Part I: Foundation of Activity Theory
Chapter 3: Human Activity. The Anthropologyof
Activity Theory
P p . 1 7 3 - 2 3I N
2:
Karpatschof,B. (2000).Hunranctctivitt,.Contributiortsto the
AnthropologiculSciences
fi'ont a Perspectiveof Actit,iry,Theory.
DanskPsykologiskForlag.ISBN: 87 77063Il2.
Copenhagen:
(Front,cover+ xii + 513 pages).
with acceptance
from the authorand copytightRe-published
holder.
3. HumanActivity
The Anthropology of t.,ini,y Theory
In the precedingchapter.I introducedthe basicconceptsof anthropology.
This introductionwaspresented.
hon'e'u'er.
u ithin thegeneralfiirmeof thetotal
ontology,or if you pret-er.metaphysicsof Activity Theor.v.Thus. the more
detailedanalysisand argumentation
arecarriedout in the remainingchapters.
just
The presentchapteris
the orertureof this analysis.Eachof the chaptersto
follou'is dedicatedto a specificaspectofthe anthropological
field. In the currentchapter.theretbre.I tr1'togive definitionsthataremoreprecise.I alsopresentpreliminaryargumentationfbr ail the rnajoraspectsof the anthropological
object field. thesemajor aspectsbein-su.'hatI considerthe onthrogtologicul
inr,ariants.
Eachof theseaspects
ll'ill be discussed
in moredetailin subsequent
chaptersdedicatedto a singleinvariant.This lo-sicalstructure.no doLrbt.will
appearat timesto the readeras somevuhat
tiresome.I haveattemptedto avoid
unnecessary
repetitions.
but thereadershouldbe warnedthatall thebasicideas
of this treatisearepresented
in a three-foldstmcture.[n otherwords.they are
presented
asheadlinesin the lastsectionof chapter2. as individualsectionsin
thepresentchapter.andfinally at somelengthin the subsequent
chapters.
Anotherwarningseemsnecessar-v
here.In the first two chapters.I did not
strayt'arfrom Leontie\,'stheor)'.N,Ir'interpretation
of his basicconcepts.
especially activitr'.action.meanin-s
and sensenti-lhthavebeensubjective.
but with
my intentionwasto expresshis originalthoughts.In this and in the succeedin-s
c h a p t e r sh. o u e v e r .I u i l 1 p r e s e n m
t \ ' o \ \ ' r tv e r s i o no f A c t i r , ' i t yT h e o r v .T h i s
impliesthatoftenI usentl ou n definitionsof basicconcepts.
Further.although
I havenot intendecl
to deviatefrorn Leontier"stheorvregardingthe basicconc e p t so f a c t i v i t \ ' t. h e v c e r t a i n l vh a v ed e v e l o p e d
a n i d i o s y n c r a t ifcl a v o u ra n d
oftena neu,emphasis.
As alread1.,
\tated.I usett,po-uraphical
markersto signif_v
whethera specificconceptis usedin a standard\\'avor whetherit is of my own
desi-en.
In the formercase.the conceptis printedtn italics.and in the latterin
bold.
One especiallr'importantcaseof rnr personaldefinition is regardingthe
conceptsof Actilin andMeatting..\nd as I alreadyexplained.a curiousambiguity sticksto theseconceptswhenseenin relationto theirclosestco-concepts
Action andSense:
174
Ch.3: Human Activity
Useof the ConceptPairs:
Activity-Action and Meaning-Sense
Object Field
Concept
Biological
Sociological
Activity
+ ibroad
N{eanrng)
+
Action
N{eaning
Sense
Acti\ it) )
( n o t p r e s e n)t
( not present)
+ (broad
\ ' l e a n i n g)
(n o t p r e s e n)t
(unthropctlogical
+
Psychological
l marginal
u s e)
+ t e e n t r aul s e )
(unthropoloeit'ttl
tmarglnal
N{eani ng )
usel
( n o t p r e s e n)t
+ (centraluse)
Firstly,the tableemphasises
the crucialimportanceof specifyingwhether
the conceptsAolllrl andMeaning arebasedon their broad.biological' or their
specificanthropologicalmeaning.Secondly.the tableshowsthat when based
on their unthropologic'o1
meaning.the two conceptsare usedmostly within
sociology,whereastheconceptsAction andSensearemainlyusedrvithinps1'chology.l
This currentchapteris dedicatedto generalanthropologyand it will be
apparentthatI havechosenActivity andMeaningratherthanAction andSense
asmy basicconcepts.
This choiceis a consequence
of thevery objectiveof thi-s
treatise.The objectiveis not to discussthefbundationof psychologynarrowly,
but ratherto show how the generalfield of anthropolog)'can be foundedon
Activity Theory.Therefore.the disciplineof sociology(socialscience.)
is just
asimportantaspsychology.
Consequentll.
I hare chosenbasicanthropological
conceptsthataresuitedto explainingthesedual anthropological
sciences,
and
eventheir relationto oneanother.
Anotherproblemof presentation
is choosingtheorderin which theconcepts
are to be introducedand treated.Tvu,oapproachesto presentationcan be used.
The tlrst approachis geneticor historical.wherethe conceptsare presentedin
the order in u'hich their respectivereferentsappearin time. The second
approachis systematicor lo-eical.
the intentionof rvhichis to erecta tower of
Part I: Foundation of Activity Theor5'
t75
conceptsin sucha way thatany subsequent
conceptcanbe definedby meansof
its predecessors.
andall thesepredecessors
canbe definedwithoutreference
to
any successor.
I haveattempted.primarily.to usethe former approach.However.insteadof
the intendedhierarchicalrelation.occasionallythereis a heterarchic'relation.
This occurswhensomeof the subsequent
relatantsareat the sametime lo_sical
predecessors
to someof their own antecedents.
Theseinconsistencies
in the
orderof presentation
suggestthat it might be necessarv
to simultaneously
use
the two approaches.
and.confusingasit is. eventheimpossibilityof respecting
thedualapproaches
simultaneousll'.
This is thecasefor suchconceptsasknov'ledge.
nteanittg.
and.scrence.
In our
realistic(andmaybeseemingly'
naiverealisticlinitial presentation.
thesemattersaresupposed
to be veridicalreflectionsof ontologicalfacts.From thisrealistic position.presentingthem accordingto the subjectmatterto u'hich they
ret'eris no offence.However.from a criticalepistemological.
languagephilosophicalandmeta-scientific
point of vievn'.
I am startingm1'discourseon ontological mattersalreudt presupposingtlrc e.ristettce
of knowledge.meuting antl
sctetl('e.
Thev are.from thispointof view. logicolh prior to theircontent.By dedicating a specificchapterto thesemattersof discourse.
however.I hopeto demonstrateor at leastto presenta few meaningfirlar_eurnents
for the very meta-principle that links the two apparentlycontradictorl'approachestogether.This
meta-principleis the necessar\,unit1'of
thegeneticdirectionfrom the object
fleld to theoreticalf ield and the logic'ttldirectionthe other way. I call this principle of directionalunitl' thepritrciple of re.fle.titin'.and su_egest
it is an important featureof anthropologl,itself.
3 . 1 Anthropogony- the Content of the
AnthropologicalSublation
When comparingthe anthropolo_sical
objectfield to the biologicalobject
field. whereit hasits origin.thereis a ntajorgeneticleap.the anthropogonic
leap.In fact.the main purposeof the precedingchapterwas lo determinethe
exactnatureof thisleap.This leapcanbe sumrnarised
in thetbllowin-escheme;
176
Ch.3: Human Activitv
Aspectsof the Anthropogonic Leap
Aspectofthe
Object Field
Biological
Object Field
Anthropological
Object Field
minor objecl
organrsm
humanindividual
major object
specificspecies
humansociety/specres
uonte\t
eco-niche
s o c i e t a ls v s t e m
minorevolution
0ntoqenesls
personaldevelopment
major history
phvlogenesis
culturalevolution
modusoperandi
functionalin
intentionalitv
actiVitvfbrm
n()n-consclous
c0ltsclous
externalside
ecologicalimpact
production
internalside
adaptation/learni
ng
appropnatlt)n
communlcatlon
mediated bv
information
( s i g n abl a s e d )
meanrng
It shouldbe notedthatthis tableillustratesthe u?r?ol'ations
ol the anthropologicalfield in the tbrm of sublation.Thus.they shouldnot be conceivedof as
total metamorphictransfbrmations.
For example.the innor,ationof corr.r.
rorr.r
activitt doesnot impll' that non-conscious
activity is completelyabsentlor
humanbeings,the true contentof the conceptbeingthe cltherway round.that
consciousactivityis literally'completely
absentlbr non-humanbeings.
In chapter2. I introducedmost.but not all. of theseaspectsof the anthropogonicleap.Beforedeli.in-sdeeperinto theseanthropological
:
characteristie
a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o nt o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v ep r e d e c e s s o rhso. w e v e r .I u i l l b r i e t l r
d e s c r i b es o m eb a s i cp r o b l e m sp l a g u i n gt h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c adli s c i p l i n ei n t , r
which we haveembarked.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorr
3.2
177
MethodologicalProblemsin Developing
an Anthropology
As a prole-eomenon
to thefbllou,ingdiscussion
of thecontentof anthropology. I will presentsome of the importantissuesthat can be characterised
as
methodological
problerns.
The first of them concernsthe problemof anthropogonictheories,that is,
theoriesof thecausesof anthropogony.
The secondissueconcernstheconceptofculture.can we reallyusethis ternr
as a well-defineduniversalconcept'lAnd. if so. are we then presumingthe
existenceof an anthropological
universal'.)
The next issueconcernsthe relationbetweenanthropogenesis.
understood
as the evolutionof our species.and the culturalevolutionthat predominantly
hashappened
afiertheforr,er phylogenetic
e'olution.Finall1,.
thethreeobjects
of theanthlopological
objectfield arepresented:
thehumun.sTtecies.
thehumtrn
individualand thehutnun:o(.tet\..
3.2.1 The Problem of AnthropogonicTheories
In an earlierdescriprion
of the cosmolo-eical
andthe biologicalobjectfields.
theorigin andtheessential
presentmodusoperandiof thetieldswerestressed.
ly' I will addressrhe modusoperandi.but will not adclress
the origin of the
objectfield. Anthropological
palaeontolo-sv
is still rathershaky.Further.theoriesof theevolutionof humancharacteristics.
conscrousness
andculturearesc.r
speculative
thatI judgethemto be. in themselves.
too weaka fbundationfor an
empirically'oriented anthropolo-eical
theorr,.'Thus. attemptsto formulate
anthropogonic
theorieshaveresultedin little mclrethancontributions
to specu_
l a t i v et h e o r i e so f t h e a s c e not f h u r n a n k i n dI .f n e a c c e p t h a tt h e r ei s n o c o n flrmedknor.l'led-re
abouttheoriginof our species.
r',,hat
canu,edo to determrne.
or at leaststart.a discussion
aboutthebasicsofan anthropological
theory,l
I suggestthat instead\\e mustto relr .n a comparativemethod.This co'rparativeanthropolcuris reallya methudconsistingof two approaches,
a negat i r e l p p r o u e hl r n dl r p o : i t i r ea p p r o u c hI .1 l h e r r t , g n l l l .w
p .e u \ e ( . ( ) m p ( r t . ( t t i , e
ethologt to delineatehumancharacteristics
in relationto non-humanspecies.
In the Tro.rrll|e.
\\e use torttptLrutivet'trlttrrttlcuttl historicttlurfihropologtto
l o o k f b r a n t h r o p o l o g i c ai nl r a r i a n c eg o v e r n i n gt h e c u l t u r e .o f a n v k n o w n
178
Ch.3: Human Activitv
humansociety.For both of thesetypesof comparisons.
the studiesof oligoartefactualsocietiesare of greatimportance.Later.I w'ill def-endthe theory,of
culturalet'olution.accordingto which thehunterandgatherercultureis actually thefirst in a succession
ofcultures.
Ner,ertheless.
in the early''historyof anthropolog)'.
a graveerror uas nrade
whenthe findingsfrom the studl'of eristinghunterandgatherercultures(er en
t h o s es u p p o s e tdo b e t h e l e a s ti n t l u e n c e db 1 ' o t h e rc u l t u r e s w
) e r ec o n s i d e r e d
directevidencere-uarding
thenatureof our ancestors'
originalculture.
This ori-sinalculturevrasno doubtof thehuntel'andgathererkind. Hou ever.
evenif it u'ascategorically
similarto thehunteland-satherer
of todal (andverr
l i k e l y i n a s h o r tt i r n eo n l y o f v e s t e r d a l ' )u.e c a u n o ti d e n t i f l t h e o n s l n a l o r
primitivehunterand gathererculturenith the specificcontemporarvcultures
of that form.
A n y c u l t u r ee r i s t i n gt o d a yh a su n d e r g o n a
e n e ' n o l u t i oonf c u l t u r a lh i s t o n .
a n d i t d e m o n s t r a t ebsf i t s o w n s u r l i v a l t h a ti t h a s- s r e ast o p h i s t i c a t i oi n t h e
transformation
of a certaingeographical
areau ith a specificecology'into a specific humansocietlu'ith a specificculture.
The assessnrent
ofpeople living in a hunterand gatherercultureas biolclgically or culturalll,primitit'eis a social-Daruinistic erpressionof racisnt.and
e \ . e nt h e e v o l u t i o n a r ys c h e m et h a t I u s ei s r e j e c t e da n d c o n s i d e r e b
d1 n t a n r
researchers
to be prejudiced.M1' specialintr.restin conlentporarlor archaeol o g i c a ls t u d i e so f h u n t e r a n d g a t h e r ecr u l t u r e sh. o r r e r e r .r s n o t b a s e do n t h e
conceptionthatthe membersof thesegroupsarept,)1tlt'(4n(tur(' or thattheif
a c t i v i t i ea
s r ed i r e c t l yi d e n t i f i a b lue i t h t h a to f o u rp r i n r r r ic\ r u t e e \)t r \ .
T h e p o i n t i s t o n o t l e g a r dt h e s ec u l t u r e sa s h i s t o n ea l t i r : r r l : . l ' o rt h c r h a re
c e r t a i n l yp a s s e dt h r o u g ha n e v o l u t i o nf o r a p e r i o d .e \ i i c t l \ u : l o n g i - r \t h e \ ( ) ,
c a l l e dd e v e l o p e d
c u l t u r e sN
. e v e r t h e l e sIs d. o r e g u . t h
l L r n r eurn r lS r r t h c . rccuf 1 ,
'I'he
turesasexamplesof thatrrhich is basicto the ver\ cr)nccprrrfculturc'. r ar.c
d e f i n i t e l ys i m p i e r t oa n a l \ ' r et h a nm 1 ' o u n c u l t u r er i i t h i t . l l ( ) r de ( ) r ' n p l i c i r r L ' d
technoiogy'.
organisational
structureand meanings\ stelu.Thts intpJic.r
l chlrllcn-ee
f o r a n 1a' n t h r o p o l o g i c g
ae
l n e r a l i s a t i oTnh. e a n t h r o p o l o gai el i r t ru l t u n t :
m u s ta p p l yt o b o t ht h o s ec u l t u i e st h n ta r ed r a r n a t i c a l l\re r \ r ' e n t ( ) tl cr o n t o u r
own. aswell asto thehistttricalculturesil ith rvhich* e arr fantiliar'.
Neverlheless.
