Report
March 2013
China’s Buddhist diplomacy
By Trine Angelskår
Executive summary
Ever since China’s “reform and opening up” process began in the early 1980s the country has
witnessed a tremendous religious revival. This poses challenges for the Beijing government, which has
generally regarded religious matters as needing control. But controlling the population has become
increasingly difficult as it becomes more educated, wealthy and confident. The religious revival also
offers opportunities – it has allowed the government to engage in religion as a political tool to promote
China’s soft power both domestically and internationally. This, however, only applies to religions the
central government does not regard as a threat to its authority, most notably Chinese Buddhism.
This report analyses how the atheistic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to utilise Chinese
Buddhism as a diplomatic tool and recognise positive aspects of a religion it had tried to
marginalise for many years. To examine how using religion as a political tool relates to the state
of religious freedom in China at the moment, the CCP’s politics of religion is analysed.
Introduction
Chairman Mao Zedong’s strict, atheistic leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1949 to 1976 made it
difficult, and at times impossible, to practise religion in
China. Only worshippers belonging to a state-sanctioned
patriotic religious association were allowed to register with
the government and legally practise their religion. Currently there are only five officially recognised religions in
China: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. Uniformity was imposed on all these religions and
previously existing denominational and sectarian systems
within them were broken down and banned. Proselytising
in public or unregistered places of worship was not
permitted. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76)
religion was defined as part of the “Four Olds” – old
customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas – that were
to be eliminated from society. Churches, mosques, and
temples were shut down and many were destroyed.
Religious texts were burned and religious statues and
artefacts were smashed, while many worshippers were
imprisoned for practising their religion.
A new, slightly softer course in the politics of religion was
introduced when Deng Xiaoping seized power in the late
1970s. Freedom of religion was ensured in Article 36 of the
constitution of 1982. The constitution specifies that the state
protects “normal” religious activities, but what the state
considers “normal” is not defined. As the legal system in
China is still – at best – immature, laws and regulations are
neither uniformly nor strictly implemented in the country. It
is the CCP’s right to regulate religious institutions in minute
detail. The Beijing government has repeatedly shown that it
can – and will – crack down on any opposition. According to
the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious
Freedom Report 2011, China is listed as a “chronic violator of
religious freedom”, together with countries such as North
Korea and Saudi Arabia (U.S. DoS, 2011).
To obtain a nuanced understanding of the current state of
freedom of religion and the politics of religion in China, it is
therefore not sufficient to analyse the legal and official
framework in modern China, nor to focus solely on reports
from Western sources documenting violations of freedom
of religion. These reports often address violations affecting
ethnic minorities, such as Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang or
Tibetan Buddhists, and do not necessarily take into account
other religious groups in China. By focusing on the largest
religious group in China – the Chinese Buddhists – we
might be equipped with a fuller understanding of the whys
and hows of the religious policies and the state of religious
freedom in China today.
Noref Report – March 2013
Renewed interest in religion
In the early 1980s China experienced a relatively large
degree of liberalisation in the politics of religion. This
changed dramatically after the Tiananmen Square protests
in 1989. A second turn of events in the politics of religion
became apparent in the wake of the Falun Gong protests in
1999, when 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners held hands in
a circle around the CCP headquarters in Beijing. Beijing
was caught off guard by the massive numbers of the
protesters. According to classified reports from the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing published by Wikileaks, what caused
the biggest surprise was that approximately one-third of all
the Falun Gong practitioners were members of the CCP
and the central Beijing government itself (U.S. Embassy in
Beijing, 2011). The event caused the central government to
sharpen the distinction between religion and superstition:
the former was to be approved of and the latter was to be
banned. Falun Gong fell into the latter category and was
later deemed as an illegal, “evil cult”, while Buddhism,
Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism were still
regarded as legitimate. The incident appears to have
motivated Jaing Zemin, the then-president of the People’s
Republic of China, to recognise – for the first time in the
CCP’s history – that legitimate religions can contribute
positively to social stability. However, if religious groups
were to be governable, they had to be allowed a certain
amount of religious freedom. If opportunities for legitimately practising religions were not made available by
official institutions, the CCP leadership feared many people
would seek alternatives, and shady underground religions
could possibly fill this vacuum.
