PREFACE
This work is a study of the statelessness of the ‘chhiter look’ (enclave people) in Bangladesh
and India. It reviews the background history as well as the political and socio-economic
perspectives of the Bangladesh-India enclaves. The key issues of the study are (i) the creation
of enclaves, (ii) the number, location, and population of the enclaves, (iii) the evolution of
social and economic life therein, (iv) statelessness and the crisis of identity (v) the problem of
state sovereignty, bilateral relations and domestic development pertaining to the enclaves.
Though coincidently with Europe and other colonial parts of the world enclaves, locally
known as chhitmohals existed widely in the Indian subcontinent since the Middle Ages the
term chhitmohal or enclave came into discussion as an international geopolitical entity in the
post-colonial period. However, the most of the world’s enclaves are now located in
Bangladesh and India. The geopolitical entity of the enclaves has occurred frequently through
the history, and Western Europe was particularly rich in enclaves. There was often an
expression of decentralized forms of rule, which admitted discontiguous territories. During
and after the Crusades, enclaves were a fairly widespread phenomenon in the eastern
Mediterranean region, and presumably also existed elsewhere during the periods of feudal
rule.
In the subcontinental context, the zamindars or the local chiefs often tried to extend their
territories by marriage, war or purchase. In doing so, they often owned some territories far
away from their own jurisdictions, laying in the others. Such a pattern of the growth of
enclaves had a gradual evolution. Over the administrative control, various complications
developed in the chhit (abridged version of chhitmohal) lands resulting in numerous conflicts
among the neighbouring zamindars, but as there was no international boundary, it did not
seem as problematic as of the later days. While executing their revenue reforms, the British
noticed the enclave problems and sometimes tried to settle those. Since there were two
conflicting parties in each case, and the British-doings were always concerned with their own
interests, the intricate boundary problems remained unresolved. The issue remained
unresolved even in the process of decolonisation as well as in the post-colonial development
of the nation states in the subcontinent and thus Bangladesh inherited it with its independence
from Pakistan in 1971.
India, the largest country in South Asia has its disputed boundary with most of the
neighbouring countries. The carving out of Bangladesh from the geographically separated
eastern wing of Pakistan added a new dimension to this problem. There remain many trivial
disputes pertaining to lands, scattered over the long boundary between Bangladesh and India,
which could perhaps be resolved through a neighbourly relation of friendship and cooperation. Unfortunately the disputes still remain unresolved, which have been a source of
tension in the bilateral relations. The partition of India (1947) along with other boundary
disputes conjured up a particular landscape on the previously existed chhitmohal, because,
the boundary, drawn in a very casual manner turned the chhitmohal into international
enclaves embodied with numerous complications.
Bangladesh has its 4200 kilometres long boundary all around with India (except the Bay of
Bengal and the relatively short boundary with Mayanmar in the south). Though boundary
disputes existed in many places on that long boundary, enclaves are found only in a small and
narrow section in the northern boundary, covered by the present districts of Kurigram,
Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and Panchagarh.
Being detached from the mainland by the international boundary of nation states, thousands
of innocent inhabitants of the enclaves perhaps have been among the most deprived people in
the world. They are totally excluded from all kinds of economic, social, political and
development activities of both the government and non-government organizations. Their
vulnerability and uncertainty of very basic needs as well as inhuman coping with the everbackward livelihood for survival is utterly contrary to the very notion of modern civilization.
The partition with artificial boundary through the densely populated agrarian area has been
found to be a disaster for the people, entailing a serious socio-economic impact at the micro
level. Remarkably the enclave people have been mostly victimized by the partition. But their
grievance could not draw even minimum attention either from the governments of the
respective countries or from the social workers and civil societies during the long period of
almost six decades. Although some initiatives were taken to resolve the issue and optimism
also appeared in 1974, it was only a part of macro events in the bilateral politics and that is
why this problem still remains unresolved with other bilateral issues understandably due to
the reluctance of India.
The modern history of the subcontinent that emerged under the patronage of the colonial rule
has mostly been unfocused on social issues. The western perception of history was introduced
in this sub-continent not for the enthusiasm of liberal history but for the interest of revenue
collection. Subsequently, the history of this region was written by either the colonial ruler
themselves or the native beneficiaries of their rule. Perhaps, because of this reason the history
of the subaltern, marginal and minority is scanty. This may be the pretext of missing the
substantial history of the Bangladesh- India enclaves, peopled by the ‘miniature societies’ in
the midst of all-out exclusions.
Since the Agreement of 1974 and its immediate dead-lock, the inhabitants of the BangladeshIndia enclaves have been receiving little importance from either of the countries except some
incidental media coverage and occasional bilateral talks (including the special agreements for
the Tin Bigha Corridor of Dahagram-Angorpota) as one of many other bilateral issues in
macro politics. Unfortunately, the concerned organizations of Human Rights as well as the
civil societies have also been silent about the sub-human livelihood of the people living
therein. The enclave-people both in India and Bangladesh are found simultaneously
subaltern, marginal and minority in regard to basic needs and the right of self-determination.
In terms of the human aspects, the plight of the enclave-people is apparently as like as that of
‘illegal immigrants’ in their very homeland.
Generally it appears that the enclaves of Bangladesh and India have virtually become
stateless limbos. The few literatures, available on enclaves hardly reveal the political and
socio-economic aspects of the individuals thereof. In fact, the enclave dwellers have no
connections with the contemporary literature on nation states and nationalism. Only
exception is that the Bangladesh government has dealt seriously with the Indian government
about its largest enclave Dahagram-Angarpota (a composite enclave as indicated by the
name) laying in India which has been linked with the mainland by a passage namely Tin
Bigha Corridor since 1992. Perhaps, for this reason some news reports and articles on
Dahagram-Angarpota were occasionally published in some newspapers and journals. But
there is a dearth of information about the rest of the Bangladeshi enclaves. The case is almost
same in the Indian side also. However, some articles especially studies undertaken by the
bureaucrats were published in India in the 1960s. It may be noted that any in-depth work on
the post-partition development of the enclaves is yet to be found.
Some scholars from outside the subcontinent did some academic works on the BangladeshIndia enclaves as a part of their global interest in the subject as a whole, like those of Lamb
(1968), Karan (1966), Presscott (1975), Presscott et al. (1977) and Whyte (2002). As almost
all of them were geographers, the background history and the resultant history of the enclaves
were usually left out in their works. Understandably they treat the issue as a geographical
curiosity or as a problem of state sovereignty and international law. Hence, very little is
known about what identities the enclave people have been getting since the emergence of the
nation states; how did they coin out the way of coping with states' arrangements that
criminalized their traditional livelihoods; and how has the social and economic life evolved
therein. Moreover, the said scholars, because of their orientation and objectives could not or
did not try to realize the immense sufferings of the people, living in the enclaves. For
example, Whyte (2002) suggested to retain the enclaves and develop tourist industry around
them as the world's most complex international boundary rather than to exchange and merge
them with the respective surrounding country. But while studying over the issue as a whole,
one comes across the sufferings of the inhabitants as well as the problems of state
sovereignty, bilateral relations and domestic development associated with the enclaves. At
least the immense sufferings of the enclave people and their inhuman efforts for survival,
revealed by the investigation, physically carried out therein, render such suggestion utterly
impractical. However, Willem Van Schendel (2002), an historian and anthropologist, put his
attention on the state of Bangladesh-India enclaves in the perspective of statehood vis a vis
individual livelihood.
However, the opening chapter deals with the background history and the resultant
development of the enclave issue. The creation of enclaves in retrospect and other related
factors such as the nature of the zamindari rule that gave birth to the chhitmohals in the
subcontinent, the global aspects of the enclaves, the tangible geopolitical reality of a
boundary line drawn on a map (in1947) that turned the existing chhitmohals into international
enclaves and the prevailing geopolitical status of the enclaves have been examined.
Chapter II provides with physical structures of the enclaves and their population. There is a
long debate between Bangladesh and India on the number and areas of the enclaves and very
little information is available at state level as both governments maintain secrecy in this
regard. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to examine the number, location, population
and other relevant factors in this chapter on the basis of available data.
Chapter III dwells on the socio-economic condition and the state of Human Rights of the
enclave people using basically qualitative and life-history methods. Virtually no official
records available in this regard. The questions as to how the very status of the enclave affects
the peoples thereof and the basic question of Human Rights have been examined on the basis
of first-hand information.
Chapter IV has been devoted to reveal (i) the statelessness and the crisis of identity in the
enclaves (ii) survival strategy of the enclave people and (iii) the prevailing social order that
has evolved as an alternative to state administration.
This work is based on my M. Phil Dissertation submitted to Jahangirnagar University in
2005. In its making I have incurred debts of gratitude to many individuals and institutions. I
take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude to my preceptors Professor Dr.
Shirin Akhtar of Jahangirnagar University and Professor M. Muhibullah for introducing me
to historical research. My gratitude goes to Prof Dr. Sayed Anwar Husain and Prof. Dr.
Shamsher Ali for their valuable suggestions. My grateful thanks to Professor Naila Kabeer
for her collaboration in my field study. I am also grateful to Dr. S. M. Zulfiqar Ali of BIDS
for his cordial cooperation.
I am thankful to my honourable teachers, Prof. Dr. Ataur Rahaman Khan, Prof. Dr. Enamul
Huq Khan, Prof. Dr. Kazi Ihtesham, Prof. Dr. Taibul Hasan Khan, Prof. Hasina Matin, Prof.
Dr. Md. Nasiruddin, Professor Dr. M. Nurul Islam Manjur, Prof. Lutful Hye Jami and Prof.
A.T.M. Atiqur Rahman for their appreciation.
My thanks go to the staffs of Jahangirnagar University Library, Dhaka University Library,
BIDS Library, National Museum Library, and the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. I am
thankful to Mr. Mohd. Hasanuzzaman Hydary, Mr. Mohammad Elias Miah and Mrs.
Shamima Rahman of Bangladesh National Archives. I am ever grateful to Miss Iffat Ara, Mr.
Shah Alam, Mrs. Shajada Begum (Munni), Lutfor Rahaman and T. M. Mazharul Islam
(Rajon), for their jovial co-operations.
I am grateful to Mr. Mohammad Ali (Statistics Officer of Patgram), Mr. Monjurul Islam and
Mrs. Morsheda Begum, Monjur Murshed Sumon (Nilphamari), Mr. Abdur Razzak Master
(Chilahati), Mr. Bulbul Islam, (Dimla), Mr. Taifur Islam, Mr. Innas Ali (Srirumpur,
Patgram), and Mr. A R Mukul (local journalist, Panchagarh) for their valuable support during
my field survey.
My gratitude goes to Samiul Islam (Kader), my elder brother, Sabina Yesmin (Shimu), my
younger sister and all other members of my family. Most of all, they shared through my pains
and pleasures as this work progressed intermittently over a long period. I owe something
more than I could put in words to Farzana Ahshan Hera (Babush) who has indebted me
through her affectionate co-operation, inspiration and encouragement in this tedious effort.
I cannot conclude without expressing my gratitude to Dr. Binayak Sen, who provided me
with continuous support, suggestions and appreciation. Lastly, my profound gratitude to Prof.
Imtiaz Ahmed of the University of Dhaka, without whose cooperation and help this book
would not have seen the light of day.
February 2007
Mohammad Golam Rabbani
Research Methodology
With an aim to reveal the political and socio-economic scenario of the Bangladesh-India
enclaves along with their retrospective views two types of methodology have been followed
in this research. To reconstruct the background history of the enclaves, high-level state
records and other archival primary sources as well as a number of secondary sources have
been underused. The voices, speaking from grassroots level, local records, newspapers and
oral and written testimony by the ordinary people have also been reproduced. On the other
hand on spot investigations, life histories, interviews and focused group discussions (FGD)
were carried out in the form of PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) to capture the prevailing
socio-economic conditions in the enclaves. A total of 22 in-depth life accounts of the
inhabitants of the Bangladesh-India enclaves were followed to expose their experiences,
aspirations, and strategies of survival in the midst of multiple exclusions in the 'stateless
limbo'.* All the interviews used in this study were taken during January-April 2004.
Table 1a: Enclaves Visited:
Seria
Indian Enclaves
l No.
**
1.
ChhitKotbhajni
(DoholaKhagrabaribari,
Balapara Khagrabari,
Kotbhajni)
2.
Singimari (Haripasha Union)
Date of Visit
In between Domar
(Nilphamari) and
Debigonj
(Panchagarh)
Panchagarh
29-30 January,
18 March ’04
20 March ’04
3.
Garati (Hafizabad Union)
Panchagarh
21 March ’04
4.
Chand Khan Putimari
Boda (Panchagarh)
22 March ’04
5.
Shalbari Chhit **(Shalbari,
Nataktoka, Beoladanga and
Kajoldighi)
Debigonj
(Panchagarh)
26 March ’04
6.
Dimla
(Nilphamari)
27 Jan ’04
9.
Gitaldaha, Chhit No. 30
10.
Panishala, Chhit No. 17
11.
Latamari (Ajwar Para), Chhit
No.20
Gangarhat (Dashiachhara)
Chhit No. 150
Banshapachai Vitor kuti
Chhit No. 52
Banshapachai, Chhit No. 53
Dimla
(Nilphamari)
Dimla
(Nilphamari)
Dimla
(Nilphamari)
Patgram
(Lalmonirhat)
Patgram
(Lalmonirhat)
Fulbari (Kurigram)
27 Jan ’04
7.
8.
Bara Khanki Kharija, Chhit
No. 23 (North Goyabari
village)
Chhoto Khanki Kharija,
Chhit No. 29
Nagar Jigabari, Chhit No. 31
Lalmonirhat
27 Feb ’04.
Lalmonirhat
28 Feb ’04.
12.
13.
14.
*
Location
28 Jan ’04
28 Jan ’04
2 April’04
3 April ’04
5 April ’04
The Life Accounts were carried out in collaboration with Professor Naila Kabeer of the University of
Sussex, UK.
**
Large composite enclave formed of some contiguous enclaves as mentioned.
Table 1b: Enclaves Visited:
Serial
No.
1.
2.
3.
Bangladeshi
Enclaves
DahagramAngarpota**
Kisemot-NijJama
Chhit
Dhabalsuti
Location
Kuchlibari
Bihar)
Mekligonj
Bihar)
Kuchlibari
Bihar)
(Cooch
(Cooch
(Cooch
Table 2: Number of Life History carried out in the Enclaves:
Total
Life
History
Life
History
No of
carried out in the
carried out in the
Life
Indian Enclave
Bangladeshi
History
Enclaves
20
12
8
Date of
visit
2 March
’04
1 March
’04.
3 March’
04
Age
Group of
the
Responde
nts
30+
In order to investigate the socio-economic conditions of the enclaves, an extensive field study
was attempted. But because of some obvious practical impediments the researcher was
almost helpless in doing so to his satisfaction. Since the Indian enclaves are located in the
researcher’s native country, it was, however, possible to visit some of them. On the other
hand it was almost impossible to reach the Bangladeshi enclaves, laying in the India territory.
The researcher was not allowed to visit the Bangladeshi enclaves for the purpose of collecting
first-hand information of the socio-economic conditions of the people thereof. Under the
prevailing circumstances of land disputes and boundary crisis it is highly risky to work in the
Bangladesh-India borders especially relating to enclaves. In spite of all these practical
impediments the topic has been studied on the basis of qualitative survey so far.
ACRONYMS
AC
BDR
BE
BIDS
BJP
BSF
CDA
CPRC
CR
EB
FAO
LGED
MDGs
NAB
PS
SSC
UP
WB
Assistant Commissioner
Bangladesh Rifles
Bangladeshi Enclaves
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
Bharotiyo Janata Party
Border Security Force
Centre For Development Activities
Chronic Poverty Research Centre
Confidential Records
East Bengal
Food and Agricultural Organization
Local Government Engineering Department
Millennium Development Goals
National Archives of Bangladesh
Police Station
Secondary School Certificate
Union Parishad
West Bengal
FIRST CHAPTER
The Creation of Enclaves: An Overview
In South Asia, the term enclave came into discussion as a geopolitical entity in the postcolonial period. However, the term enclave or exclave that referred to as chhitmohal in the
subcontinent is not a new term and many countries have experienced the problems associated
with it in various forms since the Middle Ages.
In German and French, the term enclave is used to denote a place or country, which is
entirely surrounded by the territories of another power. Encyclopaedic World Dictionary
(1971) refers enclave as `a country, or esp. an outlaying portion of a country, entirely or
mostly surrounded by the territory of another country.'1 Now-a-days enclave means the
discontiguous portion or landmass of one country separated from the mainland and
surrounded by politically alien territory. There is a terminology for enclave with little
different notion namely exclave. Both enclaves and exclaves are discontiguous parts of one
country laying within other countries. From the point of view of the state in which the outlier
is located, it is an enclave, whereas from the point of view of the state to which the outlier
belongs, it is an exclave. For example, Dahagram-Angarpota can be called as an exclave of
Bangladesh (the owner country); on the other hand it can be called as an enclave of India (the
host country). Robinson (1959) defined a political exclave as ' a part of the territory of one
country entirely surrounded by the territory of another country.'2 In such a perspective the
terms enclave and exclave are often interchangeable.
Though the use of the terms seems to have originated during the late Middle Ages, the first
diplomatic document to contain the word enclave was the Treaty of Madrid (1526). 3 Since
then the terms have also been used outside political geography. The term park, for example,
has been described as a rural enclave within a city. In Bengali, the lexicographical meaning
of enclave or exclave is ' chhitmohal'. Here, chhitmohal is a term comprising of two different
words 'chhit' and ' mohal'. The word 'chhit' has two different but almost similar meanings: the
one is ' a drop ' or ' a blob' and the other is ' a fragment', or, 'a piece or portion'. In view of
these meanings the word 'chhit' indicates some fragmented, detached and scattered things. On
the other hand 'mohal' is a corruption of mohaal that means an administrative division of a
landed estate likely mouza or a small territory or landmass. So, in full meaning, chhitmohal is
one or more holding(s) laying detached from the parent estate. Throughout the Middle Ages,
especially during the Mughal era there were so many detached territories or discontiguous
mohaal in the Indian subcontinent belonging to one zamindar or local chief, entirely
surrounded by the territories of others. These mohaals came to be known as chhitmohal. With
the emergence of two nation-states of India and Pakistan and their consequent demarcation of
boundaries in 1947, many such chhitmohals being fallen under the barriers of international
boundary got the status of international enclaves.
Enclaves or exclaves may be accessible to the main territory of the state to which they
belong, by land through an alien territory, as well as by sea. A typical example was the
1
P Hanks (ed), Encyclopedic World Dictionary, 1971, p. 58.
Brenden R. Whyte, "The Cooch Behar Enclaves of India and Bangladesh: An Historical Overview and
Determination of their Number, Area and Population" Oriental Geographer, 2002, p. 17.
3
David L. Sills (ed), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), vol. 5, p. 61.
2
former German enclave of East Prussia, which from 1919 to 1939, as well as in previous
centuries was separated from the main German territory by Polish territory and the Baltic
Sea. However, if discontiguous territories are accessible only by sea they are usually
described as islands. On the other hand if they are located in other continents, described as
colonies. So, the enclaves, from the viewpoint of the owner country are sometimes exclaves,
sometimes colonies and sometimes islands, while from the perspective of the host country
these are always enclaves. Again, small states, entirely surrounded by the territory of another
state, for example, the Vatican City, share the characteristics of enclaves and are some times
referred to as 'virtual exclaves'.4 Contiguous exclaves, which for all regular commercial and
administrative purposes can be reached only through the foreign territory, can be called peneenclaves or pene-exclaves. A typical example of pene-exclave is Dahagram-Angarpota,
which has been linked with the mainland of Bangladesh by a passage namely Tin Bigha
Corridor through the Indian territory since 1992.
