Frank Martela
3.11.2010
frank.martela@gmail.com
Ethics of Situational Growth – A Pragmatic Approach for Being Moral
[Manuscript – do not cite without permission]
Abstract
In this essay I argue for one normative principle, that of situational growth. I claim that irrespective of
the situation one has been born into and the principles of morality one has acquired from there, one
should commit oneself to moral growth; to be open to the views of others, to examine one's own
commitments and to seek out opportunities to be better than what one currently is. In short, we should
commit ourselves to cultivation of ourselves as moral agents – both on the level of moral deliberation
and on the level of habitual moral character. The name situational growth emphasizes the situational
constrains within which our moral growth always proceeds. Its main inspiration is found in the
philosophy of John Dewey, although it stands or falls independent of him.
I am not arguing for this principle on the basis of some transcendental or objective premises. The
rationale for this proposition is firstly the fact that human beings have by nature an inclination to care for
the well-being of others but only trough cultivating our ability to do so, can we really learn to act in ways
that really do improve the life of others. I believe that being able to improve the life of others near and
far is for us both instrumentally and intrinsically beneficial. Secondly, I believe that as a society – and as
individuals within this society – we all are better off, if we adopt the principle of moral growth to be part
of our moral character.
I see this form of argumentation as adequate, because I believe that pragmatist normative ethics should
be about entering into the ongoing cultural dialogue through which the society negotiates its moral
standards and ideals. Thus although I don’t even attempt to say anything about ‘how things really are’ the
proposed principle is a moral principle with all the moral normativity that this entails. Proposing it is an
attempt to convince the reader in an honest, transparent way to adopt it as part of their morality. Instead
of mere analysis of moral topics pragmatic normative ethics should also attempt to concentrate on the
real moral questions, attempting to answer these questions as best as we can with full awareness of the
shortcomings of our own normative views. The principle offered here – that of situational growth – is my
attempt to contribute into this practical discourse on good and proper ways of living.
Intro
How to do moral philosophy as a pragmatist? How to philosophize about proper way of living if
one has taken as one's basic premises the historicity of one's thinking, the non-existence of a
neutral starting-point and the particularity of one's conclusions? (see James 1991; Dewey 1908;
Martela 2009, 2010). Surely, any claims of objectivity are out of the question. One way to carry
on moral philosophy from this kind of starting point has consisted of entering into dialogue with
more main-stream and analytic moral philosophers and criticizing their efforts for being based
on false distinctions and unfounded hope of finding something that in principle is not there to
be found (see e.g. Margolis 1996). Some of the work carried out by pragmatic writers has been
more constructive, arguing for a novel understanding of what morality is about epistemologically
and ontologically (e.g. Pihlström 2005)or what moral deliberation is essentially about (e.g.
Fesmire 2003). What contemporary pragmatists have by and large not done, however, is to make
any positive claims about how one should live one's life1. Their efforts have thus been more
meta-ethical (see Miller 2003) than concerned with actual principles of good living and right
conduct.
In an ideal world we could first settle all our debates about the nature of morality and only after
that turn to the actual normative issues that impact our lives. But we do not live in such an ideal
world. Instead we live in a world where any debates about the nature of morality will most
probably never be solved once and for all. More pressingly, we live in a world where people
constantly make moral choices and in which the role and sphere of morality within people’s lives
is constantly renegotiated. If we really want to be pragmatic meliorists – aiming to contribute
positively to the development of the world – we simply can’t wait until the day when all metaethical problems have been either privately for us or publicly for all of us solved before we
present our own normative convictions2. Iris Murdoch (1997:364) has stated: “Ethics should not
1
Few notable exceptions are Joseph Margolis, who after 214 pages of more meta-ethical discussion about morality
devotes the last six pages for introducing four norms that he sees as capturing something important about human
sensibilities but that he nevertheless treats as invented (Margolis 1996).
2
The life stories of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein’s, remind us of how much one is able to publish under one’s
lifetime if one insists on ‘getting everything right’ before publishing it (see Monk 1990).
1
be merely an analysis of ordinary mediocre conduct, it should be a hypothesis about good
conduct and about how this can be achieved. How can we make ourselves better? is a question
moral philosophers should attempt to answer.” Moral philosophy should not be merely an
analysis of moral language, ontology or epistemology. It should also attempt to concentrate on
the real moral questions: how should we live, how can we make ourselves better? As pragmatists,
it is our duty to attempt to answer these questions as best as we can, with full awareness of the
shortcomings of our own normative views.
