The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches
Author(s): Jeff Victoroff
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Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Feb., 2005), pp. 3-42
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The Mind of the Terrorist
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES
JEFFVICTOROFF
Departmentof Neurologyand Psychiatry
Universityof SouthernCaliforniaSchool of Medicine
This articlereviewsthe stateof the artof availabletheoriesanddataregardingthe psychology of terrorism. Dataandtheoreticalmaterialwere gatheredfrom the world'sunclassifiedliterature.Multipletheories
andsome demographicdatahave been published,butvery few controlledempiricalstudieshave been conductedinvestigatingthe psychological bases of terrorism.The field is largelycharacterizedby theoretical
speculationbased on subjectiveinterpretationof anecdotalobservations.Moreover,most studiesandtheories fail to takeintoaccountthe greatheterogeneityof terrorists.Manypractical,conceptual,andpsychological barriershave slowed progressin this importantfield. Nonetheless,even at this early stage of terrorism
studies,preliminaryreportssuggestthatmodifiablesocial andpsychologicalfactorscontributeto the genesis of the terroristmind-set.Psychologicalscholarshipcouldpossibly mitigatetheriskof catastrophicattack
by initiatingthe long overduescientific study of terroristmentalities.
Keywords: terrorism;terrorist;psychiatry;psychology;sociology; homelandsecurity
Terrorism has surelyexisted since before the dawn of recordedhistory(Merariand
Friedland 1985). Human nature has not changed. However, three interlocking trends
have significantly changed the nature and degree of the threat: the globalization of
commerce, travel, and information transfer, which puts economic disparities and ideological competition in sharp relief and facilitates cooperative aggression by far-flung
but like-minded conspirators; the ascent of religious fundamentalism as an aggrieved
competitor with the market-economic, democratic, and secular trends of modernity;
and the privatization of weapons of mass destruction, putting the potential of macroterrorist acts into the hands of small groups or even individuals (Hoffman 1998;
Laqueur 1999; Enders and Sandler 2000). September 11, 2001, is one result-and
probablya warningof events to come (Gunaratna2002). It perhapswould not be an
exaggeration to state that these fast-evolving trends together constitute a clear and
present danger to the security of civilization (Stern 1999).
AUTHOR'SNOTE:This work was supportedin partby a grantfrom the FreyaFoundationfor Brain,
Behavior,andSociety.I gratefullyacknowledgecriticalreviewsof this manuscriptby JessicaSternandTodd
Sandler.Itrepresentsa revisionof a lecturefirstpresentedat the annualmeetingof the AmericanNeuropsychiatricAssociation, San Diego, California,March2002. Addressreprintrequeststo victorof@usc.edu.
Vol.49 No. 1, February
JOURNAL
20053-42
OFCONFLICT
RESOLUTION,
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704272040
© 2005 Sage Publications
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
It would seem appropriatefor the scholarlydisciplinesof psychology andpsychiatry to bringtheirintellectualresourcesto bearon the politicalproblemof terrorism,a
problemthat-stripped to thebasics-is one of atypicalhumanbehavior.Apartfroma
drive for truth,political psychological theory advises that the better a targetgroup
understandsthe roots of the terroristmind-set,the betterthatgroupmay developpolicies to effectively manage the risk (Wardlaw1989; Clayton, Barlow, and BallifSpanvill1998). Despitethe compellingneedfor suchan understanding,manytheoretical andpracticalimpedimentshave delayed,andperhapseven derailed,the objective
scientific psychological study of terrorism(Reich 1998; Horgan2003). Indeed, the
following questionmust be asked:to what degreeare leadingpsychologicaltheories
of terrorismsupportedby valid concepts and objective research?A comprehensive
review of the literaturesuggests that a lack of systematicscholarlyinvestigationhas
left policy makersto design counterterrorismstrategieswithout the benefit of facts
regardingthe origin of terroristbehavior-or, worse, guidedby theoreticalpresumptions couched as facts. Investigatingthe terroristmind may be a necessaryfirst step
towardactualizingmodernpolitical psychology's potentialfor uncoveringthe bases
policy.
of terroristaggressionand designing an optimumcounterterrorism
Informationfor this articlewas derivedfrom a review of the unclassifiedliterature
on psychosocial aspects of terrorism,including peer-reviewedarticles, books and
book chapters,news reports,and personalcommunicationswith terrorismexperts.
Scholarlyarticleswere identifiedby a searchfor the term terrorismin the following
databases:PsychINFO (1887-2003), Sociological Abstracts(1974-2003), Medline
(1966-2003), andLexis-NexisAcademicUniverse(1980-2003), as well as frombibliographiesof the identifiedarticles.This articlecriticallyreviewspublishedtheoriesof
the psychologicalbases of terrorism,reviewsthe psychosocialdatadescribingterrorists, defines the limits of andimpedimentsto inquiryin this field, andoffers a preliminarypolitical-psychologicalclassificationof terrorism.
DEFINITION AND DIMENSIONS
OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR
Schmid (1983) compiled 109 academic definitionsof terrorism,suggesting that
there are roughly as many availabledefinitionsas there are publishedexpertsin the
field. The lack of consensusis to some extentinescapable,given the heterogeneityof
terroristbehaviors,the varietyof declaredor assumedmotivations,andthe questionof
point of view, a.k.a.,the "oneman'sterroristis anotherman'sfreedomfighter"problem (Jenkins1982; Hoffman 1998). Nonetheless,two common elements are usually
foundin contemporarydefinitions:(1) thatterrorisminvolvesaggressionagainstnoncombatantsand(2) thatthe terroristactionin itself is not expectedby its perpetratorto
accomplisha political goal but insteadto influencea targetaudienceand changethat
audience'sbehaviorin a way thatwill servethe interestsof the terrorist(Badey 1998;
Laqueur1999).
The typology of terrorismis complex and controversialsince actorscan be characterizedacross multiplevariables.Schultz (1980) proposedseven such variables-
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 5
TABLE 1
Dimensions of Terrorism
Variable
Perpetratornumber
Sponsorship
Relationto authority
Locale
Militarystatus
Spiritualmotivation
Financialmotivation
Political ideology
Hierarchicalrole
Willingnessto die
Target
Methodology
Classification
Individualvs. group
State vs. substatevs. individual
vs. pro-state/pro-establishment
Anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist
Intrastatevs. transnational
Civilian vs. paramilitaryor military
Secularvs. religious
Idealisticvs. entrepreneurial
Leftist/socialistvs. rightist/fascistvs. anarchist
Sponsorvs. leaderversusmiddle managementvs. follower
Suicidal vs. nonsuicidal
Property(includingdata)vs. individualsvs. masses of people
Bombing, assassination,kidnapping/hostagetaking,mass poisoning,
rape,other (e.g., bioterrorism,cyberterrorism)
causes, environment,goals, strategy,means, organization,and participation-that
might be specified for revolutionaryversus subrevolutionaryterrorism.Post (2004)
usefully dividedpoliticalsubstateterrorisminto (1) social revolutionaryterrorism,(2)
right-wingterrorism,(3) nationalist-separatist
terrorism,(4) religious extremistterrorism,and (5) single-issue (e.g., animalrights) terrorism,proposingthat each type
tends to be associatedwith its own social-psychologicaldynamics.A more comprehensive typology is shown in Table 1, listing variablessubjectto analysis and classificationswithin those variables.
Any such typology mustbe considereda heuristiccompendiumof ideal types, and
classes shouldnot necessarilybe construedas dichotomous.Forexample,while many
instances of collective violence unequivocallymeet the criteriafor state terrorism
(e.g., the gassing of Iraqi civilians in Halabja),the distinction between state and
substateterrorismcan be blurred,as in the case of pro-governmentparamilitarydeath
squadsin SouthAfrica or Columbia(Hoffman1998; Stern 1999). It is an open question whethera particulartype of mind is disproportionatelyassociatedwith a given
politicalcategoryof terrorism.Yetanotherchallengeto anypsychologicalinquiryinto
the "mindof the terrorist"is thatterroristgroupstypicallyexhibithierarchicalorganization, with variousroles assumedwithin each level of thathierarchy(see Figure 1).
Each position on such a matrixmay attractindividualswith differentpredispositions
who perhapsplay theirroles because of profoundlydifferentpsychological factors.
One might postulate, for example, that some leaders are more likely to be selfimaginedidealistsor altruists,othersaredrivenby messianicdelusions,othersby ethnic or religious animus,and othersby entrepreneurialambitions-a point thatseems
clearwhen we intuit,for example,the differencesof psychic attributeslikely separating the three convicted terroristleaders Shoko Asahara, Abu Nidal, and Nelson
Mandela.Of course, roles may blur dependingon the type of the group and its size.
Nonetheless,since individualsof differenttemperamentsmightplay extremelydiffer-
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
-Sponsor
Leader
Committee
Executive
Middle
Manage
ment
Follower
State
authority
figure
Selfimagined
idealist
Political
policy
maker
Strategist/
technocrat
Foot soldier/
action
perpetrator
Substate
group
sponsor
Selfimagined
messianic
Military
policy
maker
Recruiter
Technician
Trainer/
dispatcher
Researcher/
surveyor
errand runner
Individual Ethnic or
financial
religious
contributor animusdriven
EntrepreneurI
Supplier/
armorer
Lone
Wolf
Transporter/
harborer
Sympathizer/
fellow
traveler
Figure 1: Roles and Types within TerroristHierarchies
NOTE:Mostterrorists,dependingon the politicalcategoryandsize of organization,belongto groupsexhibiting some or all of the hierarchicallevels of authoritydepictedhere.The exceptionis the Lone Wolf (e.g.,
TheodoreKaczynski)-a terroristactingin isolation.Role or responsibilitywithineach level of authorityis
probablydeterminedin partby self-selection. Levels and roles may blurin application.Note thatthe proposed typology of leadersis theoreticalandpreliminary,a heuristiclist of ideal types based on a review of
multiple sources. The self-imagined idealist leader (e.g., Menachim Begin, Ulrike Meinhof, Nelson
Mandela,andpossibly Usamabin Laden)commitshis life to a goal he imaginesas a moralnecessity,calling
for a strategictriumphhe claims to engineeraltruistically.The self-imaginedmessianicleader(e.g., Adolph
Hitler,DavidKoresh,ShokoAsahara,andpossibly some Islamicextremistimams)regardshimselfas a guru
destinedto fulfill a uniqueplace in historyin which strategictriumphequatesto personalascendancy.Many
leaders,especially those promotingviolence against all out-groupmembers(e.g., perhapsYasserArafat,
SlobodanMilosevic, variousProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy (PIRA)leaders,and possibly Usamabin
Laden),may be primarilydrivenby ethnic or religious animusthatoverridesidealistic or messianic aims.
The entrepreneurial
leader(e.g., AbuNidal, "Carlosthe Jackal,"andleadersof the Abu Sayyaf group)may
justify his actionsaccordingto one of the othertypes butis primarilycircumscribedby shallow,materialist
drives.
ent parts in a terroristgroup, any empirical study claiming to characterize"the
psychology of terrorists"might be very misleading if it fails to stratifyits findings
accordingto level and role.
Most importantfor a psychologicalanalysis,it seems reasonablethattheremay be
heterogeneity in the temperaments,ideologies, thought processes, and cognitive
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THE TERRORIST 7
capacitiesof terroristswithinpoliticalcategories,hierarchicallevels, androles (Taylor
andRyan 1988; Reich 1998). Thus,it is essentialto acknowledgefrom the outsetthat
any effort to uncover the "terroristmind" will more likely result in uncovering a
spectrumof terroristminds.
PSYCHOSOCIAL DATADESCRIBING TERRORISTS
Demographicstudiesfromthe 1960s and 1970s constructeda profileof the typical
terroristas a well-educatedsingle male in his mid-twentiesfroma middle-classbackground(see Table2). Forinstance,in a 1976 studyof eighteengroups,averageages of
membersrangedfrom 23.2 to 31.3. Most identified/convictedterroristscame from
middle- or upper-middle-classbackgrounds,and the majorityhad some college education(RussellandMiller 1983). These findingsaresimilarto those froma contemporaneousstudy of 48 Euzkadita Askatasuna(ETA) members(Clark 1983). Handler
(1990) investigatedthe relationshipbetweenpolitical orientationand socioeconomic
factorsby tabulatingFederalBureauof Investigation(FBI) interviewdata on rightand left-wing terroristsactive in the United States duringthe 1960s and 1970s. He
reportedthatwomenrepresenteda muchlargerproportionof left- thanright-wingterrorists(46.2 vs. 11.2 percent),college completion was much more common among
left- than right-wing terrorists(67.6 vs. 19.0 percent), blue-collar occupation was
morefrequentamongright-thanleft-wingterrorists(74.8 vs. 24.3 percent),andthere
was a trendfor both left- andright-wingterroriststo achievelow- to medium-income
levels even if they had college education.WeinbergandEubank's(1987) dataon 451
Italian women terroristsalso reveal a predominanceof those in their twenties,
althoughthe majoritywereteachersor white-collarworkers.In a rarecontrolledstudy,
Ferracuti(1982; FerracutiandBruno 1981; see also Post 2004) comparedItalianRed
Brigade terroristswith politically active controls, finding no notable differences in
family backgrounds.
