Expectation Gap and Corporate Fraud:
Is Public Opinion Reconcilable with Auditors’ Duties?
Jeffrey Cohena, Yuan Dingb, Cédric Lesagec,* and Hervé Stolowyc
a
Carroll School of Management at Boston College, USA
China-Europe International Business School (CEIBS), Shanghai, China
c
HEC Paris, France
b
This draft – October 28, 2010 – Please do not cite or circulate without permission – Comments welcome
œ Acknowledgments. Cédric Lesage and Hervé Stolowy acknowledge the financial support of the HEC
Foundation (Project F0802). They are members of the GREGHEC, CNRS Unit, UMR 2959. Yuan Ding
acknowledges support from the CEIBS Research Funding and from Jiangsu Jinsheng Industry Co., Ltd. They
also acknowledge Claire O’Hana for her able research assistance.
*Corresponding author: e-mail address: lesage@hec.fr
Expectation Gap and Corporate Fraud:
Is Public Opinion Reconcilable with Auditors’ Duties?
ABSTRACT. Based on evidence from press articles covering 39 corporate fraud cases that
went public during the period 1998-2005, the objective of this paper is to examine whether
the expectation gap between public opinion and auditing profession still exists and what are
the elements that illustrate the existence of such a gap. Results suggest that the expectation
gap still persists even after continuous efforts made by auditing profession to attenuate it. The
most salient elements demonstrating the gap are related to managers’ personality traits. It
appears that professional standards are reluctant to enumerate subjective personality traits as
these elements are difficult to audit in an objective way. Implications for practice and
research are discussed.
KEY WORDS: Expectation Gap; Corporate fraud, Personality traits, Fraud-related
professional standards
1
Expectation Gap and Corporate Fraud:
Is Public Opinion Reconcilable with Auditors’ Duties?
Introduction
First conceptualized by Liggio (1974), the “expectation gap” (EG) could be defined as “the
differences between what the public expects from an audit and what the auditing profession
prefers the audit objectives to be” (Sikka et al., 1998). One of the most important issues
revolving around EG deals with auditors’ responsibilities for detecting and reporting fraud
(Humphrey et al., 1992; Power, 1997; Dewing & Russell, 2001; Zikmund, 2008) as the public
might view the audit as a guarantor against fraud while auditors view it as their professional
duty to investigate for fraud but not necessarily detect fraud in every instance.
The auditing profession regularly denounces EG because it damages their reputation and
increases their litigation risk (Kaplan, 1987; Reckers et al., 2007; Zhang, 2007). In 1988, the
AICPA issued auditing standards to attenuate the gap, amongst which the SAS 53 on fraud
detection. They have been called “the nine expectation gap SAS” (Reekers & Schultz, 1993),
as the profession wanted this new regulation to bridge EG. However, the auditing standard on
fraud detection (SAS 53) did not close EG as it was expected to (Herdman & Neary, 1988)
and the subsequent issuance by the AICPA of two more standards (SAS 82 in 1997 and SAS
99 in 2002) did not solve the issue neither (Zikmund, 2008).
The causes of the persistence of EG are not clearly evident in the research literature. On
one hand, many studies have tried to find causes from the side of auditing profession, like the
difficulties in assessing their work (McNair, 1991), the mutations over the time of the
auditor’s responsibilities (Burton & Fairfield, 1982; Brown & Burnaby, 1988; Tomassini,
1990; Huss, 1991; Humphrey et al., 1992; Mikol, 1993; Jeppesen, 1998; Sikka et al., 1998)
and the self-regulation feature of the profession (Humphrey et al., 1991; Humphrey et al.,
1992; Sikka et al., 1998). Power (1997) has also suggested that the reasons for the persistence
of the EG lie with the profession side, as it originates in the differences between the
operational level (the professional practice level characterized by precise audit tasks) and the
programmatic level (discourse of the profession characterized by broad goals and values). On
the other hand, the auditing profession blames the expectation gap on the public’s ignorance
of the audit function and their unreasonable expectations of the auditing profession in fraud
contexts (Kaplan, 1987; Singleton-Green, 1990; Humphrey et al., 1993).
2
The objective of this study is to identify the most salient elements of the expectation gap
and so to answer the key question of whether the auditor’s conception of their work in
examining fraud is reconcilable with the public opinion’s expectation from a moral and
ethical lens.
As the basic concept of an expectation gap concerns differences in opinions between the
auditing profession’s view and the public’s view (Humphrey et al., 1992), we want to
investigate both sides of the expectation gap. The auditor’s side is mainly based on the
auditing standards as they reflect the auditors preference in a given political context (Sikka et
al., 1998). Regarding the “public side” of the expectation gap, we use press articles as a proxy
of public opinion since the extant literature mainly investigated through different occupational
groups: managers (Arrington et al., 1985), jurists (Jennings et al., 1993; Anderson et al.,
1998), corporate finance directors, investment analysts, bank lending officers and financial
journalists (Humphrey et al., 1993). To the best of our knowledge, we did not find any studies
investigating the “general public” expectations, although this notion is very present in the
professional discourses. In a speech entitled “Restoring Public Confidence”, Castellano,
former chairman of the AICPA, claims that “the AICPA shares the distress of all Americans
concerning the tragic breakdowns that contributed to the fall of Enron…[ and ]…is actively
engaged in supporting and implementing reforms on a number of fronts in an effort to restore
public confidence in the capital markets” (Castellano, 2002, p. 37-38, emphasis added).
Sutton, the former SEC chief accountant defined the expectation gap as the “gap between
what the ordinary person was thought to perceive as the auditor’s role and the responsibilities
the profession established for itself” (Anonymous, 1997, emphasis added).
Public opinion has been defined as beliefs, attitudes and opinions that people and/or a
society have towards a general (Tönnies, 1922). According to Tönnies, the public opinion is
defined by its consensual nature, strong or weak, and is characterized by being based on
values and broad principles (Palmer, 1938). The media acts as an indispensable agent of both
forming and reflecting public opinion (Lippman, 1922), since most of the people cannot or do
not have direct access to much of the world, Relating this to the audit expectation gap, these
concepts suggest that public opinion is therefore potentially reflected in the media coverage of
fraud cases. This is important because corporate crises seem to be the major determinant of
auditing regulation change (Tricker, 1982), as they attract public attention and raise new
expectations amongst the public. However, the public is rarely exposed to the actual output of
the auditing function as the audit reports have a very limited “circulation and readership”
(Humphrey et al., 1992, p. 149).
3
Our study therefore investigates whether the auditor’s conception of their work, based on
precise and technical duties, is or is not reconcilable with the public opinion’s expectation as
characterized by general and moral values. A negative answer would provide evidence that
EG still persists despite the attempts at reform that the profession attempted to implement in
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. We conduct a content analysis of press articles covering 39
high profile fraud cases. We then use the Porter’s (1993) total expectation gap decomposition
(sub-standard performance, deficient standards and unreasonable expectation), which we
detail by adding the fraud triangle framework outlined in SAS # 99 which posits that
corporate fraud is a function of incentives, opportunities and attitudes/rationalizations. We
then allocate each cited-by-media element according to these components. We identify the
corresponding red flags in the U.S. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS). We therefore
distinguish: (1) items, such as the presence of stock options, that are cited in both media
coverage and SAS: these elements are partially identifiable as being objective (Level 1); (2)
items cited in both media coverage and SAS, but were not taken into account in the fraud
likelihood assessment by the auditors as these cases have been identified as audit failure
(Level 2); and (3) items cited in the media but not in the SAS that deal with issues such as
personality (Level 3).
We find that Level 1 components are mainly precise and objective elements, which
corresponds to the purpose of the profession to protect itself. We also find that Level 3
components are very hard to assess ex-ante by the auditors as they are mainly very subjective
and beyond their usual sphere of control. The items in Level 3 mainly express judgements of
value on the managers’ behaviour.
The results of our analysis confirm that EG will persist given the co-existence of both
legitimate behaviours that are inherently irreconcilable: (1) the rational auditor’s impossibility
to assess these very subjective components of fraudulent behavior if he/she wants to protect
himself/herself; (2) the essential attraction of public as demonstrated in the media for
judgement of values. We contribute to the existing literature on EG in the following ways.
First, our study is the first which considers the public opinion and not occupational group as
reflecting the public side of EG. Second, from a methodological perspective, unlike most
studies on EG which have relied upon questionnaires, we use content analysis to examine
documented cases of fraud which resulted in a manifestation of EG.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our
theoretical framework, which is based on the concepts of expectation gap and fraud triangle.
4
The following sections discuss the research methodology and our results. The last section
presents a discussion with limitations and some directions for future research.
2. Expectation gap and corporate fraud: the theoretical framework
In this section, we define the concepts of the expectation gap, fraud and the “fraud triangle”
that led to the pertinent professional auditing standards regulation. Moreover, based on the
sociological perspective on the role of value judgements for the public, we also examine the
links among public opinion, media and public expectation on audit profession.