Physically, enclaves are found in three different categories such as enclave, counter-enclave
and counter-counter-enclave. We have already learnt about enclave. Now, counter-enclave
means enclave within the enclave i.e. the domestic territory laying in or surrounded by the
enclave territory of other country. A typical example of counter- enclave, locally called
Agarashaw Bigha can be found in the Indian enclave Uponchowki Bhajni/Kotbhajni (located
in Debigonj, Panchagarh, Bangladesh). Similarly, counter-counter-enclave means an enclave
laying within a counter-enclave i.e. a detached part of the principal enclave laying in or
surrounded by the counter-enclave of that enclave.
It is interesting to note that most of the enclaves in the world are now located in Bangladesh
and India. But enclaves have occurred frequently throughout the history and particularly
Western Europe was rich in enclaves. There was often an expression of decentralized forms
of rule that admitted discontiguous territories.5 During and after the Crusades, enclaves were
a fairly widespread phenomenon in the eastern Mediterranean region, and presumably they
also existed elsewhere during the periods of feudal rule. In the twentieth century also
enclaves occurred frequently in Europe and other colonial parts of the world through
accidents of discovery and difficulties of war and inland penetration.6 Simultaneously their
merging with national boundary was also proceeded.
With the growth of the centralized state system, enclaves were gradually absorbed into the
new national territories in the nineteenth century. Ratzel (1896) and other German
geographers, particularly the later German School of 'Geopolitics', regarded this absorption as
'an organic' phenomenon in the evolution of so-called natural boundaries of states. By the
time of the French Revolution, the process of absorption was virtually completed in the
Iberian Peninsula, Great Britain and Scandinavia.7 Likewise, the enclaves were eliminating
with the evolution of modern state system (nation state) since territorial contiguity began to
dominate the state sovereignty as well as national identity. Territorial consolidation was
virtually completed in all European countries except Germany by the time of the Congress of
Vienna (1815). However, a total 196 enclaves of Germany (Krenz 1961) strewn among the
German speaking-states, disappeared when the German Government amalgamated them with
4
Ibid, p. 60.
W.V.Schendel, „Stateless in South Asia: The Making of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves‟, The Journal of Asian
Studies, 61:1(2002), p. 116.
6
David L Sills, op. cit.
7
Ibid.
5
2
the federated state surrounding them in 1928.8 However, except for the unique cases of
Bangladesh and India enclaves today cover very small area and little concern.
There is a general controversy among the scholars about the total number of the world's
enclaves as of now. During my visit to some enclaves, their complex physical structure
(undemarcable in most cases) struck my attention. The controversial opinion, held by the
local people about the name, number and location of the smaller enclaves was also
noticeable. The existing traceable 223 enclaves, 32 counter-enclaves, and one countercounter-enclave9 are found mainly in three regions: Western Europe, the fringes of the former
Soviet Empire and South Asia. The great majority of the world's enclaves can be found in the
small and narrow section of the Bangladesh-India borderland, where 123 Indian enclaves
(including 3 counter-enclaves and 1 counter-counter-enclave) are located in Bangladeshi
territory and 95 Bangladeshi enclaves (including 21counter-enclaves)10are located in Indian
Territory. In terms of complex physical structure, political significance, and social
eccentricity, they have no parallel in the world.11
All through the history, the local rulers by war, marriage, or purchase tried to enlarge their
territories. In the process, they often attained some territories far away from their own
jurisdictions, laying in the other‟s territory. Such a pattern of the growth of enclaves, which
was the characteristic of the period, had a gradual evolution. Thus the origin of the most
enclaves in Bangladesh and India can be traced to the relics of the pre-colonial era. India was
never a one state. There were so many princely states in the Indian subcontinent, which
neither the Mughals nor the British brought under direct rule. It may be pointed out that the
imperial rulers often allowed semi-autonomous zamindari estates or princely states to grow in
the frontier areas in order to ensure security to the far-flung areas. Since some of the frontier
zamindari had strategic importance, the security of the country was depended to some extent
on the loyalty and goodwill of those zamindars. Consequently, the treatment they received
from the imperial rulers was that of allies rather than tax paying subjects.12 Though the
British sometimes took initiatives to bring the zamindars under the centralized administrative
discipline, the zamindars by that time brought themselves in a common platform as 'a class' to
antagonize any anti-zamindari proceeding. So, it was not possible to adopt a revolutionary
solution to the problem of 'landlordism'13 like the institution of economic discipline.
Most of the powerful territorial magnates or big zamindars used to scramble for territorial
expansion, which was in fact, a characteristic of feudal rule. The zamindars in Mughal India
with or without the patronage of the Mughals very often extended their territories, penetrating
in the neighbouring ones and thus creating some landlocked estates often referred to as taluk,
mouza, toppa, chowki (estates of different size) etc. It was also found that the taluk did not
constitute compact blocks. Each taluk was consisted of a number of jotes (small estate)14 and
the jotes were not always contiguous to one another. Even the fields of a jote were also often
discontiguous.15 For instance, the Maharaja of Cooch Bihar owned considerable number of
8
W. V.Schendel, op. cit., p. 117.
Brenden R. Whyte, op. cit., p. 18.
Ibid, pp. 18, 19, 39.
11
W. V. Schendel, op. cit.
12
S. Akhtar, The Role of the Zamindars in Bengal 1707-1772 (1982), p. 13.
13
K. N. Chaudhuri, „Economic Problems And Indian Independence‟, in: C. H. Philips & M. D.
14
The size of jotes varied from estate to estate. For example in the Estate of Chhatnai-Jhar Singerswar (Rangpur
District), the average size of jote was 9.32 acres.
15
S. I. Husain, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement of Four Private Estates in the District of Rangpur,
1903-1907, p. 5.
9
10
3
discontiguous estates in the districts of Jalpaiguri and Rangpur,16 which probably took the
characteristics of enclaves later on. Interestingly, there is hearsay about the origin of the
chhitmohal (Bangladesh-India enclaves) that the Cooch Bihar Maharaja and the zamindars of
Rangpur, Dinajpur and Jalpaiguri sometimes exchanged taluk or landed estates in their acts of
occasional poker game. It has been also said that if some of the local magnates entered the
neighbouring territories for recreation or hunting as royal guests and pitched tent in some
place, that area was given to him as a mark of honour or to strengthen their friendship.17 For
example, the estate known as Lot Kaya, the portion of pargana Kazirhat in Rangpur District
was purchased by a Raja of Cooch Bihar and made over as a gift to Utsabananda Giri Sarma,
his spiritual guide.18 Such areas formed chhitmohal later on.
Enclaves are found only in a small and narrow section of the northern boundary of
Bangladesh, covered by the present districts of Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and
Panchagarh. This area was under the jurisdiction of the semi-independent zamindars or native
chiefs of Rangpur and Dinajpur during the Mughal period. In the Indian side, enclaves are
found only in Cooch Bihar and Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal, which were formerly
under the authority of the Maharaja of Cooch Bihar. So it can be assumed that the enclaves
might have their origin in the acts of friendship or hostility of the neighbouring local chiefs of
these areas over the centuries.
The Cooch Bihar State, founded in the early sixteenth century soon rose to prominence in
northeast India due to its geo-strategic and geo-trading importance as a buffer state between
the Mughal Empire and its neighbours, the Ahom Kingdom of Brahmaputra valley and the
Tibbet. By the late seventeenth century, the Mughals, capitalizing on the palace tension of
Cooch Bihar waged a number of invasions in the Kingdom and annexed three of its southern
chaklas (districts)19 namely Kakina, Kazirhat and Fatehpur. The disputes between the
Mughals and the Cooch Bihar Royal Family continued until 1713, when a treaty was signed
between the two. Under the treaty, Cooch Bihar ceded those three chaklas and in addition it
also lost its sovereignty over three further chaklas of Boda, Patgram and Purvabhag. A nazir
(sheriff in a civil court or superintendent) on behalf of the Maharaja took the zamindari of
these three chaklas. The chaklas were not integral areas, rather contained pockets of other
chaklas and zamindari that remained under the sovereignty of Cooch Bihar State. Likewise,
there were some pockets of land within the territory of Cooch Bihar belonging to Boda,
Patgram, and Purvabhag. This led to the emergence of a number of enclaves. However, from
time immemorial Cooch Bihar State retained possession of lands outside their boundary i.e.
in the territory of Mughal Empire. Similarly some Mughal zamindars were also able to retain
their holdings in the Cooch Bihar kingdom.20 Such holdings, detached from the main land
were then known as chhitmohal.
When the British East India Company acquired Bengal from the Mughals in 1765, the border
with Cooch Bihar marked the northern most limit of the British territory. The East India
Company, responding to the request of Najir Deo of Cooch Bihar to help rid the Kingdom of
increasing Bhutanese influence in its affairs, waged a campaign and incorporated it to the
16
W. W. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal (1876), vol. 8, p. 332.
Interview with Abu Bakar Sarkar, Abdur Razzaq Master (Dakua) and others, Kotbhajni Chhit, Chilahati,
Domar, January 2004.
18
S. I. Husain, op.cit., p. 21.
19
Chakla means an administrative division, formed of some zamindari, introduced by Bengal Subadar
(provincial ruler under the Mughals) Murshid Kuli Khan in the first quarter of the 18 th Century and followed by
the British. And chaklajat land means the sway over land legitimated by virtue of chakla.
20
W. W. Hunter, op. cit., vol. 8, pp. 316-17; vol. 10, pp. 405-30.
17
4
Bengal Province in 1772.21 Thus Cooch Bihar became the first Princely State under the
control of a British political agent. The subsequent negotiations to settle the Cooch BiharBhutan boundary resulted in the creation of further enclaves between the two states in 1817.
The British intervention demarcated an area then known as Maraghat, near Dhupguri, to be
Bhutanese, but left Cooch Bihar in possession of various temples, and other sites Bhutan had
clear claim to. However, the second war between the Bhutanese and the British in 1864-5
resulted in the British annexation of the Bhutanese-held plains between Cooch Bihar and the
Himalayas, known as the Duars that forms most of Jalpaiguri district of India today. Thus all
the Mughal-Cooch Bihar enclaves and the Bhutan-Cooch Bihar enclaves turned into BritishCooch Bihar enclaves under the British rule.
Over the administrative control various complications developed in the chhitmohals resulting
in numerous conflicts among the neighbouring zamindars, but as there was no international
boundary, it did not seem as problematic as of the later days. While executing their revenue
reforms, the British noticed the chhitmohal problems and sometimes tried to settle those.
Since there were two conflicting parties in each case, and the British-doings were always
concerned about their own interests, the problems associated with chhitmohals remained
unresolved.
At the aftermath of the Second World War the process of decolonisation led to the emergence
of nation states almost all over the world. In the Indian subcontinent, the colonial rule ended
with the emergence of two nation states on communal basis. In the anti-British movement,
both the leading parties - the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League because of
their conflicting postures to each other had ruined the excellent opportunity of building up a
better future for post-colonial India. On the other hand, the 'divide and rule' policy of the
British played a damaging role in creating or intensifying most political, geopolitical and
communal problems in this multi-racial and multilingual region.
In the transfer of power (a) to two newly divided authorities, (b) within an unexpected
shortest period followed by the crisis of the World War II, (c) in a country so vast and diverse
in language, culture and race and (d) in a condition while the country was sank into a
communal strife, there arose numerous consequences full of intricacy. In such a situation 'the
actual speed of transfer has been held responsible- and no doubt correctly- for many of the
disputes which later arose between the two new countries of India and Pakistan.'22 The
consequences that arose in the demarcation of the boundary have been burning in the two
neighbouring countries for many decades in the name of border disputes.
The interim Indian government, formed on 24 June 1946, failed to settle the communal
issues, which took violent turn day by day. Under the prevailing circumstances, in February
1947, British Prime Minister Mr. Attlee declared in the parliament that power must be
transferred before 30 June 1948 and with this end in view Lord Mountbatten was appointed
Viceroy and Governor General of India on 22 March 1947. Being unable to contain the
worsening communal strife the scheduled time for the transfer of power was reduced from 30
June 1948 to 14 August 1947 in the June 3rd Plan of Mountbatten. Such a hurried decision
caused serious practical problems to the process of partition including the demarcation of the
extensive and complicated boundaries between the two emerging dominions.
21
Ibid, vol. 10, pp. 414 -16.
C. H. Philips & M. D. Wainwright (eds), The Partition of India Policies and Perspectives 1935-47 (1970), p.
11.
22
5
After the final plan of division was declared, series of administrative complications surfaced
in the process of implementation of the partition plan within the short span of 74 days. A
Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe was formed and appointed to define the
boundary of Bengal and the Punjab with the greatest speed. For the Bengal portion of the
boundary Radcliffe was to be assisted by four members viz. Justice Bijon Kumar Mukherjee
and Justice Charuchandra Biswas on behalf of the Hindu Community, and Justice Abu Saleh
Mohammad Akram and Justice S.A. Rahaman on behalf of the Muslim Community. The
judges were all communal appointees, so it was likely that the recommendations to the
Chairman would be deeply communal and contradictory.
The terms of reference of the boundary commission were to consider the contiguous areas of
the localities from the communal point of view, and 'other factors' as well. In fact, the terms
`contiguity' and 'other factors' had made the 'terms of reference' vague and ambiguous.
Because the term "other factors" was ambiguous, and the bargaining Muslim League and
National Congress used this last ambiguously worded clause to press for the inclusion of
more territory that could not connectably have been claimed on the grounds of contiguous
majority.23 It was due to two reasons: first, there was no explanation of the term 'other factors'
in the 'terms of reference'; secondly there were numerous complicated factors related to the
boundary that it was quite impossible for the commission to examine even some of those
within the given time.
Criticism from the side of Pakistan had steadily been directed against the objectivity and
detachment of Radcliffe as chairman of the Commission.24 His role of arbitral and
Mountbatten's pro-Indian interference in the proceedings gave rise to some legal issues. 'The
official documents show that in framing his plan he (Mountbatten) gave up all pretence of
treating the Congress and Muslim League impartially. He showed documents to Nehru in "an
act of friendship", accepted Nehru's suggestions and embodied them in the documents
without showing those documents and suggestions to Jinnah, and obtaining Jinnah's
reactions'25. It is true that on at least one occasion Mountbatten had suggested Radcliffe that
there might be some advantages in presenting the Award to the public if there was an „overall
balance‟ in the nature of the Award, perhaps between Bengal and the Punjab.26 But Radcliffe
did not see how this idea of 'overall balance' could possibly be pursued or achieved
consistently with his duties to each commission. All these make it understandable that truly
there was by and large an interference of the Viceroy over Radcliffe in his proceedings of
demarcation.
The Bengal and the Punjab parts of the commission met at Calcutta and Lahore respectively
while Radcliffe made his own office in Delhi and daily received full transcript of notes of
both sets of proceedings. Radcliffe's early suggestion to the members of the commission that
any boundary line agreed by them would have far more weight than any arbitral line drawn
by him27 had little effect on them since the members of the commission, being appointed on
communal basis could not have agreed on what should be the boundary line. Radcliffe,
therefore, had to take the crucial decision of Award unilaterally. Moreover, since the
commission was assigned to demarcate a long boundary through the densely populated
23
Ibid.
C. H. Philips & M. D. Wainwright (eds) op. cit., pp. 201-2.
25
H. M. C, Partition of India, quoted in: M. A. Mohaimen, Itihaser Aloke Desh Bibhag-O-Quaide-e-Azam
Jinnah (The Partition of the Country in the Light of History and Quaide-e-Azam Jinnah), 1994, p. 201.
26
C. H. Philips & M. D (eds), op. cit., pp. 21-22.
27
Ibid.
24
6
integral territory within a short span of six weeks only, it was utterly impossible to reserve
areas of special difficulty for more leisurely scrutiny, or to provide for subsequent change.
The continuous partition line, which the commission was required to demarcate, was bound
to cut across thickly populated and long-settled areas, each of which formed a contiguous
economy and culture. In fact, „unlike such boundary-making in the colonial world, the
border between East Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971) and India owed little to “modern”
concepts of spatial rationality‟28 (see Figure 1). Injustice and great hardship thus could not be
avoided, and the commission members themselves as well as the members of the partition
council were sure to be unpopular and to become the subject of controversy.
Figure 1
The undemercable, volatile borderline with hardly any „no mans land‟. The
metal fence, made by India cut the channel just between two neighbour houses.
(Picture: Mohammad Golam Rabbani)
The entire strategy of the Viceroy for partition appeared to have been too rush without giving
anyone a moment to pause for thought that it imprudently ignored the geographical
rationality in demarcation. Without having any survey, Radcliffe drew the line on the district
map, perhaps followed by the notion of 'overall balance' that he was asked for by the Viceroy
(see Figure 2). On paper the result might be a clear and tidy line but the picture on the ground
appeared to have been very difficult. One officer of the Intelligence Branch of India
complained that there was nothing to demarcate in the boundary line except an imaginary one
supported by settlement maps showing the border villages. 29 The boundary between
Bangladesh and India is hardly a straight line and it is nowhere more zigzag than in the
region where the enclaves are located.
28
W. V.Schendel, op. cit., p.120.
J. Chatterji, " The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape 1947-52",
Modern Asian Studies (1999), pp. 194, 221.
29
7
Figure 2
Now, the most vital question about the commission was that Sir Cyril Radcliffe, author of the
boundary Award was an outsider. He had no background knowledge in Indian administration
nor did he have any prior knowledge about the geo-political and socio-economic conditions
of the region through which he did his surgical operation. Moreover, neither he (a
meteorologist) was a political leader, nor he had any prior experience adjudicating disputes of
this sort. Thus it appears that Radcliff was not in a position to confirm the geographical
justification in defining the boundary. So the Boundary Commission could neither satisfy the
newly created states nor the numerous people living at the borderlands. Consequently, like
8
other outstanding problems, the enclave issue also remained unresolved at the time of the
somewhat hurried transfer of power by the British.
There were also a number of more general and fundamental problems with the Award, which
emerged only gradually with the first efforts to implement and administer it. Despite its
appearance of finality and perpetuity the Award was surrounded by rumours for more than a
year that this or that district was going to be exchanged. 30 It happened because of the plainly
errors of the Award on the ground. With all these foreseeable consequences the Award would
provoke a strongly antagonistic political and public response. To avoid this, Mountbatten in a
remarkable last moment decided to disclose the Awards only after the transfer of power so
that the scheduled independent ceremony as well as division could not be hampered by any
means of antagonism. Finally the Awards were published on 16 August 1947, after the
transfer of power.
Some statistical reports of the enclaves with existing problems and administrative
complications over the enclaves can be found in Hunter's Statistical Account of Bengal .The
enclave problems were also noted by Hurtley in his Final Report of Rangpur Survey and
Settlement Operations 1931-1938 (1940). Again, British India, the directly ruled territory of
the British Empire was partitioned in 194731 but the remaining parts forming hundreds of
native states were neither partitioned nor given independence at that time. Only option the
Princes (native rulers) had was to join either Pakistan or India. Cooch Bihar was one of such
states. Accordingly, two years later Jagadepandraw Narayan, the then Maharaja of Cooch
Bihar merged with Indian dominion signing the ''Cooch Bihar Merger Act'' on 28 August
1949 in spite of the anti-Indian public opinion of the majority Muslims. By virtue of Section I
of the Agreement, all territories belonging to the Maharaja of Cooch Bihar fell under the
sovereignty of India. Consequently, the chhitmohals of Cooch Bihar laying in the zamindari
of Rangpur, Dinajpur etc. formed part of India and the inhabitants over there got the
citizenship of India. On the other hand, the zamindari of Rangpur and Dinajpur fell within
Pakistan and the chhitmohals belonging to these zamindari surrounded by the territories of
Cooch Bihar State turned into the part of Pakistan with their inhabitants.32
After the demarcation, international boundary system with security forces started to operate
from both sides. At the turbulent aftermath of the partition both the countries deeply sank into
violent communal chaos and the inhabitants of the enclaves in both sides became the most
victims. As soon as the riot broke out, the enclave peoples turned into enemies, even to their
very neighbours and their properties into 'enemy properties'. One Khalilur Rahaman, an
inhabitant of the Indian enclave Uponchowki Bhajni (located in between Debigonj and
Domar, Bangladesh), who migrated from India during the communal tensions, says,
During the Hindu-Muslim riots, Muslim community was severely
tortured by the Hindu in India. Suppose, a bearded Muslim went to
Haldibari or Jalpaiguri (in India), the Hindus caught him and cut his
beard and beat him. And he would be killed if any thug caught him. So it
was inevitable for us to come from there…we left the place leaving all
30
Ibid, p-219.
