Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Case 11: Ford Pinto Car Accidents[Real-World]
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Background
o Who/What:
 Ford
 Automobile Explosions
o Where/When:
 all over the US
 1960s - 1970s
Outcome
o Who/What:
 ~500 burn deaths and countless injuries
 Ford Pinto subcompact car explosions in fender-benders.
o How/Why:
 Defective fuel system design
 Use of cost-benefit analysis by Ford to justify not resolving the defect.
Ford Pinto Car Accidents - extracted from a case study by Wake Forest University accessed
at: http://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/1999/Leggett-pinto.html#Text
The case involving the explosion of Ford Pintos due to a defective fuel system design led to the debate of many
issues, most centering around the use by Ford of a cost-benefit analysis and the ethics surrounding its decision
not to upgrade the fuel system based on this analysis. Should a risk/benefit analysis be used in situations where
a defect in design or manufacturing could lead to death or seriously bodily harm, such as in the Ford Pinto
situation? There are arguments both for and against such an analysis. It is an economically efficient method
which has been accepted by courts for numerous years, however, juries may not always agree, so companies
should take this into account.
Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from
exploding, the company chose not to implement the design, which would have cost $11 per car, even though it
had done an analysis showing that the new design would result in 180 less deaths. The company defended itself
on the grounds that it used the accepted risk/benefit analysis to determine if the monetary costs of making the
change were greater than the societal benefit. Based on the numbers Ford used, the cost would have been $137
million versus the $49.5 million price tag put on the deaths, injuries, and car damages, and thus Ford felt
justified not implementing the design change. This risk/benefit analysis was created out of the development of
product liability, culminating at Judge Learned Hand's BPL formula, where if the expected harm exceeded the
cost to take the precaution, then the company must take the precaution, whereas if the cost was liable, then it did
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
not have to. However, the BPL formula focuses on a specific accident, while the risk/benefit analysis requires
an examination of the costs, risks, and benefits through use of the product as a whole. Based on this analysis,
Ford legally chose not to make the design changes which would have made the Pinto safer. However, just
because it was legal doesn't necessarily mean that it was ethical. It is difficult to understand how a price can be
put on saving a human life.
There are several reasons why such a strictly economic theory should not be used. First, it seems unethical to
determine that people should be allowed to die or be seriously injured because it would cost too much to
prevent it. Second, the analysis does not take into all the consequences, such as the negative publicity that Ford
received and the judgments and settlements resulting from the lawsuits. Also, some things just can't be
measured in terms of dollars, and that includes human life. However, there are arguments in favor of the
risk/benefit analysis. First, it is well developed through existing case law. Second, it encourages companies to
take precautions against creating risks that result in large accident costs. Next, it can be argued that all things
must have some common measure. Finally, it provides a bright line which companies can follow.
In May of 1968, the Ford Motor Company, based upon a recommendation by then vice-president Lee Iacocca,
decided to introduce a subcompact car and produce it domestically. In an effort to gain a large market share, the
automobile was designed and developed on an accelerated schedule. During the first few years sales of the
Pinto were excellent, but there was trouble on the horizon.
•
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company
In May 1972, Lily Gray was traveling with thirteen year old Richard Grimshaw in a 1972 Pinto when
their car was struck by another car traveling approximately thirty miles per hour. The impact ignited a
fire in the Pinto which killed Lily Gray and left Richard Grimshaw with devastating injuries. A
judgment was rendered against Ford and the jury awarded the Gray family $560,000 and Matthew
Grimshaw $2.5 million in compensatory damages. The surprise came when the jury awarded $125
million in punitive damages as well. This was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million.
•
The Criminal Case
Six month following the controversial Grirnshaw verdict, Ford was involved in yet another controversial
case involving the Pinto. The automobile's fuel system design contributed (whether or not it was the sole
cause is arguable) to the death of three women on August 10, 1918 when their car was hit by another
vehicle traveling at a relatively low speed by a man driving with open beer bottles, marijuana, caffeine
pills and capsules of "speed." The fact that Ford had chosen earlier not to upgrade the fuel system
design became an issue of public debate as a result of this case. The debate was heightened because the
prosecutor of Elkart County, Indiana chose to prosecute Ford for reckless homicide and criminal
recklessness.