What would pragmatist normative ethics then look like? Rather than being objective, the actual
moral philosophies people follow in their lives are by and large socially constructed. The most
fruitful way of doing normative moral philosophy would therefore consist of entering into this
ongoing cultural dialogue about proper ways of living and giving one's own contribution to it,
fully aware that what one is offering hasn't got any a priori privilege of being the best opinion.
Instead one should attempt to convince the reader in an honest, transparent way to adopt the
proposed principle as part of their morality. Therefore I argue that the way to conduct pragmatic
normative ethics would be to make explicit one's own moral convictions, to make them available
for others to think through and adopt as part of their own moral agenda. The claims one make
should not be interpreted as anything objective but one should still insist that they ought to be
taken seriously.
In this essay I argue for one normative principle, that of situational growth. I claim that
irrespective of the situation one has been born into and the principles of morality one has
acquired from there, one should commit oneself to moral growth; to be open to the views of
others, to examine one's own commitments and to seek out opportunities to be better than what
one currently is. In short, we should commit ourselves to cultivation of ourselves as moral
agents – both on the level of moral deliberation and on the level of habitual moral character. I
call the doctrine situational growth because it is aware of the situational constrains within which
our moral growth always proceeds. Its main inspiration is found in the philosophy of John
Dewey, although it stands or falls independent of him.
The nature of normative theory in pragmatism
As all pragmatic philosophizing, also normative moral philosophy should start out with actual
human experience (see Pappas 1997). For a pragmatist, starting from any givens, be they certain
2
basic distinctions, moral concepts or objective moral facts, is premature. The closed possibilities
for pragmatic ethics are stated by Joseph Margolis: “Philosophy [- -] cannot ignore or deny its
own historicized setting; and [- -] admitting that, it cannot recover any form of privileged
neutrality, objectivity, universality, apodicticity, apriority, or modal necessity” (Margolis 1996:7).
What are we left with then? Bernard Williams asserts a very Deweyan thesis, when he – after
abandoning any foundations for ethics outside of ethics itself and after abandoning the
possibility of starting from the meaning of ethical words – gives up the hope of finding any
Archimedean point for ethics and instead concludes that ethical theories “still have to start from
somewhere, and the only starting point left is ethical experience itself” (Williams 1985:93; see
also Pappas 1997:546).
The pragmatic outlook also gives us a new understanding of the nature of moral theories and
moral conclusions one has drawn. Instead of being firm and final rules – let alone universal rules
– that should be applied as such to particular acts to derive their moral rightness or wrongness
they should be seen as “intellectual instruments to be tested and confirmed – and altered –
through consequences effected by acting upon them” (Dewey 1960:277; see also Fesmire
2003:59). It is appropriate to quote Dewey in length here:
“A moral principle, such as that of chastity, of justice, of the Golden Rule, gives the
agent a basis for looking at and examining a particular question that comes up. It
holds before him certain possible aspects of the act; it warns him against taking a
short or partial view of the act. It economizes his thinking by supplying him with the
main heads by reference to which to consider the bearings of his desires and
purposes; it guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important
considerations for which he should be on the outlook” (Dewey and Tufts 1952:309).
Moral principles, ideals, rules, theories or conclusions should thus be seen “neither as a
cookbook, nor a remote calculus” (Pappas 1997:546) but as instruments through which we can
change our behavior for the better. They are in a way tools of criticism (Pappas 1997:546) if we
understand that criticism “from the point of view how things are (i.e., descriptive) can be
complemented by criticism from the point of view of how things should be (normative).”
(Pappas 1997:547). Acquired principles and rules as records “of past moral experimentation”
(Fesmire 2003:59) are indispensable for “economizing effort in foresight” (Dewey 1930:244).
Moral rules are to be seen as generalizations that have proved their functionality in the past but
3
that are always open for reconsideration in the future. They are concentrated moral wisdom
through which we can criticize and attempt to improve our present behavior and particular ways
of living. As Pappas (1997:548) rightly concludes, “a moral theory can be an effort to articulate
and make explicit ideals (in the form of kinds of character and ways of life) in order to make it
available for criticism of present beliefs and institutions.”
