
ually ordinary men. This
1, pp. 60-611 highlights a
rtmentalization of many
zh specialization and deation does not have to be
: process that principally
not to others, is a logical
d to information processions of messages allows
iizational goals, probably
:Idom notice its presence.
organizational literature,*
‘* and “transmitting” the
to much of this literature,
.ay 9 role.
:r
g and transmission
lg; \A) workload of the
ens from communicating
;ceiver; and (6)’ frequency
jr may have used terms
variables referred to were
~1 values of these variables
:re are two reasons for the
it the objective values are
ICC’* or “power,” whereas
rtant to managers, is that
>jective, values cannot be,
eem to be most useful to
riables and the perceived
nay be that the perceived
rbles.
ys about message routing,
puted to a unit is inversely
2, Chapter S].
143
In order to conserve their resources, we expect organizational units to communicate
more frequently with units easily contacted than with other units. This certainly would
be so if we could extrapolate the social-psychological findings that messages will be
directed toward (a) persons in close proximity, (b) persons in the same work group, and
(c) persons in the same socioeconomic status (Collins and Guetzkow, [19. p. 187D. On
a more macro basis, and focusing on the concept of physical accessibility, Miller states
that “In general the farther components of a system are from one another and the
longer the channels between them are, the less is the rate of information flow among
them” and “the less . . . encoding a channel requires, the more it is used” (Miller, [56,
p. 31). In subsequent empirical studies, Brenner and Sigband [ 111, Conrath [20], and
Bacharach and Aiken [7] found that either physical or structural accessibility was a
determinant of the frequency with which subordinates communicated with superiors.
The difficulty in communication may be interpersonal as well as physical or
structural, as observed by Brenner and Sigband [ll], and Goldhar, Bragaw, and
Schwartz [33] and as noted by Jam [39), “If the subordinates perceive the communication from the supervisor as generally positive, they would be encouraged to exchange a
great deal of information about task related matters . . . *’
Anticipating these findings, March and Simon argued that “the greater the communication efficiency of the channel, the greater the communication channel usage” [49,
p. 1671. Ference [28] offered similar propositions that focus on avoidance of time losses
as a variable that determines routing. Studies concerning the choice of a communication medium or information source are also supportive of this proposition (cf.,
Johnston and Gibbons, [41)).
P ROPOSITION R.2. The probability that a message will be transmitted from a unit is
inversely related to the workload of the unit.
It is reasonable to expect that the transmission behavior of organizational units
would be affected by their workload. Meier, for example, found that overloaded units
“destroy lowest priorities’* when carrying out their functions [52, p. 5351. Research
supporting this hypothesis for individuals and small groups is reported by Miller [54]
and Driver and Streufert [25], respectively.
The empirical studies relevant to this proposition have found support for it only
under high load conditions where the unit seemed to be near or beyond its information
processing capacity suggesting that the phrase “work overload” might be more
appropriate than “workload.** We call attention to this issue of word choice in order to
highlight the fact that the nonuniform arrival of demands for message transmissions
will cause occasional work overloads, and thus temporarily lower the probability of
transmission within time periods where the average workload observed would not be
beyond the unit’s capacity.
Proposition R.2 highlights the usefulness of providing for multiple message sources,
especially multiple sources whose workload magnitudes are somewhat independent of
one another.
~OPOSITION R.3. The probabihty that a message will be routed to a unit is positively
related to the perceived relevance of its contents for that unit.
The literature on management by objectives, on personnel evaluation, and on
contractual grievance procedures suggests that organizations tend to reward activity
that achieves organizational goals and to punish activity that does not. It follows that ,
message-sending units, in order to achieve organizational rewards and avoid organizational penalties, would use the relevance of a message for some other unit as a criterion
in determining whether to route the message to that unit. Certainly it seems that if
relevance criteria were formalized with standing orders directing certain types of
144
GEORGE HUBER
messages to certain units, it is more likely that the message would be sent to the
designated units than to undesignated units. In addition, our everyday encounters with
overworked colleages suggest that the receiving units themselves tend to provide
penalties in the form of cornpaints to units that send irrelevant messages. An early
study by Davis (231 offers strong support to this proposition, and a later study by
Sutton and Porter [72] offers weak support.
Relevance, is, of course, influenced by tasks, assignments and responsibilities.
Tushman found that, for high performing units, the greater the task interdependence,
the greater was the frequency of communication (Tushman, [75D. We should note,
however, that while relevance influences routing, this influence is not entirely dictated
by formal considerations, as shown by Festinger, Schachter, and Back [29] and by
Wickesburg 1811, who found that individuals seek information “‘wherever in the
organization information, advice counsel, and expertise may be found . . . . Formal
organization boundaries and levels yield to the demand of the task and situation”
(Wickesberg, [81, p. 25fD.
ORGX
Some nonsupportive evic
communications within an
communication flow was do
might be a consequence of
i.n reality initiated by lower
routmixed technologies ma
scheduled quality control rf
management by exception,
PROPOSITION R-6. The pr
related to the jrequency wil
recent past.
