BRIEFING PAPER
Number 06995, 15 December 2015
ISIS/Daesh: the military
response in Iraq and Syria
By Claire Mills
Ben Smith
Louisa Brooke-Holland
Inside:
1. Background
2. What does the military
campaign entail and who are
the main players?
3. Duration of the mission
4. Legal basis
5. British military participation
6. Russian actions in Syria
7. Boots on the ground?
www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | papers@parliament.uk | @commonslibrary
Number 06995, 15 December 2015
Contents
Summary
4
1.
Background
7
2.
2.1
What does the military campaign entail and who are the main players?
Air strikes
Coalition partners conducting offensive operations in Iraq and Syria
Operations in Iraq
Operations in Syria
Other military contributions
Training and logistical support to local forces
Training in Iraq
Support to Syrian opposition forces
9
9
11
14
16
16
18
18
20
3.
Duration of the mission
23
4.
Legal basis
Iraq
Syria
25
25
25
5.
5.1
5.2
British military participation
Parliamentary approval
Air strikes in Iraq and Syria
Assets, personnel and basing
Sortie Rates
Surveillance operations over Syria
Involvement of embedded UK military personnel in Syrian airstrikes
Training
Iraq
Syrian opposition forces
Sustainability of the UK mission
Costs of the mission
27
27
32
33
35
36
37
39
39
40
40
41
6.
6.1
6.2
6.3
Russian actions in Syria
Build-up of Russian military capabilities in Syria
Russian Operations
Russian strategy
Problems for the Kremlin
Regional impact
43
43
44
48
49
49
7.
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
Boots on the ground?
Position of the British Government
Views of Parliamentarians
Views of the former defence chiefs
Views of commentators
Views of the US and other coalition partners
51
52
53
54
56
57
2.2
2.3
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
Cover page image copyright: Tornado GR4 Aircraft from 31 Squadron RAF Marham by
UK Ministry of Defence
2
3
ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
Number 06995, 15 December 2015
Summary
A coalition of 65 countries are engaged in international efforts to counter ISIS (also known
as Daesh, ISIL or Islamic State). The military campaign in Iraq and Syria is just one aspect of
that broader strategy which also includes measures to restrict the flow of foreign fighters,
stop foreign financing, provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq and Syria and strategic
communications, intended to counter their ideology.
In terms of the military campaign (Operation Inherent Resolve), which is the focus of this
paper, the United States has led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria since 8 August
2014 and end of September 2014 respectively. With a view to building the capacity of
local forces on the ground, offensive military action has so far been restricted to air
operations in support of local forces, providing reconnaissance, surveillance and attack
capabilities. Training is also being provided by a number of coalition countries to the Iraqi
security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga in order to bolster their ground capabilities and
allow them to take the fight to ISIS.
The US had also been leading a programme of training for moderate opposition forces in
Syria. However, that programme has been beset with difficulties and on 9 October the US
announced that it would pursue a new strategy with respect to supporting opposition
forces in Syria.
Who is in the military coalition?
The coalition against ISIS is being led by the United States.
Along with the US, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia,
Jordan, Canada and Denmark have all conducted air strikes in Iraq, although Belgium and
Denmark have recently withdrawn their combat aircraft.
The first US- led airstrikes in Syria were assisted by aircraft from five Arab countries:
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, with Qatar in a supporting
role. Since then Turkey, Canada, France and Australia have joined the air campaign in
Syria. The UK initially restricted itself to conducting surveillance reconnaissance operations
over Syria. The UK began offensive operations in Syria on 3 December 2015 following a
vote in Parliament.
The new Canadian government has announced its intention to end its combat mission in
Iraq and Syria, although the timetable for doing do is currently unclear. At the same time,
and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the French
government has increasingly called on its coalition partners to support the military
campaign against ISIS. The German Government approved plans in early December to
deploy Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, refuelling aircraft, a naval frigate and a 1,200
strong force to the region, although those forces will not engage in offensive operations.
The United States, the UK and a number of other coalition countries have also deployed
military personnel on the ground in Iraq to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. These
are not combat troops and are not deployed in an offensive role.
Legal basis
Military action in Iraq is being conducted at the request of the Iraqi government, which
coalition partners consider provides a firm legal basis for operations.
The reluctance of many coalition partners to intervene in Syria has partly been because of
concerns over the legality of such military action, given that it is not at the request of the
4
5
ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
Assad government, and is being conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council
resolution specifically authorising such action.
The Government’s November 2015 response to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on
extending British military action to Syria says that the main legal basis for UK military
action in Syria is collective self-defence of Iraq, with the individual self-defence of the UK
and collective self-defence of other states (but not Security Council authorisation) as
additional legal bases.
Duration of the mission
It is widely acknowledged that the campaign against ISIS will be longstanding. During the
Commons debate in September 2014 David Cameron warned Members of Parliament
that “we should not expect this to happen quickly. The hallmarks of this campaign will be
patience and persistence, not shock and awe.” In October 2015 the Foreign Secretary,
Philip Hammond, suggested that a three-year timeframe was the current expectation of
military commanders.
The UK’s contribution
In September 2014 Parliament voted to support offensive military action in Iraq. However,
that vote did not extend to offensive operations in Syria. In July 2015 the Secretary of
State for Defence indicated that the Government could seek further approval from
Parliament to extend air strikes into Syria provided that “there is a sufficient consensus
behind it”. A debate, and vote, on extending offensive military action against ISIS in Syria
was subsequently held on 2 December 2015. Parliament voted in support of military
action exclusively against ISIS in Syria by 397 to 223 votes.
Since September 2014 RAF Tornado GR4 and the Reaper remotely piloted air system
(RPAS) have conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq, with support aircraft including the
new Voyager tanker/transport aircraft and the Sentinel surveillance and reconnaissance
aircraft. The UK has been the second largest contributor to the coalition air campaign,
conducting more than 1,600 missions over Iraq, including over 380 airstrikes. The
government has suggested that the UK has carried out 8% of coalition airstrikes in Iraq;
that nearly 60% of the intelligence gathered in Iraq is provided by British Tornado aircraft;
and that Reaper and Airseeker aircraft, which have been authorised to fly surveillance
missions over Syria since October 2014, are providing up to 30% of the intelligence effort
in that country.
In early December 2015 two additional Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft were
deployed to the region following the expansion of military action into Syria. The first
British airstrikes in Syria were conducted on 3 December 2015.
Since November 2014 the UK has been providing training and military advice to the Iraqi
security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga. In early June 2015 the Government
announced that a further 125 British military personnel would deploy to Iraq in order to
bolster that training mission. To date the UK has trained over 2,000 Iraqis. The UK also
participated in the US-led programme to train moderate Syrian opposition forces which
was suspended in October 2015.
Approximately 850 British military personnel are involved in operations against ISIS.
Around two thirds of those personnel are deployed in the region in support of the air
campaign; while the remaining personnel are on the ground in Iraq providing training and
military advice. Those personnel on the ground are not combat troops.
Number 06995, 15 December 2015
The net additional costs of the military air operation (Tornado, Typhoon, Reaper and airto-air refuelling) are being met from the Treasury Special Reserve; while the costs of
training and equipping the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces, and the provision of key
enablers, are being met from the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP).
Russian actions in Syria
Since early September 2015 Russia has been forward deploying troops and other military
assets to an air base in Latakia province on the Mediterranean coast of Syria.
Estimates of the number of deployed Russian military capabilities vary, but what has been
established is that the Russian air force has forward deployed a powerful strike group
comprising nearly 50 combat aircraft, helicopters and force protection assets. Thus far
personnel appear to have been deployed in support of air operations and to provide a
base protection capability, although reports suggest that preparations are being made for
the potential deployment of significant Russian ground forces.
On 30 September Russia launched its first airstrikes in Syria, the first time that Russian
forces have undertaken a military operation beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet
Union since the end of the Cold War. Russia was immediately criticised for targeting rebel
groups rather than ISIS, including moderate opposition forces supported by the US.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Russia is targeting ISIS “and other
terrorist groups” in Syria at the invitation of the legitimate Syrian government.
Russia has also supported counteroffensive operations by Syrian government forces
against rebel forces; has violated Turkish airspace on more than one occasion and has
launched attacks on targets in Syria from Russian warships based in the Caspian Sea.
In recent weeks Russia has stepped up its bombing campaign in Syria, largely in response
to the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula on 31 October but also in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris. Some commentators have also suggested that
there has been a slight shift in focus, with Russian forces increasingly striking ISIS targets
as opposed to moderate rebel groups.
The deconfliction of Syrian airspace has become a priority and US and Russian officials
have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to that end. Most analysts concur
that the Russian air force’s presence in Syria makes the concept of establishing no-fly or
safe zones in Syria almost impossible now to implement.
Boots on the ground?
Combat troops have been explicitly ruled out by the UK and other countries involved in
the coalition, amid debate about the reliance on air power alone. However, the prolonged
nature of this campaign has led many to reignite the debate about whether the Coalition
is doing enough and whether ‘boots on the ground’ is the next logical step. The US’
recent move to deploy Special Forces’ personnel to northern Syria in support of local
forces has been regarded by many as the first step in this direction.
6
7
ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
1. Background
A coalition of 65 countries are engaged in international efforts to
counter ISIS (also known as Daesh, ISIL or Islamic State). The military
campaign in Iraq and Syria is just one aspect of that broader strategy
which also includes measures to restrict the flow of foreign fighters,
stop foreign financing, provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq and Syria
and strategic communications (propaganda, public diplomacy and
psychological operations) intended to counter their ideology. 1
As Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, pointed out in the House on 20
July 2015:
Our strategy is… comprehensive and broader than simply military
action. It deals with the ideology and territory that is ISIL’s centre
of gravity, and which it is committed to expanding. The military
element is, however, essential. The coalition has so far helped halt
and hold ISIL after its rapid advance across Iraq last summer.
Coalition airpower, including sophisticated UK aircraft, flies daily
missions to strike ISIL targets and to gather intelligence. The air
campaign is helping to turn the tide and will support ground
forces ultimately to defeat ISIL. 2
A series of Library briefing papers examines the origins and rise of ISIS,
the international reaction to their sudden emergence on the world
stage, the initial humanitarian assistance operation and the subsequent
military response to events as they have unfolded over the last year:
•
•
•
ISIS/Daesh: one year on, July 2015
ISIS and the sectarian conflict in the Middle East, RP15/16, March
2015
Iraq, Syria and ISIS – recent developments, CBP06977, 25
September 2014
•
•
Military and humanitarian assistance to Iraq, CBP06960, 8
September 2014
UK arms transfers to the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan, 18 August
2014
•
•
•
Worsening humanitarian crisis in Syria and Iraq, CBP06926, 8 July
2014
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the takeover of Mosul,
CBP06915, 20 June 2014
Military options in Iraq, CBP06917, 16 June 2014
In conjunction with this paper the Library has also produced a second
series of briefing papers examining recent developments in Iraq and
Syria and the legal basis for extending the British air campaign into
Syria:
•
Iraq and Syria: Developments in 2015, CBP7261, 27 November
2015
•
Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, CBP7404, 1 December
2015
1
2
See US Department of State: the global coalition to counter ISIL. The British
government has suggested that there are 63 countries currently in the global
coalition.
HC Deb 20 July 2015, c1233
Number 06995, 15 December 2015
•
•
Seeking a negotiated solution in Syria, CBP7392, 18 November
2015
France and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union,
CBP7390, 18 November 2015
•
UK drone attack in Syria: legal questions, CBP7332, 20 October
2015
8
9
ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
2. What does the military
campaign entail and who are
the main players?
Summary
The United States has led airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq since 8 August 2014. Operations were
extended into Syria toward the end of September 2014.
With a view to building the capacity of local forces on the ground, offensive military action in
Iraq has so far been restricted to air operations in support of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces,
providing reconnaissance, surveillance and attack capabilities. Along with the US, the United
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Jordan, Canada and Denmark have all
conducted air strikes in Iraq, although Belgium and Denmark have recently withdrawn their
combat aircraft.
The first US- led airstrikes in Syria were assisted by aircraft from five Arab countries: Jordan,
the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, with Qatar in a supporting role. Since
then Turkey, Canada, France and Australia have joined the air campaign in Syria. The UK
initially restricted itself to conducting surveillance reconnaissance operations over Syria. The
UK began offensive operations in Syria on 3 December 2015 following a vote in Parliament. 3
The new Canadian government has announced its intention to end its combat mission in Iraq
and Syria, although the timetable for doing do is currently unclear. At the same time, and in
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, the French government
has increasingly called on its coalition partners to support the military campaign against ISIS.
The German Government approved plans in early December to deploy Tornado
reconnaissance aircraft, refuelling aircraft, a naval frigate and a 1,200 strong force to the
region, although those forces will not engage in offensive operations.
The other element of the campaign is the training of Iraqi and Kurdish security forces as a
means of enabling them to take responsibility for operations against ISIS on the ground.
The United States, the UK and a number of other coalition countries have also deployed
military personnel on the ground in Iraq to train Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. These are
not combat troops and are not deployed in an offensive role.
Until recently the US had a programme of training in place for moderate opposition forces in
Syria. However, that programme has been beset with difficulties and on 9 October the US
announced that it would pursue a new strategy with respect to supporting opposition forces
in Syria. The US has also announced that “less than 50” Special Forces personnel will deploy
on the ground in northern Syria to provide logistical and planning assistance to Kurdish and
other local forces in the fight against ISIS.
2.1 Air strikes
As of 9 December 2015 Coalition aircraft have flown an estimated
59,877 sorties in support of operations in Iraq and Syria. Of those,
3
“RAF conduct first air strikes in Syria”, Ministry of Defence, 3 December 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 10
8,783 were airstrikes (Iraq – 5,765 and Syria – 3,018), with
approximately 78% conducted by US aircraft. 4
According to US Department of Defense assessments, ISIS targets either
damaged or destroyed totalled 16,075 as of 13 November 2015. Those
assets included 129 tanks, 356 armoured vehicles, 4,942 fighting
positions and 260 elements of oil infrastructure. 5 In November 2015 the
British Government suggested that 30% of the territory that ISIS gained
in Iraq after its advance in the summer of 2014, has now been regained,
including the town of Sinjar, 6 thereby cutting the main line of
communication between Mosul and Raqqa, the two largest cities under
ISIS control. 7 However, in a speech on 14 December 2015 US President
Barack Obama suggested that that figure was nearer to 40%. Providing
a summary of the campaign thus far, he stated:
Every day, we destroy as well more of ISIL’s forces -- their fighting
positions, bunkers and staging areas; their heavy weapons, bombmaking factories, compounds and training camps. In many
places, ISIL has lost its freedom of maneuver, because they know
if they mass their forces, we will wipe them out. In fact, since the
summer, ISIL has not had a single successful major offensive
operation on the ground in either Syria or Iraq. In recent weeks,
we’ve unleashed a new wave of strikes on their lifeline, their oil
infrastructure, destroying hundreds of their tanker trucks, wells
and refineries. And we’re going to keep on hammering those.
ISIL also continues to lose territory in Iraq. ISIL had already lost
across Kirkuk province and at Tikrit. More recently, ISIL lost at
Sinjar, losing a strategic highway. ISIL lost at Baiji, with its oil
refinery.
So far, ISIL has lost about 40 percent of the populated areas it
once controlled in Iraq. And it will lose more. Iraqi forces are
now fighting their way deeper into Ramadi. They’re working to
encircle Fallujah and cut off ISIL supply routes into Mosul. Again,
these are urban areas where ISIL is entrenched. Our partners on
the ground face a very tough fight ahead, and we’re going to
continue to back them up with the support that they need to
ultimately clear ISIL from Iraq.
