PHIL10099: Nature of Moral Understanding
Course Lecturer:
David Levy (david.levy@ed.ac.uk)
Office Location: Dugald Stewart 5.10
Office Hour: Tuesday 4-5
Course Secretary: Sue Richards (sue.richards@ed.ac.uk)
Course Aims and Objectives
There is a distinctive experience that humans have when they think about situations
that seem to involve moral considerations. While these experiences may be
amenable to theoretical formalisation, there is important philosophical reflection to be
done without theory. What do people understand when they understand a situation
as demanding moral consideration, reflection or decision? This course aims to make
progress with this and related questions and in the process complement our other,
more formal, courses in moral philosophy.
The central question with which this course is concerned is: what is the nature of the
understanding someone has when they engage with their moral concerns? These
moral concerns are considered to arise in relatively ordinary situations of the kinds
presented in life, literature and film. These situations include decisions about what to
do; wondering how to live; questions of whether one is under a moral obligation;
contemplation of shame or guilt.
In this sense, this course is a philosophical examination of various phenomena—
moral phenomena—about which philosophical theories are constructed. The main
goals will be to focus on the nature of the understanding we have of these
phenomena with a view to clarifying which are their essential features and which do
not distinguish them. Central to this examination, we will consider how other
philosophers have tried to delimit the phenomena or characterise our moral
understanding.
Intended Learning Outcomes
To develop further the philosophical skills acquired in previous philosophy courses.
Extend as well as deepen the knowledge acquired in previous moral philosophy
courses. In particular, we will learn how to use the techniques of philosophical
analysis and division, as well as the approaches of past philosophers, and apply
them to familiar experiences of the moral as found in ordinary lives and literature.
1
Seminar Content
Requirements
The format of this course is a seminar. It requires your participation. There is no
required text for this course. Each week there are one or two required readings
indicated above the questions given for that week.
☞ You must read that article or chapter in preparation for discussion each week.
The discussion in class is no substitute for reading this material as well. You should
read some of the additional reading given. This is essential if you propose to discuss
that topic in an essay, exam or short dissertation. I have tried to ensure that the vast
majority of the reading is online through the library’s subscriptions.
1. Introduction
No required reading.
We will discuss the content of the course and seek to identify the relation an
investigation of moral understanding has to moral philosophy and ethics.
What are moral theories theories of?
To what extent, if any, is moral reflection amenable to theoretical codification?
Is Plato an ethical theorist?
How independent, if at all, are the levels of ethical theorising, viz. meta-normative,
meta-ethical, normative ethical, applied ethical?
How many varieties of ethical theory are there?
Is there an experience that moral philosophy explains?
2. Facts and Choice
I. Murdoch. Vision and choice in morality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume, XXX:32–58, 1956. (PAS is now on JSTOR.)
Are the facts given to us in moral matters?
Do moral challenges present themselves principally as requiring choice or clarity?
Is the Socratic thesis in any way defensible?
In what sense, if any, should we distinguish the role of facts in moral matters and
scientific matters?
Which facts, if any, are moral facts?
3. Perceptiveness
Martha Nussbaum, “’Finely Aware and Richly Responsible’: Moral Attention and the
Moral Task of Literature.” Journal of Philosophy (October 1985), 82(10):516-529. (J.
Phil. is on JSTOR.) Reprinted in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and
Literature, Oxford UP, 1990.
Cora Diamond. “Missing the Adventure: Reply to Martha Nussbaum,” chapter 12 in
The Realistic Spirit. MIT Press 1991. [The Library has some copies and you can
reach it through the library website.]
2
Are some people better at recognising the facts that bear on a moral matter?
To what extent, if any, are we responsible for our beliefs?
To what extent, if any, is perception “morally loaded”?
To what extent, if any, is one’s moral character revealed by what is perceived?
Can literature function as moral philosophy?
4. Remorse
R. Gaita. Remorse and its Lessons. Chapter 4 in Good & Evil: An Absolute
Conception. Macmillan, London, 1991/2004, 1st or 2nd Edition. (The library has
several copies.)
