EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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European Federalism:
Slicing the Marble Cake of Sociological Identity and Rational Interests
Roy Taylor
University of Washington Department of Political Science
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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Abstract
“If I had to do it again, I would begin with culture.” Jean Monnet’s Federalist vision of a united
Europe was radically integrative for a time period characterized by continental strife, and
conflicted sharply with the muted tones of Churchill’s Unionist approach1. Today, though the
European Union is expanding both territorially and in the powers its transnational structure may
legitimately employ, the central conflict between the supremacy of the Union verses the
supremacy of its Member States characterizes sharp contrasts in citizen identification with and
support of Union institutions, and that these differences lie clearly along national boundaries.
Quintessentially, all analysis of normative identity genesis and propagation must first begin,
then, with the institutions and the circumstances wherein different states chose to join. I contend
that, though both Rationalist and Sociological2 explanations offer uniquely important insights
into different State behaviors within the context of European integration, only Constructivism
can explain citizen support of, and thus policy aimed at, the Federalization of Europe in spite of
the sovereignty and/or economic concerns unification raises. Further, I argue that Keohaneschool Neoliberal Institutionalism still accurately describes European Union behavior where
those of Constructivism fail, and that only through applying both theories in the framework of
Domains of Application3, and only through analyzing where those domains cross (or do not
cross) can we understand the pace and extent of Federal growth. I will begin by exploring
1
Monnet actually proposed a complete political union between France and Britain during WWII—what he referred
to as an “indissoluble union” of governments and cultures—though Churchill declined. (Dinan 16)
2
Though realism, neorealism, liberals, neoliberalism, and functionalism could all easily fall under the umbrella of
Rational Choice Theory—likewise for Constructivism and Behavioral Economics/Psychology and Sociological
Theory—I will concentrate the explanatory apparatus of this essay exclusively on Constructivism and
Neoliberalism. For an exploration of why I have disregarded Rationalism, refer to Appendix A. For an exploration
of why I have disregarded Behavioral Economics and Psychology, refer to Appendix B.
3
“The domain of application approach strives for a minimal synthesis in the sense that, although rationalism and
constructivism might appeal to completely independent explanatory factors, when combined they could increase
our ability to explain the empirical world.” (Jupille et. al. 21) In this sense, domains of application are a way of
rectifying differences between two successful theories without violating the integrity of the other.
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
European institutions (compared to American federalism) as elite-designed4 mechanisms for
facilitating loyalty transfer beyond National boundaries under the Constructivist framework.
From there, I will present evidence supporting the emergence of Civic and will look at potential
reinforcement of Cultural5 Pan-European identity as emergent from the incremental growth of
these institutions into a supranational regime. This established, I will confront the boundaries of
the Domain of Application question and explore the concept of “Liberal-minded” state citizens
verses “Identity-minded” state citizens. Finally, I will propose future areas of academic research
concentration to test the validity of this model.
4
5
Read: entrepreneurial norm-creation
Bruter
3
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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European Federalism
1—Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire: Institutions of Supranational Federalization
The process of uniting independent, sovereign states into a “supra-state” entity, herein
referred to unambiguously as Federalization, immediately raises State-level balance of power
concerns. In analyzing the nature of this problem and how it interrelates with the structure,
purpose, and application of European Union (herein referred to as the EU) transnational
governance agencies, it behooves us to yield attention to the process of American federalization.
In comparing and contrasting the two, insights to legitimacy and graduated integration should
become apparent. Additionally, guidelines for analyzing present- and future-loyalty transfer will
be illuminated.
