Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 254 (2011) 215–220
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Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / y t a a p
A model for considering different discourse communities within the toxicological
and environmental sciences: an approach for addressing jargon and personally
subjective vocabulary
Cristopher D. Broyles, ELS, Doctoral Student, Technical Editor and Writer ⁎
Texas Tech University, IntelliTech Systems, Inc./contractor for the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 3144 Presidential Drive, Fairborn, OH 45324, USA
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 13 August 2009
Revised 18 March 2010
Accepted 24 October 2010
Available online 27 October 2010
Keywords:
Jargon
Discourse
Audience analysis
Personally subjective vocabulary
Science writing
Ethnography
a b s t r a c t
Discourse speak is a powerful communication shorthand between individuals in the same discourse group.
Discourse speak consists of both jargon, the unique—but understood—terminology used in the discourse
group, and a member's own personally subjective vocabulary, wording that is commonly used in the discourse
group but has no true consensus-based meaning. It is my observation that sometimes when scientists write,
they generally focus solely on content (the pedant's stance), and, consequently, can fail to consciously consider
audience, and, by extension, they fail to anticipate that their publication may reach beyond their own
discourse group. If scientists do not consciously consider their intended audience and do not adapt their
language for “outsiders” who might be part of the audience, the usefulness of the publication becomes limited
because the intended meaning can be lost. Thus, as explained in the subsequent commentary, effective
communication in the sciences not only involves defendable science but, also, a conscious perception of
audience through a deliberate recognition of one's own discourse speak.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The Toxicology and Risk Assessment (TRAC) conference is a yearly
venue generally presented by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment program, and
other organizations. As part of the 2009 conference, I hosted a daylong workshop on written communication in risk assessment. This
workshop—specifically my presentation (and the resulting discussion) on insider and outsider language—leads me to argue in this
commentary that scientists must be conscious of the discourse
conventions they use in order to best serve the needs of their readers.
An observation
People who interact together and regularly exchange ideas
constitute a discourse group. Within a discourse group, certain language
norms (i.e., discourse speak) arise naturally to foster more efficient
communication. One of the norms, according to Montgomery (2003) is
jargon. Though jargon can be found across all discourse groups, from an
informal poker-playing group that meets Sunday nights after “the
game” to attorneys completing pretrial conferences in the judge's
chambers, of particular interest to me is its use in the scientific field.
⁎ Fax: + 1 513 569 7159.
E-mail address: Broyles.cris@epamail.epa.gov.
0041-008X/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.taap.2010.10.015
Working inside the EPA building in Cincinnati, OH, I can, during the
course of a routine daily trip to the cafeteria, hear phrases like “doseresponse” and “cumulative risk assessment” or abbreviations like “POD”
and “QSAR” used effortlessly in conversations between the scientists I
pass in the hallway. Though I can understand those concepts now, only
4 years ago, these terms were foreign to me. This recognition of my own
transition from an outsider of such language to an insider prompted my
interest in hosting a science writing workshop at the 2009 TRAC, and,
consequently, inspired this commentary article.
As a technical editor, I can appreciate jargon's ability to effectively
and concisely relay information between knowledgeable parties (i.e.,
“insiders” to the discourse speak/group). In fact, in the office I work in
(which handles the word processing and editing services for the
National Center for Environmental Assessment [NCEA]), we, too, have
our own discourse speak.
However, this communication shorthand, which is prevalent not
only in the documents I read for the EPA—but, also, a norm across
many scientific documents (Montgomery, 1996) —has a shortcoming
that sometimes goes unconsidered: it has the innate ability to
selectively prevent less-knowledgeable audiences (i.e., “outsiders”
to the discourse group) from understanding the material (Montgomery,
1996), which, by extension, could limit a document's usefulness, which
is, in this context, a reference to the document's ability to inform
decision-making by nonscientists.
Discourse groups, as defined thus far, involve people who regularly
interact and share a common language. However, it is possible for
individuals who have never met one another or spoken to each other to
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C.D. Broyles / Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 254 (2011) 215–220
actually be part of the same discourse group in terms of vocabulary and
conceptual understanding. Specifically, I contend this gives rise to an
immediate discourse group and an extended discourse group, which
seems to be supported by Banks's (1998) proposal of a discourse
continuum of various insider/outsider positions and will be explained
later in this commentary. The immediate discourse group consists of
individuals who interact regularly and share ideas. The extended
discourse group consists of individuals who can follow the discourse
speak because, though they do not directly interact with member of the
immediate discourse group, they are of the same knowledge base and
have similar norms in their own immediate discourse groups. Thus, in
this context, that would be scientists who are in the same field.