Importance of the expectation gap
The expectation gap has been identified as a major issue in auditing (Sikka et al., 1998).
Globally, EG results from the difference between public expectations and the profession
concerning assurances given by auditors following their auditing work. For instance, Sikka et
al. (1998) define EG as “the differences between what the public expects from an audit and
what the auditing profession prefers the audit objectives to be”. For example, the public might
view the audit as a guarantor against fraud while auditors view it as their professional duty to
investigate for fraud but not necessarily detect fraud. This difference was first conceptualized
by Liggio (1974), but its seems to have emerged along with modern auditing itself in the 19th
century (Humphrey & Turley, 1992).
A large number of empirical studies have tested and confirmed the existence of the audit
expectation gap (Wilcox & Smith, 1977; Arrington et al., 1983; Singleton-Green, 1990;
Humphrey et al., 1991; Benau et al., 1993; Humphrey et al., 1993; Porter, 1993; WarmingRasmussen & Jensen, 1998). The auditing profession regularly denounces EG because it
damages their reputation and increases their litigation risk (Kaplan, 1987; Reckers et al., 2007;
Zhang, 2007).
According to the profession, EG is mainly due to the misperceptions of the public for two
main reasons. First, the profession argues that audit reports users are largely ignorant of the
precise nature, goals, abilities and assurance of the audit function (Singleton-Green, 1990;
Humphrey et al., 1993). However, some studies have demonstrated that the public actually
knows the auditor’s duties quite well (CICA, 1988). Second, they claim that the public has
unreasonable expectations about the auditing profession, especially in fraud contexts
(Humphrey et al., 1993).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study analyzing these “unreasonable”
expectations. The auditing profession’s view (Tricker, 1982) supports a public interest
perspective according to which EG results in a delayed understanding by the public of the
5
regulatory changes made after corporate crises (e.g. major frauds) to correct a potential failure
by the auditing profession. For example, there is a very strong correspondence between
periods of high activity in audit standard setting and the periods of major fraud-related crisis
seems to evidence this profession’s view. As stated by Humphrey et al. (1992, p. 138), “this
view implies a profession gradually and constructively responding to the changing
expectations of society”.
Beyond the traditional profession’s explanation, many studies have focused on
understanding its causes by analyzing different features of the auditing profession: difficulties
in assessing the auditor’s work (McNair, 1991), mutations over time of the auditor’s
responsibilities (Burton & Fairfield, 1982; Brown & Burnaby, 1988; Tomassini, 1990; Huss,
1991; Humphrey et al., 1992; Mikol, 1993; Jeppesen, 1998; Sikka et al., 1998), and selfregulation by the profession (Humphrey et al., 1991; Humphrey et al., 1992; Sikka et al.,
1998). Whatever the identified causes are, regulators and lawmakers have long attempted to
address the auditing profession’s concern especially in the fraud context (e.g., Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities 1978; AICPA 1993; U.S. Government Accounting Office 1996).
Fraud and the expectation gap
One of the most important issues revolving around EG deals with auditors’ responsibilities for
detecting and reporting fraud (Humphrey et al., 1992; Power, 1997; Dewing & Russell, 2001;
Zikmund, 2008). Recent history of auditing standards about auditor’s responsibility to detect
fraud illustrates this moving power balance between both parts of the expectation gap: public
expectations and auditors’ duties. Auditors have historically built their legitimacy on fraud
detection (Carpenter & Dirsmith, 1993). However, auditors have then tried to (and largely
succeeded in) absolving themselves of this responsibility (Humphrey et al., 1992).
Unfortunately, this abdication of responsibility, has in turn historically confused the audit
reports users which has resulted in a cycle of never ending expectation gaps (Lin & Chen,
2004).
In 1988, the AICPA issued new auditing standards which have been called “the nine
expectation gap SAS” (Reekers & Schultz, 1993), as the profession wanted these new
regulation to bridge the expectation gap. One of them (SAS 53) required auditors to state that
they have actively looked for fraud (Guy & Sullivan, 1988). This change was a major step in
the efforts of AICPA to clarify the auditor’s responsibility and the meaning of an audit
(Anonymous, 1991). Unfortunately, it has been then argued that these new duties increased
instead of decreased EG (Anonymous, 1991): the efforts of the profession to bridge EG have
6
generated “misinformed views” that have increased public expectations about auditor’s duty
to detect fraud. In the subsequent years, with the issuance by the AICPA of two more
standards (SAS 82 in 1997 and SAS 99 in 2002) that reinforce the auditor’s involvement in
the search for fraud, the profession tends to believe EG may be reduced by better developing
the auditor’s ability and efforts to detect fraud. (Zikmund, 2008).
Why does the profession apparent understanding of the necessity of changes not resolve
the expectation gap? In a review over 100 years in the anglo-saxon (mainly U.K. but also U.S.
and Canada) auditing profession, Humphrey et al. (1992) provide evidence that the
expectation gap has been evoked in the late 19th century, and is still present: “Rather than the
gap reducing as a result of past changes and responses, it obstinately remains unbridged and
appears to be as large in the 1990s as it was in the 1880s.” (Humphrey et al., 1992, p. 142).
The auditing standards as a political outcome
Humphrey et al. (1992) explain that the controversial nature of the auditor’s responsibility
for fraud detection has been constructed by the profession itself. The authors illustrate their
argument by studying the history of the regulation on the auditor’s role in the fraud detection
in the U.K. Since the late 1880s to the 1940s the detection of fraud has been considered by the
profession as the primary objective of the audit (Brown, 1962). The switch which occurred in
the 1950s has been officially made on behalf of a priority given to the fairness of financial
representation. However, some authors suggested that some fraud-related famous corporate
scandals in the 1950s have so much damaged the auditor’s reputation that the profession
wanted to downplay its responsibilities in the fraud detection (Brown, 1962). Then, following
the corporate scandals of the 1980s, the pressure on auditors has continuously revealed the
reluctance of the auditing profession to extend any responsibility in fraud detection
(Humphrey et al., 1991).
According to Humphrey et al. (1992), the profession plays a proactive role in the cycle
“crisis - public demand - change in regulation”. After a highly publicized accounting fraud,
the succeeding period of reflection and regulation changes appears to be mainly driven by the
auditing profession’s self-interest. Not having considered the “interested nature of the audit
profession in both framing the content of the expectation gap and in making and
implementing recommendations and strategies designed to close the gap” (Humphrey et al.,
1992, p. 156) may lead to a misconception of the nature of EG, which makes it impossible to
close.
7
This argument is also developed by Sikka et al. (1998) who argue that the usual
definitions of EG are dissociated from their historical and political context. Sikka et al. (1998)
explain EG as a function of the moving meaning of the fraud detection role by the auditors in
the U.K. during the 1980s and 1990s (Singleton-Green, 1990). Sikka et al. (1998) conclude
that EG cannot be eliminated because it results from these social practices subject to a
continuous process of negotiation / transformation. The meaning of the audit is a permanent
political negotiation process with the “significant others” politicians, governments, etc. to
preserve their political power (Fogarty et al., 1991).
Auditing standards reflect therefore the auditors’ preference in a given political context
(Sikka et al., 1998): as any social practices, auditing standards and auditing profession protect
their self-interests (Parker, 1994; Bazerman et al., 2006). Thus, prior literature suggests that
EG may be not necessarily related to the public’s ignorance or to their “unreasonable”
expectations but better to the self-regulated auditing profession (Humphrey et al., 1992; Sikka
et al., 1992; Humphrey et al., 1993) who seeks to downplay as much as politically possible its
role in actively searching for fraud to better protect its interests.
Corporate fraud and the fraud triangle
We are interested in accounting or corporate “fraud”, as defined in SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2002,
Para. 5): “fraud is an intentional act that results in a material misstatement in financial
statements that are the subject of an audit”. Two types of misstatements are relevant to the
auditor’s consideration of fraud—misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting
and misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (AICPA, 2002, Para. 6). In this
paper, all of the cases that are examined represent documented examples of fraudulent
financial reporting. We are interested in this type of fraud as this often affects many
stakeholders (Cohen & Martinov Bennie, 2006).
In the previous literature, decomposing overall fraud-risk assessments into separate
assessments for management’s (1) incentives/pressures, (2) opportunities and (3)
rationalizations/attitudes is often referred to as the fraud-triangle decomposition (Wilks &
Zimbelman, 2004) or, in short, the fraud triangle. 1 These elements were first identified by
Sutherland (1949), and developed by Cressey (1953, p. 30). 2 Albrecht et al. (1982, p. 37)
adapted the concept from criminology to accounting and combined the fraud-related variables
1
2
Loebbecke et al. (1989) use a reasoning equivalent to the “fraud triangle” and call it a “model”.
