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“Middle Power Blues”: Canadian Policy and International Security after
the Cold War
Charles-Philippe David ;Stéphane Roussel
Online publication date: 11 November 2009
To cite this Article David, Charles-Philippe andRoussel, Stéphane(1998) '“Middle Power Blues”: Canadian Policy and
International Security after the Cold War', American Review of Canadian Studies, 28: 1, 131 — 156
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“Middle Power Blues”: Canadian Policy and
International Security after the Cold War
CHARLES-PHILIPPEDAVID and STgPHANE ROUSSEL
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C
anada has recently reaffirmed its standing as a Middle Power. By
taking an important stance on issues such as peacebuilding and the
outlawing of antipersonnel landmines, by promoting a shift to human security, and by supporting the setup of the UN-sponsored international
criminal court, Canadian foreign policy has asserted its traditional commitment to a Middle Power role.’ And it is prepared to go farther; in the
words of the former Director General of the Planning Secretariat at the
Department of Foreign Affairs, “While we have been proud of our respected role as middle power in the past, today, objectively, we are aiming at a global reach. Therefore we think that ‘global’middle power would
fit the bill.”z This ambitious agenda is supported by arguments that
Canada can practice what scholars such as Andrew Cooper and Evan
Potter call “niche diplomacy” in areas associated with the exercise of “soft
power” (information technology is a telling example of a new “niche”);
this would allow Ottawa “to maintain a high profile on the international
~ t a g e . ”These
~
hopes are commendable but will need to confront the
changes brought upon Canadian foreign policy by transformations in the
international system that, in our view, tend to diminish, not increase, the
overall leverage Canada has had (and will continue to have) as a Middle
Power. In the future, Canada may find it more difficult merely to retain
its traditional Middle Power status.
In this essay, we ask and address the following questions: Has the end
of the Cold War ushered in a promising period for Middle Powers seeking
greater influence in matters of internationalsecurity?Or is the new international context likely to put them at a disadvantage?Will current conditions
enhance the influence of Middle Powers committed to multilateralism, mediation, and peacekeeping?Do recent changes in the international system
mean that Middle Powers will have more or less freedom to act?
Two theses may be advanced in response to these questions. The first
holds that the evolution of the international system would appear to create new opportunities for Middle Powers such as Canada. “World conditions have changed radically, at least for the moment. Superpowers are
more likely to welcome middle power mediation,” suggests one former
Canadian d i p l ~ m a t In
. ~ this view, the growth of multilateralism and inThe Americnn Review of CuMdurn S&
(Spring and Summer 1998): 131-156
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David and Roussel
ternational institutions since 1990has considerably broadened the scope
for action of Middle Powers. The reform and enlargement of NATO, the
revival of the OAS, the expansion of UN peacekeeping, peacemaking,
and peacebuilding missions, as well as the ever more pressing need to rethink the role of the UN, represent new opportunities for countries such
as Canada to assert their views. Due to changes in the international situation, a number of key issues promoted by Middle Powers for many years
have found a place on the agenda: for example, human rights, environmental protection, human security, preventive diplomacy, and conflict
resolution. This new international agenda might suggest that Middle
Powers will be called upon to play a leading role in all these different are a ~ Finally,
.~
the fact that these are issues of transnational scope would
seem to indicate that the influence of the Great Powers is diminishing,
since the latter are less likely to be successful in controlling diplomatic
relations between states and in intervening unilaterally when necessary.
Seen thus, interdependence could well make traditional middle-power
policies influential in shaping coalition diplomacy.
A second thesis puts forward a more skeptical view of the possibility that Middle Powers such as Canada can continue to play a significant
role in the international system. Thus, Kim Richard Nossal argues that
“The kind of diplomacy conducted by such classic Middle Powers as
Canada arose from circumstances which no longer exist. It was the rivalry
of the Cold War that prompted the best Middle Power diplomacy.. ..We
are likely to see the death, in the short-term at least, of this kind of Middle
Power.”6 Nossal’s observation is in part confirmed by observers of Canadian involvement in peacekeeping operations-an important sphere of
activity for Middle Powers. Thus, Jocelyn Coulon remarks that “the end
of the Cold War, the collapse of the communist bloc and the proliferation of peacekeeping missions have profoundly altered Canada’s role and
influence in peacekeeping operations.”7 This analysis is confirmed by
others such as Fen Osler Hampson and Joseph T. Jockel, who note that
Canada is faced with growing competition in the area of peacekeeping,
and is therefore liable to be marginalized in the very realm to which it has
contributed more than any other state.*
This thesis is consonant with a systemic analysis of the role of Middle
Powers in the international system. A number of authors draw upon it to
explain why small states sometimes appear to exercise an influence incommensurate with their rank in the “hierarchy of powers.’* Some maintain
that the bipolar system of the Cold War granted Middle Powers greater
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Canadian Poby and International Security ajier t
k Cold War
133
freedom of action and influence, especially in relation to the Great Powers, because it allowed countries such as Canada to gain concessions in
return for participating in an alliance. Indeed, the Great Powers continually sought to strengthen their position, in relative terms, within the strategic balance.” The hypothesis drawn from this is that Middle Powers
have a greater possibility of exerting influence within a bipolar structure
than in a unipolar or multipolar system. Hence, according to systems theorists, the current unipolar, hegemonic system (dominated by the United
States), or any move towards multipolarity, presents far greater difficulties for Middle Powers. This hypothesis deserves attention since it entails
serious implications for both the foreign policy and the defense policy of
a country such as Canada. It also broaches the basic question of why
Middle Powers are likely to see their influence diminish.
How, then, can we understand the position of Middle Powers like
Canada after the end of the Cold War?Are Middle Powers indeed at the
dawn of a “new golden age”?Or,on the contrary, are they in peril of being marginalized and of losing the influence they have succeeded in acquiring over the last fifty years?
In keeping with the second thesis outlined above, we subscribe to
the hypothesis that the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of the
bipolar system have indeed done away with the conditions that allowed
Middle Powers to play a specific role, to distinguish themselves from the
Great Powers, and to extend their influence. To test this hypothesis, we
shall look at the case of Canada, a country which may be seen as the ideal
Middle Power. Canada’s conduct since 1990 with respect to problems of
security, and in particular peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and institutional reform, is indicative of the difficulties faced by
Middle Powers in preserving their traditional role. To do this, we offer a
four-part argument. First, we will review the definition of the concept of
“Middle Power” in an effort, on the one hand, to identify the salient characteristics of states that assume this role and, on the other hand, to ascertain how these characteristicsplay out in the sphere of security.Second,
we analyze how Canada conducted itself during the Cold War and how
it was able to carve out an influential role for itself as a Middle Power.
