The University of Surrey People and Organisations Subject Group Seminar Series
in Association with the Leadership Academy and the International Centre for Nursing Ethics
Issues in the workplace: Whistleblowing
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique
(work in progress)
Dr Alf Crossman
School of Management, University of Surrey
Introduction
The ethical behaviour of organisations has attracted much attention in recent years; this has
been largely due to high profile reporting of incidents of corporate wrongdoing in the media.
Through these reports it became apparent that [some] employees were aware of these acts
and either revealed to the public or remained silent, only disclosing their knowledge after the
wrongdoings became public.
Examples of wrongdoings that were allegedly known to employees include Enron; former
Enron employee Lynn Brewer claimed that many employees knew about wrongdoing in the
company, but they kept silent and became complicit rather than have the courage to disclose
it. Similarly, abnormally high post-operative mortality rates at the Bristol Royal Infirmary were
eventually disclosed by Dr Stephen Bolsin, a concerned anaesthetist. His previous attempts
to raise the issue were either ignored or he was subjected to threats by the cardiothoracic
surgeon involved, Dr James Wisheart, or Dr John Roylance, the hospital‟s CEO (Durham
and Duckworth, 2001; Learning from Bristol, 2001). More recently, an employee at BP
Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico revealed his concerns about working
practices and safety standards being employed by the company, it was later reported that
“.... rig survivors also said it was always understood that you could get fired if you raised
safety concerns that might delay drilling. Some co-workers had been fired for speaking out,
they said” (Bronstein and Dash, 2010, np). The common feature of these incidents appears
to be that, despite legislation to protect workers (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (USA); Public
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (UK)), employees were aware of the wrongdoings in their
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 1
organisations, but did not disclose these externally. The recent economic down-turn has also
raised the issue of organisational rectitude and integrity, in particular, the conduct of CEOs,
directors and senior managers whose behaviours were not exposed by subordinates despite
their awareness of it. As Wearden reports (2009, np) “Paul Moore, the former head of
regulatory risk at HBOS, claimed yesterday that he had been sacked in 2005 after warning
that the bank's aggressive sales practices threatened its stability”.
This research is not focused solely on the behaviour of managers at various levels or
company directors and CEOs, nor is it exclusively addressing the behaviour of subordinate
employees; the research is primarily concerned with providing explanations for why
employees might become complicit in organisational wrongdoings and whether this is due to
organisational loyalty, lack of interest, low moral or ethical values, or fear of reprisals. If it is
through fear of reprisals, this raises the issue of organisational climate (fear) and whether
this is a deliberate creation by management as a means of protecting organisational
interests. Likewise, the influence of role models, who have normalised corrupt behaviours in
creating a culture of complicity (Ashforth and Anand (2003) or institutional socialisation
(Kish-Gephart et al (2009), may be of equal interest and importance. What this research is
particularly interested in is whether subordinate compliance or complicity is woven into the
fabric of the organisation by its management climate, thus creating a situation whereby
silence is intentionally institutionalised to the possible detriment of organisational wellbeing.
Theory
Over the past two decades a considerable body of whistle-blowing literature has
accumulated which attempts to explain the whistle-blowing intentions and behaviours of
employees. Numerous explanations have emerged from the literature, in a variety of fields or
disciplines, as to why employees decide to remain silent or choose to blow the whistle.
Whistle-blowing may be described as a person who reports real or perceived wrongdoings of
their employer, either to the authorities or to the public in general through the media. One
recurring theme emerging from the literature is an employee‟s attachment to the organisation
and the effect this might have on whistle-blowing decisions. The psychological attachment
between an individual and their organisation has been described as a „psychological
contract‟ (Rousseau, 1989; Schein, 1965), founded on reciprocity and mutuality obligation.