Albrecht et al. (1982, p. 34) and Comer (1977, p. 10-11) present Cressey’s theory.
8
into three categories: situational pressures, opportunities to commit fraud and personal
integrity (character).
Auditing regulation (AICPA, 1988, 1997, 2002; IFAC (International Federation of
Accountants), 2005) has outlined numerous fraud-risk factors. These indicators are also called
“red flags” and represent “potential symptoms existing within the company’s business
environment that would indicate a higher risk of an intentional misstatement of the financial
statements” (Price Waterhouse, 1985, p. 31; Pincus, 1989, p. 154). Compared to its
predecessors, the most recent standard, SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2002, Para. 7) has structured the
risk factors around three conditions generally present when fraud occurs. “First, management
or other employees have an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a reason to
commit fraud. Second, circumstances exist—for example, the absence of controls, ineffective
controls, or the ability of management to override controls—that provide an opportunity for a
fraud to be perpetrated. Third, those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent
act. Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them to
knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act” (italics in the original text). These
definitions are directly linked to the fraud triangle. Thus, the fraud triangle can help predict
the context in which managers may perpetuate fraud. Appendix 1 lists the “examples of risk
factors” provided in SAS 99 and ISA 240.
Public opinion, media and “unreasonable expectations”
Public opinion is generally defined as beliefs, attitudes and opinions that people or a society
has towards a general issue (Tönnies, 1922; Palmer, 1938). The media acts as an
indispensable agent of forming and reflecting public opinion. Lippman (1922) said it best
when he entitled the chapter one of his book as "the world outside and the pictures in our
heads.” He described a triangular relationship between the scene of action, perceptions of that
scene presented by the mass media, and responses based on the perceptions by people.
On one hand, many academic studies proved empirically how the media forms public
opinion (e.g., Barker & Knight, 2000, p. 167-168). For instance Johnson et al. (2005) discuss
that the financial press may have two roles: (1) information broker, recording and
disseminating information about business activities and (2) active participant in the
development of society’s awareness, understanding, and evaluation of businesses and
business practices. This influence is even more predominant in our particular context because
of the huge information asymmetry between the daily life of general public and corporate
world. In fact, the complex nature of the corporate frauds offers an opportunity to the media
9
to play a more preponderant role in forming the public opinion on this issue. As defined by
Lippman (1922)’s triangular relationship, very few people in the society experience the board
meetings, make decisions with billion dollars on the stake, interact with complex network, or
understand sophisticated accounting and finance instruments. In short, the real corporate
world is unknown and even somehow mysterious for the public. As a consequence, media
naturally plays a much more important role in presenting the perceptions of the action (the
corporate frauds in our case) in a manner that is understandable by the public.
Further, the sociological literature identifies the agenda-setting function of mass media:
“The mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of political
figures. They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should
think about, know about, have feelings about” (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 177). Besides the
technical and legal aspects of corporate frauds, press articles could provide some journalistic
investigation on the personal traits of executives involved in these fraud cases. These add-on
perceptions make the stories more convincing and also more understandable for the public.
For example, if the media portrays the cases in personality terms, this could be in line with the
public fundamental beliefs as many in the public believe these cheating executives must have
some unique personal traits common to bad persons. Also, the media’s influence on public
opinion is heightened when the media reports negative news than when it reports positive
news which in this study would manifest itself by the media emphasizing the managers’
personal traits to justify why they committed frauds. Under such an influence, public opinion
could adjust its position toward this direction and therefore forge a stronger expectation on the
inclusion of these executives’ personal traits into auditors’ work.
On the other hand, the media reflects public opinion and functions as a monitor on behave
of the general public. Media’s role as a monitor for accounting fraud has been recently studied
(Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 2007) and has been shown to be important due to the pressure it
places on management (Dyck et al., 2008). 3 As over-mentioned, in order to understand EG
studying fraud is important because corporate crises seem to be the major determinant of
auditing regulation change (Tricker, 1982), as they attract public attention and raise new
expectations amongst the public. Meanwhile, the public is rarely exposed to the actual output
of the auditing function as the audit reports have a very limited “circulation and readership”
(Humphrey et al., 1992, p. 149).
3
We do acknowledge in the discussion section some potential limitations of press coverage.
10
Collectively, as prior literature suggests understanding EG as manifested in corporate
fraud, it is then necessary to evaluate the press coverage of documented fraud cases. Unlike
previous studies which were based on questionnaires, we focus on the media coverage of
highly publicized accounting fraud cases as the way to operationalize the public’s
expectations. Even if the public has a distorted and unrealistic image of the auditor’s duties,
public opinion is potentially reflected in the media coverage of fraud cases.
Research question
Based on the above literature review, we find there is a potential of incorporating more
strongly the public opinion seen through the press, into the expectation gap concept.
Therefore, in this paper, we will examine the following overarching research questions (RQs):
RQ1: Does the expectation gap in relation to fraud detection, as evidenced by discussion of
the fraud, still exist?
RQ2: What are the specific elements in regards to fraud detection that demonstrates that the
expectation gap to exist?
Thus, the focus of the study is to identify, through a review of press articles related to fraud
cases, the fraud factors in which public expectations and the auditors’ duties differ.
3. Research design
Proposed analytical framework
Porter (1993) decomposes EG into the performance gap and the reasonableness gap.
Performance gap is a gap between what the society expects auditors to achieve and what they
can reasonably be expected to accomplish. Reasonableness gap is a gap between what the
society can reasonably expect auditors to accomplish and what they are perceived to achieve.
Porter analyzes the total expectation gap into three separate components: sub-standard
performance (16%), deficient standards (50%) and unreasonable expectations (34%). Based
on the previous developments and on Porter’s framework, Figure 1 details the combination of
the fraud triangle and the expectation gap.
***Insert Figure 1 About Here***
Sampling
To complement prior literature (Carpenter & Reimers, 2005; Gillett & Uddin, 2005), we
examine documented behaviors in 39 cases of corporate scandals, using hand collected
11
evidence taken from press articles such as managers’ quotes and journalists’ analyses. In this
study, we take the media coverage as a proxy for the public expectations (see above), and the
auditing standards as a proxy for the auditors preference in a given political context (Sikka et
al., 1998).
To design our sample, we started from the Corporate Scandal Fact Sheet 4 , which includes
a list of 61 short vignettes on companies. Compared to a similar list maintained by Forbes 5 ,
this list’s main advantage is that it includes the names of the main characters involved in the
scandals. We deleted from this list several companies which are linked to other companies
involved in different scandals: accounting firms (e.g., Andersen, KPMG) and banks (e.g.,
Citigroup, Morgan Stanley). We also deleted companies that had no data available on the
personality of the managers (e.g., Cornell). Finally, we added three companies that do not
appear in the Corporate Scandal Fact Sheet but which had received a lot of adverse publicity
and for which press articles were available (AIG, Delphi and Freddie Mac). The resulting
sample includes 39 fraud companies for the period 1998-2005. For the sake of comparability
in interpretation, we only used U.S. cases. Because the corporate scandal was mainly based in
its U.S. subsidiary – U.S. Food Service, we also included Royal Ahold, although it is a Dutch
group.
Content analysis
To evaluate the research question, we applied a content analysis of press articles. Content
analysis is a “research method which draws inferences from data by systematically identifying
characteristics within the data” (Jones & Shoemaker, 1994). It presents the following
advantages (Kabanoff et al., 1995): (1) non obtrusive characteristic (documents can be
evaluated without the knowledge of the communicator), (2) use of a natural verbal expression
as data base, (3) adaptability in longitudinal studies if texts are presented over long periods, (4)
systematic and quantitative approach applied to qualitative data. A thematic analysis (which is
the approach that we apply) enables the researchers to identify the content categories and
trends from the text, and then draw inferences from them (Jones & Shoemaker, 1994).
In terms of data analyzed, we searched for evidence from the U.S. press coverage in the
Factiva database. 6 We also used SEC documents, to understand the technical and accounting
4
Available at the following address: http://www.citizenworks.org/corp/corp-scandal.php.
Available at the following address: http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.
6
Factiva (also called Dow Jones Factiva) is a non-academic database of international news containing 20,000
worldwide full text publications including The Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, as well as the
continuous
information
from
Reuters,
Dow
Jones,
and
the
Associated
Press
(see
5
12
aspects of the corporate fraud. For some companies (Adelphia Communications, Enron,
MicroStrategy, Rite Aid, Sunbeam, Waste Management, and Xerox), we also used the GAO
report (United States General Accounting Office, 2002) on restatements.
In order to identify the relevant press articles, we applied the following methodology. For
each case study, we first found the name of the managers involved in the fraud with the help
of the Corporate Scandal Fact Sheet or a search in Factiva on the company itself. As a second
step, we searched in Factiva with the name of the company and of the company’s managers as
key words. Keeping in mind that our objective was to find motivations of managers, we
selected the articles that included details about the personality of the managers.