Third, we examine the recent changes in the international system in order to pinpoint those trends that would suggest a diminished influence
for Middle Powers in the conduct of strategic and diplomatic relations.
Finally, by way of conclusion, we will discuss the impact of these changes
on Canadian foreign and defense policy.
134
D a d and Roussel
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The Concept of Middle Power
The concept of Middle Power dates back to the second half of this
century. The term gained currency in Canadian foreign policy parlance
after the Second World War, while the victors set up the postwar world
order. The need for it reflects a self-assertion on the part of a state that
had contributed significantly to the Allied effort and, given this, resented
the Great Powers’ assumption of privilege within international institutions
(particularlythe UN Security Council). Prime Minister King feared that
Canada would be “relegated to the same rank as the Dominican Republic or El Salvador.””
However, the concept of the Middle Power came to be used as a
catchall phrase and has become fairly problematic.” The term has been
employed to refer to a diverse group of states that do not fit the description of either “Great Powers” or “Small Powers.” It can be applied to a
very heterogeneous group including states as diverse as the Netherlands,
Argentina, Australia, Denmark, Poland, India, Brazil, Canada, Nigeria,
Ukraine, Mexico, and Sweden.” The definition based on quantifiable
measures of power (territory, population, military and economic capacity) is therefore losing currency.
Other definitions based on qualitative factors have been proposed.
For example, a Middle Power may be defined as a state which does not
possess the resources of the Great Powers but does manage to exert significant international influence. This definition begs the question: Why
and how do these states exert international influence beyond their means?
Another qualitative definition postulates that Middle Powers are states
which have significant international or regional interests but do not possess the resources to defend and promote these interests on their own. The
question then is how these states are in fact able to pursue their intemational interests in an effective manner. One possible approach to these
two questions is to study these states on the basis of their behavior and
their tendency towards specialization.’4
One of the first behavioral definitions of different categories of states
was proposed by Robert Keohane more than twenty years ago:
A Great Power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone,
exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system.. .. a Middle Power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact
in a small group or through an international institution; a Small
Canadian Policy and lnmnational Security afrer the Cold War
135
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Power is a state whose leaders considerthat it can never, acting alone
or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system.I5
A behavioral definition assumes a choice by the country’s leadership and a perception by the leaders of their country’s position in the international system. With this in mind, we propose the following
definition: A Middle Power is a state which has significant international
and global interests and defends them by adopting a security and foreign
policy style distinct from that of the Great Powers. Among other things,
this policy style includes the pursuit of policies which seek to promote stability in the international system, a tendency towards specialization,a role
centered on mediation, conciliation, and coalition-building, and a sustained commitment to multilateral institutions. To be sure, Middle Powers are not the only states to adopt the behaviors that make up this policy
style. However, they tend to do so much more frequently and more systematically than others. We shall now consider these roles in greater detail.
Four criteria may be employed to characterize the foreign policy style
of Middle Powers. First, Middle Powers are states that adopt policies designed to preserve and strengthen the stability of the international system. In general, Middle Powers do not seek to radically alter the
international balance of power. They rarely adopt assertive, expansionist, or belligerent policies. They are often weak militarily, susceptible to
the impact of international conflicts, and dependent upon international
trade. Hence, they tend to assume what George Liska calls “a useful international role.”16These states adopt policies designed to rectify situations liable to engender conflict or exacerbate international tensions.
Second, these states tend to focus their efforts in specific areas in which
they have a particular interest or special expertise. Given their relatively
limited resources, Middle Powers rely on their credibility and take advantage of their technical expertise, experience, and the national resources
at their disposal. By intervening in selected niches and with specific objectives, they can extend their influence and occasionally play a leadership rde. Third, Middle Powers can engage in active diplomacy and serve
as mediators, catalysts, and conciliators within the international system;
in so doing, they are able to extend their influence, arrive at solutions to
the problems that concern them, and generally distinguish their actions
from those of the Great Powers.’7 Mediation involves a range of activities designed to reconcile parties in conflict, whether in the context of
armed conflict or simple differences of opinion among allies. The goal of
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David and Roussel
mediation is not only to gamer prestige and international influence, but
also to prevent conflicts from endangering the stability of the international
system as a whole or of a particular region. The role of catalyst involves
facilitating initiatives in the international arena (for example, convening a multilateral conference or tabling an innovative proposal) in order
to draw attention to a specific problem, to induce other concerned states
to take a stand, or to breathe new life into a debate or process of negotiation. Finally, conciliation refers to the full range of activities undertaken
to forge coalitions among states or institutions. Forming coalitions among
international actors, planning joint action, and pooling resources are
sometimes essential to the success of such projects. Moreover, coalitions
provide Middle Powers with a counterweight to the influence of the Great
Powers. Finally, Middle Powers generally tend to act within the framework of multilateral institutions, which are a particularly suitable venue
for the type of active diplomacy described above. These institutions provide a forum where states can make their views heard, express disagreement with the decisions of some of the Great Powers, and build special
relationships with other states.
These elements of the Middle Power policy style are widely recog
nized. The use of behavioral analysis can help to explain why a country
such as Canada has been able to exert significant influence in areas such
as arms control and peacekeeping. However, this approach considers only
a state’s own attributes and is therefore confined to unit level analysis. It
tells us nothing of the relationship between the international environment and the degree of influence a Middle Power can exert. Will the
influence exercised by a state practicing this policy style be constant, regardless of the configuration of the international system, or will it depend
in large part on this configuration?
Kim R. Nossal’s observations, quoted above, and the work of many
“systemists”suggest that the international environment is just as important as a nation’s internal characteristics,if not more so,in explaining why
small and medium-sized states sometimes exercise influence out of proportion to their power attributes.ls Some of these theorists contend that
the bipolar system enables these states to increasetheir freedom to act and
expand their influence, especially with the Great Powers, since they can
win concessions in exchange for their allegiance to one camp or the
other.19 In this view, therefore,a bipolar configuration is more propitious
for the exercise of a Middle Power role than is a unipolar or multipolar
system. Regardless, then, of whether the changes now underway in the
Canadian Poky and lntemational Security after the Cold War
137
international system ultimately lead to a unipolar or multipolar system,
they may well diminish the influence of Middle Powers. Working from
these hypotheses, we will attempt to develop and refine the arguments
made by scholars who believe that the heyday of the Middle Powers is at
an end.