Ratification of the American Constitution characterized intellectual struggle between
cultural elites. On the one hand, the American Federalist school—led in literature by Hamilton,
Madison6, and Jay, and in practice by Washington, Adams, et. al.—favored a Post-AoC7
government wherein supranational8 institutions, codified under interstate law, would reign
supreme. Opposing this viewpoint were the Jefferson-school Anti-Federalists, later reorganized
as the Democratic Republicans, seeking weaker governmental integration9 in favor of States’
Rights. Federalists, predominantly from urban areas, capitalized on the democratic deficit
produced by poor communication lines to rush into ratification the Constitution before AntiFederalist voters, confined to agricultural and frontier regions, could voice their dissent at a
6
Who later recanted and became a staunch ally of Thomas Jefferson
Articles of Confederation
8
If we model American colonies as actual States, which, given their veto power and broad treaty-formation
powers in International and Intercolonial affairs, is certainly a tolerable approximation
9
At this point, due to the endogenous shock of the War for American Independence and the homogenized ethnoth
religious nature of 18 Century America, socio-cultural integration was of a lesser importance (or necessity) than
formal, governmental integration. Needless to say, Jefferson, and later Calhoun, could not have predicted the
geographic political-cultural separation that precipitated the American Civil War.
7
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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policy-making level.10 Ultimately, the Federalists won through11, and it is their Institutions that
are of interest to this analysis.
Europe’s “founding fathers” expressed similar concerns over the scope of supranational
integration, and fragmented into two schools accordingly: the Unionists, first headed by Winston
Churchill12, and the Monnet-school of Federalism lead in practice by Altiero Spinelli. Also
spurred by the endogenous shock of two world wars13, Federalist European leaders at first sought
to displace nationalism with lasting integration14,15. Despite the early failures of the Hague
Congress to embrace a truly federalist institutionalization, the framework for institutionalizing
such a government itself was widely accepted16. Over time, however, prospects for European
enlargement in the wake of Delors’ success on the question of Spanish admission combined with
institutional shortcomings in addressing issues of international economics to provide an
acceptable climate for supranational governmental reform17. This ultimately culminated in the
10
A problem, it should be noted, that does not exist in modern, post-telecommunications Europe.
Though, at the behest of Anti-Federalist objections, they capitulated and compromised on the Bill of Rights,
th
th
whose 9 and 10 Amendments codified strict limitations on the Federal Government by abrogating from those
institutions the powers not explicitly named in the Constitution proper, and bestowing them upon the citizens and
the member-States. (The Constitution 817)
12
“Churchill advocated a far more limited and cautious form of European integration than did many of his
continental colleagues. The United Europe Movement, which Churchill launched in May 1947, prompted what
became known as the “unionist” position, as distinguished from the more radical “federalist” position of Spinelli
and his Union of European Federalists.” (Dinan 15)
13
"Monnet argued that there would be no peace in Europe 'if States reestablished themselves on the basis of
national sovereignty with all that this implies by way of prestige politics and economic protectionism.' Instead,
Monnet argued, 'the States of Europe must form a federation or a European entity which will make them a single
economic entity.'" (Dinan 11)
14
(Loughlin 143)
15
This begs the question, why the Second World War? Certainly the First had enough of an impact on European
security to spur integration efforts. In fact, it did. Austro-Hungarian Coount Coudenhove-Kalergi, in Pan-Europa,
argued for integration of sorts, but this effort was disrupted by the breakout of the Second World War. (Dinan 14)
16
“Both sides agreed only on the desirability of European unity and on the need to institutionalize it by
establishing an international organization with a parliamentary body. For unionists, that body would be merely a
consultative assembly bound to defer to the committee of government ministers. For federalists, by contrast, it
would be a constituent assembly charged with drafting a constitution…” (Dinan 15)
17
(Dinan 103)
11
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Luxembourg Single European Act18 and the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in 1992.
From this rhetorical shift toward integration, several key institutions emerged which, when
compared to American federal structures, show clear similarities in design to 1) consolidate
power into a supranational authority while 2) avoiding conflagrations of balance-of-power
politics19 and 3) preserving legitimacy in the eyes of those governed.
TABLE 1: INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS20
EUROPEAN
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Primarily responsible for short-term policy-making, the
Concilium is fragmented into sub-councils on specific issues21.
