U S A K Y E A R B O O K
Vol.5, Year 2012, pp. 151-174 ©
ACCOMMODATION OR ASSIMILATION? CHINESE
GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD UYGHUR
MINORITY
M. Turgut DEMİRTEPE* & İzzet Ahmet BOZBEY**
Abstract
The relationship between minority and majority groups in various contexts has the potential to lead to ethnic friction. Some states make use of accommodational policies to overcome this dichotomy, whereas others resort
to assimilatory policies to eliminate inter-group differences. The Uyghur
case typifies the situation where a nation-state assumes assimilatory policies rather than accommodational ones. Against this backdrop, while China
claims to have granted autonomy to the Uyghurs, their autonomy comes
with serious restrictions which reduce the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region to a province under Beijing’s direct rule. In addition, the Chinese
government has, to large extent, adopted an assimilatory approach in the
form of linguistic, religious, economic, and political policies, since Beijing
perceives the Uyghur identity as an existential threat to social and political
order in China. Consequently, the Uyghur issue has been transformed into
an impasse which sometimes escalates to violent clashes between the parties
involved.
Keywords: Ethnic Relations, Assimilation, Accommodation, Ethnic
Group, Ethnic Identity, Uyghur, China.
INTRODUCTION
Ethnic-based problems, varying from non-violent tensions to fierce and
bloody clashes, have become more pronounced in number throughout the
world, particularly, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. From Chechnya
to Sri Lanka and Kosovo, the discrepancy between a minority’s demands
and a majority’s policies has come to occupy a more prominent position in
not only the international agenda, but also in everyday life through increased
media coverage. Corollary to this, the phenomenon of ethnic conflict has increasingly received scholarly interest from academics of comparative politics.
* Assistant Professor, Turkish National Police Academy.
** PhD Candidate, Middle East Technical University, Department of Area Studies.
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It is generally argued that there are two major variations of ethnic majority-minority relationships within the context of nation-states. In the first
case, nation-states pursue inclusive and accommodational policies toward
ethnic minorities, as a consequence of which minority demands are either
satisfied within a democratic polity or, in case they are not met in a satisfactory manner, minority groups tend to carry out their causes using democratic
means. Such accommodational solutions are best observed in either liberal
democracies which guarantee the equality of their citizens regardless of ethnic or faith-based differences among them, or in federal or consociational
regimes which grant the rights to representation for different groups, especially within ethnically and religiously divided societies.1
In the second case, however, nation-states attempt to establish a minority
group’s domination through a strategy of “control,” which translates into
prolonged ethnic friction between majority and minority groups with a tendency to succumb to impasse.2 A strategy of “control” itself can also be
classified into two sets of methods, namely those seeking to eliminate intergroup differences (genocide, forced mass-population transfers, assimilation,
etc.) and those aiming to manage inter-group differences (hegemonic control, arbitration, etc).3
Against this backdrop, China’s relationship with the Uyghur minority
falls into the latter group rather than the former, as Chinese policies have
exhibited a strategy of control rather than accommodation since the Chinese occupation of Xinjiang, which was mostly populated by the Uyghurs
in 1949. In the first step, in an attempt to incorporate the Uyghurs into the
wider administrative framework of China, China recognized the partial autonomy of Uyghurs and created Xinjiang as their national territory. Nevertheless, Uyghur autonomy has remained to this day mostly on paper as Beijing has held the reins in its own hands. Corollary to this, Chinese officials
have followed assimilatory as well as oppressive policies toward the Uyghur
minority on multiple levels including in linguistic, religious, economic, and
political spheres. The assimilatory policies of the Chinese government have
given rise to resistance on the part of the Uyghurs. Furthermore, they have
triggered ethnic tensions between the Uyghur minority and Han Chinese
majority, so much so that the situation has escalated from time to time to ethnic violence. The prolonged tensions led the Uyghur question to transcend
the national borders and become thoroughly internationalized.
1
2
3
William Safran, “Non-Separatist Policies regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive
Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994, pp. 61–80.
Ian Lustick, “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism vs. Control”,
World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1979, pp. 325–344.
John McGarry & Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case
Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993),
pp. 4–37.
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This article first describes the nature of Chinese autonomy in Xinjiang
or lack thereof, and then analyzes the various channels through which Chinese assimilatory policies are carried out. The article also sheds light on
the internationalization of the Uyghur issue since the case also proves that
the unresolved majority-minority relations sometimes may cause the internationalization of local problems. Yet, before doing so, since the Chinese
policy of ethnic autonomy was largely inspired by the Soviet experience,
it would be appropriate to briefly look at political autonomy in the Soviet
Union in order to set the background for the political autonomy in Xinjiang.
AUTONOMY À LA CHINOISE
When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the communist authorities found themselves faced with a demanding minority question, much like the Bolsheviks did in the early 1920s. Therefore, they sought
to emulate Soviet policies to resolve the relations between the majority and
minority groups. The Soviet Union’s establishment in 1924 of Soviet Socialist Republics along ethnic lines has been a model for the Chinese Communist Party in granting ethnic minorities political autonomy. One must bear in
mind here that the Soviet model of autonomy along ethnic lines was also put
into effect in Central Asia, which shares cultural, political, linguistic, and
economic ties with Xinjiang. The Soviet thinking behind this move was that
if the new regime granted ethnic minorities oppressed by the Tsarist regime
prior to the October Revolution political and cultural autonomy, minorities
would reap the benefits of the Soviet regime and become loyal to it. Lenin’s
famous observation that Tsarist Russia was a prison-house of nations at
the turn of the century was an indication that the Soviets were adamant in
following a different path than that of the ancien régime.4 The Bolsheviks
thought that on the one hand the central government would lead the country
to socialism by means of its economic, educational, and other policies which
would equalize conditions throughout the USSR, and on the other hand, the
republics would enjoy a flowering of their national cultures in cooperation
with the center. As a consequence, in the long run, equalizing economic and
social conditions would result in the blending together of nations, and the
blending process in a Marxist state would lead to the creation of a common
socialist identity and culture.5 After all, Lenin argued that “there was no
national content, only national form.”6 In a sense, the Communist regime
expected that what they deemed as “backward,” “pre-modern,” and tribal
4
5
6
Jeremy Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923, (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p. 2.