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Canada’s Role as a Middle Power during the Cold War
The approach that, with time and experience, would become
Canada’s Middle Power policy was initially developed by a group of diplomats who had joined the Department of External Affairs in the 1930s
and began to reflect upon Canada’s position in an international system
transformed by the Second World War. Although it was only later that
the main features of this policy were explicitly definedI2’ it exercised an
unmistakable influence on Canada’s conduct in the international arena
well before that time.*’
We need not rehearse the entire history of Canadian security policy
during the Cold War.22A few examples will suffice to illustrate Canada’s
role as advocate of multilateralism, of being an “honest broker,” and international mediator. These examples underscore Canada’s motives for
taking on such functions and shed light on the conditions which enabled
Canada to successfully carry out an influential Middle Power policy.
Not surprisingly, Canada looked to multilateralismand international
institutions as the linchpins of its policy. Given its vast territory, but rather
limited financial and human resources, Canada could not assure its own
defense alone. Orienting its policy towards alliances and institutions for
collective security seemed not only a rational but an incontrovertible
choice.23Moreover, by framing its policy around multilateral institutions,
Canada was in a better position to defend its international interests and
expand its influence within the international system, while still distinguishing itself from the United States and making it harder for that Great
Power to make unilateral decisions liable to threaten Canadian security.
The very active role played by Canadian representatives in the establishment and subsequent reforms of NATO, the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),and the UN indicates the value Ottawa
attached to these in~titutions.~’
Further, Canada often acted as a mediator during the Cold War. It
was primarily within the framework of East-West reIations that Canadian
diplomats played this role, participating in many efforts at rapprochement
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D a d and Rotusel
with the Soviet Union. In 1955, for example, Lester B. Pearson became
the first Western foreign minister to visit the USSR. Furthermore, Canada
often served as mediator within NATO, attempting to conciliate the divergent views of its European and American partners. Finally, Canada’s
role as mediator and conciliator also found expression in Pearson’s contribution to the creation of the Blue Helmets, in the country’s virtually
unfailing participation in every peacekeeping mission, and in the many
efforts to resolve interstate conflicts. On occasion, Canada was also able
to act as a catalyst in some particularly thorny negotiations. The best
known example is probably the monitoring of arms control agreements:
the government offered the expertise of the Canadian scientific community to develop methods of detecting nuclear tests and subsequently led
discussionson a possible test ban treaty.25The discussions on human rights
conducted at the CSCE during the 1980s constitute yet another example.26
We can identify four closely related reasons underpinning Canada’s
desire to behave as a Middle Power during the Cold War. The first is of a
moral or ideological nature, insofar as it relates to Canada’s foreign policy
commitment to the promotion of peace and to a vision of what “good
citizenship” in the international community means. The attitude of the
government and the Canadian public towards international security issues was largely shaped by a desire to contribute to preserving peace and
to advancing the cause of social justice and prosperity in the international
community. Second, this idea of good citizenship reinforced the attachment to certain liberal norms and values perceived as the desirable foundation for international order: democracy, respect for human rights, and
freer trade, among others. This was the international order that Canada
had always sought to maintain and ~ t r e n g t h e n These
. ~ ~ motives informed
the government’s strategic decisions, especially in cases where the
country’s vital interests were not at stake. These values also played a role
internally, by serving to legitimate international actions and to promote
a sense of Canadian identity.
Third, during the Cold War it was in Canada’s interest to play the
role of “champion of peace” and “honest broker.” Canada’s greatest fear
in that period was the outbreak of another global conflict. The Soviet
Union’s development of a nuclear arsenal and long-range delivery systems
(bombers and missiles) jeopardized Canadian security. The government’s
interest in peacekeeping and conflict resolution was thus inextricably
bound up with fear of a nuclear war between the superpowers. From this
vantage point, a policy of mediation was eminently useful insofar as it
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Canadian Policy and InternationalSecurity after the Cold War
139
responded to a real, albeit indirect, threat to Canadian security. As Michel
Fortmann put it, “peacekeeping [seemed to be] a poor substitute for a
collective security system.RZB
The fourth reason was Canada’s desire to
enhance its influence and credibility in the international arena. By playing the role of mediator and serving as one of the main suppliers of soldiers for UN peacekeeping missions, Canada sought to increase its
influence within the UN and in regional security institutions. Moreover,
this approach was likely to win favor and respect from other states,
especially in the Third World-the site of most of the conflicts between 1945 and 1989-and among neutral and nonaligned countries.
Canada thereby found a way to distinguish itself from the United
States without casting doubt on its loyalty to its main ally.29Further,
in some peacekeeping missions (for example, in the Sinai and the
Golan Heights) and mediation efforts (the International Control
Commission in Vietnam beginning in 1964-65), Canadian diplomacy
attempted to reconcile the interests of the United States with those
of a nonaligned or hostile small power.
Experts agree for the most part that Canada’s Middle Power policy
during the Cold War generally served the country well and enabled it to
play a significant role in the international system. A number of factors
account for this. The first is unquestionably related to the bipolar system,
the East-West conflict, and the threat of nuclear war that marked the Cold
War period. Those circumstances created an opportunity and a need for
Middle Powers to step in and play the role of mediator, catalyst, and conciliator. Inasmuch as Canadian efforts at mediation and conflict resolution did not jeopardize their interests, the Great Powers tolerated them
and even welcomed the attempt to achieve rapprochement among the
adversariesand create a more stable climate.30In fact, such a policy could
prove very helpful to the Great Powers in the event of diplomatic deadlock (as in the Suez Crisis of 1956, which sparked a serious disagreement
among the British, French, and Americans).
The Great Powers also allowed Middle Powers such as Canada to
carry out peacekeeping missions, which they considered beneficial to international stability, albeit of secondary importance.” They realized that,
for a number of reasons, a Middle Power was in a better position than they
to carry out interventions of this type. For example, a country such as
Canada was not a protagonist and took no sides in a conflict; the opposed
parties were likely to be far less distrustful of a Middle Power; and the
Middle Power was acting within the framework of a multilateral interven-
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David and Roussel
tion sanctioned by an international institution and placed under multinational command.
Lastly, the conflicts and security problems of the period, by their
nature, gave scope to a Middle Power policy. Because most conflicts were
of an interstate character, there was international interest in mediation
and, once a cease-fire was achieved, in deployment of disengagement
forces with the consent of the concerned parties. Under these conditions,
it was a relatively simple and inexpensive matter to mount peacekeeping
and mediation efforts. Doing so enabled Canada to exercise some degree
of influence in matters of international security.
The Prospects for Middle Powers after the Cold War
While the international situation shaped by the Cold War afforded
Middle Powers such as Canada the opportunity to play a distinct and
active role within a basically bipolar system, the situation changed substantially during the 1990s. As in the case of Canada, it is far more difficult in the current international relations environment for Middle Powers
to maintain their influence and standing. The changes in the international
system are such that the stature of Middle Powers can be expected to
decline and lose much of its lustre in the years to come. This trend is already discernible and may be explained by the combination of a number
of factors which are acting to erode Middle Power influence.