ISIL also continues to lose territory in Syria. We continue to step
up our air support and supplies to local forces -- Syrian Kurds,
Arabs, Christians, Turkmen -- and they’re having success. After
routing ISIL at Kobani and Tal Abyad, they’ve pushed ISIL back
from almost across the entire border region with Turkey, and
we’re working with Turkey to seal the rest. ISIL has lost
thousands of square miles of territory it once controlled in Syria -and it will lose more. The Special Forces that I ordered to Syria
have begun supporting local forces as they push south, cut off
supply lines and tighten the squeeze on Raqqa. 8
US Central Command provides updates on operations. Estimates
released by the Department of Defense on 15 November 2015 state
4
5
6
7
8
US Department of Defense, 9 December 2015
US Department of Defense, 29 September 2015
FCO press release, 13 November 2015
Statement on the US military strategy in the middle east before the House Armed
Services Committee, 1 December 2015
Remarks by the President on the military campaign to destroy ISIL, 14 December
2015
11 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
that the US has spent $5.2 billion, or an average of $11 million per day
on operations related to ISIS since August 2014. Airstrikes are estimated
to make up 51% of those costs, excluding munitions, which account for
a further 23% of costs. 9
Coalition partners conducting offensive operations
in Iraq and Syria
The countries currently conducting air strikes in both Iraq and Syria are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
United States
France
Australia
Jordan
Canada
United Kingdom
United States
US Air Force and Navy aircraft, including F-15, F/A-18 aircraft and MQ-1
Predator drones have been conducting air strikes in Iraq since 8 August
2014. Operations were expanded into Syria towards the end of
September 2014. US aircraft participating in those sorties have included
F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-2210 fighter aircraft and B-1 bombers. Tomahawk
missiles deployed aboard US naval vessels deployed in the Red Sea and
North Arabian Gulf were also utilised in the initial stage of offensive
operations in Syria. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
missions have continued using a mixture of manned and unmanned
systems.
Until mid-October 2015 the US also had a carrier strike group deployed
in the Gulf. The USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group is due to enter
theatre towards the end of the year in order to fill that gap. In the
intervening period the US has had to rely on US aircraft deployed
around the region. In mid-November a number of naval combat aircraft
(AV-8B Harriers), deployed as part of the USS Kearsarge Amphibious
Ready Group also began combat missions against ISIS targets. 11
At the beginning of October 2015 the US deployed aircraft and
personnel to Diyarbakir air base in Turkey to provide combat search and
rescue capabilities in support of both US and coalition forces operating
in Iraq and Syria. US aircraft, including F-15 and A-10 combat aircraft
have also recently been deployed to Incirlik air base in Turkey. Those
aircraft are conducting both counter-ISIS operations but will also
conduct combat air patrols in Turkish airspace.
France
France was the first country to join the US in air conducting airstrikes
against ISIS targets in Iraq. France initially deployed six fighter jets, an
Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft and a refueling plane at its base in
9
US Department of Defense, Weekly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Cost
Report, 15 October 2015
10
11
The F-22 conducted its first ever combat flight during attacks on ISIS forces in Syria
on 22 September 2014.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=92084
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 12
the United Arab Emirates as part of Operation Chammal. Operations
began on 19 September 2014. 12
Over the last year the complement of French fast jet aircraft has
increased, to include a mixture of Rafale and Mirage 2000 aircraft based
in UAE and Jordan. In February 2015 the French aircraft carrier Charles
de Gaulle was also deployed to the Gulf as part of the military campaign
against ISIS. The presence of the carrier was intended to reduce the time
taken to reach ISIS targets in Iraq by those fast jet aircraft based in UAE.
That carrier strike force was withdrawn in April 2015.
Initially reluctant to extend air operations into Syria, on 7 September
2015 the French President, Francois Hollande, announced that French
aircraft would begin reconnaissance flights over Syria, with a view to
informing a decision on launching air strikes at a later date. 13 The first
French airstrikes in Syria were conducted on 27 September 2015.
At the beginning of November, and prior to the terrorist attacks in Paris,
President Hollande announced that the carrier group would be redeployed to the eastern Mediterranean to participate in coalition
operations in both Iraq and Syria. The deployment of that carrier group
has tripled France’s strike capacity.
France now has deployed:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
One carrier group
One frigate
18 naval Rafale combat aircraft
6 land-based Rafale combat aircraft
3 Mirage 2000-D combat aircraft
3 Mirage 2000-N combat aircraft
8 Super Etendard carrier-borne strike aircraft
2 E2C Hawkeye aircraft
1 Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft.14
Since the terrorist attacks on 13 November France has intensified its air
operations against ISIS targets, particularly in Syria. In the immediate
aftermath of the terrorist attacks France conducted its largest air
offensive, to date, against targets in Raqqa. In a situation report
published on 26 November the French Ministry of Defense indicated
that in the preceding ten days French combat aircraft had conducted 20
airstrikes against ISIS positions in Syria. 15
Since the terrorist attacks in Paris the US and France have committed to
the greater sharing of information and details relating to operational
planning. At a meeting of EU leaders on 17 November 2015, France
also invoked Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union, which
obliges participating EU Member States to provide “aid and assistance
12
13
14
15
French Ministry of Defense, Operational Chammal
“Syria war: France to prepare for IS air strikes”, BBC News Online, 7 September
2015
Operation Chammal asset list, November 2015
French Ministry of Defense, 26 November 2015
13 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
by all the means in their power”. 16 At the end of November he French
Parliament voted overwhelmingly to extend airstrikes in Syria.
France has, however, continued to rule out providing combat troops on
the ground.
Australia
The Australian Government approved airstrikes in Iraq and the
deployment of Special Forces to ‘advise and assist’ Iraqi security forces
on 3 October 2014 (Operation Okra). Australia had already predeployed six F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft, KC-30A Multi Role
Tanker Transport and airborne early warning aircraft (E-7A Wedgetail)
to the region. Australian aircraft commenced armed air combat
operations on 5 October and carried out their first airstrike on 8 October
2014 against an ISIS facility in Iraq. 17
Following a request from the US government the Australian announced
in September 2015 that it would extend its operations into Syria. The
first airstrikes by Australian aircraft in the region took place on 14
September 2015. 18
Australia has a total of 480 military personnel deployed in the region in
support of operations: 400 assigned to the Air Task Group and 80
Special Forces. A further 300 personnel are assigned to the training
mission in Iraq (see below).
Jordan
Jordan participated in the initial airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria at
the end of September 2014.
Since February 2015, however, and after a Jordanian pilot was captured
by ISIS and burned alive, Jordan has significantly increased its role in the
air campaign over Syria. It has also extended its participation to
operations in Iraq.
Some commentators have questioned the sustainability of Jordan’s
participation given the size (39 aircraft) 19 and increasing age of its fast
jet fleet. Jordan has also not ruled out deploying ground troops,
although domestic support for Jordanian participation at any level is
reported to be minimal. 20
Canada
The Canadian Parliament approved a Government motion on 7 October
2014 to contribute Canadian military assets to the anti-ISIS coalition for
a period of up to six months (Operation Impact). Canada subsequently
deployed six CF-18 Hornets (fighter-bombers), two CP-140 surveillance
aircraft, one aerial tanker and 600 personnel. Aircraft were based in
16
17
18
19
20
The implications of invoking Article 42(7) are examined in greater detail in Library
briefing paper CBP7390, 18 November 2015
Australian Department of Defence
“Australia launches first airstrikes inside Syria”, BBC News Online, 16 September
2015
IISS, Military Balance 2015
http://www.npr.org/2015/01/28/382218309/jordan-tests-coalition-against-isis-withoffer-to-negotiate
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 14
Kuwait and began offensive operations on 30 October 2014. 26 Special
Forces were also deployed in northern Iraq.
In March 2015 the Canadian government announced its decision to
extend and expand Canada’s role in the operation. On 31 March the
Canadian Parliament voted by 149 to 129 in favour of extending the
mission for a further year, and expanding it to include airstrikes in Syria.
Announcing the decision then Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, stated:
We cannot stand on the sidelines while ISIL continues to
promote terrorism in Canada as well as against our allies and
partners, nor can we allow ISIL to have a safe haven in Syria. 21
Canadian aircraft conducted their first strike sorties against ISIS targets
in Syria on 8 April 2015.
However, Canada’s newly elected Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, has
stated that Canada will end its combat mission in both Iraq and Syria.
Initial indications were that Canada would instead focus its contribution
upon military and police training. On 13 December the Canadian
Foreign Minister also acknowledged that coalition allies had asked for
Canada’s reconnaissance and refuelling aircraft to be retained in
theatre. To date the Government has not fully set out its intentions and
any timetable for withdrawal is not yet clear. The Canadian Parliament
has called upon the Government to allow the issue to be debated and
voted upon in the Canadian House of Commons before any such action
is taken.
Mission reports have been published on the Canadian Ministry of
Defence’s website as recently as 12 December 2015.
UK
The UK has been conducting airstrikes in Iraq since the end of
September 2014 and in October 2014 the Ministry of Defence
authorised the conduct of UK surveillance missions over Syria.
A further parliamentary vote on extending offensive military action into
Syria was held on 2 December 2015. Subsequent parliamentary
approval saw RAF Tornado aircraft conduct the first offensive combat
mission in Syria on 3 December 2015.
The UK’s military contribution is detailed separately in Section 5 of this
note: British military participation.
Operations in Iraq
In addition to the countries outlined above the Netherlands, Belgium
and Denmark have also conducted airstrikes in Iraq. However, both
Belgium and Denmark have since withdrawn their combat aircraft.
The Netherlands
On 2 October 2014 Parliament approved plans to deploy six F-16
aircraft, plus 2 reserve aircraft, 250 support staff and 130 officials to
train local soldiers. The deployment was initially for one year. F-16s from
21
“Parliament votes to widen Canada’s mission against ISIS”, National Post, 31 March
2015
15 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
the Netherlands conducted their first active bombing on ISIS targets on
7 October. 22
In June 2015 the Dutch government announced that the military
mission in Iraq would be extended until October 2016.
The Netherlands is currently under pressure to expand its military
operation into Syria, following requests from both France and the US to
join US-led airstrikes in the country. Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte,
has indicated that a decision will be taken in early 2016. Initially the
government had stated that it would not conduct airstrikes in Syria
without a UN mandate. 23
Denmark
On 26 September 2014 the Danish government announced the
deployment of seven F-16 combat aircraft (four operational and three
reserve), a C-130J transport aircraft, 12 soldiers and 40 support staff to
support the effort against ISIS in Iraq for a 12 month period. Troops
were based in Kuwait. 24 Danish aircraft conducted their first sorties on
16 October but did not expend any munitions. The first airstrikes by
Danish aircraft were conducted on 20 October 2014.
On 2 October 2015 Danish combat aircraft were withdrawn for a period
of planned maintenance, although Denmark continues to provide a
‘capacity building’ contribution in Iraq with up to 120 soldiers, in
addition to 20 staff officers deployed with Coalition headquarters.
Toward the end of September the Danish government said that it would
seek Parliamentary approval for the deployment of a mobile groundbased radar, along with technical and operational support personnel, in
order to supplement its military contribution to the fight against ISIS.
The Danish Foreign Ministry confirmed that the proposed deployment is
in response to a specific need for greater surveillance and control of
Iraqi and Syrian airspace that the Coalition has identified. 25 The radar
will not, however, be used to identify ground targets. That deployment
was approved by the Danish Parliament on 10 November 2015.
It has also been suggested that the Danish air contingent could be redeployed in 2016.
Belgium
On 26 September Belgium’s Parliament approved the deployment of six
F-16 fighter aircraft, 120 personnel and a number of C-130 transport
aircraft. Belgium aircraft conducted their first airstrikes on 6 October
2014. 26 They were based in Jordan. Those aircraft were withdrawn on 2
July 2015. 27
22
23
24
25
26
27
“Dutch F-16s in action for first time”, Dutch News, 9 October 2014
“PM Rutte: Dutch to decide by January on Syria airstrikes”, Defense News, 11
December 2015
The Danish Parliament approved the deployment on 2 October 2014
. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 24 September 2015
“Belgium F-16 launches first strike in Iraq”, AFP, 6 October 2014
Dutch Ministry of Defence, 3 July 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 16
Operations in Syria
The first US- led airstrikes in Syria were assisted by aircraft from five
Arab countries: Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia, with Qatar in a supporting role. 28
Initial details on the exact nature of their participation were minimal,
with many analysts describing it as ‘largely symbolic’. Among the
partner nations Saudi and UAE F-16 fast jet aircraft were understood to
have undertaken the majority of strike missions in the first few days of
operations. 29
However, participation in airstrikes by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia is now
thought to be minimal. In a statement to the House Armed Services
Committee on 1 December 2015 the US Defense Secretary suggested
that “Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states joined the air campaign in the
early days, but have since been pre-occupied by the conflict in
Yemen”. 30
Since then Turkey, Canada, France, Australia and the UK have joined
the air campaign in Syria. The UK has also been conducting surveillance
reconnaissance operations over Syria.
The contributions of the US, France, Australia, Jordan and Canada are
outlined above. The UK’s contribution is outline in section 5 below.
United Arab Emirates
In December 2014 UAE suspended its participation in the coalition after
expressing concerns over the coalition’s combat search and rescue
capabilities following the downing and capture of a Jordanian pilot.
However, following his execution by ISIS in February 2015 UAE
announced its intention to re-deploy a squadron of F-16 aircraft to
Jordan to assist coalition efforts. It is unclear however whether that
squadron was re-deployed or indeed, how active they have been.
Turkey
On 24 August 2015 the US and Turkey signed an accord allowing US
aircraft to launch air strikes against ISIS from Incirlik air force base. 31 On
29 August Turkey formally joined the coalition in conducting air strikes
against ISIS targets in Syria. Prior to this Turkey’s role had been limited,
focusing instead on its campaign against Kurdish PKK separatists.
2.2 Other military contributions
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015
the French Government has been calling on its allies and partners in the
broader coalition against ISIS to do more to support the military
campaign. Specifically France has invoked Article 42(7) of the Treaty on
the European Union which obliges participating EU Member States to
28
29
30
31
Qatar participated in initial offensive operations but has since ceased its involvement.
“US, Arab allies take out IS oil refineries”, Jane’s Defence weekly, 26 September
2014
Statement on the US military strategy in the middle east before the House Armed
Services Committee, 1 December 2015
US air force assets had been conducting unarmed surveillance operations from
Incirlik prior to this date.
17 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
provide “aid and assistance” by all means in their power. At that
meeting of EU Defence Ministers all States expressed their unanimous
support for French efforts to defeat ISIS and several countries have
indicated their willingness to do more.
Germany
On 4 December 2015, the German Parliament approved plans 32 to
deploy 6 Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, a naval frigate which will
deploy as part of the Charles de Gaulle carrier group, refuelling aircraft
and up to 1,200 military personnel. However, those aircraft and
personnel will not engage in offensive operations but will provide
logistical and intelligence support to other countries. 33
The Netherlands
As outlined above, the Dutch government is expected to make a
decision on expanding its military action into Syria in early 2016.
Spain
The Spanish government have thus far ruled out participating in
airstrikes the Spanish Interior Minister Jorge Fernández Díaz pledged
support in the fight against ISIS in a recent interview with Telecinco on
17 November. Thousands of Spanish citizens took to the streets over the
weekend of 28/29 November on the Government not to back military
participation for fear of reprisals.