Is remorse distinct from guilt or bad conscience?
Can one be remorseful for something done on an involuntary basis?
To what extent, if any, is remorse personal?
To what extent, if any, Is the moral understanding revealed in remorse distinct from
that revealed prior to acting?
Is remorse distinct from regret?
Is remorse solely a hallmark of a moral thought or experience?
5. Forgiveness
Aurel Kolnai. Forgiveness. Ch. 10 in Ethics, Value and Reality. Athlone Press,
London 1977. Originally in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1973-4. (PAS is
on JSTOR.)
Is forgiveness possible?
Must the person who forgives also condone what is forgiven?
What, if any, are the preconditions for forgiveness?
Does forgiveness require a shared understanding between the forgiver and the
forgiven?
Are we ever obliged to forgive?
6. Individuality
P. Winch. The universalizability of moral judgements. In Ethics and Action, pages
151–170. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1972. Originally in Monist, vol. 49,
1965. (Monist is available online through the library, but you must be onsite for
access.)
What scope, if any, is there for individuality in one’s understanding of moral matters?
What is the universalizability requirement on moral judgments? Does it hold?
When, if at all, does moral disagreement imply that one party is wrong?
Does the genuine possibility of faultless moral disagreement imply that there are no
moral facts?
7. Moral Argument
Sarah McGrath, "Normative Ethics, Conversion, and Pictures as Tools of Moral
Persuasion", in Timmons, ed., Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1, 2011, pp. 268296.
[The library should have a copy or you can find one here: http://bit.ly/VmODUv]
3
To what extent, if any, are the forms of moral argument distinct from other arguments
in philosophy?
To what extent, if any, are moral arguments not amenable to the logico-deductive
model of proof familiar in logic and mathematics?
What role does example play in moral argument?
To what extent, if any, is there a difference between argument and persuasion?
8. The Banal and Absurd
R. Gaita. Fearless Thinkers and Evil Thoughts. Chapter 17 in Good & Evil: An
Absolute Conception. Macmillan, London, 1991/2004. 1st or 2nd Edition. (The library
has several copies.)
What if anything is the mark of the absurd?
Is a formal definition of what is absurd possible, other than contradiction?
Are there things we morally should fear to think?
Is absurdity a matter of conceptual incoherence?
Is banality a form of moral misunderstanding?
9. Moral Limits
B. Williams. Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass, 1985. Chapter 10. (Library has 3 copies, 2 on short loan.)
Does the moral always trump the prudential? (i.e. is morality higher than prudence?)
Can we decide in advance that some matters are never moral matters?
Is the rejection of morality of itself immoral?
Does the implication in an ethical theory that moral considerations are ubiquitous
count against its prima facie plausibility?
What limits, if any, are there on morality?
10. Moral Problems and Moral Expertise
Sarah McGrath, “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism,”
Journal of Philosophy 108 (3), 2011, pp. 110-137.
\What is a moral problem?
What is the solution to a moral problem?
Can someone be morally successful?
Can moral problems be caused or solved by luck?
Are there moral experts? What do they know?
Are moral problems always inter-personal?
11. Moral Philosophy and Moral Understanding
C. Diamond. Having a rough story about what moral philosophy is. In The Realistic
Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, pages 367–381. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass, 1991. Originally in New Literary History, Vol. 15, 1983-4.
To what extent, if any, is moral understanding distinct from moral knowledge?
How, if at all, does moral understanding increase?
What are the sources of moral understanding?
What relation, if any, is there between moral theory and moral understanding?
4
What is moral understanding understanding of?
Readings
Part I
1. Introduction
S. Hampshire. Fallacies in moral philosophy. Mind, 58:466–482, 1949.
G. E. M. Anscombe. Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, XXXIII:1–19, 1958.
R. Gaita. The Scope of Academic Moral Philosophy. Good & Evil: An Absolute
Conception. Macmillan, London, 1991/2004, 1st or 2nd Edition.
Bernard Mayo. “Aims and Methods in Moral Philosophy,” Chapter 1 in Ethics and the
Moral Life, Macmillan: London, 1958.