Leaders are appointed by member-State governments.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The only directly-elected body of the EU24 and roughly25
proportions votes according to population.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Better known as the Summit, the European Council is made up
of the popularly-elected heads-of-state from each memberState government27.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Led by a President and his ministry, both dictated by memberState heads-of-state, the Commission is the bulwark of
European executive bureaucracy, with twenty-three Directorate
Generals and sixteen services analogous to American
“Departments.”28
COURT OF JUSTICE
Formed of 27 justices—one from each state—the ECJ’s
18
AMERICAN
SENATE
Prior to the 17th Amendment22, the Senate consisted of
appointed officials sent by the legislatures of American State
governments23. The modern Senate (and House) both employ
committees for specific issues.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Originally the only directly-elected body of the United States,
and, in accordance with the Connecticut Compromise, directly
proportional to population26.
GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATIONS
Unlike most American institutions, Governors’ Associations
are much less formal, and were not codified in Constitutional
law, but rather emerged endogenously to coordinate policy
between leaders of States with similar political leanings.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Led by a President and his Cabinet, the American Executive
Branch differs from the EU’s in that the President wields more
direct authority over his government. American Presidents
appoint their own Secretaries, analogues to the European
Ministers and Directorate Generals.
SUPREME COURT
Formed of 9 justices—appointed by the President and
Ultimately this would set the stage for the Euro and the Schengen Zone. “The conference had little difficulty
endorsing the goal of an internal market, defined as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.’ But negotiations on the steps necessary to bring it
about were predictably pugnacious.” (Dinan 109)
19
What I lovingly refer to as “Ball and Chain” federalism—States wanted to avoid complete loss of sovereignty.
20
I have omitted comparison of the Court of Auditors due to its lack of an obvious analogue in American
government. Similar structures do exist in America, but exist less as formal institutions and more as expansions of
the civil service to effectively limit transaction cost in government operations. Such American institutions include
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Further, I have reserved discussion of the Central Bank and the Federal
Reserve for later.
21
(Staab 59)
22
(The Constitution 820-821)
23
(The Constitution 804)
24
(Staab 65)
25
“The number of members allotted to each country does not perfectly reflect the size of its population. For
example, an MEP from Luxembourg represents sixty thousand fellow citizens, whereas his or her colleague from
Germany represents […] around eight hundred thousand.” (Staab 65)
26
(The Constitution 803)
27
(Staab 54)
28
(Staab 47-49)
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
primary function is analysis of EU Law in the context of
conflicts and treaties. The Court issues only a single opinion,
and hears cases through requests from parties, though most
parties must first press their cases before National courts29. The
ECJ has the authority to clarify or dismiss national laws in the
context of supranational ones.30
7
confirmed by the Senate—the Supreme Court also acts as
highest-appellate court and final arbitrator in disputes.
Supreme Court authority to nullify Federal or State laws,
though not Constitutionally granted, has been accepted stare
decisis through the Marshall Court case Marbury v. Madison.
Parties must appeal to the Court from lower Federal courts—
analogues to Europe’s National courts—by pleading for a Writ
of Certiorari.
The three points aforementioned form the “crux of balance” in federalizing aspirations,
and analysis of the European Institutions—compared to their American iterations—clearly shows
an intent to ameliorate these various tensions in the foundation of the framework for
evolutionary, incremental integration31. Further, through careful implementation of integrationoriented institutions, Constructivists argue, normative loyalties—identities—and opinions of
legitimacy can form and propagate through the governed populations, in turn shaping discourses,
interests, and preferences of States at an international level32, and that through this process,
Institutions take on a governing supranational power of their own33.
Experimentally, these attempts have been successful at cultivating the “identity” and
“loyalty transfer” mechanisms requisite for true integration into a “United States of Europe,” as
Churchill famously proclaimed in Zurich. These themes will be explained in Part 2.