I am u illin-l to risk mv antl.rropolo_uical
neck br erprersinrthc
cclnvictionthatthe existrnghuntcland-satherer
cultrir.-..in terns of theirbasic
aspects.
arerathersintilartorheoriginalculturcsnfthe fif\t hunranbein-ss.
J-hir
Part I: Foundation of Activity Theorv
179
personalbelief. plausibleor implausible,will not be on trial, tbr it has no
importancefor the analysesthat follow. Further.thereis also the theoretical
clausebuilt into the fbrmer statementthat.as it is. we haveno evidenceof what
thesebasicaspects
are.
we shallretum to thisquestionof culturalevolutionshortly.but beforethat.we
haveto scrutinisethe fundamentalissueconcemingthe very conceptof culture.
3.2,2 The Statusof Culture- Absoluteor Relative
The studyof culturehasbeencharacterised
bv a strugglebetweencultural
absolutismand cuituralrelatir,isrn.
The absolutistsassertthat thereis a basic
definitionof culturesuitablefor any pastor conremporary
society.indicating
that all culturesare basicallyidentical.The relativistsmaintain.on the other
hand.that a culturedetlnesits o\^n conrent.and that differentcultures.theref o r e .h a re o n l y r a t h e \r u eu o u \t r a r t :i n c o m m o n .
The fbundingfatherof anthropologl'.Edward B. T1'lor.staresthat human
cultureis pervadedby "uniformity". "due to unitorm actionof unifbrm cau"the generallikenessofhumannature"and"the seneral
ses".He alsodiscusses
likenessin thecircuntstances
of lif'e".,
Tylor's point of vien' r.vasthe social-Daru'inistic
evolutionismof the colonial epoch.This ethnocentricand.to a certaindegree.racistperspectivewas
stronglyrejectedwhenBoas''.in theendof the l gth centur\,.fbundedAmerican
anthropologvbasedon a stricr relativisticmethoclology.
According to this
methodologv.anv culture shor.rld
be understocld
frorn within. not judged bv
extel'nalstandards.
This r iell u'asspreadverl' successtulll,
bv his pupilsBenedict-andlv{ead'in the mid-riar period.The contributionof thesetwo outstancling anthropolo-eists
u as a specitictheoreticaldirectionca\ledc.ultureuntlpersonalit. ri hich investisated
the 'ulav cultureshapes
personality.
A parallelcontemporarvstudl of this kind u as l\lalinor','skv's
analvsisof the standingof the
OedipuscomplexarnongtheTrobrianders
in thepacific.',
The so-calledll'Jni-Sapir Htl.totlte.sis
is an extremeexampleof culturalrela t i v i s m .I t i s b a s e do n s t u d i e so f t h e H o p i l a n g u a g ea n d c u l t u r e w
. hichwere
asserted
to lack anVtraceof sucha celebrated
categorvastime.,,rrhishvpothesisu'ill be discussed
in somedetarlin the nextchapteron meaning.Culturalrel a t i ' i s m i s p r o b a b l rs r i l l t h e p r e d o r n i n a ncto n c e p t i o na m o n gc o n t e m p o r a r y
anthropologr.
Ch.3: Human Activity
180
However.Activity Theory attemptsto sublatethesetwo opposingpositiotls.
Accordingly.we haveto study a specificcttlturewithottt a fixed-theclretical
by the
manualand the methodologyof our fieldwork hasto be characterised
to
According Acttor relatedtheoreticalprejudices.
absenceof ethnocentrism
vity Theory.thereare sometrans-culturaland trans-historicalanthropological
invariants.commonfor all cultures.and theretoreconstitutingthe objectof a
or invuriontsare
generaltheoryof culture.Theseunthropolotit'oluttiver.suls"
the existenceand the
Consequentl)'.
the contentof a scienceof anthropology'.
ofthis chapter.
specificnatureofthese invariantsarethe subjectn.ratter
3,2.3 Anthropogenesisand Cultural Evolution
The evolutionaryperspectivein Activity Theor,vis engral'edin its anthrogeneaiogical
dimensions:
pologyvia two consecutive
Two ConsecutiveGenealogicalDimensions
l.
endingv"'ithanthrodimensionof bio-tenesis
The psychogenetic
pogony
Il.
dimensionwhich is thee-"olutionof culture
The sociogenetic
criticismsof evolutionistthinkingin relationto the
ln chapter2. I discussed
A similar objectionhasbeenraisedagainstthe
dimensionof psychogenesis.
theoryof culturalevolution.In a laterchapter.I returnto thisissue
sociogenetic
in rnoredetail.but now I will sketchan argumentfor sucha conceptionof culn b o u tc u l t u r a le r o l u t i o nh a sb e e nl a r g e l ya n
. he discussioa
t u r a le v o l u t i o n T
intenseargumentbetween.on the one side.the reductionisticor e\rensocialcultural
Darwinisticevolutionistsand.on the otherside.the anti-evolutionary
that Activitl Theorypromotessomething
suggested
relativists.I havealread.v
quite different,a third possibility.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
181
Parallelto my argumentfbr the exceptionalstatusof the human species
regardin-e
the psychogenetic
problem.I shallnow,det'enda perspective
that is
ncrtonly unthropocentric'.
but also apparentl.veVenethnrt(entric:.
by suggesilng
thatour own cultureis categoricalll,'
mostadvanced.
Here.I usetherealitvprinciple that I introcluced
in the precedingchapter.Ach'ocates
fbr the suppressed
and often mortallv threatenedpeoplewho are adherin-u
to forms of culturethtrt
are extrernelyat Varianceto the now globalll' don'rinatin-q
industrialculture
may rejectthe postulateof a culturalhierarchr'.
accusin-e
it of beingethnocentric. repressileandevenracist.Re-srettabll.
this allegationwill very ofien be
right. On the otherhand.the relativisticculturalad.,ocacyis. to my judgment,
itselfone-sidedandtheretbrepartlvblind.
It is a historicalfact thattherehasbeena kind of Darwinisticculturalevolut i o n .u i t h t h ef o l l o ui n er n a j o r : t t s e \ :
The Major Stagesof Cultural Evolution
I . theHunterandGathererCulture
2. theNeolithicAgriculture
3. theHigh Cultureof theBronzeAge
-1.theCultureof the Iron Age
,5.theIndustrialCulture
6. the InformationTechnologl,Culture
This structuresuggests
to me a clearempiricalthesis.thecontentof rvhichis:
Ch.3: HumanActivity
182
The Empirical Content of Cultural Evolution
A.
The stagesaredefinedin a chronologyby theirtrmeof sociogenetic
time)
origin (entrance
B.
entrancetimes.therearethe successive
Betweentheconsecuti\re
epochs
C.
duringits specific
The extensionof a culturef orm will be increasing
atierward.
epoch.andthentendto be decreasing
but I u i11not hesitateto suggesta theThis is a purel,vempiricalh,vpothesis'',
oreticalexplanation.
fact,nor is it
The levelof a culturalform neitheris an inexplicableen.rpirical
concerningtheevident"natural
explainedb;ra black-boxstatement
adequatelv
selection"of culturesof a higherorderrelativeto lower orders.Actually,there
of culturaielevation.just
is an orderedrelationof culturalcontent.a hierarchy'
In this hierarchy.a higherculturecontainsall the cateiike in psychogenesis.
t
goricalconstituentsof a lowerculture.whereastheinverserelationis not true.
have.iocralcooperotion,tool.sttnd orol langtroge.A\l
Thus. all culture-s
forms of culturebeginnin-ewith the cultureof the BronzeAge havedivision of
andan accumuof state.a scriptsystem(writtenlanguage)
labour.an apparatus
lation of written knowledge.From the Iron A-eeonwards.thereis commerce
(i.e..economictransactionthroughmonel').Tu'o new culturalfeaturesoriginatedwith theindustrialculture.namelymachines (includingthekindsof tools
and an autonomousinstitulionof knot|ledge.that
that operateby themselves)
is, empiricalor realscience.
here.but it will be the
The processof culturalevolutionwill not be discussed
topicof a laterchapteron culture.
invariThe fbcusof this chapteris not on evolution.but on anthropological
ants,thetraitscommonto all cultures.il'hichincludethefollo$'in,s:
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
183
The Anthropological Invariants
i. Tools(materialproduction)
2. Meaning("ideal"or cognitiveproduction)
(of humanactivitv)
3. Cooperation
(education)
4. Appropriationof cultr-rre
3.2.4 The Human Species,the Human Individuals
and the Human Societies
As mentionedin the introducrionto this chapter.anthropologyhastwo differentkindsof issues.Its minorkind of issueis the humanindividual.the person.whereasthe major kind is the human speciesor the human society(dependingon whetherwe talk phvlogenesis
or sociogenesis).
As we shallseein
duetime.this double-sidedness
of anthropologv
impliesthattheremustbe two
separate
sciences
studyingthe speciticissues.Psychologyhasthe humanindividualsas its particularobjectfield. The specialobjectfield of sociology(in a
very broad,not standardsense) is thehumansociety.
Here.we arestill in an ontolo,eical
mode.asthischapterisjust an elaboration
of thepreviouschapteraboutontolog).The chapteron anthropological
science
will focuson the disciplinesof this scientificdomainand the differentobject
fleldseachofthesedisciplineshasas their issue.Nevertheless.
the distinction
betweentheontologicaldiscourseandthe scientificone.howevernecessary
rn
principle.has to be relaxedwhen rve are analysingthe very essentialities
of
theseobjectsfields.I thereforehaveto anticipatetheoutlinesofthe subsequent
scientifictheory.
In the currentchapter.we wiil examinethe generalanthropological
object
lield containingthe totalitl'of phenomena.
objectsanciessentialities
concerning the speciesof man.I suggestthatthis totalfield is subdividedinto two subfields. First is the psl,chologicalfieid includingthe humanindividualswith
their associated
phenomena
and essentialities.
The secondsub-fieldis the sociologicalfield.ref'eming
to societieswith theirspecificphenomena
andessentialities.
r84
Ch.3: Human Activity
(species-related
Thus. the term anthropologicalretersto the speci.ficities
mattersconsignifies
of Humankind.The word sociological
characteristics)
cerninghuman societies.Finally. the expressionpsychologicaldenotesthat
which hasto do with thehumanindividual.
Here.only the logics of extensiclnhavebeendefinedfor the concepts.Of
chapterstreatingthe specourse.we will discusstheintensionin the indir.'idual
cific fields. Later in the presentchapter.rve will startto discussthe relation
betweenthe individualandthe societl in u'hichhe or sheis lir.ing.
3.3
The GeneralForm of Human Activity
at the endof chapter2 andin the beginning
When introducinganthropology
qualityof theanthropogonic
thattheessential
of thepresentone.it wasstressed
of (conscious
ro a princ'lp1e
)
leapis a transitionlrom a princ'ipleoJ'Jiutctionttlitt
of the speciintentionalitt.This intentionalityis not a restrictedcharacteristic
flc actionsof thehumanindividual.On the contrary.the principleof intentionality is. in a somewhatparadoxicalway. also a collectiveattribute.a quality
the commonandcoordinatedactivityof a socialentity,a group
characterising
system.
or evena moreabstractorganisational
I definehumanactivitvin thefbllowins way:
A Definitionof HumanActivitv
Human activity is the societally-forrnedlif'eprocessrealised
in it.
throughtheactionsof theindividualsparticipating
The crucialpoint. hol"'er,er.is not cooperationin the senseof severalindividin an activity.leadingto an evidentlycommongoal.In this
ualsparticipatin-e
in socialinsectsand in mantmals.For instance.in
sense.thereis co-operation
thecaseof thelatter.lionshuntin a way thatinr olvesnotonly a combinationof
w'heresome
dir isionof operations.
paralleloperations.
but alsoa differentiated
''
it.
animalsarechasingthepre)'andothersarecatchin-e
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
r85
The crucialpoint is ratherthe specilickind of cooperation
thatcharacrerises
humankind.
Leontiev'scliffererrtiu
speciJicu
of humanactir,ity'is the distinctionbetween
the ultimateob.jective
andmcttit'eof the actiritv andthe subordinate
goalof the
specificactionsinto u'hichthe activitvis orsanised.
Whena member
ol humancollective
is executin-u
a.1ob.
heinitiallydoesso
to satistvhisoun needs.
A batter's
actiVitv
in primiti\,e
society.
fbr instance thatof participating
in a contmon
hunt.mustbereleased
br,theneedof
gi'en b'the animalkilled.But uhat is theimmediate
fbodandclothin-e.
direction
of hisacti'ity)Thatcanbethegoalolfii_ehtening
theherdof pre-.
andthusdrivingit towardotherhunters
lling in ambush.
In thisl'al his
u ork is done.theotherhunters
takecareof therest.ol coursetheactir.
itv
of thishunterdoesnotsatisfi'hisneedof fbodor clothin-u.
The-eoal
toward
whichhis process
of activiti.is directed
doescoincide
uith themotir,eof
hisacti'itv.thesetuo aspects
of his*ork al'eseparitte.
Suchprocesses.
firr
whichnrrll'c and.qr.,a/
do notcoincide
*ill bedenoted
asccrrorrs
lAuthor's
errphasisl.
The endeavor
of a barrer.
fiightenin-r
the prel.andcirivingit
toriardthehunters.
is thr"rs
an action.,
It seemsthatLeontier'\'!asnot au areof a simirarkind of huntingfbundin the
g r e a tc a t sw h e n h e u s e sb a t t u ea s h i s f a v o u r i t ee r a m p l eo f h u m a na c t i \ i t \ .
A l t h o u g ht h e r ei s d o u b ta b o u t h e r a l u eo f t h r ss p e c i f i ca c t i r i t r , a sh i s m a s t e r
exampieof anthropicalirl'.
this hasno bearingon his very definitronof human
activity.
The rnainpoint is thatin the distinctionberr,,
eenthe objectiveof theactir,ity
and the -soalof the action.the tbrrneris detlnedby-its ntetliut'r..
whereasthe latt e r i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d b\ tl s i n r n t e c l i u t ' t . T h e t r t e t l i u t 'trh. e
oo
f bjectofanactirity
ref'ersto the t'actthatit doesnot needt<tbeim-nedinrelr,present
to individuals
involved.
The objectivecanbe absenrin spaceand/orin time.but bv mediation.it wilt
be the nucleusin the extcndedspaceof activitv.in which specificactionsare
organisedanddirectedtorrardspresentgoals.The primaryrnecliator
representing thepotentiall)disrantobjectis calleclthemotit,eof theactivitv.
Thedistinction.tgoalandmoti'e cancenetrcallv
(thatis in theirorigin)
be tracedbackto thesegregation
ol specificoperation
fromtheprevious,
conrplicated.
of sereralpharcrc.nsistin_u.
unitarl'acti'itl'.Theseopera-
Ch.3: Human Activity
186
tions, now constituting the content of the activity of the individual are
changedinto his autonomousaction. even they are mere parts of the comof work.'n
mon. collectiveDrocess
By motive,Leontiel'meansat the sametime a cognitiveandconative/motivationalcategory.The motiveis controllingthecomplicatedweb of activityby
objectiveby pointingto it in a cognimediatingthenon-present
simultaneously
way:
tive andin a conative/motivational
The Cognitive and Conative/
Motivational Aspectsof Motives
the Cognitite u'a,r'- the goal understoodas a meansto obtain
the ob.lect
u'ar'- the efforl to realisethe goal is
the Conutit'e/rnotit'cttittnal
motivatedby the striving towardthe object
What then is the differencebetweenhuman and non-humanactivity.beWell.the leotweenfor instancethehumanbattueandits leoninecounterpart?
nine beatersarenot pursuingany specificobject.What they arepursuingis a
common goal throughdifferentiatedoperations.It is first relevantto talk about
an objectiveof activity as somethingdifferenttiom the goal when the ob.iectrve
is non-presentandthereforehasto be mediatedby a motive. Thus.althoughthe
iions of courseare motivatedto pertbrm their activit,v.they have no tnotivefor
hunting;a goal is sufficientasa motivatingcategory.ltheircooperative
The specificactionofthe individualparticipantis locatedat the secondlevel
of the definition of human activit,v.which is the unit of activity directed
towardsa concretegoal.At first sight.thereseemsto be no needfor a distinction betweenhumanandbeaston this level.Hou ever.this is not true.The fact
goal is a
thathurnanactionwith its directiontowarda present.but subordinate
objective,specifiesa relation
but non-present
way ofrealisinga superordinate.
betweenthe categorl'of ctctionand the categor)-of ocrllln'. This relationis
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
187
simultaneously
cognitiveand conative/motivational.