The next step was the identification in each article of the paragraphs dealing with the
topics of interest for us. Once these sections were identified, a coding sheet was applied to the
content analyzed. This sheet has the same format as Appendix 3 which isolates the three main
influences known to be indicators of corporate fraud according to the fraud triangle
(Incentives, Opportunities, Attitudes/rationalizations) as well as the elements of the
expectation gap (deficient performance, deficient standards and unreasonable expectations).
To enhance inter-coder reliability, two different researchers analyzed separately the same
press articles on a sample of 10 cases. The major issue was the extraction of the relevant
pieces of information from the articles and the allocation of these pieces of information to the
columns of Appendix 3. The result was a 95% rate of convergence which indicates that the
coding showed strong signs of reliability.
4. Expectation gap in cases of corporate scandals: Analysis of the results
Recall that RQ 1 asks whether the expectation gap persists, while RQ 2 asks what are the
specific elements that demonstrate that the expectation gap still persists. Appendix 2 presents
a table disclosing years when the scandal went public and the number of articles used in each
case study. It shows that there is no apparent discrepancy between the cases in terms of
number of articles used (average 3.7 articles, minimum = 2, maximum = 6). Appendix 3
presents a detailed analysis of the 39 corporate scandals. The components are classified
according to the combination of fraud triangle and expectation gap (see Figure 1): Incentivespressures (col. 1), opportunities (col. 2), attitudes/rationalizations (col. 3), deficient
performance gap (audit failure) (col. 4), deficient standard gap (col. 5) and unreasonable
http://factiva.com/index_i7_w.asp). See http://factiva.com/index_i7_w.asp. Factiva is equivalent to the LexisNexis database in terms of research tool.
13
expectation gap (col. 6). The numbers displayed after each element of Appendix 3 refer to the
“examples of risk factors” listed in Appendix 1.
We identify two categories of components:
-
Level 1 components: they are cited in both media coverage and the auditing standards:
these elements are partially identifiable as being objective (e.g. presence of stock-option
plans, etc.); they correspond to the columns 1 to 3 of Appendix 3,
-
Level 2 components: they are also cited both media coverage and auditing standards, but
were not taken into account in the fraud likelihood assessment by the auditors as these
cases have been identified as audit failure; they appear in column 4.
-
Level 3 components: they are cited in the media but not in the auditing standards (e.g.,
personal traits of personality, way of living, etc.). We find that Level 3 components
document that EG exists and what are the factors causing it. The level 3 components can
be sub-divided in two parts:
ƒ
Column 5 of Appendix 3: Corresponds to the deficient-standards gap. The origin of
the gap stems from deficiencies in the auditing standards. As discussed below, they
are mainly related to the lack of definition of certain concepts and coverage
divergence between SAS and ISA.
ƒ
Column 6 of Appendix 3: Corresponds to the reasonableness gap. This refers to what
the society can reasonably expect auditors to accomplish and what they are perceived
to achieve.
Level 1 components: the fraud triangle
Table 1 summarizes the explanation of fraud behaviors present in the auditing standards
(fraud triangle). It refers to columns 1 (incentives/pressures), 2 (opportunities) and 3
(attitudes/rationalizations) of Appendix 3. These explanations represent Level 1 components,
as defined above. As they are mentioned in the auditing standards and in the press, they do
not represent an expectation gap.
*** Insert Table 1 About Here***
Level 2 components: Deficient performance gap
In several instances, the auditing standards were not taken into account in the fraud likelihood
assessment by the auditors and the auditor’s alleged failure was identified. They are displayed
in column 4 (e.g., Cendant, Delphi, Halliburton, HPL Technologies, Merck, Sunbeam, Tyco,
14
Waste Management, Xerox). Again, since this was an auditing standard, cases in level 2 do
not represent an expectation gap.
Level 3 components (Column 5): Deficient standards gap
In column 5 of Appendix 3, we find elements cited by the press and not present in the
standards. Cases found here are examples of the manifestation of the expectation gap (RQ1).
We also identify two sources of explanations for this difference (RQ2): 1) Definition of the
concept of “rationalization” which is not developed in the auditing standards (SAS 99); and (2)
Differences between SAS 99 and ISA 240 (see Appendix 1). These items are summarized in
Table 2.
*** Insert Table 2 About Here ***
Rationalization
Although the auditing standard SAS 99 (AICPA, 2002) quotes 16 times the terms
“rationalize” or “rationalizations”, it does not provide a precise definition of the concept of
“rationalizations” but simply refers to “rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action” (§ 31).
All the examples of the section “Attitudes/Rationalizations” provided in the appendix of SAS
99 and reproduced in Appendix 1 of this article refer to “attitudes” and not a single one seems
to refer to “rationalizations”. As additional evidence, the word search in the SAS 99 text for
“charity” 7 does not generate a single occurrence.
Given this lack of definition, we refer to Anand et al. (2005, p. 9) who define
rationalizations as “mental strategies that allow employees (and other around them) to view
their corrupt acts as justified” and add that individuals use rationalizations to “neutralize their
negative feelings or regrets about their behavior” (p. 10). Ashforth and Anand (2003)
identified several rationalization tactics. Among these, we identify the “metaphor of the
ledger”, or “balancing the ledger”, using the terms of Anand et al. (2005, p. 13), where “good
works (whether actual or anticipated) earn a credit that can be used to offset corrupt acts”
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 21). These authors include the donation of corporate funds to
charity as belonging to this rationalization technique.
We identified one major argument put forward by managers which ameliorated their guilt:
the fact that their actions helped other people or organizations via their work with charitable
causes (Adelphia Communications, Computer Associates, Enron, Freddie Mac, HealthSouth,
7
There is one occurrence of the term “charitable” but it is not related to “rationalization”.
15
and WorldCom) or the fact that the managers felt that they were acting for the good of the
company (Ahold).
Difference SAS 99 – ISA 240
Taking SAS 99 as a benchmark, we find a difference between SAS 99 and ISA 240, which
concerns mainly the fact that “the owner-manager makes no distinction between personal and
business transactions”. It should be noted that this example taken from ISA 240 could also be
considered as a case of misappropriation of assets. Interestingly, we found several instances of
the use of personal expenses paid for by the company’s resources (Cendant, Enron, Global
Crossing, HealthSouth, K-Mart, Peregrine Systems, Phar-Mor, and Tyco). In Adelphia
Communications, the fraud consisted of the improper use of the company’s funds for selfdealing by the Rigas family. The money was used to buy stock and luxury condominiums in
Mexico, Colorado and New York City, to construct a golf course, to purchase timber rights to
land in Pennsylvania and to pay off margin loans. 8 Thus, the absence in SAS 99 of the
example of the owner/manger making no distinction suggests that EG in that element is more
pronounced in the US (RQ2).
Level 3 components (Column 6): Unreasonable expectations
Table 3 summarizes the elements of fraud behavior not present in auditing standards which
are identified by the press and thus constitute the reasonableness gap of the overall
expectation gap. They are displayed in column 6 of Appendix 3.
*** Insert Table 3 About Here ***
The first category of explanations not present in auditing standards but present in media
coverage relates to maintaining a high living standard, sometimes linked to a passion for
sports. Anecdotal evidence exists in the press to highlight this element. For example, former
Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski acquired a “$6,000 shower curtain for his highfalutin
apartment” (Jennings, 2006, p. 2-3). Several CEOs had a real passion for sports which
perhaps influenced them to commit fraud. For example, Mickey Monus “borrowed” about ten
million dollars of Phar-Mor’s funds to cover the debts of the World Basketball League.
Several managers of the studied firms also received glowing praise and admiration from the
press. For example, prior to the scandals, Cal Turner, Dollar General’s CEO, was considered a
8
Caruso, D.B. (2002). ‘For years, Rigas treated Adelphia like a family business’. Associated Press Newswires,
May 25. Anonymous (2002). ‘Adelphia Founder Reports Health Woes’. AP Online, June 30.
16
“marketing genius,” 9 while Jeffrey Citron (Datek Online) had been heralded as a “technology
wizard” by Forbes magazine and as “one of the 20 most important players on the financial
Web” by Institutional Investor. 10 Corporate America treated Al Dunlap [Sunbeam’s CEO
known as “Chainsaw Al”] as “a miracle worker and he did everything possible to promote this
image”. 11 It appears that the managers believed in their own press and were willing to do
almost anything to keep up the favorable image. Finally, several egregious personality traits
are also found in the CEOs involved in the cases studied. Network Associates’ CEO, Bill
Larson, is a good example of tyrannical behavior. 12 In the grand jury indictment, Martin
Grass (Rite Aid Corporation) “emerged as an arrogant bully, pressuring underlings to endorse
phony documents and bragging that cover-ups would never be discovered”. 13
Thus, the elements in Level 3 document the existence of an expectation gap (RQ1) and
what are the elements documented in the press and absent in auditing standards (RQ2).