The British ruled territory covered only three-fifths of the subcontinent. While, as many as 565 Native States
(Princely States) survived in the rest of the areas.
32
There were 51 Cooch Bihar chhitmohals in India. As soon as Cooch Bihar merged with India those
chhitmohal were amalgamated with Indian territories. On the contrary the Cooch Bihar chhitmohals in East
Pakistan (Bangladesh, 1971) and vice versa got the status of international enclave.
31
9
our properties at their disposal…Entering into Bangla (the then East
Bengal) we came straight to this chhit…There was a great Brahman
neighbourhood here. This place was called Bamanpara (cluster of a
village inhabited by the Brahmans). At that time the Brahmins and the
Tagors (Tagor is the title of the Brahmins) left their neighbourhood. We
bought these lands from them while we were in India and then came
here. We had bought a lot of land from them … we had bought these
lands at a very cheap rate. The land price was five taka per bigha.
That was the beginning of the misfortune of the enclave people and since then they have been
subjected to all the vices of a stateless limbo. Though many such enclaves had a century old
history of existence as a geographical entity, the inhabitants of the enclaves, in practice, fell
in the enclavement with all attendant problems only after the emergence of the international
boundary between the two nation states of India and Pakisatan in 1947.
Upon Cooch Bihar‟s accession to India, the enclaves turned to be an international issue
between the increasingly hostile new nation-states of India and Pakistan. The enclave issue
began to surface, as the majority Muslim populated South Berubari and Dahagram-Angarpota
posed potential source of political and communal tensions between the two countries. To
tackle the situation or to settle the enclave issue some initiatives of survey, demarcation etc.
were taken from both sides.33 High Contract Parties of India and Pakistan began discussing
the idea of exchange. Some general agreements were also made on the ground but aborted on
the issue of compensation to West Bengal for losing some additional land. By this time the
idea of exchange also became part of the public political discourse in both countries mostly
on the point of South Berubari and Dahagram-Angarpota. Eventually at the September 1958
talks between Firoz Khan Noon, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan and Jawharlal Nehru,
the then Prime Minister of India the enclave issue was settled. Their talks ended with an
agreement for a full exchange of enclaves without any compensation to West Bengal, and to
split Southern Berubari fifty-fifty. However, the Agreement was never implemented. West
Bengal‟s parliament opposed the South Berubari split and consequently the Noon-Nehru
Agreement became a sensitive political issue in India. The opposition parties termed the
Agreement as „unconstitutional act‟ and numbers of appeal cases were filed against the
Agreement. In such a situation though India amended her constitution to allow the cession of
South Berubari in 1960, the Agreement could not be implemented because of legal wrangles.
When the Supreme Court of India dismissed the last case in 1971, clearing the way for the
implementation of the Agreement, political situation between the two countries turned into
such a war crisis that any bilateral exchange was utterly impossible.
It is pertinent to note that though India and Pakistan always maintained their rigid attitude
towards the boundary disputes, their policy on the enclave issue was one of cautious
flexibility. Both realized that power play on the enclaves was impossible. Hence status quo
has been found in the enclaves of both sides except some sporadic incidents for which the
state representatives at local level were mostly responsible. There hardly found any action of
penetration or mingling, perhaps, because of the fact that any action directed against the
other‟s enclaves was bound to have repercussions on one‟s own enclaves laying in the
opposite side.34 Moreover, they tried to impress upon each other their shared interest in taking
33
Government of East Bengal, Department of Home (Political), C.R 119 (37-46), "B" Proceedings, vol. 9.
34
W. V.Schendel, op. cit., p. 123.
10
control of these detached territories and thus preventing them from falling into the hands of
“communalism and ordinary criminals.”35
The independence of Bangladesh in 1971 created some optimism about resolution of the
enclave issue with other boundary disputes. In the Agreement signed on 16 May 1974 by
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, the then Prime Minister of Bangladesh and his
Indian counter part Indira Gandhi the enclave issue was included under section 12 &14. In
this Agreement, a full exchange of the enclaves was agreed upon once again. Bangladesh
dropped the inherited claim to South Berubari in exchange of the possession of its largest
enclave in India, Dahagram-Angarpota. India agreed to lease to Bangladesh a passage
through its territory measuring 178X85 meters to connect it with the mainland for all regular
purposes. The Agreement was signed in a friendly atmosphere and the public reaction to this
Agreement was very positive.
Replaying to a question on 12 May 1974, about the up-coming treaty, Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi said, “The relationship between Bangladesh and India is one of sound and
solid friendship and I would add growing friendship. It finds formal expression in the treaty
between our two countries and we are both working sincerely to give effect to what is
outlined in the treaty...”36 The news media especially in Bangladesh highly appreciated the
Agreement. The Editorial of The Bangladesh Observer on 18 May 1974 contained: „The just
concluded Delhi summit meeting between Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman sets
up a milestone on the road to subcontinental peace realized on the basis of sovereign interests
of two close neighbours pledged to friendship and co-operation.‟ Obaidul Huq, a
contemporary columnist of Bangladesh said, “The Delhi Summit has shown that there is no
issue between two peace-loving friendly countries that mutual understanding cannot settle.”37
However, Bangladesh has ratified the Agreement in the Parliament forthwith and handed
over the relevant part of South Berubari to India in the same year. Though there was a court
case against the Agreement in Bangladesh the government rapidly dismissed the case to settle
the issue. But the stunning fact was that India requested for a change of the text of the
Agreement after Bangladesh had ratified the Agreement in the parliament and that again
barely five days before the deadline (31 December 1974). This in fact had the effect of
postponing the exchange of enclaves and territories in adverse possession in areas already
demarcated.38 Whereas the Agreement clearly distinguished between the „already
demarcated‟ and „still to be demarcated‟ areas and made it clear that the latter would not pose
any obstacle to the exchange of enclaves „in areas already demarcated‟ (see Appendix 1).
However, India has not ratified the Agreement till date, although the Dahagram-Angarpota
issue has been partly settled under some new agreements likely the Agreements of 1982 and
1992. As a result, Dahagram-Angarpota became only enclave to be connected with the
mainland since 1992. Now, Bangladesh enjoys the right to use the passage but not as fully as
the residents of Dahagram-Angarpota would like to. Though Bangladesh could operate its
regular administration therein virtually with full sovereignty, and the inhabitants can move to
Bangladesh for regular purposes but that is only for a limited time of the day. The passage
35
Government of East Bengal, Department of Home (Political), C.R 3C-6/49 (1273-329) "B" Proceedings,
November 1950; CR 3C1-4/50, "B" Proceedings, September 1961.
36
The Bangladesh Observer, 13 May 1974, p. 8.
37
Ibid, 16 May 1974, p. 8.
38
Imtiaz Ahmed, “Bangladesh India Relations: The Context of SAARC and the Emerging Global Scenario”
(Keynote paper presented at the seminar held at CIRDAP, organized by the Centre for Development Research,
Bangladesh (CDRB) on 6 April 2006).
11
namely Tin Bigha Corridor with heavy metal gate and border check posts of both countries
opens at 6.00 a.m. and shuts at 6.00 p.m. under the Indian authority. Mokbul Hossain, an
inhabitant of Dahagram-Angarpota, describes their insufficient civil rights of movement
through the passage in the following words:
We are living quite well as the road (passage) has been constructed
(since 1992). But still there are lots of problems. You see, if the road is
kept open for 24 hours then it could have been very useful for us. We
feel scared to travel through the gate. You see, the road is very small and
there is a gate on the road; the BSF personnel are standing on both sides
of the road with their rifles!
It is to be noted that the elite politicians of India are found to continuously exploit the enclave
issue in their political game. For example, when the Congress Government of India gave the
Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh in 1992, BJP (the then opposition party) opposed it with
serious agitation (Bangladeshi & Indian news papers). However, Bangladesh Government
pursued the resolution of the enclave issue in several bilateral talks. But India has yet to make
the necessary amendments to its constitution to implement the relevant pacts and agreements
to settle the outstanding enclave issue. In the meantime thousands of enclave people in both
Bangladesh and India are left without civil and political rights as well as economic and sociocultural facilities for almost six decades.
12
SECOND CHAPTER
Physical Structure of the Enclaves
The Bangladesh-India enclave issue was formerly an Indo-Pakistan one and Bangladesh
inherited it with its independence from Pakistan. Enclaves are found in no other areas in the
subcontinent except Bangladesh and India, not even in present Pakistan. On the other hand,
though Bangladesh has its 4200 kilometres long boundary all around with India (except the
Bay of Bengal and relatively short boundary with Mayanmar in the south) and land disputes
exist in many places on that long boundary enclaves are found only in a strip of northern
boundary (see Figure 3).
Figure 3
Map shows the northern strip of Bangladesh border with
India, where the Bangladesh-India enclaves are located.
However, the Bangladeshi enclaves in India are found in the area of Haldibari, Mekligonj,
Mathabhanga, Sitalkuchi, Dinhata and Tufanganj under the Cooch Bihar district of West
Bengal. Only one Bangladeshi chhitmohal known as Baikunthapur falls under Jalpaiguri
district, which was formerly under the jurisdiction of the then Cooch Bihar State. On the
other hand the Indian or so-called Cooch Bihar enclaves in Bangladesh are found in the areas
of Panchagarh, Debigonj and Boda (under Panchagarh district), Dimla (under Nilphamari
district), Lalmonirhat, Hatibandha and Patgram (under Lalmonirhat district), and Kurigram,
13
Bhurungamari and Fulbari (under Kurigram district). Formerly these areas were under the
Rangpur district of East Bengal. It may be mentioned that the administrative boundaries of
these areas were very irregular and short-lived in nature as a sequel to power practice and
penetration among the neighbouring zamindars and princes of the region. From the ancient
period prior to the British rule, scramble for extending jurisdictions and subsequent changes
were constant in the history of Kamrup, Kamta, Palas, Bengal Sultans, Mughal Subadars
(provincial ruler) and Cooch Bihar Darbar (court) with very short intervals. However, a brief
account of the boundaries and ancient history of these regions would further clarify the
position of the tract.
Jurisdiction and Brief Historical Sketch of the Cooch Bihar State
The State of Cooch Bihar was bounded on the north by the Western Duars, which formed
part of the District of Jalpaiguri since 1875; on the east by Eastern Duars, which formed part
of the Assam District and by the Districts of Goalpara and Rangpur, the Godadhar and
Sankos rivers forming the boundary line for a considerable distance; on the south by
Rangpur; and on the west by Jalpaiguri and Rangpur. But in fact, the boundaries had irregular
lines.1
The State of Cooch Bihar originally was the territory of Kamrup. Only one Prithu Raja of
„Kamrup, commonly called also Kaunrup and Kamta‟2 of the earliest dynasty can be traced.
The ruins of his city later formed parts of chakla3 Boda and pargana Baikunthapur,4 in the
then District of Jalpaiguri. The next dynasty was that of Palas from 750 to1099 AD. The
Palas dynasty was followed by a state of anarchy and Kamrup being overrun by the wild
tribes- the Koch, Mech, Garo Bhot, Lepcha and others.5 The next dynasty had three RajasNiladwaj, Chakradwaj, and Nilambhar. The first Raja founded the Kamtapur, the ruins of
which were traced in the subsequent Cooch Bihar territory, on the eastern bank of the Dharla
River. The third king of this dynasty, Nilambhar, attained great power. His dominions
included the greater part of Kamrup and the whole of Rangpur.6
The Bengal Sultan, who made the conquest over Nilambhar, was the Hussain Shahi ruler,
Alauddin Hussain Shah, who reigned A.D. 1497-1521. However, among the wild tribes that
had overrun Assam and driven back the Hussain Shahis, the Koch came to the front and
being united under Hajo, founded the Koch or Kuch Bihar (Cooch Bihar) dynasty7, which
existed up to 1949 when it merged with the independent Indian dominion.
1
W. .W Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal, 1876, vol. X, p. 332.
Abul Fazl Allmi, Ain-i-Akbari, 1873, Translated from original by Col. H. S. Jarrett, vol. 2, p. 130.
3
Chakla means an administrative division, formed of some zamindari, introduced by Bengal Subadar (provincial
ruler under the Mughals) Murshid Kuli Khan in the first quarter of the 18th Century and followed by the British.
4
There is a Bangladeshi Chhitmohal named Baikunthapur laid in Jalpaiguri District of India.
5
W. .W Hunter, op., cit, vol.vii, pp. 310-14.
6
Ibid, p. 314.
7
Ibid, p. 315.
2
14
Figure 4
The Diagrametic Sketch Map of Cooch Bihar showing enclaves (chhits).
Jurisdiction and Brief Historical Sketch of Rangpur District
During the British rule, Rangpur district was bounded on the north by the district of
Jalpaiguri and the semi-independent native State of Cooch Bihar; on the east by the
Brahmaputra river and the districts of Goalpara and Mymensingh; on the south by Bogra
district; and on the east by the districts of Dinajpur and Jalpaiguri.8 The tract comprised
within the British district of Rangpur was formerly the western part of the ancient Hindu
kingdom of Kamrup. This realm appears to have attained its greatest prosperity under Raja
Nilambhar, who was overthrown about the close of the fifteenth century by Hussain Shah of
Bengal. On the conquest of the independent Kingdom of Bengal by the Afgan General Sher
Shah, subsequently the Emperor of Delhi, Rangpur was incorporated with the empire. During
the turbulent period, which followed the death of Sher Shah, aboriginal princes of the Cooch
Bihar dynasty ruled Rangpur for about forty years. In 1584 the district was re-annexed to the
empire by Akbar, although it was not till 1660-61 that it was completely subjugated by the
generals of Aurangzeb. Thereupon the district was re-named Fakirkundi. It formed, together
with the pargana of Kundi in the sarkar9 of Bajuhaya, the chakla of Goraghat and the
province of Rangpur, as constituted when the Farman10 of the Emperor Shah Alam passed it
under the rule of the East India Company in 1765.
Strewn along the small section of the northern border of Bangladesh the enclaves of
Bangladesh and India look like a group of landlocked islands of unequal sizes and of almost
8
Ibid, vol. VII, p. 156.
Sarkar is an administrative division introduced by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1556-1605).
10
Farman is a Persian word that means order. The Imperial Order or Regulation in the Mughal Reign was
known as „Farman‟.
9
15
undemarcable locations. A number of counter-enclaves are also found within the BangladeshIndia enclaves. Under the British rule the Cooch Bihar-Assam enclaves were demarcated in
the 1920s and the Cooch Bihar-Jalpaiguri enclaves were demarcated in the 1930s as a part of
the land-revenue survey and settlement operations. During the demarcations, a number of
enclaves were also discovered to exist between Jalpaiguri, Rangpur and Dinajpur districts.
For instance, as Patgram was then a part of Jalpaiguri, many of these existed along the narrow
neck between Patgram (Jalpaiguri District) and Rangpur District (what is today the boundary
between Patgram and Hatibandha). The government of Bengal exchanged these without fuss.
Since then none of the concerned countries have ever demarcated or enumerated or published
any map of the enclaves.
However, after the Maharaja of Cooch Bihar finally acceded to India on 28 August 1949, the
Cooch Bihar territory became a district of the West Bengal of India. Consequently all the
Cooch Bihar‟s enclaves (laying within Jalpaiguri) were transferred to Jalpaiguri in 1950.
Most of those were in the vicinity of the then East Pakistan border. Those transfers were
remarkably coincident with Pakistani claims to several of them and to South Berubari Union
No. 12, a bulbous projection of Jalpaiguri district into Boda and Debigonj under today‟s
Panchagarh district of Bangladesh.11 However, upon Cooch Bihar's accession to India, the
enclaves became apparent as an international issue between the two nation states of India and
Pakistan.
It is pertinent to note that numerous changes had been taken place in the jurisdiction of
Rangpur since it was brought under British administration in 1965 in consequence of which
the area of the district was much diminished. Administrative mingling and vice versa were
also constant in Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar during the British period which indeed intricate
the enclave problems. Though some lists of the enclaves as far back as the British period are
found, these are of little use for the present purpose. With the change of the territorial features
of the region including the very boundaries of the administrative divisions under various
circumstances, the locations of the enclaves in available records have turned to be ambiguous
and undemarcable. River erosion has also caused remarkable changes in the areas and
locations of a number of enclaves. Again, the exact number of the enclaves is found
confusing in several accounts. The enclaves of Bangladesh and India are often confused with
mouza.12 A number of them are composed of several mouzas and at the same time several
enclaves are found to be included in a single mouza. An enclave may also be a fragment of a
larger mouza. There may also be the combination of these. For instance, a mouza might be
formed of several individual small enclaves, and part of a larger enclave. Nevertheless, a
tentative list of Bangladesh-India enclaves with their approximate areas and locations has
been prepared for this study basically based on the available sources and spot investigations.
11
Brenden R. Whyte, "The Cooch Behar Enclaves of India and Bangladesh: An Historical Overview and
Determination of their Number, Area and Population", Oriental Geographer (2002), pp. 30-31.
12
'Mouza' is the lowest level of land administration.
16
Figure 5
Map shows the approximate location of the Bangladesh-India enclaves. Position and sizes are approximate since
no map of the enclaves has ever been published.
Table 1a: Bangladeshi Enclaves in Indian Territory:
Serial
No.
JL
No.
Name of the Bangladeshi
Enclaves
Lies within the
PS of West
Bengal, India.