Additionally, the actual moralities or moral generalizations people hold are by and large the
results of an ongoing process of social construction.3 Moralities are deeply embedded within
human cultures. We come to uphold certain forms of moral generalizations through our
upbringing and the cultural milieu where we enact our lives. We enter into debates about the
proper way of behaving, we explain and justify to others our conduct in particular situations, we
educate the young to uphold certain moral standards, we signal our moral praise and blame both
verbally and non-verbally, to both friends and strangers. Moral questions are discussed in the
private sphere but also in the public: in TV, magazines, books or on the Internet. Thus there is a
constantly ongoing dialogue within cultures – and between cultures – about the proper ways of
behaving and the proper moral principles. It is mainly through this dialogue that the actual
moralities of people are formed and changed. Dewey had a keen eye for this social construction
of morality4. He saw how “men live together naturally and inevitably in society” and how the
social relations they have there with each other “are expressed in demands, claims, expectations”
in a way where “one persons conviction of his rights becomes for other obligations” (Dewey
1998:354). Out of the interplay of these claims and obligations “there arises the general concept
of Law, Duty, Moral Authority, or Right” (Dewey 1998:354).
How then to conduct moral philosophy as a pragmatist? I believe it should be an effort to spell
out and make available one’s own firmest generalizations about proper moral conduct in a way
that stays transparent to their role as instruments to be revised in the future. As moral philosopher
one should not just state one’s moral conclusions as such. The responsibility of a moral
3
There most probably is also a more basic and biological instinct to care for others, to seek for justice and so on
upon which the socially constructed morality is built upon. More about this see (Martela 2010; Prinz 2008).
4
Although he didn’t use such a word as it became popular only in the latter half of 20th century mainly through the
work of Berger & Luckmann (1966).
4
philosopher is to – as explicitly as possible – give out the reasons why one has come to uphold
certain moral conclusions, why one believes it to be beneficial that others adopt the same
principles, and what reservations one has regarding the principles. This transparency makes
one’s normative propositions philosophical, as part of moral philosophy and not just part of
general moral debate. Additionally, the moral statement of a philosopher should be a Bakhtian
utterance in the philosophical discourse (Bakhtin 1981): it should be a response to the
philosophical discourse that has gone one before and it should address the philosophical
discourse coming after (see Martela 2010). Because pragmatists cannot claim a connection to
some privileged form of knowledge as a demarcation line between philosophy and nonphilosophy, they can only appeal to the ancient philosophical virtue of (collective) strive towards
wisdom to set their opinions apart from other opinions about morality. As a pragmatist
philosopher, one should present one’s principles as convincing suggestions, never as final truths
about the matter.
Pragmatic normative ethics would thus be participation in this ongoing dialogue of proper ways
of living and behaving. In stating that people ought to live in a certain way, the ought should not
be interpreted as deriving from some universal principle or anything similar. It is an ought that is
based on my personal conviction. It derives its normativity essentially from three sources: firstly
the fact that I myself am committed to it, secondly, from the fact that I am demanding such
commitment from others, and thirdly, from the weight of the arguments that I am able to
present in support of the doctrine. These three in turn, derive their normative force from the
general normative role morality plays in people’s lives5.
I thus believe that one essential element of such participation into the dialogue about morality is
one’s own commitment. I can’t see much value in proposing normative generalizations for
others to adopt if the proposer is not willing to commit oneself to them. Own present
commitment to such principles or at least a second-order willingness to be committed to such
principles I thus see as a prerequisite for entering into the normative debate6. James expressed
5
Which I claim to be partly natural, partly socially constructed (See Martela 2008).
6
This again should not in the spirit of pragmatism be interpreted as an unbreakable rule but as a guiding
generalization. It might be possible to construct situations where it might be best to propagate for moral values and
norms the propagator oneself is not committed to. One is reminded of a Buddhist priest who gave the opposing
5
this demand to practice what one preaches rather strongly by condemning Rousseau who wrote
humane and influential books on child rearing while completely ignoring his own children:
”There is no more contemptible type of human character than that of the nerveless
sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but
who never does a manly concrete deed” (James 1950:125). Of course, one’s present commitment
to the principles should always be open to evolve in the future. For a pragmatist, commitment to
moral generalizations is about ”staking one’s life on one’s ideals while recognizing that they are,
in the nature of things, not final and may, (we hope, will) be improved on in the progress of the
species” (Putnam 1990:229).
