Federal Case Law
U.S. SUPREME COURT
 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed chase that threatened the lives of innocent bystanders did not violate the Fourth
Amendment as an unreasonable seizure, even when it placed the fleeing motorist at risk of
serious injury or death, as the car chase initiated by the driver posed a substantial and immediate
risk of serious physical injury to others, and the deputy’s attempt to terminate the chase by
forcing the driver off the road was reasonable.
 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): The emergency aid exception
allows officers to enter a dwelling without a warrant and without probable cause when they
reasonably believe, based on specific and articulable facts, that someone is in need of immediate
aid. After responding to a call regarding a loud party, police entered a home where they
observed an altercation, in which defendants were restraining a juvenile and an adult was injured
when struck in the face.
 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006): Suspicionless search was a reasonable
condition of parole which advanced state interests, and parole conditions severely diminished the
inmate’s expectation of privacy while on parole. The State of California had substantial
legitimate interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive
citizenship, and requiring individualized suspicion to support the search of the inmate would
undermine those interests.
 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987): Warrantless search of petitioner’s residence
for a handgun was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was
conducted pursuant to a regulation that is itself a reasonable response to the special needs of a
probation system. Supervision of probationers is a special need of the State that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements, and the special needs of the
probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the
probable cause standard with a “reasonable grounds” standard.
 Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987): An inventory search of closed containers in
a vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment when the search occurred pursuant to
standardized police department procedures, and was not conducted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation.
 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984): There is a narrow “public safety”
exception to the Miranda warnings requirement, and the availability of that exception does not
depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. Miranda does not apply in all its
rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for
the public safety, where respondent’s gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, posing
more than one danger to the public safety, as an accomplice might make use of it, or a customer
or employee might later come upon it.
 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978): While the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure applies to fire officials, a burning building clearly
presents a sufficient exigency to render a warrantless entry reasonable, and officials need no
warrant to remain in the building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it
has been extinguished. Therefore, the warrantless seizure of evidence while inspecting the
premises for those purposes is also constitutional.
 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978): The “murder scene exception” to the warrant
requirement created by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, where during a narcotics raid on petitioner’s apartment, an undercover
officer was killed and others, including petitioner, were wounded, homicide detectives conducted
a four-day exhaustive warrantless search of the apartment, and seized 200 to 300 items. The
search was not justified, as one taken into police custody does not have a lessened right of
privacy in his house; there was no emergency situation, since all persons in the apartment had
been located before the search began; there were no exigent circumstances, as there was no
indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed; and the “murder scene exception”
conferred unbridled discretion on the individual officer as to the reasonableness and scope of a
proposed search.
 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976): An inventory search of an
automobile lawfully impounded for violations of municipal parking ordinances was reasonable
under the community caretaking function.
