Health & Hospitals Corp.
(Bellevue Hospital Ctr.) v. Lewis
OATH Index No. 433/15 (Jan. 26, 2015), affirmed, HHC Pers. Rev. Bd. Dec. No. 1579 (July 8,
2015), appended
Respondent was charged with being excessively absent during a
ten-week period and a long-term absence without authorization.
Petitioner failed to demonstrate that respondent was excessively
absent, but established the long-term unauthorized absence charge.
Termination of employment is recommended.
______________________________________________________
NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIALS AND HEARINGS
In the Matter of
HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION
(BELLEVUE HOSPITAL CENTER)
Petitioner
-againstCONSTINA LEWIS
Respondent
______________________________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KARA J. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge
This is a disciplinary proceeding referred by petitioner, the Health and Hospitals
Corporation (Bellevue Hospital Center), pursuant to section 7.5 of the Personnel Rules of the
Corporation. The charges allege that respondent Constina Lewis, a hospital care investigator,
has been excessively absent between December 30, 2013 through March 7, 2014, has been
excessively absent before or after a day off between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014, and
has been continuously absent without leave from April 4, 2014 to present (Pet Ex. 1).
Following a hearing held before me, I find that petitioner established that respondent was
absent without authorization from April 4, 2014 to present, but failed to establish that she was
excessively absent between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014. I recommend termination of
respondent’s employment with Health and Hospitals Corporation.
-2ANALYSIS
Respondent has been charged with excessive absenteeism, including days immediately
before or after a day off, between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014, and a continuous longterm absence without authorization from April 4, 2014 to present (ALJ Ex. 1).
Respondent is a hospital care investigator (“HCI”). Her duties include sending bills to
insurance companies in a timely manner, collecting payments for inpatient stays, making copies,
and inputting data in the computer system (Tr. 10-11, 50). When an HCI does not report to
work, the facility starts losing money because there is a limited timeframe to contact and bill the
insurance companies for payment of services (Tr. 16). Consequently, the department has to pay
overtime to other employees to file the claims and to follow up on them to ensure that the
insurance companies do not reject claims as untimely (Tr. 29).
Respondent’s immediate supervisor is Nancy Mestre, a senior hospital care investigator,
who in turn, reports to Rakesh Kapoor, the supervisor hospital care investigator (Tr. 17). Mr.
Kapoor testified that between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014, respondent’s attendance
was poor (Tr. 20). He further testified that respondent had been previously counseled and given
warning notices regarding her attendance (Tr. 19).
Respondent testified that she sits in a cubicle in a large room with approximately 70 other
employees (Tr. 51). She suffers from “blurred vision, dizziness, and a headache” whenever she
sits down at her cubicle (Tr. 52). In addition, she experiences “gas” filling her stomach, which
sometimes results in diarrhea or chest pains (Tr. 53). Respondent testified that her symptoms
have gotten progressively worse. She sought assistance from the union and had complained
several times to managers in her unit (Tr. 52).
Respondent maintained that there would be days that she would leave work after lunch
because she felt ill. If she got sick at work on a Thursday or Friday, she would sometimes be
sick for the entire weekend. The condition always affected her for more than one day at a time
and would force her to be bed bound (Pet. Ex. 5; Tr. 60).
Respondent has been charged with being excessively absent on 15 occasions for a total of
24 days between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014. Eight of the fifteen charged occasions
are before or after a scheduled day off. Respondent’s schedule is 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday (Tr. 23, 50). Exhibit C attached to the charges and specifications
indicates that petitioner calculated each absence as a one day increment even when the absence
-3was for only part of a day. A review of respondent’s timesheets and leave request forms between
December 30, 2013 and November 7, 2014, reflect that respondent arrived one-hour late on
January 21, 2014. She also departed early on five occasions, specifically, four hours early on
three occasions (December 30, 2013, January 9, 2014, and January 14, 2014), two hours early on
one occasion (January 15, 2014), and 30 minutes early on one occasion (January 2, 2014) (Pet.
Ex. 5). Petitioner, nonetheless, charged respondent with a full-day of absence on each of these
dates, rather than charging her with either a late arrival or an early departure. Consequently, the
charge of excessive absenteeism with respect to these six dates should be dismissed.
