Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development http://www.bradford.ac.uk/ssis/peace-conflict-and-development/
Issue 21, March 2015
ISSN 1742-0601
Dr Saeed Ahmed Rid*
Abstract
Even after 65 years of their independence, India and Pakistan are locked in a deadly territorial conflict over Kashmir. Despite several mediation attempts and many rounds of bilateral negotiations, Kashmir still defies a solution. Fisher and Ury’s win-win solution in Getting to
Yes
1
is applied on India-Pakistan conflict to understand the nature of conflict and see how their four suggested methods can help addressing the deadlock in the peace process between India and
Pakistan. In the second part of the pape r Fisher and Ury’s method,
“focus on interests not positions” is used to understand the Indian fears and concerns behind India’s declared policy of calling Kashmir as their “integral part”. It is despite the fact that the first Indian Prime
Minister, Nehru had made solid pledges in UN and on other forums of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the right of selfdetermination of the people of Kashmir. An attempt is made to look at
Indian concerns more deeply and find out the possible ways of addressing them.
* Dr. Saeed Ahmed Rid has done his PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of
Bradford, UK. Currently he is working as a faculty member for National Institute of Pakistan
Studies (NIPS) in Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. Mr. Rid has read research papers in various international and national conferences and has published numerous articles on politics of
Pakistan. His two monographs were published by international publishers. One of the monograph
RCSS Policy Studies 49 coauthored with Indian scholar Sasmita Tripathy titled “Democracy as a
Conflict Resolution Model for Terrorism: A case study of India and Pakistan” is published by
Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo, Sri Lanka in 2010 and his masters thesis in Berkeley is published by the German publishers VDM Verlag in October 2010 in a book form titled “India Pakistan Peace Process: A Strategy for Removing the Deadlock in the Peace
Process”.
1 Fisher, Roger and Ury William (1991). Getting to Yes- Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In .
New York: Penguin Books.

Introduction
Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015
Conflicts between India and Pakistan are a by-product of the partition of
British India into two independent nation-states — India and Pakistan — in 1947.
Since independence, the two countries have fought three full-fledged wars (in years 1948, 1965 and 1971), and two limited wars (Brasstacks in 1988 and Kargil in 1999) with each other. The territorial dispute over Kashmir is a major bone of contention; however, this prolonged issue has developed several other smaller conflicts and sowed the seed of animosity far deeper in the two societies.
Several attempts were made by the United Nations and the international community in the first few decades after the Partition to resolve the India-
Pakistan disputes, but they failed to bring both the countries on the same page.
Later on, after the Simla Accord in 1972, both India and Pakistan have tried their best to resolve their conflicts through bilateral negotiations, but remained unsuccessful so far. In recent past, the Pakistan government has been found more willing to push for negotiations over Kashmir and find a compromise solution with India over Kashmir and other territorial disputes. From President
Musharraf (1999-2008) to the current Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif all Pakistani rulers have repeatedly made such overtures on several occasions whereas the
Indian side is found reluctant over going for a negotiated settlement for Kashmir and the other minor disputes like Siachin and Sir Creek. After the Mumbai blasts
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 in 2008 India has repeatedly brushed aside the calls of Pakistani governments for resumption of the bilateral composite dialogue framework.
In this paper Fisher and Ury’s four methods for finding a win-win solution are applied on the India-Pakistan conflict to see what they offer for resolving the
India-
Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. In second part, Fisher and Ury’s second method, “focus on interests, not positions” is used to understand the reasons and concerns behind Indian government’s reluctance over agreeing to a compromise in the negotiated settlement with Pakistan. An attempt is made to address Indian concerns in this regard and suggest steps to overcome their fears.
Fisher and Ury’s win-win solution and India-Pakistan conflict
Fisher and Ury’s Getting to Yes suggests important tools to negotiate complicated conflicts like in Kashmir by suggesting methods and steps in negotiation, which lead to a win-win solution. Fisher and Ury have suggested four methods, which could be very helpful for removing the deadlock in the peace process between India and Pakistan. Each point deals with a basic element of negotiation, and suggests what should be done about it. The four methods are;
People : Separate the people from the problem.
Interests : Focus on interests, not positions.
Options : Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
Criteria : Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.
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Fisher and Ury say, “A basic fact about negotiation, easy to forget in corporate and international transactions, is that you are dealing not with abstract representatives of the ‘other side’, but with human beings. They have emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds and viewpoints; and they are unpredictable”.