(CB=Cooch
Bihar
J=Jalpaiguri)
Area
(acre)
Teldhar *
Teldhar *
Balkunthapur Teldhar
Balkunthapur Teldhar
Balkunthapur Teldhar
Nazierganj-30*
Nazierganj-29*
Nazierganj*
Belongs to the
PS of
Bangladesh
(P=Panchagarh
L=Lalmonirhat
N=Nilphamari
K=Kurigram)
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
6
6
32
32
32
66
64
107
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Jalpaiguri J
Jalpaiguri J
Jalpaiguri J
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
14.48
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
107
107
273
253
254
256
252
251
257
261
258
Nazierganj*
Nazierganj*
Debottar Saldanga*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, III*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 99*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 24*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 13*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 112*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 113*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 15*
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 110*
Boda P
Boda P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
,,
,,
6.10
169.37
1.75
0.71
1.34
14.11
38.68
1.02
110.19
17
52.00
,,
,,
1.13
6.54
21.28
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
259
262
22
24
21
20
18
16
28
73/16
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
15
11
14
13
13
8
3
37
35
36
17
67
50
52
53
70
45
71
46
72
47
69
48
68
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
54
13
64
65
65
65
66
66
57
82
81
81
83
1
9
9
9
20
8
8
37
38
Upan Chowki Bhajni, 22*
Debi Doba*
Chit Kuchlibari
Chit Land of Kuchlibari
Bala Pukhari
Chit Land of Panbari No.2
Chit Panbari
Dahagram (linked with
mainland)
Angarpota (linked with
mainland)
Dhabalsuti Mirgipur
Bamandal
Chhit Dahabalsuti
Dahabalsuti
Dahabalsuti*
Srirampur
Jote Nijjama*
Chhit Land of Jagatber No.3
Chhit Land of Jagatber No.1
Chhit Land of Jagatber No.2
Chhit Kokoabari
Chhit Bhandardaha
Jongra*
Dhabalguri
Chhit Dhabalguri
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri
No.3
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri
No.4
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri
No.5
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri
No.2
Chhit Land of Dhabalguri
No.1
Mahishmari
Bara Saradudi
Falnapur
Nalgram
Nalgram
Nalgram
Chhit Nalgram
Chhit Nalgram
Amjhol
Kismat Batrigach
Batrigach
Batrigach
Durgapur
Bansua Khamar Gitaldaha
Karala
Karala
Karala
Chandrakhan*
Shibprasad Mustafi
Shibprasad Mustafi
Poaturkuthi
Paschim Bakalir Chhara
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Haldibari CB
Haldibari CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
72.20
7.46
370.64
1.83
331.64
108.59
3,877.05
Patgram
Mekhliganj CB
739.80
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
Mekhliganj CB
173.88
2.19
66.58
60.45
1.60
1.05
87.54
69.84
30.66
29.09
29.49
39.96
8.25
12.50
22.31
1.33
Patgram L
Mekhliganj CB
4.55
Patgram L
Mekhliganj CB
4.12
Patgram L
Mekhliganj CB
26.83
Patgram L
Mekhliganj CB
13.95
Patgram L
Hatibandha L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram/Hatibandha L
Patgram/Hatibandha L
Patgram/Kaliganj L
Kaliganj L
Kaliganj L
Lalmonirhat L
Phulbari K
Phulbari K
Phulbari K
Phulbari K
Phulbari K
Phulbari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Sitalkuchi CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
122.77
34.96
506.56
1397.34
,,
,,
49.50
,,
1.25
209.95
577.37
,,
20.96
24.54
269.91
,,
,,
34.68
373.20
,,
589.94
151.98
18
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
39
40
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
4
5
8
10
10
1
11
11
2
3
6
1
Modhya Bakalir Chhara
Purba Bakalir Chhara
Dakshin Mashaldanga
Dakshin Mashaldanga
Dakshin Mashaldanga
Dakshin Mashaldanga
Dakshin Mashaldanga
Dakshin Mashaldanga
Paschim Mashaldanga
Paschim Mashaldanga
Kachua
Modhya Chhit Moshaldanga
Purba Chhit Moshaldanga
Purba Chhit Moshaldanga
Paschim Moshaldanga
Purba Moshaldanga
Purba Moshaldanga
Uttar Moshaldanga
Madhya Moshaldanga
Daskhin Bansjani
Uttar Banshjani
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
92
93
94
95
14
14
14
17
Uttar Dhaldanga
Uttar Dhaldanga
Uttar Dhaldanga
Chhat Tilai
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Dinhata CB
Tufanganj CB
Dinhata &
Tufanganj CB
Tufanganj CB
Tufanganj CB
Tufanganj CB
Tufanganj
&Golakganj,
Dinhata CB
32.72
12.23
571.38
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
29.49
,,
119.74
11.87
35.01
,,
7.60
153.89
,,
27.29
136.66
,,
47.17
23.86
,,
,,
81.56
Table 1b: Indian Enclaves in Bangladeshi Territory:
Serial
No.
JL
No.
Name of the Indian
Enclaves
Belongs to
the PS (under
Cooch Bihar Dist.)
of WB, India
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
78
79
80
77
76
75
73
60
58
57
59
56
54
53
52
51
50
49
55
48
Garati
Garati
Garati
Garati
Garati
Garati
Shingimari part 1
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Putimari (Najirganj)
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
19
Lies within the PS of
Bangladesh
(P=Panchagarh
L=Lalmonirhat
N=Nilphamari
K=Kurigram
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Panchagarh P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Area
(Acre)
958.66
1.74
73.75
18.00
0.79
58.23
6.07
0.52
14.22
8.27
122.80
54.04
3.87
1.02
1.04
0.77
5.05
49.05
12.18
73.27
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
47
46
45
44
41
42
38
37
36
32
33
34
Part
35
3
2
Part
Part
Part
1
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
46
30
47
29
48
49
31
28
50
51
52
53
26
27
Part
Part
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Part
7
8
5
4
9
10
11
12
Part
15
13
14
16
16
17
17
18
Part
Part
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj Chhit
Najirganj
Najirganj
Najirganj
Daikhata Chhat
Shalbari
Kajal Dighi
Natoktoka
Natoktoka
Bewladanga
Bewladanga
Bewladanga Chhat
Balapara Khagrabari
Kotbajni
Kotbajni
Kotbajni
Kotbajni
Dahala Khagrabari
Dahala Khagrabari
Dahala Khagrabari
Dahala Khagrabari
Dahala Khagrabari/**
Bara Khanki/Dahala
Khagrabari
(Bara Khanki)
Kharija Gitaldaha
(Bara Khanki)
Kharija Gitaldaha
Nagar Jikabari
Bara Khanjir
Kuchlibari
Kuchlibari
Bara Kuchlibari
(Jamaldaha)
Balapukhari
Uponchowki Kuchlibari
Uponchowki Kuchlibari
Bhotbari
Balapukhari
Bara Khangir
Bara Khangir
Chhat Bagdokra
Ratanpur
Bagdokra
Fulker Dabri
Kharkharia
Kharkharia
Lotamari
Bhotbari
Kamat Changrabandha
Kamat Changrabandha
Panisala
Dwarikamari Khasbash
Panisala
Panisala
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Haldibari
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda P
Boda & Debiganj P
Boda & Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P & Domar N
Debiganj P & Domar N
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P & Domar N
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
Debiganj P
3.89
17.95
1.07
53.47
58.32
434.29
499.21
1188.93
771.44
162.26
0.26
862.46
Haldibari
Dimla N
7.71
Haldibari
Dimla N
36.83
Haldibari
Mekhliganj/
Haldibari
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Dimla N
Dimla N
33.41
30.53
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
5.78
2.04
4.35
5.24
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
0.32
44.04
36.83
55.91
50.51
87.42
41.70
58.91
25.49
0.88
60.74
51.62
110.92
205.46
42.83
16.01
137.66
36.50
0.27
18.01
20
0.83
1752.44
2012.27
,,
,,
,,
2650.35
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
19
21
20
22
23
25
24
131
Panisala
Panisala
Latamari
Latamari
Dwarikamari
Dwarikamari
Chhat Bhothat
Banskata
82
132
Banskata
83
130
Banskata
84
133
Bhogramari
85
86
134
119
Chenakata
Banskata
87
120
Banskata
88
129
Banskata
89
113
Banskata
90
112
Banskata
91
114
Banskata
92
115
Banskata
93
122
Banskata
94
127
Banskata
95
128
Banskata
96
117
Banskata
97
118
Banskata
98
125
Banskata
99
126
Banskata
100
129
Banskata
101
116
Banskata
102
123
Banskata
103
124
Banskata
104
137
Nalgram Chhit*
105
106
107
135
136
155
Gotamari Chhit
Gotamari Chhit
Madankura Chhit…
In Bhoti Nath
Batrigach*
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj/
Mathabhanga
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
ekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Mekhliganj
Mathabhanga/
Sitalkuchi
Sitalkuchi
Sitalkuchi
Sitalkuchi/ Dinhata
21
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
Patgram L
64.63
51.43
283.53
98.85
39.52
45.73
56.11
22.35
Patgram L
11.96
Patgram L
21.07
Patgram L
1.44
Patgram L
Patgram L
7.81
413.81
Patgram L
30.75
Patgram L
12.15
Patgram L
57.86
Patgram L
315.04
Patgram L
0.77
Patgram L
29.20
Patgram L
33.22
Patgram L
2.72
Patgram L
2.33
Patgram L
2.55
Patgram L
30.98
Patgram L
0.64
Patgram L
1.39
Patgram L
1.37
Patgram L
16.96
Patgram L
24.37
Patgram L
0.28
Sitalkuchi, CB
4.73
Hatibandha L
Hatibandha L
Dinhata CB
126.59
20.02
35.53
108
159
Banspachal
Dinhata
217.29
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Lalmonirhat L &
Phulbari K
Lalmonirhat L &
Phulbari K
Phulbari &
Nageswari K
Kurigram K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
109
152
Banspachai Bhitarkuthi
Dinhata
110
150
Dasiar Chhara
Dinhata
111
112
113
156
141
153
Dakurhat Dakinirkuthi
Kalamati
Shahebganj
114
142
Seotikursa
Dinhata
Bhurungamari K
45.63
115
143
Bara Gaochulka
Dinhata
Bhurungamari K
39.99
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
147
146
145
144
154
159
148
43
Gaochulka II
Gaochulka I
Dighaltari II
Dighaltari I
Chhit Seoruguri*
Chhoto Guraljhora II
Chhoto Guraljhora I
Daikhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Dinhata
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Dinhata CB
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari K
Bhurungamari
0.90
8.92
8.89
12.31
2.51
17.85
35.74
2.63
81.71
1643.44
14.27
21.21
31.58
Key:
* Counter-enclaves as referred to by Whyte (2002). These counter-enclaves are often referred
to as non-exchangeable enclaves. In fact, the counter enclaves are the landmasses of
one country laying within the mainland, surrounded by the enclaves of other country.
So, there is no question of exchange.
** Counter-counter-enclave as referred to by Whyte (2002). A counter enclave is found in the Dahala
Khagrabari area of the Kutbhajni Chhit, locally known as Agarashaw Bigha (agarashaw = eleven
hundred; bigha = 50 decimal) though its size is not as much as indicated by the name. But its name is
not found in the available lists of the enclaves. Though Whyte (2002) mentioned a counter-counterenclave he did not mention the existence of any counter-enclave in the area. But if there is no counterenclave there can be no counter-counter-enclave. So, may be Agarashaw Bigha is the counter enclave
creating the counter-counter enclave if there is any as he mentioned.
Sources:
 Census Hand Book, 1961, India;
 The records of the Land Offices of Patgram, Boda, Panchagarh, Lalmonirhat, Dimla and
Bhurungamari of Bangladesh
 Proceedings of a Symposium, 14 -15 Sept.2001, CDA, Calcutta;
 Whyte (2002).
Number of the Enclaves
The number of enclaves most commonly quoted is 130 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 95
Bangladeshi enclaves in India. The list, however, does not stand the scrutiny of facts. It is
noticed that some enclaves are consist of several mouza and in those cases each of the mouza
often counted as separate enclave. Thus the number of enclaves becomes overstated.
Moreover, a number of Cooch Bihar enclaves namely, Shankati (JL no. 68), Shankati (JL no.
63), Shankati (JL no. 62), Binnaguri (JL no. 61), Binnaguri (JL no. 81), Daikhata (JL no. 39),
Daikhata (JL no. 40), mentioned in the available lists were already transferred to Jalpaiguri in
1952. So these enclaves must be excluded from the list. So, a tentative figure of the present
22
Indian enclaves is 123. However, the concept of „non-exchangeable‟ enclaves that has been
stated earlier in this chapter further confuses the number of the enclaves. According to the
Noon-Nehru and Mujib-Indira Agreements all the enclaves are exchangeable. But while the
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh will eventually be given to Bangladesh, the Bangladeshi
counter-enclaves inside the Indian enclaves will not be given to India, rather, will obviously
remain with Bangladesh and vice versa. On the other hand, the larger enclaves of
Bangladesh, Dahagram and Angarpota (contiguous) that often stated as a single enclave
Dahagram-Angarpota has virtually been connected to the mainland of Bangladesh and thus
lost the status of enclave. But these have also been included in the available lists since the
lists date back to the colonial period. Thus the tentative figure of the Bangladeshi enclaves is
93 (excluding Dahagram-Angarpota).
Area of the Enclaves
Coincident with the confusion of the number of the enclaves the available measurement of
their areas is also confusing. The available measurements are not enclave wise, rather mouza
wise, so the areas of small enclaves forming part of multi-enclave mouzas are missing. In
terms of area, the Bangladeshi enclaves cover 12,289.37 acres of land as stated in the
available lists. But excluding the areas of Dahagram-Angarpota that has been linked with the
mainland of Bangladesh, the rest of the enclaves covers 8303.73 acres of land. On the other
hand the Indian enclaves cover 20,957.07 acres of land. But excluding the areas of the abovementioned Cooch Bihar enclaves that transferred to Jalpaiguri in 1952, the rest of the
enclaves cover 17203.12 acres of land.
Population of the Enclaves
The enclave population virtually has never been enumerated in the censuses of either of the
countries. Though some initiatives were taken from both sides in the 1950s it could never be
done because of the reluctance of one or the other party. For example, in the early 1951,
Pakistan held its first population census. When the enumerators tried to carry out the census
in the Pakistani enclaves in Cooch Bihar, the BSF of India arrested them. As a sequel, the
population of the enclaves was excluded from all censuses held since then.13 So, the actual
number of the enclave dwellers is virtually unknown to the very governments of the
concerned countries till date. Nevertheless, some figures of the Bangladesh-India enclave
population that have been found from several sources are as follows:
-13,000 Indians in Bangladesh and 11,000 Bangladeshi in India (Catudal 1979);14
-150,000 Indians in Bangladesh (Roy Pradhan 1995);15
-200,000 Indians in Bangladesh (Bose 1997);16
-450,000 enclave people in total;17
-1,000,000 Indians in the enclaves;18
-1,500,000 Indians in the enclaves;19
13
Government of East Pakistan, „B‟ Proceedings, Department of Home (Political),CR 8C1-1/51 (76-83), May
1950; CR 10-1/50 (899-903), March 1953, (NAB); see also W.V. Schendle, “Stateless in South Asia: The
Making of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 61:1(2002), p. 124.
14
Quoted from Brenden R Whyte, op. cit., p. 36.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
M. A. Haq “Slow progress in land demarcation. Settlement of enclave issue to ease border tension”, Daily
Star, 3 October 1999.
18
Centre For Development Activities (CDA), “Problems of Chhitmohal And Adverse
Possession”, Proceedings of the Symposium, Calcutta, 14 -15 Sept. 2001.
23
The range of the above figures is literally incredible. The larger figure is obviously
exaggerated. Though Whyte (2002) gave the number of the enclave population referring the
1951 census, he did not specifically mention the name of the country where the census was
held. The reports of 1951 and 1961 Pakistan census did not enumerate the inhabitants of the
enclaves. It is to be noted that in the 1961 census as many as 82 villages of Dinajpur district
have been mentioned as “uninhabited”, many of which constitute the present day enclaves.
Taking this point into consideration it can be surmised that the Indian enclaves in the then
East Pakistan were left out of the census operation and mentioned as uninhabited along with
other uninhabited villages which became uninhabited mainly due to the river erosion.
Moreover, the available state records show that no country was able to reach their enclaves
(laying in the other) for census operation. So the census figure of the enclave people appears
to be unauthentic. It may be noted that during the communal strife of 1950s, most of the
enclave people had left their home enclaves for safety, many of whom returned to the
enclaves after the chaos was over. So, in no case the census figure of the enclave inhabitants
of that period would be an objective one. Whyte (2002) also has given a figure of 55,000 of
the enclave people on the basis of calculation over the available census figure, in comparison
with the rate of population growth in the surrounding areas of both countries. In support of
the figure, he argued that „it would seem intuitive that the density of the enclaves is
somewhat less than that of the surrounding areas, due to the disadvantages of residency
there.‟ But on the ground his argument is utterly impractical due to at least two reasons- (i)
When the Pakistani government introduced the Family Planning Programme in 1960s, it was
extremely opposed by the orthodox as well as the popular Muslims in the then East Pakistan
since it was considered as anti-Islamism. It means that the Family Planning Programme was
totally absent at that time. But we have witnessed a stunning progress of Family Planning
Programme in Bangladesh during the last four decades. Virtually the growth of population is
under control of family planning to many extents. The case is more or less similar in India
also. But the enclave dwellers are yet to be introduced with the very Family Planning
Programme in the absence of any state administration. In such a situation the growth of
population in the enclaves is much higher than in the surrounding areas. (ii) Whyte (2002)
also ignored the fact that the enclave dwellers have no option to shift out of the enclaves.
However, due to the obvious reasons it is not possible to give even a tentative figure of the
inhabitants of the Bangladesh-India enclaves.
19
Ibid.
24
THIRD CHAPTER
State of Livelihood and Human Rights in the Enclaves
This chapter focuses on the socio-economic condition of the enclave dwellers using basically
qualitative and life-history methods. There is a dearth of information and remarkably very
little is known about the life and livelihoods of the people living in the Bangladesh-India
enclaves. Though some works on enclaves are found, most of them treat these as of
geographical curiosities or as problems of state sovereignty bypassing the socio-economic
conditions thereof. Since little information is available on socio-economic condition of the
enclaves, on spot investigation with a socio-economic approach was carried out in different
enclaves to uphold the experiences, aspirations and strategies of survival of the enclave
dwellers in the midst of 'stateless limbo'. An extensive field study was attempted in this
regard but the author was almost helpless in doing so to his satisfaction because of some
obvious practical impediments. However, the study is largely based on evidence contained at
„low-level‟.
The enclaves as political entities and the status of their residents received little importance
from either of the countries they belong to except for some incidental media coverage and
occasional bilateral talks and agreements as one of the many bilateral issues in macro politics.
The concerned organizations of Human Rights as well as other social organizations or the
civil societies have also been silent about the sub-human livelihood of the people living
therein. The inhabitants of the Bangladesh-India enclaves are found simultaneously subaltern,
marginal and minority in respect of basic needs and the right of self-determination. As a
whole the plight of the enclave dwellers seems that of the illegal immigrants in their very
homeland.
The Bangladesh-India enclaves are located in plain agrarian areas and the livelihoods of the
inhabitants thereof are agro-based. Peculiar in sizes1, inaccurate in numbers2, and
undemarcable in locations3 the enclaves are economically and socially contiguous with the
surrounding areas of the host country. No symbolic geographical feature or formal boundary
can be found around the enclaves to distinguish them from the surrounding foreign territories
except some irregular pillars or ruins of pillar of 1930s. A new visitor can never guess the
location or area of the enclaves, without guide of local people4 and consequently may be
disappointed in his or her curiosity about enclaves at first sight. Interestingly, the visitors
particularly the foreigners (including some geographers), having visited Dahagram1
Some of the enclaves are only few acres in size. For example, the area of Boro Khanki Kharaji (an Indian
enclave, located in Goyabari Union of Dimla thana, under Nilphamari district of Bangladesh) is only 8.33 acres.
No homestead was found in this enclave.
2
No authentic list of the enclaves is available either for Bangladesh and India. The lists, available from various
sources in both countries are contradictory to each other. The contradictions, found in the lists of various sources
are, however, not doctored but the striking point is that no mutual initiative, at government level was taken to
determine the number of enclaves and their areas till date.
3
No satisfactory answer was received from the concerned local agents of the government. i.e. A. C. (land),
Settlement Officer etc. Many of the concerned officers even do not know whether any enclave is located in their
jurisdiction.
4
Only a few people who have land in or outside the enclave know about the enclaves that locally called chhit
land. The case is more or less similar except some larger ones like Kotbhajni (Indian enclave in Bangladesh) and
Moshaldanga or Nalgram (Bangladeshi enclaves in India). But in no case, even the enclave people could give an
objective idea about the boundary and area of their home-chhit.
25
Angarpota, imagined similar picture of the other enclaves, and made suggestions on the basis
of such ideas. But the characteristic feature of Dahagram-Angarpota in terms of area,
population and the arrangement for Tin Bigha Corridor is totally different from all other
enclaves. In fact, Dahagram-Angarpota is the only enclave both in Bangladesh and India that
has been connected with the main land. Now, Bangladeshi administration regulates the
enclave virtually with full sovereignty, and the inhabitants therein can move to Bangladesh
for their regular purposes although not around the clock. The passage namely Tin Bigha
Corridor (178m x 85m) with heavy metal gate and border check posts of both countries opens
at 6.00 a.m. and shuts at 6.00 p.m. under the Indian authority everyday. Perhaps, because of
the peculiar arrangement of Dahagram-Angarpota, Whyte (2002) suggested to retain the
enclaves and to develop tourist industry around them. But, the background reality is quite
different and such a suggestion is utterly unrealistic to implement on the ground.
One thing would be visible to a searching visitor as a symbol of enclave that the trend of
infrastructure development suddenly stops before the boundary of the enclaves. The
tremendous development in rural roads and communication all over Bangladesh that occurred
during the last two decades make it easier to understand the presence of the enclave territory.