Julia Annas. “Prudence and Morality in Ancient and Modern Ethics,” Ethics, Vol. 105,
No. 2 (Jan., 1995), pp. 241-257.
Michael Stocker. “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 14 (Aug. 12, 1976), pp. 453-466.
I have found the following general work on ethics to have a format and style congenial to
the approach of this class. Therefore, you may find many of its entries helpful in
grounding yourself in moral philosophy more broadly conceived.
O. Kuusela. Key Terms in Ethics. Continuum, London, 2011.
In addition, for a fair-minded description of the “state of the art” in ethics and moral
philosophy as it is understood now, the following book is good.
C. Bennett. What is this thing called ethics? Routledge, London, 2010.
Some of the topics we will discuss are covered in more general and sometimes
introductory ways in:
J. Skorupski, The Routledge Companion to Ethics, Part V Morality, Routledge, London,
2010. [Chapters 46-50]
2. Facts and Choice
B. Williams. Morality and the emotions. In Problems of the self: philosophical papers,
1956-1972, pages 207–229. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973.
I. Murdoch. The idea of perfection. In The Sovereignty of Good, pages 1–45. Routledge
& Kegan Paul, London, 1970.
C. Diamond. Wittgenstein, mathematics and ethics: Resisting the attractions of realism.
5
In H. Sluga and D. Stern, editors, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, pages
226–260. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
R. Rhees. Moral Questions. Ed. D.Z. Phillips. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999,
chapters 5-9.
Holland, R. F., ‘Good and Evil in Action’, in Against Empiricism: On Education,
Epistemology and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 110–125.
Peta Bowden, “Ethical Attention: Accumulating Understandings,” European Journal of
Philosophy, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 59 - 77.
D. Levy. Morality without Agency. In E. Zamuner and D. Levy, editors, Wittgenstein’s
Enduring Arguments. Routledge, London, 2009.
Mark Johnson, “Imagination in Moral Judgment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Dec., 1985), pp. 265-280.
3. Perceptiveness
R. F. Holland. Is goodness a mystery? In Against Empiricism: On Education,
Epistemology and Value, pages 92–109. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.
Holland, R. F.. “Absolute Ethics, Mathematics and the Impossibility of Politics”, in
Against Empiricism: On Education, Epistemology and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1980), pp. 126–142.
Martha Nussbaum, “Love’s Knowledge”, in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy
and Literature, Oxford UP, 1990.
Beardsmore, R. W. Facts and ‘Pure Facts’. In Moral Reasoning. London: Routledge & K.
Paul, 1969.
Edward Harcourt, “The Dangers of Fiction: Lord Jim and Moral Perfectionism,”
forthcoming in Julian Dodd (ed.), Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of
Peter Goldie, Oxford University Press.
Brian P. McLaughlin, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (editors), Perspectives on Self-Deception,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, part V.
There is a modest but interesting literature on ethics and literature, some titles relevant
to our discussion are listed below.
Richard Raatzsch. The Apologetics of Evil: The Case of Iago, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009.
Michael Weston, Philosophy, Literature and the Human Good, London: Routledge,
2001. Esp. chapters 5-8.
Peter Johnson. Moral Philosophers and the Novel: A Study of Winch, Nussbaum and
Rorty, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2004.
6
Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, “The Ancient Quarrel: Philosophy and Literature,” The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, March 2011. [You can download this from the
Tanner Lectures website http://tannerlectures.utah.edu]
Part II
4. Remorse
Michael Weston. “Morality and the Past,” ch. 3 in Morality and the Self, Basil Blackwell
1975.
J. Deigh. Love, guilt and the sense of justice. In The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays
in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory, pages 39–64. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1996.
R. Rosthal. Moral weakness and remorse. Mind, 76(304):576–579, 1967.
P. F. Strawson. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 68:1–25,
1962.
I. Thalberg. Rosthal’s notion of remorse and irrevocability. Mind, 77(306):288–289,
1968.
