Franklin W. Schwartz
School of Earth Sciences
The Ohio State University
• BNL established by DOE in 1947
• Located on Long Island New York 100 km east of
Manhattan
(from BNL, 2007)
• Training base for
soldiers in WW I and
WW II
• Unconfined aquifer at
BNL likely contaminated
from military days
• Presence of pre-existing
contamination
magnifies issues related
to tritium leaks
• Brookhaven Graphite
Research Reactor 1950-1968
• High Flux Beam Reactor
- heavy-water-moderated
and cooled reactor
- operated 1960s to 1997
- spent-fuel pool leaked
tritium
• Small medical research
reactor
• Spent fuel pool contained 250 m3 gallons of water
with tritium concentrations ranging 40x106 to
140x106 pCi/L - leakage rates 25-35 L/d
• Several down-gradient monitoring wells installed in
July 1996 with first sample results released in
December 1996
• By January 1997, clear that groundwater
contaminated by tritium at concentrations above the
EPA Standard of 20x103 pCi/L.
• Studies eventually showed the spill to be relatively
minor with no migration off-site
• Yet, significant public reaction (outrage) related to
their perception of serious risks associated with the
spill and lack of confidence in BNL
• Federal administrative response to spill decisive
- fired Associated Universities Inc (AUI) who had
run lab since 1947
- four lab directors in one year
- local politicians held hearings
• Upper Pleistocene Deposits – ~35 m sand and outwash
• Gardiners Clay – mainly massive green silty clay ~confining
• Magothy aquifer – ~800 feet thick, Cretaceous sand aquifer
(BNL, 2004)
Water Table Map
• December 1996 tritium found in monitoring wells in
vicinity HFBR
• News followed hard on heels of news of solvent spills
one year earlier that had impacted wells south of the
site
- 1st spill January 1996 required supply 800 houses
- 2nd ethylene dibromide (EDB) spill found in 1996
required another 500 hookups
• Shallow unconfined sand and gravel aquifer affected
by contaminants
• Variety chlorinated solvents
(CT, TCA, PCE)
• Moving south in direction of
gw flow
• Some areas (yellow) conc >
500 ug/L
• Plumes impact residential
areas to south
• Pump and treat and
recirculation w. in-well
treatment
• Rapid/precise plume mapping highly resolved spatial sampling
• 45 GeoprobeTM wells < 35 m depth
• 77 Vertical profile wells (snapshot)
- hollow stem augers
- sampled 1.5 to 3 m intervals
• 27 conventional monitoring wells
• 1800 samples collected
• Characterize leakage along SFP, max concentrations
- concerns about other possible upgradient sources, pits etc.
• Two horizontal wells designed specifically to target upper 0.7
m of saturated gw system
- actual installation 1.5 m below water table
(from BNL, Tritium
Remediation Project, 1998)
• Portion exceeding standard
20,000 pCi/L extends 800 m
• 6440 pCi/L at 1100 m
• Est’d 12 years of travel
• Depth varies 15 to 45 m
(from BNL reports )
Max Conc
~1.6x106
pCi/L
• Problem modelled using a variety of investigative
approaches
Analytical transport with various source geometries
- uniform flow field, constant source
- 2D advection, 3D dispersion, 1st order decay
Regional MODFLOW model
- steady state flow, BCs for local scale transport
Local scale MODFLOW and MT3D
- layering, good match to plume geometry
- basis for design of remedial systems
(1) HFBR spent fuel pool is the source of tritium plume
(2) Modeling indicates tritium plume was close to
steady state and not migrating
(3) Drinking water standards will not be exceeded at
the site boundary
(4) Remedial system proposed for tritium plume will
not adversely impact solvent plumes
(from BNL, Tritium Remediation Project, 1998)
• Remedial activities varied - here focus on
remediation of the tritium plume
• System is redundant given plume at steady state and
• 3 extraction wells at nose of plume - water sent
upgradient
19 years travel
time to site
boundary
• Tritium comingled with solvent plumes – VOC
removal also required
• Experience with the tritium plume at BNL has
broader implications for similar kinds of facilities
• For tritium, concerns about SFP leakage of tritium
but no action (Webler, 2002)
• Lab director at that time, said, “Well, I’m not
surprised that it’s leaking.” (Webler, 2002)
• BNL slow to embrace idea that site could be
problematic – culture in lab operations (Webler, 2002)
• History key monitoring well at HFBR
• Webler pointed to apparent lack of interest at BNL in
“seeking out” problems of contamination led
credibility problems
• Contamination related to operation sewage
treatment plant (1984)
• Solvent plumes related to various activities (1992)
• HFBR leak (1996) and g-2 tritium plume (1999)
• Periodic discharges of water
contaminated with tritium to Peconic
River and gw via sewers (1984)
- other contaminants present
(mercury, VOCs, 137Cs) (1992)
• Ponds part of waste treatment
system & recharged groundwater
• East Tritium plume
• Not particularly curious about
contamination in sewer and other
potential leakage
• New monitoring wells found contamination - 1999
• Alternating Gradient Synchrotron (AGS) used for
particle beam experiments
• Created tritium and 22Na by activation - leached into
groundwater
• Public relations problem another unexpected
surprise with new tritium plume following HFBR leak
(from Paquette et al., 2008)
• Map shows plume due to
source at g-2
• Narrow tritium plume
headed towards HFBR
• Tritium pulses as high as
3.5x106 pCi/L
• Modeling indicated that no
remediation required
• Clearly knowledge is a prerequisite for addressing
environmental problems
• Broad knowledge of geologic and hydrogeologic
framework (conceptual model of site) essential for:
- basis for design of site/facility monitoring systems
- site-based groundwater model
 BNL benefitted from years of investigations by USGS
on Long Island - hydrogeologic framework for Lab
- Studies of Sites for Nuclear Energy Facilities – 1968
- assessments of solvent plumes well underway
 Regional groundwater modeling completed as part of
investigation of known contamination