For instance, we can refer to the large Indian enclave Kotbhajni, laying in Debigonj under
Panchagarh district of Bangladesh. Pucca roads, electricity line and motor vehicles are found
all around the enclave. But no road, no vehicle, no electricity line enters into the enclave,
whereas it has a large number of population and wide area like a union (unit of local
government) of Bangladesh.
The enclaves of Bangladesh are found scattered in different districts. Due to their scattered
locations, smaller sizes (except for some large enclaves) and contiguity with the surrounding
areas, there is no socio-economic feature of the enclaves different from that of the
neighbouring alien territories. Despite the existence of a number of other enclaves situated at
a little distance, the inhabitants of one enclave have little idea about the number, location and
population or of the similarity or dissimilarity that exists among these enclaves. One common
characteristic feature of the enclaves is of backward livelihood, social exclusion, economic
vulnerability and deprivation of the right of self-determination. In such a situation the
political and socio-economic perspectives of the enclaves under review have grown out of
social, political and legal exclusion, backward livelihood and vulnerability over the last six
decades.
The border between India and Bangladesh cut a channel 4200 kilometres long, mostly
through a densely populated agrarian area causing adverse socio-economic impact at the
micro level. The border between Bangladesh and India is hardly a straight line and it is
nowhere more zigzag than in the region where the enclaves are located. Again, the frontier
through which the border was cut, comprised of large and small holdings, rights over which
were shared by a variety of landed interest i.e., chakladar (owner of chakla), zamindar,
talukdar (owner of small estate known as taluk), toppadar (owner of small estate known as
toppa), jotedar (owner of some land known as jote), raiyat (cultivator), under-raiyat etc.
according to circumstances. An agricultural class known as bhag-chashi or adhiar
(sharecropper) used to cultivate lands under the jotedar. The nature of land ownership and
cultivation in the area was then a mixture of varieties. An individual often sharecropped one
plot, cultivated part of his tenurial land and at the same time let some parts of his land out to
be sharecropped by someone else. Likewise a zamindar often owned one or two estates
26
outright, but held some other taluk, scattered over large areas.5 Chakladari rights that may be
renamed as bifurcate ownership over landed estate were also a remarkable feature of this
region. Thus it appears that there was a contiguous agro-economy and diverse land
management with peculiar „share and remote holdings‟ in the frontier areas through which
the boundary cut the channel with little considerations of bureaucratic rationality. Hence, the
ever-zigzag boundary line in this landscape was bound to disrupt every aspects of existence
for the frontier community. It victimized mostly the enclave dwellers, criminalizing their
daily routine and customary transactions by which thousands of inhabitants survived thereof.
The border had separated the inhabitants of the enclaves from their most valuable source of
income- croplands by pushing them in a dilemma that whether they would cede their
homestead or croplands. It had happened basically in two ways. First, many enclave and also
non-enclave cultivators in the frontier areas found that the border cut channel between their
homestead and cultivable lands. For instance, a bamboo grove, an orchard of areca nuts, a
plot of tobacco cultivation etc. that fell within the periphery of a homestead was separated by
the Radcliffe line. As a result many of the enclave-dwellers saw that some of their plots with
jute fell in Pakistan, some with autumn rice fell in India and some other plots fell in the chhit.
Secondly, many enclave dwellers had migrated across the border mostly due to the communal
contention and thereby lost their lands. Rajendra Barman, an inhabitant of a Bangladeshi
enclave Kismot-nij-jama (located in Mekligonj under Cooch Bihar district of WB, India),
while interviewing him at a home of Bangladesh near the very boundary pillar, states:
The land upon which you are standing now, belonged to me. It has
penetrated inside India like a pocket. The place falls under the
jurisdiction of Srirampur Union of Patgram (Bangladesh). During the
partition‟ half of my land fell in Bangladesh and the other half remained
inside India. My home was on the Bangladesh side that is here. My
khamar (ground of home-based agricultural works surrounded by
cropping lands), batan (the yard of cattle and livestock) were on the
Indian side that turned into chhit-land. At first I used to stay here in
Bangladesh and plough my land laying in India. Crossing the border
then was an everyday affair... But at one point the BSF started to exert
too much control on the border by not allowing any cross-border
movement. Then I left Bangladesh. I could not even sell my land when I
left.
The artificial and unrealistic boundary line changed the economic life of the frontier people
downward, from peasant to sharecropper, tenant to landless and sharecropper to non-cropper.
It turned the neighbours into citizens of two states who often entertained work relations with
each other.6 The cross-border working activities continued in the form of manual labour
overwhelmingly for several years after the demarcation. When the rate of harassment and
casualties on the border alarmingly increased, the frontier people had to stop their inherited
transactions with the newly alienated old neighbours which had been criminalized by the
states in the name of „illegal cross-border movement‟. However, detachment from the
mainland by the international boundary rendered thousands of innocent enclave dwellers the
most deprived people in the world.
5
J. Chatterji, “The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape, 1947-52”,
Modern Asian Studies, 1999, p. 225.
6
W.V. Schendel, "Working Through Partition: Making a Living in the Bengal Borderlands", International
Review of Social History, 46(2001), pp. 393-421.
27
The inhabitants of the enclaves in both countries were mostly victimized as a sequel to the
communal dissension, which followed the declaration of the Radcliffe Award (1947). Abu
Bakar Sarkar, an inhabitant of an Indian enclave Balapara Khagrabari/Kotbhajni (located in
Debigonj under Panchagarh district of Bangladesh) laments,
When this changed into an enclave after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, we got affected seriously. Rioters from outside
entered into this area and ransacked everything of us like anything. They
did not leave anything untouched of us i.e. our dignity, chastity,
livestock and everything.
Harassment, decline of resources and casualties run over the enclave people in many ways.
Some times the frontier community including the enclave-dwellers were denied access to
local haat (periodic village markets) and to buy and sell articles and thus the enclave people
in particular were often pushed under economic blockade7. However, the situation eased up
slightly by a decision taken at the 17th Chief Secretaries‟ Conference held at Dhaka on the 29
and 30 August 1950, which allowed certain goods to send into the enclaves once a month.
„Only mustard oil, kerosene oil, sugar, matches, cloth, medicine, and medical appliances
could be moved between mainland and enclaves i.e., commodities could be imported to the
enclaves but local products especially jute, paddy and tobacco could not be exported to the
mainland.‟8 If we examine the above decision, we can see that bilateral commercial issue was
even more important than that of the betterment of the living condition of the enclave people.
Moreover, the very decision itself reaffirmed the economic blockade of the enclave people
since no local product could be exported to the mainland, while there was no provision that
they could legally sell their products in the surrounding markets of the host country. That was
the beginning of their disaster and since then they have been in the midst of „stateless limbo‟.
Though the enclaves as a geographical entity existed for centuries the inhabitants of the
enclaves in practice found them entrapped within their bounds only after the emergence of
the international boundary between the two nation states in 1947.
In such a situation, some enclave people, being worried about the hapless condition left their
movable and immovable properties in the enclaves and crossed the border for the land of
their religion. It may be noted that communalism played a vital role in the partition of the
British India. The flow of the migration at the violent aftermath of the partition was proreligious. Thus they became landless refugees in their new homeland while the rioters and
other illegal settlers of the surrounding country occupied their lands and resources. So during
the long period of communal barbarism the life and resources of the enclave dwellers were
affected horribly. Abu Bakar Sarkar again describes the migration casualties in the following
narrative:
After the partition of the country the Hindu people who were the original
inhabitants of this enclave migrated to India. And the Muslims took
shelter in Bangladesh. I had very good relation with the Hindus. They
requested me also to migrate to India with them. Before the partition we
were very happy here. Most of the people were educated Brahmins.
None of them lives here now.
7
Govt. of East Bengal, Department of Home (Political), 'B' Proceedings. CR. IB2-35/51 (2349-59),
January 1955, vol. 46, (NAB).
8
Govt. of East Bengal, Department of Home (Political), 'B' Proceedings. CR 3C2-5/50 (2237-2255), March
1953, vol. 15, (NAB).
28
On the other hand Joy Barman, an inhabitant of Bangladeshi enclave Kismot-nij-jama
(located in Mekligonj under Cooch Bihar district of WB, India) says,
There are 208 bigha land in our chhit. At present, there are 32
households with a population of 144. We are all Hindus. Like me all
fellow chhit-dwellers have come from outside India. To the best of my
knowledge only two families are original residents of the chhit.
During the period of communal chaos and cross-border settlement there occurred some
exchanges of chhit land (lands of enclave) between the enclave-dwellers of the two countries.
One Khoka, an inhabitant of an Indian enclave Beoladanga/Shalbari chhit, (located in
Debigonj under Panchagarh district of Bangladesh) narrates,
You will find very few original inhabitants here in the chhit. Most of the
residents have come from India exchanging lands. In 1958-59, the
Hindus persecuted Muslims in India. So the Hindus here, being afraid of
communal revenge fled to India... The Hindus mostly inhabited this
area. But now there are only two or three Hindu families. The Muslims
came here from India exchanging lands with the Hindus who had left for
India... They came here like thief at the dark of night leaving behind
even their household goods.
Land Ownership
In the early period the land-ownership in the enclaves was diverse due to the different
circumstances of their emergence. It is said that some times, when the ownership of a landed
estate was transferred in the form of somewhat gift, it virtually became tax-free. There is
hearsay about the Indian enclave Kotbhajni that one taluk of this enclave was bestowed and
since then it remained revenue free. 9 The existence of such ownership was found until the
early 20th century in several cases.10
In some enclaves it is found that in the absence of the owner of the land and any government,
local powerful citizens of the surrounding country have occupied a large chunk of chhit land.
They still live in their country but enjoy the ownership of land in the enclave. Some of the
illegal occupiers owned even hundred acres of land in the enclaves. They have collected
some landless people especially the victims of river erosion from the surrounding areas or
even from far areas and gradually settled them as adhiar in their occupied land in enclave.
Altab Ali, a settled adhiar in the Indian enclave Kotbhajni (located in between Debigonj of
Panchagarh and Domar of Nilphamari, Bangladesh) describes his settlement thus:
Our family came here after becoming destitute as the river destroyed all
lands and homestead. Finding no shelters we came to this chhit. Here I
raised a house and started cultivating some lands on sharecropping.
As adhiar, each settler family got some acres of land for sharecropping with a plot for
homestead. The settlers‟ houses are called busti (slum). The products are divided equally
9
Interview with Md. Abu Bakar Sarkar (76), an inhabitant of Kotbhanji Chhit & Abdur
Razzaq Master (50) , one Bangladeshi citizen and landholder in Kotbhajni Chhit, Chilahati;
Nilphamari.
10
S. I. Husain, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement of Four Private Estates in the District of Rangpur,
1903-7, Bengal and Assam Secretariat Press, 1908, p. 12.
29
between the adhiar and his land-master as is indicated by the name of the system. The
relation between them is different to some extent from the relation of the ordinary adhiars and
landowners in Bangladesh and India. These adhiars are mostly treated as subjects of the
landowners. The landowners used to call them proja (subject) and take pride as landlords.
It is apparent that some of the occupiers have purchased the chhit lands from the original
owners at a very cheap rate who had migrated across the border. On the other hand many
people became victims of treachery in respect of selling and exchanging lands in the
enclaves. All the acts of buying and selling of lands (registration) used to take place at the
local land registry office of the owner state across the border, viz. Haldibari (Conch Bihar) of
India for Indian enclaves and Patgram (Lalmonirhat) of Bangladesh for Bangladeshi
enclaves. But in most cases the buyers could not attend the registry office across the border.
Under the circumstances many enclave-dwellers used to bring deeds (relating to purchasing
of lands) by the cross-border brokers illegally. Since there was no scope in the process to
examine whether the deeds were true or fake, the illiterate enclave dwellers were beguiled by
the trans-border networks of frauds time and again. But in the recent years this practice also
has been stopped because of the restriction on the cross border movement. However, all the
original inhabitants, settlers, occupiers or buyers as well as the adhiars are worried about the
future of their lands in the enclaves. It is because none of them has any legal document in
support of their ownership. Even the original inhabitants do not have any proper document.
The inhabitants of several enclaves on both sides claim that no settlement, no survey and no
registration have been undertaken in the enclaves in their lifetime. Abu Bakar Sarkar and his
fellow dwellers could not show any document of their lands except a severed portion of a
mouza map (land survey settlement map) of 1930s as they claimed (see Figure 6).
Figure 6
A
severed part of a land settlement map of the Uponchowki Bhajni Mouza with the area of
the Kotbhajni enclave that shows the plots of land thereof. (The map was collected from
30
Abu Bakar Sarkar, an inhabitant of Kotbhajni enclave, located in between Debigonj and
Domar under Panchagarh district of Bangladesh).
After the partition, the chhit lands were never included in the land settlement survey by either
of the states. The landowners in the enclaves have never been provided with any ownership
document. However, some purchasers have some non-judicial stamps of registration in
support of their purchased ownership, which were registered, in the Indian Land Registry
Office in Haldibari (Cooch Bihar).
Figure 7
A severed part of another land settlement map of West Kharibari Mouza of later period
(after 1947) with the land of an Indian enclave Chhit Khanki Khariza Gitaldaha (located
in Dimla under Nilphamari district of Bangladesh). The map shows the chit area as
blank, mentioning- Chhit Khanki Kharija Gitaldaha Chhit no. 29, Porgona Mekligonj,
Cooch Bihar. The blank areas shows the alien lands i.e. enclave. (The map is preserved
by Khalilur Rahaman, a Bangladeshi citizen of Tepa Kharibari Union of Dimla under the
district of Nilphamari, who inherited 45 bigha of land [purchased by his father as he
claimed] in the Jikabari Chhit No. 31.)
State of Human Rights in the Enclaves
The connotation of Human Rights has assumed a new dimension in the recent times. The socalled 'third world' countries no longer welcome the western perception of Human Rights. It
is mostly because of their different experiences. Under the prevailing circumstances the „third
world‟ countries sometimes seem uninterested to implement the very „Universal Declaration
of Human Rights‟ under the UN Charter. In such a situation it would be absurd to look for the
implementation of Human Rights in the enclaves. Nevertheless, the fundamental human
rights or in other words the basic needs of human being that refer to food, cloths, residents,
health service and education is uncontroversial. This study is concerned with the state of
31
Human Rights of the enclave people on the basis of basic human needs which fall under what
Rawls (1971) terms “primary goods”, or what Sen (1985) defines as „basic capabilities”.
The Human Rights have been classified into Civic and Political Rights, and Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights that can be brought under the 'Right of Self-determination'. The
importance of economic, social and cultural rights is not less than civic and political rights to
any group of marginalized or stateless people11. Unfortunately, the enclave people have been
deprived of both their civic and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights since
1947. Both the bordering states have remained indifferent to the violation of the human rights
in the enclaves. Whereas both Bangladesh and India have ratified the 'International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)' and 'International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)' under the Universal Declaration which
contain - 'All People have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development. All People may freely dispose of their nature, wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation…In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence' (Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948). In such a perspective, the condition of the basic Human Rights of the enclave
people has been given bellow.
Scarcity of Food
„Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life.‟12 However, food insecurity is one of the chronic dimensions in the
overwhelming enclave-economy. The scarcity of food is more or less common for the under
developed and developing countries. Though the number of the Bangladesh-India enclave
dwellers is not remarkable in the total number of two billions of world‟s people who live in
starvation everyday, the degree of their insecurity of food is much higher than that of the
others. Factors responsible for food insecurity in the enclaves range from natural disaster to
economic, social, demographic and administrative instability, stemming from the absence of
state administration. High growth of population in the absence of Family Planning
Programme and a large number of unskilled and uneducated populations with no legal
connection to markets are enough to cause severe food shortage in the enclaves. Moreover,
the enclave population is engaged only in subsistence farming with low agricultural
productivity and restricted access to inputs technology. Even they have no permission to buy
motorized shallow tube-well. Then there is the prohibition on business. They need to acquire
special permission from the local authority to buy livestock. They cannot buy or sell paddy or
other commodities in larger quantities- there is a set limit, which cannot be exceeded.
Moreover, they have to return to their home enclave before the sunsets. Rajendra Barman
says,
The BSF has put some restrictions on our daily purchase such as we are
not allowed to buy more than the necessary for meeting daily
consumption needs.
11
Debasish Roy Oangjha, „Antorjatic Adibasi Dashok, Bangladesher Adibasi Jatigosti-O-Manobadhikar‟
(International Aborigine Decade, the Ethnic Group of Bangladesh and the Human Rights); The Prothom Alo, 4
November 2004.
12
Quote from FAO World Food Summit, 1996.
32
Another inhabitant of Bangladeshi enclave Chhit Dhabalsuti (located in Cooch Bihar of WB,
India) Umar Nondon says,
If we want to buy or sell poultry, livestock, or other items, we have to
obtain a „slip‟ [written permission] from both the BSF and the
Panchayet (village government). The chhit people are not allowed to
buy more than a sack of rice.
Water, Sanitation and Health Services
The lack of safe drinking water, sanitation, and health services are next to food insecurity as
major problems associated with the over populated countries like Bangladesh and India.
Nevertheless, the rate of actual progress achieved by Bangladesh in the recent years is,
however, higher than the pace of annual progress required for achieving the social targets set
by the MDGs by 2015.13 But the progress of the MDGs such as access to safe drinking water,
sanitary toilet, health service etc. never covers the enclave dwellers. The inhabitants of the
Bangladesh-India enclaves hardly have access to safe drinking water and hygienic sanitation.
They have to drink water from open mud wells, which go under flood water in every rainy
season, causing frequent health hazards. Basically they never have access to primary health
service that causes chronic health hazards. In case of any severe and emergency condition
they have to go to the nearby hospitals of the alien country illegally, where they receive only
secondary importance. Moreover, since there is no road and transport in or around the
enclaves it is difficult to take the patients or victims to the hospitals in case of any
emergency. Mohsin Ali, an inhabitant of Indian enclave Panishala (situated in Patgram under
Lalmonirhat district of Bangladesh) describes their difficulty in access to health services in
the following narrative,
If anybody falls sick the village doctors (paramedics) if available, come
here and provide medical treatment on humanitarian ground14. And in
case of any serious illness we have to get the patient admitted in a
hospital in Bangladesh showing some other address of Shrirampur
union. It won‟t be possible to get admission (in hospital) if we introduce
us as enclave people...No government had brought even a spade of clay
yet in the 3 / 4 miles long distance from our chhit to the nearest
Auliarhaat (only way to the outside)...During the rainy season we have
to walk crossing knee/waist deep water in all the way carrying the
patient on the shoulder...When a critical patient has to be taken to the
hospital, carrying on the shoulder shoving the water in the long road,
s/he might die before reaching the road.
Communication
In the third world there are so many problems in regard to roads and communication.
Nevertheless, a considerable degree of development has been achieved in the rural roads and
communication sector during the last two decades in Bangladesh. But there is hardly any road
13
Sen & Hulme (eds), The State of the Poorest 2005/2006,Chronic Poverty in Bangladesh, Tales of Ascent,
Descent, Marginality and Persistence; BIDS & CPRC, May 2006, p. 30.
14
The „humanitarian ground‟ does not mean free treatment. Such paid treatment is considered as humanitarian
one by the enclave people because the entrance of any doctor or anyone into enclave is illegal and hence the
doctors usually avoid them.
33
and metal street in the enclaves. Because of their tiny sizes it would be unwise to expect
metal roads and streets in every enclave. But in the larger enclaves with no metal road, it is
every body‟s case how life would be miserable during the monsoon. The enclave dwellers
make some small roads with their own efforts and resources. No culvert or bridge was found
on the canals. They make some temporary bridges with bamboo. Every inhabitant takes part
in constructing temporary bamboo-bridges (see Figure 8) and roads by providing either
bamboo or corvee labour, while the chhit council if there is any, collects necessary money
and supervise the construction.
Figure 8
Picture of a sankow or bansher pool (a mate-shift narrow pathway over a canal
made of bamboo) in the Indian enclave Shalbari (located in Debigonj,
Panchagarh), constructed by the enclave-dwellers on their own. (The picture
was taken during dry season.) This is the only way of communication of several
thousands inhabitants of the enclave. Every year they have to repair or
reconstruct the sankow early in the rainy season. (Picture: Mohammad Golam
Rabbani).