Thependulumswung in the 1980s with the relativequiescenceof Americanterrorist groups,the decimationof Europeanrevolutionaryanarchist-Marxistgroups, and
the risingworldprofileof radicalIslamicterrorists.The typicalPalestinianterroristof
thatlaterperiodwas age seventeento twenty-three,came from a largefamily with an
impoverishedbackground,and had low educationalachievement(Strentz1988). But
the pendulumhas swung again. Middle Easternterroristsin the late 1990s and early
twenty-firstcenturycome from a widerdemographicrange,includinguniversitystudents,professionals,marriedmen in theirlate forties, and young women (Rees et al.
2002). For example, the 9/11 pilots included the middle-aged,middle-class urban
plannerMohammadAttaandthe well-to-do ZiadJarrah,a manfrom an affluentfamily who attendedChristianschools and enjoyed discos and beer (Carey2002; Laabs
andMcDermott2003; Anonymous2004). The most recentdevelopment,the recruitmentof women as suicidebombers,arisesat least in partfromthe fact thatthe al-Aqsa
Martyr'sBrigade-associated with YasserArafat'sFatah-is the first seculargroup
fighting for Palestinianindependenceand thereforepermits females to participate
(Rees et al. 2002; Wilkinson2002).
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TABLE2
ReportedDemographicsof Terrorists
Author(s)and Year
Russell and Miller
(1983)
Clark(1983)
Weinbergand
Eubank(1987)
Strentz(1988)
Strentz(1988)
Handler(1990)
Hassan(2001)
Pedahzur,Perliger,
andWeinberg
(2003)
Sageman(2004)
Subjects
Age
Social Class
23.2-31.3
> 2/3 middle or uppermiddle class
350 membersof eighteen
European,Middle Eastern,
South American,and Japanese groups,active 19661976
28 percentlower;30 percent
48 ETA members,active
24 (avg.)
middle
1970s
451 Italianwomen terrorists 60 percent
Terrorists:35 percentstudents,43
ages 20-29
percentwhite-collarworkersor
teachers,and 7 percent"workers";fathersof subgroupof 27:
10 percentblue-collarworkers
and 41 percentuppermiddle
class
Leader.
Middle class
U.S. domestic terrorists:
1960s and 1970s leftist
25-40;
follower,
groups(n, NA)
20-25
17-23
1980s Middle Easternter"Unskilledandunemployable"
rorists(n, NA)
Right wing: 74.8 percentblue161 right-wingand 119 left- NA
wing terroristsactive in
collar workers,18.3 percent
United States, 1960s-1970s
white-collarworkers;left wing:
24.3 percentblue-collarworkers,
15 percentwhite-collarworkers
18-38
"Many"middle class
"Nearly250" Hamasor
Islamic Jihadmembers,
1996-1999
24.5 (avg.)
Mean socioeconomic status
80 Palestiniansuicide
(SES) = 5.97 (high SES = 1;
terrorists
low = 10)
102 Salafi Muslim terrorists 25.69 (avg.
18 percentupperclass, 55 percent
age of
middle class, and 27 percent
from SaudiArabia,Egypt,
lower class
joining)
France,Algeria, Morocco,
and Indonesia
NOTE:NA = not available;ETA= Euzkadita Askatasuna.
A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
(PCPSR)in 2001 among 1,357 adultsin the WestBankandGazatestedthe hypothesis
that poverty or low levels of education influence attitudes regarding political violence
and found that support for terrorism against Israeli civilians was even more common
among professionals than among laborers (43.3 vs. 34.6 percent) and more common
among those with secondary education than among illiterate respondents (39.4 vs.
32.3 percent) (Krueger and Maleckova 2002). This is consistent with Sageman's
(2004) finding that 94 of 132 (71 percent) of Muslim terrorists had at least some college education, and 57 of 134 (43 percent) were professionals, although his study is
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 9
biased towardleaders. More important,Kruegerand Maleckova(2002) also tested
how economic status and educationcomparedwith actual participationin political
violence: comparing129 Hezbollahfightersages fifteen to thirty-eightwho died in
action between 1982 and 1994 with membersof the generalLebanesepopulationof
the sameage range,the povertyratewas similar(28 percentamongfightersvs. 33 percent in the population),but fighterswere significantlymore likely to have attended
secondaryschool (33 vs. 23 percent).These findings are not consistentwith theories
tying political violence to povertyand lack of education(althougha critiqueof this
conclusion is noted laterin the section on sociological theories).
Psychologicaldataareeven sparserthansocioeconomicdata,althoughseveralprojects reported"typical"psychosocial characteristicsof terroristsin the 1970s and
1980s. On the basis of unstructuredinterviews,AmericanpsychiatristDavid Hubbard
(1971) reportedfive traitsof skyjackers:(1) violent, often alcoholic father;(2) deeply
religious mother; (3) sexually shy, timid, and passive; (4) younger sisters toward
whomthe terroristactedprotectively;and(5) poor social achievement.On the basis of
primarilysecondhandsourcematerialregardinga subsampleof 908 right-wingterrorists in Italy,Ferracuti,andBruno(1981) claimedto haveidentifiedninetypicalcharacteristics:(1) ambivalencetowardauthority,(2) defectiveinsight,(3) adherenceto convention,(4) emotionaldetachmentfrom the consequencesof theiractions, (5) sexual
role uncertainties,(6) magical thinking,(7) destructiveness,(8) low education,and
(9) adherenceto violent subculturenormsand weaponsfetishes. It is interestingthat
these lists, compiled a decade apart,overlapin regardto sexualrole uncertaintiesand
probablylow education(if this is a proxyfor poor social achievement).Yetapartfrom
this superficialoverlap, the two studies do not suggest common features of backgroundor personality.Neitherof these studiesused controlsor validatedpsychological instruments.Thelargeststudyof thiskindwas thatperformedunderthe auspicesof
the WestGermanMinistryof the Interior;this ambitious1980-1983 projectinvolved
semistructuredinterviews of 227 left-wing terroristsand 23 right-wing extremists
(Jiger, Schmidtchen,and Siillwold 1981). Certaindemographic,life historical, or
psychologicalfactorswere reportedwith high frequencyin this studypopulation:25
percentof leftist terroristshad lost one or both parentsby age fourteen,33 percent
reportedsevere conflict with parents,and 33 percenthad a history of juvenile court
conviction.This studyalso claimedto haveidentifiedtwo patternsof personalitytraits
commonto terrorists:an extroverted,stimulus-seeking,dependentpatternand a hostile, suspicious, defensive pattern.This Germanstudy presentsa majorchallenge to
some psychology theoriesof terrorismsimplyby recognizingheterogeneouspsychological categories among terrorists.But again, the psychological conclusions were
impressionistic,and differentpsychologists on the Germanteam drew differentconclusions (Crenshaw1986). Withoutthe use of valid andreliablebehavioralmeasures
andwithouta controlgroup,one cannotconcludethatthe characteristicsidentifiedin
the American,Italian,or Germanstudies distinguishterroristsfrom nonterrorists.
Since the tragiceventsof September11, 2001, attentionhas shiftedto the psychology of Islamic fundamentalistterrorism.Thereis a dearthof publishedliteraturedescribingpsychological studies of Muslim extremists.Merariand colleagues administered a batteryof standardizedpsychological tests, including some measures of
10
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
cognitivefunction,to Hezbollah,Amal, andsecularpro-SyrianfighterscapturedinfiltratingIsraelfromLebanonin the late 1980s (Ariel Merari,personalcommunication,
2003). Unfortunately,his datahave been classified by the IsraeliDefense Forces and
are unavailablefor scholarly scrutinyor attemptedreplication.Post, Sprinzak,and
Denny (2003) conductedsemistructuredinterviewswith thirty-fiveincarceratedMiddle Easternextremists,includingtwenty-oneIslamicreligiousterroristsfrom Hamas
and its armedwing, Izz a-Din al-Qassam,Islamic Jihad,and Hezbollah, as well as
fourteensecularterroristsfrom Fatah.Most had a high school education;some had
additionalschooling. (However,the subgroupof suicidebombersamongthe Palestinians was described as ages seventeen to twenty-two, "uneducated,unemployed,
unmarried.")
Mostcamefromrespectedfamiliesthatsupportedtheiractivism,with 30
percentof the families of religious terroristsand 15 percentof the families of secular
terroristsreportingtheir own radical involvement.Peer influence was cited as the
majorreasonforjoining a terroristgroup,andjoining increasedsocial standing.Membershipwas describedas being associatedwith a fusionof the young adult'sindividual
identitywith the group'scollective identityandgoals. Prisonexperiencewas claimed
to strengthengroupcommitmentfor most terroristsof both types. Anger and hatred
withoutremorsewere often expressed,but therewas little interestin obtainingweapons of massdestruction.Thisprojectis one of the few to employa directpsychological
examinationof recentlyactive terrorists.Unfortunately,the methodof subjectselection, the circumstancesof the interviews,and the method of interviewingwere not
describedin this otherwise impressivereport;few specific demographicswere reported,no formalmeasuresof anypsychologicalvariableswere used, andno controls
were examined.
PsychiatristMarcSageman(2004) compileddatafrompublic sourceson 172 individuals he identifiedas membersof a "globalSalafi mujahedin,"meaningMuslims
engagedin terroristacts againstthe "farenemy"in the service of a new Islamicworld
order.He includedexpatriateleadersof the EgyptianIslamic Group(EIG),members
of the EgyptianIslamic Jihad(EIJ),JemaahIslamiyah,the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front,the AlgerianGroupeSalafistepourla Predicationet le Combat(GSPC),and al
Qaeda. Sageman excluded terroristsengaged in local jihads, such as Chechnyans,
Kashmiris,Afghans,andPalestinians.His sampleis thusbiasedtowardthose involved
in transnationalterrorismandtowardthe subgroup,mostly leaders,who have come to
publicattention.He identified"somefragmentof childhooddata"in 61 cases. Only 4
hadhistoriessuggestiveof conductdisorder.Only 1 case (HabibZacariasMoussaoui)
was suggestive of a childhood trauma.Descriptorsof childhood personalitywere
foundfor 69 cases; althoughlonersoutnumberedoutgoingchildren,most descriptors
were neutralor positive. One-quarterof the group had historiesof petty crime. Detailedbiographieswere examinedfor 10 cases. Sagemanclaimsthathe found"noevidence of pathologicalnarcissism"and"nopatternof paranoidpersonalitydisorder"in
this subgroup,with the exception of possible traits of al Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri.AlthoughSageman'sconclusions seem highly plausible,the authoris candid in admittingthe limitationsof this work:his sample is very small, atypical,and
uncontrolled,and the authorhad no formal method for confirming these indirect
psychiatricimpressions.
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 11
Potentiallyhigh-valuedatawere gatheredoutsidethe academicresearchapparatus
by UnitedNations(UN) relief workerNasraHassan,basedon unstructuredinterviews
with "nearly250" membersof Hamas or Islamic Jihadconductedin Gaza between
1996 and 1999. She reportsthatthe suicide bombersrangedin age from eighteen to
thirty-eight,more thanhalf were refugees, "many"were middleclass, 2 were sons of
millionaires,and none were depressed,although"many"reportedthatthey had been
beaten or torturedby Israeli forces. Unfortunately,Hassan's lucid and widely cited
reportdoes not specify the actualnumberof terroristsubjects,as well as whatproportion of this total subject populationwere intended suicide bombers, failed suicide
bombers,or trainers,andoffers no specific demographic,socioeconomic, or psychological data(Hassan2001; Atran2003). (Some of these datawill be incorporatedinto
a forthcomingbook [N. Hassan,personalcommunication,2004].) Barber(1999) conducted the most extensive study of psychological factors possibly associated with
Islamic political violence. His reportis based on data from the PalestinianFamily
Study, a project involving 6,923 ninth-gradestudentsin the West Bank and Gaza.
Aggressivity and mood were measured with the Child Behavior Checklist
(Achenbachand Edelbrock 1987), "familyvalues" were measuredby one question
regardingthe importancethat respondentsplaced on getting marriedand having a
family, and participationin the intifadaof 1987-1993 was measuredby the yes/no
responseto a single question:"Beforethe withdrawalof Israelitroopsfrom the Gaza
Stripand Jericho,did you ever distributeleaflets, protectsomeone from Israeli soldiers or police, march or demonstrateagainst the occupation,and throw stones at
Israelisoldiers?"A yes answerto this questionwas positivelyassociatedwith depression, aggression,and family values. Unfortunately,this questiondoes not allow discriminationbetween violent andnonviolentpoliticalparticipation,underminingconclusions one might drawfrom this ambitiousstudyregardingthe predictivevalue of
psychological factorsfor Islamic insurgentaggression.
OVERVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES
Attemptsto accountfor the behaviorof terroristsfall into two generalcategories:
top-downapproachesthatseek the seeds of terrorismin political,social, economic, or
even evolutionarycircumstancesand bottom-upapproachesthatexplore the characteristicsof individualsandgroupsthatturnto terrorism(e.g., Wieviorka1993, 2004).