However, scientists whose disciplines are only one discipline apart
can have trouble following each other's discourse speak (Kennedy,
2007; Lyne and Howe, 1986) and, in the context of this paper, this
marks the beginning of the outsider region on the discourse
continuum. Fig. 1 depicts a conceptual model of the hierarchical
flow of understandability between insiders and outsiders. Fig. 1
subdivides insiders and outsiders into additional subgroups in an
effort to illustrate the gradual loss of communicative abilities as the
information travels to individuals farthest from the originating
discourse group. My motivation for developing this diagram was to
illustrate that the farther removed from the discourse groups a person
is, the greater difficulty he or she will encounter in trying to
“translate” the discourse into meaningful messages. My effort in this
visualization is to build upon the models proposed by Banks (1998)
and Labaree (2002). The Banks (1998) model, as expressed by Chavez
(2008), is a linear model placing individuals along a discourse
continuum ranging from “Indigenous-Insider” to “External-Outsider.”
Naples (1996) and Labaree (2002) contend that an individual's
position along such a continuum would actually be dynamic rather
than a fixed discernable point. Chavez (2008) depicts the Labaree's
(2002) model as an x-y-z plot: it plots “insiderness” as one metric,
“outsiderness,” as a second metric, and “time” as a third metric. The
result is a 3-D positioning along an infinite matrix of possibilities that
characterizes ones position within the discourse and allows for
fluidity in relation to time. Though this is more comprehensive than
the linearized approach of the Banks (1998) model, it does not easily
lend itself to the development of meaningful, useable classifications
for authors to consider during the writing process.
Of note, Chavez (2008) used these models as a way to help
researchers (scientists) characterize and mediate their own position
when conducting a study. This is different from my aim, which looks
at the audience and their positions along the discourse continuum as
recipients of information. Nonetheless, these sources informed my
model and my terminology—particularly Chavez's (2008) use of the
phrase “…various degrees of insider and ‘outsiderness’…” It is from
the Banks (1998) model and the epiphany gained by the Chavez
(2008) analysis, that I propose my conceptual model (see Fig. 1) for
characterizing audience insider/outsider positioning in discourse.
A fundamental assumption in the proposed conceptual model is that
there is a correlation between an individual's familiarity with the
discourse and an individual's “interest” in the discourse message. In the
context of this commentary, the first-degree outsiders include scientists
of different disciplines. These are individuals who might not follow all of
the language used but have an understanding of the content and/or
purpose nonetheless; these are also individuals who have an active
interest in the discourse. For example, a biochemist could conceivably
follow ideas put forth by a toxicologist in a risk-assessment-related
paper, but the biochemist might not be initially aware of the distinction
between the usages of the words pathway and route. However, in risk
assessment, these two words have very different meanings. A route is
the manner in which the toxicant makes its way across the body's outer
barrier and into the body (i.e., dermal, inhalation, or oral). A pathway,
however, is the larger track a toxicant takes (from the release by the
source, to the transport of the chemical through a medium/environment, to ultimate contact with a body [the exposure route]).
Consequently, a route is part of a pathway—but a pathway is not part
of a route. Thus, when these words (jargon) are used in risk assessment,
they are used selectively because they have different recognized
meanings. In biochemistry, these words can be used interchangeably
because in that context they mean the same thing.
Fig. 1. A diagram of the proposed conceptual model for insider–outsider discourse relationships. The model illustrates the translation efforts necessary when shifting information from
insiders to outsiders. The figure subdivides insiders and outsiders into additional groups in an effort to illustrate the gradual loss of communicative abilities (represented as spatial
distance in the figure) as the information is disseminated to individuals farthest from the originating discourse group.
C.D. Broyles / Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 254 (2011) 215–220
217
Fig. 2. A diagram of the proposed conceptual model for illustrating the hindering ability of jargon and personally subjective vocabulary. Specifically, the model is meant to
demonstrate the compounding effect the personally subjective vocabulary has when compared with jargon (indicated by slashes); thus, as shown in the figure, the communication
between insiders is only hindered by personally subjective vocabulary, whereas communication to outsiders is hindered by both personally subjective vocabulary and jargon.