 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973): Evidence gathered by police from a
warrantless search of a locked car trunk was admissible under the Fourth Amendment to prove
that the driver committed a homicide because the impoundment search was for the purpose of
protecting the public safety.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – FIRST CIRCUIT (MAINE, MASSACHUSETTS, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, PUERTO RICO, RHODE ISLAND)
 U.S. v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12704 (2005): Warrantless
entry into apartment was justified by exigent circumstances, where officer responded to calls
reporting a shooting, knocked on the door, an adult male’s voice responded, the door was opened
by a child who stated that no one else was there, the officer smelled and saw marijuana smoke,
and entered to give the child emergency assistance. Officers seized a handgun and a dish with
crack cocaine residue, and were justified in conducting a protective sweep because it was a highcrime area, the shootings had occurred within 100 yards of the apartment complex, their
experience and knowledge about gang behavior, and the evasive action of the adult known to be
present.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – SECOND CIRCUIT (CONNECTICUT, NEW YORK,
VERMONT)
 United States v. Chirino, 483 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2007): Discovery of a gun during a
warrantless search of defendant’s bedroom by probation officers, who were searching for a
missing girl, did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and was not suppressed.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – THIRD CIRCUIT (DELAWARE, NEW JERSEY,
PENNSYLVANIA, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS)
 Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 1996): The second search of defendant’s
residence to find missing child violated the Fourth Amendment because there were no exigent
circumstances, as police officers had no basis for believing that the child was in imminent danger
at the end of the first search.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – SIXTH CIRCUIT (KENTUCKY, MICHIGAN, OHIO,
TENNESSEE)
 U.S. v. Dunavan, 485 F.2d 201, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 7634 (1973): Exigent
circumstances justified warrantless search of motel room and briefcases, as officers had a
legitimate life-saving purpose. Following a bank robbery in Tennessee, one appellant was found
in Florida by passersby in a disabled car, foaming at the mouth and unable to speak; items found
in a search for identification were turned over to police; officers used a motel room key to seek
further identification and found smaller keys which opened briefcases containing the missing
bank robbery money. The officers had been informed by a woman in an adjoining room at the
motel that one of the men occupying the room was diabetic and kept his insulin in one of the
briefcases.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – SEVENTH CIRCUIT (ILLINOIS, INDIANA,
WISCONSIN)
 U.S. v. Ellis, 499 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2007): No probable cause with exigent
circumstances in search of home where drugs were discovered, where officers asked defendant to
open the door, using the ruse that they were investigating a missing child, broke down the door
after hearing movement in the home, and did a protective sweep.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – EIGHTH CIRCUIT (ARKANSAS, IOWA, MINNESOTA,
MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA)
 Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11673 (1971): Warrantless
search was not justified under the emergency doctrine because nothing suggested that there were
others inside the home in need of aid, where the victim called an ambulance, claiming that
defendant shot him; the victim was dead on arrival at the hospital; officers entered the home
where they found a shotgun and shells; they knew prior to entering that the victim had already
been removed by ambulance personnel and that no other wounded victims were discovered; and
there was no other evidence indicating that the officers reasonably believed that there was
anyone else in need of aid.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – NINTH CIRCUIT (ALASKA, ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA,
GUAM, HAWAII, IDAHO, MONTANA, NEVADA, NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
OREGON, WASHINGTON)
 U.S. v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2006): The emergency exception justified
search of defendant’s residence because police had good reason to believe that there was an
emergency, where they had received two emergency phone calls, saw only one severely injured
person upon arrival, and therefore had reasonable grounds to believe another might be inside the
home.
 Martin v. City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4634 (2004):
Warrantless entry fell squarely within the emergency aid exception and community caretaking
function, where the officers reasonably believed that plaintiff’s girlfriend could have been in
need of assistance inside the home, where officers were responding to a call from the girlfriend’s
father who was concerned for her safety, plaintiff refused to answer officers’ knock on the door
or the telephone, and locked himself in a room and called his attorney.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS – TENTH CIRCUIT (COLORADO, KANSAS, NEW
MEXICO, OKLAHOMA, UTAH, WYOMING)
 U.S. v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 15171 (2006): Exigent
circumstances justified warrantless entry into home, where a thirty-minute delay from the time
officers arrived to the time they entered was due to their repeated and increasingly vigorous
attempts to make contact with the person they could see inside, and the search was confined to
only those places potentially associated with an emergency. There had been a disconnected 911
call, several attempts to reach the 911 caller, and officers had knocked on the door with no
response.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT – ARIZONA
 Stanley v. Schriro, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71355 (D. Az. September 27, 2006):
Petitioner’s rights were not violated because when he made his confession, he was not in custody
and was free to leave. When he was questioned, the law enforcement investigation’s focus was
on a search for missing persons initiated by petitioner himself, and there was no direct evidence
of his involvement in a homicide.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT – DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 Hill v. U.S., 858 A.2d 435, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 426 (2004): Police violated
defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by eliciting his
statement in the absence of Miranda warnings. The detective should have known that the
combination of telling him that he was being charged with second-degree murder and that a
friend had told the police what happened was likely to elicit an incriminating response, so that
the detective’s words were the functional equivalent of express questioning requiring Miranda
warnings.
