INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
VOLUME 37, NUMBER 2, AUTUMN 2011
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION
OF WIVES’ INCOME ADVANTAGE*
SARAH WINSLOW
Clemson University
In recent years, a growing body of research has examined the impact of wives’
absolute and relative income on marital quality and stability, yielding somewhat
inconsistent results. However, like much research on the prevalence of wives
who earn more than their husbands, these analyses have not fully accounted
for the dynamic nature of wives’ earnings, particularly their earnings relative
to those of their husbands. The analyses presented in this paper unite research
on the impact of husbands’ and wives’ relative earnings with the growing body
of literature on the prevalence and persistence of wives’ income advantage by
utilizing panel data to examine the relationship between the duration of wives’
income advantage and marital conflict. The results indicate an inverted U-shaped
relationship between marital conflict and the duration of wives income
advantage—the highest levels of conflict are found among those couples in which
the income advantage fluctuates between spouses over a period of years.
The consequences of women’s employment for family life have been the
focus of much sociological research and public scrutiny. One major topic
of interest has been the relationship between wives’ labor market behavior,
particularly their income, and marital quality or stability. The results of
these analyses are mixed, with some finding that wives’ income and
employment stabilize marriage (Schoen et al., 2006), others asserting that
wives’ labor force participation and income increase conflict and
instability (Perry-Jenkins and Folk, 1994; Rogers, 2004; Teachman, 2010),
and still others indicating a curvilinear relationship between wives’ income
and marital quality and stability (Ono, 1998; Rogers, 2004). A growing
number of analyses have focused specifically on wives’ relative income
*
The author wishes to thank Bill Bielby, Mary Blair-Loy, Ellen Granberg, and Jerry A. Jacobs for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. This research was supported in part by a
Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellowship in Women’s Studies and a Clemson University
Department of Business and Behavioral Science Summer Research Grant.
204
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
advantage, yet the body of research on the impact of wives’ proportional
contributions to total income on key outcomes in marriage—namely
marital quality and stability—fails to fully account for the dynamic nature
of husbands’ and wives’ relative earnings, despite recent research indicating
that wives’ income advantages are overwhelmingly temporary rather than
persistent (Winkler et al., 2005; Winslow-Bowe, 2006). This paper expands
on previous research on the impact of husbands’ and wives’ relative
income by utilizing panel data to examine the relationship between the
duration of wives’ income advantage and marital conflict.
Earnings are an important source of power. Feminist theories have
argued that women’s economic dependency is a key mechanism through
which women’s subordinate position in families and the labor market is
created and maintained (Hartmann, 1976; Sorensen and McLanahan,
1993). Wives’ earnings relative to their husbands—and wives’ income
advantage, in particular—provide “insight into the dynamics of marital
power, equity, and challenges to husbands’ prerogatives as the primary
breadwinner” (Rogers and DeBoer, 2001, p. 460). In recent years, a great
deal of popular and empirical attention has been paid to women who
earn more than their husbands. Cross-sectional data indicate that wives
earn more than their husbands in 20 to 30% of dual-earner couples (Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 2007; Winkler, 1998) and, when defined as wives’
earning at least 60% of the total income, between 10 and 12% of all couples
(Raley et al., 2006; Winslow-Bowe, 2009) in a given year. The percentage
of wives earning more than their husbands has increased in recent years.
Among all couples, the percentage of majority or sole earner wives more
than tripled between 1970 and 2001, from 3.7% to 12.1% (Raley et al.,
2006). Data on dual-earner couples indicates a slightly less dramatic,
although still substantial, rise—from 18% in 1987 to 25% in 2003 (BLS,
2007).
Although the bulk of research on wives’ income advantage utilizes
cross-sectional data, recent research indicates that this obscures a sizeable
amount of fluctuation in couples’ relative income over a period of several
years. Winslow-Bowe (2006) finds that, although 16.3 per cent of women
earn more than their husbands in a single year, considerably fewer—5.7
per cent—do so for five consecutive years.1 Similarly, Winkler et al. (2005)
find that 40% of women who earn more than their husbands in a given
year do not maintain that advantage over a three-year period. These data
point to the importance of studying couples’ earnings arrangements as
they develop and fluctuate over time. In fact, in their analyses of female
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
205
breadwinner families, in which they distinguish wives with a persistent
income advantage from those with a more temporary one, Drago et al.
(2005) argue that “the inclusion of the temporary group in studies of
female breadwinning will therefore tend to introduce substantial statistical
noise into the results” (p. 359).
The contribution of this manuscript is two-fold. First, I assess the
theoretical and empirical claims of previous research on the shape of the
cross-sectional relationship between wives’ relative income and marital
duration utilizing data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth. Second, I expand on previous research by examining whether or
not this relationship can be adequately assessed using cross-sectional data.
Specifically, I apply existing theoretical and empirical assertions about
the shape of the relationship between wives’ earnings and marital conflict
to an analysis of panel data, focusing on the impact of the duration of
wives’ income advantage over a period of five consecutive years. In doing
so, I provide a methodological clarification by separating those wives
who temporarily earn more than their husbands from those for whom
an earnings advantage is persistent. In short, while existing research has
either utilized cross-sectional data (Furdyna et al., 2008; Ono, 1998) or
limited its focus to a single shift in earnings dynamics across a two-year
period (Rogers and DeBoer, 2001; Schoen et al., 2006; Teachman, 2010),
I present the first set of analyses that make full use of panel data by
acknowledging the dynamic nature of wives’ income advantage and
examining its relationship to marital conflict.