Growth as a human responsibility
As human beings, we are engaged actively with the world. There are particular things and
projects we want to further; particular developments are for us more welcome than others. As
human beings, we have also been equipped with a practical reasoning ability that assists us in
reaching our goals. (see Dewey 1998:354.) In these two convictions we already find the seeds for
an argument for growth to be a human responsibility.
For if we want to reach particular goals in life or express particular virtues in our conduct, we
must shape the instrument through which we can make things happen in the world – in other
words ourselves. Shaping ourselves to better meet the demands that we have set for ourselves is
what growth ultimately is about. Growth is thus development with a direction – a direction that
we ourselves have set for ourselves. As such I see two central areas for development: growth of
practical reasoning abilities and growth of character.
Growth of practical reasoning is about developing our cognitive abilities to reason about the
right way to reach our goals. Practical reasoning is thus about “creatively tapping a situation’s
possibilities” (Fesmire 2003:65). However, to shape our actions for the better, it is not enough to
develop our reasoning abilities. According to a pragmatic understanding of human nature our
minds are elastic. Our habitual nature has been shaped by our past experiences but it is also
constantly reshaped by our present-day choices and actions. Every choice “sustains a double
advice to two different monks because one of them needed more encouragement and the other needed to be more
restrained. By and large, however, one should be committed oneself to the moral principles one is propagating.
6
relation to the self. It reveals the existing self and it forms the future self [- -] In choosing this
object rather than that, one is in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to be”
(Dewey 1998:342). Growth here then means making choices and conducting actions through
which our character is shaped in the direction we want to shape it.
Another mundane fact that makes growth a necessary part of human life is the constantly
evolving world around us. In order not to become dinosaurs of outdated habits we must remain
open to the possibility that changing circumstances make our presently well-working habits a
burden in the future. “A self that was truly moral under a set of former conditions may become
a sensuous, appetitive self when it is confronted with a painful need for developing new attitudes
and devoting itself to new and difficult objectives” (Dewey 1998:353). Being open for growth is
the only cure to keeping one’s habits up to date with the changing environment.
We need to sharpen our understanding of growth still a bit. It could be argued that growth is in a
way a necessary fact of human life. This is because our habits are constantly shaped by the
environment; successful habits are strengthened while unsuccessful one’s wane away. So growth
is perhaps a necessary fact of human life. But growth-orientation is what we have in mind here.
It is a cognitive orientation or a second-order habit that makes one more open to growth. The
process of growth might be inevitable but we can through our attitudes either enhance or
prohibit this process of growth. Dewey thinks that we are by nature inclined to stick to our
current habits: “there is always a tendency to rest on our oars, to fall back on what we have
already achieved. For that is the easy course…” (Dewey 1998:353.) This is why we need the
attitude of growth-orientation to really make us open for readaptation, new situations,
enlargement and growth of our selves7. The principle of growth is therefore about being
positively oriented to growth, to welcoming it as a positive development and to remind ourselves
to not stick too possessively to our current habits.
This responsibility for growth should be understood in a pragmatic way as discussed in the
previous chapter. The rule that we should grow should thus not be interpreted as a fixed and
categorical, universal principle. Such understanding originates in the picture of morality that
7
It might be worth noting that recent psychological evidence by and large confirms the usefulness of a growth-
oriented mindset in many different contexts (see Dweck 2000).
7
pragmatism opposes. Instead the principle of growth should be understood as an idealized
summary of moral wisdom, a guiding hypothesis that helps us in attending to the situation in a
right way (see Fesmire 2003:59). The principle of growth thus reminds us in an economic way of
the specific interest we have for growth and how we should in that specific situation also take
the perspective of growth into account.
Our moral nature
I have now argued why we as human beings in general should attempt to develop our practical
reasoning abilities and habits, why we should adopt the principle of growth as part of our way of
living. Remains the question of morality and the necessity of moral growth. I have elsewhere
argued (see Martela 2010) that in addition to practical reasoning or practical wisdom (e.g.
Nussbaum 1989:305) through which we answer the general question of ‘How to live, taking all
into account?’ there is a more specific moral question that is essentially connected to the social
sphere of living, answering in essence the question, ‘How to live together with others, how to
take the well-being of others as well as the well-being of myself into account in choosing my
path of living?’ Now it is time to concentrate on the specifically moral sphere of life and see
what can be said about it.