The psychological contract has been sub-divided into „relational‟ and „transactional‟
dimensions, based on the nature and extent of the employee/employer relationship
(Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993; Millward and Hopkins, 1998); the former being longterm and based on a socio-emotional exchange (loyalty, support, organisational citizenship)
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 2
and the monetizable elements (pay) and the latter short-term and based mainly on the
monetizable elements with limited socio-emotional exchange. The literature seems to
suggest that the extent of the psychological attachment between employees and their
organisation might be highly influential in whistle-blowing behaviours and decisions; one
might expect greater loyalty in a relational psychological contract. However, the relationship
between the outcomes of a psychological contract, such as job and pay satisfaction,
organisational commitment and citizenship (Guest and Conway, 1997), and decisions to
whistle-blow have been found to be inconclusive (Brewer and Selden, 1998; Near and
Miceli, 1996). This level of inconclusiveness may be owing to different interpretations of
employee loyalty and the identity of those making the loyalty judgement for, as Vadera et al
(2009) suggest, whistle-blowing may be regarded as both an example of loyalty and
disloyalty, heroes or traitors (Hersh, 2002) depending on whether it has been done internally
or externally.
Whilst it has been argued that whistle-blowing may assist the organisation to learn about and
correct the wrongdoing/event before it enters the public domain, this only applies if action is
taken in response to the whistleblower‟s disclosure and whether loyalty is perceived to be
toward the organisation or the public interest; the case of the Bristol Royal Infirmary, where
individual priorities and aspirations overrode concerns for patient safety (Learning from
Bristol, 2001) raising concerns was clearly regarded as treachery or disloyalty. The creation
of tension through competing obligations is a distinct possibility (Vandekerckhove and
Commers, 2004); employees have a contractual legal obligation of fidelity, to be loyal to their
employers, and a moral obligation to to prevent public harm, arguably by whistle-blowing
(Duska, 1997). However, Varelius (2009) adopts an alternative stance by arguing that an
employee‟s loyalty to the employer does not conflict with blowing the whistle and disclosing
wrongdoing, indeed by doing so they are protecting the organisation from long-term. This
raises three important questions in relation to the relevance of the psychological contract to
whistle-blowing intent: First, will a strong relational contract reduce, or increase, whistleblowing intent? If a relational contract indicates employee loyalty, then one might expect the
most loyal to be more inclined to reveal wrong-doings. Second, will a strong transactional
contract increase whistle-blowing intent? This might indicate employee revenge. Third, does
the type of psychological contract act as a proxy for, or indicator of, employee loyalty?
Much research has also been conducted on the role of employee morality and ethics in
whistle-blowing decisions. Mellema (2008) argues a subtle difference between the terms, but
observes that primary actors can only succeed in wrongdoing if they are enabled to do so by
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 3
secondary actors, those who are complicit. Drawing on the writings of Thomas Aquinas,
Mellema cites nine ways in which a person might be guilty of complicity in wrongdoing,
among these are „silence‟ and „not denouncing‟, in other words complicity by omitting to act,
for whatever reason. As Bouville (2007) notes, for the morality argument to hold true the
whistleblower must be motivated by the right reasons; to protect the public interest is
acceptable, but to exact revenge on the organisations or individuals within it, or in return for
reward are not.
What is well documented is the potential price a whistle-blower may pay for the disclosure of
wrongdoing, through sanctions or retaliation by the employer. The literature on rational
decision-making explores the way that employees weigh up of the moral benefit of revelation
of wrongdoing versus the cost to the employee of any retaliation or sanctions the employer
might invoke (Glazer, (1983); Poneman, 1994), the resulting silence equating to complicity,
as argued by Aquinas (Mellema, 2008). The retaliatory actions by employers may involve,
downgrading, increase in work, reduced responsibility, termination of employment (Bok,
1980; Liyanarachchi and Newdick, 2008). A number of studies (Arnold and Poneman, 1991;
