DOCKET NO. 666/14
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
p
STATE OF FROESSEL ,
Petitioner,
- against -
JEFF LIU,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIOR ARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
Team # 2
Attorneys for Respondent
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit Court correctly
decide that FCCL §I unconstitutionally infringed on Respondent Jeff Liu’s
fundamental Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense when
Superintendent of the Froessel State Police, Alex Noble, denied Jeff Liu’s
the FCCL §III public accommodation requirement violates Jeff Liu’s right to
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ………………………………………………………………………… ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS …………………………………………………………………………… iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………………………………………...… iv
OPINIONS BELOW ………………………………………………………………………….………. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ……………………………………………………………………… 1
Procedural History ……………………………………...…...……………………….…….… 1
Statement of the Facts ……………………………………………………....…......….……… 2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..……………………………………………………………… 3
ARGUMENT ……………………….………………………………………………………………… 4
I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
WHICH IS SUBJECT TO INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY ………….………………………....... 4
A. The right to self-defend oneself is a historical right that has preceded the Bill of Rights
and was encoded into the Second Amendment ……................................................................……… 5
B. Allowing the full extent of the Second Amendment cleans the stain off America, when
America deprived African-Americans the right to bear arms …….................................................. 6
II. THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT FCCL § III SUBSTANTIALLY
BURDENS JEFF LIU’S CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO FREELY PRACTICE HIS RELIGION …….……………………………...………...………………………...……..... 8
ernmental interest asserted to overwhelms Jeff Liu’s Constitutional right to freely practice his
religion is too broad, and that enforcing FCCL § III’s public mandate against Jeff Liu is also not
iii
.......................... 9
B. The State violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
establishing a preference for LaVeyan’s Satantic belief by allowing Sigmund to obtain a
gun permit after he was assaulted by a group of ministers to the point of unconsciousness. ..... 10
CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………......…….......… 13
APPENDIX ….....……… ………… ……………………………....…………......……......…...… App.
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Supreme Court Cases
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-07 (1994) ............................................................................. 10
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, (2014) .............................................................. 12
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ........................................................................................................... 6
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ..................................................................................................... passim
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) .................................................................................. 10
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ........................................................................................ 8
Gonzales v. O’centro, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006) .......................................................................... 11, 12
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) ............................................................................................ 5
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) .................................................................................................... 8
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ................................................................. passim
Roberts v. United States Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984) ......................................................................... 11
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) .............................................................................................. 11, 12
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) ....................................... 12
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) .................................................................. 10
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, (1875) .................................................................................. 7, 8
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) ................................................................................................. 12
States Cases
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) ........................................................................... 6
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) ........................................................................................ 6
Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, CIV.A. 13-11229, 2013 WL 1190001 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013) .. 8
Liu v. Froessel, 665 F. Supp. 3d 5321 (13th Cir. 2014) ................................................................... passim
Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) ........................................................ passim
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) ................................................................................... 10
Warren v. D.C., 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981) ....................................................................................................... 9
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. I. ................................................................................................................................ App.
U.S. Const. amend. II ................................................................................................................................. App.
v
Statutory Provisions
FCCL .............................................................................................................................................................. App.
FRFA .............................................................................................................................................................. App.
Other Sources
Criminal law reporter (BNA), 87 CRL Issue No. 13 ............................................................................ 7
Luke (King James) ...................................................................................................................................... 8, 12
Karen Gantt, Balancing Women’s Health and Religious Freedom Under the Aca,
17 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 1, 32-37 (2014) ............................................................................................ 9, 10
Matthew (King James) ............................................................................................................................... 8, 12
Matthew (NIV) ............................................................................................................................................ 8, 12
vi
OPINIONS BELOW
tutionality of three sections of the Froessel Conceal Carry Law before the Froessel District Court.
requirements are unconstitutional because they infringe his Second Amendment right to bear
arms for self-defense, as recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); and
[2] FCCL §III public accommodation requirement violates his right to religious exercise under the
However, the District Court upheld the constitutionality of FCCL §§I and II and found the
FCCL § III did not violate Liu’s rights under RFRA. Liu appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth Circuit, which reversed and held RFRA entitles Liu to a religious exemption from the
requirements imposed by FCCL §§ I and II infringe the fundamental right to bear arms for selfdefense as stated in the District of Columbia v. Heller
under the Second Amendment.