WIVES’ INCOME AND MARITAL QUALITY AND STABILITY
Marital quality includes satisfaction, happiness, interaction, adjustment,
disagreement, and the likelihood of separation or divorce (Spanier and
Lewis, 1980; see also Fincfiam and Bradbury, 1987; Johnson et al., 1986),
while marital instability encompasses “the gamut of activities from
thinking about and discussing divorce to actually filing for either
separation or divorce” (Booth et al., 1984, p. 567). The analyses presented
here focus on marital conflict, operationalized as the frequency of
arguments over a number of key issues. While many analyses have focused
on divorce as the outcome of interest, I focus on marital conflict for two
main reasons. First, wives’ earnings may have a destabilizing effect even
in couples that remain intact. It is thus instructive to examine the
relationship between couples’ relative income and subjective reports of
marital quality; divorce is, after all, an extreme manifestation of marital
206
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
conflict. Second, Furdyna et al. (2008) argue that controlling for marital
quality in research on income and divorce, as is typically done, “may
obfuscate an important pathway by which divorce occurs – that is,
through the effect of relative income on marital quality” (p. 333). Previous
research indicates four potential relationships between a wife’s income,
particularly her income relative to that of her husband, and marital
conflict: (1) a positive relationship (or independence effect), in which
wives’ earnings are associated with greater conflict; (2) a negative
relationship (or income effect), in which wives’ income is associated with
less conflict or instability; (3) a U-shaped relationship, in which conflict
is lowest among couples with relatively equal earnings; and (4) an inverted
U-shaped relationship, in which conflict is greatest when partners have
similar earnings (see also Rogers, 2004).
A substantial amount of theory and research argues for an
independence effect of wives’ income. That is, wives’ employment and
earnings destabilize marriage, decreasing marital quality and increasing
marital conflict. A number of these arguments are couched in the logic
of gender-differentiated specialization in marriage. Neoclassical economic
theory, as elaborated by Becker (1991) maintains that men and women
in families maximize efficiency and utility by rationally specializing in
the domain in which each has a comparative advantage—paid labor for
men and childcare and household labor for women. Women’s
employment reduces specialization, thus making households less efficient
and more prone to instability. Parsonian functionalism similarly advocates
specialization, with husbands carrying out what he termed the
“instrumental” role of income production and wives engaging in
integrative and “expressive” activities, as a functional necessity for the
maintenance of marriage (Parsons, 1949). While neoclassical economics
and functionalism focus on employment more generally, others have
argued that earnings, particularly wives’ earnings in relation to those of
their husbands, are related to marital conflict. Economic bargaining
models argue that the partner with higher earnings is more likely to get
his or her way in decision-making situations. Earnings enhance one’s
power within marriage specifically because they are portable outside of
any particular marriage, unlike investments in household labor, which
are more relationship-specific (England and Kilbourne, 1990). Wives’
earning are thus disruptive of marital life because they shift the genderdifferentiated balance of power in marriage by giving wives’ greater
decision-making leverage within the relationship and greater opportunities
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
207
outside the marriage. Both, according to this perspective, increase conflict
and instability.
Empirical analyses offer support for the independence effect of wives’
employment. Trends at the aggregate level suggest a positive relationship
between women’s employment and marital instability in that divorce
rates rose at the same time as women’s labor force participation rate
increased (BLS, 2009; Cherlin, 1992; Clarke, 1995). Analyses at the
individual level also provide some empirical support for the independence
effect. Vannoy and Philliber (1992) argue that wives’ reports of marital
quality are lower when their occupational status exceeds that of their
husbands. Perry-Jenkins and Folk (1994) find that, among couples in
which both spouses work full-time in “middle class” occupations, the
proportion of income contributed by the wife is positively related to her
(but not his) reports of marital conflict, while Rogers and DeBoer (2001)
find that increases in women’s relative income are associated with a
decrease in men’s individual well-being. The latter relationship persists
even when controlling for men’s spells of unemployment and declines in
their own income, suggesting that the result isn’t simply due to a decline
in men’s economic position in and of itself. Others link wives’ earnings
directly to divorce. Rogers (2004) concludes that wives’ actual income is
positively and linearly associated with the risk of divorce. Teachman
(2010) specifies the relationship further, arguing that both wives’ absolute
and relative income increases the risk of divorce for Whites. Wives’
earnings appear to be less disruptive to marriage among Blacks, although
when controlling for education, Black women who consistently earn
more than 60 per cent of the family income are more likely to experience
divorce (Teachman, 2010).
While much of the theoretical and empirical literature has focused
on the independence effect of wives’ earnings on marital disruption, wives’
earnings may decrease marital conflict and instability by raising overall
income and thus increasing couples’ quality of life (also known as an
income effect). Oppenheimer (1997) argues that breadwinner-homemaker
specialization is increasingly risky while two incomes offer protection
against economic uncertainty and financial instability. Women’s
employment and income may therefore stabilize marriage, rather than
having the destabilizing effect predicted by bargaining or specialization
models. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to support a negative
relationship between wives’ earnings and marital conflict. Rogers and
DeBoer (2001) find that increases in wives’ absolute and relative income
208
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
between two points in time are associated with increases in their individual
well-being and marital happiness. Similarly, Rogers (1996) finds that, in
remarried couples with three or more children, mothers’ full-time
employment is associated with lower levels of marital conflict. Finally,
Schoen et al. (2006) report that while changes in wives’ employment are
not significantly related to changes in marital quality, wives’ becoming
or remaining employed full time decreases the likelihood of union
dissolution.
A third possibility is that the relationship between wives’ income
and marital conflict takes the form of a U-shaped curve. Much of the
theoretical and empirical research in this area has utilized wives’
proportional (or relative) income as the earnings measure, arguing that
conflict is lowest when husbands and wives have relatively equal earnings
and highest when wives’ proportional contributions are either very high
or very low. This perspective, labeled role collaboration by Rogers (2004),
posits that earnings similarity is associated with similar experiences and
greater collaboration; similarity and collaboration increase affection and
decrease conflict. While less research has focused on curvilinear
relationships than on either positive or negative relationships between
wives’ earnings and marital quality and instability, there is some empirical
evidence for a U-shaped curve. Ono (1998) finds that, controlling for
husbands’ income, the risk of divorce is highest when wives either have
no earnings or high earnings. Kalmijn et al. (2007) find a U-shaped
relationship between women’s relative income and relationship
dissolution for cohabitors only; movement away from equality toward
either male or female breadwinning increases the risk of dissolution for
cohabitors.