The remaining dates constitute nine occasions for a total of eighteen days during a tenweek period, six of which were before or after a scheduled day off. The issue is whether this
would constitute excessive absenteeism. The Health and Hospitals Corporation's rules do not
specifically define “excessive absenteeism.” Petitioner, however, is guided by the Corporation's
Operating Procedure No. 20-10 (Mar. 18, 1987) (Pet. Ex. 1). The Operating Procedure provides
that disciplinary action shall be taken after reasonable supervisory/managerial efforts have been
made to assist an employee in correcting a deficiency in performance or conduct.
The
supervisor/manager may conduct counseling for an employee who has had three unscheduled
absences or two unscheduled absences immediately before or after a holiday or pass day during
any six-month period (Pet. Ex. 1).
In prior cases where excessive absence has been charged but not specifically defined by
agency rules, this tribunal has noted three circumstances which would give rise to sanctions: (i)
absences which are so extensive in number that they are excessive per se; (ii) absences which are
excessive because of the disruption they cause to the workplace and the adverse impact they
have on workplace efficiency and operations; and (iii) absences which are excessive based on
circumstances surrounding the missed days of work. See Health and Hospitals Corp. (Harlem
Hospital Ctr.) v. Pabon, OATH Index No. 270/04 at 3 (Oct. 29, 2003). With regard to such
circumstances, factors to be considered include the availability of leave accruals, the lack of
advance notice, the timing of such absences in relation to weekends and holidays, the legitimacy
of the need for the absences, and whether respondent was ever warned that the absences were
deemed excessive. See Health & Hospitals Corp. (Bellvue Hospital Ctr.) v. Cruz, OATH Index
No. 1162/03 at 5 (May 30, 2003) (18 absences over seven months found to be excessive, given
the impact to the facility, the failure to submit documentation, and the fact that five of the
-4absences were considered instances of AWOL, and that eight occasions of sick leave occurred
either before or after a scheduled pass day).
I find that petitioner failed to establish that respondent was excessively absent between
December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014.
This tribunal has sustained charges of excessive
absenteeism where absences far exceed the threshold for counseling under the Operating
Procedure.
In prior cases when excessive absenteeism has been found, it had been calculated
over significantly longer periods of time. See, e.g. Pabon, OATH 270/04 (Oct. 29, 2003) (57
absences within 13 months deemed excessive); Cruz, OATH 1162/03 (May 30, 2003) (18 days
of absences during a seven-month period were excessive); Health & Hospitals Corp. (Jacobi
Medical Ctr.) v. Grant, OATH Index No. 1233/98 (Apr. 16, 1998) (37 absences over 21 months
deemed excessive); Health & Hospitals Corp. (Jacobi Medical Ctr.) v. Williams, OATH Index
No. 282/97 (Oct. 30, 1996) (46 absences totaling 87 days during a one-year period was
excessive); Health & Hospitals Corp. (Metropolitan Hospital Ctr.) v. Coley, OATH Index No.
2044/96 (Sept. 11, 1996) (21 absences over 9 months deemed excessive); Health & Hospitals
Corp. (Bellvue Hospital Ctr.) v. Marshall, OATH Index No. 185/96 (Oct. 2, 1995) (20
unscheduled absences within 10 months were excessive).
Petitioner charged respondent with excessive absenteeism over a ten-week period.
Calculating excessive absenteeism, however, over such a compressed period of time is
questionable. Operating Procedure 20-10 refers to absences over a six-month period. While it
may not be necessary to wait for a six-month period to lapse before finding excessive
absenteeism, an absence evaluation over a ten-week period seems inordinately short. See, e.g.
Health & Hospitals Corp. (Neponsit Health Care Ctr) v. Maxwell, OATH Index No. 1236/97
(Aug. 18, 1997), modified on penalty, HHC Pers. Rev. Bd. Dec. No. 932 (Jan. 12, 1999) (18
absences within four months deemed excessive). Accordingly, both of the charges relating to
excessive absenteeism should be dismissed.
Respondent was further charged with a long-term absence without authorization from
April 4, 2014 to present. It is undisputed that respondent has not appeared at work during this
period of time. On Friday, April 4, 2014, respondent left a message on the department’s
voicemail stating that she required a safe work environment and she cannot come to work
because her work area is unsafe (Pet. Ex. 6; Tr. 25). Respondent did not ask to use sick leave or
annual leave to cover her absences nor did she provide a date that she would return to work (Tr.