The Nature of the Change
First, the replacement of a bipolar strategic system by one which may,
in the long term, develop into a multipolar system implies a decline in
the influence of Middle Powers?2 During the Cold War, Middle Powers
were able to carve out a niche for themselves in international affairs by
playing the role of mediator and conciliator between the superpowers.
There is less need for such a role today, for Great Powers such as the
United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom (and China to a
lesser degree) no longer formulate securitypolicy exclusively on the basis of
competitive considerations and the prevailing balance of power. The countries of the world no longer fall into distinct camps. Consequently,the bridgebuilding role which Middle Powers such as Canada played is no longer
indispensable, save on rare occasions. The Great Powers now tend to settle
their problems among themselves, and this collaborative approach is all the
easier and more effective in that it does not involve other countries.
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Canadian Policy and InternationaI Security ajier the Coki War
I41
Second, since the actions of the Great Powers are no longer defined
purely by geopolitical factors and the balance of power, the concept of
securityhas so changed that countriessuch as the United States and Russia
now recognize the usefulness of cooperation and mediation processes
within multilateral forums like the UN and even NATO.” In this sense,
security policy has been conducted in a far less unilateral and more collaborative manner since the end of the Cold War.Since the Gulf War of 1991,
the Great Powers have made extensive use of international institutions,
notably in the crises in the Persian Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, Albania,
Rwanda, Somalia,North Korea, and Haiti. This change in norms of conduct
within the international community reflects a new emphasis on cooperative
conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, democratization,and preventive diplomacy. During the Cold War,such initiatives were impeded by the actions of
the Great Powers, and other countries such as Canada had to fill in. Today, a shift is possible because the Great Powers are adopting a style of
conduct which had previously been the preserve of the Middle Powers.
At the same time, with the profound change in international norms of
conduct and the increased need for humanitarian interventions, only the
Great Powers have the means and the logistics to successfully carry out
the policies which the Middle Powers have always advocated. In short,
the Great Powers are now adopting Middle Power practices and achieving more tangible and effective results than the Middle Powers themselves
could ever hope to do during the golden age of Middle Power diplomacy.
Third, as conflicts are now more frequently of an intra-state nature
and security issues have become less military in character and more multidimensional (with economic, ethnic, social, and environmentalaspects),
the actions of the Middle Powers are being scaled back, or at least diluted,
as a result of the Great Powers’ new interest in developing international
policies and security systems to manage these conflicts and problems.”
This trend is strengthened by the emergence of new Great Powers such
as Germany and Japan, which are adopting many typical Middle Power
behaviors. These new Great Powers favor cooperativepolicies and the use
of the institutional mechanisms of international and regional security
organizations. As power becomes more diffuse and the trend towards
multipolarity continues, management of security problems is being devolved to the regional level, further diminishing the stature and usefulness of Middle Powers in the international arena. Under these
circumstances, it is inevitable that Canada should encounter serious difficulties in applying a global policy built on multilateralism.
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David and Roussel
Signs of Change
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The changes in the international system are producing a direct effect on the foreign and security policies of Middle Powers. Their traditional role and stature are being undermined by the new conduct of the
other powers, great and small, within the international system. We shall
look briefly at the most significant signs of change. First, the Great Powers are making greater use of international institutions?* The UN Security Council, which had been paralyzed by East-West rivalry during the
Cold War, has become a much more effective instrument of great-power
cooperation in the management of security issues. This type of institutional cooperation indicates the return of the Great Powers to the arena
of mediation and multilateral negotiation, where they are now much more
active than in the past. The shift is particularly noticeable in conflict
resolution efforts. Moreover, great-power intervention, whether unilateral or multilateral, is now frequently supported by other states. More
active great-power participation in international forums is overshadowing the role of the Middle Powers in those institutions.
Second, the Great Powers are meeting with greater success in persuading Small Powers and securing their support in international affairs.’6
This bandwagon effect is a product of the Great Powers’ enhanced legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of other states. With the exception of a
few special cases (such as Russia and its “near abroad”), Small Powers are
much less fearful of unilateral action and efforts to defend geopolitical
interests by the Great Powers. With the Great Powers’ increased willingness to comply with institutional norms of conduct, Small Powers are more
likely to support multilateral actions led by the Great Powers. This shift
towards coalition-building is eliminating the distinct role of the Middle
Powers as mediators between the Great and Small Powers in the strategic and geopolitical arena. With growing recognition by the Great Powers that security issues have become less nationally focused and more global
and cooperative, they are winning the support of Small Powers by means
of negotiation and persuasion rather than the traditional devices of influence and coercion. As a consequence, Middle Power coalitions for the
purpose of mediating between the Great and Small Powers have become
rather an obsolete concept.
Third, great-power conflict has shifted from the sphere of geopolitical rivalry to the arena of political debates within international institut i o n ~ While
. ~ ~ these institutions appeared ineffectual during the Cold
War, they now serve as forums where the Great Powers can harmonize
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CaMdian Policy and international Security after the Cold W M
143
their security policies among themselves. There is much less need for the
Middle Powers to help mediate differences among the Great Powers, and
their bridge-building role has been scaled back as a result. At the same
time, worldwide confrontation among the Great Powers through proxies
has become a thing of the past. That style of rivalry had created a role for
Middle Powers to step in and defuse potential conflicts. Today, the Great
Powers discuss potential conflicts together in international forums and
there is no reason to fear a resumption of serious great-power rivalry. This
remarkable development marks a success for Middle Power diplomacy but
also means that there is now much less need for such diplomacy.
Fourth, UN international missions, which had been largely the purview of Middle Powers, are now often initiated by the Great Powers.’*
With the proliferation of complex peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and
humanitarian interventions, the control and management of these missions is now often beyond the capabilities of Middle Powers. And the
Great Powers have developed a powerful interest in taking part in such
missions since the end of the Cold War, cutting into the Middle Powers’
maneuvering room. This is a new role for the Great Powers, one which
the Small Powers support wholeheartedly. Thus, with the Great Powers
assuming an increasingly prominent role-politically, militarily, and financially-in UN peacekeeping operations, the Middle Powers cannot
expect to preserve their traditional niche in this area. The international
community recognizes that great-power participation in the UN’s
“Agenda for Peace” is essential;39 otherwise, it is doomed to failure.
In view of these factors, it will be increasingly difficult for Middle
Powers to maintain their stature in the international arena. Their role
may be expected to diminish, and the example of Canada is a clear demonstration of this trend.