Some felt the issues raised in the Ford Pinto cases were an example of the "deep pocket" company
disregarding consumer safety in pursuit of the almighty dollar. Others feel they are an example of
runaway media coverage blowing a story out of proportion.5 Regardless of opinion, the Ford Pinto case
is a tangled web of many complex legal and ethical issues.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
To determine if the proper result was achieved in this case, one has to evaluate and weigh these many
issues. The central issue in deciding whether Ford should be liable for electing not to redesign a
defective product in order to maximize its bottom line, one must analyze the so-called "cost/benefit"
analysis Ford used to defend this decision. Within the scope of this paper, this cost/benefit issue (and
associated sub-issues) will be the focus of discussion. Other issues, such as the ethics involved in Ford's
decision, the choice of prosecuting Ford criminally, whistle-blowing, the assignment of punitive
damages and the Court of Appeals decision reducing the damages are all important issues of this case
that will not be the focus herein.
The controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto concerned the placement of the automobile's fuel tank. It was
located behind the rear axle, instead of above it. This was initially done in an effort to create more trunk space.
The problem with this design, which later became evident, was that it made the Pinto more vulnerable to a rearend collision. This vulnerability was enhanced by other features of the car. The gas tank and the rear axle were
separated by only nine inches. There were also bolts that were positioned in a manner that threatened the gas
tank. Finally, the fuel filler pipe design resulted in a higher probability that it would to disconnect from the tank
in the event of an accident than usual, causing gas spillage that could lead to dangerous fires. Because of these
numerous design flaws, the Pinto became the center of public debate.
These design problems were first brought to the public's attention in an August 1977 article in Mother Jones
magazine. This article condemned the Ford Motor Company and the author was later given a Pulitzer
Prize. This article originated the public debate over the risk/benefit analysis used by the Ford Motor Company
in their determination as to whether or, not the design of the Pinto fuel tank be altered to reduce the risk of fire
as the result of a collision.
The crux of the public debate about The Ford Motor Company was the decision not to make improvements to
the gas tank of the Pinto after completion of the risk/benefit analysis. Internal Ford documents revealed Ford
had developed the technology to make improvements to the design of the Pinto that would dramatically
decrease the chance of a Pinto "igniting" after a rear-end collision. This technology would have greatly reduced
the chances of burn injuries and deaths after a collision. Ford estimated the cost to make this production
adjustment to the Pinto would have been $11 per vehicle. Most people found it reprehensible that Ford
determined that the $11 cost per automobile was too high and opted not to make the production change to the
Pinto model.
In determining whether or not to make the production change, the Ford Motor Company defended itself by
contending that it used a risk/benefit analysis. Ford stated that its reason for using a risk/benefit analysis was
that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) required them to do so. The risk/benefit
approach excuses a defendant if the monetary costs of making a production change are greater than the "societal
benefit" of that change. This analysis follows the same line of reasoning as the negligence standard developed
by Judge Learned Hand in United States vs. Carroll Towing in 1947 (to be discussed later). The philosophy
behind risk/benefit analysis promotes the goal of allocative efficiency. The problem that arose in the Ford Pinto
and many other similar cases highlights the human and emotional circumstances behind the numbers which are
not factored in the risk/benefit analysis.
The Ford Motor Company contended that by strictly following the typical approach to risk,/benefit analysis,
they were justified in not making the production change to the Pinto model. Assuming the numbers employed in
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
their analysis were correct, Ford seemed to be justified. The estimated cost for the production change was $11
per vehicle. This $11 per unit cost applied to 11 million cars and 1.5 million trucks results in an overall cost of
$137 million.
The controversial numbers were those Ford used for the "benefit" half of the equation. It was estimated that
making the change would result in a total of 180 less burn deaths, 180 less serious burn injuries, and 2,100 less
burned vehicles. These estimates were multiplied by the unit cost figured by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. These figures were $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, and $700 per vehicle
equating to the total "societal benefit" is $49.5 million. Since the benefit of $49.5 million was much less than
the cost of $137 million, Ford felt justified in its decision not to alter the product design. The risk/benefit results
indicate that it is acceptable for 180 people to die and 180 people to burn if it costs $11 per vehicle to prevent
such casualty rates.