Even the specilicaction
directedtoward the presentgoal is in part a mediatron.
Thus.mediationstayswrth action in its upwardrelationto the superordinate
categoryof activity'.In the animal case.there is no categoryof action and the
contentof the conceptof activity hasa quite differentmeaning.'' The mediational position ofthe categoryaction is not restrictedto its superordinaterelatant.In the intangibilityof humanactivity,actionis certainlydeiinedin relation
to a ratherconcretegoai, but even if the goal is weil definedand unequivocal,
the way to the goal is not necessarilyso.This is true startingwith the higher
vertebrates.and certainlywith the apes(thatis. in the upperpart ofthe perceptual stageof psychogenesis).
thereare proto-actionswith peri-presentgoals
controllingoperations,
which arechosenin accordance
with the specificcondit i o n so f t h es e t t i n go f a c t i ri t 1 .
In human activity.however.protoactionsare developedinto full-fledged
actions,on the one hand, mediatingupwardsto the superordinate.
distant
objectof the activity,in its directionrowarda presentof peripresent
goal.and
on the other hand.mediatingdownwardto the subordinate.immediatepresent
conditions.In fact.the secondmediation.the downwardpart.thushasan embryonicprecedence
in our phylogeneticrelatives,whereasthe upwardmediation hasnone.
We shall now follow this generalprinciple of mediationinto the other areas
of humanactivity.includingtools. meaning.division of activity and apprt_rprration.
3.4
Tools(MaterialProduction)
One of the mostconspicuouscharacteristics
of humanactivity is theproduction andthe a.seqf tools. Franklin'"aptiy definedour speciesas not just Homo
Sapiensoperating with symbolic representationof reality. but also Homo
Faber,actingon realitythroughtools.How doesthis fit into our detinitionof
humanactivity?
Chimpanzees
do useobjectsresemblingtools.and someauthorshaveactually characterisedthesemeansas true tools. For instance.the chimpanzeeis a
very skilful gathererof hive-dweilin-s
insects.suchas termites.r"
To carry out
suchan endeavour.the chimpanzeehasto go throughsomecarefullvchosen
188
Ch.3: Human Activitv
operations.amongn'hich are the selectionand the fitting of an adequatestick
delicacies.
fbr fishingout theentomological
It is. hower,er,a centralpoint in the presentanthropologythat it is a mistake
is
to equatethe useof suchmeansu'ith the humanuseof tools.The dift'erence
of the samekind asfound betweenthe protoactionand the action.The ultimate
clbjectof the non-humanactivitv cannotbe more distant.in spaceand time.
mustbe
location.Likeu'ise.the utensilof the chimpanzee
thanat a peripresent
peripresent.
Thathassomeimportantpracticalconsequences:
The Restriction of Anthropoid "Tool" Making
for one-time-use.
The anthropoidrneansaregenerallydisposable.
not for re-use.
2. The operationof choosingandfittin-ua means.suchasa stick.can
eventuallybe expanded(or elevated)to a protection.but not to an
autonomous
activit)'.distributedor,era majorperiodof time and
involvinga cooperation
of severalindividuals.
In fact. the supplernentarl
makingof one-time-use-utensils
is sublatedto a
tundamentalcharacteristic
of humanacti\it). that is. the materialmediation.
\'!e cancharacterise
Focusingon theeco-nicheof a certainspecies.
thisnicheas
either rathernarro\.r'
or ratherbroad.The morpholo-11'
and ethologycan be
eitherhighly specialised
Er en biolo-syhasits specialor highly'unspecialised.
generalism
istsandgeneralists.
In thecaseof our specres.
canbe chartrcterised
as an ecologicalspecialtl,'ofHomo Sapiens.This generalismis carriedso t'ar
thatit transcends
theevolutionarvor learningtheoretical
conceptof adaptation.
Our generalistspecialtyis a kind of inverseadaptation.
That is. insteadof the
speciesor theindividualstransfbrmingto theenvironments.
thehumanactiritr
is directedtowarda transformation
of theenvironmentto theneedsandoreconditionsof thehumanbeings.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
189
Consideringthe morphologicalequipmentthathumanindividualsaregiven
asa christeninggitt. this hardwaresuppli,is certainlynot very impressive.
Our
locomotiveequipmentis hurnbleindeedcomparedto mostanimals.re-eardless
of their statusas huntersor prey.Our weaponsof attackor def-ence
are of a
modestcalibrein comparisonto the claws and teethof othermammals.Even
our inputfunction.our senses.
is reallynothingto boastabout.The evolutionof
humancapabilitiesthus is not attachedto theseexternalunits,as a computer
scientistmight formulateit. The full courseof anthropogenetic
evolutionis. in
a mostimportantwav.not biological.but post-biological
..,The inventionand
evolutionoftools is a centralpartofthis specificanthropogenesis.
As we haveseen.rheanthropoidability'toselectandfit sticksfbr insectpicking runsthroughan ontogenetic
er,olution.That is. the individualchimpanzee
is individuallyinstructedand self-exercising
in this activityand in this way ir
will be moreandmorecapableof findingandrnodif-ving
suitablesticksfbr termite fishing.However.thereu'ill be onlv little e.rtra-or.irrTlzr-indir,idual
evolutionof stickqualitvor of stick-makingcapabilitv.
I havebeencautiousenoughto sav/itrleu'henreferringto suchan evolution.
fbr in fhct someembrvoniccasesof pre-r'ulturalevolutionhavebeenobserved.
fbr instanceamongsomeJapanese
just asu,ithttther
monkeygroups.Hou'e."'er.
proto-anthropological
quaiities.like proto-intentionalitv.
proto-acrionand
proto-tool.the phenomenonof pre-cultureis indeeda.forerunner.but not a
genuinepartof culturalevolution.
The tools and the tool n.rakin-s
activitiesof humanbeings.in contrast.are
characterised
in a decisire u a1"by'their evolutionarynature.An evolutionary
naturethat,mind you. is not biological.but posr-biological.
cultural.The very
capabilityof participating
in sucha post-bioiogical
evolutioncertainlymustbe
basedon a specificphvlo_tenic
dirnension.as we shail discusslater in some
detail.The post-biological
courseof tool evolution(andof meaningevolution)
is thusbasedon a firm biologicalfoundation.
T h e t o o l sb e i n gc o l l e c t i r e l rr e f i n e d a
. c c u m u l a t eadn dp a s s e d o w n c o n s t i tute an importantpart of the anthropoloeicalspecialtythat is calledculture.
More speciticalll'.the toolsand the activitiesattachedto them tormrhe mtuerirrl culture.Shortlr'.r"e u'ill examinethe otherareasof cultureand in a later
chaptermakeconceptsour specificobjectof lbcus.
Thereis a certaindialecticsin the relationbetw'eenthe toolmakerand the
tool.The functionof tool is asa mediarorof theactivitvin u'hichit is ultimatelv
190
Ch.3: Human Activitv
used.Thus,weaponsaremediatorsof huntingandthe gravingsticksaremediators of gathering.At the sametime, however,activity shouldbe considereda
mediatorbetweenthe tool useror makerand the tool. In making the tool. the
individualis extemalisinghis or her qualitiesto an externalobject.This object,
in fact. can be seenasan erternalisationof humanacti\ it\'.
3.4.1 The Externalisation of Human Activity
The process of externalisation as an anthropological invariant is a classic
feature in the tradition leading to Activity Theory. a tradition from Fichte and
Hegel to Marx, and tinalll'to Vygotsky and Leontiev.
Fichte's basic idea of human nature was the primordial division betrveenthe
I and the non-I. where the I transfers paft of itself to the non-I. and through this
very process is confronted with itself.
(Ubertrttgen)
however
This activityof transference
happensunconsciouslv
It is not visible to the I. but can only be seenas its product.and therefbreit
perceivesthe non-l as somethingexternal.independent
of its own actir,'ity
Thus. the activity'attachedto the non-l is possiblethroughthe transf'erence
only. and the exposure(Leiden)of the I is onlv possiblethroughexternalis a t i o nt " E i n : i u \ s e r)n.
As a pupil of Fichte. Hegel makes this externalisation a cornerstone of his
anthropology inThe Phenomenologt o.fthe Spirit.his seminal early work:
For the power of the individualconsistsin its making it [the substancel
suitable,that is. that it externaiizes
its onn Self.thus settingitself up as an
Its developmentand its own reality is thus
objectivelyexistingsubstance.
itself."
the realizationof substance
Further, in his Enct c I op edia,
The object can provide no resistanceagainstthis actiritl [ofthe Il. The
objectin questionis in this $av set up as subjective.sincethe subjectivitl
its o*n one-sidedness
externalizes
and becomesoblectire."
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
191
Finally. Marx clearly acknowledges his Hegelean debt when he made l.'orft
the supporting pillar of his anthropology and explicitly conceptualisedexternalisation as a key phenomenon:
The greatness
of the Hegelianphenomenology
and its end result- dialectics as the moving and productiveprinciple is thus.that He-eelconceives
Man's self-production
as a process.the objectivization
as opposition[errr.
g,egenstdtldlichrrrrgl.
and as elevationof this externalization:
that he thus
conceivethe natureof work and of the objectivehuman being as the result
of his ou,n work.r5
In Leontiev's \\''ork.the analysis of tool making is placed in an activitv theoretical context:
For the humanbeins.adaptation
to the extemalworld losesits direct.biological characteristics.
The nearestand fbr him or her most impoftant hun'ranobjectsand phenomenaare not situatedas an erternal en'nironment.to
which one has to adapt.but as somethin_e
that is made ones own propert\,.
somethlngto realizeoneslif'e.
Thus the evolutionof N{an'sactivit\,.in a.,r,av.transcends
the limits of its
own nature.This is. ofcourse.a rnetaphorical
expression.
but it catchesan
importanttact. Namelv that tools and machines.languageand scienceare
for humanbeingsorgansof their activit] - for the externalas well as the
internalactivity.that is thinking.And it is. to a certaindegreecorrect,that
Man u ould lose er er1'capabilityto anv human activity.if deprivedof these
organs.-n
I will call this anthropologicalcharacteristicof naterial exrernalisarionproduction. Thus, the material culture is the totality of material production. One of
the peculiar attributes of the anthropoiogical object fieid is that it is not only an
ensemble of the individuals of a certain species. it also contains the human
externalisations, that is. the cultural products (of which, we have already
looked at the material products).
However, there are also cr.rlturalproducts of a quite diff-erent type. These are
the less tangible. but just as vital means or mediators that have to do with another anthropological invariant. meaning.
192
3.5
Ch.3: Human Activity
Meaning (Ideal Production)
We saw that humanactivity presupposes
a chain of mediatorsbetweenthe
ultimateobjective(i.e..thesuperordinate
reasonfbr theactivity)andtheoperations(i.e..is theultimateimplementation
of theactivity).This chainconsistsof
thenuiliye.which Leontievcharacterises
asthe idealreflectionor pictureof the
object.andthegoals.towardwhich the indir idualactionsaredirected.
Actit'itt is an obsen'ableprocess.and the objectiveis at leasta potentially
externalentit)'or stateof aifairs.The ,qr.ra1.s.
thoughnor necessarilydirectly
present.areafterall peri-present.
andthey'arein principlefound aireadvin our
closerevolutionarvrelati."'es.
The motiyeis the n.rost
irrportantmediator.however.bv definitionit is an intangibleitem. If vn'econceir,eof the motir,eas a
p u r e l l ,p s y c h o l o g i c aplh e n o m e n o ni t. s u r e l vi s a c o n s t i t u t i n g
traitin huntan
c o n s c i o u s n e sosr. s p e c i f i c a l l yi n t h e c o n s c i o u si n t e n t i o n a l i t yo f t h e h u m a n
individual.However.intentionality.understoodas a .irrlllll,gof the indil'idr-ral
concerned.as we shall seeshortly.is only one side of the motir,eas a constituentof consciousness
in theindividual.Thereis alsoanothersideof mclrrve.
thatis, themcltiveasa pic'tureof theobject.
In a latersectionon cooperationin actiritl. we shallseein more detailthat
h u m a na c t i v i t yi s n o t a n e x c l u s i v e l yi n d i v i d u a l i s epdr o c e s sb. u t a c o l l e e t i r e
and organisedone.Theretbre,the motive likewisehasto be collectiverather
than individual.The mcltivecannotbe a solipsisticrepresentative
in the rsolatedconsciousness
of a specificindividual.
Given that the objectiles.the ultimatetal'getof huntanactivitv.cannotjust
be idiosyncraticallyrepresented
by'somespeciticinternalmentalrepresentation, the way ofrepresentingthe non-present
objecthasto be standardised.
It
thus has to be .supro-indiyiduoland con.stantover a considerableperiod.
Returningto our tools fiom the last chapter.a necessarv
conditionfbr a tool
(e.-e..
a spearor a gravingstick)to be theobjectir,e
of tool makingproductionis
that the individualsinvolved must har,ean understandingof what they are
doing:they needa ntotive.Thus.the motiverl-rust
possess
theelusivequalitl,of
pointingor refering to theobjective.As theobjectiveof a collectiveactivitl is
necessarilv
itself collective.the motiles of the individnalsmust be mediators
of the sameobjective.
This fact impiies that the way'of ref'erringto an objectir,efor any motive
mustbe collectiveaswell. Theref'erence
mustbelongto thecategorymeaning.
193
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorr
a categorythat in this treatiseis includedin the list of primary anthropological
concepts.
As such.it is certainlynot exclusivelypsychological.
but a sociological categoryaswell.
This qualityof pointingto somethingelseresembles
the informationattribute of the signalthat \\'asa constitutingt'eatureof the functionalityprinciple in
the biologicalobjectfield. It is. however.exactlythe ditl'erence
betweenthese
two ways of pointin_e
that definesthe distinctionbetweenthe functionality
principleof the biologicalobjectfield and the intentionalityprincipleof the
anthropological
objectfield.
In our descriptionof the categor)'of infbrmation.therewas a signaltriggering a certainreactionby thereleasemechanismof theorganism.
The Relation Defining
The Informational Reaction
Release
Mechanism
Signal
----)
Reaction
flowof information
fig.3.1
Thus.the signalis functioningasarepresentatire
of thesourcetiom which it
is hasoriginatedandaboutu hich it is a carrierof information.The sexualkeystimulusof the male three-pickiedsticklebackis the bulkl' red shapeof the
f'emaleabdomencontainin_e
eggs.uhich (at leastin ethologicalexperiments)
194
Ch.3: HumanActivity
easily can be duplicatedby using a simple.barrenpiece of cardboard(see
Reventlow1970).In this case.the signalis functioningas a mediatorpointing
to a specificbiologicalobject,namely.in the relevantecologicalsetting.most
ol-tena receptivefemale.