John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism, (London: Fontana Press, 1994), p. 101.
Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State
Promoted Ethnic Particularism”, Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp.
418-419.
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people of Central Asia would be transformed through political autonomy
and means of indoctrination—such as education and conscription—into
members of modern titular nations and to Homo Sovieticus.
It should be noted, however, that the Soviet policy of autonomy along
ethnic lines was not limited to political autonomy. In fact, the system, at
least in the Central Asian context, had an equally important cultural component that also came with ideological or political baggage: the creation
of separate nations out of various Muslim tribes and giving each a sense
of cultural uniqueness which is very prevalent in the formation of nationstates, almost to the point of a sine qua non status for nations. Therefore,
Central Asian Soviet republics were not only granted political autonomy
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but also their own languages,
alphabets, literature, and even histories, delineating each titular people as a
separate nation with a proper national culture. Corollary to this policy, national culture in each Central Asian republic flourished, giving each nation a
sense of uniqueness among the neighboring peoples. Therefore, political and
cultural autonomy in the Soviet Union was also a nation-building process.
One could also add to this the policy of korenizatsiia (nativization) in which
the cadres of the Communist Parties of each Soviet republic, from the lowest
echelons to the highest, and thus the administrations of the republics, were
transferred to native members.7
To sum up the Soviet policy, the Soviets created and granted autonomy
to Soviet republics where the titular ethnic groups with sizeable populations constituted majorities in the respective territories they lived in. That
is, however, not to say that life was free from the intervention of Moscow
for the locals in the Central Asian Soviet republics. On the contrary, the
federal administration imposed various destructive, repressive, assimilative,
and exploitative policies at economic, cultural, and political levels on the
republics which rendered their relationship vis-à-vis Moscow that between
a colonizer and its colonies. The anti-religious policy of the Soviet regime
was among the most severe of coercive Soviet actions that aimed to destroy
the pre-Soviet identity of Central Asian people.
It was against this backdrop that the Chinese Communist Party adopted
the Soviet policy of political autonomy along ethnic lines in 1949. Accordingly, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established along with
other autonomous regions, including Tibet. However, even a careless look
at the history of Communist China will evidence that the Chinese concept
of autonomy delegated less power to the autonomous ethnic groups than did
the Soviet system since the very establishment of Uyghur autonomy. While
the Soviet Union pursued the nativization policy with regard to the native
7
Georgia Liber, “Korenizatsiia: Restructuring Soviet Nationality Policy in the
1920s”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 1991, p. 16.
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political elites, China from the beginning had no such agenda. Chinese policy, furthermore, had little interest in improving the Uyghur language or
Uyghur culture for that matter. According to Gardner Bovingdon, “Beijing
has allowed Uyghurs almost no independence of action. The party-state has
actively and premeditatedly thwarted the emergence of a political elite in
Xinjiang capable of pressing for Uyghur collective interests [...]”8
The establishment of Uyghur autonomy became possible thanks to the
Communist Chinese policy called minzu, which identified nationalities
within the Republic of China. According to this system, China is composed
of a multitude of nationalities, the minzu, where each co-exist peacefully—
“the great family of minzu.”9 The minzu system, therefore, is there to regulate and facilitate the co-existence of nationalities in China. Accordingly,
“ethnic minorities in China enjoy preferential policies in education, family
planning, judicial treatment and other areas [...]”10 Interestingly, it is the party apparatus which decides what group of people constitutes a nation. There
are currently 56 minzu within China, each having been designated so by the
state. The minzu are equal, at least on paper, to draw a clear distinction and
even contrast between the nationalist policies of the ancien régime and the
Communist Party.11
In the course of time, rights and freedoms granted with the establishment
of autonomy have been taken away step by step as a part of the systematic
assimilation policy in order to clear off the Uyghur identity. In this context,
there have been serious coercion policies regarding language and religion as
the main elements of the historical continuity of Uyghur identity. However,
there are other facets of the assimilation policy of China toward Uyghurs. It
is possible to argue that Chinese policies against the survival of the Uyghur
identity can be examined under four groups: linguistic, religious, economic,
and political policies.
LINGUISTIC POLICY AS A MEANS OF REPRESSION
Language is an important identity marker for the Uyghurs. Uyghur is a
Turkic language, and as opposed to Chinese, a member of the Sino-Tibetan
language family. Uyghur has a rich written literature going back to at least
the 10th and 11th centuries, unlike some other neighboring Turkic languag8
Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent”, Policy Studies, No. 11, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 2
9 Gardner Bovingdon, “The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule
in Xinjiang”, Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2002, p. 41.
10 Shan Wei & Chen Gang, “The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang”,
East Asian Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2009, p. 14.
11 Gardner Bovingdon, “The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule
in Xinjiang”, p. 49.
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es which have oral forms of literature and switched to a written form only
during the 19th century. Therefore, the Han assault on the Uyghur language
constitutes a serious blow to the Uyghur identity. For an outsider, linguistic
repression of the Uyghur identity in Xinjiang is not easy to spot. The Uyghur language has its own alphabet and there are schools and universities
where the Uyghur language is taught. However, these rights and freedoms
remain mostly on paper, or come with serious restrictions. In fact, education in the Uyghur language has been discouraged through several implicit
means. Those students with a limited knowledge of the Chinese language
are at a disadvantage in comparison to their Chinese-speaking peers. Thus,
Uyghur families are tacitly encouraged to send their children to Mandarinonly schools.
Also the government, for the last two decades, follows a systematic policy to increase the number of minority-Han joint schools. The administration
of the autonomous region initially began experimentally setting up a few
minority-Han joint schools in 1960. Though the number of such schools remained limited to 44 by 1984, minority-Han joint schools were encouraged
in the late 1990s. In 2000, there were 461 minority-Han joint schools, but by
2005 the number had risen to 707.12
Chinese officials decided to have all schools in the region conform to
“bilingual education.” However, the term “bilingual education” in the regional context in fact implies a trend toward switching to Mandarin-only
education. In other words, as Schluessel rightly points out, “bilingual education is another means to repress the learning and use of Uyghur language.