It has been suggested that the Government’s current stance is being
heavily influenced by the forthcoming general election on 20 December
2015 with lawmakers unwilling to adopt policies which may be
domestically unpopular. 34
Italy
The Italian government has also pledged support for France in the fight
against ISIS but it is unclear, as yet, whether that involves any military
commitment. On 26 November Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi,
suggested that addressing ISIS in Libya was Italy’s priority. 35 In early
December the Italian government announced that it would increase its
training contingent in Iraq (see below).
Norway
The US has reportedly made a formal request to Norway to step up its
military contribution, beyond the military training that it is currently
conducting in Iraq (see below). To date the Norwegian government has
not responded to that request, although it is thought to be under
consideration. 36
By 445 to 146 votes.
“Germany joins fight against ISIL after parliament approves military action in Syria”,
The Telegraph, 4 December 2015
34
“France steps up pressure on Spain to support global fight against ISIS”, El Pais, 25
November 2015
35
“Libya a priority in ISIS fight”, The Local, 26 November 2015
36
“US asks Norway to step up fight against Islamic State”, Norway News, 9 December
2015
32
33
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 18
Greece
The Greek government has ruled out participating militarily, instead
focusing its efforts on addressing the current refugee crisis.
2.3 Training and logistical support to local
forces
Training in Iraq
In November 2014 a number of coalition countries announced a
package of training and support for Iraqi security, and local, forces in
order to assist them in countering ISIS forces and re-taking territory that
had fallen under ISIS control. The training programme is being led by
the United States and involves a number of other countries, including
the UK.
Concern over the success of the coalition training programme has been
rife however. On 8 June 2015 the US President acknowledged that the
US “lacks a complete strategy” for training Iraqi security forces, and
that a review of how the coalition can further assist Iraq in training and
equipping its security forces was now underway. 37 However, he also
suggested that more also needed to be done by the Iraqi government to
facilitate the training programme, which was reportedly being
hampered by a lack of recruits and the poor ability of the Iraqi army to
absorb the training being offered. 38
In total, 12 Iraqi brigades are expected to be trained: nine from the Iraqi
security forces and three from the Kurdish Peshmerga. Military training
is currently taking place at four training sites at Al-Asad, Irbil, Besmaya
and Taji. Training of Iraqi army recruits began at the end of December
2014 and, to date, over 11,000 Iraqi troops have been trained. A
further 3,000 troops are currently in training. 39
Contributions
The main contributing nations are:
•
United States – On 7 November 2014 the Department of
Defense confirmed the deployment of 1,500 additional military
personnel to Iraq, in a non-combat role. Their objective was to
expand the US “advise and assist” mission already in place in Iraq
(comprising approximately 1,400 US military personnel) 40 and to
initiate a more comprehensive training package for Iraqi forces.
On 10 June 2015 the US announced the deployment of a further
450 US military personnel to train, advise and assist Iraqi security
forces at Taqaddum military base in eastern Anbar province. These
37
38
39
40
See “”Obama: we want to get more Iraqi security forces trained”, BBC News, 8 June
2015
“US weighs deploying hundreds more troops to train Iraqi forces against ISIS”, The
Guardian, 9 June 2015
HC Deb 20 July 2015, c1233 and White House press release, 10 June 2015
The “advise and assist” mission provides operational advice to Iraqi brigades and
divisions and also staffs Joint Operations Centres in Iraq and Irbil which are designed
to share intelligence among US, Iraqi and Kurdish forces. More recently they have
also been used to co-ordinate air strikes.
19 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
additional personnel will not be deployed in a combat role and
will augment the 3,000 military personnel already deployed in
Iraq. The intention is to focus on improving and refining military
functions such as logistics, intelligence gathering, force protection
and operational planning, thereby complementing the four
existing training sites. 41
•
UK – (see British military participation below).
•
Denmark – Is providing 120 military trainers as part of the
additional support packages announced at the beginning of
November 2014. 42
•
Italy – An Italian contingent of approximately 280 military
personnel has been helping train Kurdish forces near Irbil. In
March 2015 the government also announced that a small team of
security specialists would begin training Iraqi police forces, with a
focus on those towns and cities that had been recaptured from
ISIS. In early December 2015 the Italian government announced
that it would increase its training contingent to almost 750
personnel.
•
Australia – In March 2015 the government announced the
deployment of 300 personnel as part of a joint training mission
with New Zealand. 110 personnel are deployed as part of the
New Zealand contingent. Troops are based at the Taji military
complex northwest of Baghdad. The mission became fully
operational in May 2015 and is expected to last for two years.
•
France – Has provided military equipment to Kurdish fighters and
approximately 40 military advisers to train them.
•
Canada – since October 2014 Canada has deployed 69 Special
Forces’ personnel to train Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in northern
Iraq. Recently the Government has suggested that it may expand
its training contingent while at the same time withdrawing its
combat aircraft. Any timetable for doing so is currently unclear.
•
Spain – Has 300 military personnel deployed as part of the
training effort. The Spanish government has made clear that it will
not commit ground forces and it will not take part in any
operations in Syria.
•
Norway – Approximately 50 military personnel are training
Kurdish forces in the north of the country. A small number of
instructors are also reported to have been deployed to Baghdad in
an advisory capacity.
•
The Netherlands – Has deployed 130 officials to train local
soldiers. The deployment is for one year.
41
42
Department of Defense, “Iraq troop increase part of broader Coalition strategy”, 12
June 2015
Department of Defense briefing, 7 November 2014
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 20
•
Germany - since 2014 Germany has been providing arms to
Kurdish fighters, along with 40 soldiers to train them. 43
Support to Syrian opposition forces
Training
In 2014 a $500 million US-led programme was put in place to train
moderate Syrian opposition forces. 44
This programme aimed to train and equip thousands (approximately 35,000 per year) of screened members of the opposition over the next
three years at a number of regional training centres outside of Syria.
Trained forces would initially focus on defending Syrian communities,
specifically against ISIS, but would subsequently go on the offensive
against ISIS. The intention was that, in the longer term, they would also
help to promote the conditions for a political settlement to the conflict
in Syria. 45 Specifically the training programme would focus on a “range
of critical combat skills including marksmanship, casualty care, land
navigation, communications, leadership, the law of armed conflict and
human rights principles”. 46
For operational security and force protection reasons the Pentagon
refused to provide specific details on the location of training, and the
size and length of courses. However, US officials revealed that the first
training course began in Jordan on 7 May 2015. 47 A second training
course was understood to have been launched in Turkey at the end of
May. 48 Future training courses were also expected to be launched in
Saudi and Qatar.
At the time the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
Dempsey, cautioned that recruiting, vetting and training enough
fighters to form a new moderate Syrian opposition force is “going to be
a challenge and may take longer than we think”.
Indeed, as of the beginning of July 2015, the programme was reported
to have only processed 60 people. 49 By mid-September General Lloyd
Austin, Head of US Central Command, acknowledged that only “four or
five” Syrian fighters remained from the US train and equip
programme. 50 It has been widely reported that a large number of initial
Syrian recruits had to be disqualified during the vetting process either
for health or age reasons, or because of suspected links to extremist
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
“Steinmeier: ‘no question’ of airstrikes against IS”, DW, 22 September 2014
This training programme is separate from a previous US-led training programme
based in Jordan in 2013. See “West training Syrian rebels in Jordan”, The Guardian,
8 March 2013
Iraq update and training the Syrian moderate opposition: written statement
HCWS501, 26 March 2015
US Central Command press release, 7 May 2015
“US begins training Syrian rebels in Jordan to become anti-ISIS force”, New York
Times, 7 May 2015
“US training of Syria rebel fighters expands to Turkey: source”, Reuters, 28 May
2015
“US admits it has trained only 60 Syrians to fight ISIL”, Al Jazeera, 8 July 2015
“US Syiran rebel training fields only ‘4 or 5’ fighters”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23
September 2015
21 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
groups. 51 According to US media reports many of the initial graduates
of the programme had also been attacked and had turned over their
equipment to the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliated group. 52
The UK had contributed 75 military personnel to the initial training
programme (see British military participation below).
Change of US Strategy
Given the extent of the difficulties faced by the “train and equip”
programme since its inception, the Department of Defense announced
on 9 October 2015 that it would pursue a new strategy with respect to
supporting opposition forces in Syria. Instead of recruiting for a training
programme based in neighbouring countries, the focus will now be on
“equipping and enabling” selected groups of vetted leaders and their
units so that over time they can make a concerted push into territory
still controlled by ISIL”. The US will provide equipment packages and
weapons, and provide air support as and when necessary. Information
on the identity of recipient groups has so far been limited, although the
Syrian Arab coalition has been named as one such recipient. 53
The intention is to make it easier to provide military supplies or airstrikes
in support of specific opposition groups as they take the fight to ISIS.
However, in order to address concerns over the flow of US weapons
into Syria, and the potential for them to end up in the hands of
extremist groups, the Pentagon has stated that weaponry will be “more
basic”. 54 It has also confirmed that it will:
continue to evaluate this program and… make refinements and
adjustments over time as appropriate. As we have said from the
beginning, the fight against ISIL will take time. Working with local
partners to win back territory taken by ISIL will continue to be a
long and arduous process. 55
Support to local forces on the ground
On 30 October 2015 the US administration announced that “less than
50” US Special Forces’ personnel would deploy to Kurdish-controlled
territory in northern Syria in order to provide logistical and planning
assistance to Kurdish and other local forces in their fight against ISIS.
The deployment has been described as part of the longer term strategy
of building the capacity of local forces on the ground and the US
Government has sought to emphasise that these personnel will not have
a combat role.
However, the lack of a coherent strategy for Syria has once again been
questioned. Responding to the announcement the Speaker of the US
House of Representatives, Paul Ryan said that he hoped this latest
51
52
53
54
55
“US faces challenges in building up Syrian training program”, The Washington Post,
3 June 2015
See “US revamping rebel force fighting ISIS in Syria”, New York Times, 6 September
2015; “After setbacks, US military looks for ways to recalibrate new Syrian force”,
the Washington Post, 12 August 2015
Statement on the US military strategy in the Middle East and the counter-ISIL
campaign, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 October 2015
“DoD lowers vetting standards for Syrian rebel training program”, The Military
Times, 9 October 2015
US Department of Defense, Statement on Syria, 9 October 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 22
deployment would be the start of a strategy for US involvement in the
Syrian conflict.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry,
acknowledged that "A more serious effort against ISIS in Syria is long
overdue," although he also questioned whether this deployment goes
far enough; a view shared by Senator John McCain. 56
Critics have regarded it, however, as the “first boots on the ground”
and a significant escalation of US military involvement in Syria.
Indeed, on 2 December the US administration announced that an
Expeditionary Targeting Force of approximately 100 Special Forces
personnel would additionally deploy on the ground in Iraq. Those
personnel will assist Iraqi and Kurdish partners, including by launching
raids against ISIS targets in Syria, gathering intelligence, rescuing
hostages and capturing high-value ISIS leaders.
56
“Lawmakers rap Obama on Syria escalation”, Defense News, 30 October 2015
23 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
3. Duration of the mission
David Cameron warned Members of Parliament during the debate in
September 2014 that “we should not expect this to happen quickly. The
hallmarks of this campaign will be patience and persistence, not shock
and awe.” 57 On 16 July 2015 the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon,
reiterated:
In military terms, we have always recognised that the campaign
would be a long one. 58
The US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey,
told Senators in mid-September “this won't look like a shock-and-awe
campaign, because that's simply not how ISIS is organized, but it will be
a persistent and sustainable campaign."59
The then Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott also warned “this
deployment in Iraq could be quite lengthy”, when he announced
cabinet approval for airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq on 3 October 2014. He
added “certainly months rather than weeks. I want to reassure the
Australian people that it will be as long as it needs to be but as short as
it possibly can be.” He added the measure of success would be “when
ISIS are in retreat, not in advance. We will know that we are succeeding
when the Iraqi government is restoring a modicum of control over its
own cities and towns.” 60
In October 2015 the Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, suggested that
a three-year timeframe was the current expectation of military
commanders. He commented:
We always said, at the beginning of the intervention last summer
that it would probably take three years to defeat ISIL militarily. I
spoke to General John Allen, the US President’s special envoy on
this subject, just a few weeks ago. His view is that that remains
correct, and we still have another two years to go to a military
solution in Iraq. 61
Speaking at the beginning of the debate on expanding military
operations into Syria on 2 December 2015, the Prime Minister reiterated
the long term nature of operations against ISIS. He stated:
The argument was made to us by the Iraqi Government that the
presence of western ground troops can be a radicalising force and
can be counterproductive, and that is our view. I would say to the
hon. Gentleman, and to colleagues behind me who are concerned
about this issue, that I accept that this means that our strategy
takes longer to be successful, because we rely on Iraqi ground
troops in Iraq, we rely on the patchwork of Free Syrian Army
troops in Syria, and in time we hope for Syrian ground troops
from a transitional regime. All of that takes longer, and one of the
clear messages that has to come across today is that, yes, we do
57
58
59
60
61
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1264
HC Deb 16 July 2015, c32WS
“U.S. says won't unleash 'shock and awe' air campaign in Syria”, Reuters, 16
September 2014
“Cabinet approves Australian airstrikes in Iraq”, The Australian, 3 October 2014
HC Deb 20 October 2015, c812
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 24
have a strategy, and although it is a complex picture and it will
take time, we are acting in the right way. 62
62
HC Deb 2 December 2015, c327
25 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
4. Legal basis
Iraq
Military action in Iraq is being conducted at the request of the Iraqi
government, which coalition partners consider provides a firm legal
basis for operations.
A summary of the British Government’s legal position on military action
against ISIS in Iraq states:
International law is clear that the use of force in international
relations is prohibited, subject to limited exceptions.
However, international law is equally clear that this prohibition
does not apply to the use of military force by one State on the
territory of another if the territorial State so requests or consents.
It is clear in this case that Iraq has consented to the use of military
force to defend itself against ISIL in Iraq […]
[In September 2014] the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq sought
additional international support and assistance for the specific
purpose of fighting ISIL. Setting out the background of the threat
posed by ISIL, its gratitude for international help provided so far
and the need to respect Iraqi sovereignty, Iraq made a request for
further military action in the following terms:
It is for these reasons that we, in accordance with
international law and the relevant bilateral and
multilateral agreements, and with due regard for
complete national sovereignty and the Constitution,
have requested the United States of America to lead
international efforts to strike ISIL sites and military
strongholds, with our express consent. The aim of
such strikes is to end the constant threat to Iraq,
protect Iraq’s citizens and, ultimately, arm Iraqi forces
and enable them to regain control of Iraq’s borders.
The government is satisfied that the consent of Iraq in these terms
provides a clear and unequivocal legal basis for the deployment of
UK forces and military assets to take military action to strike ISIL
sites and military strongholds in Iraq.
Syria
The reluctance of many coalition partners to intervene in Syria has partly
been because of concerns over the legality of such military action, given
that it is not at the request of the Assad government, 63 and is being
conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution specifically
authorising such action.
The Government’s November 2015 response to the Foreign Affairs
Committee report on extending British military action to Syria says that
the main legal basis for UK military action in Syria is collective selfdefence of Iraq, with the individual self-defence of the UK and collective
self-defence of other states (but not Security Council authorisation) as
additional legal bases.
63
Although President Assad has said that he is willing to cooperate with the US in the
fight against terrorism in Syria, (‘Syria's President Speaks: A Conversation With
Bashar al-Assad’, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2015)
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 26
It is on this premise that the Government presented its proposals to
Parliament on expanding British airstrikes into Syria.
