POLITICAL CAPITAL AS AN INFORMAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: ITS
EFFECT ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON GENERAL LEGISLATION AND THE
OBAMA HEALTHCARE DEBATE
Maggie Davis
POLS 4530
Dr. Audrey Haynes
December 3, 2013
Davis (2)
INTRODUCTION
Two particular situations characterize the executive and legislative branches of
government with roots stemming from a similar time period. The executive branch seems to be
growing at an impressive rate in its expansion of defined constitutional powers while Congress
becomes increasingly polarized on nearly every issue; these dynamics create a tense political
relationship between the Executive and legislature as views diverge and the government as an
arena becomes more competitive. The goal of my work is to explore and measure the idea of
presidential political capital as a variable influencing Congressional decision-making,
particularly in the House of Representatives. Members of the House are constantly concerned
with reelection by constituents and they must bargain to get legislation passed that would please
this vital audience. For the same motive of the perception of success, the president has a clear
incentive to be active in the legislative process to get items through Congress that uphold the
perception that s/he is successful and can overcome polarization that now regularly characterizes
the House; this often means engaging in horse-trading that requires the use of political
capital. The phrase “political capital” is vague and open to competing interpretations, but it
defines the concept that a political actor can use clout to influence other actors in order to
achieve a particular goal. I hypothesize that there is indeed a correlation between the two
variables – the amount of political capital the president holds determines the outcome of
circumstantial pieces of legislation. In an attempt to model this concept, I narrow the ambiguous
set of actors and situations that could be involved in the interactions between the president and
the House. I study both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama by the policies
they were able to effectively push at periods of unique legislative activity in addition to
performing analysis of literature on the relative political environments. This determines the
Davis (3)
influence of political capital on general legislation as well as on the recent debate over
healthcare. I measure political capital in terms of public approval of the president and success
through roll call votes in favor of the president’s standing on key issues; I will attempt to
examine the role of political capital generally through an investigation of the George W. Bush
administration, which displayed a unique range of political popularity, compared to the role of
capital in the present-day administration.
THE VAGUENESS OF POLITICAL CAPITAL: WHY APPROVAL RATING
MATTERS
Richard Neustadt was a prominent political scientist who examined the influence of
presidential power throughout history, and his importance in developing the concept of political
capital cannot be understated. Neustadt argues that presidential power is characterized by the
power of “personal persuasion” in terms of presidential reputation and prestige, and involves
impressions within Washington and “a president’s ability to ‘appeal to the people.’” (59-60)
Political capital is the translation of this personal power and is critical on key issues for the
president given that these hard-pushed issues will inevitability determine the reputation the
president so carefully tries to mold. The president seeks to use political capital to pass legislation
otherwise subject to harsh partisanship.
There is a strong scholarly consensus on the power of public approval rating of the
president as a measure of the elusive concept of political capital. Although Neustadt consistently
speaks to the dynamic factors of presidential prestige, he agrees that “his standing with the public
outside Washington… is a source of influence for him, another factor on [Congress’s]
willingness to give him what he wants.” (86) If the president has a higher approval within the
public, s/he is better able to influence Congressional leaders who are concerned about constituent
Davis (4)
reelection as well as presidential favors – in this sense, political capital acts as a vital informal
power of the president. William Riker, a prominent game theorist, concedes in The Art of
Political Manipulation that “winners… win because they have set up the situation in such a way
that other people will want to join them,” which suggests that the framing of issues to other
players impacts their base of support. (ix)
There are, of course, many intervening factors that determine the outcome of roll call
votes on every piece of legislation. Conditions such as electoral outcomes, White House staff,
Congressional ideology, and interest group support play pivotal roles in the complicated political
game. But “without public approval,… congressional support is only implied by seats.” (Light
31) Another ingredient in the political arena is the media; habituated in the information world we
live in today, public approval rating often reflects the media portrayal of the president. As a
variable, it incorporates many predetermined components and has important implications for the
presidential-congressional relationship and is widely accepted because “poll support is
notoriously difficult for presidents to manipulate.” (Schier 17) Public approval, and therefore
political capital, allows the president to actively manage all of these colliding factors and garner
support despite the odds.