These approachesare not mutually exclusive. In fact, approachessuch as rational
choice theory and relative deprivation/oppressiontheory combine these points of
view, consideringinteractionsbetweencircumstancesandactors.While acknowledging the importanceof top-downanalysesand ultimatecauses, this articlefocuses primarilyon bottom-upapproachesandproximalcauses in substateterrorism.The principal approachesare organizedinto groups for the sake of clarity.However,it will
become apparentthatconceptualoverlapexists betweentheorieswithinandbetween
groups.It will also become apparentthata particularfundamentalconceptualframework-such as psychoanalysis-may informdiversetheoriesand thatthe same theory may be championedfrom differentconceptualframeworks.For example, group
12
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
theoryhas psychoanalyticand nonpsychoanalyticchampions.Theoriesof terrorism
also vary in the extentto which they considerpsychologicaldifferencesbetween terroristsplaying differentroles (e.g., leadersvs. followers), whetherterroristsare regardedas psychologicallyhomogeneousor heterogeneous,and whethersubtypesof
terrorismare associatedwith subtypesof terrorists.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICALTHEORY
At one end of the spectrumis the popularopinionthatterroristsmustbe insane or
psychopathic(Hacker1976;Cooper 1977;Pearce1977;Taylor1988). Herea distinction must be made:modernWesternpsychiatryidentifies adultbehavioraldisorders
accordingto a multiaxialclassificationschemein whichAxis I refersto the majorclinical illnesses-those such as schizophreniaor majordepression-while Axis II refers
to personalitydisorders-such as antisocialpersonalitydisorder(APD) (American
PsychiatricAssociation 2000). APD is the currentterm for a patternof remorseless
disregardfor the rightsof othersthatwas calledpsychopathyup until the mid-1950s
andsociopathythereafter.Psychosisrefersto a loss of realitytestingobservedprimarily in a subgroupof Axis I disorders(e.g., schizophrenia)butis not expectedin Axis II
disorderssuch as APD. Insanityis not a behavioralscience termbut a legal termthat
usuallyimpliespsychosis,althoughits definitionis subjectto significantjurisdictional
variance(ResnickandNoffsinger 2004). Hence, a psychotic or "insane"personis so
mentallydisorderedas to not know rightfrom wrong, while a sociopathknows right
from wrong and chooses wrong for selfish reasonswithoutpangs of conscience.
In regardto Axis I clinical disordersamongterrorists,very little researchhas been
done involving comprehensivepsychiatricexamination,and no properlycontrolled
researchis foundin the open literature.However,the conclusion-at leaston the basis
of uncontrolledempiricalpsychologicalstudiesof left-wing Germanmilitants,membersof the AlgerianFrontde Lib6rationNationale(FLN),membersof the Provisional
IrishRepublicanArmy (PIRA), and Hezbollah-has been thatterroristsdo not usually exhibitwhatwe referto as Axis I or even Axis II psychiatricdisorders(Crenshaw
1981; Jager,Schmidtchen,and Stillwold 1981; Heskin 1984; Merari1998). German
psychiatristWilfredRasch(1979) examinedeleven terroristsuspects,includingmembers of the Baader-Meinhofgroup,and reportedon a FederalPolice studyof another
fortypersonswantedas terrorists,findingno evidenceof mentalillness in anyrespondent. Post, Sprinzak,and Denny (2003; also see Post and Gold 2002) also found no
Axis I disorderson psychiatricevaluationsof twenty-onesecularandfourteenradical
IslamicMiddleEasternterrorists.As criminologistFrancoFerracuti(1982) suggested
more thantwo decades ago, and as has been supportedby subsequentreports(Reich
1998; Silke 1998; Horgan2003), while terroristgroupsare sometimesled by insane
individuals,andwhile a few terroristacts mightbe attributedto unequivocallyinsane
persons,terroristsrarelymeet psychiatriccriteriafor insanity.
Rather,most of the literatureattributingclinicalmentaldisorderto terroristsspeaks
of the remorselesspersonalitytype,psychopathyor sociopathy(Taylor1988). Cooper
(1977, 1978), for example, states thatterrorists,like psychopaths,are ruthless"out-
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 13
laws" and "outcasts"who adhereto an anomalousscheme of values out of tune with
thatof the rest of society andthatthereis a "nearidentityof this fundamentalcharacteristicin both the psychopathand the terrorist."Pearce (1977) statedthat terrorists
were sociopathsacting antisociallydue to "superegolacunae,"meaninggaps in selfmonitoring;he supportshis conclusion partlyon the basis of tattoos found on one
terrorist.
The claim of sociopathy,advancedwithout evidence from any empirical study,
raises the importantquestion of whetherterrorismis usually antisocialor prosocial
behavior.It makes a common kind of sense thatindividualswho harminnocentsare
antisocial.Those who rejectand attacktheirown society, such as the Germanstudent
whojoined the 1970s Red ArmyFactionor the Christian-to-Muslim
convertwhojoins
a modem radicalIslamic cell, standagainsttheirown and might be regardedas antisocial. Yet severallines of reasoningtend to discreditthe simplisticclaim that antisociality is typical or even common among terrorists.First,extensive evidence supportsthe observationthat,farfrombeing outcasts,terroristsareoften regardedby their
in-groupas heroic freedomfighters.As Post (2004) points out, nationalist-separatist
terroristsmust be distinguishedfrom revolutionaryterroristsin this regardsince the
formerare typically regardedas riskingtheirlives for social welfare,while the latter
attack their society of origin. That is, the Basque studentwho joins the ETA, the
Chechen"blackwidow"who terrorizesa Moscow theater,or the LiberationTigersof
TamilEalem (LTTE)suicide bomberall use terrorismto fight on behalf of their ingroup.The Irishmanwho joins the PIRA or the Middle Easternstudentwho joins an
Islamicradicalgroup,dependingon his specific nationandprovince,may enjoy considerablepopularsupportand conscientiously serve his society in a prosocial way.
Ironically,therefore,with respect to in-groupsof identity,certaintypes of terrorism
oftenrepresentprosocialbehavior.Second,evidenceexists fromthe quantitativeliteraturethatthe actionsof terrorists,even those who fail and die, mightbenefit theirkin
and social group (Azam forthcoming).Furtherevidence of the prosocialityof some
terroristscomes from the empiricalwork of Italiansociologist Donatelladella Porta
(1988): among 1,214 Italianmilitants,351 (45.6 percent)enjoyed personalties with
eight or more group membersbeforejoining a terroristorganization.This raises the
questionof how large one's groupof identitymust be to considercollaborationprosocial, butit at least suggeststhatrecruitmentofteninvolvesa networkof sharedsocial
values. Pedahzur,Perliger,and Weinberg(2003) examinedthis issue from the perspective of Durkheim,who distinguishedaltruisticsuicide-suicide in the service of
society-from egoistic andanomicsuicide.Based on the observationthat80 Palestinian suicideterroristsfrom 1973 to 2002 exhibiteda higherrateof religiouseducation,
membershipin fundamentalistorganizations,andrepeatterroristacts comparedwith
nonsuicidalterrorists,these authorsproposedthat they were probablyacting from
altruisticmotives.Indeed,this is the essence of the concept of istishad, selfless death
in the serviceof Allah (Post, Sprinzak,andDenny 2003; see also Sageman2004). It is
obviously conceptually inadequateto judge antisociality from the perspective of
the targetedout-group,yet it is prematureto conclude thatmost membersof ethnic,
religious, or national-separatistterroristgroups exhibit prosocialitybased on these
limited reports.Some antisocial individualsperhapsuse the moral cover of group
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
affiliationto disguise theiraggressiveandremorselessdrives.However,pendingdata
to the contrary,it seems plausiblethatmanyterroristsact in a prosocialmanner,both
believingthemselvesto be servingsociety andjudgedby theirin-groupto be actingin
its interest.(It is a separatequestionto ask whetherthey subjectivelyadoptthe moral
positionthatCorrado[1981] labeled"misplacedidealism.")Thus,Ferracuti's(1982)
formulationregardingthe relationshipbetween insanityand terrorismmight equally
apply to the relationship between sociopathy and terrorism: sociopaths may
sometimes be among the terrorists,but terroristsare not, by virtue of their political
violence, necessarily sociopaths.Intuitively,one might expect differentpersonality
traits among antisocial and prosocial terrorists.This speculation requires further
study.
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
If most terroristsdo not meet diagnosticcriteriafor a majormentalillness or for
sociopathy,must one conclude thatthey are rational?This raises the questionof the
explanatorypower of rationalchoice theory-the theorythatterroristaction derives
from a conscious, rational,calculateddecision to takethis particulartype of actionas
the optimumstrategyto accomplish a sociopolitical goal (Sandler,Tschirhart,and
Cauley 1983; SandlerandLapan1988; Crenshaw1992; Wilson 2000). A distinction
shouldbe madebetweenrational-or strategic-choice theoryandotherindividualor
group psychological theories of terrorism.The lattertry to explain why people are
inclinedtowarda type or style of behavior(e.g., to be a terrorist),while rationalchoice
theory, derivedfrom economics, assumes this behavioralproclivity as a given and
attemptsto explain how changes in policy-the rules of the "game"that is played
betweenterroristsandgovernments-might predictablyalterbehavior.Since rational
choice theoryconsidersboth policy and individualbehavioralresponsesto policy, it
combines the top-downand bottom-upapproaches.
Gametheory,basedon this "assumptionof rationality"in strategicchoice formulations, has beenused to analyzeandpredictpoliticalbehaviorsince the seminalworkof
Deutschin the 1950s (Deutsch 1954;DeutschandKrause1962;MilburnandWatman
1981; Machinaet al. 1989). Empiricalsupportfor game theory comes from experimentsin whichvolunteersplay againstrivalsin games such as the prisoner'sdilemma,
sometimesto win a payoff such as points,sometimesto avoidcosts suchas loss of face
or electric shocks (von NeumannandMorgenstern1947; Deutsch 1954; Borah 1963;
RapoportandChammah1968). SandlerandArce (2003) listed six strengthsof modern game theoryfor revealingquantifiablefactorstheoreticallyunderlyingthe behavior of terroristsand targetedgovernments:game theory (1) captures the interdependentnatureof such interactions,(2) helps discoverthe strategicimplicationswhen
each side acts accordingto its best guess abouthow the other side thinks, (3) incorporates the impact of threatsand promises from each side, (4) takes advantageof
the observationthat"players"tendto maximizegoals subjectto constraints,(5) helps
predictoutcomes in bargainingover demands,and (6) acknowledgesthe impact of
uncertainty-incomplete information-on all the above.They cite the exampleof the
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 15
shift away from skyjackingsto kidnappingsafterthe installationof metaldetectorsat
airportsin 1973 as evidenceof a predictableandrationalresponseto new constraints.
PoliticalscientistMarthaCrenshaw(2000) has cautionedthatthe ostensiblegoal of
terroristsoften appearsso unlikelyto be achievedby the chosen actionthatit is difficult to supportan overarchingrationalisttheoryof terrorism.Furthermore,the outrageous inhumanityof attackson innocentcivilianschallengesthe commonplaceunderstanding of "rational"behavior. Given questions about incoherent motivations,
ghastlymeans,andpoliticalinefficacyof terrorism,some scholarshaveproposedthat
the typical terroristis not simply a "rationalactor" in the strict Weberiansense
(Brannan,Eslerm, and Anders Strindberg2001). On the other hand, historicalevidence suggests that terrorismis sometimes a practical,low-cost strategy through
which subordinategroups leverage their power to successfully achieve their ends
(Sandlerand Enders2004). Indeed,modem history is repletewith examplesof successful substatepolitical violence: Irgun'sbombingswere a majorfactorin securing
the independenceof EretzIsraelfrom the British;terrorismby the Irish Republican
Army(IRA)precipitatedaccommodationsleadingto theIrishFreeState;Shi'ite Muslim terroristsprovidedkey assistancein the ousterof the Shahof Iran;Hezbollah'ssuicide bombingcampaignof 1983-1985 directlyled to theAmerican,French,andIsraeli
withdrawalandestablishmentof a Shi'a-controlledsociety in majorpartsof Lebanon;
andtheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC) used terrorismas partof its remarkablysuccessful strategyto overthrowthe apartheidgovernmentof South Africa. More recently,al Qaeda'sbrutaltransnationalcampaign,includingthe mass murdersat New
York'sWorldTradeCenterin 2001, may have not only rapidlyadvancedUsama bin
Laden'sstatedgoal of removingthe large U.S. militarypresencefrom Saudi Arabia
but also servedas an extremelypotentrecruitingtool (Laqueur1987; Hoffman 1998,
1999; Whittaker2001). Thus, historicalprecedentssupportmanyterrorists'expectations of success, so the theory of strategicchoice must not be discounted on the
grounds that terrorism's goals are uniformly improbable. Game-theoreticalapproachesare also sophisticatedenough to recognize that the "winnings"that satisfy
terroristsmay not be theirovertantigovernmentgoals but less obvious goals such as
martyrdom,whichmaynot only serveas anend in itself butalso yield unexpectedbenefits to the terrorist'soffspringthatexceed the "opportunitycost" of an educatedlife
lost prematurely(Brooks 2002; Azam forthcoming). Moreover, game theory has
yielded evidence of counterintuitivebut importantpredictionssuch as the possibility
that governmentinvestmentsin deterrencemight waste resources or even produce
paradoxicalincreasesin threats(Sandlerand Arce 2003).