Petitioner State of Froessel petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari.
This Court granted its petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
on both claims. The D-Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, upholding the
constitutionality of the FCCL because it does not regulate conduct within the scope of the Second
Amendment. The D-Court denied Liu’s claim for a religious exemption from FCCL § III under the
RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard. Liu appealed to the Thirteenth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit reversed the D-Court’s decision contend1
ing that the D-Court erred because: RFRA entitles Liu to a religious exemption from the public
ments imposed by FCCL §§ I and II infringe the fundamental right to bear arms for self-defense
as stated in the District of Columbia v. Heller
-
ened scrutiny under the Second Amendment.
The State appealed the Thirteenth Circuit’s decision to this court and this Court granted
certiorari.
Statement of the Facts
In the wake of 2001, Froessel’s stock market crashed resulting in an economic downturn.
Ever since that day, Froessel’s crime rate has been steadily increased including crimes stemming
from the sex trade, drug culture, and the overall riff-raff that plague many American cities. The
response time to emergency calls averages about three minutes in neighboring states, compared to
the thirty minutes time frame of Froessel.
Daily Prophet highlighted that only 50 out of over 20,000 citizens were found to satisfy the “jus-
remained roughly at 6,000 per year between 2007 and 2013. Another GUIS report also noted that
the number of handguns sold in Froessel sharply dropped from 70,000 in 2007 to 10,000 in 2013.
the Peace Keeper. In 2008, Liu purchased a handgun for self-defense to keep his apartment safe.
In September 2011, Liu was brutally assaulted by drug addicts, in which they pushed him down a
public stairway and robbed him at gunpoint. Furthermore, within a few months, December 2011,
hitting his grandmother who was sitting in the car. The motorcyclist also shot at Jeff. This was all
due to a small automobile accident that occurred between the motorcyclist and Jeff. After these
near-death experiences, Jeff applied for a concealed-carry permit from the Froessel State police.
2
However, Liu’s application was denied because his life-threatening circumstances did not demonstrate a need for Liu to carry a handgun.
quired by FCCL. Mr. Yung is a Satanists and fully follows his beliefs. His beliefs are described
of Satan, immediately was taken back. Liu knew in his heart and faith that he would be violating
his beliefs providing a service to someone of the Satanic Faith. He told Yung his faith would not
allow him to provide a service and told him to leave. Yung insisted he is required to do so by law.
Liu v. Froessel, 665 F. Supp. 3d 5321, 5324 (13th Cir. 2014).
Two weeks later, Jeff received a citation in the mail from the Law Department of the
State, demanding him to pay $15,000 for violating FCCL § III. Liu v. Froessel, 665 F. Supp. 3d
5321, 5324 (13th Cir. 2014).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
unconstitutional because Froessel’s interests fails to meet the substantial burden of intermediate scutiny
Section I and II of FCCL is facial unconstitutional according to Heller. Therefore, this
Liu’s right to bear arms. Furthermore the historical denial of Second Amendment has cause bloodshed amongst African Americans and we do not want that to happen to the citizens of Froessel.
because it infringes upon Liu’s right to exercise his religion.
The Thirteenth Circuit properly found that the government’s interest asserted in the enforcement of FCCL § III against Liu was particularly broadly formulated and impinged on his
constitutional right to freely practice his religion in this particular instance.
3
ARGUMENT
I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
WHICH IS SUBJECT TO INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY.
The Second Amendment is the right of the people similar to the 1st, 4th, and 5th. See D.C.
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). It endows a person with “the right to keep and bear arms for the
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010); Peruta v. Cnty.
of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, it is a fundamental right that has
preexisted before the Bill of Rights requiring an intermediate level of scrutiny for any laws that
infringe upon this right. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010); Peruta v.
Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2014); Liu v. Froessel, 665 F. Supp. 3d 5321
(13th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court has also extended the right to bear arms beyond the home.