The cognitiverelationbetweenthe signalandthe biologicalobiectis a representation.
I would like to emphasise
thatthe biologicalobjectitself.generally.
hasno cognitiveor otherethologicalpresencefor the perceivinganimal.The
representation
is a theoreticalreconstructionof the relationbetweenthe signal
thatis effectivein the perceptionandthebiologicalobjectthatis thefunctional
targetofthe reaction.
The Relation Defining
The Informational Representation
SignalProcessing
Signal
----)
Object
Representation
fig.3.2
Here,we havein facttwo relationsbetweentheobjectandthe signal:
195
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
Two Different Relations between
Object and Signal
1. The causalreiation:
Object ------>
Signal
2. The representational
relation:
Signal --->
Object
Turning to the anthropologicaleievationof this representational
relation,we
find somethingthat structurallyis very similar.Let us. as an example.usethe
word antelopeas an acousticsign utteredto someband memberswho have
beenaskedto help carrv a killed animalback to the settlementof a group of
hunterand gatherers.
The Relation of Referencein the Caseof Meaning
Meaning
I
I
i
----t
Representation
fig.3.3
Object
196
Ch.3: Human Activity
The word "antelope"is a signreferringto a non-present
objectandthusconveyingthe motiveof the cooperativeactivity of walking into the forestro ger
the animal and carry it back to the settlement.What then is this seerningll'
occultqualityof the signcalledmeaning?
Attemptingto solvethis question.I will ret'erback to the former anthropologicalinvariant.that is. the tool. A specitictool. say'aspear.is actuallyjusta
memberof a cerlainclass.which is simplytheclassof spears.
This is apparently a quitecircularstatenlent.
Appearances
are.however.sometimesdeceptile.
In t'act.themoreprecisequestionof whatit is thatconstitutes
theclassof spears
is quitetricky andcertainlynot properlvansweredin the extentionalistic
way
of positivisticsemantics
by thepostulated
definitionof the setof all spears.
On
thecontrary.the intensionof the classof spearsdefinesthe spear-quality
of the
specitichuntingtool.andnot vice versa.
No matterrvhether\.'estartw'iththe memberof a classor theclassitself.we
get nowherewithoutattackingthecentralproblemof meaning:
Whatis spear-hood'l
That is. what makesa speara spearandnot an arrov"'?
Generally.we canask
a sw e l l :
(specific)tool-hood'l
Whatdetermines
My answeris thatthe determination
of an objectused tts uttxtl is the functionality value of the object.The functionalitvr alueof a spearis accordingly
its quality of piercingsomethingvu'hen
throu'nclrcarriedb1'handagainstthe
targetof piercing.
Thus.it is the functionalitvvalue.the qualitr of bein-sa potentialmeitnsln a
certainactivitythat constitutes
the ilrlerr.lroritof a certainclassof tools.What
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
197
in cofilmon.whatevertheir specificdimensionsand
the individualspearshar.'e
materialqualities.is exactll"this functionalityvaluethrou-shwhich they operateas mediatorsin the activit.v.
The ability of an individualto recognisea speciflc tunctionis not alwayssufflcient.hower,er.
A s w e h a v es e e n t. o o l sa r en o tj u s t i d i o s y n c r a t im
c e a n si n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s
actions.but partsof a collectile stock.Ofienwe hal'eto ref-er
to a tool thatis not
presentor possiblynot recognisedas such.If a hunterbreakshis spearsand
wantsto borrow a spearfrom a fellou'hunter.he hasto ret-erto his needfor such
an artefact.Thatis. he hasto usea uord thatis a signref'errin-e
to thequalityof
.spearhood.
Thus. the word is a mediatorconstitutin-s
a relationof a hunterwithout a
spearanda spearwithouta hunter.In fact.theword itselfhasa tool-likequality.
and it worksexactlybecauseof this specilicqualityof mediating.of refering.
This qualityisnreonin.q.
themeaningof thevu'ord.
More oreciselv.we candefine:
The meaningof any,signis its potentialqualityof ref-erring
to
sonreobiector stateof affairs.
Thus. the meaningof the u'ord "spear" is the rneta-functionalvalue of ref-erring to the kind of objectsharin_ethe functionalvalue of being suitablefbr
piercing,
Herewe havethe first exan.rple
of meaningexplainedin a way that is fieed
fiom its fbrmerveil of occultism:
The meanin_e
of a u ord for a certainkind of a tool is thequality
ofreferringto thefunctionalvalueofthat ty'peofobject.
Or
The n.reaning
of a word tbr a certainkrndof a tttolis thefunctional valueof ret'erring
to a certainfunctionalI alue.definingthe
q u a l i t l ' o ft h et o o l .
r98
Ch.3: Human Activitv
We started.however.our anaiysisof meaningwith anotherhunting story.in
which the word was"antelope".What is the meaningof this u'ord'l Norv we can
startre-usingour definitron:
The meaningof the word "antelope"is the quality of ref-ening
to a certainciassof objectsthat is the favouriteprey of the
huntersto whom we areref-erring.
However.we encounternew troublesof circularityu'henwe try to define
this classof objects.Here.a materialistictheoryof meaninghasto transcend
thenarrowcircleof word meaning.We hal'eto conceiverneaningassomething
that is not attachedjust to the word. but alsothe ref-erent
of the w,ord.Justasthe
meaningof the word for a tool is an objectir,equalityof somematerialobjects
(i.e.,the tools).the meaningof the u'ord "antelope"is not isolatedor determinedby the specificu'ord.but bv the totalrelationof thehuntersto theirprey.
The meaningof not the rr'ord"antelope",but the very c/a.isof antelopesis constitutedby theactivityof thehunters.The meaningof the animalontelopen an
objectofhunting.
Here we meetonce more the rer,'ersibilitv
of mediation.The meaningis a
mediatorfor the activity, but the activity is at the sametime a mediatorof the
meaning.
In the analvsisof tools.we saw theseobjectsas materialexternalisations
of
humanactivity.and we describedthe tool making as a materialproductionthat
producedthematerialcultureof a certainsocietv.In thecaseof meaning.in the
first stagesof culture.theseare attachedprimarily to a ratherelusiven,pe of
sign.thewordsof orallanguage.
In theevoiutionof themeanin-e
systemcarried
by orai language,however.thereare many of the samequalitiesthat characterisedthe materialculture.Further.culturalanthropologists.
in tact. do talk
aboutthe immaterialor the cognitiveculture.u,'henreferringto this meaning
system.
We saidthattoolsweretheexternalised
supplements
of our meagremorphologicalequipment.In the samewa1'.the meanings\ stemcanbe seenas a supplementto our not meagre.but consequentlv
parsimonious
ethologicalequipment.In fact.theethologicalequipmentof a specific speciesis therepeltoireof
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
r99
behaviourthat togetherwith the morphologicalequipment,afier the necessary
adaptationand learning.will enabiethe animalto surl'iveand procreatein its
environment.
There is, ofcourse. an evolutionaryreasonfbr the sparsephysicaland ethoof our morlogical equiprnentthat we get as a christeninggifi. The meagreness
phology is a consequence
of the transitionfrom phylogenicorgansto sociogenictools.r'Additionally.
of
the parsimonyof our ethologyis a consequence
the transitionfrom a predefined,phylogenicrepertoireof behaviourmechanisms to the internalisationof a sociogenicdefinition of relevantactivity
d e l i n e dt h r o u g ht h em e a n i n g\ y s t e m .
We havedescribedmeaningas a counterpart
and an analogueto tools.Both
meaningand tools areof a public nature:both havean objectivestatus,in spite
of the fact that the former item (at leastin the stageof the exclusiveoral language)doesnot existin a materialfbrm.
Justasthe materialcultureis notjust a setof isolatedtools.but alsoan interrelatedsystemof mutuallv dependentartefactsand individual capabilities,
meaningsconstitutea systemthatis the c'ognitive
In fact.we cantalk
cultttre.'u
of an accumulationand transference
of the meaningsystem.Without undue
changingof the term.we can usethe word production evenaboutthis sociog e n i ce v o l u t i o on l m e a n i n g .
I proposethefollowingmoreprecisedefinition:
A Definition of Meaning Production
The kind oJ actiyin'that has nteaning us its ob.jectiveis
production of meaning.
To completethe analogybetweenthe n.raterial
productionof artefactsand
the non-materialproductionof meaning.it would be temptingto talk evenof
this aspectof humanactivity as externalisation.
I shallu'illingly surrenderto
this temptation.
200
Ch.3: Human Activitr
T h e p u b l i cr n e a n i n gs y s t e mi s i n d e e de x t e r n atlo t h e s i n g u l a ri n d i v i d u a l s .
who areat a specificmomentusingit for a specificpurpose.However.u ithout
hesitation.
I adrnitthatthereis a differencebetweenthe natureof thenr'oerrernalisations.The meaningsystemattachedto the exclusivelvoral lansLlilsei:
not yet substantiated
in a tbrm thatis separated
from its users.The oralmeanrns
system,howeverpublicandobjective.existsonly throughthe personsu ho usci t . T h e m e a n i n gs y s t e mi s n o t y e t f u l l y e x t e r n a l i s eidn t h e u a v t h i s h a sh u p p e n e df b r t h e t o o l s v s t e mb. u t t h i s w e a k n e siss m e n d e db v c u l t u r a le v o l u r i r r n
itself.r''
3.5.1 Toolsand Meaning as RelatedMediators
We havenow introducedtwo complirlentarymediatorsof huntanactl\ it\.
toolsandsigns.In f'act.thesetrvocate-eories
of mediatorsareplacedin a kind of
circuit,consistingof theafferentandtheet-ferent
sideof activitl,.
In chapter2. it was statedthatthis circuitis alreadvcharacteristic
tbr animal
activity.In contrastto humanactivity.animalactivit)'is. however.firndamentally immediate.Animal activir\ii is certainlymediatedby signals.and by
pressingour langua-ee.
we canpossibly'call thesesignals"immediate"mediation.Meaningthattherearemediators.
but theyareworkingr.l,,ithout
mediartrrs
otherthanthemseh,'es.
Theseimmediatemediations.
however.areboundto the'
presentandto thegivensensorvsi-enals.
In contrast.humanrnediationis qLralified by its mediatecharacter:it is a full mediation.becausethe rnecliator\arc
themselves
mediated.The differenceis shownin thediasramsbelori:
Non-humanActivitv
-l --
Source
al ] \
l;*':-\
ll:l::tr
released
Sig*i "
\
]
\[*"*r
--l
_
fig.3.4
1r
/
201
Part I: Foundation of Activity Theorl
Human Activitv
,'.*,;"-1
-l
Referential
\{ediator
3tHll11,"'""'
;t""' I
\ E- [ . ' ' ; . ' 'Il
fig.3.5
When we comparethetu,oabovediagrams.it is apparentthatthe mediators
on both sides.the aff'erentsigns and the efferenttools. are the bearersof.
(the mediatedperception)and the operation(the
respectively.the ref-erence
mediatedimplementation
of activit,v).
Thus.the fundamentalfunctionof both
mediatorsis psychological.
which presupposes
thatthey'areinternalised
by the
subjector subjectsof the actir,itr-.At the sametime.thesetu'o kindsof rnediators areexternalised.The tool is producedasa cultural object.r.'n'hereas
the oral
(andlaterthe scripturalsign is prosign is producedas a culturalphenomenon
ducedasan objecttoo).
Thus. we have an anthropologicaldialecticbetweeninternalisationand
externalisation
in general.(This dialecticis the objectofa latersectionabout
appropriation.)lnthe follorvin-e
section.a specificaspectof this dialecticqill
b e e x a m i n e dt.h e r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nm e a n i n ga s a c u l t u r a lc a t e g o r )a n d c o n sciousness
asa ps1'chological
one.
This dialecticwasclearlr,pointedout bv Vvgotskv.who writes:
..[T]hebasicanalogv
ben'neen
sisnandtoolrestson themediatins
function thatcharacterizes
eachof them.Thel mav.therefore.
fiom a ps1'choIoeicalperspecti!e.
be subsumed
uncler
thesalnecate-qorv.
Wecanexpress
the logicalrelatronship
betteenthe useof signsandof toolsusingthe
schema
in Ithelti-sure
showseachconcept
subsumed
under
lbelou].r'uhich
themoregeneral
concept
of indirectlmediated)
rctiritr.
202
Ch.3: Human Activitl
Mediated activity
/
t-^--__l
I Srsns I
t
l
E
(Vygotskl
1978.
5,1r.
3.5.2 Consciousness
as the Psychological
Counterpart of Meaning
In theprimarystages,
andevenin thesubsequent
script-based
stages.
therers
an intimaterelationbetvn'een
the meaningsystemand the individualsri ho use
it. We can say that public meaningis the quintessence
of its ps1'chological
counterparts.
thepresence
of meaningfor theindividualhumanbeing.
After havingintroducedthe anthropological
conceptofmeaningin societal
or culturalcontext.we shallnow proceedto the other aspectof meaning,its
psychological
content.
There is, in fact. a basic psychologicalpresumptiontbr the categoryof
meaning.We have definedthe functional r,alueof meaningas its referenceto
something(thatin the beginningis a simpleobjector phenomenon).
The very
processof referenceis, however.a psychologicalone. Already.referencers
found in the caseof the proto-actionof the highervertebrate.For instance.apes
can learnto operatewith tokensin communicationandproblemsolving."Just
asproto-actionis only an embryonicforerunnerof huinanaction.thecapabilitr
of learningtoken ref-erence
is merely the harbingerof the human u.ar of reterring.
The humanway of referringhastwo presuppositions:
Referring
l. theexternalised.
publicmeaningsystem:the societal
meaningsystem
2. theinternalised.
personalmeaningsystem:theindividual
consciousness
203
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
The Sociologicaland PsychologicalAspect
of Meaning
Meaning as
anthropological
invariant
Personal
Societal
meaning
system
mooninc
r ,' !q,,,,,E
system
Consciousness
fig.3.6
The psychologicalaspectof meaningcan now be approachedin the tollowing definrtionof Consciousness:
Consciousness
(in the senseof 4uc1in,i.e.of beingconsciou.r)
is the
Consciousnessl
qualityof thehumanpsycheof relatingto thesituation.in which a specimeaning.
fic personis placed,especiallythequalityof handlin-q
(in the senseofrrornentarrcontenl)is whatevercharges
Consciousness2
of meaninga specificpersonhas.at a specificmoment.
(in thesenseofgeneralcontent)is whateverchargesof
Consciousness3
meaningto which a specificpersonhasaccess.
204
Ch.3: HumanActivitl
In his psychogenesis.
Leontie'deflnesthe anthropological
srageasrhelc\ el
o f c o n s c i o u s n e sI sf .i n d L e o n t i e v ' sp s y c h o g e n e t i ccaol n c e p t s o m e r , , h ar rtr r c sided.becausehe emphasises
the af;ferertt
sideclf acti\,it),.In defininsrhr.\Lre
cessiVesta-ges
of activitv.he focuseson the specificfbrm of reflecttonof rhe
p s y c h ew
, h e r e a sI h ee . f t e r e rot r a c t i v es i d eo f a c t i v i t y ' i ss o r n e * h a d
t i n r .T h i .
t e n d e n c yi s a l s oe v i d e n ti n t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c as lt a g e T
. h i s s t a s ei : l ' r u P r i , c r l
afterits afl'erentside.thatts cottsciousrtes.i.
but not afterits etferenr\ide. thi.rrr,
the innovationof usingtool.