M. Buber. Guilt and guilt feelings. In M. Friedman, editor, The Knowledge of Man. Allen
& Unwin, London, 1965.
C. G. Luckhardt. Remorse, Regret and the Socratic Paradox. Analysis 1975
Williams, Bernard, ‘Ethical Consistency’, in Problems of the self : philosophical papers,
1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 166–186.
Phil Hutchinson. Shame and Philosophy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
Stephen De Wijze, “Tragic-Remorse–The Anguish of Dirty Hands,” Ethical Theory And
Moral Practice, Volume 7, Number 5 (2005), pp. 453-471.
Lucien Jerphagnon, “Repentance,” Philosophy Today, 1959, pp. 176-182.
D. Z. Phillips and H. S. Price, “Remorse without Repudiation,” Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 1
(Oct., 1967), pp. 18-20
5. Forgiveness
Hannah Arendt, “Irreversibility and the power to forgive”, The Human Condition, chapter
33, 1958, several publishers and subsequent editions.
Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, Cambridge University
Press, 2007, esp. Chs. 1 and 2.
7
Peter Goldie, The Mess Inside, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, chap. 5 "SelfForgiveness."
David Konstan, Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Garrard, E. and McNaughton D., Forgiveness, London: Acumen, 2010.
Bishop Butler, Sermons VIII and IX, upon Resentment and Forgiveness of injuries
http://anglicanhistory.org/butler/rolls/index.html, several print versions.
Luc Bovens, “Apologies” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108: 219-239 (2008).
Luc Bovens, “Must I be forgiven” Analysis 2009 69(2):227-233.
C. Calhoun. Changing One’s Heart. Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 1. (Oct., 1992), pp. 76-96.
Benbaji H. and Heyd D., “The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration as
Supererogatory”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 31(4), 2001, pp. 567-586.
Jacque Derrida, "On Forgiveness", in On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (New York:
Routledge, 2002.
Trudy Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," American Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 36(1), 1999, pp. 59- 75.
E. Garrard, D. McNaughton. In defence of Unconditional Forgiveness. Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 2002-3.
Chris Bennett. Personal and Redemptive Forgiveness. European Journal of Philosophy
11:2, pp. 127-144.
Downie, R.S. “Forgiveness” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol 15 No.59, 1965.
Gaita, R. “Better One Than Ten” Philosophical Investigations, Vol 5, No 2, 1982.
Hieronymi, P. “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research Vol. LXII No.3, 2001.
Murphy, J. G. “Forgiveness and Resentment” in Forgiveness and Mercy, eds. J. Murphy
and J. Hampton, Cambridge University Press, 1988, originally in Midwest Studies in
Philosophy VII, pp.503-515, 1982.
Neblett, William, “Forgiveness and Ideals,” Mind 1974.
Govier, Trudy, Forgiveness and Revenge, London: Routledge, 2002. See also C.
Bennett, “Forgiveness and the Claims of Retribution” (extended review of Trudy Govier,
Forgiveness and Revenge) Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2004, pp. 89-102.
Zaibert, Leo,”The Paradox of Forgiveness,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume
8
6, Number 3, 2009 , pp. 365-393.
Novitz, David, “Forgiveness and Self-Respect,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 1998, v. 58:2.
Lang, B. “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 31:2, 1994.
North, J. “Wrongdoing and Forgiveness,” Philosophy, 42:499-508, 1987.
O'Shaughnessy, R., “Forgiveness”, Philosophy, 42:336-352, 1967.
Rashdall, Hastings, “The Ethics of Forgiveness,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 10,
No. 2, pp. 193-206, 1900. [The journal is the precursor to Ethics.]
Richards, “Forgiveness,” Ethics, v. 99, pp. 77-97, 1988.
Murray, M. J. "Repentence and Forgiveness," The World of Forgiveness, Vol 2, n.1,
June 1998, also http://edisk.fandm.edu/michael.murray/forgiveness.pdf [Though not
referenced, he has Kolnai’s paradox squarely in mind.]
6. Individuality
[There is a considerable literature on this topic, the below section exposes an
uncommon approach.]