Many previous works on the role of political capital discuss the importance of approval
rating along with the consideration of differing elements. Patrick J. Fett, in The Journal of
Politics, critiques previous studies on their inability to weigh the president’s push on each issue.
In order to measure the occurrence of presidential positions, Fett uses presidential mentions of
the issue. Instead of deploying a correlation in his research, Fett chooses a logistic regression
model that more heavily relies on probabilities of events occurring, looking exclusively at the
first year of Carter and Reagan’s presidencies. (Fett) This influenced my decision to measure
Davis (5)
political capital at unique periods of time due to the fact that presidencies differ and approval
rating may have altered effects in some administrations, and it is important to examine the
administrations that encompass many of the intervening factors. In “The President’s Role in the
Partisan Congressional Arena,” Matthew Lebo and Andrew O’Geen dissect political capital in
terms of the approval of the president’s base and electoral consequences for members of
Congress when voting with the president in addition to public approval rating. By examining
consequences, Lebo and O’Geen consider the motive for each party in voting with the president.
(Lebo and O’Geen) I choose not to include the president’s base of support as a variable because
this base will most likely support him on any issue, and this is not a good measure of the work
s/he does to convince skeptical representatives. This work is helpful in proving that as political
actors are generally considered rational, if approval of the president is favorable, motive shifts to
supporting the president on legislation to create positive outcomes for members of Congress.
In looking at the Bush years, approval rating becomes a key factor in his legislative
success, and this, in part, sparked my interest in collecting more extensive data on the Bush
administration. A rapid increase in approval rating due to the national unity surrounding the
events of 9/11 “produce[d] a surge of popular approval of [the] president, temporarily expanding
political capital,” and the subsequent decrease provided a loss in political capital that made it
harder for him to get things on the floor, specifically after a period of such perceived success.
(Schier 13) As war fighting began in 2003 with the intervention in Iraq and public opinion
decreased after the “rally around the flag” effect from 9/11, Bush lost ability to continue
bargaining at the same rate, which is displayed in roll call votes for legislation the president
pushed. This will all be reflected in the approval rating data, as well as in a discussion of the
Bush years in the results section.
Davis (6)
POLITICAL CAPITAL AND PARTIES
Although Bush experienced a time of high approval rating (his highest rate reaching a
record-breaking 89%), not all presidents enjoy this kind of public support. In fact, there is
unanimous statistical agreement that exposes the fact that the majority of presidents experience a
steady decrease in approval rating. (Newman 784) To further complicate the president’s
balancing act, Congress has become increasingly polarized by party lines, becoming
“ideologically homogeneous,” with parties “separated from each other along a single left-right
dimension.” This intense shift to a solely polarized House occurred in the 1960s and continued
into the 1970s with the development and sustainment of the civil rights movement. (Haidt)
Division over one contentious issue has led divisions over a majority of issues, which has
important implications for the president and his or her daily strategy, as well as for the broader
goal of leaving a legacy.
The reemergence of the healthcare debate by Congressional leaders in the 2013 shutdown
displays the importance of healthcare to each of the parties. Although control of Congress
shifted to Republicans in 2010 and the environment of Congress is now different than it was in
2009, Obama’s ability to pass legislation evoking such partisan attitudes remains important to the
discussion of parties. Tom Daschle, former Senate Majority Leader and Senator during the
Clinton healthcare years, stated: “by the time I left Congress in 2005, I had come to believe that
no other issue was as complex, as personal, and as fiercely contested by special interests as
health care.” (45) The complexity of the issue in addition to the personal connection many feel
toward healthcare as a life-and-death matter means that the goal of reform is something the
president must handle with extreme care and transparency, or face gridlock. Daschle also states
that the fundamental question of the role of government in personal life is the “great divide in
Davis (7)
our society,” a factor particularly contentious in health care because it “has become a symbol of
deep divide in Americans’ feelings about the role government should play in solving our social
problems.” (Daschle & Nather 10) With the beginning of the Obama administration, both
Congressional Democrats and Democrats in the electorate were hopeful about the role of
government in healthcare, while Republicans were discontent with almost any outcome
regarding government intervention on the issue.