Strategicchoice theorypotentiallyoffers vital insights into the potentialpayoff of
terroristversus governmentactions. By uncoveringotherwise cryptic benefits, this
approachmayhelp explainotherwiseenigmaticbehaviors.Insofaras humansevolved
to function as sophisticatedcalculatorsof risks and benefits, and insofar as groups
functioncollectively to actualizethe will of theirmembers,one can makequantitative
predictionsregardingthe theoreticalcircumstancesunder which terroristbehavior
serves group and individual interests. Such microeconomic analyses may help in
calculatingthe likely outcome of differentpolicy options, such as hardeningtargets,
calculatingconcessions, or performingretaliatorystrikes(Sandlerand Lapan 1988;
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
Lee 1988; Brophy-Baermannand Conybeare1994; Sandierand Arce 2003; Sandier
and Enders2004). But the following question remains:what are the limitations,or
even potentialpitfalls, of the game-theoreticalapproach?
Evidence suggests thatvery few individualswho rationallybelieve thatterrorism
may advancetheir cause ever become terrorists(Schbley 2000). This is conceivably
relatedto the discoverythat85 percentof WorldWarII infantrymenfacing the enemy
failed to pull the triggers of their weapons, despite the urgent rational benefits
(Grossman 1995). In other words, even obvious strategicbenefits may not compel
humansto violence, an arguablyirrationalresultof modem culture.And some terrorists (e.g., "lonewolf"terroristTheodoreKaczinski)commitviolence dueto unequivocally irrationalmotives (in his case, paranoidschizophrenia).Thus,the rareand idiosyncraticdecision to become a terroristcannotbe explainedby rationalchoice theory.
Yetit is inappropriateto criticizethis theorybecauseit fails to explainwhy only a tiny
minorityof individualsturnsto terrorism;it does not tryto. It focuses insteadon what
membersof this raregroupare likely to do undervariousconditions.
Twoothercriticismsof rationalchoice theorymaybe morecompelling.First,rational choice theoryclaims predictivepower for futureevents, extrapolatingboth from
laboratoryexperimentsof the behaviorof nonterroristsplayingnonnaturalisticgames
and from post hoc analysis of real-worldincidents. But as Wieviorka(1993, 57)
observed, this kind of strategicanalysis weighs "questionsof resourcesand power
relationships... as if the principlesunderlyingtheiractionshadbeen establishedonce
andfor all, andas if the effects of violence were predictableandmeasurable"(see also
Wieviorka2004). The uncertaintyof theprinciplesof terrorist-government
interaction
adds to the uncertaintyof the facts known by the players since, as the early work in
game theoryillustrates,a slight change in the "rules"may yield opposite behavioral
results (von Neumannand Morgenstern1947; Milburnand Watman1981; Machina
engagements
et al. 1989). Refinementsin the understandingof terrorist-government
based on increasinglysophisticatedevent analysis and classification should reduce
this element of uncertaintyand strengthenthe predictivevalidityof this approach.
Second, it may be dangerousto assumethata profileof a "typicalplayer"will predict an actualterrorist'sresponses.As Merari(2002, 4) has said, "Ina perfectlyrational system, the basic idea of deterrenceis to deliver a clear,crediblemessage to the
opponentthatthe cost of pursuinga certaincourseof behavioroutweighsits benefits.
In reality,however,this simple formulararely,if ever, works accordingto expectations."The most likely explanationfor suchunanticipatedconsequencesis simplythat
the immenseplasticityandindividualvariabilityof the humancentralnervoussystem
often generateidiosyncraticand individualisticresponses that defy predictionsnot
only because of incomplete informationheld by the actor but also because of impulsivity,faulty cognition, and emotional processes that overruleadaptivechoices.
Writingthe applicablegame-theoreticalequationbecomes ever more challengingas
imponderablevariablesareaddedto accommodateindividualemotionalpeculiarities
of terrorists,victims, and governments:the lure of bravadoand romanceof risk, the
self-destructiveurge for "success"in likely failurewith or withoutthe utility of martyrdom,the Svengali-likeinfluence of charismaticleaderson either side whose fol-
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 17
lowersmarchin maladaptivecolumns,thepowerof rageto betterreason,the blindness
of ambition,the illogic of spite, or the frenzy of revengeall may contributeto the stochastic occurrenceof surprisingscenarios.Moreover,the lack of an empiricallyvalidated typology of terroristvariantscomplicateswriting optimumtheoremsfor subtypes of playerswho may exhibit very differentbehavioralproclivities(Bowen et al.
1985; FriedlandandMerari1985;Merari2002). Nonetheless,no behavioraltheoryis
expectedto accommodateall examples;the law of largenumbersby itself guarantees
some failuresof prediction.It wouldbe sufficientlyvaluableif rationalchoice calculations predicteda higher proportionof terroristbehaviors than did nonquantitative
methods or reliably predictedresponses in some subtype of engagements.Merari's
(2002) strongclaim thatterroristbehaviors"rarely,if ever"follow such predictionsis
the key question.Furtherempiricalwork should be able to resolve thatdebate.
I would proposethatrationalchoice analysisis a powerfultool for discoveringtheoreticallyvalidandsurprisinglycounterintuitiveforces thatprobablyinfluenceterrorist and governmentbehaviors.Game theorymay also prove invaluablein predicting
likely changes in the base rate (the rate predictedin rationalactor simulations)of
behaviorsof an idealizedterroristin responseto concessions or deterrents.However,
rationalchoice theoriescannotpredictidiosyncraticresponses.Policy recommendations thatpredictdeterrenceof terroristacts are only as valuableas their capacityto
anticipatethe extraordinaryvariabilityand adaptabilityof humans.
Moreover,at present,rationalchoice theorydoes not explainwhy a very few individuals, among hundreds of thousands in virtually identical political positions,
become terrorists.As Crozier (1960, 9) suggested, "Men do not necessarily rebel
merelybecause theirconditionsof life are intolerable:it takes a rebel to rebel."Individualfactorsmustbe at work.Temperamentsvary.Humanfrontallobe corticalplanningbasedon rationalcalculationof costs andbenefitsis foreversubjectto limbictyranny.Passion often trumpsrationality,behaviorsmay deviate significantlyfrom the
predictedbase rate,andunderstandingthe mindof the terrorist-with or withoutpredictionof futurebehavior-requires investigationsbeyondtherealmof gametheory.
If neitherinsanity/sociopathynorrationalchoice can fully accountfor the genesis
of terroristbehaviors,what alternativepsychologicalexplanationsseem most plausible? As Crenshaw(1986, 386) stated,even though terrorismdoes not result from a
specific psychopathologicalcondition,thatis not to say that"thepoliticaldecision to
join a terroristorganizationis not influenced or, in some cases, even determinedby
subconscious or latent psychological motives."In other words, although terrorists
rarely exhibit psychological disorders, they may exhibit identifiablepsychological
traits or may have been influencedby identifiablesocial factors.Political scientists,
sociologists, psychologists,andpsychiatristshave offereddiverseopinionsregarding
the degree to which the roots of terroristaggression are innate versus acquired,the
productof psychodynamicversus social forces, or the productof individualversus
groupforces.The most frequentlycited theoriescan be dividedinto sociological theories,psychoanalyticapproachesto individualpsychology,nonpsychoanalyticpsychological approachesto individualpsychology, and theoriesof groupprocess.
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
Bandura's(1973, 1998) social learningtheoryof aggressionsuggeststhatviolence
follows observationandimitationof an aggressivemodel, anda variantof this theory
has been invoked to explain terroristbehaviors not as the consequence of innate
aggressivitybut of cognitive "reconstrual"of moralimperatives.Teenagersliving in
hotbedsof political strifemay directlywitness terroristbehaviorsand seek to imitate
themor,even morecommonly,learnfromtheirculture'spublicglorificationof terrorists-for example,the "martyrposters"lining the streetsof Shi'a regionsof Lebanon
and Palestinianrefugee camps or the songs celebratingthe exploits of the PIRA
(Crenshaw1992;TaylorandQuayle 1994; Kelly andRieber1995). Social learningof
the acceptabilityof terroristviolence may also takea didacticform,as in the teaching
of an extremistform of jihad in manyPakistaniand Palestinianmadrasas-religious
schools for young Muslimboys. Madrasashaveexisted since the time of Muhammad,
butthe recentworldwideresurgenceof Islamicfundamentalismhas led to an increase
in theirnumbersandpossibly in the violence of theirmessage (Armstrong2000; MarshallandDanizewski2001; Kepel2002; Atran2003). Evidencesuggeststhata minority of prominenttransnationalMuslimterroristswere educatedin madrasas(Sageman
2004; Anonymous2004). This, however,does not exclude the possibility that widespreadeducationof this type influences even nonattendeesvia culturaldiffusion.
Terroristdidacticlearningalso occursvia the disseminationof terroristphilosophy
andmethodologyin communiquds,audiovisualtapes,compactdisks,books, andWeb
sites. The most influential historical example may be the widely translated1969
"Mini-Manual"or "Handbookof Urban Guerilla Warfare"by Brazilian terrorist
CarlosMarighella(1971; also see Saper 1988), which, amongotherpracticaladvice,
suggests that readerslearn to pilot a plane. The charterof the Islamic Resistance
Movement(HarakatAl-MuqawamaAl-Islamiya [Hamas])representsa more recent
example; article 15 of this documentemphasizesthe importanceof teachingjihad:
"Wemustimprinton the mindsof generationsof Muslimsthatthe Palestinianproblem
is a religiousone... I indeedwish to go to warfor the sake of Allah! I will assaultand
kill, assault and kill, assaultand kill" (Alexander2002, 57). It seems plausiblethat
didacticteachingor social learningmay influence some young people towardterrorism. However,the social learning/cognitiverestructuringmodel fails to explain why
only a smallminorityamongthe hundredsof thousandsof studentseducatedforjihad
in madrasas,the millions exposed to extremistpublications,and the tens of millions
exposed to public glorificationof terroristshave become terrorists.As Taylorand
Quayle(1994, 32) put it, "Noteveryonefromthose communities,althoughsubjectto
those same or similar influences, becomes a terrorist"(see also Sageman 2004).
Therefore,while social learningprobablyhelps animatethe smallminoritywho turns
to political violence, this theoryfails to explain why these particularindividualsbecome terrorists.Otherfactorsmust be sought.
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 19
FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSIONHYPOTHESIS
This raises the questionof how politically motivatedpeople reachthe point of no
returnat which theirpotentialenergyis convertedinto violent action.The frustrationaggression (FA) hypothesis-one outcome of an interdisciplinarycollaborationby
political and social scientists at Yale University to better understandthe violence
observedin earlytwentieth-centuryEurope-has oftenbeen cited,attributingthe final
expressionof the terroristimpulse to desperationin the face of oppression(Dollard
et al. 1939;Friedland1992). PoliticalpsychologistJohnChowingDavies (1973, 251)
has even stated,"Violenceis always a responseto frustration"(emphasisadded).The
FA hypothesisis includedhere as a sociological theory,althoughthe originalintentof
Dollardet al. (1939) was also to accountfor individualbehavior;thus, terroristviolence of eithergroupsor individualsmight be explainedby this theory.
However,the applicationof this theoryto terrorismstudieshas been criticizedon
severalgrounds:millions of people live in frustratingcircumstancesbut neverturnto
terrorism,manyterroristsdo notbelong to the desperateclasses whose frustrationthey
claim to be expressing,and terrorismdoes not uniformlyappearto be an act of last
resortby those who have exhaustedalternateapproaches(Billig 1976; Merariand
Friedland1985;Laqueur1987; Friedland1992; SidaniusandPratto1999). The leftist
terrorismof 1970s Europe,for example, was primarilyperpetratedby membersof
privileged classes, and state-sponsoredterrorismcan hardly be attributedto the
oppressionof the governmentby its victims.Frustration,therefore,mayplausiblyplay
some partin the genesis of some political violence, but the FA hypothesis is not by
itself sufficientto explainterrorism.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATIONTHEORY
It has also been proposed that economic disparitiescause terrorism.This claim
underliesGurr's(1970) theory of relative deprivation-that rebellions come to be
when people cannotbearthe misery of theirlot. As Schmid (1983) observed,Gurr's
theoryderivesmore from psychoanalysisthanfrom empiricalsociology and is conceptuallyborn of the FA hypothesis.Irrespectiveof these psychiatricroots, multiple
writershaveclaimeda sociological linkbetweenpovertyandterrorism(Schmid 1983;
Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). More
recently,increasingdifferencesbetween the materialwelfare of the haves and havenotshavebeen postulatedto provokea new eraof politicalviolence thatwill accelerate
as globalizationnot only creates new foci of povertybut facilitatescommunication
betweenthose who perceivethemselvesto be globalization'svictims (Maya,Lander,
and Ungar 2002). One possibility is that either absolutedeprivationor relativeeconomic disparityignites terroristsentiments, especially among members of an oppressedunderclass.