Library Briefing Paper CBP7404, Legal basis for UK military action in
Syria, 1 December 2015 examines these issues in greater detail.
27 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
5. British military participation
Summary
In September 2014 Parliament voted to support offensive military action in Iraq. However, that
vote did not extend to offensive operations in Syria. In July 2015 the Secretary of State for
Defence indicated that the Government could seek further approval from Parliament to extend
air strikes into Syria provided that “there is a sufficient consensus behind it”. A debate, and
vote, on extending offensive military action against ISIS in Syria was subsequently held on 2
December 2015. Parliament voted in support of military action exclusively against ISIS in Syria
by 397 to 223 votes.
Since September 2014 RAF Tornado GR4 and the Reaper remotely piloted air system (RPAS)
have conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq. The UK has been the second largest contributor
to the coalition air campaign, conducting more than 1,600 missions over Iraq, including over
380 airstrikes. The government has suggested that the UK has carried out 8% of coalition
airstrikes in Iraq; that nearly 60% of the intelligence gathered in Iraq is provided by British
Tornado aircraft; and that Reaper and Airseeker aircraft, which have been authorised to fly
surveillance missions over Syria since October 2014, are providing up to 30% of the
intelligence effort in that country.
In early December 2015 two additional Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft were
deployed to the region following the expansion of military action into Syria. The UK now has
16 fast jet combat aircraft deployed on Iraq/Syria operations.
Since November 2014 the UK has been providing training and military advice to the Iraqi
security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga. In early June 2015 the Government announced
that a further 125 British military personnel would deploy to Iraq in order to bolster that
training mission.
Approximately 850 British military personnel are involved in operations against ISIS. Around
two thirds of those personnel are deployed in the region in support of the air campaign; while
the remaining personnel are on the ground in Iraq providing training and military advice.
Those personnel on the ground are not combat troops.
5.1 Parliamentary approval
Iraq
Parliament voted in favour participating in air strikes against ISIS targets
in Iraq in September 2014. The motion recognised the request from the
Government of Iraq for military support, noted the broad coalition
contributing to military support including countries throughout the
Middle East, noted the legal basis for action in Iraq and endorsed UK air
strikes against ISIS in Iraq.
The motion explicitly ruled out deploying UK troops in ground combat
operations and did not endorse UK air strikes in Syria, which the
Government indicated would be subject to a separate vote in
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 28
Parliament, should it become necessary. 64 The House of Commons
voted 524 to 43 in favour of the Government’s motion.
The Prime Minister told the House “we want to see ISIS degraded and
then destroyed as a serious terrorist force.”65
It is worth making the distinction between the vote in September 2014
and the vote on Syria in August 2013 which was on the principle of
taking military action against the Assad regime for the alleged use of
chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. 66 The August 2013 vote was
not taken specifically in relation to ISIS. Michael Fallon reiterated this
point during debate in the House on 20 July 2015:
The debate in August 2013 was on a motion that would have
authorised the Government to take action against the Assad
regime and its potential use of chemical weapons. It was not a
debate about ISIL. It is since August 2013 that we have seen the
rise of ISIL and its capture of a huge swathe of Syrian and Iraqi
territory. We have seen terrorist outrages, promoted by ISIL, in
western Europe and on our own streets. We have now had 30 of
our citizens murdered in an attack inspired by ISIL. All those things
have happened since that debate on a different issue—chemical
weapons in Syria—in the previous Parliament. 67
Syria
The nature of the problem in Syria has changed dramatically in the last
two years, particularly after the fall of Mosul in Iraq to ISIS and
widespread pledges of allegiance to ISIS across the Middle East, North
Africa and elsewhere.
Following the ISIS-linked terrorist attacks in Tunisia at the end of June
2015, which killed 30 British nationals the Prime Minister, speaking on
the Today programme, called for “a full spectrum response” to ISIS in
both Iraq and Syria. 68
During a debate in the House on 2 July 2015 the Defence Secretary
subsequently indicated that the Government could seek further
approval from Parliament to extend air strikes into Syria provided that
“there is a sufficient consensus behind it”. 69
The Foreign Affairs Committee examined the possibility of expanding
airstrikes to Syria in its 3 November 2015 report. The Committee
concluded that, while defeating ISIS is a key national interest for the UK,
“there should be no extension of British military action into Syria unless
there is a coherent international strategy that has a realistic chance of
defeating ISIL and of ending the civil war in Syria”. Specifically the
report set out a number of questions that the committee thought
should be answered before Parliament could support UK military action
in Syria. 70
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
House of Commons Order of Business, 26 September 2014
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1264
That motion was defeated on division by a vote of 272 to 285 (Division No.70,
2013-14 Session)
HC Deb 20 July 2015, c1247
Today programme, 29 June 2015
HC Deb 2 July 2015, c1672
The extension of offensive British military operations to Syria, House of Commons
29 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015
pressure for greater UK and international action in defeating ISIS
increased. On 20 November, the UN Security Council passed a
resolution calling for states to take ‘all necessary measures’ against
ISIS. 71 The resolution, a compromise between differing positions from
Security Council members, was ambiguous, in that it was not taken
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the mandatory action provision,
and, although it used the UN code for military action (‘all necessary
measures’) it did not use the word ‘authorise’. 72
On 26 November, the Prime Minister made a statement to the House of
Commons in which he set out the government’s arguments for
extending military action to Syria and its answers to the questions in the
select committee’s report. 73 A memorandum to the Foreign Affairs
Committee was also released. 74
New Labour Leader, Jeremy Corbyn, is a longstanding opponent of
military involvement in Iraq and Syria and more recently, at the 2015
Labour Party Conference, called for a UN Security Council resolution
and a fresh diplomatic push to resolve the conflict in Syria. 75 After the
debate on 26 November he also sent a letter to Labour MPs saying that
he was not convinced of the case for extending action to Syria. 76
In contrast it had been reported that up to half of the Shadow cabinet
would support airstrikes, with suggestions that a number of the shadow
frontbench would resign if forced to vote with the Labour leadership. 77
Indeed, following a meeting with the Shadow Cabinet on 30 November
it was subsequently announced that Labour MPs would be allowed a
free vote on the issue.
Parliament subsequently voted in favour of airstrikes against ISIS targets
in Syria on 2 December 2015. The eleven-point motion explicitly ruled
out the deployment of UK troops in ground combat operations, pledged
to provide quarterly progress reports to Parliament, and approve military
action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against ISIS in Syria:
That this House notes that ISIL poses a direct threat to the United
Kingdom; welcomes United Nations Security Council Resolution
2249 which determines that ISIL constitutes an ‘unprecedented
threat to international peace and security’ and calls on states to
take ‘all necessary measures’ to prevent terrorist acts by ISIL and
to ‘eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant
parts of Iraq and Syria’; further notes the clear legal basis to
defend the UK and our allies in accordance with the UN Charter;
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
Foreign Affairs Committee Second Report, HC 457, 2015–16
Security Council resolution 2249 (2015), 20 November 2015
For more on the legal implications of the November resolution, see the Commons
Briefing Paper 7404, Legal basis for UK military action in Syria, 1 December 2015
HC Deb 26 November 2015, cc1489-1537
Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee: Prime Minister’s Response to
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session 2015-16: The
Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria, November 2015
Speech by Jeremy Corbyn to the Labour Party Annual Conference, 2015
‘Jeremy Corbyn 'cannot support UK air strikes in Syria', BBC News Online, 26
November 2015
“Corbyn under pressure to reconsider Labour’s policy on Syria airstrikes”, The
Guardian, 20 September 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 30
notes that military action against ISIL is only one component of a
broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria; welcomes
the renewed impetus behind the Vienna talks on a ceasefire and
political settlement; welcomes the Government’s continuing
commitment to providing humanitarian support to Syrian
refugees; underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict
stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria; welcomes the
Government’s continued determination to cut ISIL’s sources of
finance, fighters and weapons; notes the requests from France,
the US and regional allies for UK military assistance; acknowledges
the importance of seeking to avoid civilian casualties, using the
UK’s particular capabilities; notes the Government will not deploy
UK troops in ground combat operations; welcomes the
Government’s commitment to provide quarterly progress reports
to the House; and accordingly supports Her Majesty’s Government
in taking military action, specifically airstrikes, exclusively against
ISIL in Syria; and offers its wholehearted support to Her Majesty’s
Armed Forces. 78
The House of Commons voted 397 to 223 in favour of the
Government’s motion. 79
An amendment tabled by John Baron that would prevent military action
in Syria was rejected by 390 votes to 211.
Opening the debate, the Prime Minister said:
In moving this motion, I am not pretending that the answers are
simple. The situation in Syria is incredibly complex. I am not
overstating the contribution our incredible servicemen and
women can make; nor am I ignoring the risks of military action or
pretending that military action is any more than one part of the
answer. I am absolutely clear that we must pursue a
comprehensive strategy that also includes political, diplomatic and
humanitarian action, and I know that the long-term solution in
Syria—as in Iraq—must ultimately be a Government that
represents all of its people and one that can work with us to
defeat the evil organisation of ISIL for good.
[…]
Notwithstanding all of that, there is a simple question at the heart
of the debate today. We face a fundamental threat to our
security…The question is this: do we work with our allies to
degrade and destroy this threat, and do we go after these
terrorists in their heartlands, from where they are plotting to kill
British people, or do we sit back and wait for them to attack us? 80
He concluded:
Let us be clear: inaction does not amount to a strategy for our
security or that of the Syrian people, but inaction is a choice. I
believe that it is the wrong choice. We face a clear threat. We
have listened to our allies. We have taken legal advice. We have a
unanimous United Nations resolution. We have discussed our
78
79
80
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323
The motion also noted UNSCR 2249 and noted the legal basis for action; that
military action is one part of a broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria;
noted the Vienna talks, humanitarian support for Syrian refugees; planning for postconflict stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria; and noted the requests from France,
the US and regional allies for UK military assistance. HC Deb 2 December 2015
c323-494
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323
31 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
proposed actions extensively at meetings of the National Security
Council and the Cabinet. I have responded personally to the
detailed report of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We have a
proper motion before the House and we are having a 10 and a
half hour debate today. 81
Jeremy Corbyn, the Leader of the Opposition, spoke against the motion:
For all Members, taking a decision that will put British servicemen
and women in harm’s way, and almost inevitably lead to the
deaths of innocents, is a heavy responsibility. It must be treated
with the utmost seriousness, with respect given to those who
make a different judgment about the right course of action to
take. 82
He continued:
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Prime Minister
understands that public opinion is moving increasingly against
what I believe to be an ill-thought-out rush to war. He wants to
hold this vote before opinion against it grows even further.
Whether it is a lack of strategy worth the name, the absence of
credible ground troops, the missing diplomatic plan for a Syrian
settlement, the failure to address the impact of the terrorist threat
or the refugee crisis and civilian casualties, it is becoming
increasingly clear that the Prime Minister’s proposals for military
action simply do not stack up. 83
Angus Robertson, the SNP’s Westminster leader, explained why the SNP
would vote against the motion:
I appeal to colleagues on all sides to make sure that we do not
ignore the lessons of Afghanistan, ignore the lessons of Iraq,
ignore the lessons of Libya. Let's not repeat the mistakes of the
past, let's not give the green light to military action without a
comprehensive and credible plan to win the peace. 84
Nigel Dodds, the DUP’s Westminster Leader, explained why the DUP
was supporting the Government:
Terrorism must be fought, and fought with all means realistically
at our disposal. We have not sought this conflict; terrorists have
inflicted it on us, and we must now respond. 85
Tim Farron, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, voted in favour of the
motion. Explaining that while his instincts are always to be anti-war and
anti-conflict, this has been one of the toughest decisions he has had to
take in his Parliamentary career, adding:
If we had just been asked to bomb Syria, I would be voting
no…This is not, however, a case of just bombing; this is standing
with the United Nations and the international community to do
what is right by people who are the most beleaguered of all. 86
Crispin Blunt, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, voted
with the Government. Looking back to Iraq, he said “I am satisfied that
our military effort in Iraq over the past year has been to the enormous
81
82
83
84
85
86
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c339
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c340
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c341
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c357
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c378
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c381
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 32
credit of our armed forces and has stabilised Iraq in the face of a rapidly
advancing threat from ISIL. It wholly justified the strong majority that
this House then gave for that intervention.” 87 He continued:
Whether we like it or not, the reality is that ISIL is at war with us...
This is not about a threat to the citizens of a country from their
own Government, but about people at war with us, our values
and our society. This is not a war of choice. I have not spoken to
anyone who demurs from the proposition that ISIL must be
denied the territory that it currently controls. Although the defeat
of ISIL and its ideology will be the work of many years, even
decades, the retaking of that territory is an urgent and immediate
requirement. 88
Julian Lewis, the chair of the Defence Committee, voted against the
motion:
I shall vote against air strikes in the absence of credible ground
forces, as ineffective and potentially dangerous, just as I voted
against the proposal to bomb Assad in 2013.
Indeed, the fact that the British government wanted to bomb first
one side and then the other in the same civil war, in such a short
space of time, illustrates to my mind a vacuum at the heart of our
strategy. 89
Hilary Benn, the shadow International Development Secretary, closed
the debate in what has been described as one of the greatest speeches
in the House of Commons. Hilary Benn spoke in support of the motion
saying: “We must now confront this evil. It is now time for us to do our
bit in Syria. And that is why I ask my colleagues to vote for this motion
tonight.” 90
The full debate is on Hansard. Various media outlets collated extracts
from Members speeches including the BBC and the Spectator.
5.2 Air strikes in Iraq and Syria
Until 2 December 2015 the UK contribution to offensive US-led military
action against ISIS had been limited to airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq
(Operation Shader).
The UK has been the second largest contributor to the air campaign,
conducting more than 1,600 missions over Iraq, including over 380
airstrikes. The government has suggested that the UK has carried out
8% of coalition air strikes in Iraq so far; 91 while British Tornado aircraft
have provided nearly 60% of the intelligence effort in Iraq.
Following the parliamentary vote on Syria RAF Tornado aircraft
conducted the first offensive operation in Syria on 3 December 2015.
87
88
89
90
91
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c360
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c360
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c369
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c486
Michael Fallon, “Britain is bringing quality, not quantity, to the fight against Islamic
State”, The Spectator Blog, 16 November 2015
33 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
Assets, personnel and basing
The RAF is the primary service in this operation and has deployed a
mixture of combat, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
refuelling/transport aircraft. Aircraft currently deployed include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
10 Tornado GR4 fast jet aircraft (2 aircraft deployed from 2
December 2015)
6 Typhoon combat aircraft (from 2 December 2015)
Reaper Remotely Piloted Air Systems
Airseeker surveillance aircraft 92
Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft
2 C130 transport aircraft.
E3-D sentry aircraft
Sentinel surveillance aircraft.
Tornado GR4 aircraft are capable of being armed with Brimstone
missiles (Dual Mode Seeker and Legacy variants), Paveway II, III and IV,
enhanced Paveway II, Stormshadow and ASRAAM missiles. Further
information on their specific capabilities is available at: RAF: Tornado
GR4
Typhoon FGR4 aircraft are capable of being armed with Enhanced
Paveway II, Paveway IV, ASRAAM and AMRAAM missiles. Further
information on these specific capabilities is available at RAF: Typhoon
FGR4. In the longer term the intention is to integrate the DMS
brimstone missile, Storm Shadow and Meteor air-to-air missile.