This finding is in line with the agenda-setting function of mass media we reviewed in the
previous section. Since the media focuses on managers’ personal traits when describing
corporate fraud, this in turn could lead to the strengthening of the public focus on this issue
(Davisdon 1983). Even if the repetitive media reports on the link between corporate frauds
and managers’ personal traits have few effects on changing the attitudes of many people, they
may still influence the consensus of public opinion on this issue. This is described as “the
action-inducing potential of the third-person effect” (Davison, 1983). In our case, given the
link between corporate frauds and managers’ personal traits in the coverage by the media,
public opinion should adjust its position toward this direction and therefore forge a stronger
expectation on the inclusion of these aspects into auditors’ work. “Perceptions of public
opinion, not only the actual distribution of opinion in the population, have long been
considered an essential part of public opinion dynamics: political behavior is shaped not only
by what people think, but also by what they perceive that others think” (Cohen et al., 2008, p.
340).
9
Chad Terhune, C. & Lublin J.S. (2002). ‘Unlike others, Dollar General issues a mea culpa --- Amid Enron,
other scandals, discount retailer apologizes for its accounting problems’. The Wall Street Journal, January 17, B1.
10
Ahrens, F. (2002). ‘History of conflict for ex-Rite Aid chief; Indictment paints picture of grass as an arrogant
bully’. The Washington Post, June 22, E1. Barboza, D. (1998). ‘He’s dazzled Wall Street, but the ghosts of his
company may haunt his future’. The New York Times, May 10, 1.
11
Stewart, C. (1998). ‘Live by Chainsaw, die by Chainsaw’. The Australian, June 20, 1.
12
Ackerman; E. and Kang, C. 2001, ‘Silicon valley software company sinks under its own ambition’. Knight
Ridder Tribune Business News, February 15.
13
Ahrens, F. (2002). ‘History of conflict for ex-Rite Aid chief; Indictment paints picture of grass as an arrogant
bully’. The Washington Post, June 22, E1.
17
5. Discussion and limitations
The objective of this study is to examine through the analysis of press coverage of
documented whether EG exists (RQ1) and if so, what are the elements that there appears to be
a divergence between the public expectation and what the auditing standards highlight.. We
find that within Level 3 components (columns 5 and 6 of Appendix 3), components of column
5, which represent “deficient standards”, are mainly precise and objective elements, which
corresponds to the purpose of the profession to protect itself. Conversely, we find that Level 3
components, column 6, which represent the “unreasonable expectation gap”, are very hard to
assess ex-ante by the auditors as they are mainly very subjective and beyond their usual
sphere of control (personal traits of personality, way of living, etc.). They mainly express
judgements of values on the managers’ behaviour. However, if we accept the premise that the
media is a surrogate for the public’s expectations then the lack of the ability for the auditing
profession to objectively evaluate personality traits suggests that EG will continue to exist. In
fact, the public opinion is based on general values regarding the corporate frauds, while
auditors are working on the technical aspects of these cases. Therefore, it seems to be hardly
possible to reconcile the positions of the two parties.
Given the public’s desire for the auditing profession to evaluate subjective concepts like
personality and attitude, what can be done to narrow or even bridge the gap? One approach
may be for the auditing profession to enumerate some of these “soft’ factors that auditors
must exercise their professional judgment on. For example, some fraud-risk factors that were
highlighted by the press could be included in the SAS 99 and ISA 240 appendices:
-
The manager has a very high living standard that could lead him/her to
unethical/fraudulent decisions.
-
The manager has a personality, namely tyrannical or autocratic, that does not favor a
collective and sound culture in the firm. This personality makes it difficult to promote an
honest dialogue between all levels of the hierarchy.
-
The manager has benefited from articles of praise from the press. This situation, which is
not problematic per se, has potentially given the manager an overestimated opinion of
himself/herself that may at times lead to promoting one’s press at any cost. The manager
has lost perspective about his/her authority and judgment even being questioned.
-
The manager has benefited from a dominant position vis à vis other employees. This
situation is not problematic per se. However, the employees have such a respect for their
manager (or are so impressed) that some checks and balances might disappear. The
18
employees cannot critically evaluate what the manager requires from them is unethical or
fraudulent.
The examination of these subjective factors could be integrated within the control
environment audit mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S. Congress, 2002) in section 404.
The audit requires auditors to evaluate controls via a framework which lists management
control philosophy as an important element of the control environment. In addition to controls,
auditors could examine on every audit what aspects of management’s personality may have
the potential to compromise the organization’s “tone at the top.” For example, if top
management is heavily involved with professional sports perhaps this could lead to a blurring
of the line between personal and corporate business. Auditors must go beyond what can be
objectively assessed (as evidenced by our Level 1 elements) but they must be vigilant to show
a healthy professional skepticism towards management’s personality that could bleed over to
the client’s business affairs (Nelson 2009).
Finally, as in all studies, there are potential limitations that represent opportunities for
future research. First, the red flags identified from the press and highlighted in column 6 of
Appendix 6 will not always lead to corporate fraud. The majority of managers who have a
high standard of living and have been identified as high-profile leaders will probably not
engage in fraudulent acts. Future research can explore the boundaries of when this lifestyle
will lead to unethical behavior. Perhaps if the economy is in a recession, the management of
the client may be more susceptible to fraud in order to maintain their current lifestyle.
Second, another limitation is related to the ex-post rationalization phenomenon and to
press coverage. Newspapers do shape people’s worldviews but news itself is managed,
manufactured and selectively produced. We do not underestimate the desire of newspapers to
glamorize fraud cases and to establish lively stories that contain colorful motives and are
populated with dramatic personalities. However, the press articles are generally based on facts
and actual testimonies which work to reduce the weight of the rationalization. For example,
Choo and Tan (2007) also used anecdotal elements in their research mentioned earlier. A
future study could examine if the press coverage depends on the amount of advertising firms
do with a particular media outlet.
Third, we are aware that, given the politics of rulemaking, standard setters are obliged to
accommodate some demands and proceed in an incremental way. In addition, we must
acknowledge standard setters realize the inherent difficulty (and sometime impossibility) of
assessing the personality and ethics of client personnel. Unless dysfunctional personality and
ethics are accompanied by behavior, there is a risk that these traits will go largely un-assessed
19
and un-addressed. However, future research can examine how the threat of litigation may
affect what the profession publicly promulgates what auditors are responsible for.
Finally, for the sake of simplicity and consistency, we focused on U.S. cases of alleged or
acknowledged corporate frauds. However, fraud is of course not limited to the U.S. and many
countries have faced similar situations. It would be interesting to extend the scope of study to
non-U.S. companies (e.g., Parmalat 14 – Italy –, Shell 15 – U.K./Netherlands, Marionnaud 16 –
France, etc.) to investigate the robustness of our results in different cultural and institutional
contexts.
Despite the limitations, this study adds to the literature on EG by documenting its
existence in the most recent spate of corporate scandals in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.
We have also shown that personality elements seem to be at the forefront of the expectation
gap. If auditors actively search for these factors and exercise their professional judgment, then
perhaps the expectation gap may diminish in the future.
14
Money shifted from Parmalat’s coffers to loss-making travel businesses controlled by the founder’s family.
Overestimation of oil reserves.
16
Underestimation of the accrual for gift certificates.
15
20
Appendix 1: Comparison SAS 99 – ISA 240: Risk factors relating to misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting
The following elements are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting. They are taken from SAS 99 and ISA 240. We display both classifications: letters in SAS 99 and
figures in ISA 240. The figures in italics have been added by the authors for a better reference to the examples in
Appendix 3.
There are two types of differences between the two standards:
Type 1: wording difference: “board of directors or audit committee” (SAS 99) vs. “those charged with
governance” (ISA 240); other wording difference: “reportable conditions” (SAS 99) vs. “material
weaknesses in internal control” (ISA 240)
Type 2: content difference: areas covered by ISA 240 but not by SAS 99.
a./1.
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
b./2.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
c./3.
3.1
3.2
3.3
d./4.
SAS 99
ISA 240
Incentives/Pressures
Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions,
such as (or as indicated by) the following:
High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins.
High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest
rates.
Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the industry or overall
economy.
Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover imminent.
Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from operations
while reporting earnings and earnings growth.
Rapid growth or unusual profitability especially compared to that of other companies in the same
industry.
New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements.
Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third parties due
to the following:
Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional investors, significant
creditors, or other external parties (particularly expectations that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic),
including expectations created by management in, for example, overly optimistic press releases or annual
report messages.
Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive, including financing of major
research and development or capital expenditures.
Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment or other debt covenant
requirements.
Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending transactions,
such as business combinations or contract awards.
Information available indicates that management Information available indicates that the personal
or the board of directors’ personal financial financial situation of management or those charged
situation is threatened by the entity’s financial with governance is threatened by the entity’s
performance arising from the following:
financial performance arising from the following:
Significant financial interests in the entity.
Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, and earn-out
arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results,
financial position, or cash flow.
Personal guarantees of debts of the entity.
There is excessive pressure on management or There is excessive pressure on management or
operating personnel to meet financial targets set up operating personnel to meet financial targets
by the board of directors or management, established by those charged with governance,
including sales or profitability incentive goals.
including sales or profitability incentive goals.
21
a./1.
1.1
1.2
1.3.
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
b./2.
2.1
2.2
c./3.
3.1
3.2
3.3
d./4.
4.1
4.2
4.3
SAS 99
ISA 240
Opportunities
The nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provides opportunities to engage in fraudulent
financial reporting that can arise from the following:
Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related entities not
audited or audited by another firm.
A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that allows the entity to
dictate terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that may result in inappropriate or non-arm’s length
transactions.
Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective judgments
or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to period end that pose
difficult “substance over form” questions
Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in jurisdictions where differing
business environments and cultures exist.
Use of business intermediaries for which there
appears to be no clear business justification.
Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in [tax haven] jurisdictions for which there
appears to be no clear business justification.
There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
Domination of management by a single person or small group (in a non owner-managed business)
without compensating controls.
Ineffective board of directors or audit committee Ineffective oversight by those charged with
oversight over the financial reporting process and governance over the financial reporting process
internal control.
and internal control.
There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, as evidenced by the following:
Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity.
Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority.
High turnover of senior management, legal High turnover of senior management, legal
counsel, or board members.
counsel, or those charged with governance.
Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:
Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim financial
reporting (where external reporting is required).
High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or information technology
staff.
Ineffective accounting and information systems, Ineffective accounting and information systems,
including
situations
involving
reportable including situations involving material weaknesses
conditions.
in internal control.
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
12.1
12.2
12.3
12.4
SAS 99
ISA 240
Attitudes/Rationalizations
Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity’s values or ethical
standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards.
Nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of accounting
policies or the determination of significant estimates.
Known history of violations of securities laws or Known history of violations of securities laws or
other laws and regulations, or claims against the other laws and regulations, or claims against the
entity, its senior management, or board members entity, its senior management, or those charged
alleging fraud or violations of laws and with governance alleging fraud or violations of
regulations.
laws and regulations.
Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend
A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third parties to achieve
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.
Management failing to correct known reportable Management failing to correct known material
conditions on a timely basis.
weaknesses in internal control on a timely basis.
An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings for taxmotivated reasons.
Low morale among senior management.
The owner-manager makes no distinction between
personal and business transactions.
Dispute between shareholders in a closely held
entity.
Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the basis of
materiality.
The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is strained, as exhibited by
the following:
Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters.
Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding the completion of
the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report.
Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that
inappropriately limit access to people or inappropriately limit access to people or
information or the ability to communicate information or the ability to communicate
effectively with the board of directors or audit effectively with those charged with governance.
committee.
Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving attempts to
influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the selection or continuance of personnel assigned to or
consulted on the audit engagement.
23
Appendix 2: Press articles and SEC documents 17 used for the case studies
Company
Adelphia Communications
Ahold
AIG
AOL
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Cendant
Computer Associates
CMS Energy
Datek Online
Delphi
Dollar General
Duke Energy
Dynegy
El Paso Corporation
Enron
Freddie Mac
Global crossing
Halliburton
Harken Energy
HealthSouth
Homestore.com
HPL Technologies
ImClone Systems
K-Mart
Lucent
Merck
MicroStrategy
Network Associates
Peregrine Systems
Phar-Mor
Qwest
Reliant Energy
Rite Aid Corporation
Sunbeam
Tyco
Ullico
Waste management
WorldCom
Xerox
Total
Average
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum
When
scandal went Press articles
public
2002
5
2003
3
2005
4
2002
3
2002
6
1998
4
2002
4
2002
2
1998
3
2004
4
2002
3
2002
3
2002
3
2002
4
2001
3
2003
6
2002
3
2002
4
2002
4
2002
5
2002
3
2002
3
2002
4
2002
3
2004
3
2002
3
2000
6
2000
2
2002
4
1992
6
2002
4
2002
2
2002
4
1998
5
2002
3
2002
4
1999
2
2002
6
2000
3
146
3.7
1.2
2
6
17
Number
SEC
documents
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
1
2
1
1
1
1
0
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
0
2
4
4
49
1.3
0.8
0
4
Total
6
4
5
4
7
5
5
3
4
5
3
4
4
5
4
7
4
6
4
6
5
4
5
4
4
3
8
3
5
8
6
4
5
6
5
4
4
10
7
195
5.0
1.5
3
10
SEC documents listed in this Appendix were not directly used to fill Appendix 3 but only to understand the
technical and accounting aspects of the corporate fraud.
24
Appendix 3: Case studies of corporate scandals
This appendix presents a detailed analysis of the 39 corporate scandals. The components are classified according to the expectation gap analysis Level 1 components
(Incentives-pressures (col. 1), opportunities (col. 2), attitudes/rationalizations (col. 3)); Level 2 components: deficient performance gap (col. 4); Level 3 components: deficient
standards gap (col. 5) and “unreasonable expectations” (col. 6). A numbering system is used after each component to refer to SAS 99 and ISA 240 (see Appendix 1): In
column 5, the underlined elements are covered by ISA 240 but not SAS 99. FFR stands for “Fraudulent Financial Reporting” while “MA” represents a “Misappropriation of
Assets”. We mention after the company’s name the type of fraud. FFR is present in all the cases under study.
#
Companies
1.
Adelphia
Communicatio
ns (FFR – MA)
2.
Ahold (FFR)
3.
AIG (American
International
Group) (FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
To meet Wall Street
expectations (§ 2.1).
Ambition for the
group: to build an
empire.
Fixation on growth.
Compete with Wal
Mart (§ 1.1).
Launched mergers =>
debts => to hide
(§ 2.2)
Stock options (§ 3.2)
Pressure from the
financial
market
which was criticizing
the decline in AIG’s
reserves (§ 2.1)
Important shareholder
and share price (§ 3.1)
Stock options (§ 3.2)
Opportunities (2)
Family link (§ 2.1).
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
To meet Wall Street
expectations (§ 5).
Relationship with the
distributors (§ 1.2).
Stock options (§ 4)
Complex transactions
(§ 1.4).
Stock options (§ 4)
Obsessed by the daily
fluctuations in the
company’s
stock
price (§ 4)
25
Audit failure
(4)
Deficient standards gap
Unreasonable expectation gap
Level 3
(5)
(6)
Personal enrichment (§ 9).
Sees himself as someone very
generous and helpful. Money
used to help people.
According to him, he acted for
the good of the company, and
the good of the Company was
also his good.
To maintain a high leaving standard,
greed, “To have the funds to support
his lifestyle”.
Greed
Company’s success and CEO’s
personal success: reputation at stake
Managers’ personality (“Mass market
retailer of the year 2001”…)
Company’s success = CEO’s personal
success - Reputation – Pride “Imperial chief executive” - The
market would lose faith in the
company without him.
Managers’ personality: tyrannical,
nobody dared to oppose him.
#
Companies
4.
AOL (FFR)
5.
Bristol-Myers
Squibb (FFR)
6.
Cendant (FFR MA)
7.
Computer
associates
(FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Growth. To be able to
buy the “giant” Time
Warner (§ 1.1)
Pressure
of
the
financial
market:
considered advertising
revenues as important
to
measure
the
performance (§ 2.1.)
Share price (§ 3.1)
Stock options (§ 3.2)
To keep pace with
rivals by reporting
double-digit
profit
growth (§ 1.1)
To meet internal sales
and earnings targets
and analysts’ earnings
estimates (§ 2.1, 4)
Share price (§ 3.1)
Stock
options,
compensation bonus
(§ 3.2)
To make the merger
with HFS possible (§
1.1).
Stock options (§ 3.2).
Pressure to present
strong growth figures
(§ 2.1).
Stock options (§ 3.2).
Opportunities (2)
Use of estimates (§
1.3)
“Channel stuffing”
(sales to wholesalers)
(1.2)
Auditor located far
away (§ 2.2).
Manual accounting
systems (§ 4.3).
Domination
of
management by a
small group (§ 2.1).
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Stock options (§ 4).
Audit failure
(4)
Deficient standards gap
Unreasonable expectation gap
Level 3
(5)
(6)
Chairman: Narcissist person.
Stock options (§ 4)
Influence of the managers.
Firm’s culture of “making the
numbers”.