The main controversy surrounding the Ford Pinto case was The Ford Motor Company's choices made during
development to compromise safety for efficiency and profit maximization. More specifically, it was Ford's
decision to use the cost/benefit analysis detailed in section 11 to make production decisions that translated into
lost lives. During the initial production and testing phase, Ford set "limits for 2000" for the Pinto. That meant
the car was not to exceed $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. This set tough limitations on the production
team. After the basic design was complete, crash testing was begun. The results of crash testing revealed that
when struck from the rear at speeds of 31 miles per hour or above, the Pinto's gas tank ruptured. The tank was
positioned according to the industry standard at the time (between the rear bumper and the rear axle), but studs
protruding from the rear axle would puncture the gas tank. Upon impact, the fuel filler neck would break,
resulting in spilled gasoline. The Pinto basically turned into a death trap. Ford crash tested a total of eleven
automobiles and eight resulted in potentially catastrophic situations. The only three that survived had their gas
tanks modified prior to testing.
Ford was not in violation of the law in any way and had to make the decision whether to incur a cost to fix the
obvious problem internally. There were several options for fuel system redesign. The option most seriously
considered would have cost the Ford Motor Company and additional $11 per vehicle. Under the strict $2000
budget restriction, even this nominal cost seemed large. In addition, Ford had earlier based an advertising
campaign on safety which failed miserably. Therefore, there was a corporate belief, attributed to Lee Iacocca
himself, of "safety doesn't sell."
Ultimately, the Ford Motor Company rejected the product design change. This was based on the cost-benefit
analysis performed by Ford (see Exhibit One). Using the NHTSA provided figure of $200,000 for the "cost to
society" for each estimated fatality, and $11 for the production cost per vehicle, the analysis seemed
straightforward. The projected costs to the company for design production change were $137 million compared
to the project benefits of making the design change which were approximately $49.5 million. Using the standard
cost/benefit analysis, the answer was obvious--no production changes were to be made.
Exhibit One: Ford's Cost/Benefit Analysis Benefits and Costs Relating to Fuel Leakage Associated with
the Static Rollover Test Portion of FMVSS 208
Benefits
Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2100 burned vehicles
Unit Cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle
Total Benefit: 180 x ($200,000) + 180 x ($67,000) + 2100 x ($700) = $49.5 Million
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Costs
Sales: 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks
Unit Cost: $11 per car, $11 per truck
Total Cost: 11,000,000 x ($11) + 1,500,000 x ($ I 1) = $137 Million
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Case 13: Air France Concorde Crash [Real-World]
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•
Background
o Who/What:
 Air France
 Plane Crash
o Where/When:
 Paris, France
 July 25, 2000
Outcome
o Who/What:
 100 passengers, 9 crew & 4 bystanders killed
 Only fatal Concorde accident leading to it being grounded 3 years later
o How/Why:
 Tire failure by metal strip dropped off by another plane on runway leading to the tyre
debris damaging engines right above landing gear.
 Metal strip fell off due to workers disregarding correct repair protocols
 Structural issues with landing gear being placed right underneath engines.
Air France Concorde Crash - extracted from the Engineering Disasters website accessed
at: http://engineeringdisasters.wikispaces.com/Concorde+4590
On Tuesday July 25, 2000, the Concorde registered F-BTSC, operated by Air France, crashed less than sixty
seconds after takeoff, killing one hundred passengers, nine crew members, and four people on the ground at a
nearby hotel. This was not an accident, it was an engineering disaster. Through intensive investigations on this
crash, it was discovered that the technical structure and design of the Concorde was built for daunting
supersonic travel, which would end in failure sooner or later.
A metal war strip that fell off of a DC-10 aircraft was left on the runway. This caused the tire explosion. When
the left tire ran over the metal, the pressure imposed on the tires caused the left tire explosion. Then, the rubber
debris was thrown against the underside of the left wing. This caused the second engine to rupture and catch on
fire. The controller was informed of the flames, but had no choice but to take off anyways. The pilot attempted
to fly the plane to Le Bouarget, but it was already too late. The landing gear would not react; the plane had no
way to land. The aircraft crashed onto a hotel at Gonesse, killing a total of one hundred and thirteen people.
The structure of the Concorde was built for daunting supersonic travel, which increased in popularity at the start
of the Concorde's career. Some of the reasons why the Concorde crashed are as follows:
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
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Lightweight structure was not areo-dynamically appropriate.
Enormous fuel load which imposed a risk to to the safety of the plane.
Exposed wiring on the under-belly of the aircraft.
The engines were located directly above the landing gear, which meant that if there was any problem
with the engines, then the landing gear would not be able to react, thus the plane would crash.
There was tremendous centridical pressure on the tires, which contributed to the cause of the tire
explosion.