This proposition follows
that the sender’s perceptior
short term interval. It also
R.4. The probabiliq that a message will be routed to a unit is inverse@
related to the decrearr in its goal attainment that the sending unit believes will occur as a
result of the routing.
channel usage Len& to
character, develops sidct
channd for either kind o
Simon. [49, pp. 167- 1681
As a result of his survey research in three industrial organizations, Read concluded
that “Individuals in power hierarchies tend to screen out information passed upward,
and to withold or refrain from communicating information that is potent$lly threateni
ing to the communicator” (Read, (62D.
Direct support for this proposition comes from three lines of empirical research. One
is the social-psychological research dealing with the suppression of “bad news” in
interpersonal communications (cf., Rosen and Tesser, [65); Rosen, Johnson, Johnson,
and Teaser, [66D. A second is the field research dealing with the suppression of
information that reflects adversely on the organizational performance of the unit
controlling the information (cf., Carter, [IS]; Ullman and Huber, [771; and McCleary,
[SOD. The third is the research on bargaining (cf., Cummings and Hamett, [21D and
organization power (cf., Pfeffer, [6OJ) indicating that information is a critical resource
to joint decision situations and that withholding information from one’s competitors is
often useful in attaining one’s goals in a competitive environment.
As we will see when we discuss message modification, a good deal of research
indicates that individuals distort those messages that might adversely affect their goal
attainment (cf. the laboratory studies of Cohen, [18], and O’Reilly and Roberts, [59],
and the field studies of Mellinger, [53]; Gore, (341; Read, [62]; Athanassiades, (61;
Kaufman, [42]; Roberts and O’Reilly, [64]; and O’ReilIy, [57]. Since message suppression (nonrouting) is an extreme form of distortion, it may be argued that this body of
literature also supports the present proposition.
Let us t&n now t o a
availability of information
~oPosrnoN
~OPoSrTtON R.5. The probabili~ that a message will be routed to a unit b patitiveb
related to the perceived power and statw of the unit (except for the situation described
under Proposition R .4).
This proposition follows from the findings that (1) persons of low status and power
tend to direct messages to persons with more status and power, and (2) persons of high
status and power tend to communicate more with their peers than with persons of
lower status and power (Bamlund and Harland, 181; Collins and Guetzkow, 119, p.
1871; Allen and Cohen, [3D. The proposition might also be inferred from the finding
that persons in high organizational positions, positions which often have more power
and status, are better informed (Davis, (231; Zajonc and Wolfe, [83]; Sutton and
Porter, [72J), although other variables such as seniority or perceptiveness may also play
a role in this finding.
The time that elapses
summarized or modified
chain we will call “de!
necessary to process the
other tasks, and (3) the
waiting perhaps for its
inclusion as a combinat
of these components is
sender assigns to prcces
course, be influenced b
matter of timing.
The next several par
delay: (1) timeliness of
number of links in the
associated propositions
assessing their usefulne
~OPOSTTtON D.1. Tj
to the perceived rimelin
out every&y obsr
Gerstenfeld and Berg
sending messages in s
impact, such as when
receiving the message
Assuming that orE
sending units would t
delay least those mes
way of putting the
sendinguniutowt
messages.
ORGANIZATIONAL MFORMATION SYSTEMS
lge would be sent to the
everyday encounters with
mselves tend to provide
ev
messages. An early
.d a later study by
,a
ems and responsibilities.
the task interdependence,
n [75]). We should note,
Ice is not entirely dictated
:r, and Back [29] and by
nation “wherever in the
y be found. . . . Formal
f the task and situation’*
143
Some nonsupportive evidence is the conclusion of Davis [23]. in his study of
communications within an industrial management group, that “the predominant
communication flow was downward or horizontal.” It seems, however, that this finding
might be a consequence of (1) higher organizational levels issuing directives that were
in reality initiated by lower level staff groups or (2) the fact that in organizations with
routinized technologies many upward “messages” are uncounted by observers, e.g.,
scheduled quality control reports or the absence of “out-of-stock” reports which is, via
management by exception, a message in itself.
PROPOSITION R.6. The probability that a message will be routed to a unit is positively
related to the frequency with which similar messages have been routed to the unit in the
recent past.
This proposition follows from the Propositions R.l, R.3, and R.5, since it is unlikely
that the sender’s perceptions of cost, relevance, and status will change significantly in a
short term interval. It also follows from the argument of March and Simon that
7uted to a unit is inversely
(nit believes will occur PP a
Channel usage tends to be self-reinforcing. informal communication. much of it social in
character, develops side-by-side withtasksrientcd formal communication, and theuse of the
channel for either kind of communication tends to reinforce its use for the other (March and
Simon. (49, pp. 167- 1681).
libations, Read concluded
‘ormation passed upward,
Iat is potentially threaten-
Let us turn now to a discussion of delay, another of the processes affecting the
availability of information.