Another example can be found in the word flora, which, to
anatomists and microbiologists, references the bacteria lining the
digestive tract in humans. In botany, the word has a different
meaning. In fact, the word has two meanings—neither of which
relates to the digestive tract or to bacteria. Flora can refer to the
plant life occurring within a particular region, or, alternatively, the
word can refer to a book or other work about the plant life found
within a given region. These are just two of an incalculable number
of possible examples that create language subdivides within the
sciences and, by extension, within all language.
In the context of this commentary, the second-degree outsiders
include nonscientists. These are individuals who are not familiar with
the topic or the language but have an idea of the general purpose of
the document, and consequently, have a partial interest in the
discourse. In Fig. 1, though “decision makers” have been placed in the
first-degree outsider category, it is likely that they can also be
classified as second-degree outsiders or, perhaps, even as insiders
(depending on their particular familiarity with the topics and
language used). The third-degree outsider category includes anyone
else who might read the document but who has no knowledge of the
discourse speak, the concepts, or the purpose, and has only a passing
interest in the discourse. In this context, that would be the “lay
audience.”
Of particular note in my proposed model is the absence of the
fluidity aspect that Labaree (2002) proposed. While I support
Labaree's (2002) position, because I am proposing classifications for
groups of outsiders (and, by extension, a categorical approach)
rather than trying to emphasize the individual shift of one
individual along the discourse continuum, which in Labaree's
(2002) model would result in an infinite set of points in classifying
insiderness/outsiderness, I think a more focused, categorical model
is sufficient—at least for my aim in this article. However, as
indicated previously, the category of “decision-maker” is difficult
to classify (place/position along the discourse continuum) because
of the varied education and experience he or she might have; it is
not as stringent in definition as, for example, “a scientist of a
different discipline,” in which there is a simple “yes/no” answer that
can be applied and used for designation.
Based on my research, there is no current model representing the
exact classifications I propose in my conceptual model, but there are
indeed parallels between my conceptual model and those posed by
others (as indicated previously).
Further limiting communicability is another form of discourse
speak: personally subjective vocabulary. Scientists sometimes use
words that are free of any universal definition—even within their
own discourse group or discipline; there is some degree of
“understanding” amongst the discourse participants as to what
these words mean, but, by and large, the interpretations are highly
subjective—hence their name. For example, in risk assessment,
scientists commonly use words like adverse, cause, and health
protective, but I have yet to see those terms defined to any point of
consensus. Merriam-Webster defines “adverse” as “opposed to one's
interests” or something “causing harm,”1 begging the question, what,
in turn, is “harm”? In an effort to provide some criteria for addressing
“adverse,” EPA generally qualifies a change in body weight of 10% or
more as “biologically significant” and, sometimes, as “adverse” (EPA,
2000). However, beyond that possible criterion for using the term
“adverse,” are other possibilities: In some cases, if “good” scientific
evidence exists (e.g., perhaps a transparent study showing that a
decrease in body weight is a precursor to a more “severe” effect, like
kidney damage), then an author might contend that for a specific
animal/dose-response model that a body-weight change of less than
10% might also constitute “adversity”—at least in that specific
hypothetical instance; or, the term “adverse” might be employed
based on some other biological factor (or change) that is independent
from weight loss—like a change in the level of certain liver enzymes.
Thus, despite some efforts to standardize the meaning—and use of
—“adverse” (and the other terms mentioned), though there is a
“shared general understanding,” there is still an absence of a fully
accepted definition. Thus, from a communicative perspective, it is
perhaps best to avoid using those words, or, alternatively, if the author
strongly desires to use words like these that lack universal meanings
within the discourse group, then the usages must not only be
supported by the data, but, in addition, the words must be clarified as
to the exact context of their meaning in that particular instance. These
strategies are already being employed in many of the NCEA health/
toxicity assessment and have been of recent focus in both the
1
These definitions have been borrowed on 1/8/2010 from Merriam-Webster online
at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adverse.
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C.D. Broyles / Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 254 (2011) 215–220
Integrated Risk Information Systems and Provisional Peer-Reviewed
Toxicity Value assessments. Thus, as suggested above, without clear
explanation, in this situation, not only might outsiders to the
discourse group have trouble following the text but even the
members within the discourse group can have difficulty.