34
Education
It is evident that the enclave people receive only secondary importance during the enrolment
of their children since they have to go to the schools of an alien (host) state. As most of the
enclaves are tiny in size, it is absurd to expect any educational institution to be available
there. But in the medium sized and some larger enclaves where one can expect some
educational institutions, hardly have any. In fact, like everything else their education also
depends on the mercy of the authority of the schools and local leaders with a net result that
the enclave people hardly have any education. Neither the old generation nor the new
generations have had adequate facility for education.
The enclave people were never offered educational facilities because of their de facto
stateless status. Beside the fact that there are very few schools in or around the enclaves the
enclave dwellers have also been in lack of incentives. Being the citizens of one country living
inside other, the enclave dwellers hardly have any employment opportunity. The certificate
they would get after passing of a public exam (if any of them get access to formal education
on humanitarian ground) are useless in the country to which their enclave belongs. On the
other hand, they could not get any job of the government of the host country, because they
are alien people living in the enclave. However, Rajendra Barman enumerates the problems
in schooling of their children in the following narrative:
There are some complications in respect of schooling of our children.
Admission at the primary school depends on recommendations of the
panchayet (local government of India). Then you have to request the
teachers who usually comply. Moreover, to get admission in the primary
school, a student has to submit birth certificate. But our children have no
birth certificate.
From another point of view Mohsin Ali says,
Our children study in the schools and colleges of Bangladesh. Therefore,
their certificates are from Bangladesh. These certificates are useless in
India. And if we somehow (showing false address and citizenship) get
any job of the government of Bangladesh we get arrested following the
police verification (every government appointment requires it), which
reveal that we are people from the enclave of the alien country.
In such a situation many enclave people have lost their interest in education, as is apparent
from Umar Nandan‟s remarks:
In the past there was no school in our vicinity. It‟s been a couple of
years that a primary school has been established in the neighbouring
village. Now some students from the chhit can study there only up to the
primary level. Nobody can go to high schools because the chhit
inhabitants are not allowed to sit for the matriculation examination
(SSC). Then what is the use of spending money for education? There is
no possibility of getting employment. We, being poor people can‟t even
meet our subsistence needs. Hence, we do not bother much about
education.
35
Figure 9
Picture of a group of school-aged children of an Indian enclave Shalbari (located in
Debigonj under Panchagarh district of Bangladesh), said to have been denied of the
opportunity of getting enrolment to the local primary school in Bangladesh on the
ground that they are not Bangladeshi citizens. (Picture: Mohammad Golam Rabbani).
It is not surprising that the enclave-people were never introduced with modern benevolent
statehood. Consequently, they have been coping with the vicissitudes of everyday life in the
midst of „stateless limbo‟ without any outside help. No safety net for the vulnerable groups,
no programme for human resource development and no NGO program for aid or incomegeneration cover the ever-vulnerable inhabitants of the Bangladesh-India enclaves. Umar
Nandan describes their vulnerability in the following manner:
All the people of our chhit are poor who are living under dire inhuman
conditions. We have no job, no business. We have to earn our living
only through physical labour. We do not receive any government relief
or loan. Neither the government nor any NGO comes here. If we die of
starvation, epidemic, or any natural disaster, we won‟t get even a kg. of
wheat or a piece of cloths from the government because we are citizens
of Bangladesh, but we cannot go there...
While Rajendra Barman says,
We drink from earthen well. There is no sanitary latrine. On the other
hand, we find the Indian citizens who live around us enjoying so many
facilities. The government is providing them with tin houses, installing
tube-wells and latrines, supplying livestock and poultry on credit, etc.
Even if we die of an epidemic, no one will arrange cremation for us...No
NGO has ever visited our chhit.
Hamidur, an inhabitant of an Indian enclave Ajwar Para/Latamari Chhit (located in Patgram
under Lalmonirhat district of Bangladesh) says,
We have to face our troubles by ourselves. You see none is here to see if
there is a famine now in the Chhit. During the last monga (draught
36
season) we saw that the Bangladesh government gave 10 kg rice to
every family twice a month. They gave other aids as well. But we didn't
get anything here in the chhit. No government doctor, no family
planning worker, no NGO comes here in the chhit. Grameen Bank gives
loan to the neighbouring villages. But they do not give us any loan. They
say that since we are not Bangladeshi citizens, they can‟t give us loan.
The criminalized subaltern economy of the enclave people is not recognized by either of the
states while the very states themselves made it so. Umar Nandan says,
Our movement and work are not legal, as we are not Indian citizens on
paper. Indian citizens are given a card (citizenship identity card). The
police can harass us anytime if they wish on the pretext of not having the
ID card. Hence we live under constant fear while working in Indian
territories. We have passed our whole lives in uncertainty. If it is in my
luck I will be sent to jail any time.
There have been dramatic changes in recent years in the institutional arrangement for
different markets in Bangladesh and India. But the enclave people unlike the poor and ultrapoor have been totally excluded from the “progressive segment” of the market and the
institutional credit market 15. Even the exceptional ultra-poor program never includes these so
called „no where people‟. Restriction to legal entry to the enclaves accounts for the dismal
situation. Khoka again says,
No NGO, Grameen Bank or BRAC works here. We do not get any help
from the government. No health worker works here nor does come any
family planning worker. For last several years, the government is only
giving our children the polio vaccine.
Social System
Being detached from the mainland, the enclave people became dependent on their personal
relations (social capital) with the neighbouring alien people. In fact, except for the communal
strife engineered by some rioters, the boundary could make little difference between the socalled „chhiter look‟ and their very neighbours who suddenly turned into alien people by the
partition. It means that the enclave people did not require developing a completely new social
network. Rather being abandoned by their states the existing social relations became only
means of their survival. This is to be noted that though they have a good social network, but
uncertainty also exists there. In the case of any incident that upsets the very social relations
the innocent enclave people may suffer since there is no law and order agency or
administration in the enclaves. The proverb „might is right‟ certainly has a practical value. So
whatever social relations they have the probability of being harassed or exploited always
remains and in fact, it happens now and then.
By and large the enclave dwellers are on good terms with the average people of the
surrounding alien community. They have interactions with them. Marriage is an important
way of their reliable linkage to the surrounding community. Henceforth, they mostly try to
make nuptial matches in the surrounding community of the host country. They feel safe to
15
The term “institutional credit market” is used to denote both NGOs and public financial institutions. See Sen
& Hulme, op.cit., p. 133.
37
some extent when they have some strong relatives over there. But many times they fail to do
so. Many native people deny having marriage relation with the „subaltern‟ enclave people.
Rahim Uddin, an inhabitant of the Indian enclave Shalbari (located in Debigonj under
Panchagarh district of Bangladesh) testifies,
We marry off our children inside the chhit and also in Bangladesh. We
arrange it wherever we can make. In any case, we try to make the nuptial
matches in Bangladesh most of the time. It is advantageous to have some
relatives in Bangladesh. For example, we cannot sell any cows in
Bangladeshi market. Since we cannot mention the chhit's address in the
market receipts we need some Bangladeshi to buy and sell cows in the
local market. In those cases we sell the cows through our Bangladeshi
relatives...
Sometimes some gentlemen, decline marries off their children in the enclaves. They think
that if they marry off their daughters in enclaves (where no administration exists) it would
only invite more problems. It would be a case of constant anxiety and a social liability in the
event of possible riot or arson in the enclave. Moreover, the problem of registration remains
in the event of a wedding match. Since the enclave inhabitants are alien people their marriage
would not be registered in the host country. In such cases they use the address (false) of their
relatives in the host country. However, this problem is only with the Muslim families living
in the enclaves. It is because the Hindu community does not have to go through any
registration procedure in their marriage.
Since the enclave dwellers do not have any relation with their so-called homeland, they have
to go regularly to the host country for their livelihood. It may be noted that except for earning
of livelihoods by manual labour the enclave dwellers do not have any other purpose in the
host country. Here Rajendra Barman again says,
We do not have any relation with the government of India. They only let
us go to the haat which gives us the opportunity of selling our crops. We
cannot buy or mortgage land inside India. It is because we do not have
any card (citizenship card). You can virtually do nothing without this
card.
However, the enclave people, in fact, safe to move in the surrounding country rather than to
cross the border for his or her own country. There are hundreds of examples among the
enclave people of being harassed or arrested and jailed during their cross-border movement.
Mohshin Ali describes their cross-border harassment in the following narrative:
Two of my nephews went to Jalpaiguri of India last year for medical
treatment. Police arrested them accusing in a robbery case and sent to
the court. They have been in the jail since then. We come to learn that
some accused terrorists fled away from the police custody of Mekligonj.
The police in order to save them arrested my nephews and sent them to
the court showing them as those accused terrorists. I want to get them
released even spending money, but there is no way out, because we
cannot go to India at all. We don‟t know their prison condition for last
fifteen months. We don‟t know whether any more tortures being carried
out. Because of continuous weeping, the mothers of the two boys are
now in a dying stage. Being hapless we are compelled to remain silent.
38
It is apparent that in the age of globalisation all the governments are in real trouble in
adjusting the state-economy. The responsibilities of the government, particularly in the over
populated „third world‟ countries like Bangladesh and India are increasing beyond capability.
The governments are mostly busy in making policy of economy and commerce, security and
foreign relation under the multidimensional pressure of both internal and external forces. In
such a situation, the violation of Human Rights and the aloofness of the governments in this
regard is a common phenomenon in the „third world‟. How the „first world‟ violating the
Human Rights in intra-border and trans-border arena is not supposed to be discussed here.
However, all in both Bangladesh and India know about the police harassment. In such a
perspective the above police harassment is not a unique one. But the degree of haplessness of
the enclave dwellers in such a condition is much higher than that of the citizen of any
country. In fact, what is casual for the citizens of Bangladesh and India in this regard is
regular for the stateless people living in the enclaves. The recent proliferation of smuggling
of firearms, drug trafficking, women and child trafficking and trans-border terrorism and
trans-border movement of the accused and most wanted terrorists have further deteriorated
the insecure condition of the enclave people. Very often, the inoffensive enclave dwellers
have been suspected in both countries and consequently got harassment. The continuous
trespassing of the BSF in the Bangladesh territory and the incidents of firing in the borders
caused to a number of deaths and casualties in the recent years as well as at present. Every
such incident disrupts the propensity of the enclave dwellers. The stateless people at least feel
unsafe at the aftermath of any such incident, which certainly upset their everyday life. Under
the prevailing circumstances the unique state of life and livelihood of the people living
therein for generations have been deteriorating to an inhuman condition.
39
FOURTH CHAPTER
Statelessness and the Crisis of Identity
The fate of the enclave people has been tied up with the uneasy and unproductive bilateral
relations of the ruling elite of the concerned countries for almost six decades. Neither state
dared take the step of annexing the enclaves of the other, even during the wars, fought
between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. On the contrary, the legality of the status quo
of enclaves was reaffirmed during numerous bilateral meetings of the government officials
and high-contract parties1. Any complain of annexing the chhit land or even penetration in
their boundary, demarcated with concrete pillars in 1934 between the British India and the
Cooch Bihar State or that of 1947 between India and Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971) is yet
to be raised by either of the states.
Only in one case it is found in Bangladesh that an enclave‟s status has been ignored, and that
is in the tiny enclave of Chand Khan Putimari, located in the Maidan Dighi Union (Boda)
under the district of Panchagarh (see Figure 10). It should be noted that because of some
obvious impediments the Bangladeshi enclaves, laying in the Indian territory could not be
investigated in this regard.
Figure 10
Map shows the Indian enclave Chand Khan Putimari or Putimari. The interdistrict road between Panchagarh and Thakurgaon has been metalled few
hundred meters across the enclave (Source: LGED Map of Boda thana).
Though both countries usually continue the trend of mutual recrimination on the enclave
issue, virtually none of them has administrative set up or control over their enclaves laying in
the other‟s territory. When I visited many of the Bangladesh-India enclaves and talked to the
inhabitants thereof, none of them could remember the presence of any administration in their
1
W.V. Schandel, “Stateless in South Asia: The Making of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves”, The Journal of
Asian Studies, 61:1(2002), p. 122.
40
enclaves or any connection with their respective state and government during the last half a
century. On the other hand, the host countries also have no legal right to operate any
administration or to ensure normal civic life for enclave people. If any host country attempt to
administer the alien enclaves, in any case that would be a violation of the sovereignty of the
owner state. Nevertheless, the host countries do not impose restrictions on the social network
with the surrounding community on which the „miniature society‟ virtually exists. Perhaps, it
is because of the fact that any action directed in other‟s enclaves seems to have repercussions
on one‟s own enclaves, laying in the other‟s territory. So, in the absence of substantive state
governance, the enclave-dwellers have been coping with their virtual backward livelihood,
capitalizing only the social relations with the surrounding alien society. Abdar Hossain, an
inhabitant of a tiny Indian enclave (with only a few number of household) Boro Khanki
Kharija, Gitaldaha (located in an interior place around 5 to 6 kilometres from the border in
Dimla under Nilphamari district of Bangladesh) describes their un-administered plight in the
following manner:
No government seems function in this enclave. No officer of Bangladesh
even steps his/her feet in the land of this enclave. They would say that it is
Indian territory and we are citizens of India. But the irony is that nobody
comes to see us even from India. We also cannot go to India…We do all the
works (i.e. earn livelihood) in Bangladesh. We do all our works here
socially. If any conflict ever occurs in this enclave the well-meaning
persons of the neighbouring areas come here and take initiatives to resolve
the conflict collectively.
Though the enclaves previously existed for many years, there had been nothing to distinguish
the residents of the enclaves from their neighbours except that they went to different offices
to pay land revenue or to report crime or such other problems2. But at the eve of the
emergence of India and Pakistan they were virtually encircled in the enclaves, cut off from
any government. However, someone could distinguish the people living in the enclaves from
their neighbours only after the partition when international boundary system with security
forces started to operate on the newly demarcated border, and the frontier people were barred
to move across that border. By this time they fell, in practice, in the interstices of the two
nation states though they have their own state and have been recognized as „bona fide‟
citizens of the state they belong to.
It is found that over the administrative control therein various complications developed
resulting in numerous conflicts among the neighbouring zamindars, but as there was no
international boundary, it did not seem as problematic as of the later days. However, as of the
Mughal period enclaves were also found administratively inconvenient during the British
period. Exploitation of differences in excise regulations, particularly the smuggling of
intoxicants, narcotics and liquor, between Cooch Bihar and Bengal led to an agreement in
1917, whereby the Cooch Bihar enclaves in Bengal were treated as within British customs
territory, and the British enclaves in Cooch Bihar territory were treated as within Cooch
Bihar‟s customs territory.3 This custom arrangement persisted until independence. Moreover,
the British supremacy over Cooch Bihar and administrative proximity between the two
helped to prevent the criminal activities in the enclaves.
2
Ibid, pp. 132-133.
Brenden R. Whyte, "The Cooch Behar Enclaves of India and Bangladesh: An Historical Overview and
Determination of their Number, Area and Population", in: Oriental Geographer, 2002, p. 25.
3
41
The Maharaja of Cooch Bihar had his own tax offices at Debigonj (under the then district of
Dinajpur) and Patgram (under the then district of Rangpur) to collect taxes from his
fragmented chaklajat4 lands and mohals laying in Bengal. Interestingly the Maharaja
continued to be a substantial landlord in East Pakistan and the staffs of his estate used to
collect taxes from his Pakistani tenants till the abolition of zamindari rights in 1952. 5
Similarly, some inhabitants of the Indian enclaves are still loyal to the Maharaja of Cooch
Bihar. Abu Bakar Sarkar says,
By birth we were the subjects of the Maharaja of Cooch Bihar, still we
are the same subjects. During the British period we used to pay tax to the
Maharaja of Cooch Bihar.
At the turbulent aftermath of the partition both Pakistan and India realized that the enclaves
had potential to pose any political and communal tension between the two. So, both countries
were found to manoeuvre the enclave issue to maintain mutual status quo thereof. Moreover,
they tried to impress upon each other their shared interest in taking control of these detached
territories and thus preventing them from falling into the hands of „communists and ordinary
criminals‟6 For instance, in February 1948, the East Bengal Government sent a telegram to
Cooch Bihar suggesting that by mutual agreement, armed police of both sides should be
allowed to carry arms across the other‟s territory in order to enter and leave the enclaves.7
However, under an agreement, the district officials were allowed to visit enclaves if they
would inform the concerned authority of the host country about their visit fifteen days in
advance and carry photographed identity card. The concerned security personnel of the host
country then escorted them to forth across the foreign soil. Again, to deal with any law and
order situation, uniformed police officials of the parent state without arms could visit their
enclaves. Moreover, revenue could be collected once every six months.8 However, hardly any
agreement, designed for the betterment of the enclave people sufficed to remove the inherent
defects. For instance, though there were arrangements for collection of revenue and for the
visit of the officials, nothing was agreed upon about the transit of the enclave dwellers. „In
other words, it was an agreement between two self-absorbed state bureaucracies that
completely ignored the economic interests of the people living in the enclaves‟. 9 If we
examine the above Agreement, we can see that bilateral commercial issues got preference
than that for the betterment of the enclave people. Moreover, the Agreement itself reaffirmed
the situation of somewhat economic blockade since there was no provision for exportation of
the local products to the mainland. In the absence of official directives the enclave dwellers
could not legally sell their products in the surrounding markets of the host country.
With the introduction of passport and visa control between India and Pakistan under an
agreement in 1952, the enclavement of the enclave dwellers deteriorated to farther extent.
Since there were no passport and visa offices in the enclaves, the enclave inhabitants had to
4
Chaklajat (land) means the sway over land legitimated by virtue of chakla.
Government of East Bengal, „B‟ Proceedings, Department of Home (Political), CR IV-6/50(141-71), June
1954, vol. 4, NAB.
6
Government of East Bengal, „B‟ Proceedings, Department of Home (Political), CR 3C-6/49 (1273-1329),
November 1950, vol. 2; & CR 3C1-4/50 September 1961, vol. 42, NAB.
7
Government of East Bengal, „B‟ Proceedings, Department of Home (Political), CR 3C-6/49 (1273-1329),
November 1950, vol. 2, NAB.
8
Government of East Bengal, „B‟ Proceedings, Department of Home (Political), CR 3C-6/49
(1273-1329), November 1950, vol. 2; & CR 3C2-5/50 (2237-2255), March 1953, vol. 15, NAB.
9
W V Schendel, op. cit., p. 124.
5
42
cross the foreign territory illegally without passport and visa to reach their motherland to
acquire those. Thus, the very existence of the enclave people was virtually ignored in the
mutual visa-passport arrangement. The visa checkpoint in the border barred their cross-border
movement. Thus, the thousands of people, being marooned in the enclaves could not come
out of their enclave without trespassing in the surrounding foreign country.
As a whole the thousands of innocuous people have been left un-administered for over half a
century in the enclaves. Their livelihood would be completely impossible if they did not
routinely trespass in the surrounding country or engage in actions that have been defined as
anti state and illicit by both countries. Thus, the inhabitants of the Bangladesh-India enclaves,
living in the interstices provide a unique example of „miniature society‟. Umar Nandan says,
We are really in serious troubles, as if we have no guardian. If an Indian
kills a chhit dweller in broad daylight the Indian police will not take any
action. We can‟t lodge a case at the police station. If we go to the village
chief, the panchayet, they would say -„we have no right over your
chhit‟… We do not have any security in the chhit.
Regarding the law and order situation, Abu Bakar Sarkar narrates even to collect taxes,
Since there is no state administration in the enclave even to collect taxes
some people think that we are staying well. But they couldn‟t realize
how dangerous the living is in a place that has no administration. If a
person is given a nice bed for sleeping but a sharp sword is hanged with
a thread upon the bed in such a way that at any moment that sword may
pierce his/her body, it is predictable the extent of fear that person suffers
every moment. We, the people of enclaves also spend everyday with
same degree of fear. Due to what sins ours Allah has predestined our
living in the enclave! Who desires to live in a place that has no rule?