It is important to examine the executive process because the president’s style often affects
reactions by Congress as a whole, specifically the reactions of members of the opposing party.
In much modern research on party action in Congress, “the role of the president is usually left
out or marginalized.” (Lebo and O’Geen 718) But the role of the president should not be
understated; often when the president takes a position and exerts political capital, the reaction of
the competing party is to diverge away from the position of the president. (Schier 79) Public
approval acts as a tool that assists the president in overcoming partisanship to improve the
agenda. The theory of political capital relies on the concept that it cannot be replenished; the
president cannot always expect to have public support to back his or her positions. For this
reason, it becomes extremely relevant to the discussion of the interaction of the two parties.
THE CASE OF OBAMA: DID POLITICAL CAPITAL PLAY A ROLE IN
HEALTHCARE REFORM?
There has been little research published on the early healthcare debate of 2009 and the
effect of presidential influence on its outcome. I was interested in the question of political
capital and healthcare reform for two specific reasons. It was not only the “signature political
battle during the first year of the… administration,” a battle characterized by intense partisan
debate, but it is also likely to be the reform that will define the Obama administration for the
Davis (8)
future. (Kiousis et al 652) Although much goes into agenda-setting, including, but certainly not
limited to, predetermined legislator ideology, special interest groups, and the media, Obama
would theoretically want to exercise leadership power on the issue that will make his presidency
seem successful as a whole.
A significant issue yet to be discussed in this area of study is whether Obama used
political capital to end the government shutdown caused by Republican efforts to defund the
ACA. Obama did win and ended the shutdown with only minor concessions to Republicans, but
it is too early to tell what kind of action was critical to that outcome. At the time of the
negotiations, Obama’s approval rating stayed constant at around 42-44%; this suggests that since
there was no major dip in approval rating during negotiations, Obama kept stable capital during
mediation with Republican leaders. (“Job Approval: Barack Obama”)
In Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, Kiousis, Park, Kim, and Go look at
media coverage and the role of communication messages in the success of healthcare legislation.
In their work, they find that the salience of issues in information subsidies directly translates into
the salience of these issues in Congress. As healthcare received more media attention, it became
an issue Congress was forced to handle. (Kiousis et al) For measurements, the work includes
speeches, weekly addresses, press briefings, statements and releases, and blog posts, which are
all factors that directly relate to capital in that they represent the amount of time and effort
Obama put into the issue. They are measures that are critical to how Obama would get things on
the floor, but not necessarily measures of how well Obama can sustain what he pushes, which
approval rating may be better able to encompass. Rather than action through informal powers,
Madhu Chugh argues that there were many “presidential directives,” including executive orders
and proclamations, regulatory actions through agencies, and sub-regulatory guidance with which
Davis (9)
Obama could have acted. But all of these options rely on the president acting independently of
Congress, which was neither a reality of an incoming president in 2009 nor one of the recent
government shutdown. In addition, many of the goals outlined by Obama would require
“congressional action [on] tax proposals and selling insurance across state lines,” and for this
reason it is important to think about what influence Obama maintains outside of the realm of
legal presidential powers. (30)
In fact, historical analysis of Clinton’s previous attempt at healthcare brings light to the
importance of Obama exerting capital in his pursuit of reform. Through “political learning,” the
Obama administration avoided the mistakes of the Clinton administration through a process that
heavily involved members of Congress from the start, a process that “[placed] into context the
people and organizations whose support [was] critical for successful implementation.” (Donnelly
and Rochefort 189) Clinton “overlooked a strategy for selling the product” and ultimately
soured the initially positive public approval through a “protracted and secretive process of policy
development.” (191) Without transparency to both Congress and the public, Clinton failed to
