Jannet Chang
http://www.students.uiuc.edu/~kjchang
402 N. Gregory Street
Apt. 301
Urbana, IL 61801
Cell Phone: (217) 721-6708
E-mail: kjchang@uiuc.edu
EDUCATION
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1206 S. Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
Phone: (217) 333-7082
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Ph.D., Economics, 2004 (Expected)
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
M.S., Mathematics, 2001
National Taiwan University
B.A., Economics, 1996
CITIZENSHIP
U.S.A.
RESEARCH
INTERESTS
Political Economy, Microeconomic Theory, Public Economics
THESIS TITLE
Committee Formation and Endogenous Public Good Provision
THESIS COMMITTEE
Professor Stefan Krasa (Chair)
Professor Dan Bernhardt
Professor Mattias Polborn
RESEARCH PAPERS
“Composition of Committees with Voluntary Participation”,
Job Market Paper, 2003
“Endogenous Scale and Committee Formation”
(Work in Progress), 2003
“On Preference Formation”, Working Paper, 2002
PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE
ƒ Conference Presentation:
Midwest Economic Theory Meeting, October, 2003
“Composition of Committees with Voluntary Participation”
ƒ Referee: Journal of Public Economic Theory
TEACHING
EXPERIENCE
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Instructor: Solely responsible for entire course
ƒ Economic Statistics, Summer 2002
ƒ Economic Statistics, 1998-99
Head Teaching Assistant: Led a team of 5-7 teaching assistants for a class size
of 500-700 students. Responsible for teaching-related coordination,
communication and course organization.
ƒ Economic Statistics, 2000-03
Teaching Assistant:
ƒ General Economic Theory, to 1st year Economic doctoral students,
Fall 2003
ƒ Microeconomic Principles, 1997-98
ƒ Macroeconomic Principles, Spring 1997
Others: Upgraded a theoretical statistics class in association with computer-based
applications and exercises. The materials are still used for a class of 500-700
students.
ƒ Helped develop new course formats and materials, Summer 2001
ƒ Created a profile of computer project questions and answer keys,
Summer 2001
ƒ Constructed online test banks, Summer 2001
ƒ Wrote Excel Guide, Fall 2001
HONORS & AWARDS
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
ƒ Excellence-in-Teaching Award for Teaching Assistants, selected by
college faculty and awarded annually to one T.A. in the College of
Business, 2003
ƒ Robert E. Demarest Teaching Award, given by the Department of
Economics for teaching excellence and recognizing a teaching
assistant’s “career” contributions to the department, 2002
ƒ Incomplete List of Teachers Ranked as Outstanding (Excellent) by
their Students, rated among the top 10% (30%) across campus in
the required course group for teaching effectiveness, Spring 1999,
Fall 1999, Spring 2000, Fall 2002, Spring 2003
National Taiwan University
ƒ President’s Award, awarded to the top 5% in the Department of
Economics, 1995, 1996
PROFESSIONAL
AFFILIATION
American Economic Association
REFERENCES
Professor Stefan Krasa
Department of Economics
(217) 333-7698
skrasa@uiuc.edu
Professor Mattias Polborn
Department of Economics
(217) 333-7664
polborn@uiuc.edu
Professor Dan Bernhardt
Department of Economics
(217) 244-5708
danber@uiuc.edu
Abstract
Composition of Committees with Voluntary Participation
(Job Market Paper)
This paper studies the composition of a committee by endogenizing the costly
participation decision of asymmetrically informed individuals. In the first stage,
heterogenous agents decide simultaneously whether or not to pay a fee to join a
committee. In the second stage, via a simple majority voting rule, committee members
jointly decide on the provision of a public project, a decision which also affect noncommittee members. I prove that an equilibrium exists and provide comparative statics
characterizations. First I show the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only
extremists join the committee. Then I establish how the two costs, those of entry to the
committee and of undertaking the public project, impact the equilibrium composition of
the committee. In contrast to the existing literature, the two separate costs can generate
ambiguous impacts on agentsʹ participation and welfare. Lastly, I find that the
equilibrium committee size is larger than the social optimum committee size.
Normatively speaking, this implies that agents who join the committee should be taxed.
The model provides a framework for understanding the relationship among committee
formation, voting and public good provision.
Endogenous Scale and Committee Formation (Work in Progress)
This paper extends the previous analysis to endogenize the level of the public good
when it is provided. I assume that the median committee member determines the project
scale. I show that as a result, moderates may no longer abstain. That is, in equilibrium all
types may want to participate. In addition, the model studies how the median voter of
the committee may be different from that of the population at large. I also analyze the
welfare issue of collective decision making.
On Preference Formation
Preferences are a key component in economic theory, however, they are typically taken
as exogenous when modeling individual behavior. This paper explores how the
economic environment may shape individual preferences. I model the production side
of the economy explicitly in an evolutionary framework. Despite the fact that agents can
trade at comparative prices, agents modify their preferences so that they favor the good
that they are better at producing. This equilibrium is stable and unique subject to certain
assumptions. Furthermore, in equilibrium, heterogenous preferences may coexist, as
opposed to the monomorphic population assumption in the ESS (Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy) concept.
September 12, 2003