Id. Under intermediate level of scrutiny a law that restricts the Second Amendment requires stating an important interest and present evidence demonstrating the law’s substantial relation to that
interest. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98. The government must prove a substantial interest in order
for the right to be constitutional. Liu v. Froessel, 665 F. Supp. 3d 5321 (13th Cir. 2014).
In this case, FCCL § 1 prohibits Mr. Liu from exercising his right to bear arms.
Furthermore, as the Thirteenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[it] not only burdens the right to
Id. at 5328. Mr. Liu is a citizen of Froessel that has the right
to bear arms. Id.
rational basis review. The state could also say that they have a legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from gun violence and its regulation of gun ownership is rationally related. Furthermore,
the law could be upheld under an interest balance test in which the state’s interest is compared to
the interest of the gun owner.
However, the Thirteenth Circuit noted that the facts do not align with that proposition.
Furthermore, FCCL would be deemed unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny. Liu, 665 F.
Supp. 3d at 5328-29. The statistics of low gun sales has not decreased the amount of homicides
in Froessel. Liu, 665 F. Supp. 3d at 5330. However, the Supreme Court has stated that such a
4
test would not apply. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n. 27. Furthermore, they have rejected the “interestbalance test should not impede such a right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. FCCL also fails under rational basis review because the regulation of guns is wholly unrelated to the purpose of stemming
crime. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). It is clear by the facts that the economic
downturn and other non-gun related crimes created this crime wave. Liu, 665 F. Supp. 3d at 5330.
Furthermore the Ninth Ciruit Court of Appeals has noted that the sister circuits have not properly
applied the right level of scrutiny nor the level of deference it requires:
Instead, it require[s] the government to prove that the statute did not burden the right “subPeruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotations
omitted).
A. The right to self-defend oneself is a historical right that has preceded the Bill of Rights
and was encoded into the Second Amendment
The right to self-defend is a fundamental right encoded into the Second Amendment that
has long been held by ancient civilizations. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
The Bill of Rights and the concept of Federalism “still allocates a general police power ... to the
Id. The police do not have a general duty to help a citizen. Warren v.
D.C., 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. 1981);
In, Warren v. D.C.
respond to their repeated 911 calls. Warren v. D.C.
state that there were no exigent circumstances and that they didn’t have the permission of the
homeowners to enter the house. See Id.
duty to help the citizen. Id.
stating they don’t have a duty to help individuals. See Warren, 444 A.2d at 1.
In this case, the State had the slowest police response time of all states. Liu, 665 F. Supp.
Warren, 444 A.2d at 1.
Restricting Liu’s ability to self-defend himself would take away his fundamental rights
5
protected under the Second Amendment, Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Due Process
Clause. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742 (including the opinion, as well as Thomas, J.’s Concurrence).
Liu on two occasions was not able to defend himself or his own grandma. Liu v. Froessel, 665 F.
Supp. 3d 5321, 5323 (13th Cir. 2014). Liu could not stop the inevitable demise of his grandmother,
but it is certain that he would have been able to quash the situation between him and the motorists
if Liu was armed. FCCL §§ I and II do not align with the Froessel’s policy to protect the people.
See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1178 (9th Cir. 2014). How are Liu and the others
The State has no answer to this question. It merely sidesteps the question by stating [1] that
FCCL §1 will reduce gun violence; [2] FCCL §2 will help train those who are granted a permit;
[3] and that a reduction of gun violence will reduce all types of violence. See Liu v. Froessel, 665
F. Supp. 3d 5321 (13th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, the Dissent in the Thirteenth Circuit follows into
the same hole as the State by agreeing that the statistics and stopping gun violence prevents all
types of criminal behavior. Liu at 5342-43 (13th Cir. 2014) (Dissent EL-ASSAAD, J.,). Froessel
might state the right to bear arms and defend themselves was always limited, but those limitations amount to simple dicta or misapplication of the law. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.,
561 U.S. 742 (2010); cf. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897). Moreover, many courts
age person is not guaranteed any protection. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742,
(2010); Warren v. D.C., 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. 1981); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir.