Buddhism not a threat to the
government’s authority
Currently, Chinese Buddhism is often more favourably
treated than the other officially recognised religions, even
though the government has been very specific about
treating all these religions equally. This new, relatively
tolerant attitude toward Chinese Buddhism is caused by
the fact that the Beijing government has found Buddhism
to be a convenient political resource for promoting its
political goal of establishing a “harmonious society”
domestically and to project China as a country striving to
contribute to a “harmonious world” internationally. What
then sets Chinese Buddhism apart from the other recognised religions in China? For one, it is not viewed as a
threat by the Chinese authorities, for three main reasons.
Firstly, Chinese Buddhism is to a large degree seen as a
local religion. Even though Buddhism originated in India, it
has been an integral part of the Chinese cultural and
religious landscape for more than 2,000 years. On the other
hand, Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam are often
regarded as “foreign” religions – a porthole of sorts
through which foreign ideas and loyalties can enter China.
Christian missionaries in particular have been regarded as
tools of Western imperialism.
2
Secondly, Chinese Buddhists do not have religious authorities outside the country that potentially could challenge the
Chinese governments’ authority, unlike the Pope in Rome
or the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. China does not accept
bishops appointed by the Vatican nor Tibetan lamas
appointed by anybody but the CCP. Leaders of any religion
need to be vetted and cleared by the CCP and cannot
simply be selected by the religious institution itself. In 1995
Beijing rejected the boy the Dalai Lama had selected to be
the next Panchen Lama (the second-highest spiritual
leader) and instead appointed Gyaincain Norbu – at the
time a six-year-old boy – to the position. The boy the Dalai
Lama had chosen has never been seen after the Chinese
security forces detained him. In 2007 China promulgated
regulations that only Beijing can approve living Buddhas
and high lamas, including the Panchen Lama and the Dalai
Lama. Beijing is worried about the growing stature of the
Dalai Lama as a global Buddhist leader and is working
hard to build credibility among Buddhists countries as well
as among the nation’s Buddhists so that the CCP can select
the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama without any great
international or national outcries.
Thirdly, Chinese Buddhism is not linked to separatist
movements. Especially in the Muslim Autonomous Region
of Xinjiang and the Tibetan Buddhist Autonomous Region of
Tibet there has been strong and at times violent opposition
to the way the government has controlled these regions. In
official documents it is evident that it is particularly the
ethnic minorities who are regarded as being “religious”.
The Han ethnic majority, which constitutes 92% of the
Chinese population, is referred to in official documents as
not being particularly religious and it is claimed that “the
number of those who actually adhere to a religion is not
great” (MacInnis, 1989: 11). The majority of Chinese
Buddhists in China, however, belong to the Han ethnic
majority. Chinese Buddhism is therefore often referred to
as Han Buddhism.
Buddhism as a political tool
In theory one might think that Daoism – the only officially
recognised religion that actually originated in China –
would be the preferred religion of the Chinese authorities.
However, few people practise Daoism. Buddhism thus
represents a much greater social force in society simply
because of the large numbers of its practitioners.
It is difficult to estimate the number of Buddhists and
Daoists in China because they do not have congregational
memberships and many practice exclusively at home.