Paying tax is a tradition of a country. Our forefathers paid tax
throughout their lives. Why shouldn‟t we pay?
Coping with Identity Crisis
The citizenship crisis, stemming from the partition rendered the enclave dwellers ever
vulnerable at the turbulent aftermath of the partition. As soon as the partition was declared
they found them on the horns of a dilemma in respect of citizenship. However, they were in a
dilemma not in regard to getting citizenship in the real sense of the term of their own choice
but to save their lives, resources or even chastity from the black claws of the rioting ultranationalists in both the countries. In such a situation, the innocent and almost illiterate
enclave inhabitants, who were yet to be introduced to the notion of modern citizenship, had to
cope with a unique situation. They had to compromise with the citizenship of their forefathers
or to proxy as trans-border citizens to protect themselves from the communal barbarism. The
more they were identified loyal to the detached motherland as citizen the more they were
targeted by the rioters of the host country and therefore they acted accordingly. On the other
hand, the more they tilted to the surrounding country on the ground of religion or under the
fear of communal attacks the more they detached themselves from their fellow dwellers in the
enclave. With all these consequences, the old identities, based on neighborhood, kinship,
language and culture that they shared with people outside the enclaves did not suddenly
vanish, but were now at odds with an ascendant identity (citizenship).10
10
Ibid, p. 132.
43
After the emergence of independent Bangladesh in 1971, life became easier for the enclave
peoples in both sides because of the disappearance of armed vigilance. During 1971-72 the
border virtually disappeared in the wake of the Liberation War of Bangladesh. The borders
and frontier areas between the two countries appeared to have been free and flexible, perhaps,
because of the then friendly relations. In fact, the sufferings of the enclave dwellers were
reduced to many extents by friendly measures. An historic agreement between the two
countries was signed in May 1974 to resolve the enclave and other border issues persisting
from the previous regimes. It may be noted that there was an agreed time to take into account
the opinion of the enclave people regarding their national identity, while their nationality
would also be changed with the exchange of the enclaves. In this regard there might be an
option of rehabilitation of the enclave people in the respective country of their chosen
nationality. It is no surprise that there was no such provision in the Agreement. Nevertheless,
the exchange of the enclaves then seemed to be a matter of time. But due to the reluctance of
India there has been a deadlock in the exchange process. And in the meantime the enclavedwellers in the absence of any state executed administration re-established some connections
with the surrounding society. In this way, the stateless enclave dwellers have coined out a
unique way of survival in the midst of statelessness.
The Activities of the Chhitmohal Nagorik Committee
This is to be noted that unlike all other persecuted and deprived societies in the history of
mankind the enclave people could never be organized and lodged to either of the
governments for their rights which they are entitled by virtue of birth. In fact, the enclave
people do not have any scope to gather and organize themselves with the purpose of pursuing
their rights and objectives. Because, they are scattered over different districts of an alien
country where they are under de jure restriction to move outside their home enclaves.
However, some individuals of the Indian enclaves formed the Chhitmohal Nagorik
Committee (Enclave People Committee) in a public meeting on 26th January 1972, soon after
the independence of Bangladesh. It is pertinent to note that the objective of the Committee
was to lodge complains to the governments and to procure their rights and privileges as it was
mentioned in the bulletin of the meeting (see appendix 1).
By this time some individuals who had migrated to India from the Indian enclaves, started to
lodge the enclave issue with the Indian Government. Bimal Kumar Chakravorty, for instance,
had formed a committee for the enclave people in West Bengal. He had placed many
demands and memoranda to the local administration of India. But the Indian government
never paid any heed to them. However, they could not advance their movement due to the
lack of proper organization and support from the political parties. Nevertheless, they could
procure a permission of entering into India for the inhabitants of the Indian enclaves
particularly for land related official purposes. Consequently chhit committee or council came
into existence in some of the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh. Thereafter the enclave dwellers
could go to India for 2 to 3 days for selling lands or any other works after being certified as
the inhabitant of Indian enclave by the chhit council. The chhit committee used to provide
them with certificate of citizenship of Indian enclave and then they could enter into India
showing the certificate in the border checkpoint (see Figure 11).
44
Figure 11
The Enclave Citizenship Certificate of the Chhit Council. (Abu Bakar Sarkar,
the Ex-chairman of the Kotbhajni Chhit Council provided the document.)
But that facility was cancelled in 1997 by the government of India on the allegation that the
Chhit Councils had issued some false certificates to the Bangladeshi citizens, certifying them
as the citizen of Indian enclave. Since then the inhabitants of the Indian enclaves have been
barred to enter into their de jure homeland. Babul Hossain, an inhabitant of the Indian
enclave Balapara Khagrabari/Kotbhajni (located in between Debigonj and Domar,
Bangladesh) says,
Previously the Enclave Committee used to issue card for visiting India.
It was possible to go to India showing that card. Now-a-days they have
stopped issuing the card. Because many times it was observed that the
chairman of the enclave issued card even to the Bangladeshi people for
going to India… Due to the cancellation of the card system the people of
this enclave are facing lots of difficulties.
The Activities of the Chhit Councils
In order to ensure social order and peace the stateless peoples of some larger enclaves have
formed one kind of Chhit Council like the union parishad (unit of local government) of
45
Bangladesh. This Council is, in fact, one kind of social administration. The enclave dwellers
form Chhit Council through election. Like the UP election in Bangladesh they elect one
Chairman and nine Members for the Council. The area of the Chhit Council is divided into
three wards, having three Members from each ward in the Council. Only the males are
enlisted in their voter list, enumerated by themselves. An election council, made of the „wellmeaning persons‟ from enclave and surrounding community, headed by one Ex-chairman of
the nearby Bangladeshi Union conducts the election. It is to be noted that the local leaders
come to conduct the election on invitation of the enclave leaders on the ground of social
cooperation. In taking part in such an election on their own the enclave dwellers feel proud
and try to take the taste of that of a modern state, which they have been deprived of for
generations. But the elections are held very irregularly. In some relatively small sized
enclaves, the Chhit Councils are formed on the basis of selection and the well-meaning
persons therein become the Chairman and Members of the Council.
However, the Chhit Council deals with the overall social affairs of the enclave with an
approach of social cooperation. They take initiatives to resolve the disputes among the
enclave dwellers through shalish (social arbitration). If the Council itself fails to settle any
dispute, they invite the Bangladeshi local leaders like the Chairman of the surrounding
Bangladeshi union or Ex-chairman whom they could rely on to settle the dispute. The Chhit
Council has no recognition of or relation with any government. The existence of such a Chhit
Council is found in the largest Indian enclave Shalbari (A composite enclave, made of four
contiguous chhit namely Shalbari, Nataktoka, Beoladanga and Kajoldighi, located in
Debigonj under Panchagarh district). Rahim Uddin describes the tasks of the Chhit Council in
the following manner:
There are 1500 male voters here. Women cannot vote in the election.
We elect the Chairman and Members after several years... The council
repairs the roads of the chhit and settles the social disputes... The council
does not have any money, nor does it receive anything from the
government. There are a number of ghats (boat-stands) that are leased
out by the Chhit Council. The council also lease out the jal mohal (lake)
and khoar (cattle enclosure). In this way the council can earn 30/35
thousand taka yearly. The Chairman and Members of the council take
some of the money as honourium. Rest of the money is spent on the
repairing of the roads… Our law and order situation is in our own hands.
The union council settles the disputes and arranges shalish. In bigger
problems we call the elite of the neighbouring areas of Bangladesh, like
the Chairmen of Barashashi and Mariar unions. They, sitting together
with our Chairman and Members settle the problems.
The Proceedings of Land Registration in the Enclaves
Registration is very important both in selling and purchasing of land. But the inhabitants of
the enclaves have no scope of having registration in respect of buying and selling land.
Formerly, the enclave dwellers were allowed to go to the local land registry office of India
for registration purpose. Then they had to show their ownership deeds of Indian Chhit land in
the border checkpoint along with the citizenship certificate, issued by the Chhit Council.
Because having deeds of land ownership in the enclaves was considered as an authentic
identity of Indian citizenship. However, then they would go to Holdibari of India for buying
or selling land. But now as it is impossible to go to India, they use to have registration
through the brokers without going to India. As noted earlier, since there is no scope in the
46
process to identify whether the deeds are true or fake, the almost illiterate enclave dwellers
have been beguiled by the trans-border network of frauds time and again. Under the
circumstances the enclave people have introduced one kind of social registration system that
varies from enclave to enclave. In the smaller enclaves lands are being sold orally, having
only some witnesses. In some larger enclaves where Chhit Council exists, one kind of nongovernmental land registration system is found. The Chhit Council issues the land
registration deeds, which have no legal value in either of the countries. Thereby the buyers of
land in the enclaves could not have any legal document in support of their ownership. Hence
the price of the enclave lands several times lower than that in the surrounding areas.
Absence of State Administration
In the absence of substantive state governance the enclaves have been virtually turned into
safe havens for the criminals. Since there is no administration the criminals often take shelter
in the enclaves after committing crimes in the surrounding country. It may be noted that some
enclaves are being used as transit point for smuggling. It is also apparent that some enclave
dwellers, being biased by the prevalent circumstances or under pressure got involve with
smuggling and other criminal activities. For example, ganja (hemp) cultivation has been
widely extended in many Indian enclaves as reported in the newspapers. Organized
smugglers‟ syndicates both in Bangladesh and India provide the enclave dwellers with inputs
like seed and fertilizer for hemp cultivation and buy product from them. It is also said that the
reason of large-scale hemp cultivation is that the Indian authority do not care to supply them
seed and other inputs for hemp cultivation.11 A police officer in Panchagarh (Bangladesh),
confessing the matter said, “But we cannot enter there to track down criminals or destroy
hemp fields.”12 For all these reasons, there may have a general assumption that the enclave
dwellers have been taking the advantages of the absence of state administration. But most of
the enclave dwellers are found inoffensive on the ground. There may have some criminals
among the enclave dwellers but of course, they are very few in number. Most of the enclave
dwellers were found gentle and peace loving during the survey period. The irony is the
stateless enclaves and their inhabitants have virtually been bestowed to the trans-border
terrorists. Sometimes it happens that the outside killers bring persons of their target into
enclaves and kill them there. It is because the police of the surrounding country would never
enter into enclaves even to rescue the dead body and consequently no case would be filed
against the killing. In this way many killers remain themselves out of law and court by and
large. More often the enclave people become bound to give them shelter. It is said that one
inhabitant of the Shalbari Chhitmohal who resisted the intruders was killed. In fact, the
absence of state administration gave the enclave dwellers nothing but insecurity and
vulnerability. Hence Rajendra Barman says,
There is neither any government, nor court, nor any law. You see, we are
leading a sub-human life here. Is it possible to live peacefully in a place
where no law and order or legal system exist? There is no guarantee of
life. Anybody may come from anywhere at anytime to attack any of us.
Suppose that even if five murders take place in the chhit all at a time, the
Indian police will do nothing. They would not even come here to see
what had happened inside. Suppose that an Indian comes to our chhit
11
K. Karmaker, “Indian enclaves in 2 districts „safe havens‟ for criminals, Large scale hemp cultivation in
enclaves in Dinajpur, Panchagarh”, The Daily Star, p. 6, 8 June 2005, Dhaka.
12
Ibid.
47
and kills someone. He will not face any trial. No police station will
record our case.
The law enforcement forces of either country never enter into the enclaves and the unlucky
enclave dwellers were never introduced with court and judiciary system. They could not file
any case even if horrible crimes like murder, robbery etc. occurs in the enclaves. Thereby the
economic life of the enclave dwellers is mostly victimized by the lawlessness. Neither they
have access to their legitimate administration nor do they have any relation with the
government of the surrounding country. On the other hand neither the owner state has access
to their enclaves nor does the host state have the right to operate even any humanitarian
programme therein. If any trans-border tension occurs in the enclaves the enclave dwellers
may only go to their respective BDR and BSF camps. Then the BDR and the BSF hold flag
meeting and mutually take up feasible measures. This is, however, only a way that the
enclave people can reach a sort of authority of their home country. But some enclaves are
much interior (several kilometres) in the host country that it is difficult to reach the border
outpost of their country. Moreover, both BDR and BSF (border security forces) are not
assigned to the enclave issue in particular. Therefore the enclave dwellers get secondary
importance, when lodging complains to them. Under the prevailing circumstances they have
no security of life and resources. Mohshin Ali seems very rational when he says,
There is no value for humanity here. We have no human rights. We are
surviving on the blessings of the Allah only. There is neither the
presence of the government of Bangladesh nor the government of India
here in the enclave. Can people live like this? Let this place be taken
either by Bangladesh or given to India. We want to live under the rule of
a government at least.
48
Chapter V
Conclusion
The border defines the territorial integrity of a state. Tension mounts when it is violated in
any perceptible way among the states. The borders become very sensitive when ethnic
turmoil or trans-border terrorism that has conjured up a particular landscape in the present
day global politics, create a potential of trans-border tension in their vicinity. However, many
parts of the Bangladesh-India border have been embodied with sensitivity respecting these
factors. But the northern strip of Bangladesh border where enclaves are located never
witnessed any such scenario. Moreover, there is a little economic interest of the owner states
in the enclaves because of their tiny in sizes and scattered locations. This perhaps explains the
delay in resolving the issue that plagues the enclave people with miseries.
During 1950s the enclave issue was politicised both in India and Pakistan only because of
South Berubari vis a vis Dahagram-Angarpota. South Berubari turned into a sensitive symbol
of Indian sovereignty while Dahagram-Angarpota became equally emotive symbol of the
sovereignty of Pakistan. The Noon-Nehru Agreement (September 1958) and the consequent
South Berubari split became a sensitive political issue in India. But after the dropping of
Bangladesh’s inherited claim to South Berubari in 1974 the enclave issue eventually lost the
momentary political sensitivity that arose as a sequel to the communal chaos. Moreover, the
Mujib-Indira Agreement left out little contention except the implementation. DahagramAngarpota also has been connected with Bangladesh by the Tin Bigha Corridor though after a
long delay. So, in fact, there is no insurmountable problem that stood in the way of resolving
the enclave issue.
The Bangladesh-India enclave issue demands immediate attention since it has grown to be
difficult and multi-dimensional through the deadlock in the exchange process. The instances
of intra-border and trans-border terrorism, smuggling of drugs and firearms, trafficking of
women and children have virtually rendered the issue one of most concern. As the owner
states from both sides has no administrative connection with their enclaves and the
surrounding states on the other hand legally unable to operate any form of administration in
the alien enclaves, the enclaves have been drastically fallen in a state of lawlessness and
deprivation. The enclaves seem to be prisons with invisible wall around them where
thousands of people virtually have been condemned for generations. In a sense the enclave
people are worse off than the convicted prisoners, since they have no security of life like that
of the prisoners. As the stateless 'no-where' people have been deprived of all basic needs for
at least three generations, inter-generation transmission of poverty seems as high as cent
percent among them. They have been at risk of everyday journey into a foreign country for
their survival. In all aspects, the enclave people have been in a subhuman existence.
The trans-border movements of the terrorists of both countries have further deteriorated the
hapless condition of the enclave people. The inoffensive enclave dwellers are being harassed
frequently under suspicion of both countries. The continuous trespassing of the BSF in the
Bangladeshi territory and the incidents of firing in the borders with the result of number of
deaths and casualties mostly victimize the stateless enclave dwellers and disrupt their
everyday lives. Thus, the thousands of people including elderly, women and children have
been the life-long victims in the interstices, created by the ill-conceived boundary
construction. Being marooned in the un-administered enclaves the enclave dwellers hardly
49
have any food security, health services, educational facilities, employment opportunities,
safety net, social security, and in fact, any de facto national identity. With all these
consequences the existence of Bangladesh-India enclaves is contradictory to the modern state
system and the vulnerability of the enclave people and their pathetic struggle for survival is
contrary to the very notion of modern civilization in the so-called post-modern period.
As noted earlier the enclave people have been deprived of both their civic and political rights
and economic, social and cultural rights since the partition of the British India. None of the
concerned countries have shown due interest in providing them with basic human rights.
However, Bangladesh may keep itself away from the blame of blatant violation of the
International Law of Human Rights, since it has ratified the May 1974 Agreement in the
parliament and handed over the relevant South Berubari to India forthwith. But India may not
avoid such blame as it yet to ratify the Agreement, which is, in fact, a violation of
International Law.
As discussed in Chapter IV the issue of national identity was ignored in the Mujib-Indira
Agreement. But now, after more than half a century a complete new generation has grown up
in the enclaves who virtually do not know what national identity they belong to. So the
national identity is no longer a question in the exchange process. Rahim Uddin narrates this
in the following manner:
We are now citizens of no country. Our identity to governments of both
Bangladesh and India is that we are the citizens of chhitmohal. But we
want no longer to live like this. We want citizenship either of the
countries.
While Rajendra Barman, says,
We have only one demand, that we should be granted citizenship. We do
not have any preference regarding which country. What matters is that
we want citizenship in real sense of the term. If it is India it's all right. If
it is Bangladesh, we should be given safe passage so that we can always
go to Bangladesh to work, and receive administrative support and
assistance from our government.
Because of scattered locations, tiny sizes and encircled positions of the enclaves
understandably there is no alternative of exchange. Abu Bakar Sarkar supports this in the
following words:
There is no other way of solution of this problem except conferring us
Bangladeshi citizenship handing this land over to Bangladesh. Because
there is no such logic and situation as to retain this land as part of India
which is so much an interior place in Bangladesh.
While Umar Nandan says,
I want to be an Indian citizen. Bangladeshi citizenship will not be of any
use for us. It will not be possible to travel to Bangladesh from inside
India. We will not be able to work there. Hence, we want India to give
us citizenship and provide us with all the associated facilities.
It is claimed in some Indian writings that when Dahagram-Angarpota could be connected to
mainland through the passage of Tin Bigha Corridor, why the largest Indian enclave Shalbari
would not be connected to India through such a passage. But the reality is, the distance
between Bangladesh and Dahagram-Angarpota is only 178 meters, while the distance
between India and Shalbari is more than two kilometres (approximate). So, it would be
utterly impractical to demand a passage in such a long distance as pointed out by Rahim
Uddin:
50
There will still be problems if there is a passage made between this
Chhit and India. How can we go to India for daily shopping, treatment
and many other necessities from so far a place? Is it possible for
anybody from India to come and help us instantly? That is why I want
this place to become a part of Bangladesh.
It is perceptible that the Bangladesh-India enclaves exist as inviolable barriers to the internal
development of both countries (see Figure 12). For instance, the long awaited rural
infrastructure development such as roads and bridges, electricity supply line etc. could not
run forward continuously in the areas where alien enclaves pose barrier. Moreover, some
domestic areas have also turned into adverse possession because of the existence of foreign
enclaves. For example, a village named Umarkhana in Boda thana, situated on the eastern
bank of the Korotua river is surrounded in the north, east and south by the composite
enclaves of Shalbari, Beoladanga, Kajoldighi and Natoktoka while by the big river Korotua
in the west. The problem associated with the village is that, the Bangladesh government could
not construct any road across the chhit land to the village. On the other hand a country like
Bangladesh cannot afford to allocate a huge amount of money to build up a big bridge over
the big river for the communication of only a few thousands people of a single village. As a
result, this village has turned into an adverse possession and the inhabitants of the village
have no other option but to trespass the Indian enclaves for their regular purposes. Either they
have to cross the river or the foreign enclaves for their everyday communications. The only
transit of the inhabitants of the village is the ‘earthly paths’ of the Shalbari Chhit (see Figure
8). Therefore, the people of the Umarkhana village are also in a state of enclavement. Hence
this village may be defined as a sub-enclave.
Figure 12
Sketch of the Kotbhajni Chhit lying between Domar (Nilphamari District) and
Debigonj (Panchagarh District) that has barred the straight communication
51
between these two thana headquarters. If the road between Domar and Debigonj
could run straight, the distance between these two urban areas would have been
2 km. But, to avoid the foreign territory the road needs to run an extensive
distance as can be seen in the sketch.