2
In the case of the India-Pakistan conflict, emotions, not only those of the negotiators but also of the bulk of the population from the two nations are involved. Therefore, before working on the substantive problem, the people problem should be disentangled from it and dealt with separately. The increased level of people-to-people contacts and multi-track diplomacy can be very helpful in dealing with the people problem The people to people contact initiatives like Pakistan India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy
(PIPFPD) and Aman ki Asha (the desire for peace) are two major people’s initiatives in South Asia promoting peace between India and Pakistan.
Fisher and Ury wrote, “Emotions typically become entangled with the objective merits of the problem. Taking positions just makes this worse because people’s egos become identified with their position……They now have a new interest in ‘saving face’-in reconciling future action with past positions-making
(and) it is less likely that an agreement will wisely reconcile the parties’ original interest”.
3
This is exactly what had happened with the Indian government when former Pakistani President General Musharraf had offered them several proposals on Kashmir in 2004-05. Persisting with rhetoric about India's
2
Fisher and Ury (1991), p.19.
3
Fisher and Ury (1991), p. 11.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 unwa vering stand on its territorial integrity and calling Kashmir its “integral part”
( atootang ), India initially did not respond positively to Musharraf’s proposals.
Indian sensitivity with the stance of ‘no internationalization of the Kashmir conflict’ and ‘no further geographical division’ was a result of taking this position for so long. A new interest in “saving face” before the Indian public opinion has now been attached with these two positions. Considering the Indian electoral politics it would be very difficult for any government to back track on these two positions. Indian rejection of all kinds of mediation offers of international organizations, individuals like Nelson Mandela and individual nation-states without giving them a try can also be explained by the saving face argument. The
Indian government keeps this stated position‘no internationalization of the
Kashmir conflict’- despite the fact that India had requested the US President, Bill
Clinton to intervene during Kargil war in 1999.
Fisher and Ury’s second method would help in resolving this problem- focus on interests, not positions
. “The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflict between each side’s needs, desires, concerns, and fears. Such desires and concerns are interests. Your position is something you have decided upon, your interests are what caused you to so decide”.
4
Therefore, focusing on interests, instead of position is a wiser course because ultimately it matters how much you have gained from a compromise rather than how much you have compromised on your position. Fisher and Ury
4
Fisher and Ury (1991), p.40
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 claim reconciling interests rather than positions works for two reasons. First, for every interest there usually exist several possible positions that could satisfy it.
Hence the wiser course for India and Pakistan is to focus on their interests and find out other possible positions, which might satisfy their respective interests jointly. Pakistan may ask India about their fears, concerns and desires behind their posi tion that the ‘geographical division of Kashmir’ is non-negotiable.
Secondly, focusing on interests would work because “behind opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests as well as conflicting ones”. These compatible interests need to be explored and exploited. Both India and Pakistan would like the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute for the stability of the region which would be politically as well as financially beneficial for them. Both would surely not like the Kashmiris to suffer forever. Both have a mutual interest in a closer friendly relationship with their closest neighbour. Manmohan Singh rightly says, “We can choose our friends, but we have no choice with neighbours”.
5
The Indian claim for a permanent seat in the UN would also get a boost and both countries would have more resources to invest in the development of their respective peoples.
But all these interests are sacrificed for the conflicting interests, which both countries are not very clear about except the fact that they both want
Kashmir. When Kashmir is detached from the rhetoric, emotions and sentiments one can ask both Indian and Pakistani leadership what interests the status quo is
5
Dawn, 02 February 2006.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 serving them? Would not any kind of resolution be more beneficial for them economically and politically than to keep fighting over Kashmir? They need to ask themselves, what interests in their realistic assessment they expect to achieve from Kashmir and what fears and concerns they exactly have from any territorial compromise on Kashmir?
I am sure if they can address their fears and concerns, then the merely territorial component of Kashmir conflict should not hinder their path to peace, considering the possible mutual gains from a compromise. To understand the nature of current deadlock in the peace process and to move ahead, those fears and concerns must be understood with clarity and objectivity.
Finally, there should be no objection on either side of the Wagah border to the principle that Kashmir is for Kashmiris and “the will of the people of Kashmir” should have the final say in any ultimate decision about the fate of Kashmir valley. Whatever options India and Pakistan finally decide to use and whatever the minimum interests and concerns they would like to ensure, they can agree on what Fisher and Ury term the objective criteria should be in their case that the final decision must be acceptable to the people of Kashmir, free from the will of either Pakistan or India.