In my conception.
however.humanactirit1'sl'rould
be unilerstootl
;-r'eh;1rr.terisedsimultaneously
by the( sign) mediatedconsciousness
r i.....rhr' c ff r'r.clrr
s i d e )a n da s t h e ( t o o l )m e d i a t e do p e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o nt h, r o u g h* h i e h r i r c . . , , n sciousmotiveof actir.'it,v
is executed.
B y d e f i n i n gh u m a na c t i v i t Vn o tj u \ t i - r (\ . . / / r \ ( 1 ( .u) (t 1
t i\\ i t \ . b L r rt i l , r , . r ,i , r , ,
t l i a t e dt t C t i t ' i t t . w
l a n tt o s t r e s st h e m a n l ' - s i d e n
d t u l t r f a r i t l ucr h l r l s t c r , , 1r l t i .
mediation.
T h i s .e l i d e n t l vd. o e sn o ti m p l l ,t h a tc o n s c i o u s n elsssu n e\ \ e n t l i r i . i \. L! . I l . r r '-. 1 .
t e r i s t i co f h u m a na c t i v i t y C
. o n s c i o u s n e si ssc e r t a i n i ro n e o f t h e t u n d r r r r r r . p r . r l
a s p e c tcsl ft h ev e r vm e d i a t e d n e(sm
s e d i a c)i o f h u m a na c t i r i n .
T h et e r mc o n s c i o u s n ehsassb e e no n eo f t h eo b s t a c l eosf . \ c t i r i r r T h c , , r r I n
oneof his seminalpapers.vygotskl'r-arsuesthatthe behaviour-r,tie
.rrr.lr.,..
ral biologistic)tendencvof psychology,
llas actuall\ castratingp:_rihr,l,,-lr fr.,
a b s t a i n i n gf r o m ( o r e i e n p r o h i b i t i n g )u s i n . ut h e c o n c e p t H
. .* rhcr ..,ir ,.\..
i n t r o d u c et h ec o n c e p o
t f consciousne$
s si t h i n a - t c n e r aal n t h r ( ) | ( ) l r ) !l\) . : I r tainingthe ntaterialandthe societalt-acts
of hurrinnlif'el
I w i l l u s et h e s v s t e r n a t i s irnnt r o d u c e di n s e c t i o n3 . 1 . - 1i .n d i . a r r n Lr h . , lr l r r
t o t a lf i e l d c r fa n t h r o p o l c l gd ye a l su i t h t h e g e r t e r u. ls p t ' t i l i t r' si H L t t r r t t t t k pT: ,h; t
s u b f i e l d so f s o c i o l o g va n dp s l c h o l o - sc\ o ' e r . o n t h e o n eh r n t l .n r a r r c r , , , i. , ,
cieties.andon theotherhand.lnattersconcerningrhe ltturttttt
lrrii r irllrri. \1.,,ni n g h a sb e e ni n t r o d u c e d
asananthropologica
p lh e n o r n e n o nI t.. : ( ) !r \ ) l ( , r- !r,
a s p e cits s o c i e t a(l o r p u b l i c )m e a n i n ga sa p a r to f t h es p e c i t i e u l r L r r(c) t. 1. . r
t a i ns o c i e t yA. c c o r d i n g l rc, .o n s c i o u s n eisssd e f i n e da s t h ep \ \ c h r ) l ( ) g l r r! l( ) u n
terpartto culturalmeanin-rand thus ref-ers
to the part of the indir idull hunr.rrr
p s y c h et h a t i s i n t e r n a l i s erdn e a n i n gI. a r na l i t t l e h e s i t a ntto t r r r l p l c l p r ( )l h .
m o r a s so f d e f i n i n -ceo n s c i o u s n e sbsu. t a u a v t o m a k es e n s e( ) f t h e t e m rr \ r rr n
our terminolo-sy
to gi\ e it a rrreuttittg)
is thefbllori ing:
Part I: Foundationof Activitl'Theory'
205
A Definition of Consciousness
to be involvedin mediis thepotentialitliof theindir,'idual
Consciousness
is the internalisedcompetence
atetl octit'itt.ln particular.consciousness
to attachtheobiectof theactivit,vto theactionthroughthe motive.andthe
actionto the operationthroughthe specificconditionsof the goal of the
action. Both of theserelationspresupposethe capabilityof referring.
is the fieeing of
Thus. one of the central tunctionsof consciousness
of whatis immediatelypresent.
humanactivityfiom thenarrowness
is a specificu'ay of presencefound only in the humanindiConsciousness
vidual.a presence
that alwa,vsincludes(eitherin actualityor in potentialitl'tu
thatis thenot-hereandthe not-now,
vastsurrounding
of thehere-and-now
however.is not the only' exarnpleof the
This psychologicalpeculiarit.v.
subjectinvolvedin an activityandtheoblect
rnediationbetweenthe individLral
and its sorelationin which consciousness
of this activity.Anothernecessary
(public
(or
meaning)
are
counterpart
in our terminologysociological)
cietal
relations.which are likemediatorsis in interpersonal
involvedas necessarv
n i s ea c h a r a c t e r i r toi cl - h u m u n
rctiritr.
3.6
The Organisationand Division
of Human Activitv
In the precedingsection.the mediatedqualityof humanactivitywas repeat(possiblyto the point of approachingor evenexceedingthe
edly emphasised
)
of
thresholdofthe reader'sfatigue).Thereis. however.anothercharacteristic
sheercolequalimportance:the collectit'itt'ofhumanactivity.As rnentioned.
lectivityis alsofbundin the activitl,of. fbr instance.the greatcats.The colleccollectivity of the hunan actil'itf is morethanthat:it is preciselyztntediotetl
rlvln'.
I n t h ef i e l ds t u d ro l ' p r i m u taec t i \i t ) . i t i s a p p a r e nt ht a tt h e r ei : u l i m i t a t i o inn
just with the presthe goal-setting
of the apes.This limitationis not associated
of a potentialobject.It is baseddeeplyin the motivation.
enceor peri-presence
206
Ch.3: HumanActivitr
emotionalityand socialityof our primatecousins.In chapter2. the descriptit,n
of a chimpanzee
double-crossing
a srrongermemberof the groupprovidecilir
exampleof the quiteimpressiveintellectof this pon-eid.Hower.'er.
their intr-ilect doesnot stretchfar beyondthe individualisedgoal.In experirnents
n hcrc
apeshaveto cooperate
in orderto iulfil a task.theirachieventent
is ratherIou.r.
This possiblycouldbe explainedby theirlackof a languageof comnruniclri()n.
but suchan explanation
is probably'confusing
causeandef'tect.
Rather,it is becauseof the lack of a motil'ationaiandemotionaloriclrrlrl,n
towardcooperation
thattherehasneverbeenan evolutionarvpres\urct()\\,r'ri
t h e d e v e l o p r n e notf a b e t t e rs y s t e mo f c o m m u n i c a t i o nI n
. t h r ' c o n t e \ t( r t t h .
s o c i a l i t yt h a td o e se x i s ti n a p e s( i . e . .t h er e l a t i o no f d o m i n a t i o na n da l l i u n i c ,r .
t h e y a c t u a l l yh a v ed e v e l o p e d
a n a d e q u a t cer r r n m u n i c a t i osnr r t en r . r i r ei r n ,\ n
verbalcommunication
by meansof facialexpression
andboclrpo\turc
c o m p a r i n gt h e a c t i v i t yo f t h e g r e a tc a t s( s i m p l ec o o p e r a r i o n*.r r h i r r r l . .
m e a n so f c o m m u n i c a t i o na)n dt h ea c t i v i t )o f a p e s( m o r ec o n r p l r c r t eudi r n r r r .
but at the sametime, the actir"ityis to a largeextentcarrie(lout br the .,,lrr.rrr
individual)with the activityof humans.n,efind in our u'r n acrrrrtr iln c\\cnt i a l l y m o r ec o m p l i c a t ecdo o p e r a t i o nI n. f a c t .i t i s a n r e d r a t ecd( r ( ) p c r r r i ((,\nr . 1
cooperationa
ml e d i a t i o nt.h e m e d i a t i o n avl e h i c l e so f c o o D e r r r t i thr e
n r r r rr r r r ' 1 .
andmeaning.
T h u s ,t h ec o o p e r a t i o nqaul a l i t yo f h u m a na c t i ' i t \ i s n o tj u s t a : h . r r r n -rr, t l h c
processof activit)'.but alsoof the very objectof the actirir\. Furrh!-frrr,rc.
lJ-,i:
s h a r e do b j e c ti s o t t e ns o d i s t a ntth a ti s h a st o b e r n e d i a t e d . . j uas. tr h e, , r . , ! . , 1 r . . ,
tion of the activityis so complicated.
inl'olr,'inga numberof intlir rtjuri. , ,,,c.r.,
p r o l o n g e da r e ao f t i m e a n ds p a c et.h a te r , e no r g a n i s a t i oi n
t s e l fn e e d . . rk r r . r, , i
mediation.
A s a n e x a m p l eo f h u m a nc o o p e r a t i o nl e. t u s e r a m i n et h ea c t l \ i t r . r ' . r r r , , L r f
o f c o n t e m p o r a rpye o p l el i v i n - ei n a h u n t e ra n d - s a t h e r ecru l r u r e T
. he lKurrr
peopleof Kalaharihavebeenstudiedby Lee (\919). Until recc-nrlr.
thc lKun-r
peoplehavebeenconsidered
to be oneof themost"primitir e" sroup\ot ali I rr
ing humanbeings.They havebeencalledHottentotsandotiencatelon:ctl r: .r
separate
biologicalentity,as a specialracewith a distinctline of oriqin. Ht,* ever,lheseracialor ethnic(not to savracistand ethnocentric)
rnisuncler:riintiings arenot our topic here.The point is what the activityof the !Kune peop1r.
cantell us aboutthecharacteristics
ofhumanactivrrvperse.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
207
For a firm believerin the cooperativecharacterof humanactivity',a cursorv
glanceat the life of the !Kungs can be a little disappointing.The dominant
activityof themalesseemsto be hunting.The menindeednormaliygo out in a
huntinggroup.but they actuall.vact ratherin parallel.splitting up to independently chaseand shoottheir individualprey.They arenot at all engagedin the
battue, the tavourite argumentof Leontiev for the mediatedcooperationof
human activity.In fact. the !Kung men's huntingactivitv is apparentlyeven
lesscooperativethanthat of the lions.
However.we haveto be carefulin judgingthe essentiality
of the respective
activities.The splittingup andthe individualityofthe huntarenecessary
in rhe
environmentthat containsthe activity.We can hardly expectthe !Kun-shunters
just to verity a theoryof which they haveno knou,ledge.
to cooperate
especial-
I
ly as a manifesthuntingcooperationwould frightenthe prey out of shooting
It
I
distance.rn
)
hunters.however.is apparentin the I'er1'selec,tion
of their objet.tof hunting.An
l
I
i
t
The essentialcooperativeness
and.furthermore.mediatedness
of the !Kung
anteiopeseenmany rnilesfiom the settlement|could easilybe the object(specific goal)of chasingandshooting.andthisaction,of course.canbe reaiisedby
the individual hunter.However.to be the objectof the entireactivity.that is the
hunting,somethingmore thanthe individualchasingand shootingis needed.
Therewould be no reasonat all to kill sucha big animaiif the motivewasjust
an individualfeastafterward.To getan adequate
lunch.thehuntermustdiminish his effort by choosinga prev more easilycaughtthan an antelope.rvith a
weightof a 100kg or evena buffaloseveraltimesasbig.
To be a reasonablechoicefor hunting.the antelopemust be the objecttbr not
just the hunterin question.but for the collectiveof peoplewith whom he is living in the settlement.The anteloperepresentsmeatfor not just himself.but for
l
the whole group of maybe20 individuals.and thereforethe kill has to be carried back to village. Therefore.after the killing. the hunterreturnsin quiet triumphrsto the settlementto gathera sutflcientgroup of f'ellow huntersto carry
the animalback.
Thus.grantedthatthe specificversionofLeontiev'shuntingstoryasthecrucial exampfe of the humanactivityis somewhatflawed.he is e.ssentialir.
quite
right.The activityof huntingis indeedan exampleof cooperation.
an example
of cooperationwith a rathercomplicatedinternalorganisationand mediation.
208
Ch.3: Human Activitv
The complexityandnediation.however.is not attachedto thefinding.chasrng
and shootingpart.but ratherto Ihe carrt'ittgpart of huntingactivity.
With this extendedmeaningof the hunting acrivity.rhe verv conceprof
activity accordingto Leontievis mostbeautifulh'demonstrated.
The distinction betweenthe objectiveof the activityandthe goal of a subordinate
acrion.
in fact. is fbund when the hunteris actuall,vleavingthe resultof the first part of
the huntingin orderto returnto the settlement.
The objectit.eo.fhi.sentire ttttilln is certainlvto takepossession
of the antelopeor a corresponding
anirnal.
but the goal of his uc'tictnof retttrningis to gathersomehelpersfbr the carvrng
action.we see.furthermore.that the activitl"of huntingis not indiviciualisecl
after all. In its totalitv.the huntinginvolvesa numberof peopleorganisedin
realisingits objective.and a con.rplexitl,'
of iictions.someof which havecoals
quiteditferentto. andsometimes
er,'en
directlyoppositeto. thisobject.
Thus.the directionof the returnin-s
actionis iiway'fiom the objectitself.In
returning.the hunter'sgoalof the actionis to gethelpto carrvthe anirnalhriek.
but his motiveis to obtaintheob.;ect
of theactivitvitself.
The activitvis not finishedu'henthe antelopeis caniedback.Thc prer al:.
has to be cooked.and in the preparationof the feast.the female sr'()LrP
r\
involvedas well, ultimatelr'.the whole settlement
is inlolved in the rcr\ IrLrrposeof theentireactivit,v.
thatis theeatingof theanimal.or to be rr()re\Peertr!,.
the f'eastthatinvolvesmorethanthe mundanebiolo-eical
operationof eutrnSrrr
itself.Thus.thesharingis not limitedto theeffbrtof takingtheanintaii1111r
Jrirssession:it evenincludestheconsumptionof it.
This modrfiedhuntingstorvcanbe seenassomewhatmalecentred. \\ ir) .,,r
consideran activityin which the femalestakea morecentralrolel rhe \\ ()rrL.
o f t h e ! K u n g p e o p l eh a v et w o s p e c i a l t i eass t h e i r m a i n a c t i r i t r . T h e l i r . r r .
gatheringfiuits androots.andthe secondis caringfor the smallchildrcn.f \l)c
cially thebabies.
In thegatheringof the ve-eetables.
thereis no needtbr organisin-u
rheacrrrrrr
as a complicatedcooperation.
becausethe objectsto be gatheredincludcrrranr
smalleritems.Thereis. hou er er.1 sirlrpsratitrn
in gatheringthatcon.espontl,
trr
thecarryingbackof thehunter'sprey.The resultof a day'scollectionof tl.uii..r
somedistancefrom the settlementotien corresponds
to the extentof the brs
g a m eo f t h em a l eh u n t e r s .
Therefore,the women haveto cooperatein carryingthe harvestback.As Lee
pointsout. a partof the materialcultureof thehunterand satherertvpethathas
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
209
backto thesettlement
beensomewhatignoredis thetechnologyof transporting
not only the garne.but alsothe harvest.This technologyconsistsof urte.facts
(tools),containers
devices.andtheknov'hov' ( societalmeaning)of
or carryin-u
cooper0tiIecarrying.