Collectively, jargon (words that have definite meanings within the
discourse group) and personally subjective vocabulary (words that
have only loose meanings within the discourse group) compose the
unique discourse speak of a discourse group. Unlike Fig. 1, which
demonstrates the distance between varying degrees of insider-/
outsidership in spatial sense, Fig. 2 summarizes the inhibitive abilities
of certain discourse speak by serving as a conceptual model depicting
the flow of communication between an insider and an insider, and an
insider to an outsider. In both communication situations, Fig. 2
illustrates that personally subjective vocabulary can be a hindrance,
whereas jargon is only a concern in the latter discourse setting (i.e.,
insider-to-outsider discourse).
A suggestion
My goal in writing this commentary is to encourage the reader to
become more aware of his own discourse speak in an effort to
illustrate where communication to outsiders might be hindered. I am
not advocating the complete eradication of jargon or personally
subjective vocabulary. I believe both have a place in casual
conversations between colleagues and in communications designed
solely for use by insiders to the discourse. I openly acknowledge that
such communication shortcuts make my interoffice communication
easier.
I am suggesting, however, that when it comes to writing
(particularly formal written products whose readership will extend
beyond the author's immediate and extended discourse groups or
colleagues), that authors be more sensitive to their intended audience
(and their possible lack of knowledge) rather than solely being
concerned about the defensibility and rigor of the work—the pedant's
stance (a content-only view of writing) (Glenn et al., 2003). My
position coincides with (and supports the) EPA's publications on Plain
Language and the assertions of Prelli (as presented in Harris, 1997)
and extends the discussion presented in Lyne and Howe (1986) in
reference to communication problems due to increased specialization
within the sciences.
The EPA Office of Policy, Economics, and Innovation (OPEI, 2009)
founded the Plain Language Initiative in an effort to enhance both the
clarity and the accessibility of EPA publications. OPEI (2009) cites
Christine Todd Whitman, the former EPA administrator, as saying the
following:
Improving communication between EPA and the American public is
more important now than ever before. The Agency has already made
outstanding strides to include citizens in our decision-making, to
work with the regulated community, and to provide stakeholders
with needed information. The unprecedented challenges we face,
however, require continuous improvement in our communication
skills...using plain language can help increase compliance with
regulations and decrease mistakes, frustration, and appeals,
allowing us to serve American citizens more cost-effectively and
efficiently.
To support this effort, OPEI offers a variety of free downloadable
materials to EPA employees. My commentary, though very specific in
nature and dealing with only one small aspect of the cross-discipline
communication issue, works toward this same goal.
As indicated in Harris (1997), Prelli explicitly states that one
problem in argumentation is that the rhetorician (the one who is
trying to invoke the persuasion) can misjudge his audience, and,
consequently, the audience might not accept or understand the initial
premise. In such a case, the persuasion attempt becomes moot. My
assertion is akin to these same beliefs, but my focus is on language use
and on relaying information rather than persuasion: if a scientist
focuses his efforts solely on the scientific content of his work and does
not take time to consider the intended audience, the language used
might not be understood, causing the communication to stall. Prelli
then proceeds to characterize a term for this disconnection that can
arise between communication between insiders and outsiders as a
“boundary.” To cross these boundaries, Prelli advocates that insiders
be more self-reflective of their own communication (Harris, 1997),
which is a key assertion in this commentary.
Lyne and Howe (1986) briefly examined the discourse surrounding
punctuated equilibrium, which is a theory in evolutionary biology that
proposes that species can experience localized, rapid/discontinuous
developments in speciation; it is not gradual nor does it effect the
transformation of whole lineages. Specifically, in their analysis of the
discourse, the authors observed four patterns by which science and
audience influence one another. The pattern of particular interest in the
context of this commentary article is that claims made in the confines of
one branch of science can influence other branches, and, moreover, that
often times there can be a distortion effect in the cross-discipline
exchange (which I equate to “crossing of the boundaries” proposed by
Prelli (Harris, 1997)). In making this observation, the authors draw from
the differing viewpoints of geneticists and paleontologists on punctuated
equilibrium, and, they specifically, attribute some of the communication
errors to specific words and their varied meanings within the respective
disciplines—e.g., “species” and “gradual,” both of which have different
meanings within the two scientific disciplines.
