LOGO Economics of Contract LawⅡ www.econ.sdu.edu.cn www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 Painting Sale I You value my unfinished painting at $1000 We agree on a sale price of $600 upfront Crazy cousin makes $5000 offer Buyer Painter Buy Don’t Buy Perform 600, 400 ------ Breach -400, 4600,5400 5600, -400 600 ------ What are Expectation Damages? DE = $1000 What if D = $6000 www.econ.sdu.edu.cn Painter breaches and it is efficient Painter performs though breach is efficient 山东大学 Painting Sale II You value my unfinished painting at $1000 We agree on a sale price of $600 upfront Crazy cousin makes $5000 offer Assume simple DE Buyer purchases frame for $50 which raises value of painting to $1200 Buyer Painter Rely Don’t Rely Perform 600, 550 600, 400 Breach 4400, 550 4600, 400 Whether painter performs or not, reliance makes you better off But, is reliance efficient? www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 4th Purpose of Contract Law is to secure optimal reliance. If Expected Gain from Reliance > Cost of Reliance then Reliance is efficient p = probability of performance ∆V = increase in value of performance due to reliance c = cost of reliance If p(∆V) > C then reliance is efficient Painter ex: ∆V = 200 c = 50 When the probability of performance is high, more reliance tends to be efficient p* = 0.25 www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 4th Purpose of Contract Law is to secure optimal reliance. Warning: if my damages cover your benefit whether or not it’s efficient, then you’ll always spend on reliance (over-reliance) Solution: Perfection Expectations Damages damages needed to restore the promisee had the promise been kept, and had he relied the optimal amount Foreseeability Doctrine “Reasonably expected” reliance www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 Hadley v Baxendale (1854) Hadley ran a mill and crankshaft broke Baxendale was to deliver it to engineers Delayed one week (used boat rather than rail) Hadley sued for week’s worth of lost profits Court ruled lost profits were not foreseeable www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 5th Purpose of Contract Law is to minimize transaction costs of negotiating contracts by supplying efficient default rules Gaps: contract is silent about risks Inadvertent gaps: not foreseeable Deliberate gaps: remote risks Cost of allocating a risk > Expected cost of allocating a loss leave gap Cost of allocating a risk < Expected cost of allocating a loss fill gap Default rules Compute hypothetical bargain • Who can bear risk at lowest cost? • Adjust price of the contract www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 Perfect Contracts and Market Failures Perfect Contract All risks is efficiently allocated All relevant information is communicated All resources allocated to those who value it the most Individual Irrationality Incompetence Dire constraints • Necessity • Duress Transactions Costs Exceptions to perfect contracts Spillovers Asymmetric information Monopoly www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 6th Purpose of Contract Law is to foster enduring relationships, which solve the problem of cooperation with less reliance on the courts to enforce contracts Coffee shop and the forgotten wallet Prisoner’s Dilemma One-shot game: DS is to cheat Repeated game: Cooperative outcome is Pareto Optimal “tit-for-tat” strategy “Rarely will buyers leave saying they bought the wrong goods at too high a price. Our goal is to make them eager to NY Diamond Dealer’s Club come back. We offer a source which provides a competitive edge, all of which translates directly into increased profits.” Endgame Problem www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学 Peevyhouse v Garland Coal (1962) Peevyhouse owned farm in Oklahoma Garland contracted to strip-mine coal Contract specified that Garland would take steps to restore land to previous condition Garland breached Peevyhouse sued for $25,000 Restorative costs were estimated to be $29,000 at trial Garland showed that “diminished value” of farm was only $300 Original jury awarded $5000 to Peevyhouse OK Supreme Court reduced damages to $300 Efficient breach? Dissent: specific performance was warranted, otherwise no formation would have occurred www.econ.sdu.edu.cn 山东大学