If empirical research. One
ession of “bad news” ‘in
Rosen, Johnson, Johnson,
with the suppression of
performance of the unit
lber. [77]; and McCleary,
:S
Hamett, [21]) and
I&._ d a critical resource
from one’s competitors is
ment.
a good deal of research
:dversely affect their goal
*Reilly and Roberts, [59],
[62]; Athanassiades, [6];
1. Since message suppreaargued that this body of
The time that elapses between when a message is received and when, in perhaps a
summarized or modified form, it is passed on to the next link in the communication
chain we will call “delay.” The delay time has three components: (1) the time
necessary to process the message, (2) the time lost while the processing unit tends to
other tasks, and (3) the time lapse while the processed message is held in storage,
waiting perhaps for its relevance to increase or for another message to arrive for
inclusion as a combination of messages to be transmitted simultaneously. The second
of these components is a function of, among other things, the relative priority that the
sender assigns to processing the particular message. The sender’s prioritization may, of
course, be influenced by organizational directives. The third component is basically a
matter of timing.
The next several paragraphs highlight three variables that seem to affect message
delay: (1) timeliness of the message, (2) work overload of the sending unit, and (3)
number of links in the communication chain. Because the empirical support for the
associated propositions is relatively weak, the reader should exercise some judgment in
assessing their usefulness in fulfiig his or her needs.
rated to a unit is positiveiy
‘or the situation described
of low status and power
r, and (2) persons of high
zrs than with persons of
s and Guetzkow, [19, p.
nferred from the finding
I often have more power
Wolfe, [83]; Sutton and
reptiveness may also play
4 . Deb&q
PROFQSITION D. 1. The probability dr duration of message aWay will be inverse& related
to the perceived time&tejs of the message for the receiving unit.
Our everyday observations and some research (cf., Ulhnan and Huber, [77);
Gentenfeld and Berger, [32D suggest that message processing units tend to delay
sending messages in situations where premature delivery would reduce the message’s
impact, such as when the message receiver is overloaded or has a mental set against
receiving the message.
Assuming that orwtions tend to reward good performance, it foilows that
sending units would tend to delay most of those messages that were not timely and to
delay least those messages where delay would be costly to the receiving unit. Another
way of putting the argument is that use of organizational sanctions would cause
sending units to use timeliness as a criterion for assigning priorities to the processing of
messages.
146
OR
GEORGEHUBER
~OmSlTION D.2. The probabiliry or duration of message delay will be positively
related to the workload of the sending unit.
Further evidence in I
managers attempt to cr
overstating costs (Lowe
senders do not trust the
more than otherwise ((
O’Reilly and Roberts,
modification is influcnc
the receiver (Watson an
the sender’s mobility E
Athanassiades, [6D. 0’1
variables of trusf influe
Additional support fc
example, Collins and C
communication from 1~
status person has learn
kow, [19, p. 187D.
in labmato~ setting, Miller [54], [55] has observed that delay in processing of
information is one way in which individuals deal with information overload, and he
argues that the delay would also be used by organizational units when faced with
overload. Additional evidence is the case study of work overload in libraries by Meier
[52]. In a more clinical vein, as a result of his interviews with administrators in
bureaucratic organizations, Downs concluded that “The most common bureau response to communications overloads is slowing down the speed of handling messages
without changing communications network situations or transmission rules” [24, p.
2701.
P~oposrrro~ D.3. The probabiliv or duration of message delay is pasitiveb related to
the number of sequential links in the communication chain connecting the receiver to the
message source.
This proposition relies on the reasoning, supported by Allport and Postman [4],
Higham [36], and Miller [56], that the greater the number of sequential links in a
communication chain, the greater would be the overall effect of a phenomenon that
took place at each link.
Let us move on now to examining the variables that determine changes in the form
and meaning of organizational messages. We begin by looking at those that affect
message modification, as it is this process, rather, than message summarization, at
which the greater amount of empirical research has been directed.
Proposition
Some research sugg
reducing the stress on
Campbell notes that be
he (the sender) make:
remembered detail th
gaps are conspicuous’
even after conuolhn
sender and receiver .
receiver against the s
to not distress the re
that ‘%rformation, c
perceptions of the re
5. Modification
Altogether, eight propositions are presented that relate message modification to
other variables. We begin with a few propositions concerning the motivational bases
for modification, then turn to those dealing with perceptual and cognitive bases, and
conclude with a proposition identifying an organizational determinant of message
modification.
In some cases a proposition could have been decomposed into subpropositions that
would focus on a particular form of modification or form of the associated determining variable. I have chosen to avoid extensive divisions of this nature and hope that I
have thereby decreased the chance that either I or the reader would miss the forest for
the trees. The references identified with the propositions contain the more specific
propositions or findings from which these propositions were constructed.
PROPOS~OX
M-3
related to the discret.
PRoposmo~ M. 1. The probobiliry or extent of message modification is positively
related to the increase in its goal attainment that the sending unit believes will result from
introducing the modification.