Finally, a number of studies have suggested that the relationship
between wives’ earnings—in particular, their relative earnings—and marital
conflict takes the form of an inverted U-shaped curve. That is, conflict is
highest when spouses’ earnings are relatively equal and lowest when either
the husband or the wife earns the majority of the total income. On the
one hand, this perspective is consistent with the argument posited by
proponents of specialization—that couples maximize efficiency when one
partner retains primary responsibility for breadwinning. However, as
reviewed above, classic articulations of this model (e.g. Becker, 1991;
Parsons, 1949) emphasize gender-based specialization, with husbands
maintaining primary responsibility for economic provision. In contrast,
those who argue for an inverted U-shaped relationship between relative
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
209
earnings and marital conflict, which Rogers (2004) refers to as equal
dependence, posit that marital instability is lowest when one partner
earns the majority of the couple’s total earnings because this is when
mutual obligations are highest—regardless of whether the primary earner
is the husband or the wife. In contrast, when partners’ earnings are
relatively equal, each is less dependent on the other and instability is
highest.
Scholars examining the relationship between wives’ percentage
contributions to total income and marital conflict have offered a number
of potential explanations for this relationship. Rogers (2004) argues that,
while in couples characterized by specialization (whether traditional or
reverse), marital roles are more clear, equal resources may require more
monitoring and negotiation. Furdyna et al. (2008) link earnings more
explicitly to power, arguing that variation in marital happiness across
income ratios “may reflect distinctions between having substantial
authority to negotiate roles in the household economy, having no
authority or bargaining power, and occupying a more liminal state (not
dependent, but not in control)” (p. 342). Indeed, there is empirical support
for an inverted U-shaped relationship between wives’ relative earnings
and marital instability. Rogers and DeBoer (2001) find that declines in
husbands’ well-being are most pronounced when their wives earn between
40 and 50 per cent of the couples’ total earnings. Heckert et al. (1998)
find that couples in which the wife earns between 50 and 75 per cent of
household income are substantially more likely to divorce than are other
couples. Similarly, Rogers (2004) concludes that, for couples with low or
moderate levels of marital happiness, the probability of divorce is highest
when the wife contributes between 40 and 50 per cent of the total income.
The analyses presented here test the assertions of each of the above
perspectives on the relationship between wives’ relative income and
marital conflict using both cross-sectional and panel data. In my analyses
of panel data, instead of using wives’ percentage contributions as the key
explanatory measure, I focus on the duration of wives’ income advantage
over a period of five consecutive years, thus further expanding on previous
research. To summarize, there are four potential relationships between
the duration of wives’ income advantage and marital conflict: (1) a positive
relationship, in which conflict increases with each additional year a wife
earns more than her husband (such that the highest level of conflict ought
to be found among those women who consistently earn more than their
husbands and the lowest among those who never earn more); (2) a negative
210
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
relationship, in which conflict ought to be lowest among those couples
in which the wife consistently earns more and highest among those in
which she never earns more; (3) a U-shaped relationship, in which conflict
is highest among those couples in which the wife never, rarely, or
persistently earns more and lowest among those couples in which the
husband and wife share the primary earner role over a period of years; or
(4) an inverted U-shaped relationship, in which conflict is lowest among
those couples in which either the husband or the wife persistently earns
more and highest among those couple in which the husband and wife
share the primary earner role over a period of years.
DATA AND METHODS
The analyses utilize the 1990–1994 waves of the 1979 National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth a national probability sample of young
women and men living in the United States and born between January 1,
1957, and December 31, 1964. The original sample of 12,686 men and
women was interviewed annually between from 1979 to 1994 and has
been interviewed biennially since 1994. Single-year analyses focus on the
1994 wave of data collection (N = 2261); longitudinal analyses examine
the 1990 – 1994 waves of the NLSY79 (N = 1422). The analyses presented
here utilize data from the 1990 - 1994 waves of the NLSY79 for two
reasons2: (1) 1990 was the first year in which the youngest members of
this cohort reached the age of 25, a cut-off used in previous analyses of
wives’ income advantage as signaling the beginning of peak labor force
participation years (Raley et al., 2006; Winkler et al., 2005) and (2) the
NLSY79 became a biennial survey after 1994, thus making yearly
fluctuations in income impossible to determine for latter years.3 The
sample includes both first marriages and remarriages4 and is restricted to
those consistently married to the same partner for the longitudinal
analyses.5 Analyses of marital conflict are restricted to female respondents
only because the survey questions used as indicators of marital conflict
were only asked of women in the sample (see Rogers (1996) for precedent;
see also Perry-Jenkins and Folk (1994) for the effects of earnings on
women’s reports of marital conflict).
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MARITAL CONFLICT
The present analyses focus on the relationship between the duration of
wives’ income advantage and marital conflict. The analyses assess conflict
over nine key issues—household labor, money, showing affection,
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
211
religion, leisure time, drinking, other women, and both partners’ relatives
(separately).6 Specifically, measures of conflict are obtained from female
respondents’ answers to the following questions (respondents were asked
about each area separately): “How frequently do you and [your husband/
partner] have arguments about [chores and responsibilities, money,
showing affection, religion, leisure time, drinking, other women, his
relatives, her relatives]?” Respondents answered using the following
four category options: “never,” “hardly ever,” “sometimes,” and
“often” (measured on a 0 to 3 scale). The analyses presented here use a
summed total of each respondent’s answers to these nine questions
(see Morrison and Coiro (1999) for precedent); the scale thus ranges
from 0 to 27. This measure has an alpha reliability of .74 for single-year
analyses and .75 for longitudinal analyses. Both the cross-sectional and
longitudinal analyses utilize reports of marital conflict collected during
the 1994 wave.