In the case of Xinjiang and of China in general, ‘bilingual education’ is a
euphemism for the mandatory increase in the use of Mandarin in minoritylanguage speaking children’s school environments in place of the languages
that are those students’ everyday medium of communication.”13
Indeed, in 2004, the officials announced their plan to merge Uyghur
schools with ethnic Chinese schools, and provide instruction in Mandarin
as much as possible.14 The regional government has a strict policy to have
all Uyghur students able to learn Mandarin by 2020. As a part of this policy,
particularly since 2010, Uyghur teachers who cannot speak fluent Mandarin have been increasingly getting fired from their jobs. The government
especially targeted kindergarten and primary school teachers, nearly 1000
of whom lost their jobs in the last two years. The course materials in these
schools, once published in Uyghur, ceased to exist and are now all published
in Mandarin.15
12 M. A. Rong, “Development of Minority Education and Practice of Bilingual Education in Xinjiang Uyghur Authonomous Region”, Frontiers of Education in China,
Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2009, p. 203.
13 Eric T. Schluessel, “‘Bilingual’ Education and Discontent in Xinjiang”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2007, p. 251.
14 “China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools”, Radio Free Asia, 16 March
2004, (www.rfa.org/english/news/social/2004/03/16/130822).
15 “China: Teachers Fired over Mandarin Ability”, Radio Free Asia, 23 September
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Parallel to this, Uyghur-language schools were closed in some cities, and
replaced with Mandarin-only schools.16 Also, in 2002, Chinese authorities
forced Xinjiang University, which had offered courses in both Uyghur and
Mandarin until then, to stop teaching courses in Uyghur, after which it began
instruction exclusively in Mandarin. Chinese officials justified the initiative
by claiming it would raising the level of education of Uyghur students and
providing them better opportunities of getting a job after graduation.17
Uyghurs, especially overseas groups, fiercely criticized these official
linguistic policies as an effort to eliminate the Uyghur language. Though it
would be questionable to judge the intentions of Chinese officials, it is obvious that the government’s policy to reduce, if not eliminate completely, the
teaching of Uyghur in schools in Xinjiang at all levels would certainly have
a negative effect on Uyghur proficiency among the new generation.
RELIGION POLICY AS A MEANS OF REPRESSION
Religious repression is another dimension of the wider Han policy toward the Uyghur identity. Uyghur identity is firmly embedded in the broader
Islamic culture that has flourished in Central Asia since a millennium ago.
Historical cultural centers in contemporary East Turkistan like Kashgar and
Turfan have had ties with other towns along the Silk Route, such as Bukhara
and Samarqand. This commercial link created a cultural continuum within the broader Inner Asia where Islam had positioned itself as the cultural
medium between traders, scholars, and inhabitants. Within this context, the
anti-religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party can best be described
as an assault on an indispensable component of the Uyghur identity.
While religion is not forbidden throughout China per se, religious people
and religious artifacts are looked upon suspiciously.18 Religions according to
the state are remnants of the “backward” traditions which, as expected from
a positivist ideology, are expected to fade away in the face of modernization.
It is, in the same vein, considered an impediment to society’s progress and
an obstacle to national integration, a prerequisite to establishing a socialist
society. The Chinese understanding of secularism also failed to be inclusive
for freedom of religious practice. Chinese secularism oversteps the boundaries of the public and private sphere, and the state control leaves no room for
even family life.19
2011, (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e8589e123.html).
16 Eric T. Schluessel, “‘Bilingual’ Education and Discontent in Xinjiang”, pp. 251-252.
17 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, “Language Blow for China’s Muslims”, BBC News, 1 June
2002, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2020009.stm).
18 Amnesty International, “China’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”, 22 March 2002, pp. 13-14, (http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/010/2002/en/f8e02362-d873-11dd-9df8936c90684588/asa170102002en.pdf).
19 Marie-Eve Reny, “The Political Salience of Language and Religion: Patterns of
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The state officials also have security concerns regarding Islam, and consider increasing Islamic consciousness as the main source of ethnic nationalism and opposition to the Chinese regime.20 Therefore, the state keeps a
wary eye on Islam. China, to that effect, has established an official body to
regulate Islamic matters, which in fact imposes harsh restrictions on the religious practices of Uyghur Muslims.21 Thus, mosques and centers of Islamic
learning are under the strict control of the state. The official religious body
stringently monitors theological training, the nomination of imams, and Islamic texts, especially religious sermons. The Xinjiang Islamic Religion Institute (Yisilanjiao Jingxueyuan), formed in 1987 to train “patriotic clerics,”
is the sole center responsible for providing imams to all mosques in Xinjiang, yet not unexpectedly lacks the sufficient capacity to meet the needs
of even a scant percent of a Muslim population of approximately eleven
million. All in all, as the imams graduating from this center are considered
“collaborators” by the general Uyghur public, their credibility and influence
on community are so limited.22
Anti-religious policy from time to time gained momentum, as seen especially in the era of the Cultural Revolution and during the mid-1990s. The
government determinedly embarked on the “Strike Hard” campaign in the
mid-1990s to root out, by using violent methods if necessary, ethnic and/
or religious-based activities that were out of state control.23 The campaign
led to a dramatic rise in the numbers of trials and executions in Xinjiang.
As Vicziany clearly puts it, the Uyghurs executed between 1997 and 1999
accounted for between 3 and 4% of all executions in China, though the Uyghurs represent only 1% of the total population.24
The international atmosphere after September 11 also gave allowed the
Chinese government a free hand to further increase anti-religious measures.
Mosque attendance or any display of religiosity is currently highly undesirable for Beijing. Uyghurs under the age of eighteen are not allowed to
20
21
22
23
24
Ethnic Mobilization among Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Sikhs in Punjab”, Ethnic and
Racial Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, March 2009, p. 509.
Michael Clarke, “Widening the Net: China’s anti-Terror Laws and Human Rights
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”, The International Journal of Human
Rights, Vol. 14, No. 4, July 2010, p. 545; Yitzhak Shicor, “Blow Up: Internal and
External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule
in Xinjiang”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp.
126-129.
Amnesty International, “China’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation and Repression in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”, p. 6.
Yitzhak Shichor, “Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism
and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang”, p. 128.