Winch, Peter, ‘Trying’, in Ethics and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972),
pp. 130–150.
Jann Benson, “Reflections on the Import of Universalizability in Ethics,” Philosophical
Forum 12, 1981, pp. 225-237.
O. Flanagan. Varieties of Moral Personality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass, 1991. Part I.
Bernard Mayo, “Ethical Relativism,” Chapter 3 in Ethics and the Moral Life, Macmillan:
London, 1958.
Diamond, Cora, ‘Moral Differences and Distances: Some Questions’, in: Alanen, Lilli,
Heinmaa, Sara and Walgren, Thomas, editors, Commonality and Particularity in
Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 197–234.
Hertzberg, Lars, ‘On Moral Necessity’, in: Gaita, Raimond, editor, Value and
Understanding: Essays for Peter Winch (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 102–118.
Hertzberg, Lars, ‘On Moral Necessity’, in: The Limits of Experience, volume 56
(Helsinki:Societas Philosophica Fennica, 1994), pp. 220–238. (This version subtly varies
from the above. I can lend this version if required.)
C. Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” Journal of Political Philosophy, June 2004.
C. Calhoun, "Moral Failure," in On Feminist Ethics and Politics, edited by Claudia Card
9
(University of Kansas Press, 1999).
Alweiss, Lillian, “On Moral Dilemmas: Winch, Kant and Billy Budd,” Philosophy 2003.
Atwell, John, “A Note on Decisions, Judgements and Universalizability,” Ethics, 1967.
Kolenda, Konstentin, “Moral Conflicts and Universalizability,” Philosophy 1975.
Montague, Roger, “Winch on Agents' Judgements,” Analysis 1974.
C. Cowley, “The Role of Perspective in Ethics,” Ethical Perspectives v. 13:1, pp. 11-31.
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, ‘One word of truth. . . ’: The Nobel Speech on Literature 1970,
trans. by BBC Russian Service (London: The Bodley Head, 1972).
Part III
7. Moral Argument
Alison Hills, “Moral Testimony,” Philosophy Compass, 8:6, 2013, 552-559.
O. O’Neill. The power of example. Philosophy, pages 5–29, 1986.
C. Diamond. Anything but argument? In The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy,
and the Mind, pages 291–308. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1991. Originally in
Philosophical Investigations Vol. 5 1982.
Sami Pihlström. Ethical unthinkabilities and philosophical seriousness. Metaphilosophy,
Vol. 40, No. 5, October 2009.
Kolnai, Aurel, ‘Moral Consensus’, in: Dunlop, Francis and Klug, Brian, editors, Ethics,
Value and Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai (London: Athlone Press, 1977), pp.
144–164. Originally in PAS 1969-70.
Winch, Peter, ‘Who is my Neighbour?’, in Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), pp. 154–166.
Bernard Mayo, “Reason in Ethics,” Chapter 4 in Ethics and the Moral Life, Macmillan:
London, 1958.
Peter Winch. “Persuasion” Midwest Studies In Philosophy. Volume 17 Issue
1, Pages 123 - 137.
Zed Adams, “Moral Mistakes,” Philosophical Investigations, 34:1 January 2011, pp. 122.
Julia Driver. “Autonomy and the asymmetry problem for moral expertise.” Philosophical
Studies, 128, 2006. 619–644.
10
Alison Hills. “Moral testimony and moral epistemology”. Ethics, 120(1) 2009. 94–127.
Beardsmore, R. W. Moral Reasoning. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1969.
S. Toulmin. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1950.
S. Toulmin. Uses of Argument, Updated Edition. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2003. Prior edition also suitable.
G. Orwell. A hanging. In I. Angus and S. Orwell, editors, The Collected Essays,
Journalism, and Letters Volume I: An Age Like This, pages 66–71. Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1993.
An early question concerning the form and force of even the most basic argument was
posed by Lewis Carroll. Over a century a secondary literature developed in response to
his short paper.
L. Carroll. What the tortoise said to achilles. Mind, 4(14):278–280, 1895.
Bartely, III, W. W. "Achilles, The Tortoise, and Explanation in Science and History." The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 13 (1962), 15-33.