As a result of his extensive interviews with administrators, Downs concluded that
“Each official ten& to distort the information he passes upward in the hierarchy,
exaggerating this data favorable to himself and minimidng those data unfavorable to
himself’” (Downs, [24, p. 266D. His conclusion is strongly supported by the laboratory
studies of Cohen [ 18) and O’Reilly and Roberta [59] and the field studies of Mellinger
[53], Gore [34], Read [62], Athanassiades [6], Kaufman [42],,Roberts and O’ReiUy [64],
and O’Reilly [571. The independent variables in these studes were the receiver’s status
and influence over the message sender’s goal achievement, the sender’s trust in the
receiver, and the sender’s attitudes towards his own upward mobility. The dependent
variables were quite varied, and included revising the message format (the mildest
form of modification) and eliminating the message or substituting an incorrect mes-
M.2.
related to the decrease
or her modification.
I
It seems that the
discretion in chaos;
empirical study rela
extensive interview:
distortion is to use
(except through ou
nated definitions ar
i.e., they are of fiie
&ings, the use 0
discretion in the st
those instances wh
as in those where *
We turn now tO
they and the __mot
perceive is affect
perceive-it is use
_
e delay will be positively
..t delay in processing of
marion overload, and he
-1
s when faced with
oab ,.II libraries by Meier
s with administrators in
,.ost common bureau reted of handling messages
ansmission rules” (24, p.
Aay ir posirively refated to
necling rhe receiver to the
Uport and Postman [4],
of sequential links in a
,zt of a phenomenon that
.nine changes in the form
J&g at those that affect
G:ssage summarization, at
rcted.
message modification to
.g the motivational bases
and cognitive bases, and
determinant of message
inr, Jubpropositions that
the associated determinIS nature and hbpe that I
would miss the forest for
untain the more specific
constructed.
modification is positively
.rir believes will result from
‘r, Downs concluded that
upward in the hierarchy,
hose data unfavorable to
sported by the laboratory
field studies of Mellinger
(oberts and O’Reilly [64],
were the receiver’s status
the sender’s trust in the
mobility. The dependent
sage format (the mildest
ltuting an incorrect mes-
Further evidence in support of the proposition follows from the findings that
managers attempt to create slack in their budgets by understating revenues ad
overstating costs (Lowe and Shaw, 1471; Schiff and Lcwin, [67], [68D and that when
senders do not trust the motives of the receivers, they tend to modify the mes~g~
more than otherwise (cf., Mellinger, [53]; Loomis, [48]; Read, [62]; Zand, [84];
O’Reilly and Roberts, (591; Roberts and O’Reilly, (641. Related findings are that
modification is influenced by the sender’s perception of the receiver’s influence over
the receiver (Watson and Bromberg, [80]; Alkjre, Collum, Kaswan, and Love, [2] and
the sender’s mobility aspirations (Read, [62]; Lawler, Porter, and Tenenbaum, [44];
Athanassiades, [6]). O’Reilly [57] provides a particularly articulate discussion of the
variables of trust, influence, and mobility.
Additional support for the proposition follows from the small group literature. For
example, Collins and Guetzkow’s review led them to conclude that ‘The content of
communication from low to high power-status persons will depend on what the low
status person has learned is most likely to obtain reinforcement” (Collins and Guetzkow, [ 19, p. 1871).
~OFOSXTION M.2. The probabiliv or extent of message modification is positively
related to the decrease in stress on the receiver that the sender expects will result from his
or her modification.
Some research suggests that message modifications are made for the purpose of
reducing the stress on the receiver. In his review of the early psychological research,
Campbell notes that “through an anticipatory monitoring of his own intended output,
he (the sender) makes an active effort to produce a coherent output, by suppressing
remembered detail that does not now seem to fit and by confabulating -detail where
gaps are conspicuous” (Campbell, [ 13, p. 3423). Further, Rosen and Tesser [65] found,
even after controlling for any possible prior or subsequent interaction between the
sender and receiver and for the possibility of any punitive action being taken by the
receiver against the sender, that senders still attempted to modify their messages so as
to not disttess the receiver. As a result of his reading of the literature, Ference stated
that “Information, once evaluated and integrated, will tend to fit the transmitter’s
perceptions of the recipient’s needs” (Ference, [28, p. B-851).
htOF+OSlTION M.3. The probability or extent of message modijication is positivet’y
related to tk discretion allowed in choosing the masage format.
It seems that the tendency to modiry messages would be less if the senders had less
discretion in choosing the format of their communications. I know of no specific
empirical study relating to this proposition, but note that Downs concluded from his
extensive interviews with the administrators that “One way for officials to avoid
distortion is to use messages that cannot be altered in meaning during transmission
(except through outright falsification). Such messages usually involve both predesignated definitions and coding or easily quantifiable information” (Downs, [24, p. 126]),
i.e., they are of fixed format. It is interesting to note that predesignated definitions and
codings, the use of checklists and forms, and most other mechanisms for reducing
discretion in the selection of message format would tend to reduce modifications in
those instances where the modifications were perceptually or cognitively based as weU
as in those where they were motivationally based.