June Teufel Dreyer, “China’s Vulnerability to Minority Separatism,” Asian Affairs:
An American Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 2005, p. 76.
Marika Vicziany, “State Responses to Islamic Terrorism in Western China and Their
Impact on South Asia”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2003, p. 246.
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attend mosques or receive religious education, including private Koranic
study at home.25 Due to severe restrictions on religious practice, Uyghurs
who wish to practice Islam cannot find a job in the public sector, and face
losing their jobs, expulsion from school, and even criminal punishment.26
Religious practices such as prayer or fasting are not permitted for students
even at the university level.27
Though the official rhetoric regarding religion has been relatively liberal
and the Chinese constitution and laws guarantee the right to practice religion
in general, many statements indirectly forbid any religious practice, and
consider it an act in violation of the law. To give an example, for instance,
Article 36 includes a clause prohibiting any religious observance that would
“impair the health of citizens.” This clause, which is open to interpretation,
has been mostly used to prevent fasting during Ramadan. In the same vein,
Article 36 which also prohibits “activities that disrupt public order” is mostly referred to in the ban of almost all religious practices observed in public
such as veiling.28
Members of the party and government officials are required to profess
atheism, and are forbidden from even privately practicing Islam. Those who
insist on participating in religious ceremonies and practice religious rituals have to risk “serious consequences.”29 Considering the prominence of
Islam within the Uyghur identity, it goes without saying, the existing policy
restricts the number of Uyghurs wishing to participate in politics or raise
their voices. This policy has also created a wedge between the general Uyghur public and the local elite which are, in the eyes of ordinary Uyghurs,
perceived as assimilated into Chinese culture.30
25 “Eastern Turkestan: China Bans Officials, State Employees, Children from Mosques”, Radio Free Asia, 07 February 2006, (http://www.unpo.org/article/3699).
See also, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Xinjiang-Uighurs,” in
CECC 2004 Annual Report, 05 October 2004, (http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/uighur/xinannrept04.php).
26 Human Rights Watch, “I. Summary”, in Devastating Blows: Religious Repression
of Uighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005, (http://hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/3.htm).
See also, Graham Fuller & Jonathan Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang”, in Xinjiang:
China’s Muslim Borderland, Armonk, S. Frederick Starr (Ed.), (NY: M.E. Sharpe,
2004), p. 335.
27 Human Rights Watch, “VI. Controlling Religion in the Education System”, in Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005, (http://
hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/3.htm). Approaching Ramadan, local governments
publish lists of warnings on who can fast or who cannot. Accordingly, not only students, but also government employees and teachers are not allowed to fast during
Ramadan. See, Associated Press, “Ramadan a Time of Repression: Chinese Muslims”, 30 September 2008, (http://www.unpo.org/article/8725).
28 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, (http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html ). See also, Kevin Newton, “Requirements of Religion in
Xinjiang NAR”, Monitor: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 16, Special Edition,
2011, p. 43.
29 Graham Fuller & Jonathan Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang”, p. 324.
30 Stephen E. Hess, “Islam, Local Elites, and China’s Missteps in Integrating The Uyg-
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Apart from its obviously distrustful policies toward religions in general,
China harbors a particular tendency to suspect Islam and Muslims. The antiIslamic policy hurts Uyghurs above all, for they not only constitute the largest Muslim group throughout China but, unlike the Hui Muslims, i.e., the
Islam-professing Hans, they are also are a separate ethnic group with a separate religious identity. Interestingly enough, the Chinese government does
not treat all Muslim ethnic groups equally as Hui Muslims enjoy relatively
greater freedom to practice Islam.31
This puts Uyghurs at a very precarious position. Uyghurs, on the one
hand, are suspected by the Hans due to their ethnic consanguinity with the
neighboring Central Asian nations, and on the other are under great scrutiny
due to their religious affiliation. Ethnic Uyghur separatism and even irredentism is a major concern as far as the Communist Party of China is concerned.
Since the Central Asian titular nations became independent, China’s fear of
pan-Turkism has been re-kindled.32 Furthermore, China’s fear of Uyghur
separatism has a religious tone, too. Any attempt by Uyghurs to claim their
Islamic identity meets with suspicion. China maintains that it faces a triple
threat: extremism, separatism, and terrorism, and Muslim Uyghurs are at the
center of the perceived threats to the state.
ECONOMIC POLICY AS A MEANS OF REPRESSION
Economic policies also seem to be directed at serving the Chinese assimilation of the Uyghurs as well as modernization of the region. The Chinese authorities launched the Great Western Development campaign (xibu
da kaifa) in 1999 to “open up” the country’s West to development. Xinjiang
is currently under heavy construction with new roads, railways, and industries to utilize the natural wealth of the region. Alongside economic achievement, official rhetoric also places immense emphasis on the function of the
program providing “social homogenization” within China.33 In the official
imagination, as clearly revealed in the words of Li Dezhu, head of the State
Ethnic Affairs Commission, the Great Western Development program is “a
necessary choice to solve China’s nationality problems under new historical circumstances.”34 In a sense, China assumes that increasing economic
31
32
33
34
hur Nation”, Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2009, p.
77.
Kevin Newton, “Requirements of Religion in Xinjiang NAR”, Monitor: Journal of
International Studies, Vol. 16, Special Edition, 2011, p. 47.
Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties”, The China Journal, No. 44, July
2000, p. 66.
David S. G. Goodman, “The Campaign to ‘Open Up the West’: National, Provinciallevel and Local Perspectives”, China Quarterly, No. 178, June 2004, pp. 326-327.
Michael Clarke, “China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue”,
Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 2010, p. 218.
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growth would improve the living standards of the Uyghurs, and undermine
national sentiments and separatist demands.35 While the state-level belief in
the miraculous “healing” power of economic development over ethnic and
cultural tensions is not unique to China, it is a good indication of how far
Chinese officials are from understanding the cultural or assimilatory roots of
the Xinjiang issue, reducing it to economic ailments.