Blackburn, Simon "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind, 104 (1995), 695-711.
Brown, D. G. "What The Tortoise Taught Us." Mind, 63 (1954), 170-179.
Harris Jr., James F. "Achilles Replies," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 47 (1969),
322-324.
Hollis, Martin. "A Retort to the Tortoise," Mind, 84 (1975), 610-616.
Rees, W.J., "What Achilles said to the Tortoise." Mind, 60 (1951), 241-246.
Ryle, Gilbert. "'If', 'So', and 'Because'." In Philosophical Analysis. Ed.Max Black.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1950, pp. 302-318. Also in Collected Papers.
London: Hutchinson, 1971, Vol. II, pp. 234-49.
Smiley, Timothy. "A Tale of Two Tortoises." Mind, 104 (1995), 725-736.
8. The Banal and Absurd
R. Gaita, “Forms of the Unthinkable”, in A Common Humanity: thinking about love and
truth and justice, Routledge 2000.
Diamond, Cora, ‘Easting Meat and Eating People’, in: The The Realistic Spirit:
Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991. Originally
in Philosophy, vol. 53, 1982.
P. Singer. Famine, affluence and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(3):229–243,
11
1972.
Bernard Mayo, “Moral Principles and Moral Man,” Chapter 10 in Ethics and the Moral
Life, Macmillan: London, 1958.
D.Z. Phillips, “Allegiance and Change in Morality” in Through A Darkening Glass:
Philosophy, Literature and Cultural Change, University of Notre Dame Press, 1982.
Originally in Philosophy and the Arts, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, volume 6
(this volume is in the library).
Thomas Nagel. The Absurd. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 20, 716-727. Oct.
21, 1971. Reprinted in his Mortal Questions.
9. Moral Limits
Baron, Marcia, ‘On Admirable Immorality’, in Ethics (April 1986), pp. 557–566.
Susan Wolf. Moral Saints. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No.8 (Aug., 1982), 419439.
R. Rhees. On Knowing the Difference Between Right and Wrong. Without Answers.
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969, pp. 97-102.
Bernard Williams. Moral Incapacity. In Making Sense of Humanity and other
philosophical papers, Cambridge UP, 1995.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Lecture on Ethics. Edited by Levy, D., Zamuner, E. and E. V.
DiLascio. Blackwell, 2014. Also in the Philosophical Review 1965.
Peter Winch. Moral Integrity. In Ethics and Action, pages 151–170. Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1972.
R. Gaita. The Repudiation of Morality. In Good & Evil: An Absolute Conception.
Macmillan/Routledge, London, 1991/2004, 1st or 2nd Edition.
Bernard Mayo, “Commitments and Issues,” Chapter 6 in Ethics and the Moral Life,
Macmillan: London, 1958.
D.Z. Phillips, “Some Limits to Moral Endeavour” in Through A Darkening Glass:
Philosophy, Literature and Cultural Change, University of Notre Dame Press, 1982.
Beardsmore, R. W. The Rebel and Moral Traditions. In Moral Reasoning. London:
Routledge & K. Paul, 1969.
Chris Bennett, "The Limits of Mercy," Ratio vol.17, no.2, 2004, pp. 1-11
Ignatieff, M., "The Limits of Sainthood," The New Republic, June 18, 1990 pp. 40-46.
10. Moral Problems and Moral Expertise
Plato, Laches.
12
S. Cavell. Must we mean what we say? In Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of
Essays, pages 1–43. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.
R. Rhees. 'What are moral statements like?' In D. Z. Phillips, editor, Without Answers.
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
R. Rhees. Moral Questions. Ed. D.Z. Phillips. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, esp.
chapter 8, and chapters 5-9.
Winch, Peter, ‘Particularity and Morals’, in: Trying to Make Sense (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell,1987), pp. 167–180.
Sarah McGrath, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise,” Shafer-Landau, ed. Oxford
Studies in Metaethics v.4: 87-107, 2007.