1982); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1215 (7th Cir. 1988).
Second Amendment in which children and mentally challenge cannot have access to weapons.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742. Furthermore, FCCL §II actively encourages the mentally challenge by
B. Allowing the full extent of the Second Amendment cleans the stain off America, when
America deprived African-Americans the right to bear arms.
The 13th and 14th Amendment allowed African-Americans to assert their citizenship and
receive the rights under the Bill of Rights. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Furthermore,
6
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment into the constitution. McDonald,
561 U.S. at 742.
The legal history, denial of right to bear arms, and documentation of atrocities that occurred to African Americans has been resolved by Heller and McDonald. See McDonald, 561 U.S.
742 (2010). Liu is not an African American, however he is similar in that the Froessel denied Liu
his right to defend himself. Liu has had to see his family member killed by an armed motorcyclist
because the State denied his right to bear arms.
The State might not associate Liu with African-American plight because it was a different era. They might state that it is a minor issue in the narrative in gun regulation and historically
guns were heavily regulated. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1190 (9th Cir. 2014)
(Thomas , J., dissenting).
However, that sidesteps the issue, regulation of arms for an African-American or Liu is
still deprivation of rights. Just like Heller and McDonald vindicated African Americans of history.
Today we can vindicate Liu and the other people that are being bound by Frossel law.
Even in historical debates of the 14th amendment, Congress felt that African Americans had the
right to self-defend themselves:
“Every man ... should have the right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family
and his homestead. And if the cabin door of the freedman is broken open and the intruder
enters for purposes as vile as were known to slavery, then should a well-loaded musket be
in the hand of the occupant to send the polluted wretch to another world, where his wretchMcDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
Id. at 742. Even at the time of creation of the Bill of Rights
22 out of 37 states governments encoded the right to bear arms. Id. at 3042. Even today, Heller’s
decision is not so controversial as 42 states constitutions have strong gun ownership protection.
See Criminal law reporter (BNA), 87 CRL Issue No. 13. If Congress outlawed that right it would
put African Americans as well as many Americans at risk. If the court today, allows FCCL §§I &
II to be deemed constitutional then it would be certainly be a risk to the lives Liu and Gotham citizens. Even the failed argument that Liu would fail as the Second Amendment applies to all under
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742.
7
Furthermore, as Cruikshank is an horrible example when the Second Amendment is allowed to subverted by state actors it can lead to a massacre of many. See McDonald, 561 U.S.
at 742; See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Cruikshank was not merely a case
about the Second Amendment, but rather a case where “[d]ozens of blacks, many unarmed, were
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742. This is essential the
creation of bad law to institutionalize the mass killings and disarment of individuals. Thankfully
the court overturned that decision, but we still need to be vigilant to prevent any further attacks on
this amendment. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742.
II. THE THIRTEENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT FCCL § III
SUBSTANTIALLY BURDENS JEFF LIU’S CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHT TO FREELY PRACTICE HIS RELIGION.
State from enforcing FCCL § III against Liu; and [2] the public accommodation RFRA compels him, under threat of onerous penalties, to engage in conduct that violates the tenets of his
Christian faith, facing the choice between violating the law and violating his faith. See Liu at 533334; Matthew 4:10 (NIV); Luke 4: 1-13 (King James).
FCCL § III, as applied to Jeff Liu, must be found unconstitutional pursuant to the Religion
mental right to freely exercise his sincerely-held religious beliefs according to the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. I. The
of the First Amendment. Id.
Id.; See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
had narrowly interpreted the Free Exercise clause. Liu, at 5345-44. In Smith, the court held that
a generally applicable law under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not be
construed as providing an exemption for religious claims unless it had been passed to single out
religion for particular disfavor. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8
tive history of RFRA illustrates that the Legislature interpreted and applied the term in accordance with the Free Exercise clause cases decided before Smith, which recognized a strict level of
scrutiny. Therefore, under RFRA, Froessel may not create a statute, which substantially burdens
the exercise of one’s religion, even if the burden results from a neutral law of general applicability.