In a blog for The Spectator in mid-November 2015 the Defence
Secretary, Michael Fallon, outlined the contribution that the RAF is
making to the military campaign. He suggested that the UK’s precision
strike capabilities and ability to conduct ‘dynamic targeting’ brings a
“qualitative edge” to the campaign. 93
In the debate on 2 December the Prime Minister also stated:
I believe that we can make a real difference. I told the House last
week about our dynamic targeting, our Brimstone missiles, the
Raptor pod on our Tornados and the intelligence-gathering work
of our Reaper drones. I will not repeat all that today, but there is
another way of putting this, which is equally powerful. There is a
lot of strike capacity in the coalition, but when it comes to
precision-strike capability whether covering Iraq or Syria, let me
say this: last week, the whole international coalition had some 26
aircraft available, eight of which were British tornadoes. Typically,
the UK actually represents between a quarter and a third of the
international coalition’s precision bombing capability. We also
have about a quarter of the unmanned strike capability flying in
the region. Therefore, we have a significant proportion of highprecision strike capability, which is why this decision is so
important. 94
Tornado, Typhoon aircraft are currently operating out of RAF Akrotiri in
Cyprus. The RAF also has Al-Minhad airbase in the United Arab Emirates
92
93
94
Also known as Rivet Joint, the aircraft entered service in early 2014
Michael Fallon, “Britain is bringing quality, not quantity, to the fight against Islamic
State”, The Spectator Blog, 16 November 2015
HC Deb 2 December 2015, c329
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 34
(south of Dubai) which is the home base of 906 Expeditionary Air Wing.
It primarily provides support to air transport links between the UK and
operations in Afghanistan, and logistic support to deployed forces, but
also supports RAF aircraft conducting joint exercises in the region.
Coalition personnel, including the RAF, also have access to al-Udeid air
base in Qatar.
Approximately 850 UK personnel are supporting Operation Shader in
Iraq and across the surrounding region. 95
On 23 November 2015 the Government confirmed that the use of RAF
Akrotiri had also been offered to France. The airbase will not be used to
launch offensive operations by French aircraft but will be available in
support of operations by the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as
an emergency diversion airfield if required. 96 The Type 45 HMS
Defender will also provide air defence support to the Charles de Gaulle
whilst she is deployed in the Mediterranean. 97
Timeline of Deployment
Six Tornado aircraft were initially deployed to RAF Akrotiri on 12 August
2014 and began flying reconnaissance missions over Iraq. 98 Parliament’s
vote on 26 September 2014 triggered the deployment of Tornado
aircraft on armed reconnaissance operations and on 30 September
Tornado aircraft carried out their first airstrikes on ISIS targets.
In October 2014 the Prime Minister announced that the Tornado
contingent would be supplemented by two further aircraft, bringing the
total number of Tornado aircraft committed to the Iraq operation to
eight.
Voyager aircraft have provided an air-to-air refuelling capability; while
C17 and C130 aircraft have delivered supplies and equipment to local
forces. Two C130 aircraft have also remained on standby for the
delivery of humanitarian assistance, should it once again become
necessary. E3-D Sentry aircraft have enhanced the coalition’s capacity to
provide airborne command and control.
The Airseeker/Rivet Joint aircraft began surveillance operations over Iraq
on 9 August 2014 and was supplemented in theatre in October with
the re-deployment of two Reaper RPAS from Afghanistan to the Middle
East in order to provide both surveillance support and situational
awareness, and add to the strike capability provided by Tornado
aircraft. 99 Reaper conducted its first airstrike against ISIS targets on 9
November 2014. 100 Further Reaper aircraft were expected to be
deployed to the Middle East following their withdrawal from
Afghanistan at the end of 2014. However, for operational security
95
96
97
98
99
100
PQ15165, Middle East: Military intervention, 10 November 2015
MOD press release, 23 November 2015
MOD press release, 18 November 2015
MOD press release, 12 August 2014
This was the first operational use of the UK Reaper capability outside of support to
operations in Afghanistan.
MOD Press Release, 10 November 2014
35 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
reasons the MOD has refused to disclose the final number of Reaper
RPAS operating in the Middle East. 101
Reaper pilots are bound by the same UK rules of engagement as apply
to manned aircraft.
In a written statement on 26 March 2015 Defence Secretary, Michael
Fallon confirmed that two Sentinel aircraft would also be deployed to
the Iraqi theatre in order to provide additional intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance support. 102 The deployment of those aircraft has
since been extended until 2016.
Following the extension of operations to Syria on 2 December 2015,
two further Tornado aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft have also been
deployed to RAF Akrotiri.
Extension of Tornado squadrons in service
As a result of Iraqi air operations, the withdrawal from service of one of
the three currently available Tornado squadrons has now been delayed
until March 2017. 2 (AC) squadron had been expected to disband in
March 2015 and reform as a Typhoon squadron in April 2015. At the
onset of the Iraq operation, however, the MOD announced that 2 (AC)
squadron would continue as a Tornado squadron until April 2016, due
to the operational demands being placed on the Tornado squadrons. 103
Plans to stand up a fifth Typhoon squadron in April 2015 remained
unchanged, however, and therefore the badge name 2 (AC) Squadron
has now transferred to what is now the fifth Typhoon squadron based
at RAF Lossiemouth. As a result the Tornado squadron formerly known
as 2 (AC) Squadron was renamed 12 (B) Squadron. During a visit to Iraq
in August 2015, Michael Fallon announced a further year’s extension for
the squadron, to March 2017. 104
The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew Pulford, said:
The decision to retain the third Tornado GR4 squadron for a
further year is welcome news. It is clear that the requirement for
fast jet precision strike and intelligence gathering shows no sign
of diminishing; extending the life of Number 12 (Bomber)
Squadron will allow the Royal Air Force to continue to provide a
unique and hugely valuable contribution to the coalition fight
against Da’esh. I offer my sincere thanks to all the men and
women of the RAF who operate and support this vital capability
and for the part they have, and will continue to, play in the
campaign. 105
Sortie Rates
As of 3 December 2015 the UK had conducted 1,632 sorties, including
380 airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq. 106
101
102
103
104
105
106
Islamic State, PQ213744, 6 November 2014
HCWS501, 26 March 2015
A letter to Angus Robertson MP, dated 2 October 2014, explains this decision in
more detail.
Defence Secretary announces Tornado extension, MOD News, 4 August 2015
MOD Press Release, 4 August 2015
MOD press release, 3 December 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 36
Nearly 60% of the intelligence gathered in Iraq is provided by British
Tornado aircraft; while Reaper and Airseeker aircraft have been
providing up to 30% of the intelligence effort in Syria. 107
The Government has suggested that the UK has carried out
approximately 8% of coalition air strikes in Iraq so far. 108
The Government does not routinely publish figures on sorties rates or
the number of airstrikes conducted by RAF aircraft. However, it does
provide updates and commentary on RAF operations: Updates:
Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria
On occasion the MOD has also published figures either in response to
parliamentary questions on this subject, or in response to a Freedom of
Information request. The latest parliamentary question is as follows:
•
PQ8667, Middle East: Armed Conflict, 14 September 2015
The MOD also made a statement on sortie rates in July 2015, largely in
response to the change in the methodology of calculating strike
numbers:
•
HC Deb 16 July 2015, c32-33WS
FOI requests of this nature include:
•
The number of airstrikes conducted by individual platform (Reaper
and Tornado) for the period March-June 2015 was published in
response to a Freedom of Information Request on 4 August 2015.
An explanation of the methodology used to calculate sortie/strike
numbers was also provided in answer to an FOI on 2 September 2015
5.3 Surveillance operations over Syria
The MOD announced on 21 October 2014 that Reaper and
Airseeker/Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft had been authorised to begin
conducting surveillance flights over Syria. In a Written Statement the
MOD said:
Further to the update I provided to the House on 16 October on
UK operations against ISIL, Official Report, column 35WS, I can
confirm that Reaper remotely piloted aircraft are due to begin
operations very shortly.
As well as their operations over Iraq, both Reapers and Rivet Joint
surveillance aircraft will be authorised to fly surveillance missions
over Syria to gather intelligence as part of our efforts to protect
our national security from the terrorist threat emanating from
there. Reapers are not authorised to use weapons in Syria; that
would require further permission.
The legal basis for this authorisation is as set out to Parliament in
the debate on 26 September.
I will continue to provide updates to the House on our military
activity. 109
107
108
109
HC Deb 26 November 2015, c1489
Michael Fallon, “Britain is bringing quality, not quantity, to the fight against Islamic
State”, The Spectator Blog, 16 November 2015
HC Deb 21 October 2014, c63WS
37 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
Those aircraft are not deployed in an offensive capacity and are thought
to have contributed 30% of the intelligence effort over Syria.
On 21 August 2015 an RAF Reaper killed two British nationals, Reyaad
Khan, the target of the strike, Ruhul Amin, and a third individual, in a
targeted strike in Syria. The Prime Minister said the strike was lawful and
authorised on the basis of self-defence, a reference to Article 51 of the
UN charter. The Prime Minister said the strike was not as not part of
coalition military action against ISIL in Syria but a target strike “to deal
with a clear, credible and specific terrorist threat to our country at
home.” 110
5.4 Involvement of embedded UK military
personnel in Syrian airstrikes
Various UK media outlets published reports on 17 July 2015 stating
that, despite the lack of a parliamentary mandate, some UK military
personnel had taken part in airstrikes over Syria while embedded with
coalition allies. The Daily Telegraph said it had confirmed that three
Royal Navy pilots were involved in air strikes in Syria and were flying F18 Super Hornets from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The reports were based on a June 2015 response given to a Freedom of
Information Request submitted by Reprieve. 111
While acknowledging that UK military forces embedded with US, French
and Canadian armed forces have been authorised to deploy with their
units to participate in operations against ISIS, the MOD’s response to
that FOI request itself did not explicitly say that UK personnel have
conducted air strikes in Syria:
UK military personnel embedded with the USA, French and
Canadian armed forces have been authorised to deploy with their
units to participate in coalition operations against ISIL. UK Embeds
operate as if they were the host nation’s personnel, under that
nation’s chain of command. These personnel include pilots flying
ISR and Strike missions against ISIL targets using the equipment of
those units. Of these three nations only the USA and Canada are
operating in Syrian airspace.
The UK does not hold information on the specific location or
number of air strikes/ISR sorties conducted by embedded
personnel. Overall Coalition air strike information can be found at:
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0814_iraq/ 112
However, in response to the media coverage the MOD issued a
statement on 17 July which outlined:
The UK is contributing to the anti-Isil coalition air campaign
against Isil targets in Syria through the provision of intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance. Isil poses a direct threat to the
UK and to countries around the world.
The UK itself is not conducting air strikes in Syria. But we do have
a long-standing embed programme with allies, where small
110
111
112
HC Deb 7 September 2015 c25-26
FOI2015-03225, 03226 and 03227, 15 June 2015
FOI2015-03225, 03226 and 03227, 15 June 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 38
numbers of UK personnel act under the command of host
nations. That has been the case in Syria, although there are
currently no pilots operating in this region. When embedded, UK
personnel are effectively operating as foreign troops. 113
The Defence Secretary Michael Fallon subsequently made a statement to
the House on 20 July 2015 clarifying the position of embedded UK
military forces. He acknowledged that on previous occasions a small
number of UK personnel had conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Syria.
However, he also stated that those personnel operate as members of
their Host nation’s military, the implication being that the participation
of embedded personnel in Syrian airstrikes did not undermine the
Government’s commitment to return to Parliament if the UK proposed
to take offensive military action in Syria. 114
The issue of rules of engagement for embedded military personnel is
one that has arisen many times within the context of previous
operations. In February 2014 the Government said that, in the context
of personnel embedded with the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
Africa, embedded personnel within a US military headquarters “come
under the command and control of the US armed forces, but remain
subject to UK law, policy and military jurisdiction.” 115
With regard to UK personnel embedded with US Air Force personnel
operating US Remotely Piloted Aircraft the Government stated in 2014
that “UK aircrew are subject to UK Rules of Engagement for all
weapons releases.” 116 Mark Francois, then Defence Minister, made a
similar comment when asked about operations in Afghanistan in 2014.
He said: “RAF personnel are subject to UK rules of engagement for all
weapon releases when operating a UK or a US platform.” 117
The previous Labour Government explained how this works in practice
in response to a written question in 2006:
Lord Drayson: UK military personnel embedded with US forces
remain subject to UK law and service law. They are authorised
only to be involved in the planning or execution of operations that
comply with British domestic and international legal obligations,
including the principles of the laws of armed conflict and the use
of force in self-defence. This means that they are bound by the
UK's determination of the ambit of the armed conflict, including
the determination of which armed groups constitute legitimate
targets. Within those constraints, UK embedded personnel act
within US rules of engagement may use US collateral damage
methodology and work to US delegated authorities. 118
113
114
115
116
117
118
Ministry of Defence, Defence in the Media, 17 July 2015
HCWS 149, 20 July 2015
HC Deb 4 February 2014 c169W
Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – current
and future use: Government response, 22 July 2014, HC 611 2013-14, para 5
HC Deb 24 February 2014 c62W
HL Deb 19 June 2006 cWA54.
39 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
However, a common call among critics has been for greater
transparency by the Ministry of Defence about the rules under which
embedded personnel operate. 119
5.5 Training
Iraq
Since October 2014 the UK has been providing training to Kurdish
Peshmerga forces and military advice to the Iraqi security forces.
Specifically, the UK is co-ordinating the coalition’s counter-IED training
programme.
In a written statement on 13 October 2014 the Ministry of Defence
confirmed that it had sent what it described as a “training team” to
northern Iraq to instruct Peshmerga soldiers on the operation of 40 UKgifted heavy machine guns. Other training teams would also be sent to
provide soldiering skills, medical and counter-explosive devise
knowledge. 120 In a separate statement, the MOD said they were a
“small specialist team of non-combat Army trainers.”121
On 5 November the MOD announced that additional military assistance
would be provided to Iraqi forces. Advisory personnel would be
deployed to Iraqi headquarters; while additional training would be
provided to Peshmerga fighters, to include infantry skills such as sharpshooting and first aid. Further equipment would also be provided. 122
That training contingent was supplemented in June 2015 by an
additional 125 army personnel. The majority of those additional forces
(100 personnel) will focus on counter-IED training across the four main
training sites in Iraq. Up until this point UK military training assistance
has been focused solely on Kurdish forces in the north of the country. 123
The remaining 25 personnel will provide training in other critical skills
including medical training, equipment maintenance, manoeuvre support
for bridging and crossing trenches, and information operations.
Following these deployments, the total UK training contingent based in
Iraq will comprise 275 personnel. 124
To date the UK has trained over 2,000 personnel. 125
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
The rules of engagement as they apply to RPAS operations has been the subject of a
study by the Birmingham Policy Commission, chaired by Sir David Omand, in
October 2014. That study called on the Government to do more “by way of
reassurance to explain the safeguards that are in place to ensure that embedded
personnel remain compliant with international humanitarian law”. Chapter 3 of the
Commission’s report The security impact of drones: challenges and opportunities for
the UK, examines this issue in greater detail.
HC Deb 13 October 2014 c10WS
“MOD confirms that British troops are in Iraq”, BFBS, 13 October 2014
“UK to provide further support to forces fighting ISIL”, MOD Press Release, 5
November 2014
HC Deb 8 June 2015, c890
HC Deb 8 June 2015, c900-901
MOD press release, 26 September 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 40
Syrian opposition forces
Although initially the UK did not participate in airstrikes in Syria, the
government did acknowledge that defeating ISIS in Syria was an
important part of the overall strategy, and reiterated the belief that
“defeating ISIL ultimately lies with local forces”. 126
On that basis, in October 2014 the Foreign Secretary indicated that
work was underway, with coalition partners, to examine how the UK
could support the US-led programme to train the moderate Syrian
opposition, in order to “create effective ground forces in Syria, as well
as Iraq, so they can take the fight to ISIL”. 127
Following on from that work, in a written statement on 26 March 2015
the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, confirmed that the UK would
contribute approximately 75 military trainers and headquarters staff.