Let’s say that we are in a situation, attempting to make a decision that would in the long term
mostly benefit our own inner experience. Into this calculation, two elements enter that make it
understandable why such an effort inevitably should include the moral element within it. Firstly,
as human beings – as social animals – we are equipped with specific emotional structure that
makes ordinary human beings sensitive for the well-being of others (see e.g. Tangney, Stuewig,
and Mashek 2007; Prinz 2008). Secondly, our individual lives are socially embedded in a deep
way, we live our lives among the others, the others perception of ourselves all the time upon us.
Taking these two facts into account in our practical deliberation already makes morality to be an
essential part of that deliberation. Let’s spell them out in more detail starting with the second
one.
When thinking about the selfhood that we are, we should not fall victim to the atomistic model
in which individuals are “supposed to be naturally isolated” and in which “social arrangements
were considered to be secondary and artificial” (Dewey 1998:349). If we understand ourselves to
be such homo economicus with an “exclusive regard for his own profit” (Dewey 1998:349) regard
8
for others becomes something that must be accounted for. Luckily, this is a flawed view of
human being, born out of the Western philosophers urge to draw strict boundaries in order to
make the world more analyzable. Isolated, faceless and self-interested subjects in the markets are
not a proper metaphor for what it is like to be a human being. The metaphor of family much
better describes human life: “It is an enduring form of association in which the members of the
group stand from the beginning in relations to one another, and in which each member gets
direction for his conduct by thinking of the whole group and his place in it” (Dewey 1998:349).
Instead of an atomistic view of humanity, we should understand that “selfhood is not something
which exists apart from association and intercourse” (Dewey 1998:348). We are born into a
social world, usually within a family. Our selfhood develops in close interaction with our primary
caregivers and significant others. Their ways of interacting with us and opinions of us are the
space within which our own selfhood slowly grows into being. Their values and valuation get
deeply under our skin, constituting quite readily ourselves and our valuations. Our individuality
is the product of our social embeddedness, we are much more the products of our cultures than
some philosophers with a high regard for their uniqueness would like to admit8. Our social
upbringing makes our habitual nature to involve the regard for others in a deep way.
It can even be argued that such a benevolent attitude towards others is not simply a cultural
product; it is part of our nature shaped by evolution. We are social animals and recent scientific
evidence makes a strong case for the existence of deeply held emotions that sensitize us for the
well-being of others. I have elsewhere (see Martela 2010) reviewed this evidence and will not go
deeper into it here. Suffice it to say that from that evidence a picture emerges where human
beings are seen as creatures that are deeply designed to care for those close to them.
Accordingly, Dewey sees self-regard and regard for others “both of them secondary phases of a
more normal and complete interest: regard for the welfare and integrity of the social groups of
which we form a part” (Dewey 1998:349). Thus we can argue that there is an inclination to take
the well-being of others into account in all normally developed human beings. It is simply the
way we are designed by nature and struggling against it is usually bad for oneself as the classic
case of Raskolnikov demonstrates (Dostoevsky 1950). Recognizing and following this instinct is
8
I almost feel that the isolated subject that can for himself decide what values to uphold is a macho fantasy born
out of the personal psychological struggles of certain philosophers (Nietzsche and Sartre come readily to mind).
9
usually the best course of action even for our own well-being as many research results of the
well-being increasing effects of altruism reveals (e.g. Post 2005; Tomasello 2009).
The moral principle of moral growth
The previous description of human nature and the role morality and regard for others play in it
has been all descriptive. It may well be that we have a natural inclination to be concerned for the
well-being of others. Still, someone may ask, what does this have to do with morality? From the
fact that we are inclined to help others we can’t derive the moral law that we should help others.
In other words, what I have been offering has been descriptive, but what about normativity,
wasn’t the point of the article to develop a normative theory about morality?