governmental interest was too broad and it overwhelmed Jeff Liu’s Constitutional right to
freely practice his religion, and that enforcing FCCL § III’s public mandate against Jeff Liu
RFRA, and therefore he should be granted a religious exemption. To satisfy strict scrutiny, the
particularity. See Hobby Lobby (citing Gonzales v. O’centro). In both cases decisions, the Supreme
whether the state has a compelling interest in enforcing its mandate against “the particular claim-
interest. Id.
perfect, congruity between the State’s interest and the means chosen to further that interest. The
State relies on several cases to support its asserted interests in equality, uniformity of application, and prevention of discrimination, while the government’s interest may have been found to
See Gonzales v. O’centro, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006). Essentially, the State’s theory that “once a
inquiry that RFRA demands. See Liu at 5336.
In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Court essentially held that once a person
essentially making the choice to live by the rules that govern their business, and their competitor’s
9
in the commercial sphere. United States v. Lee
Id.; See Karen Gantt,
Balancing Women’s Health and Religious Freedom Under the Aca, 17 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 1,
32-37 (2014).
The State seems concerned with the ‘slippery slope’ of religious exemptions that might follow if Liu is granted an exemption. Liu at 5336. However, the State is unwarrantedly assuming that
the remaining Firing Ranges in the Froessel would all bring these RFRA § III claims, and therefore by granting the religious exemption, it would subsequently render the entire statutory scheme
FCCL § II. Liu at 5336.
B. The State violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by establishing a
preference for LaVeyan’s Satantic belief by allowing Sigmund to obtain a gun permit after
he was assaulted by a group of ministers to the point of unconsciousness.
The Establishment Clause precludes religious accommodations that shift the material
cost of engaging in religious practices that accommodate one religion to the detriment of other
third-party secular interests. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703
(1985); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705-07 (1994).
Thus, where the shifted burden is negligible de minimus
Establishment Clause erects no per se bar to the accommodation of religion. See Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-81 (1977).
Froessel will argue that exempting Liu from FCCL § III’s public accommodation mandate would consequently enable RFRA to impermissibly burden the rights of Sigmund Yung.
Moreover, the Court contends that relieving religious exercise of substantial burdens will almost
always exact some cost on society, See Hobby Lobby at *15-26.
This Court, in Walz, upheld real property tax exemptions for churches and religious organizations notwithstanding the costs such exemptions shift to taxpayers. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.,
tions, such as churches and religious organizations are usually community oriented and generally
10
take a more substantial role in community outreach programs theoretically shifting other costly
burdens from the tax-payers. Id.
gous exemption. Id.
The government has a compelling interest in preventing discrimination as it does in preventing discrimination on the basis of race. Id. The dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring (i.e., on the basis of race) might be really disguised as a religious practice to escape
legal sanctions. Id.; See Liu at 5338. However, the RFRA accommodates religion on a case-bycase by basis by conducting the substantial burden, compelling interest, and least restrictive alternative analyses, which are integral and apparent to an RFRA Free Exercise of Religion claim. See
Liu at 5335; Hobby Lobby, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *75, 77.
The least restrictive means prong under the RFRA accommodates only exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise. Id. The State will argue that FCCL §
III places a heavy on the State in furthering their compelling interest, and by imposing a puniwould still be able to engage in his asserted religious exercise — discrimination against Satanists
- in all but his commercial activities. See Liu at 5343-44 (El-Assaad, J., dissenting).
However, Froessel’s argument proceeds from a faulty premise because it misconceives the
nature of Liu’s burdened religious exercise. See Liu at 5335. The exercise of religion allegedly burdened by FCCL § III is not Liu’s discrimination against Satanists generally, it is about his ability
to conduct his business in accordance with his deeply held religious beliefs. Id. What subsequently
leads to discriminatory conduct on Liu’s part does not alter the nature of the religious exercise at
issue. Id.
Liu has a fundamental right under the law and under the Constitution to run his business
in a manner that conforms with his religious beliefs. Id.; See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (an argument on gender
equality and access to services for women). Even if it is deemed that the State’s has a compelling interest in enforcing its mandate, it still needs to satisfy the second prong of strict scrutiny,
which is the least restrictive means test. See Liu. The State, however has not validly asserted any
alternative means other than a punitive measurement, which would cripple Liu’s livelihood, all
just because he is exercising his fundamental to exercise and operate his business according to the
11
principles and deeply-held religious beliefs. Id.