The majorEuropeanrevolutionsof the eighteenththroughthe earlytwentiethcenturieswereprobablyprovoked,at least in part,by class disparities.Fromthe Frenchto
the Russianrevolutions,have-notsindisputablybecamemajorparticipantsin political
20
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
violence (Zamoyski1999). On the otherhand,as notedabove,the left-wing terrorists
of the 1960s to 1970s were not usually impoverished;indeed, they were sometimes
accusedof belongingto an idle middleclass thatexpropriatedthe miseryof a different
class to serve theirown goals. So, althoughpovertymay play a role in some political
violence, relativedeprivationis neithernecessarynor sufficientto explainrevolutionary terrorism.Evidence also exists thatright-wingextremismoccurs independentof
economic status.CanettiandPedahzur(2002), for example,reportedthatright-wing
extremistsentimentswere unrelatedto socioeconomic variablesamong 1,247 Israeli
universitystudents.
Kruegerand Maleckova's(2002) previouslycited importantwork with Palestinconclusion. However,their
ians does not supporta simple poverty-causes-terrorism
analysis is based on socioeconomic background,not on socioeconomic prospects.
Giventhe 70 percentadultunemploymentratein Gaza,the gross domesticproductof
less than $1,000 throughoutthe PalestinianTerritories,the severelyconstrainedeconomic opportunitiesdespite educationalachievementdue to the unresolvedIsraeliPalestinianconflict,andthe culturalimportanceof the malebreadwinnerrole, it is prematureto ruleout the possibilitythatdiminishedeconomicprospectshavehelpedprovoke Palestinianterrorism(Bennet 2004). Furthermore,nationalist-separatistand
many religious fundamentalistterroriststend to enjoy the supportof theircommunities. In such cases, terrorismmay be a prosocial activity ostensibly undertakenon
behalf of all classes. If the entirein-group(thatof the politicalactor)faces economic
disparitiesrelativeto anout-group(thatof theprivilegedtarget),participationin political violence would not be expectedto be an economic class phenomenonbuta groupof-identityphenomenon.Furtherresearchwill be necessaryto determinethe relationshipbetweenclass of origin,economicexpectations,individualfactors,andterrorism.
OPPRESSION THEORY
Multipleauthors,fromsociologiststo revolutionaries,contendthatoppressionprovokes political violence (Fanon 1965; Whitaker1972; Schmid 1983). Particularlyin
the case of nationalist-separatistor ethnic-sectarianterrorism(e.g., ETA, PIRA,
Hamas),actorsoften cite the injusticeof theirtreatmentby governmentsthatrobthem
of identity,dignity, security,and freedom as the motive for theirjoining a terrorist
group (Crenshaw1986; Taylorand Quayle 1994; Post, Sprinzak,and Denny 2003).
Since it is difficultto measureoppressionitself-a sociopoliticalrelationshipsubject
to point of view-and since the impact of oppression may be felt subjectivelyto
greateror lesser degreesby individualswithina communityat risk,perceivedoppression may be the propercognitive-emotionalvariableto examineas a potentialriskfactor for terrorism.There are innumerablescales and instrumentsfor assessing perceived prejudiceanddiscrimination(e.g., McNeilly et al. 1996; Utsey andPonterotto
1996; Neto 2001; Loo et al. 2001; Murryet al. 2001; Duckittet al. 2002). However,
virtuallyall of these are specifically designed to addressthe experience of a single
group-in most cases, African Americans. None of them measures the life-andliberty-threateningdominion of one group over another implied by the psychopolitical concept of oppression. In fact, an extensive review of multiple databases
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 21
revealsthatno generalpsychologicalinstrumenthas yet been validatedandpublished
for the study of perceivedoppression.As a result, no persuasiveempiricalevidence
is availablesupportingthe much-citedhypothesis that oppressionor its perception
drivesthe behaviorof terrorists.
Evenif perceivedoppressioncouldbe shownto breedterrorism,it wouldneverbe a
sufficient explanation.As Silke (2003, 33) said so well, "Veryfew individuals of
aggrievedminoritiesgo on to become activeterrorists.The questionhas alwaysbeen,
why did these particularindividualsengage in terrorismwhen most of theircompatriots did not?"Sociological theories,like rationalchoice approaches,do not answerthis
question.
NATIONAL CULTURAL THEORY
While many differences are observed between cultures, a specific variablewas
claimed to be key by Weinbergand Eubank (1994), who proposed that terrorism
expressesitself differentlyin "collectivist"versus"individualist"cultures.According
to this theory,in collectivist cultures,a person'sidentityis primarilyderivedfromthe
social system, dividingthe world strictlyaccordingto in-groupsand out-groupsand
linkingtheirpersonalwell-being to the well-being of theirgroup,while in individualist cultures,identity is derivedfrom personalgoals. Weinbergand Eubankpropose
thatcollectivistswould be morelikely thanindividualiststo carryout terroristattacks
on out-groups,includingforeigners.Individualistswouldbe less inhibitedin attacking
one of theirown. The authorsused psychologicalrankingsof IBM corporateemployees in forty nationson a scale of individualism/collectivism,reportingthatU.S. citizens were the most individualistic(score 91), Israelis were in the middle (54), and
ThirdWorldnations tended to be the most collectivist, such as Pakistanat 14 and
Columbiaat 13. Comparingthese rankingswith reportsof terroristactivityfrom the
Terrorism:Attributesof TerroristEvents 1968-1977"(ITERATE)data"International
base (Mickolus 1980), they claim that the data support their prediction that
collectivistsaremorelikely to attackforeigners,while individualistsaremorelikely to
attackconationalsor membersof otherindividualistcultures.Theyalso claim,without
data, that individualists feel morally restrainedfrom attacking innocents, while
collectivists have two moralities-one for the in-group,one for the out-group-and
would not be morallyinhibitedfrom attackinginnocentsin the out-group.
This work might be criticizedon numerousgrounds:the paucityof data thatcultures can be rankedon this collectivist/individualistdimension;the doubt that IBM
employees are representativeof their cultures;the failure to addressthe possibility
that,withinnations,subculturesexist thatvaryon the presumeddimension(such that
terroristsderivefrom a distinctsubculture);the likelihoodthat,regardlessof national
culture,individualistsarise who become terrorists;the likelihood thatthe ITERATE
databasefor thatdecadecapturedprimarilyleft-wing revolutionarieswho may beara
or relidifferentrelationshipto their cultureof origin than do nationalist/separatists
gious radicals;andthe factthatno dataareofferedsupportingthe theoryof differential
moralinhibition.Nonetheless, setting aside the simplisticconcept of "national"culture,the concept thatdifferencesin group culture,as exploredin culturalanthropol-
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ogy, might influencethe expressionof terrorismand audienceresponsesto terrorism
seems worthyof furtherinvestigation.
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES
In contrastto sociological theoriesthatemphasizefactorsinfluencingthe behavior
of an entire group,psychological theories of terroristbehaviorprimarilyemphasize
individualfactors.Since the earlytwentiethcentury,a fiercecontroversyhas roiledthe
psychiatriccommunity,dividingpsychoanalyticapproachesto the studyof individual
psychology, primarilyderivativeof Freudiantheory, from nonpsychoanalyticapproaches (Wallerstein1995). For the purposes of this review, these approachesare
consideredseparately.
PSYCHOANALYTICPSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORIES OF TERRORISM
Psychoanalysisis basedon the propositionthatmuchof mentallife is unconscious,
thatpsychologicaldevelopmentproceedsin stagesbasedon infantilesexualfantasies,
and thatpsychologicaldistressderivesfrom unresolvedintrapsychicconflict regarding those fantasies(Gabbard2000). The "dynamics"of this theory was literallyderived from nineteenth-centuryconcepts of physics, in which the flow of mentaland
libidinalenergy is deterministicallyexpressed,repressed,or discharged.The theory
has variants,butthey sharethe notionsthat(1) parenting(as opposedto intrinsictemperament)determinespsychologicaltemperamentandhealth;(2) active,unconscious
forces excludeunpleasantthoughtsfromthe consciousness;and(3) relationshipswith
others,"objectrelations,"are controlledby unconsciousforces such as projectionthe theory that one irrationallyattributesone's own attitudeto others (Wallerstein
1995; Gabbard2000). Multiplenonscientificassumptionsunderliethe "discoveries"
claimed by psychoanalysts,principallythatthe early analysts'impressionisticinterpretationsof classic cases accordingto theirown dynamictheoryconstituteevidence
supportingthat theory.
Psychoanalyticapproachesto terroristbehaviormay be roughlydividedaccording
to theiremphasison identitytheory,narcissismtheory,paranoiatheory,andabsolutist
thinking.
Identity Theory
It has been proposedthatcandidatesfor terrorismare young people lacking selfesteemwho have strongor even desperateneeds to consolidatetheiridentities(Olsson
1988). On the basis of unstructured(andlargelyundocumented)interviewswith Irish
andEuropeanterrorists,Taylorand Quayle (1994) reportedthatmanybecamepolitically violent, seeking a sense of purposeand self-worth-"a place in the sun."The
theoryof psychologistErikErikson(1959), thatadolescentsreacha stage of identity
formationat which ideologies assist in self-definition,was the basis for Bollinger's
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 23
(1981; also see Crenshaw1986) psychoanalyticinterpretationof his interviewswith
eight members of Germanterroristgroups: Billinger claimed that overcontrolling
parentspreventedthese respondentsfrom developing autonomy,leading to identity
crisesthatmadeviolent struggleirresistible.At the extreme,those with identityconfusion are perhapstormentedby a sense of isolation, conceivablyengaging in terrorist
violence as an adaptiveresponseto the pain of anomie (Ferracuti1982).
Thisperspectiveis consistentwith Freud's(1953-1974) speculationthatthe principle of self-determinationmay be inseparablefrom the impulse for destruction.This
view is also reminiscentof the theoriesof psychiatristFrantzFanon(1965), who posited thatviolence againstcolonial oppressionliberatesnot only the body but also the
self-identity.MenachemBegin (1977) offered his own confirmationof this mode of
thinkingwith his neo-Cartesianaphorism:"Wefight, thereforewe are."Youngpeople
turningto politicalviolence in a desperatesearchfor identitymay act alone (e.g., perhapsCharlesBishop, a fifteen-year-oldwho flew a small airplaneinto a bankin early
2002, leaving a suicide note declaring his allegiance with al Qaeda) (Rosenberg,
Waddell,and Smalley 2002), yet they may be very eager to join groups-a behavior
offeringan instantaneousgraftingof identity.Identity-starved
joinersarealso hypothesized to be motivatedby a desire to embracethe intimatetutelage of a charismatic
leader-a formof anacliticdevotion(choosing a love objectwho resemblesa parent).
To date,no controlledempiricalstudytestingthe applicabilityof this theoryto young
terroristshas been published.
Narcissism Theory
JohnCrayton(1983), EricShaw(1986), RichardPearlstein(1991), andothershave
invoked Kohut'sself psychology to explain the sequence that drives young people
to terrorism.PsychoanalystHeniz Kohut (1972, 1978; see also Wallerstein1995;
Gabbard2000) developedself psychology as a departurefrom the classical ego psychology of Freud.Self psychology emphasizesthe needs thatan infanthas for caring
responses to develop normally.Failureof maternalempathyleads to damage to the
self-image-so called narcissistic injury-that arrestsdevelopment in one of two
ways: persistentinfantile grandiose fantasies or failure to internalizethe idealized
image of the parent.Eitherproblempreventsthe developmentof adult identity and
morality.Crayton,for example,proposedthatpoliticalexperience,such as the humiliationof subordination,mightproducean adultnarcissisticinjurythatmightreawaken
the psychologicaltraitof infantilenarcissism.The resultmightbe a pathologicalexaltationof self (the genesis of the leader),the abandonmentof independenceto merge
with the archaicomnipotentfigure (the genesis of the follower), or a combinationof
these impulses,as seen in the egotisticalyearningfor glory underthe maskof selflessness. Both of these forms of infantileretreatarehypothesizedto mobilize the expression of the desireto destroythe sourceof the injury(i.e., narcissisticrage).This rageis,
in essence, rage againstthe damagedself, projectedonto the targetof the terrorist's
animus,as if thetargetwerethe sourceof theintolerablefeelings the terroristhas about
himself (Crayton1983; Akhtar1999). Accordingto Risto Fried(1982), the targetor
victim is treatedas a "discardableobject,"which psychoanalystRichardPearlstein
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
cited as evidencethatterrorismis a "spectacularlyvivid exampleof narcissisticobject
manipulation."