Examiningthe secondmajor t'emaleactivit)''.the careof the children.and
of the totalaetiviespeciallyof thebabies.we canseethevery macro-structure
ofactivity in thehunterandgatherers.
As we haveseen.thereis a cooperation
(or
ty. but no distinctdivisionof activity labourto usethetraditionaltermfrom
the more complicatedcultures)in the caseof either the rnalehuntersor the
f'emalegatherers.At the very apexof actii ity in its totality.however,we find a
division,andnotjust a temporaryone.but a permanentone as well. This is the
divisionbetweenthemaleandthet'emalerolesof theactivities.
In organisinga cooperative
activitylike this.the societalmeaningsystenris
n e c e s s a rtyo m e d i a t et h e i n d i v i d u a li n t e n t i o na n d k n o w l e d g ef r o m . f o r i n stance.a successful
hunterto his carryinggroup.This cclmmunicative
mediat i o nw i l l b e e x a m i n e d
i n t h ef b l l o w i n ss u b - s e c t i o n .
in HumanActivity
3.6.1 Communication
I havenow detinedhumanactivityby its intentionalmediation(or mediated
intentionality)and its collectivity.These double characteristics
imply the
necessitl,
of itttentionolconuntmication.
To deflnethis concept.we -gobackto
the pre-humansta-qe
to analyseanimalconrrnunication
in orderto find a starting pointtiom whichthehumancommunication
begins.
We saw in chapter2 thatpre-humancommunication
is predominantllbased
predispositions
on phylo-eenetic
of emittingand sendin-s
signals.Animal conimunicationthuspresupposes
a geneticallygiven code.Thereis no greatneed
tor anythingmore fancy'.becausepre-humanacti\ity is not 1et really mediational. Even amongthe apes.it is only the hierarchicalstrug-ule
that has the
imprint of a complicatedinter-individualactivity.and er.enthis kind of enterpriserarelyinvolvesrnorethana pair of monkeys.
Humanactivityis. however.by its naturebasedon thetollowin-s:
2r0
Ch.3: Human Activitv
Two Basic Preconditionsfor Human activitv
1.A complicated<-ooperotion
in a culturallydefinedorganisation
2. A meoningslstemthatis likewiseoutsidethe scopeof eitherthe
phvlogenetic
dispositionor theonrogenicresultof simplelearnin-e
T h u s h u m a na c t i v i t y b
. e s i d e si t s o p e r a t i o n apl l a n e .h a sa m e a n i n gl e v e la t
w e l l , a n d t h e s o c i a la s p e c o
t f t h i s m e a n i n gl e v e l i s h u m a nc o r . n n t u n i c a r i t r n .
Human communicationis an interpersonal
transt'er(andsontetimes
c\ en pr()c e s s i n go) f m e a n i n gT. h e i n t r a - p e r s o n caol u n t e r p a ri st c o g n i t i o nt.h a ri s . t h e
i n d i v i d u apl r o c e s s i nogf m e r n i n g .
We havenow discussed
threemajorf'eatures
of our species:tools,meaning
and organisation.Thesethreeareall constituents
of culture.Cultureis. houever,a very fragiletbrmation.It candisappear
in just one-qeneration
if theculture is not transferredfiom the parentsto their children.In a way. culture
definesthedispositionfbr theindividualsto actin a cerrainway.Thesedispositions are not presentas a birth gifi in the form of a phylogenicallydetermined
geneticsetup. Insteadof a baptismpresent.the bab;rhasto struggletbr many
years.indeedfor a lifetime, ro ctppropriotethe cultureinto which he or shehappensto be born.
Therefbre.thereis evena tburth constituentof culture.and consequentlv
a
fourth anthropologicalinvariant.This fourth anthropologicalinvariantappears
in the sociologicalsub-fieldasa sociological
constituent
andin thepsvchological sub-fieldas a psychologicalconstituent.The anthropolo_lical
inrariant is
transnissionof culture.The sociologicalconstituenriseducorioriandthe pslchologicalconstituent
is thechiid'soppropriatiort.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
3.7
2tl
Transmission
of Culture
(EducationandAppropriation)
Marx oftenusedthe metaphorof metaboiismu,henref-eningto humanactivity. If we takethis seriousl.v.
we conceiveof this self'-maintaining
processof
humanityasa closedcircle.whereculturalproductionis thefirst partof the arc
andculturalappropriation
is the second.The productionof tools.meaningand
organisational
structureis thus one sideof activit1,,.
the aspectof externalisation.r.','hereas
appropriation
is theotherside.theaspectof internalisation.
This grand circuit. in fact. is attachedto both kinds of anthropologicai
objects.the sociologicalobject(societl'1
andthe psvcholo_eical
one (a persoll).
culturai transmission
is. thus.a trvo-levelprocess.on the sociologicallevel.it
is a sociogenicprocess.an education.transmittingthe totalityof culturefl.om
one genelationto another.On the psycholo-uical
lerel, it is a pst'chogenic
process.an appropriation:
it is thedeleloprnenttrl
processin uhich thepersonality fbrmationof therndividualchild rakesplace.
The Sociologicaland PsychologicalAspectof
Cultural Transmission
Education
the sociogenicpl'ocess
transmittingthe
totalitv of culturelrorn
one generationto
another
Appropriation
thedevelopmental
process
ol personalitl
lbrrnationlor the
indii iclualchilcl
fig.3.7
212
Ch.3: Human Activitv
of cultureon
Having analysedthe conceptualstructureof the transmission
the societalas well as the psychologicallevel,next we examinethe dynamic
is r palt.
relationsof activityof which culturaltransmission
The Constituentsand Forms of Activitv
Constituentsof Activitv
Person
Form ofActivit]
Societ)
Protluction
V
Culture
V
Personalitv
Y
V
externalisation
of personality
internalisation
of culture
fig.3.8
of activity.andtwo laterall-n"
This circuitwith two relatants(theconstituents
reversedforms of actir,ityas the interactiveprocessesbetweenthesecttttstituents)
is presented
in thediagramabove.
j usta speFrom a p.ilc'ftolog,icalpoint of view. this is a proce:sconcertting
lnrnt
Ho"r'ever.
cific individual.namel1'theautopoesis
of his or her personalitv.
process.a societal
perspective.
it is a part of a supra-individual
a sociologic'ul
processof transmittingman'smostcostlvcollectivetreasurethroughthc individualconveyorsof society.In thischapter.thesupra-indiridualcarliersol culas majorconstituents
incessantly
ture.i.e.,toolsand signs.havebeenstressed
insutficientas a meansof culturaltransmissron.
of culture.They are.hou''e'u'er.
Without convevanceof the lon-e-livedculture through short-lil'edpersons.
qualitiesof thesupra-individual
culture.
therewould be no endurin-u
of'tultLuzandthe idiogenIn this wa1'.thereis a dialecticof the.iocro,qenesis
esisof thepet'sori.I uill usethe conceptidiogenesisto ref-erto the psychologiof the humanindir,idual.The concepthasbeen
cal aspectclf the ontogenesis
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
213
coinedt"to emphasise.
on theonehand.personalityformationassomethingdistinct in relationto the biologicalaspecrof ontogenesis.
on the otherhand.the
conceptis intendedto stressthe radicalindividualitr'.the uniquenessof the
humanpsyche(i.e..personality)andof the process(personaiity
developrnent.)
by which personalityis fbrmed.
The transmission of culture hasalreadybeennotedfbr its curiousfunctlonal duality.thedualfunctionsbeing.on rheonehand.personalityformationancl.
o n t h e o t h e rh a n d .i n t e r - g e n e r a t i o nt a
r al n s m i s s i oonf c u l t u r e T
. h e r ei s . h o w ever.evena dualitl'attached
to thecge[tsofappropriation.
Justastherearetwo
functionallevels.therearelikewisetwo a-sent
levels.a psl,cholo-rical
oneanda
sociologicalone.The psychological
agentis thechikl clet'eloping
herpersonttlrrl throughthe appropriationof the cultureinto which shewas born.From a
sociologicalperspective.
thesociological
agentis theinstitution ofeducation.
(or
the socicllogical
agent ratheractant)institutedbv the society,
in questionttr
ensurethe inter--eeneratiitnal
transmission
of culture.
This sociolo-sical
institutionof educationonlv recentlr-,
hasbeensegregated
asa specificsociolo-sical
svstemdedicatedto thetransmission
of culture.Such
a s p e c i a l i s ei dn s t i t u t i o nn. a m e l yt h e s c h o o l d. i d n o t e x i s tb e f b r et h e h i g h c u l turesof the BronzeAge. Anv culture.eventhe foragin-e
type.hower,er.hasan
i n s t i t u t i o no f e d u c a t i o na. l t h o u g ht h i s i n s t i t u t i o ni s s e n e r a l l Vn o t a n a u r o _
n o m o u so n e .
Thus.the famill. apprenticeships'"
trndinitiationrites(w,iththeirinstructors.
uho arernostolten the eldermen or \\'omen)areall non-dedicated
institutions
o f e d u c a t i o no. n e o f t h e t u n c t i o n s( o r p e r h a p tsh eo n l y ' f u n c t i o no)f a l l o f t h e s e
agentsot education.dedicatedor not. is an actiYit),with the objectir,eto transnrittheculture.This basiccategorvof actir,it,v
is whatis cor,ered
by theconcepr
erlucution.
Educationmay be carriedout bv a non-cledicated
agent.but it is by
deflnitiona specificprocessof culturaltransmission.
thatis. an activityhaving
thistransmission
asits ob.jective.
However.there are manl' other sociologicalprocessesgoing on that althoughthey have objectivesquite differentfrom culturaltransmission.
they
nevertheless
aretvorkingin sucha',r,avthat thel,hai,ethe ef-fectof enforcing
thistransmission.
T h u s .w h e n e v e cr h i l d r e na r e w i t n e s s etso t h e a c t i r i t i e so f g r o w n - u p st.h e
fbrmerareinfluencedb1-the latter.Suchactir.'ities
arenot only withouta dedi-
Ch.3: HumanActivity
2t4
cation toward cultural transmission.they are also unspecifiedas having an
I call socialisaobjectivethat is somethingelse.Theseunspecifiedprocesses
tion.
of socialisationrepresent.
The institutionsof educationand the processes
however.only one type of the sociologicaltorcesof culturai transmission.
the
namelythe side of the forces of socialisation.The other side represents
to
the
which
is
attached
namely
appropriation.
of
socialisation.
counterpart
child her-or himself.
The Forcesand Processesof Cultural Transmission
Cultural Transmi$sion
/\
The Cultural
Recei!er
The Cultural
The Unspetific
Form
fhe Non-dedicated
Form
II
I
{ppropriation
Socialisation
;::lil::
fig.3.9
Part I: Foundation of Activity Theory
215
I will definesocialisationas thatprocessthroughwhich the child'sappropriationis facilitatedand modified.The rerm education is thus reservedfor
socialisation
processes
andculturalinstitutionsdedicatedto this objective.
3.8
The Relationbetweenthe Biological
and SociologicalObject Fields
we ha'e now provideda sketchof the anthropologicalobjectfield, a sketch
to be elaboratedupon in the following chapters.Beforeconcludingthis preambleto the study of man.however,I will introduceiwo of the most important
rssuesassociatedwith the foundationof this field. The first is the relation
betweennatureand c'ulture.betweenthe biologicalandsociologicalin human
beings.The secondis therelationbetweenthehumanindit'idualand theltumun
coLlective.and thus alsobetweenthe psychologicaland sociologicalobjectsof
the anthropologicalobjectfield.
3.8.1 The RelationbetweenPhylogenesis
and
Sociogenesisin the Evolution of Humankind
In the anthropologyadvocatedfbr in this treatise,the anthropogonicieap rs
characterised
as a transitionfrom the biological objectfield into the anthropological one. At the sametime, this leap is a transitionfrom one type of evolution to another,i.e.,fiom thebiogenesis
of naturalselectionto the sociogenesis
of culturalhistory.''This transitionis discussed
in the presentsection,because
it is markedby a particulardialecticthat canbe describedasa 3-staqeDrocess:
i
I
I
r
I
I
I
Ch.3: Human Activity
216
The 3-stageprocessof Anthropogenesis:
stageof purephylogenesis
1. thepre-anthropoid
2. theanthropoidtransitionstage- thedialecticsof naturalandcultr.rral
positiveselectionvalueand
evolution(cultureasa self-eler.'ating
pressof selection.)
3 . t h ea n t h r o p i set a g eo l p u r es o e r o g e n e s i s
in thetollowing sections.
Thesethreestagesarediscussed
3.8.1.1 The Pre-anthropoid Stageof Pure Phylogenesis
u asdescribedearlierasan interplayof.
The biogeneticprocessof er.'olution
on the one hand. the evolutionarvpressurefrom the eco-nicheof a certlin
speciesand.on the otherhand.the selectionvalueof rnolphologicalandethtll o g i e ucl h a n g eost t h e: p e c i e s .
eventuallyreacheda certainpoint in thc
The processofpure phylogenesis
This evolutionan'pt,lnt
line of evolutionleadingto our immediateancestors.
not
was realisedwith the arrivalof a speciesof the family Homo. possesslns
oi
primitive
svstenl
yet
rather
only a pre-culturelike thatofthe apes.but a real.
that was culturallyand not geneticalll'tlanstools.meaningand organisation
mitted.
leapcameabout.asalreadrsaid.
How andwhenthisdecisiveanthropo-sonic
assumedamongphysicalanthroIt is generally'
is still a mattefof speculation.
jump". but in fact.our
pologiststhatHomo Habiliswaspastthis anthropo-eonic
knowledgeaboutthepossiblecultureof this probableancestoris quitemeagre
of little importancer'"hetherthe end of purephvlogeneindeed.It is. horve'u'el.
the remainsof a
to precisely'
is to be nrttached
sis and the startof sociogenesis
presumedspeciescalled Hqmo Habilis or ratherto some sli-ehtlydifferent
earlier.The rnainpoint is the theoretical
anthropoidtbssils.datedsomevuhat
distinctionbetween.on the onehand.therealpre-historvof man (i.e..our pure
phylogeneticancestr)) andon the otherhand.the real claun of humanhistory
(i.e..the inventionof culture.thenteansof rnediated
acti\ it) ).
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
2r7
3.8.1.2 The Anthropoid Transition stage- the Dialecticsof
Natural and Cultural Evolution
In thetransitionalstage.therewasnot a dichotomy.but an interplaybetween
thebiologicalfbrcesof phvlogenicevolutionandthe anthropological
fbrcesof
culturaldeveiopment.
The relationbetweengeneticsandculturewas thusvery
differentfiom the logics found in the pre-anthropoidstageand alsofromthe
presentanthropicstage(to be discussed
shortll,).
In both the first andthe laststage.therewas no realrelation.This sirnilarity
betweentheseextremestages\.ras.however.of a negativecharacter,
asthereasonsfor the lackingrelation\\''erenot the same.In the pre-anthropoidstage,the
missinginterylaywasdue to the lack of culturalfbrces.In the anthropicstage.
its causewastheterminationof genetice."'olution.
In the middlestageof anthropoidtransition.thereu,as.however.a vigorous
interdependence
betweenphylo-eenetic
and cultural er,olution.The relation
wasa circleof double-positive
f'eedback.
on theonehand.thealreadyexisring
culturewas at any point exercisinga selectionpressure
on the geneticdisposition fbr producingand appropriatingculture.on the other hand.the growth in
suchdispositions.that is. in the menralpotentialitiesfor the developrnent
of
skillsandabilities.wasa conditionfbr thefurtherer.olutionof culture.