- expedited down-scaled plume modeling,
assessment and interim remediation (May, 1997)
• BNL plume definition rapidly completed with
extraordinarily detailed snapshot of plume
• Selected as an instructive case study in a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission study on monitoring/
modeling (NUREG/CR-6948 v. 2)
• Makes resolution in sampling obvious as well as local
variability in concentration distributions
• Authors suggest that such visualizations helpful in
presentations to public
(NUREG/CR-6948 v.2)
• Weiner and Gilbertson (1993) described deficiencies
- DOE facilities in reactive mode, weak management
systems for ES&H, weak oversight
- management systems lack formality and discipline
to correct ES&H errors, weak documentation
• Culture at BNL other DOE facilities focused on science
• Not proactive on environmental surveillance, safety
(from Creative Uncut)
• 1989 U.S. Secretary Energy announced initiative to
strengthen ES&H at DOEs facilities
- focus on safety, environmental protection, waste
management
• Among initiatives was establishment of “Tiger Team
Assessment Program”
• Independent assessment of facilities by an arm of
DOE not related to management system for the lab
• Term “Tiger Team” apparently came out of US
aerospace industry
• “A tiger team was a small hand-picked, particularly
skilled and capable group of ‘tigers,’ often chosen
and chartered by a commanding officer, to plan for
and/or achieve a very specific mission” (Joe Lehman
onhttp://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/08/10/upfront-tiger-teams.aspx)
• I worked on such teams for DOE at BNL, Sandia
National Lab, and Oak Ridge National Lab on
contamination problems (mostly tritium)
• "A 'Tiger Team' is formed when there is a massive or
series of massive screw-ups……” (Reader comment)
• At BNL kick started cleanups at the lab and a focus on
worker health and safety
- members of team had power to “red tag”
equipment or operations if unsafe
• Side effects - stress in affected organization, not a
long-term fix, crazy enforcement created problems
but can provide
• My experience that “complexities” in one way or
another impact studies
• Hydrogeologists generally come equipped with
simple understanding of concepts and methods
- most problems have exceedingly complex pieces
• This is another talk “Complexity: the challenge of
forgetting what we know”
• At Brookhaven, discuss two complexities – max
concentrations at source, other remedial impacts
(from NUREG/CR-6948, Vol. 2)
• Both HFBR and g-2 spills
had issues dealing with
thin plumes at the water
table at source
• Sampling wells often
below much of plume
- concentrations sensitive
to water-levels
during dry times
(complex time series)
• g-2 spill had similar
problems
(from Paquette et al., 2008)
• At BNL, variety of different
pumping systems some pump
and treat systems for solvents
• This pumping apparently
changed local patterns of flow
on the site
• Tritium plume moved in a
different direction than
predicted by regional water
table
- need to account remediation
20-year simulation didn’t accurately
account for complex pumping nearby
(from NUREG/CR-6948, Vol. 2)
• Ideas here distilled from Webler’s (2002) report
• BNL did NOT understand complexity of social
networks and diversity of other viewpoints
Friends of BNL
present/retired employees
DOE and lab users outside
views shaped by workplace
Community Residents
Long Is. Activists
civic organizations
school board, library
environmentalists
public Health Organizations
peace/social justice advoc..
views shaped by Friends,
Activists, meetings
no reactors on Long Island
Box 4-1. Factors Shaping Risk Perceptions
Friends of BNL Network (from Webler, 2002)
• Familiarity with radiation and knowledge about
its health effects
• Familiarity with scientific terms associated with
the contamination (e.g. pCi/liter)
• Confidence in the honesty, integrity, and
competence of scientists & Lab management
• Belief that the Lab produces net positive social
benefits
• Availability of technical information and
groundwater models
• Opportunity to learn about the issue on
“company time” with minimal effort
• Tolerance for contamination
• Box 4-2. Factors Shaping Risk
Perceptions for Community Residents
• Familiarity with the Lab and personal
relationships with individuals in Lab and DOE
• Sense of commitment by Lab leadership to be
open and do the clean-up right
• A jury mentality where they listen to
information and arguments made by the two
arch-enemies: the Activists and the Lab
• Personal ability to understand technical
information
• Verifying the data given by Lab (from Webler, 2002)
Box 4-3. Factors Shaping Risk Perceptions
for Long Island Activists Network
• Belief that there is no safe level of dose to
radioactivity
• Adherence to the precautionary principle
• Belief that the nuclear weapons are morally
wrong
• Sense of responsibility to protect public
welfare and environment
• Lack of trust in Lab employees
• Technical information from independent
sources (from Webler, 2002)
stigma associated with radiation propelled a local
controversy about VOCs into a huge risk conflict
groups framed the controversy in their own way
• Never just a controversy as to whether tritium spill
impacted human health, although important
• BNL tried to frame issue as solely about health risks
• Community residents less focused on health risks but
issues of trust and confidence in BNL
- angry that a world-class facility let this happen
- trust conditional on Lab doing right things and
taking care of nearby residents
• Activists concerned about moral correctness of
nuclear weapons, nuclear power, nuclear research,
environmental health
• In retrospect tritium spill at HFBR was a small
problem with no public health implications
• Activists and community surrounding BNL came to
this conclusion
• Analysis of this case study has important implications
from a policy perspective
- minor problem changed science agenda at BNL and
forced change culture to win back public opinion