Criminal Profiling of insiders.
Lecturer: Roberta Bruzzone, Psychologist and Criminologist – International Crime
Analysis Association (ICAA)
bruzzone@icaa-italia.org
mobile +39 3393597995
Developed in USA in the early seventies within the ambit of violent crime
analysis (and more specifically of serial matrix), Criminal profiling is a support
investigative activity that provides a possible psycho-behavioural profile of the
(still) unknown subject that has committed a given crime. This investigative
technique is primarily used to narrow the number of suspects in order to
address investigative resources only towards the ones that have some
personality and behavioural characteristics (that are emerged from crime
scene analysis or rather from the way a crime has been committed). From this
perspective then, the primary aim is represented by the possibility to help
investigators to manage with greater effectiveness their suspect list.
In general Criminal profiling can be divided into three main approach models:
inductive, deductive and mixed. Inductive profiling is founded on generalized
behavioural patterns that start from statistic analysis of data coming from a
sample of known offendesr that have committed a give crime.
Deductive profiling, differently from the former, is not founded on
generalizations obtained from the analysis of a given sample of subjects but it
is based on logical evaluations focused on the specific case analysed. In fact
evidences from the case are analysed and then used to build a specific
behavioural profile, exclusively valid for the case that is under investigation at
the moment.
Among the mixed models, the more modern and effective approach seems the
one proposed some years ago by Marco Strano in USA and developed by an
ICAA1 international research team (project N.N.P.C.P. Neural Network for
Psychological Criminal Profiling) at the Laboratory of Intelligent Systems and
Control della Duke University – L.I.S.C. Durham, North Carolina. The
application of NNPCP system, based on a neural network and evolved data
mining, in practice proposes itself as a sort of digital profiler that analyses
crime scene and provides to investigators a biographical, psychological and
motivational profile of an unknown offender.
From biographical profile point of view (Bartol 1999), the most part of inside
crimes is committed by male unmarried employees, less than 30 years old.
Regarding motivational profile of insiders, Bologna and Shaw (1997), and more
recently Strano (2000, 2001, 2003), underline that the inspiration to commit
crime inside the company/organization is a product of criminals’s mind and
that motivation is of secondary importance to understand a criminal action
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International Crime Analysis Association – www.icaa-italia.org
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because the latter is often spread even among persons that don’t commit and
that will never commit crimes.
In other words, motivation (as the need of money, for example) must find a
compatible psychological base in order to manage to nourish a criminal action.
To evaluate and analyse the motivational base of insider criminals is in any
case useful to plan prevention training courses that can have an influence on
the social environment, reducing, as much as possible, conditions that can
favour a crime.
Regarding this aspect, Fischer and Green (1992), Maree (2003) and Lydon,
propose some “typical” situations, statistically correlated with crimes
committed at workplace (inside companies/organizations and in particular
misappropriation crimes):
1.Personal financial difficulties. At the origin of many inside crimes can be
placed a period of financial difficulty connected, for example, to reckless
investments, to gambling or simply to the craving of a higher standard of
living. Some employees in fact steal for the simple reason that they need more
money to supplement their income or because at the moment they are
crossing a period of particular economic difficulties and want to be able again
to pay their bills.
2. Revenge. Employees believe that in some way they have been treated
unfairly by their own employers and because they (the employees) don’t have
the power or financial means enough to contrast their employers, they commit
sabotage or misappropriation crimes to revenge themselves.
3. Inadequate pay. Employees are convinced that they are not properly paid
for their work. Instead of negotiating in order to get a rise, they steal
money/goods to their employers. Employees justify their actions stating that
they have the right to steal because underpaid.
4. Work dissatisfaction. The most part of sabotage, fraud and theft cases are
committed by those employees that show dissatisfaction towards some aspects
of their own work, above all towards their employer.
5. Feeling of being not esteemed by the company. An important psychological
factor that can be placed at the base of insider crimes is represented by the
feeling of the employee about the opinion that the company/organization can
have about him/her.
6. Psychiatric disorders and drug abuse. Alcohol and drug abuse and some
psychopathological disorders can represent a motivational base for insider
crime, both of vandalic-destructive type and embezzling type. However this
dimension represents a smaller sample of total workplace crimes.
Of course these conditions can be detected even in subjects that are very
distant from any form of crime. Psychological and motivational characteristics
of insiders have been focused by only few accurate studies carried out by some
American researchers (Parker, 1976-1998) in the early eighties that have used
some classifications based on known insider criminals (that have been
detected) and based only on a little sample of cases.
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These approaches present the risk of generalizations and can say not much
about those insiders that have never been detected (that seem to be the most
part of active insiders).
In Europe the research experience carried out by Prof. Marco Strano’s team,
started in the early nineties, is focused on an operating tool for criminal
profiling of insiders. This tool tries to reduce systematic errors by proposing a
system based on neural network and data mining (IAD System).
The ICAA IAD system (Inside Attack Database)
As formerly documented by a wide international scientific literature, private
companies and Public Administration demonstrate a considerable reluctance to
publicize through reports to Law Enforcement Agencies the attacks that they
have suffered and in particular the ones defined “inside attacks” (committed by
subjects that belong to the organization). This situation has made very difficult
scientific research on the topic and, more in general, the circulation of useful
information to contrast this criminal phenomenon. The ICAA’s target is to offer
to security specialists a new intervention tool that is called IAD (Inside Attack
Database).
Experimentations to apply NNPCP software (Neural Network for Psychological
Criminal Profiling) even to insider crimes have started in 2005 and represent
the last born among ICAA research projects in partnership with Duke
University and other professional associations that operate in information
security sector. IAD system contains data on computer crime inside cases and
allows to security specialists and investigators to acquire immediate infooperating elements on different kinds of inside attacks.
The system in practice, in the line of NNPCP project, provides to operators a
“decisional support” in the investigative phase. NNPCP software, in fact, is able
to realize a socio-biographical, motivational and technological profile of the
attacker supporting operators in cases of unknown offender. To feed the
system, ICAA and AISIC2 have created a sort of security specialists ‘ s “club”
that, since years, is feeding IAD system with cases in an anonymous form. Of
course, the ones that contribute to train IAD system through real cases can
then interrogate it for free in case of necessity.
From first application of IAD system are emerged confirmations as regards the
fact that insiders normally are included into 3 categories with different
characteristics: high profile insiders, low profile insiders and unaware insiders.
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AISIC (Associazione Italiana per la Sicurezza nelle Informazioni e nelle Comunicazioni)
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