Chinese authorities tried for decades to marginalise and
“shrink” any form of religion. Local authorities had
personal interests in reporting low numbers of religious
practitioners, because this could improve their chances
of further promotion within the CCP. According to official
numbers, there were over 100 million religious people
in China in 1997. There were more than 13,000 Buddhist
temples and monasteries and about 200,000 Buddhist
Noref Report – March 2013
monks and nuns in the country (State Council Information
Office, 1997). However, a state-supported survey in 2007
conducted by researchers at East China Normal University
revealed that, in fact, there are three times as many
religious people in China as previously anticipated (Sun,
2007). This survey was conducted at the same time the
Beijing government started to use ­Buddhism as a political
tool both domestically and internationally.
tions has proved to be very useful for local governments
with poor economies. According to National Public Radio,
the Nanputuo temple’s philanthropic foundation in Xiamen
has given approximately $7 million in aid over the past
16 years (Lim, 2010). However this charitable work must be
done discreetly, because the government does not want to
be portrayed as being unable to provide welfare services to
its people.
If carefully managed, religion is no longer necessarily
viewed as an “opiate of the masses”. By underpinning
nationalism, forming a moral foundation for the population,
boosting the economy, serving as a buffer against the rapid
spread of Christianity and serving as a diplomatic tool in
China’s international relations, Chinese Buddhism is rather
viewed as something that may contribute positively to
establishing a “harmonious society” and a “harmonious
world”.
Buffer against Christianity
Nationalism
Chinese Buddhism is seen a useful diplomatic tool in
China’s international relations. Chinese Buddhism is thus
considered as a means to gain power in terms of both
China’s domestic and international policies.
Chinese Buddhists contribute to strengthening a Han
identity and a nationalistic sentiment that the government
sees may contribute to establishing a stable and harmonious society. According to Jayshree Bajoria, a senior
researcher at the Council of Foreign Relations, for the past
few years and in line with a lack of traditional communist
ideology, the Chinese government has tacitly recognised
nationalism as a source of the CCP’s legitimacy and as a
form of glue that binds society together (Bajoria, 2008).
Chinese Buddhism has proven to be an excellent tool that
can contribute to this process.
Moral foundation
Despite the fact that the Beijing authorities have regarded
religions as superstition and as a symbol of something
reactionary, religious people have often been regarded as
having high moral standards. Because there seems to be a
moral vacuum in current state ideology, religion is seen as
filling this vacuum and contributing to the establishment of
a moral foundation.
The economy
Popular Buddhist temples attract hundreds of thousands of
believers and tourists every year, generating huge revenues annually. The temples also serve as a catalyst for
economic development for their surrounding counties and
villages. Buddhism is also actively used to attract foreign
investment, particularly from Taiwan and overseas Chinese
people. The intention, as Yang Fenggang, director of the
Centre on Religious and Chinese Studies, puts it, is to
“build a religious stage to sing the opera of [the] economy”
(Yang, 2006:109).
Charity
This is another central element in the government’s
positive view of Chinese Buddhism. Throughout this vast
country the government faces great challenges to provide
adequate social welfare. Collaborating with, and to a
certain degree supporting, religious charitable organisa-
By promoting Buddhism the authorities hope that this
religion will serve as a buffer against the rapid spread of
Protestantism and Catholicism – or any foreign religion,
for that matter. The Chinese authorities generally tend
to put more trust in Buddhists than Christians and fear
foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs
disguised as religion.
International relations
China’s Buddhist diplomacy
Because China is too often portrayed in foreign media for
negative reasons – Tibetan self-immolations, violations of
human rights, the CCP’s campaign against Falun Gong
members, crack-downs on Christian underground churches, corruption, pollution, food safety scandals, etc. – China
wishes to improve its image internationally. Buddhism is
often perceived as a peaceful religion. By portraying itself
as a Buddhist nation, the Chinese government hopes to
assure the world that it is a responsible, trustworthy and
friendly nation.
Because China and India are competing for access to
strategic harbours, airfields and energy supplies in their
neighbouring Buddhist countries – particularly in Nepal,
Myanmar and Sri Lanka – we are witnessing both China
and India engaging in Buddhism in order to project their
soft power. India is the country where Buddhism originated
and China is currently the country with the largest
­Buddhist population in the world. Until last year India had
done little to promote its Buddhist heritage since Prime
Minister Nehru welcomed the Dalai Lama to India after he
fled from Tibet in 1959, which angered China enormously.