The metal strip that fell off the cowl of the DC-10 aircraft was an error. The workers had disregarded the
correct procedures, and the technical tests the aircraft went through after its repairs. If the tests had
detected the error, the chain of events would not have been started.
An air force spokesman said that, “If the crew had any doubts over whether there was a problem, the plane
would have never taken off”. This proves it was technical error, not human. Who is to blame? Who is
responsible for the disaster? Some may say the workers who made repairs on the DC-10. Some may blame the
pilot. Some may blame the air controller. But if you look at the reality of the situation, technology is to blame.
The engineers who designed the structure thought that they could take a risk and design an airplane that is both
built for supersonic speed, a "mighty advancement" in technology, and be in safety guidelines. This was a huge
mistake.
Imagine a car. Now imagine a group of engineers and mechanic designing an improved car to travel at ten times
the maximum speed of the original car. Would it be right to state that this is an advancement, even though the
car is faulty and takes many risks involving the design and structure? Would it be in guidelines with the
engineering ethics to release this new model and promote consumers to use it to travel? The Concorde is the
same situation. This crash signaled the downfall of it's career, due to the faulty technology that the engineers
decided to use to promote this new popular way of traveling.
Most importantly, engineers must evaluate every factor, every hole, and every crevice, so that they ensure that
progress in the technical design will not cause disasters like this. Not only in engineering, but in other
occupations around the world more and more individuals and businesses are beginning to trust technology. That
is no the right call. In the Concorde accident, the pilot and crew made the mistake of trusting the tests, systems,
and communications of technology. If the error had been detected, one hundred and thirteen people would not
have died. Advancements can appear to be mighty accomplishments, but if you look at some of the results you
learn that technology cannot be trusted. Some may think that technology is improving and we reap the benefits,
but in reality, it results in disaster, not only in the Concorde accident, but in many other situations across the
world.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Case 15: The Rat Race [Hypothetical]
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Background
o Who/What:
 Cindy, a new graduate student
o Where/When:
 Very Big State University (VBSU)
Outcome
o Who/What:
 Miscommunication and misunderstandings between Cindy and Beth, another graduate
student working in the same lab as Cindy, leads to friction between the two.
o How/Why:
 Miscommunication leads to Beth shunning Cindy over the authorship of a grant research
proposal
 Cindy accused Beth of sabotaging her experiment by placing defective joysticks
 Both Cindy and Beth complain to their adviser, Tom about the other.
 Beth and Cindy stop talking to each other
 Beth is not mentioned in any of Cindy’s ten published articles
The Rat Race - extracted from The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research accessed
at: http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/ratrace.aspx
Cindy, a new graduate student, entered an established and highly productive experimental psychology
laboratory at Very Big State University (VBSU). From the beginning, Cindy exhibited high motivation and
competence in psychology with a desire to publish early on in her graduate career in research journals within
her area of specialization. She joined six other graduate students in the lab of her adviser, Tom. Other incoming
first year graduate students in the area but outside her laboratory competed in a friendly manner; they competed
in the class room and made wagers as to who would finish their master's first and who would publish first.
Cindy excelled in and out of the laboratory, and subsequently developed a very good reputation with most of
the faculty in her area. Further, she developed a very close relationship with Tom in the first few months after
she arrived at VBSU.
However, a series of events unfolded in the laboratory soon after Cindy's arrival at VBSU. Tom asked another
graduate student, Beth, to complete a research proposal for a grant. Beth knew the deadline was fast
approaching; the unfinished manuscript needed to be mailed out the following day, requiring work late that
night. Tom asked Cindy to help Beth finish the manuscript since she had experience on the topic. Tom failed to
mention this arrangement to Beth, who had expected to work on the project alone. That evening Beth walked in
on Cindy, who was working on the manuscript; Beth immediately turned around and left. Beth ignored Cindy
for some time after this meeting. The two eventually reached an understanding that Cindy did not intend to cut
into Beth's territory. Rather, the misunderstanding had been a result of poor communication.
About two months later, another situation arose. Cindy required the use of a joystick for an experiment for a
particular day and signed the laboratory time sheet requesting the use of the only working joystick. Beth had
requested the use of the joystick for the evening prior to Cindy's request. The day Cindy started the study she
noticed after running the first few subjects that the data made no sense whatsoever. After examining the
equipment, she discovered that her subjects were using one of the defective joysticks, although it bore the
instructions for the experiment she had put on the working joystick. Cindy believed that Beth had replaced the
good joystick with a broken one and moved the stickers with instructions from the good joystick to the bad one.