Those training personnel would provide instruction in the use of small
arms, infantry tactics and medical skills. Headquarters staff would
coordinate and develop the programme.
As outlined above the US announced on 9 October 2015 that the focus
of the US’ programme of support for Syrian opposition groups would
now change to one of “equipping and enabling” selected groups. In
response to that change the MOD has stated:
The UK remains committed to a range of wider programmes to
support the moderate opposition. We are providing a range of
civilian support to help save lives, bolster civil society, counter
extremism, promote human rights and accountability, and lay the
foundations for a more peaceful and democratic future. To this
end, we have committed £55m this year. 128
5.6 Sustainability of the UK mission
Since the beginning of air operations concerns have frequently been
raised about the sustainability of the UK’s contribution given that the
emphasis on air strikes places the onus of this operation on the Royal
Air Force.
One former head of the RAF has said the RAF is at “rock bottom” after
years of cuts and sustaining this operation would be “quite a stretch.”
Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Graydon added “the lack of combat air
craft is a major weakness in our make-up. This has been raised time and
time again and basically ignored. We really are at rock bottom.” The
Daily Telegraph also quoted Air Commodore Andrew Lambert:
I think it’s doable, but we are really scraping the bottom of the
barrel. There’s nothing more there, so let’s hope Ukraine doesn’t
bubble up into something nasty. Weapons stocks are parlous and
when you chuck this all together, it’s a pretty poor position. We
have too few aircraft, too few pilots and too much tasking. 129
126
127
128
129
Ministry of Defence press release, 26 March 2015
HC Deb 16 October 2014, c470 and Ministry of Defence press release, 26 March
2015
MOD, Defence in the media, 10 October 2015
“‘Bare bones’ RAF will struggle to mount Iraq operation”, Daily Telegraph, 25
September 2014
41 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
General Lord Richards, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, expressed
concern about the impacts of cuts to the RAF, asking “I’m not sure how
long we can sustain this.” 130
A sign of the Government’s concern was considered evident in the
announcement by the Prime Minister that one of the three front-line
Tornado GR4 squadrons would not now be disbanded, as planned, in
March 2015, but would be extended until April 2016. The further
extension of that squadron in service until 2017 prompted The Financial
Times to suggest that “the extension of the squadron of Tornado
ground attack aircraft conducting air strikes against ISIL
underlines that the Royal Air Force is stretched after years of
Defence savings”. 131
Amid debate on the extension of air operations into Syria in early July
2015, The Financial Times suggested that, even if approval were given,
the Government would not deploy additional combat aircraft to the
operation. It suggested that “the RAF would struggle to muster much
extra firepower”. 132
In response the MOD stated:
The RAF is fully resourced to meet any future operational
demands – as shown by the expansion of the Typhoon fleet and a
£135 million investment which has doubled the number of Reaper
aircraft. 133
Indeed, following the vote in Parliament on 2 December 2015 to extend
airstrikes in Syria, the MOD announced that two additional Tornado
aircraft and six Typhoon aircraft would deploy to the region.
5.7 Costs of the mission
The net additional costs of military operations are funded through the
Treasury Special Reserve. 134 Additional costs include the costs of fuel
and munitions; extra maintenance requirements; spares; the
deployment and recovery of equipment and personnel from theatre
including accommodation; operational allowances (if applicable) and
theatre-specific training. It does not include the costs of the base
salaries of the service personnel involved or the base level of equipment
usage. 135 In essence, the MOD pays for the military to be ready for
operations but the net additional costs of those operations themselves
are met from the Reserve.
In March 2015 the MOD confirmed that the net additional costs of the
military air operation 136 would be met from the Treasury Special Reserve;
while the costs of training and equipping the Iraqi and Kurdish security
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
“We won’t beat them with airstrikes”, Sunday Times, 28 September 2014
MOD, Defence in the Media, 5 August 2015
“RAF faces struggle to find extra firepower after cuts”, The Financial Times, 2 July
2015
MOD, Defence in the Media, 3 July 2015
This was established in 2002 specifically for the Iraq conflict and has since been used
to finance the additional costs arising from military operations, including urgent
operational requirements.
HC Deb 13 December 2012 c419W
The Tornado GR4, Reaper RPAS and Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 42
forces, and the provision of key enablers, would be met from the
MOD’s Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP).
In answer to a PQ on 6 November 2015 the MOD set out the costs of
the operation so far:
The net additional cost of Operation SHADER, the name for
countering ISIL activity in Iraq and Syria, from the start of
operations in August 2014 to the end of the financial year in
March 2015 was around £80 million (£35 million of which was
allocated for the replenishment cost of munitions to be purchased
in 2015-16). For the current financial year, running from April
2015 to March 2016, at Main Estimates the MOD has initially
requested a further £45 million. 137
In October 2015 the MOD stated that the net additional costs of Reaper
operations over Iraq and Syria alone, to the end of September 2015,
was £43 million. 138
The net additional costs of the military support provided to the
humanitarian mission in Iraq in August and September 2014 were £3.5
million, the majority of which has been recovered from the Department
for International Development. 139
The Government has not provided an overall estimate of the potential
cost of the mission. Malcolm Chalmers, a defence economist at RUSI,
had suggested that the cost could be in the ballpark of the 2011 Libyan
operation, assuming only air power is used and the campaign lasts for a
couple of years. The net additional cost of the seven month Operation
Ellamy in Libya in 2011 was £199 million. 140
Box 1: Suggested reading
•
•
•
•
•
137
138
139
140
Prime Minister’s Response to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Second Report of Session
2015-16: The Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria, November 2015
Foreign Affairs Committee, The extension of offensive British military operations to Syria, HC
457, 3 November 2015
Michael Fallon, “Britain is bringing quality, not quantity, to the fight against Islamic State”, The
Spectator Blog, 16 November 2015
Inherently unresolved, RUSI Occasional Paper, 2015
Peter Ford and Julian Lewis, “The arguments against bombing Syria are compelling”, The
Guardian, 21 October 2015
PQ14576, Iraq: military intervention, 6 November 2015
PQ12980, Syria: military intervention, 27 October 2015
Iraq, PQ224989, 2 March 2015
HC Deb 26 November 2012 cc12; previously, the MOD had reported in December
2011 the estimated cost to £212 million. This constituted £145m of operating costs
and a £67m on the cost of replenishing munitions [HC Deb 8 December 2011
c41WS]
43 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
6. Russian actions in Syria
6.1 Build-up of Russian military capabilities in
Syria
Since early September 2015 Russia has been forward-deploying troops
and other military assets to an air base in Latakia province on the
Mediterranean coast. Syria is already home to Russia’s only other
military base outside of the former Soviet Union, at the naval port of
Tartus.
Estimates of the number of deployed Russian military capabilities vary,
but what has been established is that the Russian air force has forward
deployed a powerful strike group in Syria. Initially that strike group
comprised 24 Su-24 and Su-25 ground attack aircraft, six Su-34 strike
aircraft and four Su-30SM multi-role aircraft, which are likely to be
providing an air defence capability for the base. In addition, Russia
deployed a large number of utility (Mi-8) and attack (Mi-24) helicopters
to Latakia, along with seven T-90 tanks, armoured personnel carriers,
artillery units and 12 D-30 howitzers. On 20 November the Russian
news agency TASS reported that an additional 8 Su-34 strike aircraft
and a flight of Su-27SM3 aircraft had also been deployed to the country
bringing the total of Russian combat aircraft deployed at Latakia to
around 50.
The air contingent is a mixture of old Soviet-era aircraft and the more
advanced Su-34 which have never before been deployed militarily.
According to various analyses, the majority of ordnance deployed is
unguided, as opposed to precision guided munitions. 141 The Russian air
force’s lack of precision weaponry and sophisticated targeting systems is
a longstanding issue for the air force and a problem that was
highlighted during the 2008 conflict in Georgia. 142 However, the tactical
intelligence support provided by the Syrian army on the ground is likely
to make up for the lack of any sophisticated targeting systems.
Thus far personnel appear to have been deployed in support of air
operations and to provide a base protection capability. However,
continued infrastructure expansion at the base has led many to
speculate that Russia is establishing a long-term presence at Latakia. 143
Media reports have also widely suggested that two further Syrian bases
are being prepared to receive potentially thousands of additional
Russian troops. 144 In early November Russian officials inadvertently
confirmed that a number of attack helicopters and an artillery unit had
141
142
143
144
“Syria: what can Russia’s military do?”, BBC News Online, 7 October 2015
An assessment of the campaign in Georgia is available in Library briefing Russia’s
Military Posture, April 2009
“Humaymin air base, Syria”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 October 2015
“Syria conflict: diplomatic goals behind Putin’s military build-up”, BBC News Online,
25 September 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 44
also been re-deployed to other Syrian bases, allegedly in support of
government forces. 145
On 2 October the Russian Ministry of Defence also announced the
deployment of a navy cruiser equipped with S-300 surface-to-air
missiles, to the Eastern Mediterranean Following the shooting down of
a Russian Su-24 aircraft by Turkish forces on 24 November, after it
reportedly violated Turkish airspace, the Russian Ministry of Defence
announced that it would re-deploy that cruiser closer to Latakia and
deploy the advanced S-400 anti-aircraft missile system to its base in the
country, prompting fears of a military escalation in the conflict. Indeed,
some commentators have suggested that Moscow is exploiting the
current tensions between Russia and Turkey, using it as an opportunity
to augment its military presence in the region. 146
6.2 Russian Operations
On 30 September Russia launched its first airstrikes in Syria, the first
time that Russian forces have undertaken a military operation beyond
the boundaries of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold
War.
Russia was immediately criticised for targeting rebel groups rather than
ISIS, including moderate opposition forces supported by the US.
According to a RUSI analysis in early October, approximately 80% of
airstrikes by that point had targeted armed opposition groups fighting
the Assad regime. 147
In a Joint Statement issued on 2 October, the Governments of France,
Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the US and the UK criticised
Russian actions:
[We] Express our deep concern with regard to the Russian military
build-up in Syria and especially the attacks by the Russian air force
on Hama, Homs, and Idlib which led to civilian casualties and did
not target Da-esh.
These military actions constitute a further escalation and will only
fuel more extremism and radicalization.
We call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its attacks
on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on
fighting ISIL. 148
The continuation of Russian airstrikes and the incursion by Russian
combat aircraft into Turkish airspace also prompted a statement from
the NATO North Atlantic Council on 5 October:
Russian military actions have reached a more dangerous level with
the recent violations of Turkish airspace on 3 October and 4
October by Russian Air Force SU-30 and SU-24 aircraft in the
Hatay region. The aircraft in question entered Turkish airspace
despite Turkish authorities’ clear, timely and repeated warnings. In
145
146
147
148
“Russia confirms forward deployments in Syria”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19
November 2015
“Officials: Moscow using Turco-Russian tensions to bolster military presence”,
Defense News, 3 December 2015
“Russia’s war plan in Syria”, RUSI Analysis, 2 October 2015
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2 October 2015
45 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
accordance with NATO practice, Turkish fighter aircraft responded
to these incursions by closing to identify the intruder, after which
the Russian planes departed Turkish airspace.
Allies strongly protest these violations of Turkish sovereign
airspace, and condemn these incursions into and violations of
NATO airspace. Allies also note the extreme danger of such
irresponsible behaviour. They call on the Russian Federation to
cease and desist, and immediately explain these violations.
Allies call on the Russian side to take all necessary measures to
ensure that such violations do not take place in the future.
The security of the Alliance is indivisible, and Allies stand in strong
solidarity with Turkey. We will continue to follow the
developments on the South-Eastern borders of NATO very
closely. 149
In a move which has been widely regarded as an escalation of Russia’s
involvement in the Syria conflict, on 7 October the Syrian army and
allied militia also conducted a ground offensive against rebel forces,
backed up by Russian airstrikes. Those allied militia are thought to
include several thousand Iranian fighters.
Russia has also launched attacks on targets in Syria from Russian
warships based in the Caspian Sea. In early October Russia’s Ministry of
Defence confirmed that four warships had fired 26 land attack cruise
missiles on 11 targets in Syria. The use of land attack missiles, as
opposed to air strikes, in this instance has been questioned by a number
of analysts. Jonathan Marcus, defence correspondent with BBC News
suggested that:
Sea-launched cruise missile have long been a favourite US weapon
of choice in interventions overseas, so there may be an element of
Russia demonstrating that it has the full military panoply of any
other “superpower”. 150
However, western analysts have also questioned the success of the
strikes after it was suggested that four of those missiles had failed to
reach their targets and hit Iran, an allegation which both Moscow and
Tehran have disputed. Since then further cruise missile launches have
been conducted from the Caspian Sea, the most recent on 20
November when 18 cruise missiles struck 7 targets in Raqqa, Idlib and
Aleppo provinces. 151
In recent weeks Russia has stepped up its bombing campaign in Syria,
largely in response to the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai
Peninsula on 31 October but also in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks in Paris. Some commentators have also suggested that there has
been a slight shift in focus, with Russian forces increasingly striking ISIS
targets as opposed to moderate rebel groups. 152
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence aircraft sorties are
averaging between 40 and 80 per day:
149
150
151
152
This statement was also mirrored in a press release following a meeting of the
Council of the European Union on 12 October 2015.
“Syria: what can Russia’s military do?”, BBC News Online, 7 October 2015
Russian Ministry of Defense website, November 2015
“Russia targets ISIS in Syria”, The Military Times, 17 November 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 46
On November 23-26, aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces
performed 134 combat sorties engaging 449 objects in the
Aleppo, Damascus, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Raqqah and Deirez-Zor provinces.
Between the 21 and 23 November:
Aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces have performed 141
combat sorties engaging 472 terrorist objects in the Aleppo,
Damascus, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Raqqah, and Deir ez-Zor
provinces.
On 9 December the Russian Ministry of Defence also confirmed that its
Navy had also launched a number of cruise missiles from a submerged
submarine stationed within the Mediterranean. Those missiles were
reported to have targeted two ISIS command positions around Raqqa.
Issues
Deconfliction
One of the biggest problems for US and coalition forces operating in
and around Syria is the conduct of safe air operations in what is
becoming an increasingly congested environment.
At a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 8 October, US Defense
Secretary, Ash Carter, commented:
We have not and will not agree to cooperate with Russia so long
as they continue to pursue this misguided strategy. We've seen
increasingly unprofessional behavior from Russian forces. They
violated Turkish airspace, which as all of us here made clear earlier
this week, and strongly affirmed today here in Brussels, is NATO
airspace.
They've shot cruise missiles from a ship in the Caspian Sea
without warning. They've come within just a few miles of one of
our unmanned aerial vehicles. They have initiated a joint ground
offensive with the Syrian regime, shattering the facade that
they're there to fight ISIL.
The deconfliction of Syrian airspace has therefore been a priority and US
and Russian officials have engaged in a series of discussions to that end.
The US reportedly put forward proposals including ensuring air crews
follow international rules for safety of flight; ensuring navigation
through professional airmanship, including the use of appropriate and
active communications; and avoiding any actions that could cause
unnecessary confrontation. On 20 October US and Russian officials
signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding safety over Syrian
airspace. A working group has also been established to discuss any
implementation issues.