Canada’s Middle Power Policy in the 1990s
Fifty years after it was proposed, the concept of a Middle Power
remains a central reference point in the formulation of Canada’s foreign
policy and defense policy. As Tom Keating has observed: “Ona series of
recent issues.. . policy-makers have displayed a preference for working
through multilateral coalitions and under the auspices of international
organizations. The members of these coalitionsmay have changed and the
organizations may have more selective memberships, but the techniques
have remained quite constant over time.’” The continuity of this policy
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David and Roussel
since the beginning of the 1990s can be seen in a number of indications.
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal argue that Canada can serve as a catalyst for
initiatives related to new, primarily nonmilitary, aspects of security. They
adduce the example of Canada’s key role in the negotiations leading up
to the signing of the “Open Skies” treaty in 1990 and its record as an
advocate for human rights, notably in South Afri~a.~’
Canadian policy under both Conservative and Liberal governments
has also upheld the continued relevance of the Middle Power role. At the
dawn of the 1990s,External Affairs Minister Joe Clark proposed the concept of “cooperativesecurity,”which preserves Canada’s commitment to
multilateral cooperation and the broadening of the concept of security to
include economic and social factors.4zThe parliamentary Report of the
Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy of November
1994and the February 1995 Government Statement, Canada in the World,
confirm these priorities and propose a new concept of security, called
“humansecurity,”which must henceforth rest on foundations such as “the
promotion of democracy and good governance, human rights, the rule of
law, and prosperity through sustainable de~elopment.”~~
The government
is attempting to adapt its discourse to new international realities by picking up on the concept of “soft power,” which has been used by scholars
such as Joseph Nye and Felipe Fernandez-Armesto.44In Foreign Minister Axworthy’s words, the concept consists in “the art of disseminating
information in such a way that desirable outcomes are achieved through
persuasion rather coercion.’145
These efforts appear at first glance to support the thesis that the
dynamics of the international system and of new security issues could
enhance Canada’s role and influence. In our view, however, the changes
in the international system which we have discussed represent obstacles
and not opportunities for a country that wishes to maintain a Middle
Power policy.
Multilateralism and International Security Institutions
In recent years, Canadian initiatives in international security institutions have met with less success than they had during the Cold War.
For example, while the plan to create a UN intervention f~rce~~-which
has been one of Canada’s main initiatives-garnered some support from
other Middle Powers, it was met with little enthusiasm by members of the
Security Council. Though none has openly raised objections, some of the
comments from China, France, and the U.S. indicate that these countries
Gmadian Poky and I n t e m a t i d Security a@ the Cold War
145
have re~ervations.4~
Moreover, as some observers have pointed out, this
proposal could have the opposite of the desired effect:
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If its proposal is adopted, Canada’s abiliry to make choices about
international commitments will likely be reduced. Those commitments will be made by others, namely the Security Council and its
five permanent members.... Thus, Canada is likely to find itself increasingly subservient to the wishes and desires of others, primarily
the great powers led by the United States. Paradoxically,a proposal
designed to increase Canadian influence on ideological and functional grounds will have the opposite result.#
Canada has been highly discreet in the discussions on reforming
NATO, which have essentially been a dialogue between the Europeans
and the Americans. The Canadian position was weakened by the 1992
decision to withdraw Canadian troops from Europe, where they had been
stationed since the early 1950s.That move was seen as a unilateral decision, at odds with the Canadian government’s stated commitment to
multilateralism and with NATO r~les.4~
Moreover, Canada may well suffer ill effects from the enlargement
of NATO to include Central and Eastern Europe. It is clear that Ottawa
still has not fully grasped the consequences of NATO expansion. In 1993,
the Canadian government gave unreserved support to the enlargement
process. At the discussions leading up to the Madrid Meeting of 1997,
Canada lined up with the nations that favored admitting all five candidates (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Rumania)
rather than just the three that were ultimately chosen. This position was
consistent with the Canadian government’s conception of the alliance as
an institution dedicated not only to collective defense but also to cooperation in nonmilitary spheres. Some observers also contend that the
admission of new members “would strengthen the voice of smaller countries in the alliance.”5oHowever, the process entails as many risks as potential benefits, insofar as enlargement could, on the contrary, have the
effect of diluting and marginalizing Canada’s influence in NATO as the
organization “Europeanizes.” If the European pillar of the alliance were
to be strengthened, it is unclear how the only North American Middle
Power, which has little clout within the American pillar, could make its
voice heard. At a time when Canada is scaling back its commitments in
Europe, its leaders ought to approach this issue with greater caution than
they have shown to date.
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146
D a d and Roussel
In 1990-91, the CSCE (since 1995 known as the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) seemed to be the institution best suited to serving the aims of Canada’ssecurity policy in E~rope.~’
Despite some professions of faith in the Organization in the 1994 Defence
White Paper, however, it seems clear that Canada has concluded that its
hopes for this institution were vain and no longer intends to play a leading role there. We should also note the failure of Canadian proposals in
1990-91 to initiate and institutionalize a security dialogue in the North
Pacific, and Canada’s undistinguished role in the Organization of American States since it joined the body in 1990.52
Some scholars, such as John Kirton, argue that there is in fact a
“Concert of Great Powers” but that this does not undercut Canada’s influence, for Canada is part of the Concert. Canada’s status is confirmed
by its membership in the G7, which gives Ottawa a say in shaping the
international agenda on both economic and security issues.S3It is not
clear, however, that Canada’s inclusion in the major leagues has had much
practical effect; Canada’s exclusion in 1994-95from the Contact Group
(comprised of four of the seven members of the G7 plus Russia) suggests
that its status in the Concert is not as secure as some in Ottawa would
like to think.
Lastly, the success of the “Ottawa Process,” which led to the signing of the treaty banning antipersonnel land mines in December 1997,
seems to have opened new avenues for the exercise of Middle Power
This success was fashioned by government initiatives
combined and coordinated with pressure from a broad coalition of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), making it one of the first
successful instances of decentralization (if not privatization) in the
pursuit of foreign policy and security policy. In this sense, the process
was both original and promising. However, it may also prove to have
been the exception, and we might question whether it can be repeated
in the future, given that decentralization also means that states have
a diminished capacity to control the parameters of the process. In other
words, the government’s agenda must coincide with that of the other
actors involved, which is not always the case. At a forum held soon after
the signing of the land mine ban treaty, a number of observers expressed
doubt about whether this approach could serve as a model, arguing that
Canada enjoyed exceptionallyfavorable circumstances in this case which
could not easily be reproduced in the future.s5
Canadian Policy and In-
Security after the Cold War
147
Mediation, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping
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As Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal note, the Gulf War clearly illustrated how difficult it is for a Middle Power to conduct initiatives within
the framework of a multilateral operation in which the Great Powers are
directly involved.56In fact, one of Canada’s few actions was an improbable diplomatic mission to convince Cuba (then a member of the Security Council) to join the emerging consensus in the UN.57The post-Cold
War period has generally provided Canada with scant opportunity to distinguish itself. This is particularly true of multilateral peacekeepingoperations.