Cindy confronted Beth and more or less accused Beth of sabotaging her experiment. Beth denied this accusation
and stated she had merely forgotten to replace the joysticks when she had finished. Furthermore, Beth claimed
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
she needed to take off the instructions because they were not pertinent to her experiment that she ran the
evening before. Cindy brought up the matter with Tom, who took a hands off approach. The two graduate
students have not talked since that time, and the laboratory, which had always been congenial, according to
Beth, had become a source of friction for all.
Other events have transpired over the course of two years, and Beth and Cindy have complained to Tom about
various situations. His response to the situation can be described as laissez faire.
Beth completed her work for the Ph.D at the end of the two years, and she will be leaving for a very good postdoc position. Cindy composed a website for the laboratory with the names and research of the graduate students
at about this time. By the end of the second year Cindy managed to publish ten articles, which she listed on the
website. However, she did not include any information about Beth.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Case 17: Airless Paint Spray Cans [Hypothetical]
•
Background
Airless paint spray guns do not need an external source of compressed air connected to the gun by a
heavy hose along with an electric motor and pump. There are two common designs:

The first one, uses an induction motor that does not cause sparking since it does not use a
commutator and brushes. This type has a warning label nonetheless.

The second one, uses a high-speed universal motor and disk type pump to reduce weight of
the gun. This type uses a commutator and brushes, which makes it prone to sparking. This
type also has a very detailed warning label, which states that this gun should never be used
with paints that employ highly volatile and flammable thinners.
•
Outcome
o Who:
 A painter using the second design, suffered severe burn injuries
o How/Why:
 Painter filled gun with paint thinner because he did not read the warning label.
 Painter was a recent immigrant who did not read English well
 Painter had used the first design before without any issues.
 The warning labels on both designs looked pretty much the same.
Airless Paint Spray Cans - extracted from Ethics in Engineering 4th Edition, Martin & Schinzinger pg. 134
(Available at 18th Avenue Library Reserve)
“Airless” paint spray guns do not need an external source of compressed air connected to the gun by a heavy
hose (although they do need to attach them to a power source) because they have incorporated a small electric
motor am pup. One common design uses an induction motor that does not cause sparking because it does not
require a commutator and brushes (which are sources of sparking). Nevertheless the gun carries a label warning
users that electrical devices operated in paint spray environments pose special dangers. Another type of gun
that, like the first, also requires only a power cord is designed to weigh less by using a high-speed universal
motor and disk-type pump. The universal motor does require a commutator and brushes, which cause sparking.
This second kind of spray gun carries a warning similar to that attached to the first, but it states in addition that
the gun should never be used with paints that employ highly volatile and flammable thinners such as naptha.
The instruction booklet is quite detailed in its warnings.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
A painter had been lent one of the latter types of spray guns. In order to clean the apparatus, he partially filled it
with paint thinner and operated it. It caught fire, and the painter was severely burned as the fire spread. The
instruction booklet was in the cardboard box in which the gun was kept, but it had not been read by the painter,
who was a recent immigrant and did not read English very well. He had, however, used the first type of airless
paint spray gun in a similar manner without mishap. The warning messages on both guns looked pretty much
the same. Do you see any ethical problems in continuing over-the-counter sales of this second type of spray
gun? What should the manufacturer of this novel, lightweight device do?
In answering these questions, consider the fact that courts have ruled that hidden design defects are not excused
by warnings attached to the defective products or posted in salesrooms. Informed consent must rest on a more
thorough understanding than can be transmitted to buyers by warning labels.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Case 19: Hurricane Katrina [Real-World]
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Background
o What:
 Hurricane leading to flooding
Where/When:
 New Orleans, Louisiana
 August 29-30, 2005
Outcome
o Who/What:
 ~700 deaths
 75% of city flooded with depths as high as 25 feet.
 New Orleans survived the storm with limited damage, but most of the damage was
caused by flooding.
o How/Why:
 Failure of levees due to soft soil foundations.