The MOU does not, however, establish zones of cooperation, or involve
intelligence sharing or any sharing of targeting information in Syria. The
US government has made clear that the signing of this MOU does not
constitute US cooperation or support for Russian policy or actions in
Syria. 153
153
Pentagon Statement on Memorandum of Understanding with Russia regarding air
safety over Syrian air space, 20 October 2015
47 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
The launch of Russian cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea has also
prompted international aviation safety agencies to issue a safety alert to
airlines operating in the region. In its bulletin the European Aviation
Safety Agency stated “Before reaching Syria, such missiles are
necessarily crossing the airspace above Caspian Sea, Iran and Iraq,
below flight routes which are used by commercial transport
aeroplanes”.
No-Fly/Safe Zones
Most analysts concur that Russia’s presence in Syria now makes the
concept of establishing no-fly or safe zones in Syria almost impossible to
implement. Justin Bronk at RUSI has said:
The Russian forces now in place make it very, very obvious that
any kind of no-fly zone on the Libyan model imposed by the US
and allies is now impossible, unless the coalition is actually willing
to shoot down Russian aircraft”. 154
On 20 October the Foreign Secretary set out the position of the British
Government with respect to the establishment of safe zones in Syria:
Mr Hammond: As the right hon. Gentleman will know, there
have been extensive discussions about safe zones, which were
originally a Turkish idea, over many months. At the moment, we
judge the creation of safe zones to be impractical and impossible
to enforce. We are acutely conscious that if we create something
called a safe zone, it must be safe. There must be someone who is
willing to enforce the safety of that zone. We judge that that
means boots on the ground, and we and the United States are
certainly not prepared to put boots on the ground in northern
Syria.
Hilary Benn: I take the point that the Foreign Secretary makes,
but that does not mean that we should not try. The boots could
be those of neighbouring countries […]
Mr Hammond: In response to the right hon. Gentleman’s
response to my comments, I say that it is easy to volunteer others
to put boots on the ground, but it is pretty difficult to tell people
to do what we are not prepared to do ourselves.
UN Security Council resolutions are already in place and we will
continue to test the appetite of the permanent five for going
further, but the Russian intervention in Syria complicates matters
not only on the ground, but in the Security Council. 155
Box 2: Suggested reading
•
•
154
155
Tim Eaton, “Syria safe zones, another stalled debate”, Chatham House Expert Commentary, 13
October 2015
US Congressional Research Service, No-fly zones, strategic, operational and legal considerations
for Congress, May 2013
“Moscow scuppers US coalition plans for no-fly zone in Syria”, The Financial Times,
4 October 2015
HC Deb 20 October 2015, c808-809
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 48
6.3 Russian strategy
Russia presents the action as a counter-terrorist action to protect
religious minorities and to protect the secular government. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says that it is targeting ISIS “and other
terrorist groups” in Syria at the invitation of the legitimate Syrian
government. 156
Asked whether Russia had targeted groups supported by the US and its
allies, he repeated that Russia had targeted ISIS. The increasing
ambivalence in the West and elsewhere, given the rise of ISIS, about
pushing for Assad’s fall has made Russian intervention in favour of the
Syrian government far more palatable to international opinion.
Russia’s longer-term strategy aims to lend effective support to the Assad
regime, which has been coming under increasing pressure in recent
months. Russia denies, however, that Bashar al-Assad himself must
remain in power (and it is reported that Russia offered in 2012 at the
UN to provide for Bashar to step down in 2012 – an offer which
Western powers ‘ignored’). 157
But Moscow wants to maintain its relationship with whatever Syrian
government eventually emerges from the conflict there – Syria is one of
the last states in the region that is clearly friendly to Russia. Syria’s proRussian alignment is one of the reasons, along with a perfectly
reasonable objective to have a secular government in Syria, why it is so
important for Russia to avoid the arrival in power of a Sunni Islamist
regime in Damascus. Russia also wants to keep its military bases on
Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
It could be useful, especially with the Assad government increasingly
under threat, for Russia to build up a significant military presence as
soon as possible so that a more decisive intervention is possible in the
event of imminent government collapse.
Moscow is also eyeing increased trade and economic opportunities with
Syria after the conflict, particularly in energy. 158
Many commentators see more negative reasons for the dramatic
intervention, however. Russia is widely reported to have attacked the
‘moderate’ rebel groups that are the basis for Western hopes for a
political solution. One source says that only 20% of Russian attacks
have been against ISIS. 159 Russia may also be interested in:
•
156
157
158
159
Supporting the Syrian government’s strategy of making the
rebellion more terrorist in nature, bolstering its claim to be
fighting terrorism rather than resisting democracy
‘Russian Foreign Minister Defends Airstrikes in Syria’, New York Times, 1 October
2015
‘West 'ignored Russian offer in 2012 to have Syria's Assad step aside'’, Guardian,
Salam al-Saadi, ‘Russia’s Long-Term Aims in Syria’, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 6 October 2015
Igor Sutyagin, ‘Russia's War Plan in Syria’, Royal United Services Institute, 2 October
2015
49 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
•
Spoiling any potential Western-backed solution, underlining the
weakness of the US and the West in the region.
•
The Kremlin may even be happy to see the conflict worsen so
that the West remains distracted from other rivalries with
Moscow; deeper intervention by outside powers is likely to
prolong the conflict and cost more Syrian lives.
Nevertheless, given its problems with jihadi violence at home, Russia
does have a genuine interest in preventing the establishment of ISIS in
Iraq and Syria.
Problems for the Kremlin
Russian influence in Damascus is not that strong. Russian attempts to
broker some sort of deal involving ‘constructive’ elements of the
opposition were obstructed by the Syrian government; the present
action is in part designed to ensure that the Assad government is more
dependent on Russian protection (perhaps relative to the growing
Iranian help that Damascus has been getting, especially in view of
potential rapprochement between Iran and the West).
Syria is outside Russia’s self-declared ‘privileged sphere of interest’.
Russian and Soviet leaders have avoided taking such ‘out of area’ action
in recent history, preferring to concentrate resources on countries
bordering Russia or the Soviet Union. Close involvement in Syria risks
diluting Russian influence closer to home.
A long-term military presence on the ground is inherently risky. Firstly, it
may be difficult to secure the goals that Russia has set itself – to prevent
the Assad government from falling. Once committed, Russian forces
may be drawn deeper into the conflict and it would be difficult to hide
the costs in human lives and money from the Russian people. The
USSR’s Afghan entanglement was an important factor in its collapse. As
an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly has noted:
In the apparent absence of a political endgame, Russia has made
an open-ended commitment to a complicated conflict that could
ultimately undermine rather than enhance its standing on the
international stage. 160
Regional impact
Russia aims to maintain its influence with Damascus, but supporting the
Assad government may undermine Russian influence with Sunni
governments, most notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Sunnis are in a
majority in most Muslim countries in the region. Reports suggest that
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are likely to increase their support for
rebel groups in the face of the Russian intervention.
One Saudi analyst said:
Since the beginning of the uprising in Syria, the view in Riyadh has
been that Bashar al-Assad must go. There is no indication
whatsoever that Riyadh will change this position. What is clear to
Riyadh and its regional allies is that the recent Russian and Iranian
160
“Analysis: Russia’s unguided intervention”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 October 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 50
escalation will only create a more unstable region and spill more
blood. 161
In a sign of the strength of reaction in Saudi Arabia, 55 Wahhabi Saudi
clerics signed a document calling for jihad against Russia for its military
intervention in Syria. 162 The document also attacked the West for failing
to support the anti-Assad rebels.
Russia does not seem to be shy of provoking the Sunni powers.
Incursions by Russian warplanes into Turkish airspace were widely seen
as intentional. 163
Allegiances in the region are shifting, however, and the situation is
complicated. Other states have not been as hostile to Russia as might be
expected. Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi welcomed Vladimir Putin to Cairo
in 2015 and has taken a different line from the Gulf States and Turkey
to a Syrian solution. Binyamin Netanyahu visited Moscow in September.
Box 3: Suggested reading
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
161
162
163
“Russia must reconsider its role in the fight against ISIS”, Chatham House Commentary, 1
December 2015
“Putin’s gamble in Syria”, Chatham House Commentary, 6 October 2015
“Russia’s long term aims in Syria”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6 October 2015
“Russia steps into Syria”, The World Today, October/November 2015
Dr Igor Sutyagin, “Russia’s war plan in Syria”, RUSI Analysis, 2 October 2015
David Gordon, “Putin’s involvement in Syria – and how Obama can leverage it”, Foreign Affairs,
30 September 2015
Sarah Lain, “How bolstering military support for Assad helps Russia in Syria and Ukraine”, RUSI
Analysis, 18 September 2015
‘Gulf states plan military response as Putin raises the stakes in Syria’, Observer, 4
October 2015
‘Saudi opposition clerics make sectarian call to jihad in Syria’, Reuters, 5 October
2015
‘Syria conflict: Russia violation of Turkish airspace 'no accident'’, BBC News Online, 6
October 2015
51 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
7. Boots on the ground?
The US-led military operation against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria has so
far been confined to airstrikes and the training and support of local
security forces and there appears to be no appetite by America or any of
the countries currently contributing to the campaign to place combat
troops in either country. President Obama has repeatedly ruled out
‘boots on the ground’, telling soldiers “I will not commit you and the
rest of our armed forces to fighting another ground war in Iraq.” 164
The UK, France and Australia have all similarly ruled out sending combat
troops; while the Iraqi Prime Minister has also ruled out any interest in
foreign troops to return to Iraq, telling reporters in September 2014 that
“the only contribution the American forces or the international coalition
is going to help us with is from the sky.”165
However, the speed at which ISIS has adapted its tactics in response to
coalition airstrikes and its success in capturing and retaining ground has
raised questions over the effectiveness and reliability of the Iraqi security
forces and the utility of a strategy focused entirely on air power and
empowering local forces. As an article in The Financial Times on 9 June
questioned:
Despite months of US-led coalition air strikes the Islamist group
appears stronger than ever after claiming more territory in Iraq
and Syria. So what can be done to halt its bloody progress? 166
The option of putting combat ‘boots on the ground’ is one which many
commentators have increasingly argued needs to be considered. Indeed,
the US’ recent move to permanently deploy Special Forces’ personnel to
northern Syria in support of local forces has been regarded by many as
the first step in this direction.
164
165
166
“Obama, Kerry: No U.S. troops will be sent into combat against ISIS in Iraq, Syria”,
CNN, 17 September 2014
“Obama, Kerry: No U.S. troops will be sent into combat against ISIS in Iraq, Syria”,
CNN, 17 September 2014
“A long campaign ahead”, The Financial Times, 9 June 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 52
7.1 Position of the British Government
At the outset of the campaign the Government made clear that it was
not contemplating putting combat troops on the ground in Iraq. Indeed,
the motion that Parliament voted for in September 2014 specifically
stated “Her Majesty’s Government will not deploy UK troops in ground
combat operations”. 167 David Cameron added “we are not deploying
British combat troops, but we are providing air power in support of local
forces on the ground. No British or western troops will occupy Iraq.” 168
He went on to state:
I am not contemplating the use of British combat forces because I
think it would be the wrong thing to do. The lesson to learn from
previous conflicts is that we should play the most appropriate role
for us. It is for the Iraqi Government and for the Iraqi army to
defeat ISIS in Iraq. 169
Amidst growing criticisms of the perceived failure of the air campaign,
and the training effort in halting the advance of ISIS, the Government
has sought to make clear that “defeating ISIL will take time and
patience”.
An MOD spokesman said on 24 May 2015 that:
Iraqi Security Forces have retaken large areas from ISIL proving
that the terrorist organisation are under increasing pressure and
are losing both territory and fighters. With a 60-nation coalition
backing the Iraqis we’re confident they will retain this momentum
but British combat forces will not be on the ground fighting: Iraqi
troops will lead the fight as they have done before. 170
In an interview with Andrew Marr on 7 June 2015 the Foreign Secretary
reiterated this point. He stated:
ANDREW MARR:
Now we’ve been talking a lot about ISIS this morning and the
appalling things going on inside Iraq and Syria. The truth of the
matter, as Tom Holland said, is that we are losing there. ISIS are
winning, aren’t they?
PHILIP HAMMOND:
Well I don’t accept that. I think that if you think back, it’s a
question of timescale. Last spring ISIL were advancing across Iraq
at an alarming rate of knots. The coalition came together, started
using air power to stop that advance, and it has stopped it. Now
the battle goes on, the ebb and flow of the battle goes on.
They’ve lost territory in the north to the Kurds, they’ve made
some gains to the west of Baghdad, but they are not making the
advances that they were making last year. In fact they’re about 25
per cent down in terms of territory controlled from the peak that
they controlled late last year and now it’s about rebuilding the
Iraqi security forces in order to slowly retake that ground and hold
it sustainably. It’s not going to happen overnight.
ANDREW MARR:
167
168
169
170
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1256
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1264
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1266
Ministry of Defence, Defence in the media, 24 May 2015
Michael Fallon:
I am clear that were
we to intervene on
the ground with
combat troops, we
could well help
further to radicalise
opinion in Western
Europe and
encourage more
support. That is
exactly why the
Prime Minister of Iraq
for
one has made it very
clear that he does not
want foreign troops
on the ground and
that this fight has to
be a fight of the Iraqi
army, which has to
win back the support
of the local
population. There is
therefore no question
of our supplying
combat troops on the
ground in Iraq
(HC Deb 20 July 2015,
c1243)
53 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
They’re very close to Baghdad at the moment. The real question, I
suppose, is whether air power alone can atone for the fact that
for instance in Ramadi the Iraqi army on the ground just turned
around and ran away?
PHILIP HAMMOND:
Air power alone will not do the job, we know that. Air power …
ANDREW MARR:
So are you going to help them with other things?
PHILIP HAMMOND:
… air power can hold ISIL in check while the Iraqi security forces
rebuild their capability. And that process is now happening. We’re
delivering technical support, we’re delivering training – particularly
counter-IED, which is the big and urgent need that the Iraqis
have. 171
The motion approved by Parliament to extend military operations to
Syria explicitly rules out the deployment of UK troops in ground
operations. 172
7.2 Views of Parliamentarians
Defence Select
Committee:
A number of Parliamentarians raised concerns about the limits of air
power along during the debate in both Houses on 26 September 2014.
John Baron raised the risk that air strikes could become counterproductive “if civilian casualties mount and ISIS spins the story that it
has withstood the might of the west and held its ground, which it has
so far managed to do.” 173 Former Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox
suggested “close air support will be required if there is to be a
successful counter-offensive by any ground forces in the conflict. We
need to understand the risks that that will pose to our forces.” 174
“We believe that the
UK Government is
capable of providing
much greater support
to the Iraqi
Government and for
the Kurdish Regional
Government than it
has done to date…
Lord Jay of Ewelme questioned whether airstrikes will be enough and
whether the Iraqi and Kurdish fighters will be able to defeat ISIS on the
ground. He wondered if military trainers “may edge ever closer to a
combat role.” 175
In a report published in February 2015, the Defence Select Committee
did not support the argument for committing ground troops, but it did
call for greater support than the UK has provided to date:
we believe that the UK Government is capable of providing much
greater support to the Iraqi Government and for the Kurdish
Regional Government than it has done to date. The level of that
support should increase exponentially in terms of both gifting and
sale of equipment and the number of UK troops provided for
training, particularly in the area of command and control.