The complexityof these missions in the post-Cold War world, the extensive
means they demand,and the impossibility of swayingthe protagonists through
traditional mediation methods (especiallywhen these are not backed up with
the threat of force) are diminishing the scope of Canada’s Middle Power
policy. Moreover, as Joseph T. Jockel and Jocelyn Coulon point out, Third
World states are supplying the UN (and even NATO, in the case of its Stabilization Force [SFOR])with peacekeepingcontingents in growingnumbers,
making the participationof Middle Powers, which had been well-represented
on peacekeeping missions, less necessary. Canada’s modest role in multilateral missions in Haiti, Somalia, and particularly the former Yugoslavia
confirms this trend. We shall discuss the Yugoslav case here, since it provides the clearest illustration of the limitations which now apply to
Canada’s role in the security sphere.
We find a number of paradoxical features in Canada’s attitude towards the Yugoslav conflict.58To begin with, the Canadian government
readily committed a fairly large contingent of peacekeepers (over two
thousand soldiers, the fifth largest contingent in the UN force). On the
ground, however, the Canadians exerted little or no influence on
decisionmaking,since very few Canadian officers occupied key positions
in the chain of command-with the exception of General Lewis
MacKenzie (who served as Commander of the United Nations Protection
Forces [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia in the spring and summer of 1992) and
the Deputy Commander of UNPROFOR.
Second,Canada’s military involvement was not guided by any clear
position on how the conflict might be ended and, more precisely, by what
means an end could be achieved. Thus, Canada exercised no leadership
and made no major political initiative of the sort which could have earned
it influence in multilateral discussionson managing the conflict. Ottawa
was largely absent from the decisionmakingprocess and, while it supported
all the peace initiatives put forward by the international community, it
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148
David and Roussel
made no direct contribution to developing them. The most striking illustration of this state of affairs was the fact that, as noted above, Canada was not
included in the Contact Group formed in April 1994 (although Canada did
attend a meeting as an observer in September 1995). Ottawa did not ask to
be part of the group, at least not officially, but the discussions in Parliament
indicated that the politid class was smarting from Canada’s exclusi0n.5~The
parliamentarydebates reflected disappointmentengendered by the obstacles
to pursuing a Middle Power policy in the current situation. In one sign of the
times, Canada was one of the last countries to announce its contribution to
the Implementation Force (IFOR)/SFOR, the NATO force sent to supervise the implementation of the Dayton Accord, signed in November 1995.
In the end, a contingent of twelve hundred was deployed,one thousand fewer
than Canada’s contribution to UNPROFOR.
Canada’s dwindling political role was also highlighted by the Canadian government’sfailure to play its traditional bridge-building role in
NATO and the UN when differences arose between the Europeans and
the Americans on managing the Yugoslav conflict. Canada was shunted
aside not only in matters related to traditional aspects of security but also,
surprisingly, in spheres where it has long made substantial contributions,
such as mediation and peacekeeping.
The record is more positive when it comes to the civilian side of
managing conflicts and implementing peace agreements. Canada spent
C$73 million on humanitarian aid over the 1991-97 period and about
C$28 million on reconstruction programs during the years 1995-97.
Among the most important successes to which Canadian diplomacy contributed was the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT)
to try war criminals and the reinterpretation of SFOR’s mandate to include capturing suspects. It is, however, difficult to gauge the impact of
these measures in terms of influence or image, since these initiatives were,
in large part, carried out through multilateral institutions such as UN
agencies (UNICEF, the World Food Program, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, etc.) or NGOs (the Red Cross, Care Canada).
Although Canada’s experience in the former Yugoslavia indicated
the extent to which Canada had been shunted to the sidelines, in November 1996, in the space of a few days, the crisis in eastern Zaire made
it appear that Middle Powers were making a comeback. The Government
of Canada was basically responsible for creating a multinational intervention force to deliver humanitarian aid to hundreds of thousands of
Rwandan refugees. As a result of its leadership role, Canada was asked to
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Canadian Policy and lntanational Security after the Cold War
149
chair the International Steering Group set up by the main contributors
to the operation. However, the limits of Ottawa’s leadership soon became
apparent. Without the means to determine the number of refugees or to
track their movements, the government became embroiled in a battle of
figures with the US.In the end, the estimates on the need for humanitarian aid were scaled back, undercutting the need for the operation, and
it was finally cancelled on 13 December. Canada was the only state to have
actually placed troops at the disposal of the multinational force. The information and the pressure had come from NGOs. Their mixed success
in this role illustrates the potential problems which the decentralization
and privatization of security can entail in the field.
Domestic Issues and Canada’s International Rok
In the Canadian case, domestic problems have contributed to further undermining the country’s role as a Middle Power. To return to
Keohane’sdefinition, these problems have altered our leaders’perceptions
of our country’s potential role in the international system. To begin with,
Canada has been beset by a crisis of public finances since the mid-l980s,
which is exerting pressure on the government to scale back its participation in peacekeeping missions.60While such missions are proliferating and
growing in complexity, Canada has dwindling resources to devote to defense and, consequently, to UN operations. In this respect, the situation
which prevailed during the Cold War has been reversed.
Moreover, the public consensus has been eroding. The first signs of
unease appeared during the Gulf War in 1991,when almost half the population opposed Canadian participation in the military operation. Misconduct by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia in 1993,
the ineffectuality of the handful of UN personnel in Rwanda in 1994,and
the hazards encountered by UNPROFOR personnel since 1992 have made
an impact on public attitudes towards peacekeeping missions. While support is still strong, the public is more aware of the risks Canadian soldiers
encounter in operations of this type. Public support plunges when the
troops seem to be in danger, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia in
January 1994.61
The erosion of support is also evident among the political class. The
consensus which had prevailed on Canada’s international role since 1956
is being seriously challenged for the first time. In particular, the Reform
party’s repeated calls for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Bosnia
have contributed to growing skepticism about any new peace missions.
150
David and Roussel
In the years to come, this shift in attitude will make it still more difficult
for Canada to maintain a Middle Power policy.
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Conclusion
We have shown the important‘role played by Middle Powers such
as Canada during the Cold War, but also the obstacles to preserving this
role since the beginning of the 1990s. The hurdles have become so numerous that we may wonder whether the very concept of a Middle Power,
as it has been used over the past fifty years, is still applicable to the security sphere. In the coming years, Canada will inevitably need to refocus
its international role. The strength of the Middle Power role lay in its
unique position on the world stage. We must conclude, however, that this
role is no longer unique today. To be sure, the current international system needs mediators, conciliators, catalysts, and peacekeepers more than
ever, but although countries such as Canada have traditionally played this
role, their ability to properly perform this function, at least in the sense
in which it was understood during the Cold War, is waning.
