Unified and Joint Land
Operations: Doctrine for
Landpower
Dr John A. Bonin
15 October 2014
We are convinced that significant operational
flexibility is provided the combatant commander
when Army corps and division headquarters are
prepared to function as the core element of a joint
task force or as a joint land component command.
General Raymond D. Odierno, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
13 March 2013
The Army Operating Concept
“The Army’s operating concept is the core of its doctrine. It must be
uniformly known and understood within the Service . . .”
Unified Land Operations
…describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and
maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through
simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent
or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict
resolution.
Unified Land Operations are executed through Decisive Action and by
means of Army core competencies as guided by Mission Command
The operating concept describes how Army forces adapt to meet the distinct
requirements of unified land operations . . . broad enough to describe operations
now and in the near future . . . flexible enough to apply in any situation worldwide.
3
LANDPOWER
• The Army gives the United States landpower. Landpower is the
ability –by threat, force, or occupation-to gain, sustain, and exploit
control over land, resources, and people. Landpower includes the
ability to:
– Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
– Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in an
operational environment.
– Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the
conditions for political and economic development.
– Address the consequences of catastrophic events-both natural
and manmade-to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic
civil services.
– Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence
and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an
operational environment.
ADP 1, The Army, Sept 2012
ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: 4 MAR 43
ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
U.K. Chiefs
of Staff
Combined
Chiefs of Staff
US Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Allied Force
Headquarters
EISENHOWER
Med Air
Command
18th Army
Group
Naval
CINC Med
5th US
Army
TEDDER
ALEXANDER
CUNNINGHAM
CLARK
Malta Air
Command
NW Strat
Air Force
DOOLITTLE
Mideast Air
Command
NW Coast
Air Force
NWA Air
Forces
1st British
Army
II US
Corps
8th British
Army
Royal Navy
Levant
8th US
Fleet
SPAATZ
ANDERSON
PATTON
MONTGOMERY
HARWOOD
HEWITT
British
NW Tac
Air Force
V British
Corps
XIX FR
Corps
U.S.
CONINGHAM
ALLFREY
KOELTZ
Combined
French
CENTRAL PACIFIC FORCES: April 1945
Pacific Ocean Areas
ADM Nimitz
U.S Army POA
LTG Richardson
Operation ICEBERG
CENTRAL PACIFIC TFs
(5th FLEET)
ADM Spruance
Naval Covering & Striking Force
TF 50
ADM Spruance
TF 58
Fast Carrier Force
Objectives:
TF 57
British Carrier Force
Joint Expeditionary Force
TF 51
VADM Turner
Amph Spt Forces
TF 52, 54
Expeditionary Troops
TF 56
LTG Buckner
Naval Atk Forces
TF 53,55
– Establish bases from which to
• Attack the Japanese main islands from air & sea; Support further
operations in the E. China Sea; Sever Japanese LOCs
– Establish secure LOCs to China
– Maintain unremitting pressure on Japan
EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS: April 1945
Expeditionary Troops
TF56 (10th Army)
LTG Buckner
Island Command
MG Wallace
XXIV Corps
MG Hodge
Tactical Air Force
MGen Mulcahy
Army Services of Supply
Joint Communications
Military Government
7th Inf Div
96 Inf Div
Construction Troops
-38 Eng Bns & NCBs
10th Army-MISSION:
Naval and AAF Bases
III Amph Corps
MGen Geiger
1st Mar Div
Naval Forces
RADM Cobb
6 th Mar Div
As Expeditionary Troops, initially under Expeditionary
Force Commander (JTF 51):
–Assist in the capture, occupation, defense, and development of OKINAWA
–Establish control of the Ryukyu area
–Capture, develop, and defend additional positions
•Upon completion of Amph phase, 10th Army then becomes a JTF 99 directly
under CinC POA (with Naval, USMC, and AAF elms).
ICEBERG-LESSONS LEARNED
• Demonstrated maturity of Amphibious operations by U.S.
forces
• Okinawa represented joint service cooperation at its
finest and a model of interservice mutual support
• Artillery and air support was used interchangeably,
supporting those units with the greatest need and
highest priority
• But, many of these “lessons” were not retained due to
perceived irrelevance of landpower after use of the ABomb and in the face of Service parochialisms during the
post-war drawdown.