Indian Fears and Concerns
Only Indian fears and concerns are discussed in detail here because currently it is the Indian side, which is not ready for a territorial compromise. The
Pakistani side is pushing for a territorial compromise in the current situation.
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Nonetheless, one might ask why Pakistan is unwilling to give up its historical claim on Kashmir altogether. The answer is, would it not be unfair to expect one side to give up its claim altogether on the negotiating table? Such a thing can only be expected in a humiliating defeat and even then nations do not normally accept the defeat as optimal solution-Alsace Loraine the old historical dispute between France and Germany is a case in point. The concessions must be two sided where both sides agree to give up something for a mutual gain.
Many historians and modern writers suggest that Kashmir was part of
Indian nationalist ideology right from 1947. Prof. Ron Hassner wrote in one of his articles that from the time of partition, the leadership of India and Pakistan was clear about the symbolic importance of Kashmir.
6
However, the history of
Kashmir dispute tells a different story, especially as far as Indian leadership was concerned. The historical evidence shows that Kashmir was entrenched in the
Indian nationalist ideology slowly and gradually. It is also evident from the fact that Indian historians take pains to prove that Kashmir accession was an historical accident rather than a well planned policy of the then Indian government.
7
The Indian government’s often reiterated position Kashmir is an integral part of India has not been there from very beginning, as it is often believed. In fact at the time of partition of the subcontinent, Indian leadership was not so sure
6
Hassner, Ron, E. (2006/07). The path to indivisibility: Time and the entrenchment of the territorial disputes. International Security , vol. 31, no. 3,
7
Winter, pp. 107-138.
See Gupta, Das (1968). Jammu and Kashm ir. The Hague: MarrtinusNijhoff.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 about whether they really wanted Kashmir to become part of India or not.
Professor Das Gupta wrote in his book “ Jammu and Kashmir ”, “Sardar Patel
(Nehru’s deputy prime minister and a hard-line right-wing Indian nationalist) even gave Mountbatten the authority to commit the Government of India to accepting
Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, should she so desire”.
8
It was not until the commencement of the constitution of Indian-held
Kashmir on 24 th
January 1957, that the Indian government officially started saying that Kashmir was the integral part of India. The constitution declared that the, “State is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India”, and that its territories “shall comprise all territories which on August 15, 1947, were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ruler of the State”.
9
This in other words meant territories under Pakistani control -- Azad Kashmir (the portion of valley under
Pakistani control) and the Northern areas of Giligit and Baltistan -- were also declared part of the Indian union to give the accession of Hari Singh, the last
Dogra ruler of Kashmir a constitutional cover. Before this Nehru had pledged on several occasions that the fate of Kashmir would be decided by the people of
Kashmir through their free will. On November 2, 1947 Prime Minister Nehru declared in his radio broadcast, “We have decided that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people………….. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under
8
Gupta (1968), p.102.
9
Gupta (1968), p.225.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people, and we shall accept their verdict.
10
Later on the government of India made the phrase ‘Kashmir is an integral part of India’ a cornerstone of its foreign policy and Kashmir became a sign of
Indian nationalism. Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state within the Indian union; therefore it is considered vital for the secular credentials of the Indian state. Kashmir is also attached with the ideological battle of the One Nation theory versus Two Nations Theory, which has its roots in the partition of the subcontinent. In other words, the argument goes that Kashmir as a Muslim majority province within India proves the fact that the partition of India on the basis of Two Nation Theory was a farce.
The Indian position on Kashmir is clear and not subject to political debate.
Any arrangement that cedes portions of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (the only majority Muslim state in India) to Pakistan is not acceptable. India is unwilling to lose even one additional hectare of this land.
The Indian fears and concerns behind this unwavering stand on Kashmir are also clear. For India any territorial compromise with Pakistan would be tantamount to accept the failure of One Nation Theory and the principle of plural and secular India. New Delhi is also concerned that compromising on separatist tendencies in Kashmir might lead to the fragmentation of other Indian states on
10
Lamb, Alastair (1966). Crisis in Kashmir 1947-1966 . London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, pp.47-48.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 the basis of religion, ethnicity, language or sub-national identity (e.g. Punjab or
Assam).