Managers’ personality (youngest
chief executive…)
Lack of experience.
Personal enrichment
with sale of stock
options (§ 4).
26
Personal enrichment: payment of
their living expenses (planes,
golf). Too high living expenses
(§ 9).
Donation to and promotion of
charitable causes.
Built day-care centers for their
children in CA offices
Awards received
managed company.
“Software titan”.
for
the
best
#
Companies
8.
CMS
(FFR)
Energy
9.
Datek
(FFR)
Online
10.
Delphi (FFR)
11.
Dollar General
(FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Performance-based
compensation, yearend bonus (§ 3.2).
To be a credible
marketer.
Possible
energy
market manipulation.
To follow Enron’s
example.
Growth and creation
of
a
group
of
companies.
To hide the bad
financial state (§ 1).
To
fund
pension
obligations.
To hide a dispute with
General Motors
To
meet
analyst
earnings expectations
(§ 2.1).
Increase of stock price
and sale of stocks (§
3.1).
Performance-based
salary (stock options,
incentives (§ 3.2).
Growth (§ 2.1).
Stock options (§ 3.2).
Opportunities (2)
“Round-trip”
(§ 1.1).
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Audit failure
(4)
Deficient standards gap
Unreasonable expectation gap
Level 3
(5)
(6)
trades
High standard of living (expensive
cars).
Personal enrichment: boosting the
revenues to increase year-end
bonuses.
Highly
complex
transactions (§§ 1.3,
1.4).
High standard of living (personal
plane).
“Technology wizard”.
CEO appears in many rankings.
Greed (performance-based salary).
Several
executives
involved (§ 2.1).
x
(§ 2.2).
Direct involvement
of the CEO in
preparing
the
company’s financial
results (§ 2.1).
Donation to endow a program on
moral leadership at a University.
27
Image of “marketing genius”.
#
Companies
Energy
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Performance-based
compensation, yearend bonus (§ 3.2)
12.
Duke
(FFR)
13.
Dynegy (FFR)
Salaries based on
performance (§ 3.2).
14.
El
Paso
Corporation
(FFR)
15.
Enron (FFR MA)
Success
and
profitability.
Top-rank of energy
traders.
Market power.
To complete a merger.
Ownership
and
increase of stock price
(§ 3.1).
Salaries based on
performance (§ 3.2).
Growth.
To
enter
the
burgeoning
deregulated
energy
markets
without
sacrificing the credit
rating.
16.
Freddie
(FFR)
Mac
To meet analysts’
expectations
(reduction of earnings)
Appearance
of
sustained, predictable
growth (§ 2.1).
Stock options (§ 3.2).
Opportunities (2)
“Round-trip”
(§ 1.1).
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Audit failure
(4)
Deficient standards gap
Level 3
(5)
trades
“Round-trip” trades
(§ 1.1).
Close
relationship
between executives.
“Round-trip” trades
(§ 1.1).
(6)
Personal enrichment: manipulation to
maximize the size of the year-end
bonuses and other performance-based
compensation
To be a leading global energy
company.
Personal enrichment
(stock price § 4).
Personal relationship
between executives.
Conflict of interest
for
the
auditor
(charity).
Corporate
culture
which
encourages
fraud to approximate
analysts’ forecasts.
Unreasonable expectation gap
x
Stock options (§ 4).
28
Personal enrichment: off-balance
sheet partnerships (§ 9).
Donation to the city’s art
museum, fund-raiser for the
local Holocaust Museum.
Influence of the CFO.
CFO: Image of financial genius,
arrogant, self confident.
Threat towards analysts.
Donation to charities.
Personnel ambition (to become the
CEO).
#
Companies
17.
Global crossing
(FFR - MA)
18.
Halliburton
(FFR)
19.
Harken Energy
(FFR)
HealthSouth
(FFR)
20.
21.
Homestore.com
(FFR)
22.
HPL
Technologies
(FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Sustainability of the
firm (§ 1).
To meet securities
analysts estimates (§
2.1).
Sale of shares (§ 3.1).
Bad state of the
economy
Sales of shares (§ 3.1).
Sales of shares (§ 3.1).
Pressure from the
market (§ 2.1).
Sales of shares (§ 3.1).
Salaries based on
earnings (§ 3.2).
Revenue
growth(advertising
revenue) (§ 2.1).
Contract with AOL
Sale of shares (§ 3.1).
Growth in revenues.
To be able to make an
IPO.
Collapsing markets of
Silicon Valley and the
world of high tech.
Opportunities (2)
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Audit failure
(4)
Swap of network
capacity (§ 1.1, 1.2).
Political link of the
managers.
Stock options (§ 4):
sale of stock options.
Political link of the
managers
Lack of experience of
certain
mid-level
executives.
Involvement of many
executives.
Fake
entries.
Insider trading.
Deficient standards gap
Level 3
(5)
(6)
Personal enrichment: Consulting
and real estate fees. Confusion
between company’s assets and
his own’s. (§ 9).
Greed, ambition: to build an empire
(“the Emperor of Greed”.
Personal enrichment: sale of shares
when the business was going bad.
Chairman is bright, aggressive and
has a huge ego. “Roman emperor”.
Greed
x
Donation to charities. Creation
of a church.
“Round-trip”
transactions (§ 1.1).
Fraud hidden to
auditors.
x
29
Unreasonable expectation gap
The CEO funneled his own
money to the company accounts
in an attempt to cover fake sales.
Passion for sports (purchase of a
football team).
Greed. Acquisition of planes, house
and yacht.
Wanted to be the “highest-paid CEO
in the world”.
CEO “terrorizing his colleagues and
employees” (and analysts and
journalists).
Power and influence (network).
Greed (sale of shares).
CEO’s power, ambition (the CEO
embodied the company).
Admired head of a fast-growing
software company.
#
Companies
23.
Im
Clone
Systems (FFR)
24.
K-Mart (FFR MA)
25.
Lucent (FFR)
26.
Merck (FFR)
27.
MicroStrategy
(FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Sales
of
shares
(insider trading) (§
3.1).
Competition
with
Wal-Mart (price war)
(§ 1.1).
Survival (weight of
debts).
Performance-based
bonuses, stock options
(§ 3.2).
Internal sales target.
External sales target
(§ 2.1).
Bonus on sales (§ 3.2).
Keep their job
To make the Company
look successful.
Growth in revenues.
To ease the IPO of a
subsidiary.
To boost the firm’s
share price.
Opportunities (2)
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Audit failure
(4)
Deficient standards gap
Level 3
(5)
Family link.
(6)
Personal enrichment.
Standard of living to maintain.
To pay debts (secured by the stocks).
Insider trading for himself and his
family. Protect the wealth of his
family and friends.
Junior
executives
were demoted or
transferred when they
refused to make
unrealistic forecasts.
Deficient
control.
Unreasonable expectation gap
Personal enrichment (personal
air travel), loans to themselves.
(§ 9).
internal
Personal enrichment: bonuses on each
sale they achieved.
Career: So as to keep their jobs and/or
to be promoted, by meeting the
internal sales targets.
No apparent personal
interest.
Total control of the
company.
x
Personal problems (alcohol).
CEO’s ego.
Impressed by wealth.
30
#
Companies
28.
Network
Associates
(FFR)
29.
Peregrine
Systems (FFR MA)
30.
Phar-Mor (FFR
- MA)
31.
Qwest (FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
To
become
the
world’s
leading
provider of network
security products
High growth rate
targets (§ 2.1).
Sale of stock options
(§ 3.2).
Performance
based
salary (§ 3.2).
Peregrine’s
success
and viability in the
short-run.
Insider trading (sale of
shares) (§ 3.1).
Stock options (§ 3.2).
To
restore
the
Company’s
profitability.
To meet earnings
projections (§ 2.1).
Double-digit growth
(§ 2.1).
Ambition:
mergers
needed
Insider trading (sale of
shares) (§ 3.1).
Bonus based on the
stock performance (§
3.2).
Opportunities (2)
Round-trip trades (§
1.1).
Family link (§ 2.1).
Outside
board
member = brother-inlaw of the chairman.
Deficient standards gap
Level 3
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Unreachable targets.
(§ 5).
Audit failure
(4)
Personal enrichment
(stock options) (§ 4).
x
(the auditor
even
encouraged
the fraud).
Acquisition of golf membership
(§ 9).
Donation to charities.
x
Personal enrichment (home, jet,
car…). (§ 9).
Very little oversight
inside the company.
Collusion
between
several
top
executives.
Unreasonable expectation gap
(5)
(6)
Career, image of competence.
CEO
bullying
his
employees
(“suicide
[is]
sometimes
an
appropriate response to failure”).
Influence of the CEO.
CEO fascinated his co-executives
(“god”).
Passion for sports (funding of a
basketball team).
Passion for burgeoning sports and
entertainment empire.