Since then China has worked to establish itself as the
world’s leading Buddhist country.
China’s Buddhist diplomacy is an inter-agency effort and
represents a new strategy in projecting the country’s soft
power. According to Holmes Welch, formerly assistant
director of Harvard’s Center for the Study of World Religions, Mao considered Buddhism to be of no use domestically (Welch, 1972: 169-230). However, prior to the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76) he tried to use Buddhism in China’s
international relations in an effort to persuade foreigners
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Noref Report – March 2013
that Buddhism was flourishing as never before, thus
hoping to convince neighbouring Buddhist countries that
China was not an alien country. This practice had ended by
the start of the Cultural Revolution. The current Beijing
government’s aim of engaging with Buddhism, as described by Wang Zuoan, director of the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), is to “Actively develop
international religious exchanges and advocate the Chinese
concept of religious harmony and to expand the influence
of the Chinese concept of harmonious religion” (Hua, 2011).
This is intended to project China as a global patron and
sponsor of the Buddhist world, through which Beijing
hopes to promote international understanding and acceptance of its policies and actions regarding religions. In
terms of the government’s dealings with Buddhism,
gaining acceptance of its religious policies implies gaining
acceptance of the CCP’s right to select religious leaders
such as Tibetan Buddhist lamas.
China’s Buddhist diplomacy is mainly aimed at its Buddhist
neighbours. Over the last few years the atheistic CCP has
increasingly incorporated Buddhism as part of its soft
diplomacy and is using the religion as a political vehicle to
establish diplomatic common ground with its neighbouring
Buddhist countries. As China attempts to increase its
influence in the region, its government needs to communicate to wary neighbours that the country’s rise to power is
a peaceful one.
China’s Buddhist diplomacy is additionally intended to
project the country as the global patron and sponsor of the
Buddhist world. China has made vigorous efforts to ensure
that anybody with a Buddhist background feels connected
with the country. As used to be the case in China, the
various international Buddhist institutions have traditionally been very loosely connected to one another and there
has been little overarching international structure. As we
shall see, the CCP tried to change this when China hosted
the first World Buddhist Forum in 2006.
China’s Buddhist diplomacy also appears to be aimed at its
domestic audience. The Beijing authorities hope that
promoting Buddhism internationally will generate strong
appeal among Buddhists in China. They also hope to build
stronger ties to both Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Chinese Buddhist diplomacy measures
There are three particular areas where China’s Buddhist
diplomacy is clearly visible: the sponsoring of international
Buddhist conferences, the sending of Buddhist relics on
tours to other Buddhist nations, and helping to revive
important Buddhist centres in India and Nepal.
1. World Buddhist Forums
A major shift in the CCP’s view of Chinese Buddhism
became publicly apparent in 2006 when China hosted the
First World Buddhist Forum in the city of Hangzhou. This
was the first time that the atheistic CCP had contributed to
4
the hosting of a large-scale international religious conference. Xi Jinping, party secretary of Zhejiang at the time,
helped organise the forum, which approximately 1,000
monks and experts from 35 countries attended. The forum
marked a turning point in the government’s official attitude
towards religion in general and towards Buddhism in
particular. In his speech at the forum, Ye Xiaowen – the
then-director of SARA – described Buddhism as an
“ancient Chinese religion” and China as “a great Buddhist
nation”.