make key compromises and close important deals with Republicans and moderate Democrats
who would be critical to the consideration of healthcare on the House floor. (Starr) According to
former Senator Daschle, who happened to be later nominated by the Obama administration for
the Health and Human Services secretary, “the [Clinton] White House should have engaged
congressional leaders in a more meaningful way at the very beginning.” (112)
Strategically keeping this historical context in mind, the Obama administration shifted its
strategy to involve the use of political bargaining and persuasion in many ways. Shortly after
taking office, Obama held a health care summit in March of 2009 with invites going out to
industry professionals as well as Republican House leaders, allowing Obama to build a base of
Davis (10)
support that would help in efforts to reach across the aisle in future negotiations. Following the
summit, Obama invited House and Senate leaders to the White House to discuss reform on
multiple occasions and even attended the House Republican health care retreat. (Donnelly and
Rochefort) These early moves during a time of high approval rating set a unique strategy for
success in which “the president would push Congress to start on health care right away and pass
it quickly—not let a bill hang out there in public spotlight, losing… public support.” (Daschle &
Nather 129)
RESEARCH METHODS
There are two variables for which I find measurements. The dependent variable,
presidential political capital, is measured by public approval rating of the president. The
independent variable, presidential success, is measured by the number of roll call votes in the
House in support of the president’s position on a piece of legislation. In order to find the
approval rating, I use data from UC Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project which
measures approval rating based on the percentage of Americans that say “approve” to the
following question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [George W. Bush or Barack
Obama] is handling his job as President?” (2012) Findings from UC Santa Barbara originate
from Gallup’s poll which contains minimal bias due to the objective approach of limiting out
subjective justifications for approval. Data for the independent variable of presidential success
come from Thomas.gov’s collection of Congressional roll call votes. This information reports
the real values of House decisions - it contains raw data on “yeas” and “nays” on legislation. I
limit the scope of my study to the House because the Senate was designed to be more
independent from the influence of other branches of government, as well as in an attempt to
avoid measuring error. The data on each area are found in Figures 1, 3, 5, and 7.
Davis (11)
With this data, I focus on key issues that President Bush and Obama pushed during their
presidencies. I chose President Bush as a comparison to the situation regarding Obama and
healthcare due to his unique ability to use political bargaining tools. Bush is the president with
the largest range of political capital during his presidency, with an extremely low approval rating
at 25% and the highest ever recorded at 89%. I measure approval ratings on the day of House
votes on issues that defined the Bush presidency, which include the Iraq War, tax cut policies,
and trade policies.
Due to inherent difficulties regarding measuring activity of the current presidency and the
fact that Obama has not had the same large range in approval rating, I measure only the approval
rating and House roll call votes on various pieces of healthcare legislation and do not take into
account other Obama policies. I attempt to focus not only on the introductory and final pieces of
legislation, the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, but also the smaller pieces of legislation, including amendments and
Republican attempts at repeal. My data also include the recent Continuing Appropriations Act
that ended the shutdown, which also represents a big win for Obama in the healthcare
debate. Although Obama has not had the same compelling variation in his approval rating, I use
the same method in order to determine the significance of approval rating on both initial
healthcare policy and ending the shutdown.
To examine the policies pushed by Bush and Obama, I plotted the data on scatterplots
and found the regression lines, equation, and R-squared values to determine correlation and
predictor value between the two variables. I placed the independent variable, approval rating, on
the X-axis and the dependent variable, number of roll call votes, on the Y-axis. The graphs
Davis (12)
displaying the plots, trendlines, and regression and slope equations can be found in the
Appendix.