Within this context, it is possible to argue that there is a two-pronged
assimilatory Han economic policy. On the one hand, Xinjiang has become
a target for an influx of a large number of Han immigrants. On the other,
a high number of Uyghurs are recruited as workers to be employed in the
worker-hungry factories in the East.36 As a result of this deliberate policy,
the Han population in Xinjiang strikingly rose from 6.2% in 1945 to 39.2%
in 2008. In the same period, the Uyghur population dramatically decreased
from 82.7% of the province to 46.1%.37 This is also despite the fact that
the natural growth rates of Uyghur and Han populations have been very
different. For instance, in the 1990s, the rates were, respectively, 20.3 per
thousand and 7.8 per thousand in 1990.38 The most dramatic case of Han inmigration is Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, where the Hans now account
for 95% of the population.39
These policies have been very effective in disturbing the ethnic and demographic make-up of Xinjiang in favor of Hans; so much so that Uyghurs
have now been demoted to a minority position in their own territory, which
compels one to draw a comparison with the Soviet policy of Virgin Lands
that opened the Kazakh steppe to Slavic inhabitation with negative repercussions for Kazakhs at a catastrophic level.40 Han in-migration has been
35 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslims Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China”,
Asian Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2008, p. 17. See also, Stephen E. Hess, “Islam, Local
Elites, and China’s Missteps in Integrating The Uyghur Nation”, Journal of Central
Asian & Caucasian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2009, p. 88.
36 James A. Millward, “Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning
Point?”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2009, p. 347.
37 Anthony Howell & C. Cindy Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey
of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol.
52, No. 1, 2011, p. 123.
38 Nicholas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties”, p. 70.
39 Graham E. Fuller & S. Fredrick Starr, The Xinjiang Problem, Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute, 2003, p.17.
40 Although, ethnic Kazakhs within the territory of contemporary Kazakstan constituted 81,7 percent of the total population in 1897, their percentage dropped to the
level of 30.02 percent until 1959, but increased again to 39.68 percent in the eve of
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nurbulat Masanov, “Ethnodemographic Situation
in Kazakhstan”, in The Nationalities Question in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Natsuko
Oka, et al. (Ed.), (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, 2002), pp. 1-2. See
also Anatoly M. Khazanov, “Ethnic Stratification and Ethnic Competition in Kazakhstan”, in After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Anatoly M. Khazanov (Ed.), (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), pp. 156-173.
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Accommodation Or Assimilation? Chinese Government...
encouraged since the establishment of Xinjiang as an autonomous province,
but has accelerated since the 1980s in harmony with the Chinese economic
reform that had begun in 1978. The Great Western Development campaign
gave further impetus to the trend, resulting in the settlement of significant
numbers of Han in Xinjiang. The acceleration of the Han influx into Xinjiang has come with serious demographic, cultural, and political consequences that have changed the make-up of the province, widening the cultural gap
and alienation between Uyghurs and Hans.41 The Sinicization of Xinjiang
has been executed under the guise of the economic development of the underdeveloped province. In a similar fashion, Uyghurs are being proletarianized outside Xinjiang under the guise of providing ethnic minorities with
job opportunities and fighting underdevelopment.
However, despite all the Chinese efforts to modernize and develop Xinjiang, the region seems to be among the least developed provinces. As a
matter of fact, Xinjiang can hardly be considered underdeveloped, for it
ranked 15th among the 31 provinces of China in terms of GDP per capita in
2008.42 The issue of underdevelopment, therefore, is not about the poverty
of Xinjiang at a provincial level. The “Chinese miracle” that started in 1978
has transformed the country entirely, but Uyghurs cannot benefit from this
change on an equal footing with the Hans. Although Xinjiang has now become a moderately developed province, all the big businesses in the region
belong to Hans, and they have to operate at the margins of Uyghur society
which mostly lives off agriculture and petty trade. Most projects initiated by
the government are concentrated in the north where Uyghurs are considerably less represented, and so mostly local Hans and migrant workers benefit
from job opportunities. Contrarily, the majority of Uyghurs reside in the
cities of the southern part of Xinjiang such as Kashgar and Hotan where
industries and investment hardly ever existed, and so “are living in comparatively backward conditions.”43 For instance, though Kashgar’s population is one third of Urumqi’s, until recent years economic indicators of the
city such as GDP, industrial output, and retail sales were much lower than
that of the capital, about some ten times.44 Only after the deadly July 2009
riots, the government decided to take a balanced approach between the north
and south, and adopted a plan to increase investment and enterprises in the
southern part of the region.45
41 N. Joanne Smith, “’Making Culture Matter’: Symbolic, Spatial and Social Boundaries between Uyghurs and Han Chinese”, Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2002, p.
157.
42 Yuhui Li, “Notes on the Chinese Government’s Handling of the Urumqi Riot in
Xinjiang”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2009, p. 12.
43 Abanti Bhattacharya,“Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3, July-September 2003, p. 368.
44 Ibid., p. 368.
45 Shan Wei & Weng Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges”,
East Asian Policy, Vol. 2, No. 3, July/September 2010, p. 63.
U SAK Ye a r b o o k 2 0 1 2
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Also, Uyghurs who generally have lower levels of education and lower
proficiency in Mandarin are at a disadvantage in competing with the Hans
for resources and jobs. Thus, most companies, especially those privately
owned, prefer to hire the Hans instead of local Uyghurs.46 Uyghurs are as a
result excluded from the industrial job market and the energy service sector,
and so compelled to work in low-paying service jobs and in the informal
sector. The differences in socio-economic status aggravate income inequality between Uyghurs and Hans, providing conditions for fueling ethnic-based
conflict.47 Despite the social and economic marginalization of the Uyghurs,
Han Chinese perceptions are totally different from that of natives in that they
claim the Chinese government has brought social and economic development to the region, and that it follows an affirmative action policy toward
minorities.48 The differentiation of perception nurtures negative attitude toward the “other,” and further increases inter-ethnic tension.