29
(Staab 74-75)
“Even brasher was the ECJ’s statement that the EU constituted a new legal order whose subjects were not only
members states but also their nationals, who then also enjoyed a set of rights.” (Staab 77)
31
“Throughout these reforms, the European Union has indeed become a fully institutionalized political entity with
a comprehensive set of executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. […] However, unlike national bodies,
European institutions cannot be classified only along functional typologies (legislative, executive, judicial) but also
show very significant structural differences. Indeed, the various institutions of the European Union could be
divided into ‘integrative’ bodies (e.g., the European Parliament and the European Commission) and
intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the Council of Ministers). Integrative bodies work as supranational institutions that
take decisions, so to speak, like a ‘federal’ government, without consideration for the balance of power […]
Intergovernmental institutions, on the other hand, make decisions in a co-operative mode with all infra-federal
members represented as such.” (Bruter 68)
32
“Constructivists argue that international institutions and organizations are able to disseminate norms that may
eventually change state conceptions of their self-interest.” (Caporaso and Madeira 116)
33
“…also argue that international organizations play a role that goes far beyond the neoliberal claim that
institutions merely reduce transaction costs to facilitate cooperation between states. Barnett and Finnemore argue
that international organizations exercise autonomous power over states in way that states could not have
anticipated when these organizations were created.” (Caporaso and Madeira 116)
30
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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2—Symbols and Governance as Mutually-Constitutive: European Culture vs. Citizenship
What, exactly, is Identity34? In this essay, I assume the definition of identity presented by
Jupille et. al.35 and the categorization postulated by Bruter36 of “civic” (that is, identifying with
the institutions themselves, therein granting them legitimacy and passively deferring to their
authority) and “cultural” (that is, associating as “European” instead of as “German,” etc.)
identity. Accruing credibility—that is, establishing a civic identity—was, naturally, one of the
strongest concerns of Eurofederalists,37 and can clearly be reflected in the attempt to solve for
democratic deficit38 while maintaining a legitimate, legislative authority39.
Of course, in attempts to supplant nationalism, the cohesive cultural glue that catalyzes
unification in other cases—America after the Revolution, Germany under Bismarck and, later,
after the merging of East and West—is ex ante lacking from European integration. Further,
lacking this “supranational nationalism,” it should be apparent that European national identities
would not simply disappear. In fact, they seem to build upon themselves—those identifying
strongly as “German” also identify strongly as “European,” and so forth40,41. Analysis should
34
It is here that we inject Wendt’s concepts of norms in the context of “anarchy [as] what states make of it.” This
can be demonstrated thus: “A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act
toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.” (Art and
Jervis, 70)
35
“The relationships between identity, interests, preferences, and loyalties are not clear. Briefly, identity can be
seen as self-conception rooted in society, a sense of who we are in relation to others. Both individual and social
components are integral to identity. Because of this dual nature, identities are less concrete than interests but
more substantial than preferences.” (Caporaso 2005: 2-3)
36
“The first, a cultural perspective, would analyze political identities as the sense of belonging […] The second, a
civic perspective, would see political identities as the identification of citizens with a political structure, such as a
State, which can be defined as the set of institutions, rights, and rules…” (Bruter 12)
37
(Bruter 63)
38
By granting citizens direct election powers into the European Parliament
39
“Citizens express perceptions regarding the design and functioning of their political institutions: are institutions
"fair" in the way they function? Are they democratic, transparent, efficient? Does the design of an institutions-enable it to make decisions soundly, quickly, and with a guarantee of sufficient public debate?
(Bruter 67)
40
(Bruter 115)
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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then look first at civic identity and later at structures that might encourage cultural identity
genesis. Can such an approach yield conclusions consistent with current public opinion and State
behavior? Yes and no42.
The Eurobarometer43 offers insight into the development of European identity,
particularly in the framework of loyalty transfer from national to trans- and supranational polity.
While national identity correlates positively with supranational identity, the inverse is true for
loyalty. Europeans, increasingly, place more and more trust—and hence legitimacy—in EU
institutions than in their own national ones, and this trend is established at least in the time period
between 1995 and 2003, when Bruter’s analysis of the Eurobarometer first occurred44.