The theory of terroristnarcissismis consistent with many reportsregardingthe
pathologicallydependentpsychology of cult adherents,but it is perhapsmore pertinent that it fits with empirical observationsof both Hubbard(1971) and el Sarraj
(2002) that terrorists,far from being the aggressivepsychopathsof public imagination, areoftentimid,emotionallydamagedadolescents-those who havesufferedego
injuriessuch as parentalrejectionthatdelay or preventfull achievementof adultidentity-who seem to be in searchof affiliationand meaning.In this respect,narcissism
andidentitytheoryoverlap.Potentialsupportfor the importanceof narcissismcomes
from GustaveMorf's (1970) clinical examinationsconductedwith prisonersheld as
membersof the Frontfor the Liberationof Quebec (FLQ). Morf reportedthat these
individualsexhibitednarcissistictraits,wishing to put themselvesat the centerof the
universe,but did not fulfill the criteriafor a full-blownnarcissisticpersonalitydisorder.He furtherconcludedthata "permissivesociety"was responsiblefor theirnarcissism. However,he used no standardizedpsychologicalinstruments,reportedno statisticaldata,andused no controlgroup.Like Sageman's(2004) previouslycitedexegesis
of ten terroristbiographies,the conclusionsregardingnarcissismareimpressionistic,
not empirical.As a result,it remainsundeterminedwhetherthe prevalenceof narcissistic traitsamong terroristsexceeds the prevalencein the general population.And
otherauthoritieshaveobjectedthatnarcissismis unlikelyto explainterrorismin even a
small numberof groups(Corrado1981; Reich 1998). Again, the intuitivelyplausible
scenarioof identitydeficitwith narcissisticragein thedevelopmentalpathto terrorism
has yet to be supportedby scientific study.
Paranoia Theory
George Washington University psychiatrist Jerrold M. Post is unequivocally
amongthe principalcontributorsto politicalpsychologicaltheoriesof terrorism.Post
(1998, 2004) offers a comprehensive,psychoanalyticallybasedformulationof terrorist behaviors-one thatincludesan explanationfor the terrorist'scapacityfor murder:
echoing Kohut(1972, 1978), he positsthatthe salientfeatureof terroristpsychologyis
projection,an infantiledefense thatassigns intolerableinternalfeelings to an external
object when an individualwho has grown up with a damagedself-concept idealizes
the good self and splits out the bad self. This projectionis proposedto be the root of
an adult persistenceof the infantilephase that Melanie Klein called the "paranoidschizoid position"(RobinsandPost 1997). While not overtlypsychotic,the paranoid
position nonethelessinflamesthe terroristwith suspicionsthatjustify bloody acts of
"self-defense"againsthis victims: "the zeal of the torturer,the alacrityof the killer,
representshis eagernessto destroythedevaluedanddisownedpartof the self"(Robins
and Post 1997, 146). Post's paranoiatheory offers a developmentalmodel that explains not only why only a minorityof individualswith political grievancesturnsto
terrorismbutalso why terroristskill those who do not appearto constituteanimminent
threat.
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 25
Post (1998, 2004) bases his theoryin parton an interpretationof the findingsof the
Germanpsychological team that interviewed250 radicalsfrom the 1970s-mostly
left-wing revolutionaries(Jiger, Schmidtchen,and Stillwold 1981; Billinger 1981).
Unfortunately,despitethe earnestambitionsof thatmajorstudy,no formalmeasurementsof paranoiawere used, therewas littleeffortto stratifyaccordingto hierarchical
level androle, therewereno controls,andextrapolationsfromthis subtypeof terrorists
to otherpoliticalcategoriesmaybe inappropriate.It seems plausible,for example,that
the studentradicalof the 1970s who adopteda flagrantlyantisocialrevolutionaryideology is more likely to have exhibitedsome kind of psychological atypicalitythanis
thetypicalPalestinianextremistor SunniIraqiinsurgentwho chooses behaviorwidely
supportedwithin his community.A scientificallyweak but plausiblecriticismof the
paranoiatheoryis providedby Sageman's(2004) findingthatnine of ten Muslimterroristbiographiesrevealedno evidence of paranoia.Yet the most importantcriticism
of such psychoanalyticaltheories is that it is impossible to test any hypothesisthat
attributescovertadultpsychodynamicforces to covertpsychosexualprocessespostulatedto haveoccurreddecadesbefore,in infancy.Paranoiatheory,like narcissismtheory, remains an intriguingalbeit impressionisticpsychoanalyticinterpretationthat
might, after controlledresearchusing validatedmeasuresof paranoia,someday be
shown to explain some instancesof this very heterogeneousadultbehavior.
Absolutist/Apocalyptic Theory
HarvardpsychiatristRobert J. Lifton is anotherimportantcontributor.Lifton's
(2000) majorrecent contributionis an accountof the Aum Shinrikyocult and other
apocalypticgroupsthatenvision mass destructionas a pathtowardreplacingthe corruptworldwith a purenew social order.Apocalypticgroupstypicallyexhibitabsolutist moralpolarization,idealizationof a messianicfigure,and impairedrealitytesting,
imaginingvast conspiraciesof evil such as a "worldshadow government"of Jews.
Lifton's insights-that absolutist/totalistmoralthinkinghelps motivateterrorismvia
its seductive appeal to young adults with weak identities and that terroristsdefend
themselves from normal emotional responses to violence through denial, psychic
numbing,or isolationof affect-both fit withpsychoanalytictheory.Althoughneither
absolutismnor isolationof affectby themselvesoffers an animusbelli or explainsthe
specific impulse to harminnocents, it seems plausibleto predictthat irrationalviolence againstthe "other"would be precipitatedwhen pathologicaldefenses lead to
black-and-whitethinkingaboutthe out-groupcombinedwithparanoiaaboutin-group
annihilation.This is consistentwith the proposalof Devine and Rafalko(1982) to the
effect that,paradoxically,terroristsare often uncompromisingmoralistswho see the
world in starklypolarterms.
Lifton's (2000) absolutistapproachto terrorismrepresentsa compellingcombination of psychoanalyticdevelopmentaltheorywith a theoryof atypicalcognitive style.
However,the evidence offeredto supportthis theoryconsists of a subjective,theoryof unstructuredinterviewswith a few individualswho maynotbe
driveninterpretation
representative,and the postulatedexistentialistdespair,irrationalfantasiesof world-
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wide dominion,andpathologicallydependentgroupbehaviorof apocalypticcults led
by messianic leaders seem to characterizeonly a small minorityof terroristactions.
One must still explain the majority.
The great strengths of psychoanalytic interpretationsof terrorism are their
acknowledgmentthatindividualdevelopmentalfactorsbeginningin early childhood
probablyinfluence adult behavioralproclivities,their recognitionof the enormous
power of the unconsciousto influence conscious thought,and theirobservationthat
covertpsychodynamicforces of groupsmay subsumeindividuality.The greatweakness is theirlack of falsifiability.Psychoanalysishas been largely abandonedamong
modern psychiatristsprecisely because it rejects the scientific method, asking that
adherentsaccept its propositionsas received wisdom. This is not by any means to
deny that early childhood,unconsciousprocesses, and group dynamicsmay be key
factorsin the genesis of terrorism.However,psychoanalyticclaimsregardingpseudophysicalintrapsychicdynamicstied to presumptivestagesof sexualitycannotbe confirmedaccordingto the modernmethodsof social andbehavioralscience. A less ideological and more empirical psychodynamic model that nonetheless considers the
crucialrole of the unconscious-tested, for example,via controlledresearchexamining whether a stratifiedsubgroupof terroristsexhibit elevated scores on validated
measures of maternal rejection, self-absorption, or paranoia-might more persuasively demonstratehow developmentaland unconscious processes help drive
terrorism.
NONPSYCHOANALYTICPSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORIES OF TERRORISM
Cognitive Theories
Cognitivecapacity refersto mentalfunctionssuch as memory,attention,concentration,language, and the so-called "executive"functions,includingthe capacityto
learnandfollow rules,to anticipateoutcomes,to makesensibleinferences,andto perform accuraterisk-benefitcalculations(Lezak 1995). Many of these mental operations areconductedwithinthe dorsolateralprefrontalcortexof thebrain,a largeneural
association region that attends to perceptionof present circumstances,previously
learnedassociations, and emotions to calculate and activateadaptiveplans. In contrast,the capacityto restrainimpulses and comportone's behaviorto social expectations depends on the ventromedialcortex, a region that sits just behind the eyes
(Gazzaniga2000; Mesulam2000). Cognitivestyle refersto ways of thinking-that is,
biases, prejudices,or tendenciesto over- or underemphasizefactorsin decision making. Apartfromreportsof absolutistthinking,littleattentionhas beenpaidto thepossibility thatterrorists,or subtypesof terrorists,exhibitidiosyncrasiesof eithercognitive
capacityor cognitive style.
Substantialevidence exists thatviolent behavioris influencedby cognitive capacity and/orstyle (Bryantet al. 1984; Kandelet al. 1988; Satterfield1998; Ernstet al.
2003). It has also been proposedthatcognitive style influencesthe aggressivebehav-
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 27
ior of political leaders(Satterfield1998). It is temptingto speculatethatvariationsin
either the capacity or style of thoughtmight affect the likelihood that an individual
would sympathizewith,join, follow, or lead a terroristgroup.It is also plausiblethat
knowledge of typical variationsin cognitive capacityor style might supplementthe
rational choice approach to help predict otherwise unaccountablebehaviors in
responseto contingenciessuch as interactionswith governments.Unfortunately,this
potentiallyrich vein of study has hardlybeen mined. Taylorand Quayle (1994), for
example, speculatedthatyoung people joining terroristgroups make a fundamental
attributionerror,a cognitivebias inaccuratelyattributingdevious and evil motives to
those theyperceiveas oppressors.However,they offer no datasupportingthis reasonable-soundingclaim and no solutionto this potentialproblem,a cognitive factorthat
might accountfor certaincomplicationsof conflict resolution.While some classified
dataexist regardingcognitivecapacitiesof young terrorists(e.g., Merari1998, 2002),
the open literaturedoes not reportneuropsychologicalfindings meaningfullycomparingterroristsor ex-terroristswith matchednonterrorists.
Sidanius (1985) conductedone study of potentialimportanceto the question of
cognitive style among terrorists:to examine cognitive factors in differenttypes of
extremism,he measuredconservatism,cognitiveflexibility,cognitivecomplexity,and
intolerance of ambiguity using normed and validated instruments,including the
BudnerIntoleranceof AmbiguityScale (Budner1962), in a randomlyselectedsample
of 195 Swedishhigh school students.Respondentswere classified as extremeleftists,
moderateleftists,moderate,moderaterightists,or extremerightists.Contraryto theories claimingthatextremismis associatedwith cognitive limitations,extremeleftists
and moderaterightistshad the highest cognitive complexity;moderateshad the lowest. Consistentwith some assumptionsregardingthe rigidityof right-wingvalues,less
cognitive flexibility was associatedwith more sexual repressionand greatergeneral
conservatism.Perhapsmost useful for the analysis of terrorism,reduced cognitive
flexibility was associatednot only with intoleranceof ambiguity,especially the need
for certaintyand uniformity,but also with racismand ethnocentrism.Thus, it seems
worthexploringwhetherthose who become ethnic terrorists,drivenby a black-andwhite animus that does not accept the possibility of valued characteristicsamong
membersof the out-group,aremorelikely to exhibitthe traitof cognitiveinflexibility.
These findingsperhapsmeshwith those of CanettiandPedahzur(2002), who reported
that right-wingextremismamong Israelis is associatedwith authoritarianattitudes,
xenophobia,and supernaturalbeliefs.
Muchfurtherworkwouldbe neededto determinewhethercognitivefactorssuch as
inflexibilitymightconceivablyrepresenta generaltraitof terrorists,a predictabletrait
of a politicalsubgroupof terrorists,or a traitof leadersthatmightbe identifiedby analysis at a distance.Findingsin this areamayconceivablyhavestrategicimportance.For
example, terroristswith diminishedexecutive function will fail to anticipatefuture
consequences.As a result,theirresponsesto negotiationor threatmay be less predictable. Those with excessive intoleranceof ambiguityor cognitive inflexibilitymay be
less adaptable,unableto appreciatenuance,and more irrationalin bargaining.Political psychologists could potentiallycapitalizeon these factorsto help refine security
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plans, identifyingbehavioralmarkersthatdistinguishterroristswho are more or less
likely to follow projectedpaths.
Novelty-Seeking Theory
Some psychologicaltheoriesattributeterrorismto specific innateaspects of temperament.For example, developmentaltheories might predictthat youngsterswith
aggressivetemperamentswould be disproportionatelyattractedto terroristorganizations (Pettit1997). However,no publishedresearchsupportsthis intuitivelyplausible
supposition.In fact, a semistructuredpsychologicalanalysisof 227 left-wing German
militantsfoundno commonpatternof aggressivity(Jager,Schmidtchen,andSillwold
1981). Anotherpossibilityis thatterrorismis associatedwith the traitof novelty seeking. Terroristplanningandexecutionis indisputablythrillingactionoutsidethe realm
of ordinaryexperience,andmanytheoristshaveopinedthatpoliticalviolence may satisfy innate,perhapsgeneticallydeterminedneeds for high-level stimulation,risk, and
catharsis(Hacker1983; Kellen 1979;Levine 1999). Possibly consistentwith this proposal, many incarceratedterroristshave expressed their pleasureand excitementat
being involved in such thrillingaction (Juergensmeyer2000). IsraeliPrimeMinister
YitshakShamir,who spenthis early adulthoodwith the terroristorganizationIrgun,
conceivablyhintedat the samewhen he said, "Thatperiodin the undergroundwas the
best partof my life" (Marton1996, 53). The "romanceof risk"mayexplainthe special
affinity of teenagersfor such behavior:adolescentanxieties, sexual frustration,and
developmentalattractionto risk takingmay play a role in a dangerousflirtationwith
political violence (Ponton 1997; Levine 1999).