Independent Variable: Husbands’ and Wives’ Relative Income
I use husbands’ and wives’ wage and salary income to compute a measure
of wives’ income as a percentage of couples’ total income for each wave
of data (i.e. 1990–1994).
For single-year analyses, the 1994 data are utilized to create a number
of measures of wives’ relative earnings.
• Wife’s per cent of couple’s total income. This is a continuous measure
of a wife’s income as a per cent of the couple’s total income in
1994.
• Wife earns more than 50% of couple’s income (wife income advantage).
The percentage measure above is used to construct a dummy
variable of wives’ income advantage. This variable is coded ‘1’ if
the wife earns more than 50 per cent of a couple’s total income in
1994, ‘0’ otherwise (i.e. less than or equal to 50 per cent).
• Relative earnings categories. In order to assess the U-shaped and
inverted U-shaped relationships proposed by previous empirical
and theoretical research, I utilize the percentage measure of wives’
income contributions to create a three-category measure of
husbands’ and wives’ relative earnings. More specifically,
respondents are categorized as being in a couple in which the
wife earns less than 40 per cent of the couple’s total income
(neotraditional or reverse specialization), the wife earns at least
40 but less than 60 per cent of the couple’s total income (mutual
212
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
dependence, co-provider), or the wife earns 60 per cent or more
of the couple’s total income (reverse specialization). This measure
reflects that utilized in previous research (Raley et al., 2006;
Winslow-Bowe, 2009).
For multi-year analyses, I utilize wives’ percentage of couples’ total
income to construct a dummy variable of wives’ income advantage for
each wave. This variable is coded ‘1’ if the wife earns more than 50 per
cent of a couple’s total income in a given year, ‘0’ otherwise (i.e. less than
or equal to 50 per cent). This series of single-year dummies is used to
create several measures of wives’ long-term income advantage.
• Number of years a wife earns more than her husband. This is
a summed total of the dummy variables of wives’ singleyear advantage for each wave of data and thus ranges from
0 to 5. It is included in regression models as both a continuous
variable.
• Three-category measure of wife’s income advantage. A final measure
takes the entire five-year time span as a reference point and
categorizes respondents as being part of a couple in which the
wife earns 50 per cent or more of the total income (1) never or for
one year, (2) for two or three years, or (3) for four or five years.
This measure thus groups together those who have a relatively
stable division of earnings (with one category each for an advantage
favoring wives and an advantage favoring husbands) and those
for whom relative earnings are in flux (see Drago et al., 2005;
Winkler et al., 2005; Winslow-Bowe, 2006 for discussions of the
transience and permanence of wives’ income advantage). This is
similar to the three-category classification utilized in single-year
analyses and allows for the consideration of U-shaped
relationships.
Control Variables
Brief descriptions of all control variables appear below. 7
Marital happiness. Overall marital happiness is based on responses (in
1994) to the question, “Would you say that your [relationship/marriage]
is very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy?” While others have used
similar measures as a dependent variable, I use it as a control variable
because (a) the vast majority (approximately three-quarters) of respondents
report that they are “very happy” with their marriages, thus leaving little
variation to analyze and (b) Sayer and Bianchi (2000) convincingly
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
213
demonstrate that relationship quality mediates the negative relationship
between wives’ relative income and the odds of divorce. The measure of
marital happiness is included in the regression analyses as a dummy
variable measuring unhappiness; it is coded ‘1’ if respondents reported a
relationship that is fairly happy or not too happy, ‘0’ otherwise.
Descriptive analyses (Table 1) present a mean measure of marital happiness
for which “not too happy” was coded as ‘1,’ “fairly happy” was coded as
‘2,’ and “very happy” was coded as ‘3.’
Race/ethnicity. This variable measures the race/ethnicity of the focal
respondent; respondents are classified as non-Black, non-Hispanic, also
referred to as White and used as the reference category; Black; or Hispanic.
This measure is the main NLSY79 race/ethnicity variable.
Husband’s income in bottom quartile. In order to assess whether any
disruption caused by wives’ income advantage is conditioned by the
necessity of her income, I include a variable measuring whether a
husband’s income was in the bottom income quartile of men’s earnings.
In single-year analyses this is included as a dummy variable, while in
multi-year analyses this is included as a continuous variable measuring
the number of years that a husband’s income fell in the bottom quartile
of men’s earnings.
Husband’s weekly employment hours. In single-year analyses, this
measure represent the number of hours per week a husband spent engaged
in paid labor. In multi-year analyses, hours worked represents husbands’
average weekly hours worked over the five-year time span.8
Husband’s and wife’s education. Each spouse’s education is measured
using a dummy variable indicating whether or not he or she has a
Bachelor’s degree or more education (coded as 1; those with less than a
Bachelor’s degree are coded as 0).9
Parental status. This measure is designed to capture both the presence
and age of the youngest child in the household. Respondents are coded
as having no children (the reference category), having a youngest child
under the age of six 6, or having a youngest child between the ages of 6
and 17. In multi-year analyses, parental status is measured in the first
year of the five-year period (1990), with an additional control for the
birth of a child (see below).
Birth of a child. This variable is coded 1 if a respondent experienced
the birth of a child between 1990 and 1994, 0 otherwise (see Cowan and
Cowan (2007) for a discussion of the disruptions associated with the
transition to parenthood).
214
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
RESULTS
Table 1 presents means and frequencies for all measures in the analyses.
I focus my discussion here on the independent and dependent measures—
wives’ income advantage and marital conflict. The mean level of marital
conflict in 1994 is 7.58; in the multi-year sample, it is 7.74. To put these
figures in substantive terms, it is instructive to consider that each of the
nine areas of conflict is measured on a 0 to 3 scale, with ‘0’ indicating that
they “never” argue over a given topic, ‘1’ indicating that they “hardly
ever” argue, ‘2’ indicating “sometimes” arguing, and ‘3’ indicating “often”
arguing. This means that the mean level of conflict nears an average of
“hardly ever” for respondents in this sample (in that scores of 7.58 and
7.74 on a nine-item measure is an average of just under one for each
measure).