In our view, to define the future role of states such as Canada in the
international security arena, we need to seek new moorings by revisiting
concepts such as “power” and “security.” The nature of current security
problems constitutes a challenge to the sovereignty and the primacy of
the state, notions on which the concepts of power and security were
founded. No longer is a player’s power determined solely by its ability to
play the game of interstate relations, and no longer are decisions and
actions to promote the stability of the international system guided by full
respect for national sovereignty. The operations conducted in recent
years-in Cambodia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia-attest to this development.
The changing nature of security issues and problems is having the
same impact on strategy as growing interdependence and globalization did
on economics. To gain international influence, governments must now
think in different terms; they must have the ability to grasp problems at
many levels (local, national, regional, global) and to negotiate with very
heterogeneous players who are not necessarily operating within a state
framework. It is by developing their capabilities in this sphere-rather
than by clinging to behaviors and policies from a bygone Golden Agethat Middle Powers can hope to preserve a measure of international influence. Increasingly frequent recourse to NGOs (for example, in the
Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War
15 J
Ottawa Process and during the crisis in eastern Zaire) is certainly a first
step in this direction. But the consequences of this decentralizing trend
in the implementation of security policies deserve much greater attention
than they have received thus far.
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NOTES
This is a slightly revised and mostly updated version of an article that appeared
in French in International Journal of Winter 1997. The authors acknowledge permission
granted by the Editor of this journal to reprint this text and to allow us to reach a wider
American readership.
1. A summary of Canada’s recent activities in these areas is offered in Lloyd
Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership,” InternationalJournal 52 (1997): 183-196;for an in-depth analysis see Myriam Gervais and Stephane Roussel,
“De la skurite de l’Etat celle de l’individu:l’bvolution du concept de &curit6 au Canada
(1990-1996),” Etudes interntionales 29 (1998): 25-52. On peacebuilding, see CharlesPhilippe David and Martin Bourgeois, “Le Canada et la consolidation de la paix: une
nouvelle approche pour la politique &rangere canadienne,” forthcoming in Etudes
i n m ’ o n a l e s29 (1998).
2. Ferry de Kerckhove,“Canada’sResponse to Current Challenges,”in Jim Hanson,
ed., World 2000: Conflict, C h s or Ciuili7ation?(Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), 70.
3. Andrew Cooper, “ln Search of Niches: Saying ‘Yes’and Saying ‘No’in Canada’s
International Relations,” Canahan Foreign Policy 3 (1995): 1-14; Evan Potter, “Niche
Diplomacy and Canadian Foreign Policy,”lntemotionalJoumul52 (1997): 38.
4. Canadian diplomat J. Hyndman, “A Time for Middle Powers,” The New Fedpration 3 (1989): 28, quoted by Fen Osler Hampson, “A New Role for Middle Powers in
Regional Conflict Resolution?”in Brian Job, ed., The Insecurity Dikmma: National Security of Third W
orld S m s (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 191.
5.Combining these arguments,Allen Sens wrote: “[NATO’s] expansion could also
provide Canada with an opportunity to engage in such ‘soft’security roles as human rights
monitoring,advising, and peacekeeping mining, which rely more on expertise,with which
Canada is well endowed, and less on military capabilities, of which Canada has fewer and
fewer.” See Sens’s ‘Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance,” I n m ‘ d Journal 50 (1995): 698-699. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim R. Nossal, RelocatingMiddle Powers: Ausrralia and Cmroda
in a Changing World Ordm (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 22.
6. Kim Richard Nossal, quoted by Geoffrey Hayes, “Middle Powers in the New
World Order,” Behind the Headlines 51 (1993-1994): 12.
David and Roussel
152
7. Jocelyn Coulon, Les Casques bleus (Montreal: Fides, 1994), 272. Our translation.
8. Hampson, ibid.; Joseph T. Jockel, Crmada and International Peacekeeping(Toronto:
Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 23-26.
9. Ulf Lindell and Stefan Petsson, “The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research
and Literature Overview,” Cooperation and ConfZict2 (1986): 79-84; Robert 0.Keohane,
“The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Poky 1 (1971): 161-182.
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10. Lindell and Persson, 81; Michael Handel, Weak States in the Intmnatiod Systern (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 194-195.
11. Quoted hy James Eayrs, “Le Canada, puissance de premier plan,” Perspectives
intematiaales 4 (1975): 22. See also John W. Holmes, C u d : A Middle Aged Power
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).
12. Michael Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or SateUite! (Downsview: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1984),3-8.
13. See Bernard Wood, “Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions,” in
Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Inrernationalisrn: The North-South Dimension (Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’sUniversity Press, 1990), 70-107; David R. Mares, “Middle
Powers under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement,” I n r e m a t i d Studies Qwrmly 32 (1988): 453-471; David R. Mares, “Mexico’s
Foreign Policy as A Middle Power: The Nicaragua Connection, 1884-1986,”Lain American Research Review 23 (1988): 81-107.
14. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, ibid. See also David R. Black and Heather A.
Smith, “Notable Exceptions?New and Arrested Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy
Literature,”Canadian]od ofPolitiralScience26 (1993): 745-774;Hayes, ibid. It should
also be noted that some writers challenge the proposition that Middle Powers are behaving differently than other states. See Laura J. Neak, Beyond the RhetoricofPeacekepingand
P e a c d n g : Middle States in International Politics. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1991.
15. Robert 0.Keohane, “Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” InternotionalOrganization 23 (1969): 296.
16. George Liska, “The Third World,” in America and rhe World (Baltimore:Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970), 409-423.
17. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 24-25. This is not to say that these roles are the
exclusive preserve of Middle Powers, but only that Middle Powers frequently rely on these
strategies.
18. Lindell and Persson; Keohane.
19. Handel.
Canadian Poky and IntffMtionalSecurity after the Cold War
153
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20. We find attempts to systematize what a Middle Power policy is in these diplomats’ memoirs and comments on current affairs. See in particular John W. Holmes,
C u d : A Middle Aged Power; John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: CaMda ad the
h c h f o r WorLlorder 1943-1957(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1979and 1982);
Lester B. Pearson, Mike, Vol. 11-Memoirs 1948-1957:The lnmnatimd Yams (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1973);Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott
Reid (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).See also J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa
Men: The Civil Service Ma-,
1935-1957(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982).