Thus, in the scope of this commentary-type article and as posed
previously by Baake (2003) in relation to science communication,
the principal challenge scientists must be mindful of when writing
is using language that can cross disciplines and result in effective
communication to the discourse outsiders without sacrificing the
traits that are discipline specific (like the route vs. pathway issue
presented earlier). Though to fully address this challenge, there are
more rhetorical elements to consider and possible approaches for
use (like the use of metaphor in science writing as advocated by
Baake (2003)), which are beyond the scope of this commentary, one
step in the “right” direction—the step that deals particularly with
discourse speak—is as follows: in addition to “knowing” the science
well, similar to assertions posed by Keys (1999) and Prelli (Harris,
1997), I believe effective communication requires a thoughtful
analysis of the intended presentation/publication, in terms of
audience, in order to (1) identify the discourse speak and (2)
develop a workaround for both the jargon and the personally
subjective vocabulary when necessary (thus, representing a
dissolution of the boundaries that Prelli describes).
Because personally subjective vocabulary is, in this context, largely
an internal discourse-group concern, it can be remedied by identifying
the terms, discussing them within the discourse groups, and developing
formal guidance for their use (i.e., definitions) within the discourse
group just as statisticians have done in defining “statistical significance”
as a p-value of less than 0.05 (though there appears to be some ongoing
discussion about changing this value). However, even if consensus is
reached for these terms, it elevates them only to a “jargon” status, which
means the wording still might require further modification in order to
be fully appreciated by those outside the discourse group.
Generally, a workaround for jargon can be achieved by one of two
means: providing a definition to the jargon, which works well for
educated or decision-maker audiences by helping them to become
insiders to the language, or, avoiding the jargon's use altogether,
which might work well when the information that is contained within
the jargon is not essential to the meaning that the audience is
expected to grasp from the material—as is the case in many
documents designed for lay audiences. In looking at this commentary
C.D. Broyles / Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 254 (2011) 215–220
article, itself as an example, which I have written for other scholarly
audiences (particularly scientists), the reader can see that I clearly
took the time to define terms like “discourse group” and “discourse
speak” even though in my particular field, composition and rhetoric,
those terms are understood; they are part of my field's discourse
speak. In remedying the overuse of jargon, a conscious, clear
perception of the intended audience is essential.
Below is an example sentence containing jargon (in bold) from my
workshop on Written Communication in Risk Assessment at the 2009
TRAC followed by my analysis and recommendation for rewording for
various audiences:
“The high Point of Departure limits the model's predictive
capabilities.”
■ The first-degree outsider (e.g., a decision-maker audience) will
likely want to see this phrase retained as a way to strengthen the
scientific rigor of the document—even if they do not fully
understand its meaning. Because this phrase directly speaks to
the “why” and the “how” of the model's limitations, it would be
appropriate to retain the language. Thus, in this case, a definition
would be appropriate.
○ Reword for the decision maker:
“The high point of departure, the point below which the estimates
are no longer valid, limits the model's predictive capabilities.”
This reword provides greater clarity and does not sacrifice the
scientific quality of the document.
■ The second-degree outsider (e.g., a nonscientist/more general
audience) will more likely be interested in the overall effect and
the impact of the finding—not so much the “how” behind it or the
“exact limitations of the predictive model used.” Thus, the nature
of the model's limitations needs not be expressed in detail, but a
passing mention that the model “is limited in its predictive
abilities” might be worthwhile. Consequently, in many cases, the
jargon can be removed to create a simpler read.
○ Reword for the general public:
“The model has limited predictive capabilities.”
This reword provides the greatest clarity, but it does demonstrate a
sacrifice in the scientific quality (by not characterizing the nature of
the limitation). Thus, such extremes should be used only when the
“rationale” is not equally as important as the “message” itself, which
was the initial premise for this particular example.
■ The third-degree outsider (e.g., the “lay” audience, those who are
farthest removed and have the least interest) will likely only be
concerned with the finding's effect and the possible impact of the
finding or research. Thus, in such cases, sentences not relating to
impact/effect, but that of method, can, sometimes, be deleted. So,
in this instance, the example sentence, which is a caveat about the
method, could be eliminated from the text.