Hence, we can sum up; behind Indian insistence on its territorial integrity they have basically three fears and concerns. Their first concern is India will lose moral ground to exist (raison d’etre and failure of the one nation theory), secondly it will be the defeat for secular and plural India, thirdly this will disintegrate India into several small states and thus united India will cease to exist.
Addressing Indian Fears and Concerns
The first and foremost requirement for peace between India and Pakistan would be to overcome the debate of One Nation versus Two Nations. People and governments in two countries should understand Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are unalterable realities now and their sovereign and independent existence should be accepted with an open heart.
In June 2005 a statement to this effect by main opposition leader in India and the President of the right-wing Bhartya Janta Party (BJP), Mr.Lal Krishan
Advani, started a new debate on the issue and also created a big rift within his own party. During his three-day visit to Pakistan, Mr.Advani was reported in the press saying, “The emergence of India and Pakistan as two separate, sovereign an d independent states is an unalterable reality of history”. His next statement in the same press conference touched the real heart of the problem: “Let there be no place for anti-Indianism in Pakistan, and no place for anti-Pakistanism in
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India”.
11
Mr.Advani was accurate if he meant to say there should be no anti-
Pakistan or anti-India constituency in the two countries if they have to live together in peace. However, his own political party, BJP and Mr.Advani personally are accused of inciting and then using the same anti-Pakistan constituency to reach the power corridors in New Delhi twice.
The debate over One Nation versus Two Nations is irrelevant considering the present day scenario. The people of the two countries should realize that they have nothing to achieve from this useless debate now, which has no value other than opening the old wounds. History has also proved that the partition in
1947 was more an issue of political interests and fear of marginalization than simply an issue of One Nation versus Two Nations . These two factors always constitute the real basis behind any nationalist movement. Identity can be created easily on ethnic, religious, cultural or regional basis by focusing on factors of unity for ‘in-group’ and on factors of differences for ‘out-group’, provided genuine concerns or fears of marginalization exist.
The break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate, sovereign and independent state is a proof to this effect. It was not a victory of one nation theory or the failure of the two nations theory as generally argued in India rather the independence of Bangladesh has proved that behind the debate of one nation and two nations the real issue was that of the political power and the fear of marginalization. Had it been a failure of Two Nations and a
11
Dawn 03 June, 2005.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 victory of One Nation then East Pakistan would have become part of India and not an independent Bangladesh. This is the reality which neither Indian nor
Pakistani nationalists are willing to understand. The same logic of marginalization and political interests will apply to all secessionist and nationalist movements in both India and Pakistan like Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Indian
Punjab in India, and in Baluchistan and Sindh in Pakistan.
Using the constructivist approach, as nationalist ideology was gradually constructed around Kashmir after the partition there now is a need to deconstruct the same and separate Kashmir from the nationalist ideologies of India and
Pakistan. This can be achieved by understanding the history of partition jointly by looking at it from the human perspective rather than just from the Indian or the
Pakistani perspective. The historians, writers, media men and intelligentsia in the two countries need to work collectively for this purpose. The joint creative peace moves by these people would make a big difference. The increased level of interaction between two peoples and sharing those stereotypes openly with each other would help. Changing the collective understanding about each other by throwing away the historical baggage after learning proper lessons from it and by giving new definitions and meanings to the material world with the help of human capacity of learning or reflection, would make it possible for the two people to over come their national bias and see the issues of confrontation on their real merits.
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The inclusion of Kashmir with the concept of secular India was also a later inclusion. Even the word “secular” itself was made part of the preamble of the
Indian constitution only in 1976 by the 42 nd
Amendment.
12
However, Nehru is considered as founder of the secular India and he indirectly attached the Kashmir issue with his concept of Indian secularism much earlier than this date. Rejecting the territorial compromise with Pakistan on Kashmir Nehru was quoted in an interview in 1956:
“I say we cannot accept that because once we accept that nationality goes by religion, we break up our whole concept of India.” 13
(Sharma
2001:53-6). Well a question could be raised, if accepting the partition in 1947 did not break the whole concept of India then how come a mutual compromise on
Kashmir can break it? Adding further to the debate it should be noted that these were the initial days when Nehru officially rejected the plebiscite on Kashmir
It is really a strange argument that keeping Kashmir, even by means of force, proves the secular credentials of India, as it is the only majority Muslim state within the Indian union. Yet India as an extremely diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and plural society does not need the only Muslim majority state
Kashmir to prove this fact. If 138 million Muslims, which are 13.4 % (2001 census figures) of the total Indian population, can live in India with pride and respect that
12
Nayar, Sanjeev (2004). Secularism, An International Perspective. February 2.