We turn now to the perceptual and cognitive bases of message modification. mile
they and the motivational bases of message modification are interactive-what we
perceive is affected by what we are and what we are is affected by what we
perceive-it is useful for both administrative and research purposes to make diitinctions between them wherever possible. Propositions M.4 and MS identify modifica-
¶
.--
--148
,
- ORG
GEORGE HUBER
would be less. Empirical SC
Closely related is the idea
and if the anticipated cost
One contribution to antic:
get the correct message fr
for having made the mod:
information channels mc
(DOW-IS, [24, p. 2691). ‘Ihe
one might expect (cf.. Hs
tions introduced by the message receiver. Propositions M.6 and M.7 return again to
modifications introduced by the sender.
~OPOSl’TlON M.4. The probabiIiry or extent of message madification is positiveb
related to the difference between actual message content and its expected or desired
content.
_
In his review article, Campbell [ 131 notes that both cognitive limitations and
personal motivations cause transmitters to imperfectly modify messages during assimilation, stating that the “tendency to distort messages in the direction of identity with
previous inputs is probably the most pervasive of the systematic biases” @. 346), and
“that . . . the human transmitter is prone to bias away from input in the direction of
the transmitter’s own attitudes” (p. 3%). As a result of his interview study, Downs
concluded that “Officials’ perceptions will operate so as to partially screen out data
adverse to their own interests, and magnify those favorable to their interest” [24, p.
2721. These conclusions suggest that information inputs are transformed in the direction of the receiver’s prior information, expectations, or wishes. McLeod (51, p. 2181
reviewed a number of studies suggesting that the transformation is less if the sender
expects to receive further information on the subject.
~OPOSmON
More links in a COTdistortions to occur. Tha
the rumor transmission
[36]. Other writers have
[56]. In their discussior.
“Selective filtering take
every state in the trani
Simon, (49, p. lSSl>, ar
through many officials.
the next, the final outp
is, significant distortio
have addressed these c
A dramatic example
PnoposmoN M.5. The probabiliry or extent of message modification is positively
related to the perceived ambiguity of the data on which the message is based.
&una summarized the early work relating to this proposition in his review article
“On Perceptual Readiness” as follows: “Presented with a complex stimulus, the subject
perceives in it what it is ‘ready’ to perceive; the more complex or ambiguous the
stimulus, the more perception will be determined by what is already ‘in’ the subject
and the less by what is in the stimulus’* (Bruner, [12]). Porter and Roberts, in their
review of findings related to this idea, stated that ‘These results would indicate that
the more. tangible and objective the subject matter . . . the more likely it is that
subordinates and their superiors will feel that they are communicating accurately,
whereas when the messages involve more subjective opinions and feelings there is
greater doubt about accuracy” (Porter and Roberts, (6 11).
A rCpOrtCr -aaS F
D$fision in 1967. It
brigade was: “On no
l-he brigade rack
absolutely COntiUCe
The battalion rat
COng in tlxhade:
PRomsmoN M.6. The probability or extent of message modification is positiveb
related to the extent of the sender’s work overload.
The company cc
It seems reasonable to believe that, if the sender is either cognitively or logistically
69D.
overloaded, message modifications would be greater. His early literature review led
Campbell to conclude that “Whenever human beings operate at near maximum
capacity, selective information loss-undesired reduction of message complexity-is
apt to be involved . . . ”(Campbell, [13, p. 3363). Miller [54], [55] has given considerable attention to information overload and found that a wide variety of modifications,
e.g., filtering, approximation, and omission, and other devices, are used to deal with it.
Of some interest was his observation that “At slow rates of transmission subjects used
few adjustment processes. At mediumlrates they attempted them all. At higher rates
filtering was preferred, but as the ma&mum channel capacity was reached, both
subjects used chiefly omissions’* (Miller, [55, p. 941). Additional support is given to this
proposition by the empirical study of Lanzetta and Roby (431, the case study by Meier
[52], and the review by Driver and Streufert [25].
PRomsmoN M.7. The probability or extent of message modification is inverseh
related to the cost that the sender expects to incur as a result of making the modif?cation.
If cognitive limitations were the cause of message modification, and if the anticipated cost to the sender of these modifications was high, then it seems likely that the
sender would put forth a greater effort not to make errors and that the modification
M.8. 7%
related to the number 9:
receiver to the message SC
This phenomenon
example, Kaufman
civilians by Americ
military hierarchy t
levels had no idea o:
for transmission of
declared that “eve:
(Kaufman, 142, p. :
Message summz
military outpost C
L
command the nun
truck traffic count
truck traffic even
average number c
taken in summar
and M.7 return again to
modij5cation 13 positively
expected or &sired
;d
cognitive limitations and
‘y messages during assimidirection of identity with
latic biases” @. 346), and
I input in the direction of
s interview study, Downs
partially screen out data
e to their interest” [24, p.
transformed in the direcrhes. McLeod (51, p. 2181
lation is less if the sender
8 modijication is positively
lessage is bared.
jsition in his review article
nplex stimulus, the subject
omplex or ambiguous the
is already ‘in’ the subject
)rter and Roberts, in their
results would indicate that
rhe more likely it is that
:ommun.icating accurately,
JO
end feelings there is
would be less. Empirical support for this belief is provided by Adams and Swanson [I].