Bangladesh and India are closely connected to each other in terms of geographical proximity,
socio-economic features, cultural heritages and men to men relations. But it is only the elite
politicians who, for their narrow political aspirations continue border disputes between the
two countries. As a big neighbour, having territories surrounding a small country like
Bangladesh, India can play the most vital role in normalization of border situation. But India
seems failure in this respect. Truly enough, the politicians for the interest of their party
politics often seemed to exploit the issue. For instance, when the Congress Government of
India gave Bangladesh the Tin Bigha Corridor in 1992, BJP, the then opposition party
opposed it with serious agitation. Since then an annual ‘Tin Bigha Protest Day’ was
observing on 26 June by BJP. In many BJP writings, the enclaves as well as the Tin Bigha
Corridor were put next to the Kashmir issue as powerful symbol of Indian sovereignty. But
when BJP came into power in 1998, it was caught between its political conviction and
government. Subsequently in April 2000, the then Indian Home Minister of BJP government
Lal Krishno Advani while visiting the Tin Bigha Corridor pronounced, "any party may come
and go but a government should honour its predecessor's decision, so we have to ensure the
corridor functioning smoothly" (Indian and Bangladeshi Press).
It can be surmised that the enclave issue is usually insignificant to a vast country like India.
But when we notice India's ambitious project on fencing around the extensive boundary, it
seems contradictory to the previous notion. The critics may logically take it as India’s ill
practice of geo-politics with a small neighbour. However, understandably this is a big issue
for a small country like Bangladesh. It is apparent that the enclave issue has been one of the
major issues, deteriorating the bilateral relations of friendship and cooperation. Bangladesh
stands to gain from a quick solution of the enclave issue along with other boundary disputes.
For Bangladesh there are a number of reasons to achieve a speedy solution to this issue. On
the other hand this issue is also important for India since economic diplomacy and regional
co-operation have become pertinent in the global politics. But India seems reluctant to
resolve the issue till date.
As has been emphasized in the study it is a multi-dimensional issue in both intra-border and
trans-border perspectives. Leaving such an issue unresolved, bilateral relations of friendship
and co-operation, trans-border security and so called regional co-operation would never be
achieved in real sense of the terms. Since there is no other convenient option of exchanging
the enclaves and two historical agreements already have been signed up between the
concerned countries in this regard, the desired solution can be found only through a realistic
effort of friendship and cooperation.
52
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Unpublished Records
Govt. of East Bengal & Govt. of Pakistan
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Mekligonj, Cooch Bihar, 1 March 2004.
,,
,, Abdur Razzaq Dakua (50), (Bangladeshi citizen and land holder in
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,,
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,,
,, Rahim Uddin (64), Shalbari (Indian enclave), Debigonj, Panchagarh,
27 March 2004.
Life History
First-hand informations and 22 life histories of the inhabitants of several enclaves have been
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Bangladesh, Tales of Ascent, Descent, Marginality and
Persistence; BIDS & CPRC, May 2006.
Sill, D.L. (ed), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; vol. 5. The
Macmillan Company & The Free Press, USA, 1968.
Tarafdar. M. R., Husain Shahi Bengal, 1495-1538; University of Dhaka, 1965.
SECONDARY BENGALI WORKS
Ahmed, S. U. (ed),Dinajpur: Itihas-O-Otihya (Dinajpur: History and
Heritage); Bangladesh Itihas Samity, July 1996.
Bhadra, G. & Chatterjee, P. (eds), Nimnoborger Itihas(Subaltern Studies); Ananda Publishers
Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, April 1998.
Chatterjee, B., Deshbibhag: Paschyat-O-Naypathya Kahini (Partition of the
Country: The Tales of Hindquarters and Behind); Ananda
Publishers Pvt. Ltd, Calcutta, January 1993.
Islam, S. A., Bangla Oncholer Itihas, (History of the Region of Bengal);
Papiras, Dhaka 1996.
Kamal, M., Chakrabartee, I. & Nasrin, Z. (ed), Nijbhume Parabashi, Uttarbonger Adibasider
Prantikata Discourse (Illegal migrant in the very homeland, The Discourse of
the Marginality of the Aboriginals of the North Bengal); R D C,
July 2001.
Khan Chowdhuri, A. A., Cooch Beharer Itihas (A History of Cooch Behar); Cooch
Behar State Press, 1936.
Mohaimen, M. A., Itihaser Aloke Desh Bibhag-O-Quide e-Azam Jinnah („The
Partition of the Country and Quide e-Azam Jinnah in the Light of
History); Pioneer Printing Press Ltd. Dhaka, 1994.
Rahim, M.A., Banglar Samajik Sanskritik Itihas,1576-1757 (Social and Cultural
History of Bengal, 1576-1757); vol. 2, Bangla Academi, Dhaka,
June 1982.
Rahim, M.A., Chowdhuri, A.M., Mahmood, A.B.M. & Islam, S., Bangladesher Itihas
(History of Bangladesh); Nawroze Kitabistan, Dhaka, November 1977
(10th Edition, March 2003).
Roychowdhuri, L., homota Hostantor-O-Deshbibhag (Transfer of Power and
Partition of the Country); Dey‟s Publishing , Calcutta, 1999.
Shashmol, B., Bharat Kee Kore Bhag Holo (How India Was Divided); Tin
Songi, Calcutta, January 1981.
ARTICLES
Ahmed, I., “Bangladesh India Relations: The Context of SAARC and the
Emerging Global Scenario” (keynote paper presented at the seminar
held at CIRDAP, organized by the Centre for Development Research,
Bangladesh (CDRB), 6 April 2006).
Akhtar, S., “Adminiostration of Sylhet Under The Nawabs”, in: Ahmed, S.U.
(ed) Sylhet, History And Culture; Bangladesh Itihas Samiti, Dhaka, July 1999.
Alam, M., “Dahagram Kadchhe: Bangladeshira Jago” (Dahagram Crying:
Awake Bangladeshis), in: Jay Jay Din; No. 37, 29 June 2004.
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C DA: “Problems of Chhitmohal and Adverse Possession”, Proceedings of
the Symposium, Calcutta, 14 -15 Sept. 2001.
Chatterji, J., “The Fashioning of Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal‟s
Border Landscape, 1947-52”, in: Modern Asian Studies; vol. 33,
Part-1, February 1999.
Elahi, M. & Rahaman, M. S., Bangladesher Chhitmohals” (The Enclaves of Bangladesh),
in: Bhugal Potrika (A journal of Geography); Department of Geography,
Jahangirnagar University, No.11, 1992.
Haq, M. A., “Slow Progress in Land Demarcation. Settlement of Enclave Issue to
Ease Border Tension”, in: Daily Star; 3 October, 1999.
Husain, S. A.,“Ethnicity and Security of Bangladesh”, in: Iftekharuzzaman (ed),
South Asia’s Security Primacy of Internal Dimension; Vikash
Publishing House Pvt. LTD, 1995, pp.174-191.
Karmaker, K., Indian enclaves in 2 districts ‘safe havens’ for criminals, Large scale hemp
cultivation in enclaves in Dinajpur, Panchagarh”, in: The Daily Star; p. 8, June 2005,
Dhaka.
Oang Jha, D. R., “Antorjatic Adibashi Dashok, Bangladesher Adibashi Jatigosti-OManobadhikar” (International Indigenous Decade, The Indigenous
Community of Bangladesh and The Human Rights), in: The Daily
Prothom Alo; 4 November 2004.
Schendel, W. V., “Stateless in South Asia: The Making of India-Bangladesh
Enclaves”, in: The Journal of Asian Studies; February 2002.
Schendel. W.V., Working Through Partition: Making a Living in the Bengal BorderLands”, in: International Review of Social History; 6 (2001), pp. 393-421.
Sen, A. k., “Tales of Nowhere People”, presented at the
Symposium on „Problems of Chhitmohal and Adverse Possession‟,
Centre For Development Activities, Calcutta, 14-15 Sept. 2001.
Sen, B., “Prantojoner Kotha” (Tales of the Marginals), in: The Prothom Alo, 14 April, 2004.
Spate, O.H.K., “The Partition of India and Prospects of Pakistan”, in: Geographical
Review; vol. 38, January 1948.
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Overview And Determination of Their Number, Area And Population”,
in: Oriental Geographer; vol. 46, No. 2, Dhaka, July 2002.
.
NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS
The Anandabazar Patrika, Calcutta
The Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka
The Daily Inqilab, Dhaka
The Daily Ittefaq, Dhaka
The Daily Prothom Alo, Dhaka
The Daily Jonokontho, Dhaka
The Daily Star, Dhaka
The Sangbad, Dhaka
56
Appendix 1
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE‟S REPUBLIC OF
BANGLADESH AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
CONCERNING THE DEMARCATION OF THE LAND BOUNDARY
BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA AND RELATED MATTERS.
The Government of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of
the Republic of India,
Bearing in mind the friendly relations existing between the two countries,
Desiring to define more accurately at certain points and to complete the
demarcation of the land boundary between Bangladesh and India.
Have agreed as followes:Article 1
.
The land boundary between Bangladesh and India in the areas mentioned bellow
shall be demarcated in the following manner:
1. Mizoram Bangladesh Sector- Demarcation should be completed on the
basis of the latest pre-partition notifications and records.
2. Tripura-Sylhet Sector- Demarcation which is already in progress in this
area on the agreed basis, should be completed as early as possible.
3. Bhagalpur Railway Line-The boundary should be demarcated at a
distance of 73 feet parallel to the toe of the railway embankment towards
the east.
4. Sibpur-Gaurangala Sector-The boundary should be demarcated in
continuation of the process started in 1951-52 on the basis of the District
Settlement Maps of 1915-1918.
5. Muhuri River (Belonia) Sector- The boundary in this area should be
demarcated along the mid-stream of the course of Muhuri River at the
time of demarcation. This boundary will be a fixed boundary. The two
Governments should raise embankments on their respective sides with a
view to stabilising the river in its present course.
6. Remaining Portion of the Tripura-Noakhali/Comilla Sector- The
demarcation in this sector should be completed on the basis of ChaklaRoshanabad Estate Maps of 1892-1894 and the District Settlement Maps
of 1915-1918 for areas not covered by the Chakla-Roshanabad Maps.
7. Fenny River- The boundary should be demarcated along the mid-stream
of the course at the time of demarcation of that branch of the Fenny River
indicated as the fenny River on Survey of India Map Sheet No. 79 M 15,
1st Edition 1935, till it joins the stream shown as Asalong C on the said
map. From that point on, downstream, the boundary should be
demarcated along the mid-stream of the course of the Fenny River at the
time of demarcation of the boundary. The boundary in this sector will be
a fixed boundary.
57
8. Rest of Tripura-Chittagong Hill Tracts Sector- The boundary will
follow the mid-stream of that branch of the Fenny River, referred to in
para 7 above, up to Grid reference 009779 (map sheet as in para 7 above)
from where the boundary will follow the mid-stream of the eastern most
tributary. From the source of this tributary, the boundary will run along
the shortest distance to the mid-stream of the stream marked Bayan
Asalong, on the map referred to above, and thence will run generally
northwards along the mid-stream of this river till it reaches its source on
the ridge (indicated by grid reference 046810 on the map referred to
above). From there it will run along the crest of this ridge up to Bhogoban
Trig Station. From Bhogoban Trig Station up to the tri-junction of the
Bangladesh-Asam-Tripura boundary (Khan Talang Trig station), the
boundary will run along the watershed of the river systems of the two
countries. In case of any differences between the map and the ground, the
ground shall prevail. The boundary will be a fixed boundary in this
sector.
9. Beanibazar-Karimgonj Sector- The undemarcated portion of the
boundary west of Umapoti village should be demarcated in accordance
with the agreed basis of demarcation, leaving Umapoti village in India.
10. Hakar Khal- The boundary should be demarcated in accordance with the
Nehru-Noon Agreement of September 1958, treating Hakar khal as a
geographical feature distinct from the Ichhamoti River. The boundary
will be a fixed boundary.
11. Baikari Khal- In the Baikari Khal, the boundary should be demarcated
on the agreed basis and principles, namely, that the ground shall be
prevail, i.e., as per the agreement reached between the Directors of Land
Records and Surveys of West Bengal and erstwhile East Pakistan in
1949. The boundary will be a fixed boundary.
12. Enclaves- The Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and Bangladeshi enclaves
in India should be exchanged expeditiously, excepting the enclaves
mentioned in paragraph 14 without claim to compensation for the
additional area going to Bangladesh
13. Hilli- The area will be demarcated in accordance with Radcliffe Award
and the line drawn by him on the map.
14. Berubari- India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union no.
12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles
approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and
Angarpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area
of 178 metres x 85 metres near „Tin Bigha‟ to connect Dahagram with
Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh.
15. Lathitilla-Dumabari- From point Y (the last demarcated boundary pillar
post on), the boundary shall run southwards along the patheria Hills RF
boundary up to the point where it meets the western boundary of
Dumabari Mouza. Thence, along the same Mouza boundary up to the trijunctions of Mouzas Dumabari, Lathitila and Bara Panthigaon through
the junction of the two Mouzas Dumabari and Lathitila. From this point it
shall run along the shortest distance to meet the mid-stream of Putni
Chara at the time of demarcation, till it meets the boundary between
Sylhet (Bangladesh) and Tripura (india).
58
Article 2
The Governments of Bangladesh and India agree that territories in adverse
possession in areas already demarcated in respect of which boundary strip maps
are already prepared, shall be exchanged within six months of the signing of the
boundary strip maps by plenipotentiaries. They may sign the relevant maps as
early as possible and in any case not later then the 31st December 1974. Early
measures may be taken to print maps in respect of other areas where demarcation
has already taken place. This should be printed by 31st May 1975 and signed by
the plenipotentiaries thereafter in order that the exchange of adversely held
possessions in these areas may take place by 31st December 1975. In sectors still
to be demarcated transfer of territorial jurisdiction may take place within six
months of the signature by plenipotentiaries on the concerned boundary strip
maps.
Article 3
The Governments of Bangladesh and India agree that when areas are transferred,
the people in these areas shall be given the right of staying on where there are, as
nationals of the State to which the areas are transferred. Pending demarcation of
the boundary and exchange of territory by mutual agreement, there should be no
disturbance of the status quo and peaceful conditions shall be maintained in the
border regions. Necessary instructions in this regard shall be issued to the local
authorities on the border by the two countries.
Article 4
The Governments of Bangladesh and India agree that any dispute concerning the
interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully
through mutual consultations.
Article 5
The Agreement shall be subject to ratification by the Governments of Bangladesh
and India and Instruments of Ratification shall be exchanged as early as possible.
The Agreement shall take effect from the date of the exchange of the Instruments
of Ratification.
Signed in New Delhi on May 16, 1974, in two originals each of which is equally
authentic.
For the Government of the
People‟s Republic of Bangladesh
For the Government of the
Republic of India
(SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHAMAN)
Prime Minister of Bangladesh
(INDIRA GANDHI)
Prime Minister of India
Source: The Constitution of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh.
59
Appendix 2
(Translated from the original Bengali version)
Jonoshobha (Public Meeting)
Taluk Kutbhajni (Chhitmohal)
District: Cooch Bihar
Date: 26.1.72
Time: 2.00 pm
In the combined Meeting of the Chhit Taluks, the proceedings of the meeting started
under the Chairmanship of Mofijuddin Sarkar of Kutbhajni Village with the consent of all
members. Whole hearted congratulations and tribute goes to the fighting people and the
government of independent Bangladesh at the beginning of the meeting, and tribute goes
to the valiant martyrs and freedom fighters. Then the meeting condemn the Pakistani
military with serious hatred and resentment for committing barbarian robbery, violence
against women and genocide; and demand for punishment of the criminals.
1. The people of nearly 30 square miles area of India, being detached from the
mainland have been living in a state of lawlessness and misery for more than two
decades in the absence of state administration. After a detail discussion the
meeting decide to form a strong organization named “Chhitmohol Nagorik
Committee (Enclave People Committee)” by the following leaders to lead a
political movement (being in the friend country Bangladesh) for achieving the
status of citizenship. The Committee is being given the supreme authority to deal
with the government for all purposes of the Chhitmohols and to declare any
movement at this end.
2. Name of the Organization: Chhitmohol Nagorik Committee.
For the convenient of the Committee particularly to maintain communication with the
chhitmohols and to deal with the government the Head Office of the Committee is decided to
be set up at Haldibari of Cooch Bihar District.
Md. Mofijuddin Sarkar
President
26.1.72
60
Name of the Members
Name: Member of the Chhitmohol Nagorik Committee
Presidium Members
1. Md. Mofijuddin Sarkar : President
2. Md. Hazrat Uddin Sarkar : Vice President
3. Md. Tofiuddin Sarkar : Vice President
4. Md. Mohammad Ali : Vice President
5. Md. Mohammad Hussein : Vice President
Secretaries
1. Moulana Abu Bakar Sarkar
2. Moulana Mozammel Huq
3. Moulana Shahidul Islam
Members:
1. Moulana Jahiruddin
2. Moulana Akbar ali
3. Moulana Md. Jasharatuddin
4. Sri Gomona Kanto Roy
5. Md. Sultan Uddin
6. Md Afajuddin Sarkar
7. Md. Faimuddin
8. Sri Mohesh Chandra Roy
9. Sri Kistoram Roy
10. Sri Bhot Nath Roy
11. Md Tofel Miah
12. Md. Samir Uddin Sarkar
13. Md Jahurul Huq Pran
14. Sripohatu Ram Roy
15. Md. Hafizar Sarkar
16. Md. Kasir Uddin Sarkar
17. Md. Enamul Huq Prodhan
18. Sri Punoswar Chandra Roy
19. Md. Momir Uddin Sarkar
20. Md. Azizar Rahman
21. Sri Bisweswar Chokrovorty
22. Sri Himadri Bollov Roy Pramanik
23. Sri Upendraw Nath Roy Sarkar
24. Sri Akhil Chandraw Dev Singh
Md. Mofijuddin Sarkar
President
26.1.72
Sri Bimol Kumar Chokrovorty, General Secretary
61
Enclave People Committee (Chhitmohol Nagorik Committee)
Objectives and Duties
1. To help the returning enclave dwellers for rehabilitation who had left their homes
due to the tyranny of the Pakistani military and their associates; to find out the
looted resources of the enclave dwellers and to return them to their original
owners and to evict the illegal occupiers from the enclaves.
2. To place demand to the government for the rehabilitation of the returning refugees
and to help the government at this end.
3. To compel the government to start administration in the enclaves such as the
Village Panchayat, Regional Panchayat, Village Chowkidar etc.
4. To force the government to restart Outpost in the enclaves in order to re-establish
peace and order.
5. To ensure such an arrangement so that the enclave dwellers could regularly move
towards the mainland of India crossing Bangladeshi territory.
6. To establish an arrangement for importation of necessary goods in the enclaves
and for exportation of the agricultural products of the enclaves to India.
7. To force the administration to ensure the fundamental rights of the enclave
dwellers and to resolve the prevailing artificial problems in the enclaves.
8. To force the Indian Government and the concern authorities to establish Primary
and Secondary schools, charitable medical centre and post office in the enclaves.
9. To ensure job facilities for the educated unemployed young people and equal
rights for the enclave dwellers free of communal differences and discriminations.
10. To ensure the right of vote in the election of parliament; to have separate pulling
centre in the enclaves and if necessary to establish a separate constituency for the
enclaves.
11. To ensure such an arrangement so that the Committee could take part in the
election through an effective liaison with the Enclave Refugee Samity in India.
Bangladesh, being freed from the grip of Pakistan is now an independent sovereign state
and as India has recognized it, these two countries have become friends. Hence the
meeting adjourn after congratulating the two great leaders of the two countries.
Md. Mofijuddin Sarkar
President
26.1.72
Published by Sri Bimol Kumar Chokrovorty, General Secretary
On Behalf of the Chhitmohol People Committee
Printed at Ramananda Press, Haldibari
62