XXXXX
UN Forces under EUSA had 932,539 troops
in 6 USA, 1 USMC, 1 UK CW, and 14 ROK
Divisions. [267,177 USA; 35,306 USMC
39,145 UN; 590,901 ROK]
U.S. Army in Korea 27 July 1953
USFFE
XX
ROK
3
XX
ROK
5
XXXX
EUSA
KMAG
XXX
XXX
XXX
I X US
I US
XX
ROK
1
XX
1 CW
XX
US 25
ID
[EUSA Reserve]
XX
US 1st
MAR (+)
XX
US 7th
ID
X
409th
ENG Bde
XX
ROK
2
XX
US 2d
ID
XX
ROK
Cap
1st,
IIInd
22 ,
8226th
SIG Grps
III
XXX
XXX
X US
II ROK
I ROK
187th
ABN RCT
XX
ROK
9
XX
US
3rd ID
XX
ROK
11
XX
ROK
7
x
44th AAA
Bde
XX
ROK
8
XX
ROK
6
XX
US
40th ID
XX
ROK
12
III
1st
Trans
Avn Bn (Prov)
30th MED
GRP
XX
US 45th
ID
XX
ROK
20
III
59,
ORD
GRP
XX
ROK
21
XX
ROK
15
III
501st
Comms
Recon Grp
Non-US/ROK UN Combat Forces included: 1st Commonwealth
Division (with BR, CDN, AUS, and NZ units); a Turkish Bde; and
Belgian, French, Dutch, Thai, Greek, Ethiopian, Columbian, and
Philippine Bns. The Turkish Bde and the other Bns were attached
to US Divisions.
U.S. /RVNAF/FW COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS VIETNAM 1967
PEAK U.S ARMY-365,000
Corps and Below~170,000
(7 Divs & 5 Sep Bdes/ACRs
Theater and EAC~195,000
US NCA/JCS
SVN NCA
USPACOM
ADM Sharp
USARPAC
FW
Forces
USMACV
JGS,
RVNAF
GEN
Westmoreland
USARV
GEN
Westmoreland
Army Adv
Grp IV CTZ
IV CTZ,
RVNAF
II FF
III CTZ,
RVNAF
I FF
II CTZ,
RVNAF
III MAF
I CTZ,
RVNAF
FMF,
PAC
PACFLT
Naval
Forces, VN
PACAF
7th AF
Coordination
COCOM
OPCON
ADCON
DESERT STORM
COALITION OPERATIONS
GEN
SCHWARZKOPF
JOINT MILITARY COMMITTEE
Joint Force
GEN HAMMAD
CENTCOM
GEN SCHWARZKOPF
STAFF
Command
C3IC
LTG
KHALED
LAND OPERATIONS IN
EASTERN & NORTHERN PROVINCES
LTG YEOSOCK
LTG KHALED
DCG - MG ABDUL AZIZ
Saudi
Saudi
AF
Navy
LTG
ADM
AL-Buhairi
AL- Mufadhi
MG
East
COL JOHNSON
SVC STAFFS
LTG YEOSOCK
North
Cmd
MG
Al-Akami
MLT
MLT
MLT
VDCG - MG SWARTZ
J STAFF
Al-Muhaya
Cmd
SOCCENT
EQ
Syrian
CORPS
Div
LTG BOOMER
LTG HORNER
ARCENT
MARCENT
VII Corps 146,321 (123, 321 USA)
XVIII Corps-117,160 (106,040 USA)
“Tiger Bde” w/USMC ~6,000
22 SUPCOM-38,825
Army Troops-33,454; ARSOF-2,585
TOTAL- 338,345 (304,215 USA)
/I MEF
VADM MAUZ
CENTAF/
NAVCENT
JFACC
L18
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (1 JUN 99)
CINCEUR SACEUR
GEN Clark
NAVEUR
AF
JTF NA SOUTH
USAFE
Gen Jumper
USAREUR SFOR
ADM Ellis
6 FLT/
V CORPS 16 AF/AIR
SOUTH
SFS TF HAWK
GEN Meigs
ARRC
(KFOR)
AMF(L)
(AFOR)
VADM Murphy LTG Hendrix LtGen Short LTG Jackson LTG Reith
3 USAF
JTF SH
TF
EAGLE
CAOC
MG Byrnes
MajGen Hinton
ADCON
COCOM
EUCOM
OPCON
TACON
TF
FALCON
BG Craddock
NATO
OPCON
Kosovo Lessons Learned
-Ruling out a ground option corrupted JFLCC continuity, removed
campaign planning, challenged C2, and resulted in a hasty last
minute ground planning effort
• Lack of a Ground Component Commander was a mistake
• The Air Campaign-Effective But Politically constrained and . . .
significant ground forces were still required to occupy and secure
the area.