Furthermore, very recent trends show more trust placed in the Commission than the Parliament,
relative to national Executive and Legislative branches45, suggesting that the democratic deficit
has been “solved,” and that a true and lasting legitimacy has been established the European
Union as a body-beyond-representation—that is, that the “European social contract” has been
accepted. This bodes well for the Constructivist theory, as it suggests strongly the formation of
Pan-European identity—in the weak sense, politically, and in the strong (and as yet
undemonstrated) sense, culturally46.
41
“Indeed, the highest average level of European identity is reached by the French sample, which also has the
highest level of national identity, while the lowest average level of European identification is that of the Dutch
sample, which also has the lowest level of national identification.” (Bruter 116)
42
For where it fails, refer to Part 3.
43
Which Bruter is careful to point out ignores any hypothesized difference between civic and cultural identification
44
(Bruter 70-71)
45
(Bruter 70-71)
46
“The first important finding is that undoubtedly, the mass media, by disseminating good or bad news on Europe
and European integration has a strong identity-building power over the citizens of the European Union. All three
regressions show that European identity can--and, indeed does--vary over time as a result of media
communication. [...] The regression coefficient--which assesses the influence of the variable on European identity-of news on Europe is statistically significant and unexpectedly high. Equally strong is the fact that exposure to
symbols of European integration is similarly conducive to higher levels of European identity--in general, civic, and
cultural components, for citizens across countries. This confirms the hypothesis formulated earlier [...] that
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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Constructivists also place a tremendous weight on the power of symbols and discourse in
the flow of norms, particularly those of identity. Correlating strongly with the positive
association of national with supranational civic identification is the origins of symbols employed
by EU elites. Programs designed at cultural integration—such as SOCRATES, ERASMUS,
LENOARDO, and the use of the Ode to Joy as a “supranational anthem”—all testify to this
trend, as national symbolisms are intelligently coopted into the Pan-European context47. I, thus,
contend that the (mild) cultural “expansion” of national symbols into a sort of “EU Melting Pot”
contributes to feelings of “Europeanness,” though this discussion is far from over, and requires
even greater analytical power than the Eurobarometer can muster48. This, taken alongside the
growth of trust in the EU proper as a governing agency, show the emergence of a mass PanEuropean identity that can be used as a springboard for justifying further expansion and
integration, the two made modes of “uniting” the continent.
However, we are still vexed with the problem of “Liberal-minded” States and their
populations, which only weakly accept integration—that is, modern iterations of Churchill’s
Unionists. To solve for this, I propose selectively applying Liberalism outside of the
Constructivist frame.
3—Yes and No: Neoliberalism and Constructivism and the Domain of Application
Symbolic of the “eurosclerosis” paralyzing integration efforts in certain, specific
countries49 was the rejection of the Brussels Constitution. Despite enthusiasm for its
development, and despite being accepted—by referendum in some cases, no less—by most of
political systems have the power to influence [...] the emergence of new political identities.” (Bruter 124-126)
(Emphasis added)
47
(Bruter73) and (Bruter 89-90)
For further reading, refer to Part 4.
49
England, Denmark, and Sweden most notably.
48
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the European member-States50, the Constitution was never ratified. How can we explain the
growth of European identification but the rejection of European constitutionalism51?
Jupille et. al. propose treating competing, “partially-orthogonal” Institutionalist theories
as each having some amount of worth to be contributed to the discussion. The methodological
breakdown of this argument fragments along four different approaches—competitive testing,
domains of application, sequencing, and subsumation52. For the purposes of this essay, I contend
that the Constructivist framework defended above applies most pertinently to a certain group of
countries, and that other countries follow Neoliberal Institutionalist logic, as espoused by
Keohane and defended by Caporaso in Globalization, Institutions, and Governance. These
establish the boundaries of our “domains.”
Bruter’s analysis of European identity broke down at this same point. Where he did not
have an explanation53 for why certain countries associate weakly with integration and others do,
he did present a categorization of EU formation into four broad periods—two of which were
integrative, and two of which were policy-based and economic54. States, then, that joined during
50
Among them Spain, Germany, Italy, Finland, and the most recent-joiners
The last requisite step, perhaps, in true unity.