Table 1 also echoes the results of the growing body of research on
husbands’ and wives’ relative earnings and wives’ income advantage. On
average, women earn approximately one-third of couples’ total income.
Approximately one-fifth of wives (21.8 per cent) earn more than their
husbands in a single year and women out earn their husbands in just
under one year out of five. Sixty per cent of couples are characterized by
traditional specialization in a single year, while just over one-quarter are
mutually economically dependent and approximately 13 per cent exhibit
reverse specialization. When attention shifts to wives’ long-term income
advantage, over three-quarters of women either never ear more than their
husbands or do so for only one year (two-thirds, or 66.42 per cent, never
earn more). The income advantage fluctuates across spouses in
approximately 10 per cent of couples, while 12.36 per cent of women
persistently earn more than their husbands.
Table 2 explores the relationship between three measures of wives’
single-year relative earnings and marital conflict through OLS regression
analyses.10 I present only the final full models including all covariates as
successive nested models produced no changes in the substantive results.
In addition, because the relationship between marital conflict and the
control variables is consistent across models, I first focus on the measures
of wives’ earnings, followed by a discussion of the control variables. The
most notable finding in Table 2 is that wives’ relative earnings—whether
operationalized as a continuous measure of wives’ percentage of couples’
total income (Model 1), a dummy measure of wives’ single-year income
advantage (Model 2), or a three-category measure of spouses’ relative
earnings (Model 3)—are not significantly associated with reported levels
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
215
Table 1
Weighted Means and Frequencies of all Measures. Source: 1990- 1994 NLSY79
1994
Marital conflict
Wife’s per cent of couple’s income
Wife earns more > 50% of couple’s
total income
Relative earnings categories
Traditional specialization
(wife earns <40%)
Mutual dependence
(wife earns 40 – 59.9%)
Reverse specialization
(wife earns> 60%)
Years wife earns > 50% of total
Wife earns > 50% of total:
Never or once
Temporarily (2 – 3 years)
Persistently (4 – 5 years)
Marital happiness
‘Not too’ or ‘fairly’ happy with
relationship
Race/Ethnicity
White
Black
Hispanic
Husband’s income in bottom quartile
(yes/ever)
Years husband’s income in bottom
quartile
Husband’s hours worked
Wife college educated
Husband college educated
Parental status
Children <6
Children 6-17
No children <18
Birth of a child
N
1990 – 1994
Mean
Frequency Mean
7.58
32.60
7.74
Frequency
21.80
60.88
26.35
12.76
0.93
77.25
10.40
12.36
2.72
2.73
25.13
24.57
87.81
6.56
5.63
89.82
5.23
4.95
26.38
40.64
1.19
43.88
44.50
2261
50.12
47.45
51.13
47.66
49.67
33.10
17.23
58.17
17.35
24.45
38.34
1422
216
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
of marital conflict. Other results presented in Table 2 indicate that women
who report being ‘not too’ or ‘fairly’ happy with their marriages report
higher levels of conflict than do women who are ‘very’ happy with their
marriages. Analyses not shown tested the potential mediating effect of
marital unhappiness on the relationship between conflict and wives’
relative income—while unhappiness itself is a significant predictor of
conflict, it does not significantly impact the relationship between wives’
income and marital conflict. Black women report higher levels of marital
conflict than do White women. College-educated women and women
with college-educated husbands report less conflict than do women whose
husbands have less than a Bachelor’s degree, while women with children
under the age of six report greater conflict than do women without
children under the age of 18.
Table 2
Single-year Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of Conflict
Source: 1994 NLSY79
Model 1
Wife’s per cent of couple’s income
Wife earns more than 50% of total income
Relative earnings categories
Traditional specialization
Mutual dependence
Reverse specialization
‘Not too’ or ‘fairly’ happy with relationship
Race/Ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Husband’s income in bottom quartile
Husband’s hours worked
Wife college educated
Husband college educated
Parental status
Children <6
Children 6-17
No children <18 (reference)
Adjusted R2
Model 2
Model 3
0.001
0.222
3.520**
3.522**
0.042
-0.031
3.519**
0.651**
-0.055
0.255
0.0001
-0.329†
-0.678**
0.649**
-0.043
0.185
0.003
-0.346†
-0.686**
0.648**
-0.060
0.283
-0.0001
-0.325†
-0.673**
0.801**
-0.002
0.819**
0.016
0.797**
-0.001
0.167
0.167
0.166
†p<.10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
In sum, contrary to the predictions of each of the four perspectives
reviewed above, the results presented in Table 2 indicate no significant
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
217
relationship—positive, negative, or curvilinear—between wives’ singleyear relative earnings and reported levels of marital conflict. But what
about over a period of several years? Are relative earnings and wives’
income advantage felt cumulatively rather than immediately? Table 3
addresses this issue by examining the relationship between the duration
of wives’ income advantage and marital conflict.
Table 3 presents ordinary least squares regression analyses designed
to assess the four potential relationships between the duration of wives’
income advantage and marital conflict suggested by previous research.
As was the case in Table 2, I present full models containing all covariates
because, in stepwise models not shown, the relationship between the
income advantage measures and marital conflict was not substantively
altered by the inclusion of covariates. This includes marital unhappiness—
contrary to the predictions of some previous research, marital unhappiness
does not mediate the relationship between wives’ long-term income
advantage and marital conflict. Because the control variables operate
similarly in both models, I first summarize the impact of the two key
measures of wives’ earnings advantage, followed by a general discussion
of the relationship between the control variables and marital conflict.
Model 1 focuses on a continuous measure of the number of years a wife
earns more than her husband and is designed primarily to test the income
effect—which predicts a linear, negative relationships between the duration
of wives’ income advantage and marital conflict—and the independence
effect—which predicts a linear, positive relationship between marital
conflict and the number of years a wife earns more than her husband.