This thesis raisestwo issues: first, sensationandnovelty seeking, a normativefeature of adolescentdevelopmentprobablytied to expected changes in neuralactivity
(Dahl 2004), may play a role in the naturalhistoryof terroristinvolvement.Second,
the personalitytraitof novelty seeking-a measurable,nonnormative,and probably
geneticallyinfluencedcharacteristicthatpersistsin certainindividualswell into adulthood (Zuckerman2002)-possibly distinguishesthose who aremorelikely to be terrorismprone.Withregardto the firstpoint,evidencesuggeststhatthetypicaldevelopment of terroristsympathiesperhapsfollows an arc:young adolescentsare plastic in
theirpoliticalorientationandopen to indoctrination.Positionshardenin lateradolescence suchthat,as Saper(1988, 26) putit, "oncebelief systems,resentments,anddesperate response tendencies are rigidly instilled . . . they are virtually impossible to
modify belatedly."At the far end of the arc, reductionin destructivenessmay occur
with maturity:interviewswith many"retired"terroristshaverevealeda mellowingof
attitudeconsistentwith the theory that enthusiasmfor terroristaction is primarilya
developmentalphenomenonof late adolescenceand early adulthood(Laqueur1987;
Levine 1999; Akhtar1999). So the normativedevelopmentalformof novelty seeking
probablydoes contributeto terrorism.Withregardto the secondpoint,no studieshave
yet been reportedassessing the association between terroristsand adult-persistent
nonnormativetraitsof risk taking or novelty seeking. While it seems plausiblethat
individualsexhibitingsuch traitsaredisproportionatelyrepresentedamongterrorists,
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 29
pendingsupportiveevidence, it is prematureto concludethatthis atypicalpersonality
featurehelps drive terrorism.
Humiliation-Revenge Theory
Humiliation-and the consequentinternalpressurefor revenge-is anotherpsychological factor that has been hypothesized to drive terrorist violence
(Juergensmeyer2000). Revengefor humiliationby an oppressoris, in fact, an ancient
culturaltraditionwith direct links to the currentviolence in the Middle East. The
oppressionof the early Christians,embodiedin the image of Christon the cross, was
partof the inspirationfor the apocalypticmovementin Christianitythatculminatedin
the FirstCrusade(Armstrong2001). A cycle of oppressionandhumiliation,followed
by violent actionin the nameof liberation,characterizesthe subsequenthistoryof the
MiddleEast. PalestinianpsychiatristEyad el Sarraj(2002) has specifically observed
thathumiliationis an importantfactormotivatingyoung suicide bombers.Dr. Abdul
Aziz Rantisi,the late political leaderof Hamas,confirmedthis notion in a statement
published three years before his death via targetedkilling by the Israeli Defense
Forces:"Todie in this way is betterthanto die daily in frustrationand humiliation"
(Juergensmeyer2000, 187). Several other authoritiesalso propose that humiliation,
eitherby parentsin earlychildhoodor by politicaloppressorslaterin life, can provoke
terrorism,butno quantitativeresearchhas yet exploredthis hypothesis(Crayton1983;
Volkan1997; Stern2003). Whetherconsideredfromthe psychoanalyticpointof view
as an inevitabledynamicconsequenceof narcissisticinjuryor from the nonpsychoanalyticpoint of view as a painfulsocial stressor,humiliationseems plausibleas the
rootof anurgeto retaliateagainstpoliticalentitiesthatareperceivedto be responsible.
The conceptthatfeelings of humiliationor being takenadvantageof gives rise to a
passionfor revengeis very familiarin forensicpsychiatryandcriminologyandprobably contributesto many nonpolitical murders(Miller 1993; Brooks, Thomas, and
Droppleman 1996; Schlesinger 2000; Meloy 2001). Note that revenge, in itself,
should not be regardedas antisocialbehaviorbut as a normaland potentiallyuseful
activity.Jurisprudenceformalizesthis featureof social contracts,emphasizingretributionin partas deterrence,andpolitieshaveused vengeancefor misdeedsto maintain
theirintegrityat leastsince theTrojanWar.Indeed,revengeis anemotionthatis probably deeply rootedin the adaptiveinstinctto punishtransgressorswho violate the contractsof social species;hence, it is a motivatorthatoften servesnot only the goals of a
vengeful individualbut also the goals of his group(Clutton-Brockand Parker1995).
In this sense, revengeis often prosocialand sometimes-if the vengeancetaker(e.g.,
Achilles or suicidebombers)standsto sufferandhis groupto gain-even altruistic.In
a recent study combining psychological with functional neuroimagingstudies in
humans,de Quervainet al. (2004) showedthatindividualspunishsocial transgressors
even when it is quitecostly to the punisher,andtheyreportedevidencethatthis altruistic behaviorwas drivenby deep subcorticalbrainactivitythatmay have overruledthe
more rationalcortex. Knutson(2004) highlights the self-defeating and emotionally
driven natureof vengeance demonstratedby this study, stating that these findings
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"chip yet anothersliver from the rationalmodel of economic man."While this science intriguinglyhelps to explainhow revengemight motivateterroristsandperhaps
governmentsto commit murderousbehaviors without likely strategicbenefits, no
questionnairedataor measurementsof subjectivehumiliation,desire for revenge,or
emotionalsatisfactionafterretributionin terroristsor ex-terroristshave yet been published. This plausibletheoryawaitsbettersubstantiation.
THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESS
Most publishedpsychological theoriesexplain terrorismas the productof group
psychology withinidiosyncraticsubculturesthatcoalesce in reactionto circumstances
they perceiveas intolerable(Taylorand Ryan 1988; Friedland1992; Hoffman 1998;
Merari 1998; Levine 1999; Post 2004; Sageman 2004). Membershipin a terrorist
organizationoffersdisciplesa headyliquorof a well-definedpersonalrole, a righteous
purpose,the opportunityfor revengefor perceivedhumiliations,andthe liftingof constraintson the expression of otherwise prohibitedbehaviors-freeing the member
frompersonalresponsibilityfor attackson out-groups(Hacker1983;TaylorandRyan
1988; Weinbergand Eubank1994; Stern 1999). Groupforces, includingideological
indoctrination,repetitive training, and peer pressures,have been hypothesized to
influencethe group'sviolence, whetheror not individualmemberswere predisposed
to such behavior(Crenshaw1992; Clayton,Barlow,and Ballif-Spanvill1998). This
mayoccurbecausecollectiveidentitysubsumesindividualidentity.As Post, Sprinzak,
and Denny (2003, 176) put it, "Anoverarchingsense of the collective consumes the
individual.This fusion with the groupseems to providethe necessaryjustificationfor
theiractionswith an attendantloss of felt responsibility."This descriptionof the submersion of individualityis very reminiscentof Eric Hoffer's (1951, 128) statement
that people who plunge into mass movements "arefashioned into incomplete and
dependenthumanbeings even when they have withinthemselvesthe makingof selfsufficiententities."Withdrawalfromthe mainstreammay increasethe potencyof collectivethought:basedon a semiquantitativereviewof life historiesof morethan1,500
Italianand Germanmilitants,greaterisolation is associatedwith greaterseparation
from social reality (della Porta 1992).
The principaldebate among those discussing group versus individualfactors in
political violence centerson whethergroup dynamicsare sufficientin and of themselves to turnan averagepersoninto a terroristor whetherindividualhistoryandpersonality must be consideredas well. Sageman, one strong proponentof the group
hypothesis,goes so faras to say that"it'sa groupphenomenon.To searchfor individual characteristics . . . will lead you to a dead end" (Rotella 2004, A3). However,
Sageman'spsychiatricassessmentsof Islamic mujahedinwere exclusively based on
secondarysourcesthatdid not includeanyobjectivebehavioraldata,so his conclusion
seems premature.Rasch(1979, 82) observedthatthe dynamicsof living in a terrorist
grouptendsto alienateone fromothersbutthat"thestartingpoint andpersonalneeds
existing at the time of entryinto the terroristgrouparevery differentfor the different
terrorists."This claim of initial psychological heterogeneity followed by group-
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 31
inducedhomogenizationappearssensible,butit requiresempiricalverification.Consistentwiththis theory,Friedland(1992) postulatedthatterrorismis notpurelya group
phenomenonbutis obviouslythe resultof an interactionbetweensocial processesand
individual dispositions. However, he proposes three conditions under which individualproclivityto violence is a relativelyminorfactorin the group'sterroristturning:
(1) deprivationis intense, (2) the group has ideologized its discontent,and (3) the
groupis cohesive andclearlydifferentiatedfromthe out-group.He gives the example
of the Palestinians,whose specialcircumstancesdriveindividualswith no specialpropensityto violence to undertaketerroristacts. This formulationseems plausibleon its
surface.However,one still mustaccountfor the fact that,while most Palestinianssupportsuicidebombing,a very smallminoritydoes it. Furthermore,no publishedstudies
supportthe propositionthatthese threeconditionsincreasegroupdynamicsuccess in
drivingnonviolentpersonsto politicalviolence. Unless anduntil systematicresearch
is conducted making in-depth psychological comparisons between terroristsand
matched controls from identical political circumstancesand estimating premembershipandpostmembershipwillingnessto harminnocents,one cannotmeaningfully
quantifythe relativeinfluence of individualand groupfactors.
LIMITS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON TERRORISM
PsychiatristWalterReich (1998, 262) has warnedthat"psychologicalaccountsof
terrorismare replete with explanationsthat ignore or blur the variety and complexity... a productof loose andweak thinking,a disregardfor the need for evidence, and
the habit,unfortunatelyendemicin so manyareasof psychologicaldiscourse,of having a single idea and applying it to everything."Reich's strong caveat against
overgeneralizationandreductionismis a vital counterto the potpourriof psychological theoriespromulgatedby terrorismscholars.In this, he supportsCorrado's(1981)
criticalreview of the mentaldisordersapproachto politicalterrorism;Corradostates
thata terroristpersonalityprobablydoes not exist and thatefforts to psychopathologize this type of aggressionarerootedin biased theory,not in unbiaseddata.
Caveats against overgeneralizationand unwarrantedmedicalizationof terrorist
behaviorsare logical and important.Yet it seems reasonableto seek a middle ground
between the reductionistposition thatproposesa single psychology of terrorismand
the nihilist position that denies any explicit psychology of terrorism.That is, until a
rigorouseffortis madeto investigatethe nullhypothesisvia the collectionof empirical
evidence, it is prematureto conclude that there are no distinguishingpsychological
characteristicsamongthetinyminorityof individualswho arewilling to senda terrifying political message to a targetaudienceby attackinginnocentnoncombatants.
Whyhas thebehavioralscience communityso farfailedto amassa persuasivebody
of evidence in this domain? Multiple practical and theoretical impedimentshave
delayedthe scientificpsychological studyof terrorism.Most of the practicalbarriers
areobvious.Forexample,terrorismresearchmay involveexpensiveandinconvenient
travelto politicallyunstableregions,is potentiallydangerous,andraisesethicalissues
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that may challenge institutionalreview boards (e.g., Wieviorka 1995; Brannan,
Eslerm, and Anders Strindberg2001). These issues may explain why journalists,
ratherthanacademics,have publisheda substantialproportionof the availableliterature reportingbehavioralobservationsof terrorists.Active terroristsmay have little
motivationto cooperatewith behavioralassessment, and inactiveterroristsmay no
longerexhibitthe psychology of interest(Reich 1998). Languagebarriers-including
the lack of expert translationsof high-qualitypsychological instruments-frustrate
collection of data. Authoritiesmay deny scholars access to incarceratedterrorists
because of security concerns and the perceptionthat such assessmentsare not pertinentto counterterrorism.
A theoreticalissue thatseriouslylimitsthe utilityof interviewswith specificterrorists or groupsis the fact that,contraryto some publishedhypotheses,terrorismis not a
unitarybehavior(Crenshaw1986; Laqueur1987; Haroun1999). As a result,theories
thatattemptto generalizeandreducethe psychology of terrorismbegin with a premise
thatis inconsistentwith the availableobservations,and studiesbasedon such theories
will produceresultswith limitedpredictivevalue since they conflatedatafrommixed
populations.Classifyingterrorismaccordingto probablehomogeneouspsychological
subtypesthatare"atleast descriptive,inclusive,discrete,endowedwith forecastingor
prognostic value, policy-generating, possibly etiological, and theoretically
grounded,"as advisedby Ferracuti(1982, 132), may be an indispensablepreliminary
step to designingresearchprojectsandinterpretingdata(Wilson2000). Moreover,as
Crenshaw(1986, 384-85) urged,"theanalysisof terrorismdeals with the intersection
of psychological predispositions(which may be derivedas much from priorexperience andsocializationas frompsychologicaltraitsemergingfromearlychildhoodand
infancy)andthe externalenvironment."A completeunderstandingof the psychology
of terrorism,therefore,will requirethe difficultinvestigationof the dynamicsof that
intersection,in concertwith an understandingof the forces of groupdynamicsand a
quantitative analyses of events, a challenge demanding an interdisciplinary
perspectivebeyond the bordersof parochialregimes.