Available at: http://esamskriti.com/html/inside.asp?cat=670&subcat=669&cname=Secular_rediff
[accessed on 02 August 2010]
13
Sharma, Usha (ed.) (2001). Political Development in Jammu, Kashmir and
Ladakh . New Delhi: Radha Publications, p.53.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 would be the real proof of the Indian secularism rather than holding one majority
Muslim state Kashmir with the help of armed forces
– the state has the highest troops to civilian population ratio worldwide. The continuation of the Kashmir dispute and enmity with Pakistan has its impact on the lives of Indian Muslims and the rise of Hindutva, extremist Hindu movements within India.
A study by Hilal Ahmed reveals how pre-partition rivalry between Hindus and Muslims still haunted Indian Muslims in the 21 st
century India. Studying the process of monumentalization in colonial India from 1850 to 1904, he has pointed out that the monuments constructed during the Muslim rule of India were not categorized on religious grounds before 1850. He argues after 1850, “(t)he listing and categorization of archaeological buildings as a source of history on religious bases provided a fixed religious identity to these historic sites. As a result, every single historical object became a part of a larger ‘communal’ grouping. In this sense, the religious categorization legitimized the colonial notion of ‘Muslim invasion’ and ‘Hindu resistance’”.
14
The demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 by Hindu extremists was a result of this religious categorization which has been kept alive because of the continuing enmity with Pakistan and the lingering
Kashmir conflict. Otherwise after sixty plus years of the partition secular India should have been able to dilute this religious categorization.
14
Ahmed, Hilal (2006). The community of monuments and the monuments of a community: understanding the idea of an ‘Indian Muslim architectural heritage. paper presented in BASAS Annual Conference and AGM 2006 , 19-21 April 2006,
Birkbeck College, University of London, UK.
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Hence peace with Pakistan and amicable resolution of the Kashmir dispute would surely enhance the secular profile of India rather than reducing it by any means. It will have a very positive impact on curbing the religious extremism within India. Anti Pakistan and anti Muslim vote, which is a real threat to the secular India might cease to exist in the Indian politics or get really marginalized. The political leadership and the civil society in India and Pakistan need to work together on separating the Kashmir issue from secularism and
Islam because it would be really difficult to resolve the Kashmir conflict if it remains attached with such grand ideas which are so dear to the people in the two countries respectively. There can be a compromise on a territory but compromising on secularism or Islam is not possible.
There is a need to revisit the history of partition, learn from the past mistakes, and acknowledge the fact that human suffering at the time of partition was a common phenomenon on both sides of the border. The people in two countries can use the human capacity for reflection and learning to separate
Kashmir from the national ideologies of the two countries and see the issue on its real merits.
In this regard the South African model of Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) can also be considered. TRC provided a historic bridge among different South African communities of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice of the apartheid period and founded new South Africa on the recognition of human rights,
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 democracy, and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all
South Africans.
15
Though there are stark differences in South African and South
Asian examples, still the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Asia would be very helpful in dealing with the wounds of partition and later history of
Hindu-Muslim divide in India. The commission can be constituted by passing an act of parliament by the Indian and Pakistani parliaments on the model of the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of the South African parliament. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper, a comparative study of some other TRC experiences in the other parts of the world would help in finding a suitable example for South Asia.
The third and the most important Indian concern on territorial compromise over Kashmir is their fear that it will trigger a disintegration drive in the other problematic regions like Assam, Nagaland and Punjab. Equating Kashmir with
Assam, Nagaland and Punjab is not only unjustified but also a joke with the history of the partition. The case of Kashmir is unique as compared to the other secessionist movements in India because Kashmiris have never been given the right of self-determination, which was vaguely promised in the partition plan, but was promised in very clear terms at the forum of the United Nations by the first
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. On the other hand Assam, Nagaland and Punjab were given this chance and they expressed their will to join the
Indian union at the time of the partition. Therefore, Assam, Nagaland and Punjab
15
Tutu, Desmond, Mpilo (1999). No Future Without Forgiveness . New York:
Doubleday.