Uyghurs have been crowded out within the process of development and
capitalization. In this respect, it clearly seems that the capitalizing process
increases the socio-economic stratification based on ethnicity. The proletarianization of the Uyghurs has also been detrimental to Uyghur identity,
alienating them even further.49 Mostly young, poorly educated women with
little command of Mandarin have been recruited from the rural parts of Xinjiang for working at factories in east China. According to official statistics,
only in 2007, more than 100,000 Uyghurs, mostly women between the ages
of 16 and 25, migrated from Xinjiang under the government program.50
China claims that this policy helps the most rural and underdeveloped part
of Xinjiang grow wealthier as “migrant workers” send remittances to their
families. Nevertheless, the Uyghur diaspora movement, not unexpectedly,
fiercely criticizes the policy as a systematic effort to forcibly assimilate Uyghur people, pointing out the official conflicting policies that the Chinese
government, on the one hand, supports the movement of huge numbers of
Han migrants to Xinjiang, and on the other forced the Uyghurs, especially
women, regarded as the bastion of a strong and distinct Uyghur culture, to
work in factories in east China.51
46 Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent, p. 39.
47 Shan Wei & Weng Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges”, pp.
59-60.
48 Barry Sautman, “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of
Xinjiang”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, pp. 99-103.
49 Steve Hess, “Dividing and Conquering the Shop Floor: Uyghur Labour Export and
Labour Segmentation in China’s Industrial East”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No.
4, 2009, pp. 403-404.
50 Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), “Deception, Pressure, and Threats: The
Transfer of Young Uyghur Women to Eastern China”, 8 February 2008, p. 2, (http://
docs.uyghuramerican.org//Transfer_uyghur_woman.pdf), cited from, “A Large
Number of Minority Farmers from Xinjiang Go Inland to Work”, Xinhua Net, 2
April 2007.
51 Ibid, pp. 1-2. For a detailed account of Chinese policy on Uyghur women by Rabiya
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Accommodation Or Assimilation? Chinese Government...
Also, it has been argued that China has another motive in transplanting
Uyghur workers into distant, industrialized and predominantly Han regions:
labor segmentation. According to this argument, the displacement of a high
number of unskilled female Uyghur workers with a poor command of Chinese and employing them in Han-owned factories in Han-dominated cities
can be attributed to the factory owners’ desire to erect insurmountable linguistic, cultural, and economic barriers between workers so as to prevent
them from uniting and claiming their rights against the severe working conditions at factories.52
POLITICS AS A MEANS OF REPRESSION
Last but not the least, the Chinese government uses political means to
repress Uyghurs. In doing so, the Communist Party of China employs political instruments both at domestic and international levels. Its political
instruments include a significantly trimmed autonomy of Xinjiang, which
has already been mentioned, and the brutal repression of Uyghur discontent
using military solutions. The many violent clashes between armed forces of
the Chinese government and Uyghur insurgents in the past exemplify the
great lengths the government stood ready to take in order to quell any act of
disobedience or expression of resentment by Uyghurs.
While China’s violent military “solutions” toward Uyghurs abound, no
other example is necessary to illustrate the Chinese brutality than the most
recent incidence of ethnic clashes which started first in Urumqi and soon
spread to the rest of Xinjiang in July 2009.53 Hundreds of civilians were slain
and afterwards thousands of Uyghurs were taken into custody and tortured
under the guise of fighting against terrorism at the demonstrations in July
2009. In the following months, the Chinese court sentenced at least 25 Uyghurs to death over the ethnic unrest.54
Corollary to the repressive policies, China has been in the habit of harassing Uyghur inhabitants of Xinjiang by various means including organizing crack-down operations and drills with large numbers of troops and
Kadeer, the President of World Uyghur Congress, see Rebiya Kadeer, “Uyghur Women and Human Rights”, Human Rights Council, Forum on Minority Issues, Geneva, 29-30 November 2011, available from (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrcouncil/minority/docs/session4/ItemV/Participants/WorldUyghurCongress.pdf).
52 Steve Hess, “Dividing and Conquering the Shop Floor: Uyghur Labour Export and
Labour Segmentation in China’s Industrial East”, p. 404.
53 For a detailed account of the violent events of July 2009 in which different narratives
of the events by Chinese officials and Uyghur and human rights advocacy groups are
mentioned, see Howard Jia, “Xinjiang: Deadly Violence Highlights Deeper Ethnic
Tension”, Chinascope, September-October 2009, pp. 14-19.
54 “Four More Death Sentences over Xinjiang Unrest, BBC News, 26 January 2010,
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8480601.stm).
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police forces.55 Arrests by police of peaceful Uyghur demonstrators are an
oft-seen sight.56
The unwillingness of the Chinese Communist Party to include Uyghurs
within its higher-echelon cadres and reliance instead on Hans in the administration of Xinjiang is another political maneuver through which Han
domination over the Uyghur population is guaranteed.57 The Uyghurs have
little representation in the Xinjiang CCP. Moreover, though China officially
maintains an inclusive policy on regional autonomy, and declared that the
head of an autonomous unit must be a member of the minority group, “none
of the First Party secretaries at any level of the party in the region are from
an ethnic minority.”58 In the regional administration, in a situation where the
Uyghurs are appointed to some of the top positions, they have no real room
to exercise power. In a sense, regional autonomy remains, as Binh G. Phan
aptly calls it, “paper autonomy.”59
To top it all, the Chinese government puts in force a most strict form of
censorship over reporting matters concerning Uyghurs and Uyghur discontent, or that of Tibet for that matter.60 Thus, the international community is
but left with a small venue of accurate and reliable communication with
Xinjiang, as the rest of the world is condemned to Xinhua, the state-owned
Chinese news agency, as the source of information regarding Xinjiang. The
world media, thus, is to suffice with what modicum of information the expatriate Uyghur groups and international human rights groups can glean
from Xinjiang and China. Consequently, the grievous events in Urumqi in
July 2009 were covered by the media, Chinese and international alike, in a
disturbingly one-sided and distorted manner. While the violent attacks by
Uyghur rioters on Han Chinese and private and government property were
broadly covered in the Chinese and international media, another aspect of
the events of the evening and night of July 5 is hardly documented in the
press at all: clashes of Uyghur protestors or rioters with police, armed police,
and military forces in the course of the repression of the riot.61
55 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslims Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China”,
p. 20.
56 Ibid., p. 21.
57 Matthew Moneyhon D., “Taming China’s ‘Wild West’: Ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang”,
Peace, Conflict, and Development, No. 5, July 2004, p. 12.
58 Michael Clarke, “China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue”,
p. 220.
59 Abanti Bhattacharya,“Conceptualising Uyghur Separatism in Chinese Nationalism”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3, July-September 2003, p. 366, cited from
Binh G. Phan, “How Autonomous is the National Autonomous Areas of the PRC?