-527). When Mr. Kapoor made an inquiry of the benefits office he was informed that it had not
approved an extended leave for respondent and concluded that respondent’s absence was
unauthorized (Tr. 27).
Mr. Kapoor testified that the next time he had heard from respondent was on May 12,
2014, when she called about obtaining a workers’’s compensation form. Respondent informed
Mr. Kapoor that she would pick up the form the next day before 12:00 p.m. Respondent,
however, never appeared and never contacted Mr. Kapoor again (Tr. 27-28).
Mr. Kapoor acknowledged that respondent had previously complained about her work
environment. He recalled her complaining about a headache and telling him that she sees
particles in the air that make her feel ill. No one else in the work area, however, complained
about the air quality or particles in the air (Tr. 30-31). Mr. Kapoor referred respondent to
employee health services many times (Tr. 30). Respondent went a few times and then refused to
go back because she claimed that employee health services did not do anything. Respondent
informed Mr. Kapoor that she was going to see her own doctor, but he never saw any medical
documentation. Nevertheless, following respondent’s complaints the facility had the air tested
and the duct was checked. The union also brought in a specialist to test the air quality. Nothing
unusual was found (Tr. 32).
Shirley Facey, coordinating manager in Human Resources benefits unit, testified that she
is responsible for coordinating workers’’s compensation issues as they arise within the facility.
Employees are notified during orientation that the facility has a written policy regarding
absences due to service-related injuries or occupational diseases. (Pet. Ex. 7). See, Bellevue
Hospital Ctr. Administrative Policy and Procedure HR-25, Absences due to Service-Related
Injuries/Occupational Diseases (Workers’’s Compensation), eff. date 1/7/11. Pursuant to HR25, when an employee is injured, she must report the injury to her supervisor, who fills out the
necessary forms and refers the employee to employee health services or the emergency room
(Pet. Ex. 7; Tr. 35-36). The employee is also responsible for filling out a set of forms, including
an option form. The option form is for the employee to select whether she wants to use her own
annual and sick leave balances, so that she continues to get paid while her claim is pending, or
prefers not to use her own leave and wait until workers’’s compensation pays. Once the forms
are completed, Ms. Facey is responsible for processing and forwarding the forms to workers’’s
compensation (Pet. Ex. 7; Tr. 37).
-6Ms. Facey testified that respondent had come to her office in February 2014, complaining
that when she is at her desk, she experiences pain when she breathes (Tr. 36). Ms. Facey told
respondent that she needed to file a workers’’s compensation form and provided her with the
necessary documents. Respondent never returned the forms to Ms. Facey. Ms. Facey also
recalled that she had discussed the Family Medical Care Leave Act (“FMLA”) with respondent.
But, respondent did not pursue that either (Tr. 40-41).
In late April or early May 2014, Ms. Facey received a telephone call from the workers’’s
compensation liaison in the New York City Law Department. The Law Department informed
Ms. Facey that respondent filed a claim directly with the workers’’s compensation board, which
was requesting additional forms from the facility (Tr. 41). Ms. Facey, however, was unable to
produce them because respondent had never returned the completed forms to her (Tr. 42). Ms.
Facey called respondent in May 2014, to follow-up but respondent still has not provided the
forms (Tr. 42-43).
On September 15, 2014, the workers’’s compensation board issued a notice placing
respondent’s claim in a “No Further Action” status because she never provided the board with
the necessary medical documents and forms. The board gave respondent 30 days to file an
objection or its decision would be deemed final on October 15, 2014 (Pet. Ex. 8; Tr. 44-47). The
Law Department informed Ms. Facey that because respondent did not file an objection and the
board’s decision was finalized, respondent was never placed on workers’’s compensation leave
(Tr. 48).
Respondent acknowledged that she has not been to work since April 4, 2014. She
explained that she has been complaining about being sick at her cubicle since the end of 2010.
Respondent’s allergist diagnosed her condition as “sick building syndrome” (Tr. 57, 62). Her
doctor suggested that if being in the workplace was making her sick, she should not be in that
environment (Tr. 57). Respondent testified that she did not want to go back to work and get sick,
so she decided not to return until they provided her with a safe work environment (Tr. 54).