52
(Jupille et. al. 20-23) These strategies, however, ought to be reclassified. As the Jupille et. al. text points out,
“sequencing”—that is, breaking down the theories into timeframes wherein the apply, can really be considered
“temporal domain of application.” Further, competitive testing is more of a metamethodological tactic, I would
contend, in that it is either useless or completely disproves one theory or the other on foundational, principle
bases. Discussion of incorporation (subsumation) will be had in Appendix B.
53
I would contend because he is operating exclusively from a sociological standpoint without the domains
approach.
54
"The cross-country variations [in European identification], however, are not only significant, but also far from
randomly distributed geographically. The top nine average scores of European identity are reached quite simply
among the six founding member-States of the European Union and the three countries that joined in the 1980s. In
a similar way, the lowest six scores are reached in the three countries that joined the European Communities in
the 1970s and in the 1990s. [...] The six founding countries of the ECSC promoted a European project that was [...]
primarily political and idealistic. In exactly the same way, Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the European
Communities in the strength of its 'EU identity and citizenship' phase, that is, in the glorious years of the project of
a 'People's Europe.' On the contrary, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EEC in the midst of its
policy-making phase, and Sweden, Austria, and Finland, in the crisis years that ran from the Danish first 'nay' to the
Maastricht Treaty to the Amsterdam and Nice summits. [...] Joining the European Union at a time of political
focus of integration could be more favourable to the strengthening of European identity feelings than joining at
51
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the integrative, idealistic phases were more likely to take Constructivist approaches to
identifying within themselves and beyond their borders with “Europeanness,” whereas the other
states joining during economic phases were more likely to view Institutions as being
fundamentally assistive in State-based goals55.
This explanation is powerful. First, it—at least in principle—ameliorates the debate
between Rational Choice and Sociological scholarship. Second, and most powerfully, it paints a
cohesive picture of the EU as a unified entity with some degree of public support transcending
national boundaries of identity while simultaneously explaining State-side behavior that
contradicts trends of integration. This is not too dissimilar from our American case, where most
Anti-Federalists originated from agrarian, Southern colonies which had less experience in, or
need for, strong unifying governmental bodies, while Federalists tended to originate from urban,
proto-industrial Northern colonies, which had tremendous experience in and need for strong
governing institutions.
Liberalism fails, on its own, to explain behavior—particularly public opinion—in these
“Constructivist” (or Federalist) States. More and more, support seems to be shifting towards nonEconomic policymaking at an EU level56. At the same time, the “Liberal-epoch” countries tend
a time when the European Union is focusing on economic aspects. […] The countries with the lowest levels of
European identity on an average are those that have missed out on some of the most significant civic projects and
symbols of the European Union: the Schengen agreements (United Kingdom, Ireland) and the Euro (United
Kingdom again, Denmark, and Sweden) even though the exact causality is here a little difficult to disentangle."
(Bruter 137) (Emphasis added)
55
Here we borrow from Keohane, who argues that institutions allow states to ‘get what they want,’ while
simultaneously compelling them to reform internal organizations to demonstrate that, at an intergovernmental
level, they are able to deliver upon what they have promised. (Keohane 86) This can explain admission into the
European Union, while simultaneously explaining reluctance to expand it into spheres of National sovereignty.
56
Bruter’s analysis of Eurobarometer surveys shows strong support for non-economic policymaking. Support is
strongest for foreign and environmental policy, and weakest for economic and immigration policy, (66), the issues
most directly pertinent to Liberally-behaving States. Furthermore, strong support is shown for “European OVER
National” policy severity in Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium (92). Finally, his analysis
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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to use the EU as a scapegoat—accepting credit Nationally for its successes, and blaming it
Internationally for its failures57.
By combining the two theories, then, in their own “spheres” or domains of application,
we can easily account for two disparate trends in attempts at European integration.