An Analysis of Documents and Cases”, Issues and Studies, No. 35, July 1996, no.
35, p. 84.
60 “In China, Reporting on Tibetan and Uighur Unrest is Nearly Impossible”, Christian Science Monitor, 2 March 2012, (http://www.csmonitor.com/World/GlobalNews/2012/0302/In-China-reporting-on-Tibetan-and-Uighur-unrest-is-nearlyimpossible).
61 James A. Millward, “Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning
Point?”, p. 352.
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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE XINJIANG ISSUE
By the term “internationalization of the Xinjiang issue” we refer to the
carrying by the parties involved, that is, the government of China, Uyghurs,
and human rights groups, of the issue to the attention of international actors,
be it the international community in general or international organizations
and individual countries with an aim to recruit their support for their respective causes. Therefore, the internationalization of the issue can be attributed
to at least three parties: the government of China, Uyghur activists and international human rights groups, and other international actors. The last twenty
years indicate that each aforementioned party has carried the Xinjiang issue
to the attention of the international community and somewhat realized their
respective expectations in the internationalization of the Xinjiang issue with
varying degrees of success.
The political repression of Uyghurs is also carried out at the international
level in tandem with the repressive and assimilatory domestic policies. To
circumspect eyes, China is one of the few countries that has truly comprehended the vitality of presenting the domestic ethnic and religious clashes
to the international community within the context of 9/11 events and the
subsequent “war on terrorism.” Following the 9/11 events, China carried
out a witch-hunt campaign in which thousands of Uyghurs were arrested or
detained between 2001 and 2005 under the flag of the war on terrorism.62
China has reaped well the benefits of the sensitivity of international community to terrorism and Islamic extremism.
It is reasonable to argue that China’s heightened interest in carrying the
Uyghur issue to the attention of the international community has a lot to
do with its desire to counter the international community’s increasing responsiveness to the plight of Uyghurs. Therefore, China wishes to convey
to the Western world its own “point of view” in response to the allegations
of Uyghurs living abroad regarding violations of human rights in Xinjiang.
China positions its assimilatory methods within the context of the war on
terrorism and fight against radical Islamic terrorist groups. To that effect,
China asserts that the disgruntled Uyghurs, who express from time to time
their discontent with and resentment toward assimilatory Chinese policies,
are Islamic terrorists attempting to derail stability in the region and create
an Uyghur state where radical Islamism will dominate. A great majority of
the said restive Uyghurs are in fact non-violent people who demand nothing
but equality, democracy, and respect for human rights. There is growing tendency among human rights groups to acknowledge that China “makes little
62 Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Uighurs Fleeing Persecution
as China Wages its ‘War on Terror’”, 6 July 2004, pp. 9-10 (http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/asset/ASA17/021/2004/en/47e9cf33-d5cd-11dd-bb24-1fb85fe8fa05/
asa170212004en.pdf); and Human Rights Watch, “Devastating Blows: Religious
Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang”, 1 April 2005, pp. 4-5, (http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/42c3bcf20.html).
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distinction between separatists, terrorists and civil rights activists—whether
they are Uyghurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese or Falungong Buddhists.”63 China
attempts to bolster its hyperbolic claims with suggesting links between Uyghur dissidents and international terrorist organizations like al-Qaida and the
Taliban.64 While the accuracy of these claims remains highly questionable
and should be taken with a grain of salt, the damage is done, as the mere
suggestion of such connections tips the international community away from
Uyghurs toward the Chinese government. This tactic works particularly
well with the United States and its allies who have waged a war against the
aforementioned terrorist groups. There are, furthermore, experts who argue
that “unlike the impression created both before and certainly after 9/11 of a
rise in terrorist activity in Xinjiang—and a corresponding retaliation by the
Chinese—Uyghur militancy and violent confrontations have substantially
declined since 1997.”65 However, China musters yet another weapon against
Uyghur opposition: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is China’s most important international tool in justifying its assimilatory policies toward Xinjiang. Under
the leadership of China and Russia, with the participation of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the Shanghai Five was established in 1996 and
transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with the participation of Uzbekistan in 2001. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was
founded as a security organization against “secessionism, terrorism, and extremism” which China refers to as “three evil powers”, and the Xinjiang
issue constitutes its most important agenda topic.66 China, with the identification of the Xinjiang issue with secessionism, terrorism, and extremism
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, tries to avert the criticisms
of its coercive policies. In this context, it is evident that China efficiently
uses the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a political instrument in the
framework of its own interest. In fact, in the declaration of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization which hosts three countries containing Uyghur
diasporas (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) and an additional three
other republics, it is stated that the incidents which took place in Urumqi
in July 2009 and the government’s harsh involvement against it are seen
as “China’s internal affairs,”67 and corollary to this statement, the Chinese
government’s modus operandi is approved.68
63 Dru C. Gladney, “China’s Minorities: The Case of Xinjiang and the Uyghur People”,
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 5 May 2003, p. 1.
64 David Kerr & Laura C. Swinton, “China, Xinjiang, and The Transnational Security
of Central Asia”, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2008, p. 119.
65 Yitzhak Shichor, “Blow Up: Internal and External Callenges of Uyghur Separatism
and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang”, p. 124.
66 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslims Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China”,
p. 18.
67 “SCO Expresses Condolence to Families of Victims in Xinjiang Riot”, Xinhua, 12
July 2009, (http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6698435.html).
68 Uyghur activists in Central Asian countries are frequently prevented from engaging
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Accommodation Or Assimilation? Chinese Government...
As the rhetoric of the war on terrorism works fine with both the Western
world and China’s peers in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so does
China’s claim that Uyghurs are trained by the Taliban and similar terrorist
groups in Afghanistan before infiltrating Xinjiang. This claim suggests that
the Xinjiang issue is not only China’s business, but also that of the Central
Asian states, Russia, and even ISAF. Particularly in recent years, the Chinese administration accelerated the coercion and assimilation policies. The
mental atmosphere surrounding the international community following the
9/11 incidents made it much easier to avert the criticisms of the coercion
policies of China. Within this period, China tends to identify every kind of
human rights request by Uyghurs with “terrorism”; therefore, it is seen that
China seeks the support of the West for its coercive policies.
