Citation – Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972 Summary of Argument -­‐ Allison argues that nuclear war was avoided at the last moment by a precarious alliance between Khrushchev and Kennedy and that their sense of impending catastrophe allowed them to help each other to maintain control of their respective government and military machines -­‐ Argues that Kennedy at least was under strong pressure to take action which would not have allowed this alliance to develop from a situation of mutual distrust, and that at least one of the things that persuaded Kennedy to delay direct action was a factual misstatement by the Air Force about the effects of an air strike on Cuba which both Kennedy and the JCS actually favored at the time -­‐ Quite a number of incidents beyond the control of the leaders could have committed them willy-­‐nilly to successive acts which they themselves were not confident of controlling -­‐ The overall point of his book is that positions leaders find themselves are only partially the result of a deliberately conceived line of action and that leaders are the victims of long chains of circumstances beyond their control and prisoners of the systems they are supposed to master -­‐ Analyzes the Cuban Missile Crisis from 3 view points – Rational Action Model, Organizational Process Model and Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics o Rational Action Model § Assumes that governmental actions can be explained in terms of the means which a rational man would adopt to achieve his ends § If you want to understand what another government is doing you observe its actions and infer the intention behind the action from your own reflection on why a rational man would do such a thing § Assumes the state is a unitary actor § Involves unrealistic assumptions about how individuals make choices – perfect information, unlimited time, clear preference schedules etc. § Author argues that governments are not individuals but clusters of organizations, and organizations are not like individuals either, certainly not rational men • They act on imperfect information, under pressure of time, not for the best conceivable outcome but for one that is reasonably satisfactory; but above all they act according to established routines (standard operating procedures) o Organizational Process Model § Looks at decisions as the products of the routine activities of the government departments involved Organizations are defined by the ways they have of doing things – SOPs § Organizations come up with policies which fit within a limited perspective defined by previous experience (military men will give the sort of advice that military men have given before) § They will also act on orders in ways which they have been accustomed to act before, whether or not these ways fit in with the intentions of those giving the order § This model shows how things puzzling or inexplicable in terms of the rational actor model can be seen to flow from the characteristics of the organizations involved • Soviet missile deployment procedures – incomprehensible if one assumes an intention to surprise – make much more sense if one assumes that the Soviet organization concerned just went ahead and did what it always did at home o Governmental Politics Model § Pulls from the PPM (Neustadt, Huntington etc.) § Government is recognized as a congeries of organizations with their own traditions and routines which affect both policy and implementation § Decisions emerge from argument and conflict within and between organizations, partly over who shall do what (organizational survival), and partly because of different perceptions of the problems and the means to deal with them § Decisions will be taken not on the merits of the case but as the result of the conflicting views and interests of a variety of organizations on this and many other questions as well § This model sees government as a continuous process of interdependent decisions which has effects on the relative position and strengths of individual politicians and the constituencies they represent Allison argues that these models are incompatible with one another §
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Significance to Relevant Literature Questions the state as an actor Spawned significant research on BPM and the problem of unified decision making Questions/Problems/Issues Allison seems to give little attention to the Rational Actor Approach but in does indeed play a role o Nations may not be persons but they are legal and moral entities -­‐
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o When Robert Kennedy argued against an air strike on Cuba, his concern was for the reputation of the United States. Everyone understood what he meant, even if they did not agree with him. o Underlies the public language in which politicians must argue and provides the legitimation of their bargains from whatever motives and interests these result Allison says little of “collective manifestations” – morale, panic, terror etc. ß these can play a role on the decision making process and are not tied to rationality, procedures or organizations Rational Actor model assumes everyone knows they are playing the same game o Perhaps it is better used for examining one's own problems of collective decision for both moral and practical consistency What is the major distinction between Model II and Model III? o Organizational process is not limited to formal routines but includes also the informal conventional understandings which can be, and are, modified more or less continually in the process of bureaucratic politics o This tends to merge the models unless Model II is confined to formal aspects only o The 2 diverge in origin – II from sociology and III from psychology Is it true that these models are really incompatible with one another? II and III can almost be merged and I can easily be implied once II and III have been ironed out (once the bureaucracies have fought and a decision is made on what the situation is, formulating policy can be seen as rational)