The most basic and general moral principle we can come up with is that we should take the
interests and well-being of others into account. If morality is about something, it is about that
principle. There is a reason why we need to make this into a moral principle and not merely rely
on our natural inclination for sympathetic feelings for others. This is because there is a tendency
within us to take the regard for our selves as the more important principle. Communal life,
however, demands from us that we can look at a matter from the point of view of others and
take their as well as our interests equally into account. We might have a natural inclination to
take the well-being of others into account but only through cultivating this inclination can it
really become a guiding principle for our lives. Therefore we need a principle to remind us of
not letting our own point of view override the point of view of the other. This principle has
been expressed in many forms in numerous writings since Ancient times, for example ‘And as ye
would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise’ (Luke 6 v31). That we should take
others into account, I thus take as the self-evident and prototypical moral principle. I see it as
especially urgent in the modern time in which culture promotes largely a self-cultivating and selfpromoting kind of attitude (see MacIntyre 1984; Taylor 1991; Bellah et al. 1985). My point is
not, however, to suggest and defend it9, but to offer another moral principle to supplement it. In
the previous chapter I hope I made clear why I believe that most of us humans ought even for
their own inner well-being adopt this basic moral principle in quite strong sense as part of their
9
I believe that as such, it is in no need of defense because practically everyone agrees with it.
10
worldview and way of living. Now my argument is aimed at those people that already are
convinced to take regard for others as a moral principle.
As a moral principle I state that we should cultivate our regard for others, we should make our
other-regarding motivation to grow within our motivational structure. My argument for this
principle is in the end very simple: if we have adopted regard for others as a moral principle,
then we can be better or worse in actually advancing the well-being of others both in terms of
our behavior and our deliberation. Therefore, an essential part of our regard for others is an
effort to develop us to be better able to actually fulfill this basic moral principle. I am thus
willing to derive from the general moral principle ‘we should take the interests and well-being of
others into account’ a more specific moral principle: ‘we should cultivate our regard for others.’
Again, there are two sides to this cultivation because regard for others has a double meaning: “It
may signify that action as a matter of fact contributes to the good of others, or it may mean that
the thought of others’ good enters as a determining factor into the conscious aim” (Dewey
1998:348). Firstly, it is about cultivating our actual habits of taking others into consideration.
Pappas (1997) takes up the fable of Good Samaritan and argues that the difference between the
one’s helping and the one’s walking past is not in their cognitive moral principles but in their
habits10. Dewey states that inclinations to take others as well as ourselves into account are both
natural (Dewey 1998:349). What is socially determined is the extent to which these two
inclinations are cultivated. So what I am saying is that morally we should develop our habitual
nature towards a direction in which we more naturally would take the interest of others into
account in our behavior. Especially, we should cultivate our capacity for empathetic feelings for
others.
Secondly, we can be better or worse at understanding and furthering the needs of others. We can
be better or worse at predicting what courses of action really are beneficial for others as well as
ourselves. Therefore, cultivation of our abilities to deliberate about morality is a central part of
10
In fact, in a famous empirical recast of the Good Samaritan fable in which theology students hurrying towards
giving a speech on Good Samaritan encountered a man slumped in an alleyway it was found that the amount of
hurry more than their personal characteristics or other variables explained who stopped to help and who just passed
by (Darley and Batson 1973).
11
our moral growth. In here, the traditional moral theories such as utilitarianism, Kantianism or
virtue ethics have their place. They highlight certain moral aspects of the situation thus assisting
us in getting a more holistic picture about what is at stake in every single case11. In here, also,
dialogue and dialectic processes have their place. Through engaging in dialogue with people that
hold different moral opinions from ours we can come to appreciate what is valuable in their
moral point of view – and also help us see the blind spots and flaws of our own moral thinking.
Additionally, our capacity for imagination is what Dewey puts quite much emphasis on (see here
also Alexander 1993; Fesmire 2003). Other peoples moral convictions, argumentation and
discussion about the moral aspects of a particular case, sophisticated moral theories philosophers
have come up with as well as our own capacities for reasoning and imagination all thus serve as
raw material through which we can cultivate our own sense for the moral way of living.
The principle I am defending should not be seen as a strict rule but rather as an attitude of
moral cultivation (cf. Martela 2009). It shouldn’t be just abstract but this attitude should make a
practical difference in our behavior. More precisely: (1) as regards our moral convictions, it
should make us take a fallibilistic and development-seeking attitude towards them, nevertheless
being seriously committed to them for the time being, (2) as regards moral debates, it should
make us more open to listen and aim to understand the opinions and points of views of others,
(3) as regards our moral deliberation, it should make us more honest with ourselves and make us
seek opportunities for deliberation as well as opportunities to put the results of our deliberation
into action, (4) as regards our behavior it should (a) make us aware that all our behavior impacts
our habitual nature, and (b) make us seek for possibilities to behave in ways that strengthen our
other-regarding habits
When I am saying that there is a moral principle that we should cultivate our regard for others,
what I am in fact doing is reconstructing our socially constructed understanding of morality. I am
strengthening the role that regard for others and cultivation of that regard have. I agree with
Dewey when he states that: “We may say that the good person is precisely the one who is most
conscious of the alternative, and is the most concerned to find openings for the newly forming
11
Word of warning though: Taken as such and alone they might lead to counterintuitive moral conclusions because
they all seem to have their own blind spots.