In addition, as mentioned in the beginning of this commentary,
sometimes the jargon is not a word or phrase, but, rather, it is an
abbreviation or acronym (Laszlo, 2006) (like “POD” or “QSAR”). In
that case, writing the abbreviation or acronym out in full in
conjunction with the abbreviated/acronym version of the text, next
to it in parentheses, upon the first use in the main text, is a useful way
to identify what the abbreviation or acronym stands for. For example,
“The model has a high point of departure (POD).” Now, the reader
knows what “POD” stands for. However, in some cases, knowing what
the terms stands for does not necessarily equate to elucidating what
219
the term actually means. Accordingly, providing an explanatory
phrase that describes the meaning of the term, too, can, also, enhance
the readability of the document by discourse outsiders, as indicated in
the previously shared rework example for first-degree outsiders.
Conclusion
When developing documents, authors must make a clear distinction
between the casual language they use in the hallway when talking to
colleagues (members of their discourse group) versus the language they
use in written communication—which has the capacity to extend to
audiences beyond the author's own discourse group. Generally, writing
for the audience who is farthest removed from the discourse group (but is
still considered part of the intended audience) is a good approach. Thus, a
journal article, for example, is written for scholarly audiences (who may or
may not be in the exact same field as the author). Therefore, it would be
best to consider a journal publication as including first-degree outsiders.
Practically, as already mentioned, this means taking the time to define
terms and introduce abbreviations (on their first use) that might
otherwise be “old-hat” to the author. In this case, it would not mean
eliminating the use of insider language because that would reduce the
scientific rigor of the work.
If authors do not take the time to make their documents clear and
accessible to all intended audiences, then the audience might end up
relying on third parties to “interpret” the information for them—
which can create error. In some cases, that third-party filtering can be
off target, and, consequently, lead to incorrect information being
passed on to said audience—a key point in Carl Sagan's essay titled
“Why We Need to Understand Science” (Grinnell, 2007) that
reinforces my call for more conscious thought of the intended
audience by authors in science writing.
Admittedly, on the other side of the issue, often times, such courtesies
(e.g., providing definitions, etc.) will have to be balanced against space
constraints/word-count limitations. Additionally, as mentioned earlier,
the use of this model and the strategy proposed herein is limited by its
dependence on the association of “distance from the discourse” and “level
of interest.” A more comprehensive model for considering audience
would deal with each item separately but would be more cumbersome to
work with and, consequently, more resource intensive; in fact, a
conceptual model combining my categorical approach with the dynamic
(and 3-dimensional) nature of Labaree's (2002) model might make for a
more comprehensive model, though it would be more cumbersome to
work with, and, consequently, more resource intensive than the 1dimensional static model I propose.
The ideas proposed in this commentary fall in concert with the
OPEI's Plain Language Initiative. Similar to Booth (a noted 20thcentury literary critic), I try to encourage a closer examination of the
author-audience relationship. My specific cause in this commentary is
to advocate for greater recognition of one's own personally subjective
vocabulary and use of jargon, and, in doing so, to inspire a greater
awareness of how such language can limit a document's accessibility
beyond the discourse group.
An improved flow of information between insiders and outsiders
to a discourse group is a key take-home point from my 2009 TRAC
workshop. Recognition of the insider–outsider language relationship,
as presented here, is limited to discourse speak and framed under the
premise of overcoming certain communication boundaries. Tinker
and Armstrong (2008) propose a second benefit in the recognition of
this relationship—particularly in the qualitative research process (like
interviews). Their research represents an offshoot of the core ideas
presented in this commentary, which might be of interest.
As indicated in this commentary, one approach to overcoming these
communication boundaries is through conscious recognition of one's own
discourse speak and a renewed consideration of audience in place of the
pedant's stance. If not written in an audience-focused manner, meaningful
ideas, unfortunately, can become easily lost in a sea of scientific parlance.
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C.D. Broyles / Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 254 (2011) 215–220
Conflict of interest disclosure
The author declares that there is no competing interest in the
submission and publication of this article.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Dr. Glenn Suter of the EPA and Dr. Barbara Hull
of Wright State University for presenting at the 2009 Toxicology and
Risk Assessment Conference and for their comments/feedback on this
commentary. The author also thanks Dr. Mileti, of Colorado University, Dr. Ken Baake of Texas Tech University, and Ms. Susan Rieth of the
EPA, for their helpful comments. Lastly, the author thanks Dr. Jon Reid,
of the EPA, for his verification of some of the terminology and science
discussed in this commentary, and Ms. Heidi Glick, of ECFlex, Inc., for
her editorial services.
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