Fundinghas long been a problem,with limitedfederalsupport(Jenkins1983). In
2004, the U.S. Homeland Security Department(DHS) published a Broad Agency
Announcementsolicitingproposalsfor a university-basedHomelandSecurityCenter
for BehavioralandSocial Aspects of TerrorismandCounter-terrorism,
to be fundedat
$4 millionperyearfor threeyears(U.S. Departmentof HomelandSecurity2004). On
one hand,thisis a historicfirst,the largestgranteverofferedto supportresearchon this
vital issue. On the otherhand,the amountinvolvedrepresentsa very smallproportion
of the DHS researchbudgetof morethan$500 millionperyear(Brumfiel2003) anda
paltrypartof the U.S. defense budget.The announcementemphasizesmodeling "to
detect, prevent,preparefor, and respondto terroristactivity at the earliest possible
point in time" (U.S. Departmentof HomelandSecurity2004, 8). The above review
suggeststhatthat"earliestpointin time"may occurdecadespriorto the formationof a
terroristgroup or the planningof an attackand may relateto a combustibleconvergence of historical,political, and psychosocial factors.Psychological researchmay
contributemost to long-termnationalsecurityby an open-mindedexplorationof the
deep roots of terrorism,with a time horizonthatextendsfarbeyond imminentthreats
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 33
and a conceptualhorizonthatextends beyond the traditionalmission of intelligence
services.
But the most importantbarriersto scientificresearchon terrorismmay have deeper
origins.
Terrorism,like a sharkattack,wields tremendouspsychological impact.It is rare
but awesome, deriving almost mystical significance by virtue of the suddenness,
drama,and outrageousnessof its violence (Zulaikaand Douglass 1996; Mahmood
2001). But terroristsare not bogeymen, and both behavioral scientists and the
counterterrorism
communitymustbe waryof explainingthe terroristmind-setby prowritespsychoanalyst
jecting the stateof mindrequiredto act in this way. "Terrorists,"
Lloyd DeMause(1986, 419), are"containersinto which one can projectone's unconscious hostility."While this statement again presumes a difficult-to-testpsychodynamictheory,it is legitimateto proposethatsubjectivityconfoundsthe design and
the interpretationof terrorismstudies. That is, in both the scholarly and counterterrorismrealms,one mustacknowledgethepossibilitythatterrorismexcites passions
thaterode logical discourse,leading to responsesthatarereactiveand enragedrather
thanproactiveandanalytical(ZulaikaandDouglass 1996). Justas the terroristadopts
absolutistthinkingto justify his indefensiblyimmoralactions, the horrificthreatof
terrorismmay perhaps provoke absolutist thinking about terroristsamong some
observersand may conceivablylead threatenedgroupsnot only to discountthe value
of objectivestudyandprejudgeor misinterpretthe availabledatabutalso to rationalize
extralegalsteps and the curtailmentof civil rights in the name of a war on terrorism
(Pettit 1997). In his WorldWar I-era essay, "Thoughtsfor the Times on War and
Death,"Freud (1953-1974) admonishedthat nation-statessometimes "makeuse of
theirintereststo rationalizetheirpassions."This hypothesisitself could be the subject
of study.
A culturaldividealso separatesbehavioralscientistsfromlaw enforcement,intelliforces occupy an adversarialposition
gence, andmilitarypersonnel:counterterrorism
and must steel themselves against any sympatheticconsiderationof the terrorist's
position. Behavioral scientists, no matterhow much they despise terroristactions,
must steel themselvesto adoptthe position of unbiasedobserversand interpretersof
behavior(Soskis 1983). While behavioralscientists may recognize markedpsychological heterogeneityandeven prosocialfeaturesof terroriststhatmight be exploited
in the developmentof policy, counterterrorismforces and even policy makersmay
resist suchconclusionsdue to culturalbias, cognitiveinflexibility,or attributionerror.
by isoThis divide unfortunatelymay undercutthe effectivenessof counterterrorism
lating practitionersfrom theorists-a separationakin to isolating engineersfrom the
discoveriesof physicists.
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS
The leadingpsychologicaltheoriesof terrorismincludea broadspectrumof sociological, psychological,andpsychiatricapproaches.Strikingly,virtuallynone of them
has been testedin a systematicway. They areoverwhelminglysubjective,speculative,
34
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE3
PsychologicalVariablesPotentiallyIdentifyingTerroristSubtypes
Variable
Reality testing
Sociality
Temperament
Cognitivecapacity
Cognitivestyle
Dominance
Classification
Nonpsychoticvs. psychotic
Prosocialvs. antisocial
Typicalvs. atypicalfor culture
Atypically aggressive/hostile
Novelty seeking
Identityseeking
Affectively atypical(depression,irritability,anxiety)
Vulnerableto charismaticinfluence
Sensitiveto perceptionof oppression
Sensitiveto humiliation
Vengeful
Self-destructive
Normalvs. impaired
Executivefunctionimpairment
Impulsecontrolimpairment
Typicalvs. atypicalfor culture
Intoleranceof ambiguity
Low vs. high complexity
Leadervs. follower
and, in many cases, derivedfrom 1920s-erapsychoanalytichypothesesthat are not
amenableto testing. Studentsof terrorismmightjustifiablyconclude from the peerreviewedliteraturethatthe totalnumberof publishedtheoriesexceeds the numberof
empiricalstudies-an imbalancethatmay be of morethanacademicimport.Even the
smallamountof psychologicalresearchis largelyflawed,rarelyhavingbeen basedon
scientificmethodsusingnormedandvalidatedmeasuresof psychologicalstatus,comparingdirectexaminationof individualswith appropriatecontrols,andtestinghypotheses with accepted statisticalmethods. Insofar as policy makersrely on published
analysesof the "themindof the terrorist,"
policies intendedto reducetheriskof terrorism may be basedon invalidpremises.The best solutionis hypothesis-basedresearch
andevidence-basedpolicies. Towardthatend, I offer severalpreliminaryconclusions
and proposals:
behavioris probablyalwaysdetermined
of innatefactors,
by a combination
1. Terrorist
factors,cognitivefactors,temperament,
envibiologicalfactors,earlydevelopmental
ronmental
influences,andgroupdynamics(seeTable3). Thedegreeto whicheachof
to a giveneventprobably
variesbetweenindividual
terrorists,
thesefactorscontributes
betweenindividualgroups,andbetweentypesof groups.Theoriesthatclaimthepresincenostudieshave
dominance
of oneof theseinfluencesovertheothersarepremature
systematically
examinedmorethanone or twoof thesefactors,let aloneempirically
themuch-cited
examinedonewhilecontrolling
fortheothers.Inparticular,
claimthat
noindividual
factorsidentifythoseatriskforbecomingterrorists
is basedoncompletely
research.
inadequate
Victoroff/ THEMIND OF THETERRORIST 35
A new model is needed,one thataccommodatesthe multiplicityof forces at workto
arriveat plausibleandtestableconsilience-that is, a unifiedtheorythatis explanatory
across levels of analysis and examples of terroristactivity.One possibility is a neuroeconomic model thatacknowledgesthe ultimateadaptivenatureof this behavior,modified by an empiricallybased psychology identifying the influence of individualand
groupdynamics.Terrorismis unequivocallya multiplyandvariablydeterminedsubtype
of humanaggression.Recognizing this fact may be the first step towardthe extremely
challengingjob of designingresearch,conductingresearch,and interpretingdata.
2. Terroristsarepsychologicallyextremelyheterogeneous.Whateverhis statedgoals and
groupof identity,every terrorist,like everyperson,is motivatedby his own complex of
psychosocial experiences and traits.Plausible psychological variablesand classes of
behaviorare summarizedin Table3.
3. Terroristsexhibiting differentpsychological subtypes probablyconform to different
behavioralproclivities.It is plausiblebutyet to be proventhatdifferenttypes of terrorism disproportionatelyattractindividualswith specific temperaments.Futureresearch
should attemptto determinethe most likely psychological types among terroristsin
groupswith differentpolitical orientations,as well as the relationshipbetweenpsychological types, individualroles in the group, and typical responses to constraints.For
example,the psychology,morality,andresponseto bargainingamongterroristswho are
primarilyprosocialin theirorientationmay proveto be dramaticallydifferentfromthat
of antisocialterrorists.Leadersand followers tend to be psychologically distinct.Because leadershiptends to requireat least moderatecognitive capacity,assumptionsof
rationalitypossibly apply better to leaders than to followers. Those with diminished
executivefunctionmay be less predictable.Those with subnormalcognitive flexibility
may be less adaptableand more irrationalin bargaining.Those with atypicaltemperaments-who aredrivenby an excessive need for self-affirmation,hatred,vengefulness,
or self-destructiveness-may behave more erratically.Improvedmodeling of markers
of psychological subtypesmay enhancethe predictionof terroristbehaviors.
4. Acceptingthatterroristsareheterogeneous,fourtraitsmaypossiblybe characteristicsof
"typical"terroristswho lead or follow in substategroups:
a. High affective valence regardingan ideological issue
b. A personalstake-such as stronglyperceivedoppression,humiliation,or persecution;anextraordinaryneed for identity,glory,or vengeance;or a drivefor expression
of intrinsic aggressivity-that distinguisheshim or her from the vast majorityof
those who fulfill characteristica
c. Low cognitiveflexibility,low tolerancefor ambiguity,andelevatedtendencytoward
attributionerror
d. A capacityto suppressboth instinctiveandlearnedmoralconstraintsagainstharming innocents, whether due to intrinsic or acquired factors, individual or group
forces-probably influencedby a, b, and c
Thesefourcharacteristicsseem plausiblebasedon the abovesummaryof research.They
are testablehypothesesproposedfor furtherstudy.
5. It seems plausiblethatthe cultureof origindifferentiates,to some degree,expectedindividual and group dynamics. However, group theory would predict that the internal
psychodynamicsof a terroristgroupis influencedas muchby the specific personalityof
its leaderand the temperamentsof its followers as accordingto any systematicdiffervs. religious).
ence accordingto politically types (e.g., nationalist/separatist
6. The currentthrustof strategicchoice studiesfocuses on predictingthe behaviorof committedterrorists.Forthepurposesof long-termsecuritypolicy formulation,anincreased
emphasisshouldbe placedon earlyprevention,thatis, on the analysisof the interaction
between those psychological, cultural,economic, and political factors that influence
uncommittedbut impressionableyoung people to turntowardterrorism.
36
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
7. A balance must be achieved between the benefits of secrecy and the urgentneed to
advanceknowledgein this field. Restrictedaccess to datawill slow scholarlyprogress
with unknownconsequencesto nationalandinternationalsecurity.A reviewof the ultimateimpactof this issue at the highestlevels of securitypolicy may be requiredto optimize this balanceand overcomepotentiallycounterproductivebarriers.
8. Scholarsmust be willing to attemptresearchthatbringsthem into directcontactwith
active terrorists,recentlyactive terrorists,or those at risk for becomingterrorists.Noncoercive recruitment,voluntaryparticipation,and informedconsent are essential.
9. A majorinvestmentis requiredto advancethe field of the behavioralandsocial aspects
of terrorism.Meaningfulresearchis likely to be interdisciplinary,
empirical,controlled,
ethical, conductedacross levels of analysis, anddirectedat root causes andmodifiable
riskfactorsalong the entirechain of causalityfromhistoricalforces to childhoodinfluences to the momentof a terroristact. Since the best expertsin anydisciplineareinevitably scatteredgeographically,ratherthan dependingon a single center of excellence,
fundingcommensuratewith the magnitudeof the threatshouldbe availableon a competitivebasis to seriousscholarswhereverthey workthroughindependentscience supporterssuch as the NationalScience Foundationor the Departmentof Defense.
The problem is to ask questions the answers to which are most likely to make a difference for security, to prioritize research within the remarkable spectrum of possible
investigations, and to develop practical projects. For example, is the carrot of perceived concern for victims of disenfranchisement or the stick of high-altitude bombing a better investment in reducing the psychological forces nurturing the next generation of potential terrorists? What observable behavioral traits distinguish terrorist
groups or leaders who would be likely to back away from aggression if their grievances were addressed by negotiation, as opposed to traits distinguishing groups that
can only be deterred by force? Is the social influence of fundamentalist madrasas associated with a measurable increase in the likelihood of adult terrorist behavior? If so,
could support for alternative, culturally valued education help impressionable young
people find more productive foci for their high emotional energy? Do economic prospects and a sense of personal hope reduce the lure of terrorism? If so, what socioeconomic or psychological factors modify that association, and what cost-benefit formula
is applicable? Do psychological traits of leaders of target nations drive policies that
mitigate or exacerbate the threat? Answers to these and similar questions may be part
of the key to avoiding catastrophic violence in the twenty-first century.
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