Contrary to either of these predictions, the continuous measure of the
length of wives’ income advantage is not significantly related to reported
levels of marital conflict.
Model 2 focuses on a categorical measure of the number of years a
woman earns more than her husband, classifying women as earning more
than their husbands never or for one year only, for two or three years,
or for four or five years. In addition to offering another test of the income
and independence effects, this categorical measure allows for an
examination of U-shaped relationships. The results indicate that women
who earn more than their husbands for two or three years out of five—
that is, couples in which the income advantage fluctuates across partners
over a period of years—report higher levels of marital conflict than do
those who never earn more than their husbands or do so for only one
year. Those who persistently earn more than their husbands report levels
218
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
Table 3
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of Conflict, by Wives’
Long-term Income Advantage. Source: 1990- 1994 NLSY79
Model 1
Years wife earns > 50% of total
Wife earns > 50% of total
Never or once (reference)
Temporarily (2 – 3 years)
Persistently (4 – 5 years)
‘Not too’ or ‘fairly’ happy with relationship
Race/Ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Years husband’s income in bottom quartile
Husband’s hours worked
Wife college educated
Husband college educated
Parental status
Children <6
Children 6-17
No children <18 (reference)
Birth of a child
Adjusted R2
Model 2
0.088
3.547**
0.896*
0.479
3.555**
0.234
-0.130
0.062
0.027*
-0.527*
-0.690*
0.262
-0.102
0.032
0.027*
-0.541*
-0.709**
0.148
-0.329
0.183
-0.301
0.851**
0.171
0.862**
0.173
of marital conflict that are not significantly different from those who
never earn more or do so for only one year.
Across all models of Table 2, those who are “not too” or “fairly”
happy with their marriages report significantly greater marital conflict
than do those who are happy with their marriages. Husbands’ work hours
are associated with higher levels of marital conflict, while husbands’ and
wives’ college educations are associated with lower reported levels of
conflict. Finally, measures of parental status at the beginning of the time
interval under consideration are not significantly associated with marital
conflict—parents, regardless of the age of the youngest child in the
household, do not report significantly different levels of conflict than do
those without children in the home. Those who experienced the birth of
a child during the interval considered in the analyses, on the other hand,
report significantly greater marital conflict than those who did not add a
child to their family.
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
219
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Two major findings stand out. First, comparing the analyses of crosssectional and panel data indicates that a full understanding of the
relationship between marital conflict and wives’ relative earnings,
particularly their income advantage, cannot be gleaned from crosssectional data, nor from longitudinal analyses that measure only a single
change in couples’ relative income. In fact, the cross-sectional data indicate
no significant relationship between wives’ income relative to that of their
husbands, regardless of the operationalization of this measure, and marital
conflict. Moreover, analyses of panel data indicate that attention to
fluctuation in couples’ relative earnings is key. Thus, research on the
relationship between marital conflict and husbands’ and wives’ relative
income must utilize panel data and take into account the results of recent
research indicating that wives’ income advantage is often temporary rather
than persistent (Winkler et al., 2005; Winslow-Bowe, 2006).
Second, the longitudinal analyses offer support for the assertions of a
mutual dependence perspective—marital conflict is highest when the
income advantage fluctuates across spouses over a period of five years.
That is, the relationship between marital conflict and the duration of
wives’ income advantage takes the form of an inverted U-shaped curve.
More specifically, conflict is highest among those couples in which the
wife out earns her husband for two or three years out of five (and, by
extension, a husband out earns his wife for the other two or three years).
I find no support for an independence effect, income effect, or U-shaped
relationship (i.e. role collaboration). In other words, marital conflict does
not increase or decrease linearly as the years a wife earns more than her
husband increase, as would be predicted by the independence and income
effect perspectives, respectively. Nor does a shared income advantage
over a period of years increase similarity and affection, as the role
collaboration perspective would predict.
Why might such fluctuation be disruptive? Two related strands of
theoretical and empirical research suggest potential answers. West and
Zimmerman’s (1987) formulation of gender as a routine accomplishment
of everyday behavior and interaction is useful in understanding the impact
of fluctuation in wives’ income advantage. According to West and
Zimmerman (1987), individuals engage in behaviors that construct gender
and thus appropriately locate themselves in their respective sex category—
they “do gender.” Applying this approach to household labor activities,
they write, “It is not simply that household labor is designated as ‘women’s
220
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
work,’ but that for a woman to engage in it and a man not to engage in it
is to draw on and exhibit the ‘essential nature’ of each. What is produced
and reproduced is not merely the activity and artifact of domestic life,
but the material embodiment of wifely and husbandly roles, and
derivatively, of womanly and manly conduct” (West and Zimmerman,
1987, p. 144). While West and Zimmerman use the example of housework,
one could easily apply the same logic to economic provision. In other
words, husbands’ primary earning, an activity intricately linked to the
husband role, draws on and exhibits their “essential nature.” Fluctuation
in husbands’ and wives’ income advantage is disruptive because it inhibits
the ability of each to exhibit their “essential natures” and perform “wifely
and husbandly roles.” To do gender appropriately, West and Zimmerman
(1987) note, we must do it consistently. Couples in which the income
advantage fluctuates operate under structural conditions in which this is
impossible (at least as far as wage earning is concerned).