 Floodwalls were overwhelmed due to not accounting for very high hydraulic loading.
o
•
Hurricane Katrina- extracted from Engineering Ethics 4th Edition, Fleddermann pg. 80-82 (Available at 18th
Avenue Library Reserve)
Residents of coastal regions along the east and gulf coasts of the United States have long been familiar with the
devastating effects of hurricanes. Rarely does a season go by without a hurricane striking the mainland United
States, causing damage, disruption, and loss of lives near the coast as well as far inland where tornadoes
spawned by the hurricane can destroy property while torrential rains flood entire communities. Although
communities in the United State have plans for handling hurricanes and other natural disasters Hurricane
Katrina presented unique problems that made the normal issues associated with hurricanes even worse.
Like many hurricanes that hit the United States, Katrina started as a tropical depression, forming in the
Caribbean on August 23, 2005. Its first landfall was in south Florida where it was relatively harmless Category
1 storm. (The intensity of hurricanes is described by a system of “categories” ranging from Category 1, the least
intense, to Category 5, which denotes very significant and dangerous storms.) After crossing southern Florida,
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Katrina intensified in to a Category 5 storm as it moved through the Gulf of Mexico. Katrina weakened to
Category 3 status before making landfall along the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts on August 29, but the
storm surge was still enormous. Damage was reported as far away as Alabama and Texas, but the bulk of the
damage from wind and flooding occurred in New Orleans and the Mississippi communities of Biloxi, Gulfport,
and Pass Christian. Initially, it appeared that New Orleans had survived the hurricane with only limited damage.
But by August 30, it became clear that the system of levees and canals that protect New Orleans had failed,
leading to flooding of the city. Ultimately, over 75% of the city was flooded, in some areas to depths as high as
25 feet.
To understand the problems that New Orleans faces, it is necessary to know a little about the infrastructure of
the city. New Orleans is one of the oldest cities in the United States, having been founded on some relatively
high and dry land along the Mississippi in 1718. Over the years, the city grew by draining swampland and
protecting it from flooding using levees to hold back the river and other bodies of water. Much of the modern
city of New Orleans lies below sea level, so a series of pumps is used to remove rainwater and prevent flooding
in the city. As the city has grown, more levees were constructed and a system of canals was built in part to help
protect the city from floods on the Mississippi and storm surges from the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, New
Orleans is a major seaport: Oceangoing ships arrive at the port of New Orleans through a series of dredged
channels and canals.
A complete picture of what happened in New Orleans also requires looking beyond the city itself to the very
complex Mississippi river system and the attempts over the years to control the river. Historically, the
Mississippi, like all rivers, has flooded annually. From an ecological point of view, this flooding is a good thing,
enriching the soil in the flooded areas and providing nutrients to plant and animal wildlife. This flooding also
contributes to the counteracting land subsidence as the floods leave behind a new layer of soil to rebuild land
levels. However, flooding is generally incompatible with human activity – it interferes with agriculture and
human habitation. To prevent this flooding, humans have been attempting to control the Mississippi ever since
the banks of the river have been occupied. For years, levees have been built along the river to prevent flooding,
often by local entities with no coordination of efforts. This is illustrated by a passage from the book published in
1874, Life on the Mississippi by Mark Twain, where he describes the efforts of the precursor to the modern
Army Corps of Engineers in taming the river: “The military engineering of the Commission have taken upon
their shoulders the job of making the Mississippi over again – a job transcended in size by only the original job
of creating it.”
Not until relatively recently was there a centralized coordination of flood control projects along the Mississippi,
which was basically provided by the Army Corps of Engineering. The result of the years of building along the
river is an extensive and complex system of levees, dames, and canals along the length of the river from
Minnesota to Louisiana. Although flooding has largely been controlled by this, there have been numerous
unintended consequences. For example, the Mississippi delta, the land created as soil carried downstream by
the river is deposited into the Gulf of Mexico by the river, has stopped being nourished by the river and has
shrunk. The wetlands of the delta are an important component of the protection of New Orleans from storm
surges such as those generated on the gulf coast by Katrina. Humans have also altered the protection system for
New Orleans by cutting straight canals through the delta and adjacent areas. It is thought that these canals
served to funnel storm surge from the gulf to the levees and canals protecting New Orleans.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
On one level, the disaster in New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina can be viewed as simply an unfortunate
natural disaster, similar to an earthquake in California. Viewed this way, there are certainly no ethical issues
related to the engineering of the protection system for New Orleans. However, even though there is no obvious
person or group who can be blamed for the disaster in the weeks and months since the disaster, much new
information has come to light regarding decisions that were made that contributed to the problems in New
Orleans. Perhaps the most concise statement to date regarding the issues surrounding this disaster comes from a
review done by the American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE). This report addressed many important
issues:
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The report states that “decisions made during the original design phase appear to reflect an overall
pattern of engineering judgment inconsistent with that required for critical structures.”