4—Looking Ahead and Behind: Prospects for Future Research and Prediction
Constructivism, then, ought to be considered prima facie and beyond all others the
explanatory theory best able to demonstrate trends toward Integration and adaptation of a
cultural Pan-European entity. As with the Monnet aphorism at the inception of this essay, culture
matters first and foremost in justifying why a State would “want” to yield its authority to a supraState entity. This was the case with America, and, to a lesser extent, is becoming the case in
Europe.
However, some important questions remain fundamentally unanswered and, alas,
unanswerable barring further research58. Perhaps the most troubling to the Constructivist model
is why France, with its strong European identification and long, “socialized” history of
attempting the work of integration, would reject by referendum the Brussels Constitution. To
answer this question, domestic politics and comparative political systems must be invoked, and I
am inclined to believe the fault lies most prevalently with the growing political salience of the
French Right. Without conducting domestic policy studies, however, this issue is beyond the
grasp of this paper’s explanatory apparatus, and I would encourage future researchers to begin
here.
points to mobility between countries as being much more strongly supported---almost by a factor of two—than
economic benefits. Concerns over losing control of national policymaking are almost nonexistent. (93)
57
“Uncle Dutch and Aunt Sally” syndrome. (Bruter 72)
58
A good deal of which ought to occur on a survey-level. Meta-analysis can only go so far.
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
14
Another issue is that of methodology. The Eurobarometer, as Bruter notes in Citizens of
Europe?, does not distinguish between cultural and civic identity. Perhaps future tests, along the
lines of those constructed by Bruter, could be carried out to determine how much Europeans
identify amongst themselves when presented with an “other.” The first step for this would be
analysis of the Turkey issue. This is of particular importance, as it can be broken down in both
Domains—do Liberal states oppose Turkish accession for economic reasons? Do Constructivist
states oppose Turkish accession for identity ones?
An interesting study that could be easily arranged would be one of sports identity. If, in
an international sporting event, Country X watches rival European Country Y pitted against a
team from a Non-European country, who would they cheer for? Would the European identity
win out, or would intraeuropean “cultural strife” define the boundaries of allegiance? A plausible
starting point would be with the upcoming Sochi Olympics—or, for further depth, contrasting
these trends backwards in time as far as data is available.
For now, however, the domains of application approach with Constructivist primacy
seems the best explanatory apparatus for the apparently contradictory events of Post-Maastricht
integration.
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Appendix A: On Realism
First and foremost, I sidelined discussion of Realism for concern of Mearsheimer’s Five
Assumptions. Survival of the State59,60 ought to be the first overriding priority of government
action in international relations, yet, though this can (barely) explain the European Coal and
Steel Community as an attempt to dismantle single-state heavy industry apparatus (which,
naturally, is integral to predatory revisionist states conducting war upon their neighbors), it
cannot explain the fact that the Brussels Constitution was even considered.
I, for one, believe that Realism could offer some true insights—insights, perhaps, even
more powerful than sociological explanations like public opinion—IF the assumption is made
that being a member of the European Union is like playing a game where the only losing move is
to defect. This requires tremendous intellectual arbitrage from Behavior Economics and Game
Theory, however, and would be an undertaking far more colossal than the confines of this paper
allow, so for the most part I have disregarded discussion of Realism and its variant forms.
59
60
(Mearsheimer 61)
In the words of George R.R. Martin, “In the game of thrones, you win or you die.” (Martin Chapter 45)
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
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Appendix B: On Behavioral Economics and Psychological Political Science
The central basis of this debate has centered around Rational Choice Theory verses
Sociology. Behavioral Economics and Psychological Political Science are new to the scene, and
only in a metatheoretical sense, been evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Since the bulk of EU
literature focuses on the Liberal and Constructivist schools, it made less sense to “reinvent the
wheel” when the strengths of Behavioral Economics explanations could simply be, in the sense
proposed by Jupille et. al., subsumed into either Liberal or Constructivist approaches. As
mentioned in Appendix A, it also offers great theoretical insight into Realist integration theories,
but as a stand-alone theory appears to be insufficient to offer any real lasting explanatory power.
EUROPEAN FEDERALISM
17
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