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or growing self” (Dewey 1998:353). In other words, the good person is the one who is looking
for changes to grow morally, to cultivate his or her morality.
Part of the reason for the emphasis on the attitude for growth rather than on the adoption of
any specific principles as sign of moral goodness or badness is the fact that one cannot choose
the morality one is born into. In here, Hugh LaFollette provides an important personal
testimony:
“I grew up a bigot, living in a land of bigots. I walked, talked, acted, thought and
imagined like a bigot. I had no acquaintance with blacks, and no experience or habits
to prompt me to change my bigoted habits. I enjoyed my (relatively) privileged
status, although I did not see my status as privileged – I saw it as reflecting some
natural order of things. My upbringing and social norms blinded me to my bigotry.
At that point I was unlikely to change my racist ways, since the same conditions
which shaped these habits also shaped my deliberative abilities. How could I see my
flaws?” (LaFollette 2001:409).
How could we criticize a person for growing up in a land of bigots? One hardly can choose
where one is born. Some of us have the fortune of being born in a liberal democratic state with
freedom of speech and free education available to all citizens. Others have the faith of growing
up in Germany in the 1930s and spending one’s youthful years in Hitler Jugend – a youth
organization specialized in brainwashing the children to be loyal Nazis. Some were born into
Athens of 400 BC where slavery and oppression of women was part of everyday life, part of
how things naturally are. It doesn’t seem fair to judge one’s moral status based on the time and
place of one’s birth and upbringing. I feel that much better and also much more productive way
of evaluating the person’s moral character is the extent to which one is willing to transcend the
limits of one’s particular morality, the extent to which one is aiming to grow morally.
So, what one cannot choose is the moral values one has grown into through one’s upbringing.
What one can choose is the attitude one has for one’s present moral principles and towards
morality in general. Dewey notes that moralists have a tendency to talk about lower and higher
selves and of thinking that the difference between the two is due to a difference in “definite
qualities and traits” (Dewey 1998:353). But along with Dewey I think that the real difference
should be made between those that are satisfied with their current system of morality and those
that attempt to grow. As regards high and low selves, “the only distinction [- -] that can be
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drawn without reducing morals to conventionality, self-righteous complacency, or a hopeless
and harsh struggle for the unattainable, is that between the attained static, and the moving,
dynamic self” (Dewey 1998:353).
As said, the principle of moral growth is a moral principle. We should praise and condemn
people morally based on their inclination to follow this principle in their lives. I argue it is a
moral ought that I myself and you and all of us should be committed to; disregarding its direct
utility for ourselves. This is because my firm conviction is that if more people would be more
committed to this principle, we would live in a better world. This alone is enough for me to
propagate this principle to others; to state that others as well as myself should live according to
this principle. Through this principle, I believe we could be on our way towards a more moral
society, a society where people would more genuinely think of the well-being of everyone and
would be more skillful in actually advancing the well-being of everyone. This kind of society I
believe would be better for us all, and therefore I urge you, me and everyone to adopt this
principle as a basic part of our moral character.
Discussion
There are a number of questions and dilemmas that the normative proposition just given raises.
One paradox concerns the balance between radicalism and conservatism. There is a danger that
through our deliberation we arrive at moral conclusions that differ radically from the consensus
of our current society. Should we then abandon the constraints of prevalent norms and set out
to live according to our newly found moral standards? In here, I agree with Margolis that “there
is a prima facie obligation favoring conformity to a society’s traditional norms” (Margolis
1996:217)12. The prevalent norms of a society usually have gathered much wisdom from past
experience and we shouldn’t abandon them easily. The least we can do is to start the
transformation by entering into a dialogue with other members of the society about our novel
moral conclusions to weight them against the reasons the proponents of the prevailing norms
are able to give for their convictions. Of course, sometimes we learn that the norms of the
society really need improvement and then we should act. Individuals who have acted like this are
the reason we no longer have slavery and that women and people of different ethnicity have
12
According to Margolis both MacIntyre and Gadamer also support this idea (Margolis 1996:217).