Furthermore, FCCL § III also unduly burdens Liu’s religious right because it can be argued, that forcing Liu to provide the use of his facilities to a Satanist, is essentially restricting his
beliefs who was against his detriment. Id.
-
ing his belief. This Court in Sherbert v. Verner
-
ing his own belief that is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause:
For ‘(i)f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions
or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.’
....
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion ... Nor may the South Carolina court’s construction of the statute be saved
not appellant’s ‘right’ but merely a ‘privilege.’
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, (1963) (citations ommitted).
Furthermore, Froessel is allowing Yung weapon training so he can defend or quite possible
attack Christians as well as others that pose to be Christians. Id. However, they have not allowed
Liu to get a permit even though he suffered gun violence twice, and one that left to the death of his
dearly grandmother. Id.
However, if the State allowed Liu to restrict customers only to his faith they will be favoring Christianity. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (that some entanglement of
faith is allowed by the Establishment Clause because it is unreal to think the state and church
would never mix). This is a situation in which the State is caught in between a rock and a hard
place. See Liu at 5335-36. It would have been better if this law would not have been created. See
Id. Furthermore, the state could have taken their resources and provided there very own gun
training facility rather than impose such draconion laws. See Generally Liu at 5335-37.
Furthermore, it also unduly burdens Liu by stating he should restrict his own Christian
beliefs and serve a Satanists by providing the use of his facilities. See Liu at 5333-34; Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (entanglement of government and religion is unconstitutional);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.
12
ant, who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade participation in production of
Matthew 6:24 (King
James) (one man cannot serve too masters); Matthew 4:10 (NIV); Luke 4: 1-13 (King James). This
law is unconstitutional because in either way it favors one or more religions. Id.
13
CONCLUSION
Therefore, I conclude that FCCL §§ I and II are unconstitutional because
they restrict Liu’s right to defend himself under the Second Amendment.
Therefore, I conclude that FRFRA is unconstitutional, because it restricts
Liu’s right to excericise his religion and entangles the government and Satanic
faith under the Exercise and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Respectfully submitted,
By: Team #2
Attorneys for Respondent
Submitted: August 11, 2014
Attorneys for Respondent
New York Law School
185 West Broadway
New York, NY 10013
14
APPENDIX
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. Const. amend. II
A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.
Statutory Provisions
Froessel Conceal Carry Law
-
the superintendent of the Froessel State Police. The superintendent may only issue conceal-carry
permits for handguns, and shall consider all permit applications in accordance with the following
provisions:
No application shall be approved by the superintendent unless the applicant demonstrates that he is
(1) over the age of 21, (2) has no criminal history, (3) has no history of mental illness, and (4) that
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by
issuance of a permit to carry a handgun. The following factors, whether individually or in the ag(i) A generalized desire to carry a concealed weapon to protect one’s person and property;
(ii) A generalized fear of living in a dangerous society; and
(iii) Living or being employed in a high-crime area.
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group,
IV. If the superintendent determines that the applicant has not met the above requirements, the
after which the applicant may submit an application for renewal.
V. The following persons are exempt from Sections I and II of this statute: (a) Members of law
handguns in the course of their employment; (d) Hunters in the course of hunting, and; (e) Persons
effecting courtordered surrenders of their handguns.
VII. If any provision of this statute is found to be invalid, unconstitutional or otherwise unenforceable, that provision alone shall be deemed deleted, and the validity and enforceability of the
remaining provisions of this statute shall not be affected.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(a) Findings
(1) The framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right,
secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
interfere with religious exercise;
(3) In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated
the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion; and
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(4) The compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this Act are:
(1) To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.
(c) Operative Standard: Free Exercise of Religion Protected
(1) In General. Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.
(2) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
government interest.
(d) Establishment Clause unaffected
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way address that portion
of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion.
or central to, a system of religious belief.
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