Closely related is the idea that if motivations were the cause of message modification
and if the anticipated cost of making them were high, then modification would be less.
One contribution to anticipated cost would be the knowledge that the receiver could
get the correct message from another source, and would hold the sender accountable
for having made the modification. For example, Downs noted that “use of redundant
information channels increases the probability of obtaining accurate information”
(Downs, [24, p, 2691). The empirical support for this latter idea is more equivocal than
one might expect (cf., Hsia, [37]; Anderson, [S]).
PRoPOsXTtON M.8. The probabiliq or extent of message modification is positively
related to the number of sequential links in the communication chain connecting the
receiver to the message source.
More links in a communication chain provide the opportunity for additional
distortions to occur. That these additional distortions do occur was a central finding of
the rumor transmission research by Bartlett [9], Allport and Postman [4] and Higham
[36]. Other writers have also addressed the matter (cf., Downs, [24], p. 2691; and Miller,
(561. In their discussion of organizational innovation, March and Sunpn stated that
“Selective filtering takes place not only at the boundary of the organtzation, but at
every state in the transmission and elaboration of program proposals” (March and
Simon, [49, p. 189]), and Downs concluded that “When information must be passed
through many officials, each of whom condenses it somewhat before passing it on to
the next, the final output will be very different in quality from the original input; that
is, significant distortion will occur” (Downs, [24, p. 2691). Smart and Vertinsky (711
have addressed these same ideas in the context of decision making under,crisis.
A dramatic example of what Downs was describing is the following:
A reporter was present PI a hamlet burned down by the U.S. Army’s 1st Air Cavalry
Division in 1967. Investigation showed that the order from the division headquarters to the
brigade was: “On no occasion must hamlets be burned down.”
The.‘bripde radioed the battalion: “Do not burn down any hamlets unless you are
absolutely convinced that the Viet Cong are in them.”
P mocijkation is positively
The battalion radioed the infaavy company at the scene: “If you &ink there are any Viet
Gong in the hamlet, bum it down.”
r cognitively or logistically
The company commander orderedhis uoopr: “Bum down that hamlet” (Millet, [56, p.
69D.
early literature review led
lperate at near maximum
of message complexity-is
11, [55] has given considerle variety of modifications,
es, are used to deal with it.
transmission subjects used
J them all. At higher rates
tpacity was reached, both
Inal support is given to this
.3], the case study by Meier
:e modification is inversely
of rrraking the modification.
dication, and if the anticihen it seems likely that the
I and that the modification
This phenomenon takes place in upward as well as downward communications. For
example, Kaufman notes that “An official study of a mass kiIling of Vietnamese
civilians by American troops disclosed that at each successive higher level in the
military hierarchy the reported number of victims was reduced, so that the highest
levels had no idea of the extent of ‘the tragedy despite two separate command channels
for transmission of news about events in the field. A field commander subsequently
declared that “every large combat unit has similar episodes ‘hidden somewhere’”
(Kaufman, 142, p. 14J).
6 . S-n
Message summarization can perhaps best be illustrated with an example. If a
military outpost monitors enemy truck traffic, it may report to some higher level
command the number of trucks seen each day. The higher level command, recei+g
truck traffic counts from many such outputs and having to communicate a measure of
truck traffic even further upward through the chain of command, may’ well report the
average number of trucks per day observed by this outpost. The fit step has been
taken in SUmmarizB tion-a frequency distribution has been reduced to a descriptive
.
11
,
150
GEORGE HUBER
I
‘
’
1
t
i
I
i
I
I
i
t
i
statistic, in this case the mean. The next higher echelon will receive many such reports
from its several subordinate units and may be required to conclude &ether enemy
truck traffic in its area is increasing or remaining constant. When it does this, the
second step has been taken-a statistical inference has been draw, a mean value has
been encoded as a 1 or a 0, depending on whether the null hypothesis was rejected or
accepted.
The echelon receiving this coded inference may receive such inferences about the
increase in truck traffic from many subordinate units, and may pass upward the
descriptive statement that “in twc+thirds of the sectors polled, truck traffic has
increased.” Here, data in the form of binary digits were combined into a descriptive
statistic, a proportion. It may well be that proportions dealing with other variables
such as rail traffic, construction of artillery sites, etc. would also be received by a still
higher echelon and would be subjectively combined with the truck traffic proportion
to facilitate the drawing of still another inference concerning whether or not the enemy
is in the process of a major buildup of its forces in a particular region.