Ambition, thirst of power. To build
an empire
Not to lose face.
31
#
Companies
32.
Reliant Energy
(FFR)
33.
Rite
Aid
Corporation
(FFR)
34.
Sunbeam
(FFR)
35.
Tyco (FFR MA)
36.
Ullico (FFR)
37.
Waste
Management
(FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Ambition for the
company: make the
company one of the
best energy traders.
Enron’s
influence
(energy market).
To do better than his
father. => mergers =>
high debt.
Rite Aid as a powerful
retail company.
Sale of shares (§ 3.1).
Salaries based on
performance (§ 3.2).
Growth in earnings (§
2.1).
Sale of shares (§ 3.1).
Ambition: image of a
growth company.
Many
(expensive)
acquisitions
Unauthorized bonuses.
Stock options (insider
trading) (§ 3.1).
Earnings target (§
2.1).
Stock options (§ 3.1).
Bonus
based
on
performance (§ 3.2).
Opportunities (2)
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Audit failure
(4)
Deficient standards gap
Unreasonable expectation gap
Level 3
(5)
Round-trip trades (§
1.1).
New
field,
new
market (no one knew
what the size of the
market).
Family link (§ 2.1).
(6)
Executive’s career and image of
competence.
High standard living (helicopter).
Real estate transaction with the
family.
Ambition and competence.
Martin Grass was bullying his
employees and partners
x
x
Many executives and
directors involved.
x
32
Worldwide reputation, recognition
CEO considered as a miracle worker,
a genius by the business world.
Tyrannical CEO.
Personal enrichment (use of
loans for luxury apartments,
yachts, jewelry, parties) (§ 9).
Greed
Personal enrichment with sale of
shares.
Professional career.
#
Companies
38.
WorldCom
(FFR)
39.
Xerox (FFR)
Auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Deficient
performance
gap
Level 1
Level 2
Incentives/Pressures
(1)
Company’s
performance (§ 2.1).
Ever growing revenue
and income (§ 2.1).
To meet analysts’
forecast (§ 2.1).
To maintain the share
price.
Earnings target (§
2.1).
To boost the firm’s
share price
Increase
in
compensation
(including
stock
options) (§ 3.1, 3.2).
Opportunities (2)
Management
the truth.
hides
Opposition within the
board.
Attitudes/
Rationalizations (3)
Personal enrichment
(shares
of
the
company) (§ 4).
Audit failure
(4)
Personal enrichment
(shares
of
the
company) (§ 4).
x
33
Deficient standards gap
Unreasonable expectation gap
Level 3
(5)
(6)
Donation to charities. Fund
raising for the local college.
Scholarships, free telephone
service for hurricane victims.
Complicity between the CEO and the
CFO.
Autocratic boss.
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Zhang, P. (2007). The Impact of the Public's Expectations of Auditors on Audit Quality and
Auditing Standards Compliance. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(2), 631-654.
Zikmund, P. E. (2008). Reducing the Expectation Gap. CPA Journal, 78(6), 20-25.
37
Figure 1: Expectation gap and fraud
Auditor fraud detection
Audit expectation-performance gap
Perceived
performance
of auditors
Fraud triangle
Incentives
Opportunities
Society’s
expectations
of auditors
Performance gap
Attitudes /
Rationalizations
Reasonabless
gap
Deficient
performance
Deficient
standards
Unreasonable
expectations
Auditor
failure
Rationalizations
Differences with
ISA 240
Public
opinion
(through
the press)
Adapted and developed from Porter (1993)
38
TABLE 1
Explanation of fraud behaviors present in the auditing standards (fraud triangle)
Elements of the
fraud triangle
Incentives/
pressures
Items
Companies involved (anecdotal evidence)
High degree of competition or
market saturation
Profitability or trend level
expectations of investment
analysts, institutional investors,
significant creditors or other
external parties
Ahold, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Cendant, HPL
Technologies, K-Mart, Reliant Energy
Adelphia Communications, AIG, AOL, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Computer Associates, Delphi, Dollar General,
Freddie
Mac,
Global
Crossing,
HealthSouth,
Homestore.com, Lucent, Merck, MicroStrategy, Network
Associates,
Phar-Mor,
Qwest,
Sunbeam,
Waste
Management, WorldCom, Xerox
Ahold, Datek Online, Enron, HPL Technologies, K-Mart,
Merck, Rite Aid Corporation, Tyco
AIG, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Delphi, El Paso
Corporation, Global Crossing, Halliburton, Harken Energy,
HealthSouth, Homestore.com, Im Clone Systems,
Peregrine Systems, Qwest, Rite Aid Corporation, Sunbeam,
Ullico, Waste Management, Xerox
Ahold, AIG, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Cendant,
Computer Associates, CMS Energy, Delphi, Dollar
General, Duke Energy, Dynegy, El Paso Corporation,
Freddie Mac, HealthSouth, K-Mart, Lucent, Network
Associates, Peregrine Systems, Qwest, Rite Aid
Corporation, Waste Management, Xerox
CMS Energy, Duke Energy, Dynegy, El Paso Corporation,
Global Crossing, Homestore.com, Network Associates,
Reliant Energy
Ahold, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Global Crossing
Need to obtain debt or equity
financing to stay competitive
Significant financial interests in
the entity
Opportunities
Attitudes/
rationalizations
Significant portion of the
compensation being contingent
upon achieving aggressive
targets for stock price operating
results, financial position of
cash flow
Significant
related-party
transactions not in the ordinary
course of business
Strong financial presence or
ability to dominate an industry
Accounting figures based on
significant estimates
Significant, unusual, or highly
complex transactions
Domination of management by
a single person or small group
Ineffective board of directors or
audit committee oversight over
the financial reporting process
and internal control
Ineffective accounting and
information systems
Excessive
interest
by
management in maintaining or
increasing the entity’s stock
price or earnings trend
A practice by management of
committing
to
analysts,
creditors, and other third parties
to achieve aggressive or
unrealistic forecasts
The owner-manager makes no
distinction between personal
and business transactions
AOL, Datek Online
AIG, Datek Online
Adelphia Communications, Computer Associates, Delphi,
Dollar General, Enron, HealthSouth, Im Clone Systems, KMart, MicroStrategy, Peregrine Systems, Qwest, Rite Aid
Corporation, Ullico
Cendant, Delphi, Enron, Halliburton, HPL Technologies,
Merck, Peregrine Systems, Phar-Mor, Sunbeam, Tyco,
Waste Management, WorldCom, Xerox
Cendant, Lucent
Ahold, AIG, AOL, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Computer
Associates, El Paso Corporation, Freddie Mac, Halliburton,
Peregrine Systems, WorldCom
Adelphia Communications, Network Associates
Adelphia Communications, Cendant, Enron, Global
Crossing, K-Mart, Peregrine Systems, Phar-Mor, Tyco
39
TABLE 2
Deficient standards gap
Panel A - Rationalizations
Items
Charitable causes
Action for the good of the company
Companies involved (anecdotal evidence)
Adelphia
Communications,
Computer
Associates, Enron, Freddie Mac, HealthSouth,
and WorldCom
Ahold
Panel B – Difference SAS 99 – ISA 240
Items
Personal enrichment
Companies involved (anecdotal evidence)
Adelphia, Cendant, Enron, Global Crossing, KMart, Peregrine Systems, Phar Mor, Tyco
40
TABLE 3
Unreasonable expectations
Categories
Living standard
Reputation
Influence
Prize
Personality
Items
To maintain a high living standard
sometimes linked to a passion for
sports
Reputation at stake (company’s success
= personal success)
Influence of the managers
Influence of the CEO
Complicity between the CEO and the
CFO
Prize received
or superlative:
Personality
41
Companies involved (anecdotal evidence)
Adelphia
Communications,
Cendant,
Computer Associates, Datek Online,
HealthSouth, Im Clone Systems, Phar-Mor,
Rite Aid Corporation, Tyco
Harken Energy, Qwest
Ahold, AIG, Network Associates, Qwest
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Enron, Phar-Mor
WorldCom
Ahold, Computer Associates
- Youngest chief executive (BristolMyers Squibb)
- Marketing genius (Dollar General)
- Admired head of a fast-growing
company, very rich and very young
manager (Datek Online)
- Highest-paid CEO (HealthSouth)
- Worldwide recognition (Sunbeam)
- Financial wizard (CFO of WorldCom)
- Tyrannical/autocratic (AIG, Enron,
HealthSouth, Network Associates, Rite
Aid
Corporation,
Sunbeam,
WorldCom)
- Narcissistic (AOL)
- Encourages hero worship of executives
(Phar-Mor)
- Personal ambition - career (Freddie
Mac, Homestore.com, Reliant Energy,
Waste Management) or for the firm
(Global Crossing, Qwest)
- Alcoholic (MicroStrategy)