Although respondent is familiar with the hospital’s time and leave policies, she
maintained that she is not really familiar with the extended leave of absence policy. She asserted
that she was never trained regarding these policies but thinks she may have heard about them
during orientation (Tr. 51-52).
Respondent believed that since she filled out workers’’s
compensation papers, her extended absence was authorized (Tr. 55). Respondent acknowledged
-7that she did not receive anything from the facility indicating that she was being placed on
workers’’s compensation leave.
The only paperwork she received from the Workers’’s
Compensation Board only confirmed receipt of her claim (Tr. 63-64).
According to the facility’s rules, employees are made aware of the call-in policy for
unscheduled absences during orientation and it is discussed occasionally in department meetings.
See, Bellevue Hospital Ctr. Administrative Policy and Procedure HR-10, Call-in Policy for
Unscheduled Absences, eff. date 2/7/11. If an employee is ill, she must call in to her department
at least two hours before the start of her shift and no later than one hour after the employee’s
shift. The employee is required to call every day that she is scheduled to work, unless she is able
to specify an exact number of consecutive work days that she will be absent (Pet. Ex. 3; Tr. 11,
13-15). If an employee wants to request leave for an extended period of time, the supervisor will
refer the request to Human Resources. Human Resources will contact the employee’s supervisor
as to whether an extended leave had been approved (Tr. 12).
It is undisputed that respondent has been absent without authorization from April 4, 2014
to present. Her assertion that she was excused because she submitted a workers’’s compensation
claim is without merit. We have held that an employee’s obligation to request leave and submit
documentation is not obviated by her filing of a worker’s compensation claim, and the failure to
comply with agency rules pertaining to leave requests may constitute grounds for disciplinary
action. Dep’t of Transportation v. Mendez, OATH Index No. 384/05 at 8 (Jan. 19, 2005). See
also, Dep’t of Correction v. Winkfield, OATH Index No. 2219/99 (Sept. 21, 1999); Health &
Hospitals Corp. (Harlem Hospital) v. Case, OATH Index No. 595/95 (Apr. 6, 1995). Respondent
had been notified that her workers’’s compensation claim was closed because she did not provide
the proper paperwork. Therefore, her justification for not returning to work due to a lapsed
workers’’s compensation claim does not comport with common sense.
Attendance has been found to be an “essential function” of most employment. Lyons v.
Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512, 1516 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is clear that an essential aspect of many
jobs is the ability to appear at work regularly and on time”); Vandenbroek v. PSEG Power Ct
LLC, 356 Fed. Appx. 457, 460 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Daddazio v. Katharine Gibbs School,
Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5408 at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir.
2000)) (“‘Regularly attending work’ is an essential function of virtually every job.”); Scalera v.
-8Electrograph Systems, Info., 848 F. Supp.2d 352, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Indeed, one such
essential function of an employee’s job is showing up for work”).
Respondent has failed to provide sufficient justification for performing an essential
function of her job – reporting to work. Her absence is unauthorized and is causing a negative
financial impact on the facility. Accordingly, I find that petitioner established that respondent
was absent without authorization from April 4, 2014 to present.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Petitioner failed to establish that respondent was excessively
absent between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014.
2. Petitioner failed to establish that respondent displayed a pattern
of excessive absences before or after a scheduled day off
between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014.
3. Petitioner established that respondent has been continuously
absent without leave from April 4, 2014 to present.
RECOMMENDATION
Upon making the above findings, I requested and received a summary of respondent’s
personnel history in order to make an appropriate penalty recommendation. Respondent was
appointed as a hospital care investigator in 2009. During her tenure with the facility, she has
been disciplined on one prior occasion in 2014. Following a hearing before this tribunal,
respondent was suspended for 25 days for excessive lateness and absence. See Health &
Hospitals Corp. (Bellevue Hospital Ctr.) v. Lewis, OATH Index No. 911/14 (Feb. 13, 2014).