The implicit assumptions set forth by West and Zimmerman’s (1987)
articulation of doing gender are made more explicit by another vein of
symbolic interactionist theory. Identity theorists argue that individuals
strive for self-verification—that is, situations in which one’s perceptions
of oneself match the identity standard he or she has established (Stryker
and Burke, 2000). When there is a mismatch between the situational
perception and the identity standard, individuals attempt to produce
alignment (Stryker and Burke, 2000). Identity modification is a gradual
process in which either (1) behavior is modified to change situational
perceptions or (2) the identity standard slowly shifts so as to more closely
match situational perceptions. Two key points are relevant to the topic
at hand. First, identity change, though pervasive, is small and slow
(Burke, 2006). Burke (2006) writes, “Because this process is slow, it is
unlikely to result in much change unless the perceptions are persistently
different from the standard” (p. 93). Second, aligning perceptions with
standards through behavioral modification is not always possible. In
many situations, individual behaviors are constrained by structural
exigencies (e.g. the economy). These structural realities have the
potential to disrupt “the continuously adjusting identity processes”
(Burke, 1991, p. 840). The product of this disruption is distress (Burke,
1991), which Stets and Burke (2005) show can lead to aggression in
marriage.
To apply this to the current analyses, an identity theorist would argue
that the roles of husband and wife carry with them particular expectations.
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
221
These expectations shape one’s identity standard. For example, as would
be predicted by much of the research on gender in marriage, one’s identity
as a wife may involve caretaking and nurturing but not acting as the
primary earner in the household. One’s identity as a husband, in contrast,
may quite likely hinge on fulfilling the breadwinning role (for an
application to fatherhood, see Townsend (2002)). Primary earning on
the part of a wife, then, produces a situational perception that does not
align with the identity standard of either spouse. Identity theorists would
argue that both spouses would work to create alignment between
perceptions and standards by altering identity standards (e.g. by adding
wage earning to one’s definition of the wife identity) or modifying the
situation. Both alternatives are problematic. On the one hand, one’s salary
is largely determined by outside forces outside of one’s control, thus
creating structural barriers to modifying the situation. Thus the remaining
alternative is to adjust one’s identity standard to include, to a greater or
lesser extent, the role of primary earner. As reviewed above, such change
is ubiquitous but slow. Women with a persistent income advantage have
the opportunity to move through this process of identity change,
incorporating greater responsibility for wage earning into their identity
standard with each year that they out earn their husbands. Over time,
then, the identity standard of those with a persistent income advantage
aligns with situational perceptions. Women in couples in which the
income advantage fluctuates (and, by extension, their husbands), on the
other hand, are less able to adapt their identity standards to include
responsibility for wage earning because the perception of themselves as
primary earner (derived from the realities of situation) is not consistent.
The mismatch between situational perceptions and identity standards
thus continues, producing stress that manifests itself in marital conflict.
In sum, the analyses presented here add to the literature on the impact
of wives’ employment on family life by utilizing panel data to understand
how the duration of wives’ income advantage is related to marital conflict.
I find no indication that wives’ single-year income advantage is
significantly related to reported levels of marital conflict. Moreover,
persistent income advantages on the part of either husbands or wives do
not appear to be disruptive. Instead, reported levels of marital conflict
are highest among couples in which the income advantage fluctuates across
partners over a period of years. In these couples, mutual obligations are
lowest and the role of primary earner is contested terrain and this—not
who bears this title—is a source of conflict.
222
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
Notes
1.
These analyses utilize the 1990–1994 waves of the NLSY79, the same data
used in the analyses that follow.
2.
The cross-sectional analyses use 1994 as the focal year because questions
regarding relationship dynamics were only asked in the 1988, 1992, and
1994-2006 waves of data collection.
3.
Analyses not shown indicate that the prevalence and persistence of wives’
income advantage among this restricted sample do not significantly differ
from other, broader samples, suggesting that the results presented here are
unlikely to be substantially shaped by the cohort and year restrictions
imposed.
4.
In analyses not presented, a control for marital order in multivariate analyses
indicated that remarriages do not differ significantly from first marriages.
This control is not included in the final presented models.
5.
Analyses not shown indicate little evidence for a relationship between wives’
income advantage and sample attrition.
6.
While the NLSY79 also contains a measure of the frequency of conflict
over children, this is excluded from the analyses because this question is
necessarily only asked of parents, thus artificially inflating the level of conflict
reported by some members of the sample. However, in analyses not
presented, all models were run using a measure of total conflict including
conflict over children. All substantive results were similar to those presented
here, including all relationships between wives’ income advantage and marital
conflict. The analyses here can be taken as a conservative estimate of the
impact of children on marital conflict, insofar as children are themselves
another arena of potential conflict.
7.
In analyses not presented, controls for wife’s age, marital order, and marital
duration were included; these measures were not significantly related to
marital conflict, nor did they influence any of the substantive results. In the
interest of parsimony, these are not included in the final presented models.
8.
Measures of wives’ weekly work hours are not included as they are highly
correlated with wives’ income.
9.
Additional analyses utilizing a multi-category education measure yielded
substantively similar results; thus, the simpler dummy variable is included
in the analyses presented below. This manner of measuring educational
attainment is similar to that utilized in other research (see, for example,
Goldstein and Kenney, 2001) demonstrating diverging family experiences
by education.
10. Since it could be argued that the dependent variable is categorical (in that it
was constructed from a series of ordered categorical responses), all models
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
223
(cross-sectional and longitudinal) were also run using cumulative ordered
regression. In addition, analyses were conducted on subsets of the dependent
variable (e.g. arguments over chores and money, the two most frequently
reported areas of conflict, only) and utilizing unordered logit estimation
techniques. In all cases, the substantive results remained the same, thus the
simpler single OLS model is presented here.
References
Becker, G. S. (1991). Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Booth, A., Johnson, D. R., White, L., & Edwards, J. N. (1984). Women, Outside
Employment, and Marital Instability. The American Journal of Sociology,
90(3), 567-583.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2007). Women in the Labor Force: A Databook [Data
file]. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2007.pdf
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009). Women in the Labor Force: A Databook [Data
file]. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf.
Burke, P. J. (1991). Identity Processes and Social Stress. American Sociological
Review, 56: 836-849.
Burke, P. J. (2006). Identity Change. Social Psychology Quarterly, 69(1), 81-96.