RESULTS
There is a slight statistical significance between approval rating and votes in favor of the
president’s standing for legislation that they specifically push. This is implicit from the slopes
and R-squared values of the regression lines on each graph, despite the variation in R-squared
values. These values suggest how well the model predicts the data, and in each case there are
different reasons for why the R-squared value may be what it is. The R-squared values for Bush
on policies of interest range from .69 to .28, as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 6, with the most
significant value found on Iraq War policies; approval rating highly predicted the votes on the
Iraq war as the value R2=1 is the total and a value closer to 1 suggests stronger predictive power.
The R-squared value for Obama's healthcare policies and roll call votes is R2=.06 (Figure 6),
which is a much less significant value, but in this application is certainly still relevant given
historical context. The value R2=.69 for the Iraq war data suggests that approval rating affects
votes on legislation that is in response to a national crisis or legislation falling under what is
perceived to be the president’s area of expertise, in this case, presidential war power authority.
The president’s general authority of determining situations of war may be why Bush was
theoretically better able to effectively switch undecided votes. The cases of tax and trade
policies may not provide such high correlation results because they are domestic and Senate
issues, respectively. As explained above, the partisan divide characterizing healthcare may
explain why Obama’s approval had little effect in roll call outcome; even House members lying
closer to the center of the ideological spectrum have an incentive to vote with their party on the
most important partisan issues of the time. Yet, in each case, there is a positive coefficient of
Davis (13)
determination, meaning that higher approval rating does have a possibility of predicting a higher
number of roll call votes.
CONCLUSION
My hypothesis is proven neither true nor false through my research design and literature
review. There is a chance that political capital affects decision-making in the House, but that
decision-making may be more heavily affected by political capital exerted on policies specific to
presidential expertise or authority. Although my analysis may not give substantial understanding
for why Congress votes a certain way, it could help in future prediction of whether certain events
play an important role in the passage of legislation. As a source of comparison, the Bush data
demonstrate the importance of political capital on war-making issues and issues around the time
of a “rally around the flag” effect. The Obama data suggest that political capital is not as
effective on policies that are intrinsically partisan and involve the question regarding intervention
of government in citizen life. Despite the possible issues with statistical significance of the data,
there is scholarly consensus that as an informal power, presidential persuasion plays a deep and
critical yet complicated role in the Congressional arena.
Results of the literature review and historical analysis provide reason to believe that the
higher a president’s approval rating with the public, the easier negotiations will be, especially on
the specific issues of Bush’s Iraq war policies and Obama’s healthcare policies. Both were and
are defining elements of each administration and much literature seems to focus on the efforts of
each president in passing pieces of legislation of this nature. Post-9/11 Bush experienced a time
of great national crisis characterized by the “rally around the flag” effect, which allowed him to
achieve many bipartisan agreements. (Schier) Bush used this rare time of a near-perfect
approval rating to his advantage as he pushed legislation with “coalitional and bargaining skills,”
Davis (14)
such as in the case of the “approval of additional tax cuts.” (18) As this effect died off and
conditions such as Congressional Democrat backlash (in the form of filibuster and federal court
challenges) and the public approval rating dropped, as it inevitably does, Bush found it much
harder to sustain policies such as continued authorization for the Iraq War. (9) Although not
well reflected in data, Obama assuredly used the influence and prestige of the new administration
to jumpstart early negotiations in the healthcare process. In contemporary debate on social
issues, the vote will always be close; the fact that Obama was able to accomplish the passage of a
healthcare policy at all, let alone with the polarization of Congress that characterized his position
in 2009, is a testament to his ability to use presidential persuasion.
This discussion is relevant to the recent government shutdown debate and political parties
in the state in which they are found today, as they are “now able to learn more about public
opinion through private and media polls” and disseminate that information quickly in building a
strategy for party power. (Schier 17) Much scholarly work is still necessary to draw conclusions
on the influence Obama wielded in the circumstances surrounding the shutdown. But without
creating points of compromise with Republican leaders, the concessions made by Obama could
have been more severe with bigger consequences for the Democratic Party. With sustained
study, the political science community may be able to predict these Congressional consequences
and better understand why the United States finds itself in such a unique time for inter-branch
competition.