There is no demand from the Iraqi Government for combat
troops; nor any question of the UK deploying such troops. But
171
172
173
174
175
The Andrew Marr Show, 7 June 2015 s
HC Deb 2 December 2015 c323
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1259
HC Deb 26 September 2014 c1288
HL Deb 26 September 2014 c1689
There is no demand
from the Iraqi
Government for
combat troops; nor
any question of the
UK deploying such
troops. But Iraqi
forces continue to
have significant
requirements for air
support and training
in IED awareness and
disposal”.
(HC 690, February
2015)
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 54
Iraqi forces continue to have significant requirements for air
support and training in IED awareness and disposal.
Such activities would require only the deployment of a few
hundred personnel, the cost would be relatively modest, and it
would not entail the risks inherent in deploying UK troops in
combat roles. These roles are also consistent with the scale of the
£38 billion Defence budget, commensurate with its global
presence, the expectations of Iraq and the Kurdistan region of
Iraq, its status as a P5 member of the Security Council, and its
traditionally close relationship to the United States.
We are not calling for combat troops, still less for an attempt to
repeat the counter-insurgency and state-building agendas of Iraq
in 2007. Any contemporary intervention must be far more
focused and incremental. But this is not a reason for the UK to
lurch from over-intervention to complete isolation. 176
However, the committee went on to caution that:
At the very least any training of the Iraqi Security Forces should be
related to institutional reform. The Iraqi Security Forces have
already been trained and equipped extravagantly and repeatedly
in the past decade. To do so again, without first addressing the
structural issues, would be a total waste of time and money. 177
The Government rejected many of the assertions made in the
Committee’s report, suggesting that it was based on “out of date or
inaccurate information” and did not “recognise the major role the UK
Government has played since the beginning of operations”. 178
7.3 Views of the former defence chiefs
At the beginning of the air campaign varying opinions were expressed
by the former defence chiefs on the utility of airstrikes alone, and the
decision not to extend air operations into Syria.
General Lord Richards argued that air power alone wouldn’t achieve the
strategic goal, and ultimately a land army would be required:
the only way to defeat Isis is to take back land they are occupying
which means a conventional military operation. The only way to
Lord Dannatt:
“We have now
reached a point when
we must think the
previously unthinkable
and consider that
British troops, acting as
part of an international
coalition, may be
required to mount a
ground campaign in
Iraq and Syria”.
(Mail on Sunday, 24
May 2015)
176
177
178
Defence Select Committee, The situation in Iraq and Syria, HC 690, Session 201415, conclusions and recommendations
Defence Select Committee, The situation in Iraq and Syria, HC 690, Session 201415, conclusions and recommendations
Ministry of Defence press release, 25 March 2015. A copy of the Government’s
response to the Defence Committee report is available at: Twelfth Special Report:
The response to Iraq and Syria
55 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
do it effectively is to use western armies but I understand the
political resistance. 179
Former Chief of the General Staff, Lord Dannatt, while backing military
action against ISIS, also made the point that “attacking ISIS from the air
solely above Iraq is dealing with half a problem not all of it” and
applauded the American decision to attack ISIS in Syria. He likewise said
ISIS must be defeated on the ground. Without British or US ground
combat units, he suggests fully supporting those who are already
fighting on the ground – the Iraqi Army, the Peshmerga and the Free
Syrian Army. 180
The outgoing Chief of the General staff, General Sir Peter Wall, warned,
however, against “rushing into a war against ISIS”, suggesting that the
Government “must be cautious because it has little idea of the
capabilities and strengths of the terrorist organisation”. However, he
went on to comment that Britain could not ignore the threat posed by
the group. 181
In light of recent gains made by ISIS, more recently Lord Dannatt argued
in a piece in The Mail on Sunday on 24 May that:
"In light of this terrifying scenario, how much longer can Britain
and the US continue to show such a lack of commitment to
defeating IS militarily? Their default option of air strikes and
limited assistance to indigenous forces has failed thus far.
"We have now reached a point when we must think the
previously unthinkable and consider that British troops, acting as
part of an international coalition, may be required to mount a
ground campaign in Iraq and Syria. I am no gung-ho general who
says 'just send the boys in and don't worry about the body bags',
far from it, but faced with such a lethal and uncompromising
enemy as IS - and with the lack of political and diplomatic
solutions at our disposal - we can no longer rule out 'boots on the
ground'. 182
This position has also been supported by retired Major General Tim
Cross who has argued that “Britain should consider putting boots on
the ground in the Middle East because it could take a generation for the
Iraqi army to be capable of defeating Islamic State”. 183
Former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mike Jackson has also
suggested that the UK should go further and consider deploying forces
into Syria:
How long is Britain and the West prepared to stand back and
allow IS to carry on?
Britain certainly cannot unilaterally send a brigade to Syria but I
don’t think we should just sit back and watch as IS commits the
horrors it is committing.
179
180
181
182
183
“Boehner says US might 'have no choice' but to send combat troops to fight against
ISIS”, Daily Mail, 29 September 2014
“Hitting ISIS solely from above Iraq is dealing with only half the problem”, Daily
Telegraph, 27 September 2014
“Army chief: don’t rush into war against ISIS”, The Daily Telegraph, 8 September
2014
“Dannatt: send UK troops to fight IS”, Mail on Sunday, 24 May 2015
“Britain should consider putting boots on the ground”, The Daily Mail, 25 May 2015
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 56
If there was a fresh coalition with the right mandate and clearly
laid out objectives, I for one would back it. 184
Speaking on the Andrew Marr Show on 19 July Lord Richards once
again expressed his view that:
if you’re objective is to get rid of Isis, we now need to look again
at the strategy… the current strategy won’t work in the time I
think we’ve got available. The current strategy is essentially one of
equipping and training others to do the hard stuff for us. I think
that could work, but the scale of effort going into it is woefully
insufficient […] If we really want to get rid of them… we need to
effectively get on a war footing.
7.4 Views of commentators
In September 2014 former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the
future use of combat troops “if absolutely necessary” should not be
ruled out. He argued “you cannot uproot this extremism unless you go
to where it originates and fight it.”185
Afzal Ashraf, a former RAF officer, also argued in favour of deploying
airmobile forces – including 6 Air Assault Brigade –for specific tasks and
handover to Iraqi forces as soon as they’ve achieved their objective. He
argued that foreign airmobile forces could be a “battle-winning
combination”, suggesting that “if used to quickly seize ISIS held
objectives, for the Iraqis to hold and then surge, airmobile forces could
dramatically cut the time required to reduce ISIS territorial control and
degrade its capabilities.” 186
Professor Gareth Stansfield, an expert on Iraq, explored the question of
“who would be wearing these boots, and where they will be” in an
analysis for RUSI. He noted that Syria is the key theatre for ISIS but
engaging ISIS in Syria on the ground is “currently a fool’s errand.” He
suggested that Iraq is important to ISIS and is where the “process of
unravelling ISIS can begin.” He argued that if there are to be combat
troops in Iraq “they almost certainly need to be worn by Sunni Arabs.”
He warned that the involvement of Kurdish Peshmerga and Shia militias
(including the Iraqi Security Forces) would “generate further legitimacy
for ISIS the more they push south and north respectively.” 187
In an examination of the UK’s role in the campaign in February 2015
Richard Barrett, an Associate Fellow at RUSI, argued for the
continuation of a policy of ‘military containment’ as opposed to a
broader military campaign. He commented:
Even for a non-expert, it would seem that one thing the region
does not need is another military campaign. Certainly Daesh
should be contained, but there should be great care not to
empower Shia militia or Kurdish forces as a result […]
The conclusion then should be that the UK continues to support
a policy of military containment of Daesh, which may not require
184
185
186
187
“We’re coming to get you UK special forces launch cyber war against ISIS
networks”, Sunday Express, 31 May 2015
“The way ahead”, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, 22 September 2014
“Dealing With ISIS Through ‘Boots with Wings’”, RUSI analysis, 30 September 2014
“What it Will Take to Degrade ISIS?”,RUSI analysis,
57 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
much more effort than it currently expends, while bringing
whatever pressure it can to bear on the regional powers to agree
what to do about Syria. At the same time, Abadi must be
supported in his effort to reform the Iraqi government sufficiently
to win the confidence of the Sunni tribes. But how to achieve this,
over what time frame, and with what monitoring mechanisms, is
not something that anyone has been able to articulate, anywhere,
and understandably so. 188
In contrast, Archbishop Bashar Warda of Irbil has called for ‘boots on
the ground’ in order to halt “the genocide of the country’s Christians
and other minorities at the hands of Islamist terrorists”. He
acknowledged that “It is hard for a Catholic bishop to say that we have
to advocate a military action but we have to go for that. There is no
other option”. 189
In a more recent RUSI assessment of the military campaign against ISIS,
Elizabeth Quintana suggested:
Ultimately, the coalition’s military objectives – to degrade and
destroy ISIS as a militarily capable force – can only be achieved by
ground forces. Air power may create the conditions for effective
ground-force operations but it cannot substitute for them.
However, the rebuilding of the ISF will be a long-term project, and
Kurdish forces are now stretched and risk the wrath of their
Turkish neighbour and of local Arab populations if they continue
to take ground. Absent a new Sunni Awakening, there are
insufficient numbers of effective ground forces to reclaim the
territory currently held by ISIS and there is, so far, no appetite at
all in Western countries once again to deploy combat troops in
the region. 190
7.5 Views of the US and other coalition
partners
In mid-May 2015 the US Chief of Staff of the Combined Joint Task
Force stated that “the coalition and Iraqi security forces strategy to
defeat and dismantle the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant extremist
group is clear and on track”.
On 11 June the US Combined Forces Air Component commander, Air
Force Lt. Gen. John Hesterman III, suggested that:
Coalition air power has helped ground forces regain territory,
removed significant numbers of fighters from the battlefield, and
eliminated the majority of ISIL oil refining capability
Not only has air power been effective, but it has enabled virtually
every victory on the battlefield and given the ground forces time
to regroup and get their forces in order.
It’s also given all our coalition nations the space and time to
execute the international lines of effort for countering flow of
foreign fighters; countering [ISIL] financing; providing
188
189
190
“Dealing with Daesh: the UK’s role in the coalition”, RUSI Analysis, 11 February
2015
“Iraqi Archbishop calls for British boots on the ground to fight ISIS”, The Catholic
Herald, 10 February 2015
Elizabeth Quintana, “Introduction: countering ISIS”, Inherently unresolved: the
military operation against ISIS, RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2015
US Defense Secretary,
Ash Carter:
“While we can enable
them, we cannot
substitute for them”.
(Statement before the
Senate Armed Services
Committee, 9
December 2015)
Number 06995, 15 December 2015 58
humanitarian assistance; countering [ISIL's] messaging; and
stabilizing liberated areas, all of which will be necessary to finish
[ISIL]. 191
A Pentagon assessment of operations, one year on, also concluded:
Airstrikes have gone a long way to degrade ISIL's ability to mount
large offensive attacks, as well as reducing their ability to openly
control towns and cities, where they so often inflict terror on
those civilian populations. 192
Despite these assessments, several prominent US figures have continued
to call for the deployment of ground troops. Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Senator John McCain, has accused the US
government of having no “coherent strategy” for ISIS and that
“American boots on the ground are necessary to defeat [ISIS] in Iraq
and Syria”. Specifically he has suggested that more US Special Forces
personnel should be embedded as advisers with Iraqi forces on the
ground. 193 This is a view shared by former US Army Chief of Staff,
General Ray Odierno, who commented in mid-August 2015 that “if we
find in the next several months that we are not making the progress
that we have, we should probably, absolutely [try] embedding some
soldiers with them and see if that would make a difference”. 194
Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution has also
supported this view, suggesting that the US’ commitment to Iraq should
be trebled:
If Iraqi forces backed up by U.S. and allied airpower can only
gradually expand and intensify their operations, ISIS will learn
tactical lessons and redress some of its vulnerabilities—such as
where to hide their headquarters and leaders within cities they
currently control.
While “shock and awe” has a bad name in Iraq, it is an
undeniable military reality that hitting hard keeps an enemy off
balance and creates opportunities to exploit.
In fact, this is one reason why I favor going beyond the usual
recommendations for added American forces in Iraq—more
trainers, forward air controllers, forward-stationed advisors—and
advocate as well the temporary (and unannounced) deployment
of direct action special forces.
They could team with Iraqi Special Forces in a vigorous raiding
campaign against ISIS, once the necessary battlefield preparations
have been made (perhaps later this year or early next).
Mr. Obama’s basic strategy in Iraq is not unsound. But poor and
tepid implementation of even a good strategy can spell defeat.
We need to do more than the minimal incrementalism, and step
up our game in Iraq twofold or threefold in the coming
months. 195
Even the announcement of the deployment of US Special Forces into
northern Syria to assist local forces has been criticised as not going far
191
192
193
194
195
“ISIL fears coalition air power”, DoD news, 11 June 2015
Department of Defense press release, 6 August 2015
“McCain: more boots on ground in Iraq, Syria”, Defense News, 26 January 2015
“Odierno, US should embed with Iraqis if no headway made against IS”, Jane’s
Defence Weekly, 19 August 2015
“To defeat ISIS in Iraq Obama must treble our forces”, Newsweek, 16 June 2015
59 ISIS/Daesh: the military response in Iraq and Syria
enough. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry,
acknowledged that "A more serious effort against ISIS in Syria is long
overdue," although he also questioned whether the recent
announcement would be sufficient to make any difference to the
campaign; a view shared by Senator John McCain. 196
However, giving evidence to the Senate Armed Service Committee on 9
December 2015 US Defense Secretary, Ash Carter, rejected suggestions
that US ground troops should be deployed, arguing that to pursue such
a move would “Americanize the fight”. He commented:
While we certainly have the capability to furnish a US component
to such a ground force, we have not recommended this course of
action for several reasons. In the near term, it would be a
significant undertaking that, realistically, we would embark upon
largely by ourselves; and it would be ceding our comparative
advantage of special forces, mobility and firepower, instead
fighting on the enemy’s terms. In the medium-term, be seeming
to Americanize the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, we could well turn
those fighting ISIL or inclined to resist their rule into fighting us
instead […]
And lastly, in the long-term, there would still remain the problem
of securing and governing the territory – these must be done local
forces. So in the end, while we can enable them, we cannot
substitute for them”. 197
Box 4: Suggested reading
•
196
197
Inherently unresolved: the military operation against ISIS, RUSI Occasional Paper, October 2015
“Lawmakers rap Obama on Syria escalation”, Defense News, 30 October 2015
Statement on the counter-ISIL campaign before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 9 December 2015
About the Library
The House of Commons Library research service provides MPs and their staff
with the impartial briefing and evidence base they need to do their work in
scrutinising Government, proposing legislation, and supporting constituents.
As well as providing MPs with a confidential service we publish open briefing
papers, which are available on the Parliament website.
Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in these publically
available research briefings is correct at the time of publication. Readers should
be aware however that briefings are not necessarily updated or otherwise
amended to reflect subsequent changes.
If you have any comments on our briefings please email papers@parliament.uk.
Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing only with Members
and their staff.
If you have any general questions about the work of the House of Commons
you can email hcinfo@parliament.uk.
Disclaimer
This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their
parliamentary duties. It is a general briefing only and should not be relied on as
a substitute for specific advice. The House of Commons or the author(s) shall
not be liable for any errors or omissions, or for any loss or damage of any kind
arising from its use, and may remove, vary or amend any information at any
time without prior notice.
BRIEFING PAPER
Number 06995, 15 December
2015
The House of Commons accepts no responsibility for any references or links to,
or the content of, information maintained by third parties. This information is
provided subject to the conditions of the Open Parliament Licence.