Cherlin, A. (1992). Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage (2nd ed.). Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Clarke, S. C. (1995). Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990.
In National Center for Health Statistics, Monthly vital Statistics Report, 53(9,
Supplement). Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/supp/
mv43_09s.pdf
Cowan, P., & Cowan, C. P. (2007). New Families: Modern Couples as New
Pioneers. In A. S. Skolnick & J. H. Skolnick (Eds.), Family in Transition
(14th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson.
Drago, R., Black, D., & Wooden, M. (2005). Female Breadwinner Families.
Journal of Sociology, 41(4), 343-362.
England, P., & Kilbourne, B. (1990). Markets, Marriage, and other Mates: The
Problem of Power. In R. Friedland & S. Robertson (Eds.), Beyond the
Marketplace: Society and Economy. New York, NY: Aldine.
Fincfiam, F. D., & Bradbury, T. N. (1987). The Assessment of Marital Quality:
A Reevaluation. Journal of Marriage & Family, 49(4), 797-809.
Furdyna, H. E., Tucker, M. B., & James, A. D. (2008). Relative Spousal Earnings
and Marital Happiness among African American and White Women. Journal
of Marriage & Family, 70(2), 332-344.
224
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE FAMILY
Hartmann, H. (1976). Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex. In
Blaxall, M., & Reagan, B. (Eds.), Women and the Workplace: The Implications
of Occupational Segregation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Heckert, D. A, Nowak, T. C., & Snyder, K. A. (1998). The Impact of Husbands’
and Wives’ Relative Earnings in Marital Disruption. Journal of Marriage and
the Family, 60, 690-703.
Johnson, D. R., White, L. K., Edwards, J. N., & Booth, A. (1986). Dimensions
of Marital Quality: Toward Methodological and Conceptual Refinement.
Journal of Family Issues, 7(1), 31-49.
Kalmijn, M., Loeve, A., & Manting, D. (2007). Income Dynamics in Couples
and the Dissolution of Marriage and Cohabitation. Demography, 44(1), 159179.
Morrison, D. R., & Coiro, M. J. (1999). Parental Conflict and Marital Disruption:
Do Children Benefit when High-conflict Marriages are Dissolved? Journal
of Marriage and Family, 61(3), 626-637.
Ono, H. (1998). Husbands’ and Wives’ Resources and Marital Dissolution. Journal
of Marriage and Family, 60(3), 674-689.
Oppenheimer, V. K. (1997). Women’s Employment and the Gain to Marriage:
The Specialization and Trading Model. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 431453.
Parsons, T. (1949). The Social Structure of the Family. In R. Anshen (Ed.), The
Family: Its Function and Destiny (pp. 173-201). New York, NY: Harper.
Perry-Jenkins, M., & Folk, K. (1994). Class, Couples, and Conflict: Effects of
the Division of Labor on Assessments of Marriage in Dual-earner Families.
Journal of Marriage and the Family, 56, 165-180.
Raley, S., Mattingly, M., & Bianchi, S. (2006). How Dual are Dual-income
Couples? Documenting Change from 1970 to 2001. Journal of Marriage and
Family, 68(1), 11-28.
Rogers, S. J. (1996). Mothers’ Work Hours and Marital Quality: Variations by
Family Structure and Family Size. Journal of Marriage and Family, 58(3),
606-617.
Rogers, S. J. (2004). Dollars, Dependency, and Divorce: Four Perspectives on
the Role of Wives’ Income. Journal of Marriage & Family, 66(1), 59-74.
Rogers, S. J., & Deboer, D. D. (2001). Changes in Wives’ Income: Effects on
Marital Happiness, Psychological Well-being, and the Risk of Divorce.
Journal of Marriage & Family, 63(2), 458–472.
Sayer, L. C., & Bianchi, S. M. (2000). Women’s Economic Independence and
the Probability of Divorce: A Review and Reexamination. Journal of Family
Issues, 21(7), 906-943.
MARITAL CONFLICT AND THE DURATION OF WIVES INCOME ADVANTAGE
225
Schoen, R., Rogers, S. J., & Amato, P. R. (2006). Wives’ Employment and
Spouses’ Marital Happiness. Journal of Family Issues, 27(4), 506-528.
Sorensen, A., & McLanahan, S. (1987). Married Women’s Economic
Dependency, 1940-1980. American Journal of Sociology, 93(3), 659-687.
Spanier, G. B., & Lewis, R. A. (1980). Marital Quality: A Review of the Seventies.
Journal of Marriage and Family, 42(4), 825-839.
Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2005). Identity Verification, Control, and Aggression
in Marriage. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(2), 160-178.
Stryker, S., & Burke, P. J. (2000). The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity
theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63(4), 284-297.
Teachman, J. (2010). Wives’ Economic Resources and Risk of Divorce. Journal
of Family Issues, 31(10), 1305-1323.
Townsend, N. (2002). The Package Deal: Marriage, Work, and Fatherhood in Men’s
Lives. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Vannoy, D., & Philliber, W. W. (1992). “Wife’s Employment and Quality of
Marriage. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 54, 387-398.
West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing Gender. Gender and Society, 1,
125-148.
White, L. K. (1990). Determinants of Divorce: A Review of Research in the
Eighties. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 52, 904-912.
Winkler, A. E. (1998). Earnings of Husbands and Wives in Dual-earner Families.
Monthly Labor Review, (April), 42-48.
Winkler, A. E., McBride, T. D., & Andrews, C. (2005). Wives Who Outearn
their Husbands: A Transitory or Persistent Phenomenon for Couples?
Demography, 42, 523-535.
Winslow-Bowe, S. (2006). The Persistence of Wives’ Income Advantage. Journal
of Marriage and Family, 68(November), 824-842.
Winslow-Bowe, S. (2009). Husbands’ and Wives’ Relative Earnings: Exploring
Variation by Race, Human Capital, Labor Supply, and Life Stage. Journal
of Family Issues, 30(10), 1405-1432.