Davis (15)
APPENDIX
IRAQ WAR DATA
Legislation
Approval Votes in
Rating
Favor
(%)
62
296
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002
Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Deploring the abuse of persons in United States custody in Iraq
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
Disapproving of the decision of the President announced on January
10, 2007
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007
To provide for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces and
defense contractors from Iraq.
U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007
Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act
70
52
61
48
45
32
414
362
410
365
390
182
34
218
33
171
33
221
31
223
Figure 1
Votes in Favor of President Bush on Iraq War
Policies and Approval Rating
y = 5.6072x + 40.256
R² = 0.69414
500
400
300
Number of Votes
200
100
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Approval Rating (%)
Figure 2
60
70
80
Davis (16)
TAX LEGISLATION DATA
Legislation
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1836) to provide for
reconciliation pursuant to section 104 of the concurrent resolution on the
budget for fiscal year 2002.
Waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the bill
(H.R. 1836)
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001
Marriage Penalty and Family Tax Relief Act of 2001
Death Tax Elimination Act of 2001
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
Approval
Rating
(%)
55
55
Votes in
Favor
55
213
58
52
59
88
76
230
282
274
417
231
Figure 3
Votes in Favor of President Bush on Tax Policies
and Approval Rating
R² = 0.52101
y = 3.803x + 25.387
500
400
300
Number of Votes
200
100
0
0
20
40
60
Approval Rating (%)
Figure 4
80
230
220
100
Davis (17)
TRADE LEGISLATION DATA
Legislation
Trade Act of 2002
Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002
Trade Promotion Authority of 2002
To reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance program under the Trade Act of
1974, and for other purposes
Clean Diamond Trade Act
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
Customs Border Security and Trade Agencies Authorization Act of 2004
United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act
United States Trade Rights Enforcement Act
United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
To authorize the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade
relations treatment) to the products of Vietnam.
To modify temporarily certain rates of duty and make other technical
amendments to the trade laws, to extend certain trade preference programs, and
for other purposes.
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act
Trade and Globalization Assistance Act of 2007
Approval Votes in
Rating
Favor
(%)
87
373
70
344
85
215
87
420
87
68
59
59
48
48
48
48
408
215
299
309
314
341
323
217
48
43
37
33
240
327
221
228
38
212
32
31
285
264
Figure 5
Votes in Favor of President Bush on Trade
Policies and Approval Rating = 0.28023
y R²
= 1.8038x
+ 192.12
500
400
Number of 300
Votes
200
100
0
0
20
40
60
Approval Rating (%)
Figure 6
80
100
Davis (18)
HEALTHCARE DATA
Legislation
Health Insurance Restrictions and Limitations Clarification Act
Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009
*Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009
Medicare Premium Fairness Act
Affordable Health Care for America Act
Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act - Concur w/ Senate Amendments
Assuring Quality Care for Veterans Act
Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare Beneficiaries and Pension Relief
Act of 2010
Family Health Care Accessibility Act of 2010
Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010
Repeal of the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act
Repeal of Mandatory Funding in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act
Protect Life Act - Amend to Stop Abortion Coverage
Repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Fairness for American Families Act - Delay Application of Individual Mandate
Keep the IRS Off Your Health Care Act of 2013
Keep Your Health Plan Act of 2013
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014
Approval Votes in
Rating
Favor
(%)
62
422
59
409
56
219
51
406
54
220
49
406
50
219
45
413
45
417
44
46
51
51
417
409
189
183
40
50
48
44
41
42
172
195
174
185
157
235
Figure 7
Number of Votes in Favor of President Obama on
Healthcare Policies and Approval Rating y = 4.4497x + 69.351
R² = 0.05664
450
400
350
300
250
Number of Votes
200
150
100
50
0
0
10
20
30
40
Approval Rating (%)
Figure 8
50
60
70
Davis (19)
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