• “A View from the Top,” Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander, Joint Task Force
NOBLE ANVIL during Operation ALLIED FORCE
JFLCC Development
• A JFC Option since Goldwater-Nichols of 1986
– Army not interested in pushing; historically many
Army commanders served as both CINC and their
own JFLCC.
– Marines opposed; didn’t want to be dismembered
by the JFACC and JFLCC
• CINCCENT designated ARCENT as DJFLCC post
Desert Storm as an interim
• GEN Zinni designated LTG Franks as JFLCC on
23 June 1998 for his major OPLAN.
– “We can make the land component
command arrangement work. There will
be no more occasions in the Central
Command’s area of operations where
Marines will fight one ground war and
the Army fights a different ground war.
There will be one ground war and a
single land component commander.”
General Anthony C. Zinni
Commander, US Central Command
March 2000
– “To improve strategic responsiveness, we will enable our (ASCCs)
to function both as JFLCC and as
ARFOR HQ.”
– “We will enable our Corps to
function as JFLCC, ARFOR, and
JTF HQs.”
General Eric K. Shinsecki, CSA
(AUSA Speech 12 Oct 99)
Status of Doctrine Nov 1999
FM 100-1
The Army
NCA
CJCS
2000
2000
Solid body
of doctrine
JTF CDR
JFLCC
Department
of the Army
CINC
OR
JFLCC OR
FM 100-7
The Army
in Theater
Operations
ASCC
FM 100-5
OPERATIONS
2000
Emerging doctrine
xxx
xxx
ARFOR
FM 100-15
CORPS
FM 100-15
OPERATIONS
xx
x
xx
x
xx
x
xx
xx
CORPS
FM 100-15
OPERATIONS
CORPS
OPERATIONS
xx
Solid body
of doctrine
Filling the Doctrinal Voids
JFLCC
The development of JFLCC doctrine:
• Proposal submitted to Joint Staff Jan 00
• JWFC conducted front-end analysis (FEA)
• Approved at Joint Doctrine Working Party
Apr 00
• Army as Lead Agent; USMC as Technical
Review Authority
• JFLCC Handbook developed, Pub as FM 331 & MCWP 3-40.7 in Dec 2001
• JP 3-31: Command & Control of Joint
Land Operations published March 2004.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS ENDURING FREEDOM
November 2001
JFC /
F2C2
COORD
COMCENT
COMEUR
GEN FRANKS
Gen RALSTON
21
TSC
COCOM
ARCENT
CFLCC
CENTAF
CFACC
CINCSOC
Space &
Info Ops Elm
NAVCENT
MARCENT
CJFMCC
JTF AG
LtGen
HAILSTON
VADM MOORE
LTG MIKOLASHEK LtGen WALD
COAL
FORCES
Gen HOLLAND
SOCCENT
C/JSOTF
RADM CALLAND
OPCON
TF
Firepower
CFLCC
(FWD)
CAOC
JTF SWA
CFMCC
C/JTF 50
U.S.
SOF
BRITISH
SAS
SOF
Elms
10TH ID
CVBGs
TF ARGO
NAUT
TF 58
1ST MEB
NAVAL
AIR
TACON
GRD
CFLCC/3rd Army
I MEF & UK-92,000
V Corps- 134,000
377 TSC-30,000
Army Troops-26,000
ARSOF-10,000
TOTAL-292,000 (200,000-USA)
In Iraqi Freedom
XXXXX
CENTCOM
ARCENT also served as
CJTF-7 from 1 May 2003 until
15 June 2003 when V Corps
became CJTF-7
GEN FRANKS
XXXX
CFLCC
LTG MCKIERNAN
JSOTF North
XXX
X
XXX
V
Corps
LTG WALLACE
XX
X
XX
XX
1 AD
TF 2/82
3ID
101 AAD
III
I MEF
LTG CONWAY
X
XX
XX
2 MEB
1 MARDIV
1 UK AD
173
ABN
XX
4
3
++
++
++
++
x
++
X
X
X
377 TSC
416
ENCOM
335
SIG CMD
32
AAMDC
75
XTF
352
CA CMD
513
MI BDE
244
AVN BDE
455
Chem
X
++
++
X
++
++
800 EPW
BDE
3 PERS
COM
366 FIN
COM
220 MP
BDE
143
TRANSCOM
3 MED
COM
JSOTF
GEN Mattis
JFMCC
CENTCOM
SACEUR
ADM Stavridis
ISAF
JFMCC
GEN
Austen
USF-I
XVIII
US
LCC-I Corps
LTG
Helmick
ARCENT JFACC
JFLCC
Theater JFLCC
1st Theater
Sustainment
Command
MARCENT
CUSF-A
GEN
Allen
LTG Brooks
311th Theater
NETOPS
Command
IJC
513th
Military
Intelligence
Brigade
I Corps MN
LCC-A
LTG
Scaparrotti
July 2011 CENTCOM AOR
JFLCC DOCTRINE
• JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States: A
JFC has the authority to organize assigned or attached
forces . . . to best accomplish the assigned mission based
on the CONOPS.