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 are purely internal problems of India whereas India is not justified in its claim that
Kashmir is also its internal problem. Kashmir is a border dispute between India and Pakistan, which has remained unresolved since the partition and both sides can rightly blame each other for not resolving it for so long. Indian government also accepts the disputed status of Kashmir de facto by holding talks with
Pakistan on Kashmir but they are unwilling to accept it de jure.
The freedom struggle in Kashmir has its own dynamics and it has no direct link with any of the secessionist movements active in other parts of India.
The secessionist movements basically emerge from alien feelings and issues involving control over resources. Indian government has been successful to control somehow the alien feelings in Assam by dividing it into several states. In
1948, Arunachal Pradesh was separated from Assam, and in 1963 Nagaland, in
1972 Meghalaya and in 1987 Mizoram. The separatist movements in the North
East and Punjab are indigenous movements with no direct link with Kashmir.
Therefore any change in Kashmir should not have a direct impact on them.
A change in the status of one state successfully triggers similar changes in the other problematic regions only if the Nation-State itself becomes very weak and starts crumbling just like the Turkish Empire crumbled in l9th century, and former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the end of the cold war. There is no comparison between emerging great power status of India with those declining nation-states. The fact that independence of Bangladesh in 1971 could not trigger disintegration in the West Pakistan despite the fact that nationalist
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 movements in Baluchistan, Khybar Pakhtunkhwah (formerly NWFP) and Sindh were quite strong at that time and had some links with Bengali nationalists as well could be cited as a proof that the Indian fear of disintegration is not well founded.
Hence, any territorial compromise which in no way would be India giving the whole of Kashmir to Pakistan, could have any direct impact on other regions within India. Pakistan government and the separatist Kashmiri leadership of All
Parties Hurriat Conference (APHC) recognizes that it would be wrong to presume that India would just give into demands of free Kashmir, or for Kashmir to join
Pakistan.
16
Therefore, they are no more looking for these options. In fact APHC, the major separatist group in Kashmir, are now asking for tripartite talks (India,
Pakistan and Kashmiri representatives) to find a middle ground, which could be acceptable to all the parties concerned.
Here again the Constructivist approach would be helpful. If the Indian leadership and intelligentsia is willing to reach for a compromise with Pakistan they can use ‘the human capacity for reflection and learning’ to deconstruct the fear of disintegration among Indian masses. While discussing the resolution formulae with Pakistan and Kashmiri leadership this Indian concern can also be taken care of. But before entering the meaningful negotiations stage on resolution formulae, the Indian public opinion needs to be convinced that any compromise on Kashmir would not lead to the disintegration of the Indian union.
16
The Nation, 10 March 2005.
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The way these fears and concerns are constructed around Kashmir over the years by the political leadership has made them a part of the implicit ideology of the Indian public opinion. There is a need to start a serious debate within
Indian media and intellectual circles about these fears and concerns. The
Pakistani government and civil society groups should also work on separating
Kashmir from Islam and the two-nation theory.
The current generation in the two countries has this gigantic task at their disposal to deconstruct all those fears, concerns, stereotypes and belligerent identities, which were constructed by their fore-fathers. Otherwise, it will be really hard for both sides to reach at any sort of agreement. If both Indian and Pakistani governments are really serious for peace they need to explain their fears and concerns very clearly to each other and seek and offer help wherever possible.
Conclusion
Addressing the fears and concerns of parties in conflict is important to bring them towards the path of peace. In this paper an attempt is made to address the major fears of the Indian side on a possible compromise with
Pakistan on Kashmir.
Fisher and Ury’s
Getting to Yes provided a very useful insight into the India-Pakistan conflict. It helped to identify the Indian fears and concerns behind their positions which are stalling the peace process.
The three Indian fears and concerns are identified in this research paper that hampers a compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir. First of all India fears
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Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development – Issue 21, March 2015 any compromise with Pakistan would mean a defeat of the One Nation theory versus the Two Nations theorythe raison d’être of Indian state. Secondly, it amounts to the defeat of Indian secularism versus Islam. Finally, they fear any compromise on Kashmir will ultimately lead to the complete disintegration of
India as other separatist movements in India will demand the same deal. In this paper all three fears are analysed in detail and addressed one by one with historical evidence and arguments. Addressing the above mentioned Indian fears and concerns will help preparing a ground for moving ahead in the peace process and arriving at an amicable solution of the disputes between the two countries.
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