“The design calculations for the 17th Street Canal floodwall did not account for the possibility of a gap
developing on the canal side of the floodwall as the hydraulic loading on it increased.”
“The potential for floodwalls to undergo large deformation was evident from a mid-1980s field test
performed by the Corps.”
“Because it appears that this information never triggered an assessment of the impact that such a gap
would have the stability of the existing levee and floodwall system…. The ability of any I-wall design in
New Orleans to withstand design flood level loading is unknown.”
“The design calculations did not account for the significantly lower shear strength of soils at and beyond
the toe of the levee relative to the strength beneath the levee crest. The profession has known for
decades that strengths of soft soils are significantly influenced by overburden pressure.”
“The stability of levees founded on soft soils remains in question…”
“The 17th Street Canal floodwall was designed too close to the margins for a critical life-safety
structure.”
“Many miles of levee and floodwall were overwhelmed by overtopping because Katrina exceeded the
standard project hurricane. It appears that the standard project hurricane. It appears that the standard
project hurricane reflected the largest hurricane of record to hit the Gulf Coast, occasionally updated
when an even larger hurricane struck. This approach is inconsistent with the logic used in design of
structures to resist earthquake loading or floods.”
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Case 21: Drinking in the Workplace [Hypothetical]
• Background
o Who/What:
 Branch Inc. adopted a substance abuse policy to improve its competitiveness.
 An employee, Andy Pullman has a drinking problem and is being considered for the
position of head of quality control.
• Outcome
o Who/What:
 John Crane, Andy Pullman’s friend and colleague knows about his drinking problem but
is in a dilemma as to tell the plant manager or not, since Andy Pullman’s drinking might
get in the way of his new position.
o How/Why:
 Branch Inc.’s substance abuse has been ineffective.
 Absenteeism is still high. Work is still shoddy.
 Management proposing a new mandatory drug testing policy
Drinking in the Workplace - extracted from The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Research accessed
at: http://www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/Drinking.aspx
Branch, Inc. has been losing ground to its competitors in recent years. Concerned that substance abuse may be
responsible for much of Branch's decline, the company has just adopted a policy that imposes sanctions on
those employees found to be working under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs.
John Crane and Andy Pullman have worked together in one of the engineering divisions of Branch for several
years. Frequently John has detected alcohol on Andy's breath when they were beginning work in the morning
and after work breaks during the day. But, until the new policy was announced it never occurred to John that he
should say anything to Andy about it, let alone tell anyone else about it. Andy's work has always been first rate,
and John is not the kind of person who feels comfortable discussing such matters with others.
Two days before the announcement of the new alcohol and drug policy, Andy tells John that he is being
considered for the position of head of quality control. Although pleased at the prospect of Andy's promotion,
John wonders if Andy's drinking will get in the way of meeting his responsibilities. John worries that, with
additional job pressures, Andy's drinking problem will worsen. What should John do?
1. Talk with Andy about his drinking.
2. Keep quiet and mind his own business, leaving the problem up to Andy and those who have the
responsibility to select someone for the job.
3. Other.
Harvey Hillman, Plant Manager at Branch, knows that Andy and John have worked together many years. He
has narrowed his choice for Head of Quality Control to Andy and one other person. He invites John out for
lunch to see if he can learn something more about Andy from John. Should John volunteer information about
Andy's drinking? Suppose Harvey says, "This is a really important decision. We need a top person for the
quality control job. We've had some real problems the last few years with shoddy production, probably because
of alcohol and drug abuse in the workplace. I had to move Jack Curtis out of head of quality control because he
was drunk on the job. We have to get this under control. The new policy might help. But quality control will
still have to keep a really close eye on things." Should John say anything now?
Ethics Cases – Schedule 3 (ENG1181)
Branch's policy on the use of alcohol and drugs has been in effect for a year. It does not seem to have made a
significant difference. Absenteeism is still high. Shoddy workmanship continues. And Branch's profit margins
are still declining. Management is now proposing mandatory random drug testing for its non-professional
workforce, and mandatory drug testing for all new workers. The labor union protests that such a policy is
undesirable in two respects. First, it is an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of workers. Second, exempting
professionals from the testing is discriminatory and, therefore, unjust.