21. This point must be made with some caution, however, for the concept of a
Middle Power and the related policies were essentially developed and applied by the
Department of External Affairs. It appears to have exerted far less influence a t the
Department of National Defence, which was partially responsible for the implementation of security policy. Examples of this policy are therefore found primarily in the
diplomatic sphere.
22. See Douglas Murray, “Canada,” in Douglas Murray and Paul Viotti, eds., The
Defense Policies of Nations:A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994 [3rd. Edition]), 57-94,for an excellent overview.
23. In this sense, Canada’sposition may be compared with that ofa number of Small
and Middle Powers in Central and Eastern Europe. On these states, see Allen Sens, “The
Security of Small States in Post-Cold War Europe,” in David G. Haglund, ed.,From Euphoria to Hysteria: WestemEuaropm Security After the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press,
1993),229-252.
24.John W. Holmes, The Shapingof Pence; Escott Reid, Time of Fear ad Hop: The
MakingoftheNorth AtlunticTreury 1947-1949(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977);
Tom Keating, C a d and World order: The Multilaterht Tradition in C h n Foreign
Poky (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993).
25. See in particular Michael Tucker, “Canada and the Test-Ban Negotiations
(1955-1971): in Kim R. Nossal, ed., An Acceptance of Pardox: Essays on C a d i a n Diplomacy in H o ~ u a of
r john W. Holmes (Toronto: CIIA, 1982),115-140.See also Albert
Legault andMichelFortmann,ADiplomacyofHop:CaMdadDismmment 1945-1988
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’sUniversity Press, 1992),359-362.
26. H. Gordon Skilling, “The Helsinki Process,” in Robert 0. Matthews and
Cranford Pratt, eds., Human Rights in CaMdian Foreign Poky (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988),135-158.
27. According to some writers, the ideological and normative dimensions play an
important role in defining the attitudes of Middle Powers. For example, in their study of
Middle Powers, Cranford Pratt et al. focus on what they postulate as these States’shared
view of the world. See for example Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The
Nonh South Dimension (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990).
See also Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 27.
154
David and Rowsel
28. Michel Fortmann, “Le Canada et le maintien de la paix,” in Andre P. Donneur
and Jean Pariseau, eds., Regards sur le systhe de defense du C a d (Toulouse: Presses de
I’Institut d’8tudes Politiquesde Toulouse-Centre &Etudes et de Recherches sur l’Arm&,
1989), 105. Our translation.
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29. Jockel, 13-23.
30. Peacekeeping, mediation, and conflict resolutionoperationscould be conducted
only with the approval of the Great Powers, and only when the Great Powers were not
directly involved. Lyndon B. Johnson’s reaction to Pearson’s criticism of the US. bombing of Vietnam in 1965 is a case in point.
31. We exclude here peacemaking operations conducted unilaterally by one or
another of the Great Powers, with or without a UN mandate.
32. Christopher Layne best makes the argument that the current preponderance
the US. enjoys in the strategic international system will not last and will have to deal
with strong, rising, multipolar trends, in “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing:
America’s Future Grand Strategy,” Inrrmationnl Security 22 (1997): 86-124; see also his
“The Unipolar Illusion: W h y New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17
(1993): 5-51.
33. Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1996).
34. John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Ordm in the New
Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
35. Thomas Risse-Kappen,“Between A New World Order and None: Explaining
the Re-Emergence of the United Nations in World Politics,” Occationul Paper, York
University Center for International and Strategic Studies, No. 29, March 1995.
36. Brad Roberts, U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 120-149.
37. JamesChace, TheConsequencesofthe Peace (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), 169-179.
38. Charles William Maynes, “Relearning Intervention,” Foreign Poky 98 (1995):
96-115.
39. Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda fur Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1995 (2nd edition]).
40. Keating, 19.
41. Cooper, Higgott, and NossaI, 144-162.
Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War
155
42. See David Dewitt, “Cooperative Security: A Canadian Approach to the Promotion of Peace and Security in the Post Cold-War Era,” Cunudiun Defence Quurterly 23
(1994): 11-18.
43. Government of Canada, C a d in the World. Government Statement (Ottawa,
1995),25. See also the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House
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of Commons, Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Cnnada’sForeign Policy: Principks and
Priorities for the Future (Ottawa, November 1994).
44. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lad: The ChangingNatureof American Power (New York:
Basic Books, 1990); Felipe Femandez-Armesto, M i h i u r n (New York: Bantam, 1995).
45. Axworthy.
46. Government of Canada, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability for the United
Nations (Ottawa, September 1995).
47. Isabelle Desmanis and Manon Tessier, “Une capacite de rtaction rapide pour
YONU,” Le maintien de la p i x , Bulletin No. 18 (Septemher 1995).
48. James Fergusson and Barhara Levesque, “The Best Laid Plans: Canada’s Proposal
for a United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability,” IntoMttonalIoumnl52 (1997): 119.
49. See Sttphane Roussel,“Amkre AmCrique. .. L’OTAN et I’intCrEt national du
Canada,” CaMdian Defence Quarrerly 22 (1993): 35-42.
50. Sens, “Saying Yes to Expansion,” 698.
51. Keating, 237.
52. Keating, 238-240; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 155-156.
53. John Kirton, “The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, The G7 and the Halifax
Summit,” Canadian Foreign Policy 3 (1995): 63-79.
54. Bob Lawson, “Towards a New Multilateralism: Canada and the Landmine Ban,”
Behind the Headlines 54 (1997): 18-23.
55. “Table-ronde sur le Processus #Ottawa pour le bannissement des mines antipersonnel” (Ottawa, DFAIT, 5 December 1997).
56. Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 116-143.
57. JocelynCoulon, La demae noisode: La guerre du Golfe et le rSle cacudu C a d
(Montreal: Mkridien, 1992), 71-76.
58. See Andre P. Donneur and Stephane Roussel, “LeCanada: quand I’expertise
e t la craibilite ne suffisent plus,” in Alex Mcleod and Stephane Roussel, eds., Intktt
156
David and Roussel
Mtional et tespmsabilitks
-ni
:Six E m face au conjlit en ex-Yougoslavie(Montreal:
Guerin, 1996), 143-160, for a detailed analysis.
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59. See Debntes of the H o w of Commons, Vol. 133, No. 193,30 November 1994,
8479; 1 December 1994,8550; 9 December 1994,8881; 3 May 1995, 12110-12111;30
May 1995, 13002.
60. In February 1993, a Senate Committee recommended that the government be
more selective in its peacekeeping commitments. See Report of the Standing Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Meeting New ChaIJ.enges: Canah’s Response to aNew Genprarion of Peacekeeping (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1993).
61. Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “CanadianPublic Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World,” intemariodJoumal50 (1995): 370-400.