Petitioner has requested that respondent be terminated from her position as a hospital care
investigator. Respondent’s defense is unsupported by medical documentation and does not
warrant mitigation. Moreover, even if respondent had a valid reason for her extended absence,
the negative impact that it is having on the facility is sufficient to justify termination. See,
Romano v. Town Bd. of the Town of Colonie, 200 A.D.2d 934 (3d Dep’t 1994) (in upholding
termination of employee who was absent from work 41 days in five months, finding that “the
fact that petitioner may have had a ‘valid’ reason for each one of the individual absences is
-9irrelevant to . . . whether his unreliability and its disruptive and burdensome effect on the
employer rendered him incompetent to continue his employment”).
Respondent has been found guilty of an unauthorized absence from work for an extended
period of time. Respondent’s unauthorized absence is a fundamental form of misconduct which
substantially impedes the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission. The only appropriate penalty for
such misconduct is termination, and I so recommend. See Health & Hospitals Corp. (Bellevue
Hospital Ctr.) v. Marzouk, OATH Index No. 539/15 at 4 (Dec. 1, 2014); Health & Hospitals
Corp. (Bellevue Hospital Ctr.) v. Owens, OATH Index No. 986/12 at 2 (Feb. 27, 2012).
Kara J. Miller
Administrative Law Judge
January 26, 2015
SUBMITTED TO:
STEVEN R. ALEXANDER
Executive Director
APPEARANCES:
CHRISTINA PAPADOPOULOUS, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
KREISBERG & MAITLAND, LLP
Attorneys for Respondent
BY: JILL MENDELBERG, ESQ.
PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD
THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND
HOSPITALS CORPORATION
-------------------------------------------x
In the Matter of the Appeal of
Decision No.: 1579
CONSTINA LEWIS
Date: July 8, 2015
Hospital Care Investigator
Bellevue Hospital Center
DOCKET NO.: 4083/15
-------------------------------------------x
This is an appeal to the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
Personnel Review Board ("Board") by Constina Lewis (Appellant") from the decision by
Bellevue Hospital Center ("Facility") to terminate her, pursuant to Rule 7.5 of the
Personnel Rules and Regulations of the New York City Health and Hospitals
Corporation, from her position as a Health Care Investigator. As explained below, the
Appeal is denied.
BACKGROUND
The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation ("HHC"), charged
Appellant, inter alia, with being excessively absent and absent without leave. HHC
charged that between April 10 and December 20, 2013, Appellant was absent on 22
occasions, for a total of 31 days. HHC also charged that Appellant was excessively
absent between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014, and absent without leave
("AWOL") from April 4, 2014 through June 2, 2014. On January 17, 2014 the Office of
Administrative Trials and Hearings ("OATH"), Administrative law Judge John B.
Spooner presiding, conducted a Rule 7.5 hearing on first set of charges. On November
18, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Kara Miller presiding, held a Rule 7.5 hearing on
the charges relating to the period December 2013 through the date of the hearing. In a
Report and Recommendation dated February 13, 2014, Judge Spooner recommended
that Appellant be suspended for twenty-five days. In a Report and Recommendation
dated January 26, 2015, Judge Miller recommended that the charges as to absences
between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014 be dismissed, and that the AWOL
charges be sustained. Judge Miller recommended that Appellant should be terminated.
In both cases, Appellant argued that the workplace made her sick and unable to work.
Appellant testified, in the case before Judge Spooner, about numerous ailments
caused by the workplace environment. In that case, the evidence showed that the
Bellevue safety inspector and the safety director, together with Appellant's supervisors
and union representative walked through the area in April and October 2013, but did not
detect any environmental issues. Further, in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the
water was tested by an outside testing service in January 2013. In December 2013, a
safety inspector conducted various environmental tests. All of the tests showed that the
area was acceptable based on industry and governmental standards. Appellant visited a
doctor for her complaints, but there was no evidence linking the illnesses to the
workplace. Appellant was counseled in May 2011 and March 2013 about excessive
unscheduled absences. The record showed that Appellant was absent 22 times (for a
total of 31 days) without prior approval, almost all of which were before or after a
scheduled day off. Accordingly, Judge Spooner imposed a fine of 25 days without pay.