Depending on the number of echelons involved, we can envision the continuing
repetition of the following cycle: (1) data are combined into a descriptive statistic, (2)
the descriptive statistic is compared to some standard and a statistical inference is
drawn, and (3) inferences are treated as data. It is not necessary that only one step in
this cycle takes place at any particular node in the communication network, or that a
summarization takes place at every node.
Of course summarization also occurs with qualitative information. For exampie,
information obtained in an employment interview is subjectively aggregated and
transformed into a descriptive rating, the rating is compared to some (perhaps implicit)
standard, and a conclusion is drawn concerning the acceptability of the candidate.
As we noted earlier, message summarization is a process purposefully employed by
organ&dons and tends to have as an outcome a faithful representation of the original
meaning These features are generally in contrast to those of message modification.
Message summarization greatly reduces the cognitive and logistical loads on organktional units. In addition, in that the conclusions that follow from inference-drawing
become guidelines and directives for organktional action, it aids considerably in
planning and coordination (cf., the discussion of “uncertainty absorption” in March
and Simon, 149, pp. 165-1661). For these reasons, message summarization is a
pervasive organizational process. In spite of its pervasiveness, however, there is very
little empirical literature that deals with the subject The relative shortage exists in
contrast with the abundance concerning message modification. Perhaps the disparity
exists because findinga of successful summarization, i.e., condensation without distortion, are less tantalizing than are findings of modification, e.g., alteration with
distortion. Whatever the reason, there is very little literature on which to base
propositions about message summarization.
I have chosen, nevertheless, to offer four propositions on the subject. I hope that
their presentation will lead organizational scientists to undertake empirical studies of
information summarization and that it will heighten the sensitivity of organization
designers and analysts to this organizational process.
There are four variables that it seems reasonable to believe would affect the
summaking of information in or&tions: (1) savings in transmission costs, (2) cost
of summarGng the message, (3) workload of receiving unit, and (4) number of links in
the communication chain. It is important to note that “costs” include the expenditure
of any resource, including time, space, and intellectual effort.
S.1. The probabiliry or exzent of message summarization is positively
related to the perceived savings in twwnission costs obtained from summarizing tk
message.
hOPOSmON
It seems reasonable to
message than an
(2) the greater the
summarization. On the
senders seek and use
cases, transmission
Rather, only (1) where
are transmission costs
here the fact that the prc
PROPOSZION s.2. The
related to perceived cost
Working against the
requires time and effo
associated with transmi:
sion of unsummarixed
observed by Kaufman
managen to the U.S.
Proposition S.2.
Because of the
would expect an
and the cost of
difficult to validate
the dependent variablt
relationship between
difficulty of successfu:
valid may explain
relationships.
PROPOSITION S.3.
related to the perceivec
A number of
extent if it is known
the sending unit
message in accordant
thought that the
be desired, leads us
by the sender and
observation of
becomes overloaded
so &at the lower
messages’* (Downs,
of its workload reduc
receiver.
~ROPOXT’ION
related to tk
receiver to tk
It seems reasonat
communication cha
took place at
[9j, Allport and
receive many such reports
j conclude whether enemy
ot. When it does this, the
.n *’ w, a mean value has
lesis was rejected or
4.
such inferences about the
nd may pass upward the
polled, truck traffic has
,,mbined into a descriptive
Aing with other variables
i also be received by a still
he truck traffic proportion
4 whether or not the enemy
:ular region.
n envision the continuing
o a descriptive statistic, (2)
d a statistical inference is
:ssary that only one step in
nication network, or that a
urformation. For example,
.bjectively aggregated and
1 to some (perhaps implicit)
ability of the candidate.
purposefully employed by
presentation of the original
‘: of message modification.
ogistical loads on organixaJW
n inference-drawing
aids considerably in
)n,
inty absorption” in March
ssage summarization is a
less, however, there is very
relative shortage exists in
ttion. Perhaps the disparity
mdensation without distorttion, e.g., alteration with
zrature on which to base
jn the subject. I hope that
lertake empirical studies of
sensitivity of organization
believe would affect the
I transmission costs, (2) cost
, and (4) number of links in
ts” include the expenditure
XT.
sutnmari2ution is positive+
ined from summarizing the
It seems reasonable to believe that (1) if it is less costly to transmit a summarized
message than an unsummari& message, then the sender would summa&e, and that
(2) the’ greater the reduction in transmission cost that is possible, the greater the
summarization. On the other hand in today’s technology where high volume message
senders seek and use very low cost transmission machines, it may be that, in many
cases, transmission costs are not important determinants of message summarization.
Rather, only (1) where they are large and (2) where the sender is accountable for them,
are transmission costs likely to be important dete rminants. In view of this, we highlight
here the fact that the proposition deals with perceived savings.
PROPOSITION
S.2. The probability or extent of message summarization is inversely
related to perceived cost of summarizing the message.