The forums seem to be heavily impregnated with political
missions. China has so far hosted three World Buddhist
Forums, in 2006, 2009 and 2012. The forums have been a
platform for the Chinese government to become a forerunner in the Buddhist world. Beijing hopes to utilise this clout
to influence and define the future development of
­Buddhism. China’s 2006 initiative was the first large-scale
attempt to gather together in the country Buddhists from
all over the world and from all different branches of
Buddhism. The only significant person not invited to the
events was the Dalai Lama. Indeed, one of the government’s aims in supporting the forums appears to have
been to parade the Beijing-selected Panchen Lama in an
attempt to obtain tacit international recognition of Beijing’s
legitimate right to select religious leaders. By obtaining
such international recognition, Beijing hopes to undermine
the status of the Dalai Lama – who Beijing regards as “a
wolf in a monk’s robe”. The ultimate goal is to influence the
succession to the Dalai Lama. However, trying to compete
with the Dalai Lama is not an easy task and the Chinese
Buddhists simply cannot match his soft power. According to
André Laliberté, a professor of political studies at the
University of Ottawa, “The Chinese leaders have yet to find
a leader who can generate feelings of admiration comparable to those the Dalai Lama receives from foreigners”
(Laliberté, 2011: 116).
Another mission of the forums appears to be to tie the
mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong closer together: the
second and third forums were partially held in Taiwan and
Hong Kong, respectively.
China’s engagement with Buddhism as a political tool to
promote itself as a peace-seeking and friendly nation
striving to establish a harmonious society and a harmonious world also becomes evident when we examine the
official slogans of the state-sponsored forums: “A harmonious world begins in the mind”, “A harmonious world;
A synergy of conditions” and “Common aspirations and
actions towards a harmonious world”. It is easy to dismiss
these CCP-designed slogans as nothing more than empty
rhetoric. However, it is worth taking a closer look at them
because they point to issues that the government itself
identifies as problematic and needing to be changed. By
identifying a harmonious society as a political goal, there is
a tacit recognition of modern Chinese society as affected by
disharmony.
Noref Report – March 2013
2. Competing with India
India has also recently stepped up its own Buddhist
diplomacy, along with its military presence in the region. In
2011 India hosted the Global Buddhist Congregation in
Delhi, timed to coincide with the 2,600th anniversary of
Buddha’s enlightenment. At this gathering the International Buddhist Confederation – which was meant to serve as a
common platform for Buddhists worldwide – was founded.
The confederation will be based in India. However, the
Global Buddhist Congregation in Delhi coincided with a
scheduled meeting between China and India to sort out a
long-standing border dispute between the two countries.
The Buddhist conference led to a diplomatic row between
them, and China chose to cancel the scheduled border
talks when New Delhi refused to give in to Beijing’s
demand not to allow the Dalai Lama to attend the conference. China appeared to be worried that it could be used as
a platform for Tibetans to criticise the Chinese government’s handling of Tibetan Buddhists internationally.
3. Reviving important Buddhist centres
Traditionally, Bodh Gaya (where Gautama Buddha achieved
enlightenment) and Sarnath (where he first taught the
Dharma) in India have been considered the two main
Buddhist pilgrim destinations. Now, however, with Chinese
backing, Lumbini – the birthplace of the Buddha – in Nepal
is challenging both Bodh Gaya’s and Sarnath’s eminence.
In recent years China has shown great interest in Nepal
and hopes to dislodge it from India’s orbit as a satellite
state. In March 2011 the commander-in-chief of China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly signed a $19.8
million defence agreement with the Nepalese army –
­ignoring protests from the Nepalese Ministry of Defence
– because China would not tolerate a third country (i.e.
India) coming in the way of the friendship between Nepal
and China (Ranade, 2011a). China’s objectives in keeping a
tight grip over Nepal are many. Jayadeva Ranade, distinguished fellow at the Centre for Airpower Studies in New
Delhi, claims that “The highest priority is for neutralising
the threat perceived as emanating from Tibetans in Nepal
and their potential, in collusion with what Beijing calls
‘hostile forces’, for destabilising Tibet” (Ranade, 2011b).