 Oliver v. U.S., 656 A.2d 1159, 1995 D.C. App. LEXIS 83 (1995): Warrantless police
entry into appellant’s home and retrieval of a kidnapped baby were justified by emergency
circumstances and thus lawful under the Fourth Amendment, where entering the home and
taking the baby to a hospital was narrowly tailored to achieve identification and rescue.
 U.S. v. Mason, 734 F.Supp. 35, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4149 (D. D.C. April 10, 1990):
Exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into apartment, where police responded to an
emergency call regarding a shooting, interviewed the victim/defendant who advised that he had
been shot by intruders and fled to another apartment, found defendant’s apartment door ajar and
heard noises from within, drew their weapons, entered the apartment, and quickly searched to
determine whether any of the attackers were hiding there. The subsequent search of the
apartment and defendant’s safe was valid because it was only undertaken after a valid written
consent was obtained.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT – IOWA
 Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9256 (S.D. Ia. March
28, 1974): Mentally ill prisoner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when police
detective elicited statements from him revealing the location of a missing child’s body, where the
police obtained the statements through deception after agreeing not to interrogate him in the
absence of counsel. The prisoner’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated because he
was in custody and suspicion was focused on him when the trip occurred, and the detective failed
to cease interrogation after he stated his desire to remain silent and to repeat the Miranda
warnings after the first incriminating statement violated his Miranda rights.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT – NEBRASKA
 Myers v. Halbleib, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38577 (D. Ne. May 25, 2007): There were
no exigent circumstances to justify the search of plaintiff’s home where officers spent over
fifteen minutes attempting to obtain her consent, an indication that reasonably objective officers
would have concluded that no exigent circumstances existed and that a warrant or consent was
necessary. There was sufficient time between the reported disappearance of the juvenile and the
search to obtain a warrant.
 Nunez v. DEA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32883 (D. Ne. April 17, 2009): Officer had
probable cause to search plaintiff’s vehicle without a warrant after a canine officer indicated the
odor of drugs and plaintiff was the sole passenger in the vehicle. Once plaintiff was arrested, the
officer had the authority to seize and remove plaintiff’s vehicle under the “community caretaker”
doctrine.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT - NEW YORK
 U.S. v. Montes-Reyes, 547 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D. New York April 14, 2008):
Defendant was entitled to suppression of the physical evidence obtained from a search of his
hotel room, as well as of his statements, because federal agents used a ruse of looking for a
missing girl to gain his consent to enter the room. His consent was not voluntary under the
Fourth Amendment.
 Shapiro v. The City of Glen Cove, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43276 (E.D.N.Y. May 5,
2005): Emergency doctrine justified entry into an unfinished, unoccupied building owned by
plaintiff, where police responded to a call regarding dogs in distress in the building, and noted
that the building was not a residential site upon looking through the window, supporting a
reasonable belief that a warrant was not required to enter the building. Upon opening the door,
they noticed a “horrendous” odor, and reasonably believed they needed to investigate whether
there was a dead body inside and what role the dogs played in the situation. There were
objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency requiring immediate
intervention.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT – PENNSYLVANIA
 Cuevas v. City of Philadelphia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56107 (E.D. Pa. August 11,
2006): Parents of kidnapped child brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the City of Philadelphia and various city officials, for failure to conduct a proper search for the
child at the time of a home fire, asserting individual rights under the National Child Search
Assistance Act of 1990. There is no individual right to enforce the statute, and no binding and
mandatory obligation on the states enforceable by individual citizens.
U.S. DISTRICT COURT – WISCONSIN
 Hanson v. Dane County, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (W.D. Wis. 2009): Existence of
exigent circumstances allowed a warrantless entry, where the hang-up 911 call and the
unanswered 911 return call made it reasonable for the sheriffs to believe that someone inside the
home required immediate assistance.
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