– JFCs may establish functional component commands to conduct
operations
– Functional component commander’s staffs should Service
representation from each represented Service
– The joint force land component commander will normally be a
Service Component Commander.
DEFINITION: JFLCC:
The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified
command, or a joint task force responsible to the establishing
commander for making recommendations on the proper employment
of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces;
planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such
operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land
component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish
missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.
Joint Pub 3-0
JP 3-31, Feb 2014: New Definitions
• Joint Land Operations include any type of joint military
operations, singly or in combination, performed across
the range of military operations with land forces (Army,
Marine, or Special operations) made available by Service
components in support of the JFCs’ campaign.
• Land Control Operations. The employment of ground
forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as
appropriate) to control land vital areas.
• Land Domain. The area of the Earth’s surface ending at
the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime
domain in the landward segment of the littorals.
SELECTED ASPECTS OF LAND ENVIRONMENTS
ASPECT
Number of Civilians
Amount of valuable infrastructure
Multi-dimensional operational
environment
Restrictive rules of engagement
Detection, observation, engagement fires
Avenues of approach
Ease of vehicular movement and
maneuver
Communications functionality
Logistics requirements
URBAN
High
High
Yes
Yes
Short
Many
Low
Degraded
High
DESERT
Low
Low
No
No
Long
Many
High
Fully
Capable
High
JUNGLE
MOUNTAIN
SUBTERRANEAN
Low
Low
Some
No
Short
Few
Low
Degraded
Low
Low
Yes
No
Medium
Few
Medium
Degraded
Low
High
Yes
No
Short
Few
N/A
Degraded
High
Medium
High
AOR with MULTIPLE JFLCCs
CCDR
JTF-A
TheaterJFLCC
Theater
Sustainment
Command
JOA
JFLCC
JFACC
Theater
NETOPS
Command
Military
Intelligence
Brigade
JFMCC
JTF-B
JOA
JFLCC
JFLCC Candidates
AOR-Wide
JOA
• U S Army
– Theater Army
√
• Contingency Command Post
– Corps
– Division
√-SSC
√
√-SSC
• USMC
– Marine Expeditionary Force
– Marine Expeditionary Brigade
√
√-SSC
COMPOSITION OF A NOTIONAL JFLCC
Joint Responsibilities
As determined by JFC
(normally OPCON for
same Service forces;
TACON for other
Service forces)
Service
Responsibilities
CCDR
ASCC
ARFOR
• Title 10
• ADCON of
Respective
Service Forces
Corps
Divs
BCTs
JFLCC
Theater
Army
Forces
AAMDC
TSC, TEC,
MP Cnd
TIB, Sig Bde
* Allied forces may frequently be
employed with US joint land forces
creating a multinational LCC
MARFOR
MAGTF
MultiNational*
MEFs
MEBs
MEUs
Corps
Divs
Bdes
Army Mission Command Concept
FM 3-94
Theater
Army, Corps,
Division
Operations
- CORPS are the Army’s principal HQs for applying landpower for
major operations.
- Providing HQs for JTF or JFLCC/ARFOR for major
operations.
- THEATER ARMY HQs set conditions for effective landpower
– Provide AOR-wide Title 10, Administrative Control, Lead
Service, Army Executive Agent, and Army support to
other Services to:
• The Combatant Commander
• Other Service, Joint and Army forces operating
within the AOR
– May be designated by the Combatant Commander as the
AOR-wide [theater] JFLCC
29
Questions
Unified and Joint Land
Operations: Doctrine for
Landpower
Dr John A. Bonin
15 October 2014