Sarah McGrath, “The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference,” Philosophical Perspectives,
Volume 23 Issue 1, pp. 321–344, 2009.
David Enoch, “A Defense of Moral Deference,” manuscript, available:
http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/ADefenseMoralDeference.pdf
Bernard Mayo, “The Nature of Moral Problems,” Chapter 7 in Ethics and the Moral Life,
Macmillan: London, 1958.
Bernard Mayo, “Ethics and Moral Controversy”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 4, No.
14 (Jan., 1954), pp. 1-14
Barabas, M. The Problem with the Moral Problem: An Example of Lying.
Organon F, VIII. (2001), No 4, pp 353-387. (I will supply a copy of this on request.)
C. Cowley. Scientific Contribution: A new rejection of moral expertise. Medicine, Health
Care and Philosophy (2005) 8:273–279
P. Singer, “Moral Experts”, Analysis 32:115-117, 1972.
11. Moral Philosophy and Moral Understanding
“Flawed Crystals: James’s The Golden Bowl and Literature as Moral Philosophy.” New
Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation (Autumn 1983), 15(1):25-50.
Reprinted in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford UP, 1990.
Peter Winch. Can a good man be harmed? in Ethics and Action Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London, 1972. Originally in Proc. Arist. Soc. 1965-1966.
H. A. Prichard. Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Mind, 21:21–37, 1912.
R. Gaita. Moral Understanding. Chapter 15 in Good & Evil: An Absolute Conception.
Macmillan, London, 1991/2004, 1st or 2nd Edition.
Kieran Setiya, “Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?,” Philosophical Topics
Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 2010.
13
Lars Hertzberg, “On Knowing Right from Wrong,” unpublished.
http://web.abo.fi/fak/hf/filosofi/Staff/lhertzbe/Text/Knowing_Right_from_Wrong.pdf
Rhees, Rush. Ethics and Human Lives. Part IV in D. Z Phillips (ed.) Moral Questions.
New York: Macmillan Press, 1999.
S. Darwall, “Moral Obligation: Form and Substance,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 2009/10.
S. Berker, “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 37:4, pp. 293-329.
John Kekes, Enjoyment: The Moral Significance of Styles of Life, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2008.
Aurel Kolnai, Ethics, Value and Reality, Athlone Press, 1977.
Blustein, J. The Moral Demands of Memory. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Jean Kazez. The Weight of Things: Philosophy and the Good Life, Blackwell 2007.
Concluding Note
The following books touch on many of the themes we will discuss in this course
without giving the sort of treatment we will be obliged to give. You may find them
stimulating.
Christopher Hamilton, Living Philosophy: Reflections on Life, Meaning and Morality,
University of Edinburgh Press, 2001.
Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Many Faces of Evil: Historical Perspectives, Routledge,
2001.
7. Assessment
Exam
This course will be assessed solely on the basis of an exam given in the April/May
2016 diet of examinations. Students who qualify (usually fourth year single honours
philosophy students) may be obliged to submit a Coursework Dissertation (formerly
called long essay or short dissertation) instead of sitting the exam. The title of your
short dissertation must be approved in advance by submitting it to me in person or
by email. After your title is approved you will complete a form confirming this title
and submit it to the departmental office. Generally, any question listed below for
discussion in a seminar is a suitable short dissertation title.
14
Formative Essay
In addition, anyone can submit an essay of 2000 words to me for assessment and
comment. This “formative essay” will not count toward determining your mark for
this class or the class of degree you are ultimately awarded, unless special
circumstances prevent you from completing the prescribed assessment above.
However the essay is an excellent opportunity to improve your philosophical writing
and try arguments you may ultimately use in the exam or short dissertation. I
strongly urge you to submit this essay. If you submit the essay by the end of
teaching week 9, I will return it to you in class in teaching week 11. If you submit the
essay by the end of teaching week 11, I will return the essay to you via the
philosophy office in week 1 of the exam term. Essays must be submitted, with a
cover sheet, in the manner prescribed by the philosophy office. Generally, any
question listed below for discussion in a seminar is a suitable formative essay
question.
15