Working against the impact of Proposition S.l are the facts that sum.marixing
requires time and effort, and that the resultant costs could exceed the savings
associated with transmitting a summarized message. This could lead to the transmission of unsummarized messages even when transmission costs are significant, as
observed by Kaufman in his study of the communications from individual forest
managers to the U.S. Forest Service (Kaufman, (42D. This idea is captured in
Proposition S.2.
Because of the fact that summarization does take time and effort to carry out, one
would expect an inverse relationship between the extent of message summarization
and the cost of message summarization. If this inverse relationship exists, it would be
difficult to validate both propositions, since S.l posits a positive relationship betwetn
the dependent variables and the extent of summarization and S.2 posits an inverse
relationship between the dependent variables and the cost of summarixation. The
difficulty of successfully validating these two propositions, even if both are in fact
valid, may explain the lack of reported empirical studies dealing with the stated
relationships.
PROPOS~ION S.3. The probability or extent of message sumnuui2ation is positively
related to ,tk perceived work&d of rhe receiving unit.
A number of arguments suggest that the message will be summa&cd to a greater
extent if it is known that the receiving unit is heavily loaded. One argument is that if
the sending unit wants the message to have an irnpacf it will attempt to format the
message in accordance with the desires of the receiving unit. This, combined with the
thought that the greater the receiving unit’s workload, the more summarization would
be desired, leads us to conclude that a relationship would exist between summarization
by the sender and workload of the receiver. A final line of reasoning follows from the
observation of Downs that “when the topmost level of communication intermediaries
becomes overloaded for any reasou, it can react . . . by changing the tntnsmission rules
so that the lower levels in the network screen out more information before sending
messages” (Downs, [24, p. 129D. Thus, an overloaded receiving unit might have some
of its workload reduced with a directive that sending units condense their inputs to the
receiver.
PnomsmoN S.4. The probability or extent of message eation is positive&
related to tk number of sequential link3 in tk commum ‘cation chain connecting tk
receiver to the message source.
It seems reasonable to believe that the greater the number of sequential links in a
communication chain, the more intense would be the effect of a phenomenon that
took place at each link. Evidence supporting this is suggested by the work of Bartlett
[9], Allport and Postman [4], and Higham [36].
:
--- _--
_
-7
GEORGE HUBER
152
ORG.%
7. summary
2.
This paper reviewed the literature concerning the determinants of the performance
and behavior of organizational information processing systems. In most instances,
these detemlinan ts and their impact were identified from an examination of the
empirical literature, and thus most of the propositions are supported by this literature.
The review did identify two areas, however, where there seems to be an especially
acute need for further empirical research. One of these concerns message routing The
presently available literature related to message routing deals primarily with informal
and not necfss(iTily work-related messages. It may be that, in some instances, empirical
studies of the more formal&d information systems that deal primarily with workrelated messages would lead to somewhat different propositions than those that
followed from the presently available literature.
The second area in particular need of further empirical study concerns message
summa&&ion. The literature pertaining to this topic is extremeiy sparse. It seems that
the results of studies dealing with message routing in formal settings and with message
swtion would be quite useful to the designers and managers of information
systems, since the availability, form, and meaning of messages are such important
determinants of. the quality of organizational decisions, and hence of the effectiveness
and viability of the organization itself.
There is clearly much research to be done before management scientists can tell
managers or information systems designers how to prevent or resolve any information
system malfunction that might occur. I hope that highlighting this fact fl accelerate
the amount of research that wiIl be brought to bear on the matter. In the meantime,
however, management scientists are being called upon to address problems that have
deadlines for solution. They cannot ask the clients to wait for future research results,
but mu& work with the knowledge that is available today. By searching out and
gathering together this knowledge, by summarizing what we know, or think we know,
about the determinants of the performance and behavior of organizational information
systems, I have attempted to take a first step in responding to this need.
Two matters seem to be worthy of special mention at this point. One is that the
forthcoming inclusion of extremely sophisticated computing and comminications technology, irito our organizational information systems may affect the nature of the
impact of the determinants identified in the review presented here. Or, it may generate
additional determinan ts. Thus there will be a need for further research of a relatively
basic nature.
The second matter concerns a more immediate need, the need for applied research
to respond further to the needs of today’s managers and systems designers. I believe
we can expect to see, and should see, studies that include the following steps: (1)
developing normative guidelines for the design and management of information
systems, guidelines based on behavioral research such as that reviewed here, (2)
testing, revising, and retesting the usefulness of these guidelines in the actual design
and management of organiz&ional information systems, and (3) reporting the results
of these teats so that when the guidelines are valid, they may be adopted by others and
so that when they are not, further and more targeted research can be initiated?
3.
‘The ruthot would like to thank Chula O’ReilIy, Daniel Power, Michael Tubman, and the reviewers for
their vay UsefIll comments on 8n earlier draft.
This reacuch was supported in put by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and SociJ
Sciences end in part by the National Science Foundation’r Division of Infonnatioo Science and Tcchnolo@
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