In the case before Judge Miller, she found that six of the fifteen absences
charged between December 30, 2013 and March 7, 2014 should have been charged as
lateness or early departure. As to the remaining nine instances, six of which were
before or after a scheduled day off, Judge Miller did not believe they should be
considered excessive. Accordingly, the gravamen of the case before Judge Miller, was
Appellant's long term absence without authorization. In February 2014, Appellant went
to Human Resources in the Facility and obtained forms for a workers' compensation
claim. However, she did not return the forms to the Facility. On April 4, 2014, Appellant
left a voice message stating that she could not come to work because the area is
unsafe. Appellant works in a space with many other persons, and no other person
complained about the air quality. On May 12, 2014, Appellant called her supervisor and
said she wanted to come in for a workers' compensation form, but she did not appear.
Human Resources first learned that Appellant filed a claim directly with workers'
compensation when the workers' compensation liaison requested Appellant's
documentation. However, there was no documentation to provide. In September 2014,
the Workers' Compensation Board placed Appellant's claim on "No Further Action"
status, because Appellant did not provide the necessary forms or medical
documentation. Judge Miller found that as Appellant did not pursue any of the options
available to obtain a medical leave of absence, and did not support her claim of medical
disability with any evidence, termination was warranted. Judge Miller ruled that
Appellant's absences alone were sufficiently disruptive to the workplace to warrant
termination.
On February 27, 2014, Howard Kritz, Senior Executive Director of the Facility
advised Appellant that upon review of the entire record, he agreed with Judge
Spooner's findings and recommendation; Appellant was suspended without pay from
March 10 through April 3, 2014. On February 17, 2015, Howard Kritz, advised Appellant
that he had reviewed the record in the case before Judge Miller, and that he agreed with
Judge Miller's Report and Recommendation; accordingly, Appellant was terminated,
effective immediately, from her position. Appellant, by her attorney, Kreisberg &
Maitland, appealed the OATH decisions to the Board. She appealed Judge Spooner's
decision on March 31, 2014 and she appealed Judge Miller's decision on March 3,
2015.
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 6, 2015, the Board held a hearing on the consolidated appeals. Jeffrey
L. Kreisberg, Esq. appeared for Appellant and Michele C. McCarthy, Esq. appeared for
HHC. In both appeals, Appellant argued that Judges Spooner and Miller failed to give
sufficient credence to Appellant's claim that the air surrounding her cubicle was
sickening
her,
and
that
the
penalties
imposed
for
her
absenteeism
were
disproportionate to the conduct charged. In the case before Judge Spooner, Appellant
was absent twenty-two times during the period April 10, 2013 through December 20,
2013, without prior authorization; thirteen of the absences were before or after
scheduled days off. The record of the case before Judge Spooner does not contain any
medical notes for these absences. The only doctor's note that is part of the record is
dated January 14, 2014, after the absences charged in the case. The doctor states that
he has been treating Appellant since April 2013. The note says "recent" something
illegible, and tongue swelling. The note does not contain a diagnosis or course of
treatment. The doctor advises, without explanation or diagnosis, that she should change
her work situation. There is no evidence that the note was given to the Facility.
In the case before Judge Miller, HHC charged Appellant with being excessively
absent during the period December 30, 2013 through March 7, 2014, and absent
without leave commencing April 4, 2014. Although Judge Miller did not uphold the
charges of excessive absenteeism for the period December 30, 2013 through March 7,
2014, we believe that the absences not credited by Judge Miller: nine absences, six of
which were before or after a scheduled day off, should be considered together with the
record before Judge Spooner. These absences are consistent with Appellant's history of
absenteeism and disregard for her obligations to the Facility, and cannot be ignored.
Appellant testified that she complained to a supervisor commencing at the end of 2010
about the work environment. She further testified that she was aware that she needed a
doctor's note for absences. However, she did not follow the Facility's time and leave
policies. The record of the case before Judge Miller does not contain any doctors' notes.
Appellant left a voice message on April 4, 2014 stating that she could not come to work
because the area was unsafe. The Facility sent letters on April 10 and April 24, 2014,
advising her about the procedures to follow for absences, medical or other. Appellant
did not follow through with any of the required steps to obtain an authorized leave.
After a review of the records in both Appeals, and the decisions sent to the Board
by Mr. Kreisberg, the Board finds no reason to overturn the determinations of either
Judge Spooner or Judge Miller or the decision of the Facility to terminate Appellant. For
all of the foregoing reasons, the Appeals are denied.
Gayle A. Gavin
Chair
Jonathan L. Kimmel
Board Member
Pamela G. Ostrager
Board Member