Indeed.this was a gloriouspartnership
betweennatureand culture.So why
did sucha dynamicandsuccessful
reiationship
evercometo an end'lrhis question is to be answeredin thesectiondevotedto thethird andfinal stage.
3.8.1.3 The Anthropic Stageof Pure Sociogenesis
culture only exerciseda selectionpressureand the evolutionof phylogenic
dispositionfbr appropriating
cultureonly represented
a seiectionvalueas long
as the presentphylogenetics
\\,asa banier tbr culturalevolution.Two changes
took placeas a resultof evolutionin the transitionalsta-ee.
In f'act.therewas a
changeassociated
with eachof thetwo relatants.
The maturationof the phylogenicevolutionresultedin a mentaldisposition
of the humanindividual:therewas no longera needfbr any furtherimprovement. In other words. the mental equipmentfor most human inciividuals
becamesufficientfor the appropriationof any fbrm of humancultureand even
fbr participation
in thecurrentproductionandculturalevolution.
218
Ch.3: HumanActivity
Thus.culturehad matured.Consequently.it becameincomparablyeasierfor
changesto takeplacein the culturalsystemthanin the phylogenicdisposition
for appropriatingand modifying culture.
hasbeenthoroughlydefeatedby culturalevolution.
Actually.phylogenesis
There are severalreasonsfor this fact. Cultural changesare much fasterthan
geneticones.The systemof culture is also more flexible and has a higher
The sysdisposition.
structurethanthelaterpartof phylogenetic
organisational
havethe
do sometimes
tem of cultureis reflexive.thatis. theculturalprocesses
very culturefrom which the)'originateastheir target.
system
side.u'ecouldaddthepsychological
In a way.on theanthropological
ofpersonalityto the sociologicalsystemofculture.All thathasbeensaidabout
Accordingto
culturecouldjust as well havebeenstatedregardingpersonalit-v".
the definitionsof thesetwo concepts,hou'ever.thereis suchan intimateinterdependence
betweenculture and personalitythat in unisonthe.vhave to be
of phylogenesisin the anthropologicalevolution.In
placedas the successor
the functionof cultureratherthan personalit,"-.
this evolution.I havestressed
andnot idiogenesis.
whatwe aretalkingabouthereis sociogenesis
because
3.8.2 Biologismand Anthropism
the discussionaboutthe natureoi lif'e.
In the precedingchapter.I presented
wasclarifiedusingthe strugglebetweenmechanismandvitalThis discussion
ism as an example.and led ultimatell'toa sublationof the conceptualcontradiction. In the analogousdiscussionaboutthe natureof humanexistence.a
similar diatribeoccurred:a strugglethat broke out afterDarwin's Descentrf
of evolution.
andopponents
Man,belweentheadherents
This struggleis still ragingin its classicalform, especiallyin the U.S.,with
thesisof t retrno\\"gatheringunderthe pseudo-scientific
theanti-evolutionists
tionisnt.The theoreticalcontradictionin the conceptionof man is much more
generalandfundamental.
In fact.it is at thesametime echoingandsupplementandvitalism.
ing thefight betweenmechanisnt
Now
I havecalledthe polesof this contradictionbiologismandanthropisin.
we will meetthesetwo antagonists.
a reductionismof anthropologyto biology
The first pole is simultaneousiy
of biologv to the postulatedvalidity in the anthropological
and a hypostasy'
objectfield. Anthropologicalbiologisrnis a reductionistconceptionof human
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
219
nature;the brologistdeniesany specificquality of humankindthat is diff'erent
in principiefrom thosefound in the restof nature.
In contrast,the secondpole,unthroplsn. is an anti-biologism.Anthropismis
not only anti-reductionistic,
but.in fact.ardentlyopposedto thesuggestion
that
thereis any relationwhatsoeverbetween,on the one hand.htrmannature and,
on the other hand,plain nature,thus settinga dualism.This dualism suggests
that thereis no correspondence
betweenthe qualitiesof animal speciesand
humanity.Instead.the anthropistbelievesin two contrastingnatures.animal
natureand humannature.The socialconstructionisttendencyin the socialsciencesis a clear exampleof thrsanthropr.in,and is representedby Bergerand
Luckmann".
Thesenaturesareseenasoppositions.
The voicesofbiologismarein unrson,
whereasthereare many differentversionsof anthropistpositions.We have
alreadymentionedthe creationists,
who can be seenas a sub_eroup
of a religious view, also calledtheisn. Thus, theismis the pure dualism.fbr which
Descarteswas the most famousadvocate.Descartessaw the immortal.nonmaterial spirit ofman asthe essentialanthropoiogicalcharacteristic.
Afier the declineof theismand the growth of atheisticand positivisticphilosophy,the heritageof dualisticanthropism.to largeextent,hasbeentransmitted in humanitiesand social sciencesby anthropologiesthat often seemto not
be spiritualisticat all. at ieastin their own self-understanding.
However.they
deny that we have a phylogenicnatureresemblingthe natureof other species.
On the contrary,they claim that the characteristicsof any specific societyare
attachedto this peculiarkin structure,economicsystem,classdivision,language.history or any otherpart of their culture.
In this sociologistic,economistic.iinguisticor historisticconception(regardlessofthe specificbrandofthe culturalisticconception),
cultureis always
categoricallyopposedto nature.Culturein this contextrefersto what is unnatural,to all that we haveinventedourselves.in a sublimecontemptfor the
naturethat we left long ago.
The questionof absolutismor relativism is related to the antagonism
betweenbiologismand anti-biologism.In fact.absolutismis associated
with
the versionof biologismthat assertsthe existenceof a specifichumannature
thatis geneticallyfixed.In contrast.relativismis linkedto theculturalistictype
of anthropism.
Ch.3: Human Activitv
Just as in the former discussionon the natureof lif'e in relationto the inanrmatepartof cosmos.I am an advocateof a He-selian
sublationof thecontradiction betweenthe anthropolo-eical
eliminationof biologisticreductionismand
the anthropological
hypostasy
of anti-biologistism.
Human nature.as it is empirically found in any specifichuman indir.'idualin
any specific society.is accordin_u
to this conceptiona complicatedset up
involvinga combinationof ratherfixed phy'logenic
dispositions.
amongwhich
arethecapabilityof culturalappropriation.
andtheresultof thisculturalappropriation.The bestexpression
of this conception.
accordingto my evaluation.is
f o u n di n t h et h e o r lo i a c t i v i t l .
3.9
The Relationbetweenthe Human Individual
and the Human Society
We have discussedthe reiation betweenphvlogenv and sociogenetics.
betweenthe biologicaiheritageand the dynamicsystemof culture.The other
fundamentalquestionto be introducedconcernsthe relation betweenthe
humanindividualand the humansociety.and whetherit is tantamountto the
problemconcerningtherelationbetweencultureandpersonality.
Thesetwo relationsarequite dift'erentin type. The relationbetweenculture
and personalityis manif'estin the relationbetweenthe biologicalpre-hisrttn'
and thepost-biologicalhistor-r'ofhumans.and betweenthe biologicalpredispositionand the psychologicairealisationof this predispositionthroughthe
appropriation
of culture.Inbothcases.biologyref-ers
to theprimitivepreconditionsand anthropologyis its sophisticated
This relationis rather
continuation.
similarto the one betweenthe cosmologicaland the biologicalobjectfields.
Next,we will exploretherelationbetweenthedualobjectfieldsof anthropology. a relationof a very diff'erenttype.
The FrenchMarxistphilosopherSbveexaminesthis relationin a rnajorpart
of his book "Marxism andpersonalitvtheory"(1978).wherehe coinsthe ternt
jufiastrltcture position to ref-erto the relation.His ideais actuallythat personality is not somethingbiologicalin relationto thenon-biological
society.nor is it
a merereflectionor superstructure
of the basicstructuresof society.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
22r
It is clearfor two reasonsin particular
thattheconcrete
individualis nota
superstructure
of thesocialrelations.
In thefirstplace,whilebeingradically
functionally'deterntined
br,thesocialltase,socialindividualittdoesnot
occupya superstructural
positionwithre-eard
to it. sinceit is anittegrulpttrt
of thisbaseandits process
of reproduction:
thebasicindir,idual
lif-e-processesdo notappearor7thebasisof socialrelations.
part
theyarea
of them.In
thesecond
place.socialindividualitl,
itselfdevelops
withinbiological
individuals
whoassucharenotatalltheproduct
of thesocialbaseanditscontradictionsbutof a quitedistinctrealiti..
Thusalthough
theyarefunctionallv
detennined
bl thesocialbase(andits superstructures)
quiteas nrucliasthe
sLlperstructures
thentselVes.
indir,rduals
do notariseorrthisbasewithsuperstructural
characteristics
but areasit lr'erelaterallynteshed
ir *,ith it and
becomeu holly'subordinated
to it - althou-sh
it is notrheirut.tuol.sorrri:e
. To
designate
thisspecilictl'peof essential
connection.
u'hichdoesnotsolell
occurr',ithindividuals
moreover.
I sug-eest
thetermju.\tustnkture.l'
It would be an exa-egeration
to characterise
Sire's definitionas lucid.He is
not particularlyclearin his descriptionof personalitvor in theconceptionof its
relationto society.but he is evidentlyan advocatefor a relationalandto a certain extenta processual
understanding
ofpersonality.He considerspersonality
t o b e a n e x p r e s s i oonf t h e s o c i e t aal c t i v i t i e si n w h i c h m a n i s e v o l v e d a
. n dh e
stresses
thatpersonalitfis not the sol'ereignoriginatorof action.but a relatant
in a dialecticsin which activityis theprocessshapingpersonalitl'.
Capacirres
as
well as needsarethe resultof actir,'itv.
notjust the causesof actir,'itv,
Thereis
c o n s i d e r a b lceo n c o r d a n cien S d v e ' sa n d L e o n t i e v ' st h e o r i e so f t h e r e l a t i o n
betweenthe hun.ranpersonand society.a point that both of thesetheoristshar,.e
(Leontier.'
expressed
1983.Sdve1978).
I will providean interpretation
of this relation.departingfrom theconceptof
activitydetinedin thepresentchapter.The superordinate
ideaofthetheoretical
structuresetup in thisandthefollowingchapters
is thatwe hal.ejust onesingular process.but two typesof objectsin theanthropological
field.
The singularprocessis ofcourseactivity.which is not theexclusivepractice
of societyor the separare
behaviourof humanindividuais.Actir,.ityis by definition associated
with bothtypesof objects.asdepictedin thediagrambelow:
222
Ch.3: HumanActivitv
The Relation betweenthe Human Individual
and the Human Societv
Activitl
Person Personality
Society
Culture
fig.3.r0
The relationbetweenthe two discriminateobjectsof anthropologyis preciselythe ruling processofthis field. that is, the activityin which both objects
mustnecessarily
be simultaneously
involved.
However,it would be a misunderstanding
to talk aboutthe interplc..,.between
the two. We cannottruthfullydescribethe relationas an interactiorr.in which
two objectsareperformingunderconditionscharacterised
by a spatialrelation
of separation
anda processof physicalinteraction.
The Relation betweenthe Human Individual and
Human Societyaccording to the Interaction Model
Model of Interaction
fig.3.rr
Part I: Foundation of Activity Theory
))1
The mechanicaimetaphorof two collateralobjectsin interactionis a false
model,as Sdvepointsout. We can talk aboutthe interactionbetweentwo personsor betweentuo societies.The relationbetweenpersonand societyis.
however.not collateral.The personis. in a way. a part of society.not a thing
apaft.The conceptof interactionis thereforelogically wrong. In a mereological
relation':.thereis hypotaxicalcoordinationbetu,eenpart and whole.which is
quitedifferenttiom theinteractionbetweentwo collateralobjects.
We will analysethe ideaof a simpleu'hole-partrelationshortlv.However.
thereis anotherkind ofconnectionthat is otien usedto describethe personsocietyrelation.namely,
thecclncept
of interactionaccordin-e
to theinteractionistic socialpsychologyoftheoristslike Parsons.'"
The Relation betweenthe Human Individual and the
Human Societyaccording to the Model of Interactionism
Model of Interactionism
fig.3.r2
In interactionism.the interpersonalinteractionis seenas the fundamental
societalprocess.and soclerl is the total systemof theseinteractions.On the
other hand,personalitvis constitutedby the total systemof interactionsin
which a specificindividualis involved.
The modelthatconceivestherelationbetweenindividualandsocietywill be
analysedas.r.r's/enri
c. that is. as a relationbetweena componentof a systemand
theentiresystem.
224
Ch.3: HumanActivity
The Relation betweenthe Human Individual and the
Human Societyaccording to the SystemicConception
SystemicModel
fig.3.13
This is in a way a betterdescription
thantheothermodels.asthehumanindividual hereappearsin the form of a tiny'cog in the hugemachineof societl'.
This pictureis. no doubt.li'ell suitedto theexperience
ofour personalexistence
in the Kafka-likeweb of modernor evenpost-modernsociety.The pictureis.
however.r."'rong
atier all. The personcannotbe reducedto a societalcomponent.Strictlyspeaking,
thepersonis not at all a realsociological
object.
I preferto takethe idea of Sevdanjuxtastructure
to its logical conclusion.
wherewe har"ea third possibilitythat in somerespectshassimiiaritiesto borlt
of thepreviousmodels.andat the sametime is in contradiction
to bothof thern.
The kernelof truth in the interactioirmodelis thatthe personhasan indii idualityand autonomythatcannotbe reducedto the logic of society.However.
thelalsit1,isthatthepersonis not a totallyindependent
entity.because
he or she
hasdevelopedandexistsentirelyon societalconditions.
The kernelof truthin the.sr'.r/ent
modelis thatthehumanindir,'idual
is actually a componentof the partof societyto which he or shebelongs.The falsity'ot
thispositionis,however.thatthepersonis notjust a component.
but at thesar.ne
time is a uniqueandlargell'autonornous
individual.
I shallpropagatethe versionof Actit'itv Theorl,describedabove.not as a
compromise.
but ratherasan attemptedsublationof thesetwo modeis.
If we takethestepfiom theontologicaldiscourse
to thetheoryof science.
the
questionis how we canunderstand
therelationbetweentherespective
theoretical flelds.This problemwill be a centraltargetfor the rernainingpart of the
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorv
))<
treatise.I shall.however.pre-emptmy suggestion
that the total domainof the
anthropologicaldisciplinescan be conceivedof as the mother-disciplineof
anthropologyand the two sisterdisciplines.psychologyand socioiogy.In the
disciplineof anthropology.we introducethe most basicconceptsand assertionsaboutour species:octivitl andits immediatesub-concepts,
theconceptof
dnthropogene.vs
consistingof the threestagesdescribedabove,and two specific anthropological
objects.hLtnnnperson.s
andhumunsocieties.
In precedingsections.
the problemsof foundationhavebeenaddressed
and
subsequentll,the
respective
positionsin philosophyandin the relevantscientific disciplinehavebeenintroduced.In therelationbetweenthehumanindividual and the humansociety.the ontologicaicomplexitiesarerepresented
in the
contradictions
oftheoreticalpositions.The basiccontradiction
is betweenpsychologismandsociologism.
3.9.1 PsychologismandSociologism
The simplestpositionsin the controversyaboutthe individualand society
arethe two reductionistic
schools.that is psrcftologismandsociologi,sru.