It would be misleading, however, to attribute the internationalization of
the Xinjiang issue solely to Chinese manipulations in order to legitimize its
crackdown policy within the eyes of international community. Uyghurs living in the developed Western countries as well as human rights groups such
as Amnesty International and Asia Watch have also brought the issue to the
attention of the world, albeit with a mindset completely different from that
of the Chinese government. Among these, the World Uyghur Congress and
Uyghur American Association are the most prominent organizations led by
Uyghurs for the Uyghur cause. They make peaceful efforts to make known
the Uyghur cause in the Western world and to muster recognition and support from the international community. However, they have been labeled as
terrorist organizations by the Chinese government with no solid evidence.69
As such, the government of China hopes to discredit, through terrorismlinked allegations, the activities of international Uyghur organizations toward the recognition of violations of human rights by China in Xinjiang.
While there are arguments regarding the presence of Uyghur organizations
which advocate military means of opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang,
such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, some circles have called into
question the efficacy of such organizations, and consider them “only a ‘dubious threat’ and have been used as an excuse for increased repression.”70
activities on the Xinjiang issue by the administration of the their respected republics due to pressure from China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. See,
“Uyghur Leader Barred from Travel”, Radio Free Asia, 01 May 2011, (http://www.
rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/worlduyghurcongress-05012011173228.html). For a
detailed account of Central Asian countries’s harsh policy on Uyghur diaspora, see
Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 145-146.
69 “China Says International Extremists Backing Terrorism in Xinjiang”, Asia Pasific News, 9 January 2007, (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/251452/1/.html); “China Urges International Community to Fight ‘East
Turkistan’ Forces”, Xinhua, 22 September 2009, ( http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/22/content_12098221.htm).
70 Dru C. Gladney, “Responses to Chinese Rule”, in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, S. Frederick Starr (Ed.), (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 390.
U SAK Ye a r b o o k 2 0 1 2
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It is reasonable to argue that the internationalization of the Xinjiang issue
has gained momentum after the collapse of communism. Prior to the 1990s,
Xinjiang rarely appeared on the front pages of newspapers, due, understandably, to the fact that it was a remote part of China. China at that time had
already started its development project at full-speed about a decade earlier,
but its peripheral territories such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia
were either less affected by the era’s frenzy of development than the Haninhabited eastern territories, or these territories were less accessible due to
infrastructural deficiencies. Another reason for the relative isolation of the
territories inhabited primarily by non-Hans was the government’s fear of an
“infiltration of deleterious ideas and persons.” However, as China’s role in
the global economy grew, the said three provinces became better connected
to the rest of the country as well as the world, both in terms of infrastructure
and economic or productive inter-dependency. Therefore, the isolation from
the world of the three provinces bearing the names of titular nations was long
over in the 1990s. It was also during the same decade, and in consequence
of the chain of same events and factors at work, that the world became better cognizant of the domestic issues of China, including political repression,
ethnic tensions, and the level of assimilation policies toward non-Han ethnic
groups. As the number of Uyghurs living and travelling abroad increased,
so did the volume of their dissenting voice. Also, technological innovations,
such as mobile phones and the Internet, enabled Western rights groups and
Uyghurs to communicate free of Chinese intervention. Thus, the Western
world’s heightened sensitivity to the violation of human rights and ethnic
repression came to embrace the issue of Xinjiang. It is also possible to argue
that China’s painful efforts to distance the debates regarding the Xinjiang
issue from a human-rights perspective and position it within a context of
security and international terrorism can be seen as its desire to counter the
effects of the tide of human rights and humanitarian intervention, as well
as the combined effort of Uyghurs and international human rights groups
which have been at work since 1990s.
CONCLUSION
The majority-minority dichotomy always constitutes a problem for nation-states calling for a settlement. Some states have attempted to solve this
problem within a democratic framework through the adoption of accommodational policies. Some others, on the other hand, have sought means to
establish domination over minorities by applying a strategy of control. Assimilatory policy is a subset within strategies of control nation-states employ
very often.
The Uyghur case in China is a striking example of the situations where
nation-states adopt an assimilatory rather than an accommodational policy,
and thus, where ethnic frictions remain unsolved and even transcend na-
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tional borders to become internationalized. China, inspired by the Soviet
model, assumed an understanding of solving the problem through granting
ethnic groups autonomy, but this autonomy remained on paper only, never to
materialize into real autonomy. It has been observed that the central government always exerts enormous power over Xinjiang. China, it is further observed, applies assimilation as a part of a strategy of control in four spheres:
language, religion, economy, and politics.
China, under the pretense of bilingual education, has placed severe restrictions on the Uyghur language which is an inalienable component of the
Uyghur identity. Pursuant to the policy of state atheism, the expression of
religion in the public sphere has been strictly hampered, and even its flourishing and transmission in the private sphere has not been allowed. As Islam
has been identified as a dominant component of the Uyghur identity, its
survival and transmission into the younger generations in the private sphere
has been perceived as a threat. In the economic sphere, the Great Western
Development campaign that aims to develop Xinjiang is used as a fig leaf
to cover the large-scale migration of ethnic Hans to the region, the ethnic
composition of which has been changed significantly. Moreover, it has been
the Hans who have benefitted disproportionally from the economic boom.
Uyghurs, Uyghur girls in particular, have been forced to move to eastern
regions of China for jobs. Politically, the higher echelons of the Communist
Party of Xinjiang and the administrative cadres have been mostly occupied
by ethnic Hans, whereas ethnic Uyghurs have been employed at lower and
token levels.
All these assimilatory policies have amplified the Uyghurs’ perception
of Chinese domination and threats to their own national culture, intensifying ethnic friction even further. That China condemned Uyghur resistance
to the so-called concept of three evils, namely separatism, terrorism, and
extremism, and also that China has attempted to benefit from the atmosphere
dominant since 9/11, has carried the problem beyond the confines of the
nation-state to the international level. More significantly, the fact that the
majority-minority relations are of an assimilatory nature within the context
of a strategy of control has transformed the problem from tension between
the state and an ethnic minority into a clash between ethnic groups.
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