Braback, 1984; Liyanarachchi and Newdick, 2008) consistently indicate that individuals with
a higher degree of moral reasoning are more likely to blow the whistle than those with a
lower level. Likewise, individuals are more likely to reveal wrongdoings when the likelihood
of retaliation is perceived weak than they are when the likelihood is perceived to strong.
There is little doubt that the risks associated with whistle-blowing are high; research has
revealed that the majority of whistle-blowers lose their jobs through termination or forced
retirement, are blacklisted for obtaining jobs in their field, lose their homes and their
marriages; the majority suffer from depression and poor physical health (Alford, 2007;
Bouville, 2007; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999). The question for a potential whistle-blower will
be, is this a price worth paying? Perhaps the most interesting and relevant pieces work in
the field of whistle-blowing decision-making is that of Gundlach et al (2004; 2008); the
researchers use attribution theory to explore the way corporate wrongdoing might invoke
certain cognitive and emotional responses. The dimensions measured are: the seriousness
of the wrongdoing, perceptions of intent, judgments of responsibility, and feelings of anger,
thus integrating moral judgments about wrongdoing with emotions. This implies that
wrongdoing is subjected to value judgements and appraisal of the degree of seriousness in
the view of the individual, which in turn raise the prospect of wrongdoing becoming
incrementally accepted through normalisation as a result of increased exposure.
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 4
Whilst the various researches into different aspects of whistle-blowing behaviour discussed
above, provide potential explanations on the extent to which employees may either expose
wrongdoing or become complicit in it by remaining silent, they tend to be contained within
disciplines and adopt a narrow and specific stance; there is little if any cross-fertilisation
through interdisciplinary study. Likewise, there is little evidence of employee complicity being
a result of the deliberate creation of an organizational climate (of fear) by management,
designed to inhibit revelation. The combination of sophisticated employee selection
techniques (designed to achieve high levels of „person-organisation fit‟) and the adoption of
increasing popular employee loyalty, commitment and engagement programmes create the
potential for an organizational climate in which revelation of wrongdoing may be judged as
treachery, rather than in the long-term interest of the organisation and its various
stakeholders.
Although research has been conducted into organisational climate (fear) and the way in
which this might influence employees‟ behaviours (Ashkanasy and Nicholson, 2003), there is
a dearth of research which specifically links this to whistle-blowing decisions. Furthermore,
there is little evidence of how fear creation might impact on the psychological attachment
between the employee and the organisation and how this might affect whistle-blowing
decisions; Turnley and Feldman (1999) looked at the relationship between psychological
contract violation and whistle-blowing, but not whether the contract was relational or
transactional. There is also an absence of evidence in the management literature which
explains how climate of fear, in relation to whistle-blowing, may flow from a deliberate fear
creation strategy; although this may be similar to such a climate being created among the
criminal fraternity, though which „snitches‟ and „squealers‟, terms which might also be
substituted for whistle-blowers (Hauserman, 1986), live in constant fear of reprisals. This
research offers the potential to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how the
variables are related and, in doing so, make a worthwhile contribution that will benefit
academics in management science and practising managers and high-level policy-makers.
Research methodology
The overarching objective of this research project is to identify whether subordinate
compliance or complicity is woven into the fabric of an organisation by its management
climate, thus creating a situation whereby silence is intentionally institutionalised to the
possible detriment of the long-term organisational wellbeing. It is intended that this research
will build on existing research in discreet areas of whistle-blowing, climate of fear, ethical
values and psychological contract by seeking to identify the potential relationship between
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 5
each of them, whilst developing a new dimension of management intent to encourage
complicity through fear creation. More specifically, the objectives are to discover:

Whether fear creation techniques lead to a climate of fear at the organisational level.

Whether there is a relationship between climate of fear and the psychological contract,
both generally and specifically in respect of the transactional and relational dimensions.

Whether there is a relationship between climate of fear and whistle-blowing intent.

Whether there is a relationship between employee ethical values and whistle-blowing
intent.

Whether there is a relationship between the psychological contract and whistle-blowing
intent.

Whether the nature of the psychological contract is related to whistle-blowing intent.
The research will be conducted in two phases. The first phase will be an exploratory study
based on qualitative interviews with a sample of middle/junior managers; the purpose of this
is to confirm relevance and nature of the proposed variables to be utilised in the research,
these are:

Psychological contract

Employee ethical values

Fear creation

Climate of fear

Whistle-blowing intent
The second phase comprises quantitative research by way of a questionnaire which will
collect data in relation to the variables. Wherever possible the variables will be measured
using pre-existing instruments with high statistical reliability; where measures do not exist
new ones will be designed and piloted prior to main data collection. The quantitative data will
be analysed in the first instance using appropriate the statistical techniques (e.g. correlation
and regression) with additional analysis, such as structural equation modelling, being
performed as appropriate to fully exploit the data. A multi-sample study is proposed with
organisations being recruited to participate in the following sectors:

Higher education

Police service

Banking and finance

National Health Service

Oil and gas
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 6
It is intended that five organisations will be recruited with samples of participants c300 in
each giving a total sample size of c1,500, which will enable comprehensive analysis of the
main dataset and sub-sets. The proposed measurement of each variable is as follows:
Psychological contract: adoption of the shortened Millward and Hopkins (1998) scale, which
distinguishes
between
„relational‟‟
(long-term,
open-ended
relationships)
and
„transactional‟ (short-term monetizable elements) psychological contracts.
Climate of fear: adoption of the scale used by Ashkanasy and Nicholson (2003) which
measures employee perceptions of fear in organisations as experienced or perceived
by employees.
Fear creation: a new instrument/scale will be developed and tested, to identify whether there
is a perception that fear is created deliberately to inhibit employees from revealing
corporate wrongdoing.
Whistle-blowing intent: adoption of the scale used by Gundlach et al (2008) which measures
whistle-blowing intent; feeling or anger; judgments of responsibility; seriousness or
wrongdoing.
Ethical values: a new instrument/scale will be developed and tested to measure the ethical
values of employees to ascertain if this is influential in whistle-blowing decisions.
It is anticipated that the qualitative and quantitative results of the research will allow the
identification and understanding of the relationship between climate of fear, climate creation,
ethical values, psychological contract and whistle-blowing intent/employee. The findings of
this research will benefit the academic community, practitioners/managers, and regulatory
bodies and provide a framework through which to improve corporate rectitude. Interim
results may also be disseminated through appropriate conferences and symposia.
Hypotheses
From an initial review of the literature on psychological contract and whistle-blowing the
following hypotheses have been formulated:
H11
The type of the psychological contract (relational or transactional) will affect the level
of employee whistle-blowing intent.
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 7
H1a1
A strong relational psychological contract score will be associated with a low whistleblowing intent score
H1b1
A strong transactional psychological contract score will be associated with a high
whistle-blowing intent score
H21
The strength of employee ethical values will affect their whistle-blowing intent.
H31
Perceptions of fear creation by employers will be related to the type of employee
psychological contract (relational or transactional).
H41
The level of climate of fear will be related to the type of psychological contract
(relational or transactional).
H51
Employee perceptions of fear creation will be related to their assessment of the
climate of fear in the organisation.
H61
Employees who perceive a high climate of fear will exhibit a low whistle-blowing
intent resulting in complicity.
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 8
Psychological
contract
(PC)
H1
Relational
H1a
Transactional
H1b
H4
Climate of
fear
(CF)
H6
Whistleblowing intent
(WBI)
Act of
wrongdoing
H5
H3
Employee
ethical values
(EV)
Fear
creation
(FC)
H2
Investigating Employee Complicity as a Management Technique – Page 9
Whistleblowing
decision
 Revelation
 Complicity
Potential contribution
In contrast to previous research in the area, the originality of this project relates to the
investigation of the specific issue of institutionalised silence as a deliberate managerial
technique, where the climate is such that subordinates accept what they may regard as
inappropriate or unethical actions or behaviours because the consequences of doing so
(retaliation or reprisals) are too great and the cost of „doing the right thing‟ is regarded as
being too great a risk to take. Previous studies appear to have adopted a rather parochial
approach with the emphasis on discrete disciplines; this study, in contrast, proposes a multidimensional approach by drawing on a variety of conceptual areas. The research has the
potential to significantly enhance our understanding of managerial and employee
behaviours, to improve the socio-psychological and cultural well-being of employees, and to
inform policy-makers in organisations and the higher political sphere.
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