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equal rights in our societies. But as said we should move carefully and give the prevalent norms a
change to explain themselves before pushing for radical reforms.
Next, someone might be scared by the fact that the emphasis on certain attitudes instead of
strict rules and principles might not be enough to hold at bay the scary possibilities of ‘anything
goes’ –attitudes and complete anarchy. Many seem to think that loosening the tight control
morality should have as firm rules on our conduct might undermine our moral behavior. This
accusation would need a longer answer than is possible here and a detour into moral psychology
so that I could really convince the person why I don’t see this as a real possibility and how I feel
that a serious commitment to the moral principle of situational growth can be as firm as any
rule-based morality despite the fact that it doesn’t give any final answers to moral questions.
Suffice it to say here that I myself am more scared of the consequences of moral perspectives
that include the belief that someone can have the right final answer in moral questions. As
Margolis noted: “the most monstrous crimes the race has ever (been judged to have) perpetrated
are the work of the partisans of ‘right principles’ and privileged revelation” (Margolis 1996:213).
Finally, someone might laugh at this whole article, noting that once again a philosopher tries to
write normative ethics but in the end doesn’t solve any ethical problems. In here my only
defense is to say that considering particular moral problems the metaphor of solving doesn’t
capture the way we should think about them given the basic understanding of the whole issue of
morality we have here adopted. Instead of a metaphor borrowed from mathematics, one from
law would be more appropriate and we would be better off talking adjudication of particular moral
problems (Putnam 1990:181). Our moral growth halts at the moment we believe we have solved
a moral problem once and for all. In facing a particular moral situation, we should apply all our
gathered moral wisdom to reach a verdict that best balances different considerations that play a
role in it. This is the most I can say about ‘solving’ particular moral problems in here. My aim
here has been to propose an attitude through which we can slowly become better ‘solvers’ of
particular moral problems in the future, not to solve any problem at the outset.
Conclusion
I have given you a moral proposition. I’ve tried to give you as best as I can the reasons why I
think you should adopt the proposition as part of your own morality. I have tried to be honest
with you and told you only things that I myself sincerely believe in. My hope is that my reasons
15
are convincing enough for you to take this proposition seriously. Actually, I have to say this
more strongly: I urge you to adopt this moral principle. Not because I believe it to be anyhow
objective or final truth about morality but because I feel that if you and others would adopt it,
we all would live in a better world.
My proposition has been that we all should commit ourselves to moral growth, to cultivation of
ourselves as moral agents. This is because “morality is a continuing process not a fixed
achievement” (Dewey 1998:322). My principle of moral growth involves two basic elements:
firstly, the growth of our ability to deliberate about moral matters and the moral consequences
of our possible actions. And secondly, the growth of our moral character, the continuous
development of our habitual nature and practical abilities to act morally as part of our everyday
conduct.
My reasons for taking this moral principle to be centrally important include firstly the fact that
human beings have by nature an inclination to care for the well-being of others and this natural
inclination is significantly strengthened by our social upbringing. Thus acting in a considerate
way is the only way for ourselves to be in harmony with our inner nature. And only through
cultivating our ability to do so, can we really learn to act in ways that really do improve the life of
others. Perhaps even more importantly, I believe that as a society – and as individuals within this
society – we all are better off, if we adopt the principle of moral growth to be part of our moral
character. Therefore I am willing to state that the principle of situational growth is a moral
principle with all the moral normativity that this entails. Additionally, I believe that we should
also take responsibility in educating others – especially children – into adopting and cultivating
this principle. We should construct our socially negotiated reality in a way that would take this
principle more seriously.
The reason I’ve called this principle ethics of situational growth is to remind ourselves of the
situational nature of our ethical journey. We start our journey towards betterment from our
particular situation and we are always bound by it. Thus we should never consider our moral
convictions or our moral character to be in any way final. We should remain open and seek
opportunities to grow morality as long as we breathe. We can never arrive to the final
destination but we can widen our horizon in the Gadamerian sense (Gadamer 2004). There is
always room for becoming a better person – to further cultivate our ability to make the world a
better place for us all.
16
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