The Dalai Lama has not been allowed to visit Lumbini since
the late 1980s and Tibetan refugees in Nepal are shown
little tolerance by the Nepalese government, mainly due to
pressure from China. After the PLA’s hard-ball visit in
March 2011, the Asia Pacific Exchange and Co-operation
Foundation (APECF), a Hong Kong-based and CCP-sponsored NGO, ostensibly in co-operation with the United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation, proposed a
seemingly softer initiative – a $3 billion plan to turn the
Buddha’s birthplace, Lumbini, into a first-class pilgrimage
destination and tourist attraction. Plans included a new
airport, highways, hotels and other amenities. However,
following local protests due to lack of consultation, the
Nepalese government later rejected the plan and soon
thereafter itself constituted the Greater Lumbini National
Development Directive Committee (GLNDDC) in a new
attempt to establish Lumbini as a pilgrimage site and
tourist attraction. The GLNDDC has not entirely rejected
the APECF’s engagement in Lumbini. As of September
2012 the APECF was reported to have signed a memorandum of understanding with a British theme park developer,
VTP Global, as lead development manager for the proposed
international pilgrimage and tourism development in
Lumbini (VTP, 2012). China wishes to continue to undermine the Dalai Lama’s position in Nepal while building up
its political and economic influence in the country.
China is also engaged in the Pan-Asian project of reviving
the Nalanda University in India. Nalanda was a great
Buddhist university, established in the 5th century. The
famed Chinese monk Xuan Zang travelled to Nalanda to
study and teach Buddhism in the early Tang dynasty
(618-907). When he returned to China several years later
he brought with him several hundred Buddhist texts and,
with support from the emperor, established a large
translation bureau in China. Ever since the Indian government initiated the project to revive Nalanda in 2006 China
has showed strong interest in it. Nalanda and Xuan Zang
represent India’s and China’s early bilateral relationship
and are therefore valuable symbols of their current
relationship. In 2011 China donated $1 million to the
university. In the words of Wen Jiabao, former premier of
the State Council, the donation was given: “as a friendly
gesture from the Chinese people to the Indian people”
­(Chinese Embassy in India, 2011). The donation has,
however, not been well received by all Indians as the
money is earmarked to establishing a Chinese-style library.
This has left many Indians with a bitter taste in the mouth.
4. Exhibiting Buddhist relics in other countries
Another initiative China has engaged in is lending out
sacred Buddhist relics to other Buddhist countries in order
to enhance mutual understanding and trust. Myanmar is an
example of this. Myanmar has long been a strategic
investment partner for China, especially while Myanmar
was largely isolated from the rest of the world. When
Myanmar began its current reform process, China was
quickly faced with increasing competition from other
countries and hence saw its own influence decline. One of
Thein Sein’s first tasks as the newly installed president of
Myanmar was to suspend the construction of a controversial $3.6 billion Chinese-backed hydropower dam in
northern Myanmar. This has been seen as an attempt to
build better relations with other countries and to make
Myanmar less dependent on China. The Beijing government, still wanting to be on good terms with its geopolitically important neighbour, responded with a good-will
gesture: in November 2011 China sent a holy Buddhist relic
– a tooth of the Buddha – to Myanmar, where it was
publicly displayed for 48 days. This was the fourth time
since the 1950s that the tooth had been sent to Myanmar.
The event represents “not only a major event of the
Buddhist believers, but also a fine story of China-Myanmar
friendship”, Xinhua, China’s state-owned news agency,
reported (Xinhua, 2011). Along with the tooth came a
high-level Chinese government official delegation, led by
5
Noref Report – March 2013
the SARA director, Wang Zuoan, as well as the president of
the Buddhist Association of China (BAC). The tooth is a
highly venerated relic in Myanmar and attracts large
crowds wherever it goes. The sending of this holy relic to
Myanmar was expected to play an essential part in “enhancing the understanding and mutual trust between the
two peoples”, Xinhua reported the day the holy relic arrived
in Myanmar. China’s gesture did not pass unnoticed by the
Myanmar government. Top officials, including President
Thein Sein, awaited the holy relic’s arrival to pay homage to
it when it arrived in the capital, Naypyidaw. According to
local media, even the former junta leader, Than Shwe, was
reported to have been seen paying homage to the relic.