Psychologismasserts.
in its mostextremefbrm. thatsocietyis not an existingentity. but only an abstractiondesignatingcommonaspectsof indir,'iduallife. At
the dawn of sociology.this positionof so-cailedmethodological
individualisnr
was def-ended
bv Tarde(1969) in his famousdiscussionwith his antasonist
Durkheim( 1966).who wasdef'ending
a methodological
collectivism.
Thus.the claim of methodologicalcollectivismfor the existenceof socrol o g i c a lo b j e c t si s d e n i e db 1 ' p s y ' c h o l o g i s m
I n.s t e a dt.h e i n d i v i d u a lp e r s o ni s
seenas an unconditionalentity'.ratherunaff-ected
by the society.which after all
is not in existence.
Socialprocesses
areseenastheresultclfpsychological
phenomena.Thus. Jung in his analysisof the grou'in-eNazism in the thirties
explainedthis phenomenonas the resultof someGermanicarchetypes
(Jung
1970).
To be exact.it might be adr,isable
to distinguishbetweenan ontologicaland
a theoreticalpsycholo-uisnr.
The ontologicalpsychologismreducessocietal
entitiesand phenomena
to psvchologicalones.'-Accordingto theoreticalpsychologism.all explanations
of socialphenomenaare unnecessar-v.
as the psychologicalexplanations
areasserted
to be suftlcient.A positionofontological
psychologism
impliesa theoretical
pst chologism.but not vice versa.
226
Ch.3: Human Activity
The positionof sociologismmeans.in the extreme.an ontologicalsociologism.or a denialof the very existenceof individualpersons.a stanceactually
takenby somestructuralist.The more moderatepositionsof theoreticalsociologismassertonly thatpsychological
theoryis falseor redundant.as all seemingly psychological
phenomena
canbe explainedby sociological
theory.
Any hypostasy
of theschoolswithin thesocialsciences
tendsto a socioiogistic position.For instance.
the psychologyof the Sovietu'asalmosttotallyprohibitedby Stalinin thethirties.whena rathersociologistic
versionof Marxrsm
wastheruling ideology.'*
The dichotomouschoicebetu'eenthe dual reductionismof psychologisrn
and sociologism.
of course.hasfrustratedpsychologistoften.as well as social
scientists.
Especiallyin themediatingfield of sociaipsychology.
therehasbeen
a markedal'ersiontowardsthis choice.Therefore.it hasbeenpopularto avoid
both extremesb.vacceptinga dualisticposition.which could be calledsocropsychologism.
Socio-psychologism
rs interactionistic.
in a way resemblingmetaphysical
interactionism.
wherethe dual substances
of matterand mind arein a mutual
relationof interaction.Thus. the individual aff'ectssocietythroughhis/her
actions.andin returnis influencedby the societalprocesses.
The positionadvancedin this treatisecouid superficiallyresemblesucha
socio-psychological
interactionism.
This is. however.certainlynot the case.It
is true that I assertthe existenceof separateand ratherautonomichumanindividuals as well as a humansociety.and it is likewisecorrectthat I describe
activityastherelationbetweenthesetwo entities
Activitl,. however.is not an interactionlike a double feedbackcircle of
causallyinterconnected
objects.Whereasinteractionis secondary
to thequalitiesof the interconnected
objects.activityis primaryto both of its humanrelatants.This canbe statedlike this:
Interaction rs an erternalrelationbetweenthe interactingobiects
thatexistindependently
of theinteraction.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorr
'r)1
In contrastto this:
Activity is an internalrelationbetu'eenthe individualand society,
which meansthat both of theseobjectsonly erist throughthis relation.tu
This conceptionofthe relationis thusa directconsequence
ofthe definition
of activitl,fiom page2 I 3:
The Definition of Activitv
Human activitf is the societally-formed life process realised
through the actions of the individuals participating in it.
3.10 The Meta-scientificRelationsof
the AnthropologicalDisciplines
we shallfinish this chapterlr'ith a shortintroductionto the meta-scientific
consequences
of theconceptionof activityjust described.
The meta-scientific
positioncorresponding
to this conceptioncan be illustratedbv the diaerambelow:
228
Ch.3: Human Activitv
The Meta-scientific Relations of
the Anthropological Disciplines
General Activitl, Theorl'
Pre-divided
/\
. / \
/
\
/
\
/
Ps1chologl'
Sociologl
fig.3.14
The theory field of anthropologycan be dir,idedinto ps,vchology.
sociology
and the general,super-ordinate
basic atthropologt that logical prior to both
psychologyandsociolog.v.
in vitueof consistingof the anthropological
characteristicscommonto humanindividualsandhumansocieties.
This prior part is
lhe generultheort o.l'actit'itv.
It shouldbe notedthatthe meta-scientif
ic relationof theoryfieldsbetl'u,een
this pre-dividedanthropologyand the specificdisciplinesof psychology'and
sociologyminors the objectrelationsbetweenactiviry.psychologyand sttciology.The super-ordinate
Theoryof Activity containsthe basicdefinitionsand
thesesof the anthropological
theorl'field. This contenris commonfbr psychology andsociology.Actuall1".
mostof thischapterhasbeenpreciselydedicated
to this super-ordinate
theorl'.In a wa1'.it is a disciplinethatcanbe calledphilosophicalanthropology.but I will ai'oid defining it as philosophyand riither
conceiveof it asthe mostgeneralpartof the scienceof anthropolo_r1'.
Theseissueswill be thoroughll'exploredin the later chaptersthat cover
thesedisciplines.
In the follow'ingchapters.hou,ever.u'e
miike an ercursioninto some
"lill
philosophicalareasthat haveto be clarifiedbetbreu,ecan presentan acri\.it)
t h e o r e t i c ael x p o s i t i o no f t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c adli s c i p l i n e sI.n a c a d e m i cd i s course.it is not enoughto know v'hot v'e ure tulkitt,qabout: we shouldalso
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorl
229
know rr'lialv'eure.irnlng.Therefbre.the nextchaptersrvill coverproblemsof
knowledge.meaningandscience.
Notes
I
The readershouldbear in mind that I am usingthe term biological hereto refer to
all non-humanorganisms.
2
Psychologyis ref'erringto hnr.nanps1-cholo-uy.
not comparativepsychology.both
hereandin theremainderofthistreatise.
3
Suchspeculative
andcertainlvstimulatingtheoriesarefbund in Leontiev(1973)
( 198:l).
Lovejol'( I 98 I ) andEngelsted
-l
It shouldbe notedthat the rerrn"culture" hastrvo ratherdifferentdenotations.
a
broadone anda narrou one.In the broadsenseusedin thrstreatise.culturesignilles humanactivities
andall thatis producedb1'them.In the nanor.i,
sense.culture
standsfbr thoseactivitiesandthoseproductsthathaveno directpracticalaim. but
are either ol value in themselvesor as a sl,mbolicexpressionof such values.
\\'eber( 1964).tbr instance.
distin-euishes
ben',eenthe rationalitvofa goalandthe
rationalityof value.The narro* definitionof tulture is associatedwith value
rationalit)',
A revealingtrait of our societl'.no doubt.is thatgenerallywe makea
distinctionbetweenthe rr.refirl.
itr.\trunrettolpart.
thebasicpart(i.e..activitiesand
prcrducts
out.sitle
culture.suchastechnologl.economicsand politics)andculture
itself.the icing on the cake(i.e..somethincuithout actualuse.but niceto haveor
i
toexhibir).
5
6
1
8
Herequotedfionr ( Bror',n 199I . p. -5-1i.
( B o a s1 9 8 ' 1 t .
(BenedictI 93-1i.
t M e a d1 9 2 8 1. 9 3 5 t .
(Malinousk1
y 961i.
l0
( W h o r f1 9 , 5 6 t .
ll
Brown ( 1991)is an excellentexponenttbr a modernuniversalisnt.
by demonstrating thetalsitl'oftheclaimsolthe relativists.
searchrng
tbr anthropological
universals.anddenvingneitherthespecificitl,of theindrvidualculturesnorthe necessity
of studvingthem tiom an internalperspective.
l2
The verdictthatthe thesisis empiricalis fbrmulatedin accordance
with the Popper'sphilosophyofscience.Empiricalis. hor'",ever.
not to be understood
asexperimental.asPopperprei'ered.but to be evaluat
The categorical
constituents
areall the decidingcharacteristics
ofa culture.such
asthetbrm ol its meaningsvstem.tool svstemandor,ganisation
svstem.
1 . 1 (Peters& Mech 197-5
i.
l-l
230
Ch.3: Human Activitv
l5
( L e o n t i e v1 9 7 3p. . 1 6 8 ) .
l6
(ibid.).
l7
Poulsen(199-l) has developeda theort of conation built on this distincrion
20
betweensimplemotivationandthepossession
of a conscious
motire.
"For
Leontier,writes:
the animals.the objectand the motive of activit\,- as \\'e
havealreadvpointedout - arealwaysamalgamated
andcoinciding."1ibid1.
The use and fabricationof insrrur.nents
of labour.althougheristingin the germ
amongcertainspecies
of animals.
is speciticallv
characteristic
of thehumanlabourprocess.
andFranklintherefbre
definesmanas a tool-making
animal(Nlarx1996.
part3. chapter7I.
(Passingham
1981.l-53ff).
2l
However.it shouldbe keptin rnindthata majormorphological
chan-ue
is a biolog-
18
19
ical presupposition
fbr this post-bioloeicaldevelopmenr.
rhis changebeing the
quantitative
andqualitativegrou,thofrhe brain.This point is cliscussed
in ser:rion
3.8.
22
( F i c h t e1 9 6 5p. . 3 1 8 .a u t h o r ' rsr a n s l a r i o n ) .
23
( H e g e l1 9 8 6p. . 3 6 5 ) .
21
( H e g e1
l 975.p.350).
25
(Marx 197,1.
p. 57-1).
26
( L e o n t i e r ' & P a n o1r '9 6 3 . p . 1 2 ) .
21
Noticethedifferencebetrveen
intentionandintension.
28
The generalrnorphologicaland ethologicalparsimonr.of course.is re'"ersed
regardingthe brain and the potentialitiesassociatedrvith this organ,that is. innate
dispositions
thatsecuretheappropriation
of languageandculture.
29
In contrastto ilnterial culture.the meaningsl,stemis sometimescalled the fu1ea1
culture.I generalll'ar,oid
this expression.
becauseto m),tasteit hasa someuhat
dualistict-lavour.
30
Anthropologists
who do not like this evolutionarvr) pe of expressionwould discussthe differencebetweenthe oral and written meaninss\,stem.We u,ill returnro
this issuein chapter6.
3l
The proto-actions
areexcludedhereasunaroidabl,vdisturbingprecursors
modif_ring. but not definingtheessentiality
ofanimalacri\ir].
32
( V y g o t s k y1 9 7 8 p, . 5 - l ) .
S e e( D e s m o n d1 9 7 9 ) .
3.1 (Vygotsky 1925)."Consciousness
as problemin the psychologyof Beharior"
(ori,q.articlein K.N. Kornilor'(ed.)Psikhologiia
i marksizm.Moskva( 1925)Sor,r33
et Ps1'chetlogt
1979,\ltl. XV71,1:3--35.
35
The prefixedexclamation
mark in "!Kun-e"is not an expression
of theenthusiasm
of the authoraboutthis group ol people.but is actualll'referringto a specific
phonemeoftheir language.
a so-calledclickine-sound.
36
The shootingdistanceis the distanceofan arrow projectedfiom a bow.
Part I: Foundation of Activitv Theorr
23r
It is of coursecrucial that all people.even the nomads.do have a settlement.This
aspectof the living conditionsis intimatelyrelatedto the totality of human aclivity, asit will appearin the following.
hasto be quiet.as thereis a severenorm of modestyin the
3 8 The triumphactuall-v
!Kung culture.The hunteraccordinglyrvill explainthat he regrettablyenoughhad
very bad luck. just killing a miserable.little rabbit.The very fact that he is returning empty-handed
shou'sthatthis storyis.in fact.a purepretension
u,ith(Rasmussen
1978).
The conceptwasdevelopedin cooperation
39
,10 (Lai'e& Wenger1991).
''Uberthis transitionis called
4 l Using the terminoloeyof Critical Ps1'chology.
g a n g s f e l d - T i e r - M e n sScehe.( H o l z k a m p1 9 8 5p. . 1 6 1 ) .
,44
( L e a k yl 9 8 l ) .
+-1
r B e r g e&
r L u c k m a n n1 9 6 7r .
44
( S b v e1 9 7 8 . p . 1 , ! 1 ) .
( S e e2 . 7 ) .
16
11
(Parsons
and 1962t.
& Bales19,56
48
In 1936.the centralcomitr-of the Sor,ietUnion passeda resolutionwith the title
"On the Pedological
Distortionsin the Systemof People'sCommissariat
of Edu(Petrovsky'
cation"
I 990.252ff).Pedologywasaneclecticdisciplineintendingthe
Herbertlversenn'rites.
Thusthe DanrshPhilosopher
originat a certain
timeat a ceftainlocation
on
I wouldliketo knos.\\hatof hunran
indiridunllirin.qhunnn
Earthcan be tracedbeside.Denenlrand behind.speti.fir'.
Dein.gs.
Peterand Petrine.Thomasand lUar1.Ivan and Sonja.Abdul Khan and
1 ri billion)- andtheirdii}erent.
Chingo-puh
etc..c-tc.
{atthetirrebeing.ali together
- andin supplement.
rpecificsmallmanifestations
of lite. 'material"
and 'spiritual"
persons.
if rou uan1.theproducts
oi thesepersons
andof deceased
suchashouses.
ships.car:.furniture.
clothes.
books.pieces
of art.
. . .. Perhap:
I canfind it in an old glasschestin a basement.
or someold rneticu*ork called.r
sheIousgoldsmrth
cro\\n.a sceptre
or thelikeor someoldparchment
uritinganduith sealing
uax. or on a loli. a coloured
tlaguith
etsuith flourishrng
mornings
and
se*n liguresandfabulous
monster\
to be hoisted
up on a barcertain
leti thereto be aireduntildark.I ask.of an)'thesepiecesof handicrafior industrl'
ghichrs thestate.)Itnone.I am afiaidthatsucha 'state"is
insidecenainhouses.
Whitehallor anvotherstreetor
notat all to beprocured.
ireilheron \['ilhe]lrnstrasse.
cin' or anvotherspecificgeographical
locationon thisEarth.
statecanthusbefirund.Theydo
.... Neither
thePrussran.
theEnglishor an)'other
notexist.(Iversen
19 18. p. 2-19-5
I ). fAuthor's
translation
tiom Danish.l
integrationofphysiologi'.ps)'chologyandpedagogfinto an integrated
scienceon
child development.
andits ban wasin itselfno greatlossfbr science.It was.however.a deadlypoisoningof academicfreedom.A greatpart of psvchologl'.suchas
uas in fact blacklistedaspedologicaldistortions.
Whatthe rvritingsof Vy-eotsky.
ever the politicaland ideologicalmotivesfor the pedologyban.it represented
in
my view a sociological
tendencyin the Stalinistversionof vulgarMalxism.
49
distinguishingbet*'eenexternaland internalrelaOsterberg( 1972)suggested
tions.The first kind denotesthoserelationsbetweenrwo entitiesthat can disao-
232
Ch.3: Human Activity
pearwithout an annihilationof the entitl',or a total changein its essence.The second kind denotesthoserelationsthat arebasicto existenceor essence.The concept
of an intemal relationis inspiredbv Marx's analysisof the internol t:ontradictiorts
in the tbrmationof capitalism(Marx 1974).