Only two months after the exhibition of the Buddha’s tooth,
China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing friendly relationships between the
Beijing Lingguang Temple, where the Buddha’s tooth
resides, and the Shwedagon Pagoda of Myanmar. The
deputy director of SARA, Zhang Lebin, was reported to have
expressed that this would enhance the bilateral ties
between the two countries and boost world peace (Xinhua,
2012a). It is hardly believed that Buddhist institutions like
the BAC in themselves will have a great impact on China’s
international relations. But, considering that these institutions are backed by Beijing, it is fruitful for the Chinese
government that the BAC is legitimising its authority and
establishing a platform for improving China’s international
relations.
The holy relics of the Buddha’s tooth and finger bone, with
the latter normally residing in the Famen Temple in Xi’an,
have also been sent on veneration tours to Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Thailand. Additionally, as a result of poor
language skills among Chinese Buddhist monks, SARA has
arranged English-language training for Buddhist monks to
better equip them to participate in international exchanges
and faith diplomacy. In the National Human Rights Action
Plan of China (2012-15) it is stated that the government will
support “Promoting cultural exchanges in religion. China
will support friendly exchanges between Chinese religious
circles and foreign religious organisations” (Xinhua, 2012b).
Conclusion
Over the past ten years the Chinese government has
realised that religion can be employed as a form of statecraft to boost its soft power in the world. The atheistic CCP
had previously prohibited religious practice, but is now
trying to shape and domesticate it and use it as a diplomatic tool to promote its soft power. Religion in China is
thus not merely subject to state authority; it is a branch of
the government itself.
While China has experienced tremendous economic growth
in the last couple of decades, its leaders have not been able
to stop social unrest at home. To accept small violations of
1 Author’s unofficial translation.
6
what is accepted religious practice on a micro level, such
as proselytising outside government-appointed designated
areas or burning paper money in Buddhist temple grounds,
probably costs the government far less than the benefits it
currently reaps from the increased stability and general
satisfaction among the huge number of practising Buddhists in China. This applies as long as religious practice is
not perceived as a threat to the government’s authority. The
dynamics of the politics of religion show that the government utilises Buddhism as a means of control. If we follow
this line of thought a little further, it is possible to read this
as the government, ironically, making use of Chinese
Buddhism as a kind of “opiate of the people”. However, as
Chinese Buddhists currently represent a powerful social
force in society, they have strong cards in their hands when
negotiating freedom of religious practice for themselves.
For this reason we can see that the revival of Chinese
Buddhism in China today is also a result of the government
probably not having much choice in the matter and making
the best of the prevailing situation.
Many of China’s neighbouring countries fear its economic
and political rise. Beijing’s rhetoric concerning establishing
a harmonious society and a harmonious world seems to be
contrasted by the fact that China is currently involved in
border disputes with many of its neighbours and that it
claims large parts of the South China and East China seas.
Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan in particular feel
threatened by what they consider to be China’s aggressive
behaviour. Faith diplomacy might serve as a counter to this
– as a way of easing the fears of China’s neighbours and
hence benefiting China’s international relations, as we have
witnessed in Myanmar and Nepal.
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2 Author’s unofficial translation.
The author
Trine Angelskår holds an MA in religious studies/Chinese studies
from the University of Oslo. She has lived in China for several years
and has attended Fudan and Peking universities. She has fieldwork
experience from China and speaks Chinese. Her main research
interests include the state and religion in China, lay religious
practice and human rights. She has been an adviser to Amnesty
International Norway.
Disclaimer
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of view are published on the author’s own account. The Norwegian
Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) does not give any
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