A Philosophical Discourse: A Defense of Incompatibilism: The Irreconcilability of Free Will an... Strona 1 z 14
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A Philosophical Discourse
It is natural to feel victimized by philosophy. There is a persistent temptation to turn this subject into
something more shallow than it is. It is an extremely difficult subject and no exception to the general rule
that creative efforts are rarely successful. I do not feel equal to the problems treated under philosophy.
They seem to me to require an order of intelligence wholly different from mine. Others who try to address
the questions of philosophy will recognize this feeling.
About Me
NAME: MICHAEL HANNON
LOCATION:TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA
But someday, in a stronger age than this decaying, self-doubting present, he must yet
come to us, the redeeming man, of great love and contempt, the creative spirit whose
compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, whose isolation is
misunderstood by the people as if it were flight from reality - while it is only his
absorption, immersion, penetration into reality, so that, when he one day emerges again,
into the light, he may bring home the redemption of this reality. The antichrist and the antinihilist; this
victor over God and nothingness - he must one day come.
View my complete profile
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2006
Representations of ‘Truth’
and the Legitimation of
Testimony in the Criminal
Justice System: An
Analysis of Sexual
Harassment and Sexual
Assault
ARE THERE
PHILOSOPHICAL
PROBLEMS? Metaphysics
and the Ontology of
Aesthetics
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The Failure of Penal
Justice and The Need for
Alternative Sanctions
A Defense of Incompatibilism: The Irreconcilability
of Free Will and Determinism
Abstract
This essay examines our perceived capacity to consciously will certain
actions. Several topics are explored, including (but not limited to)
conscious will, moral responsibility, and mental causation. I begin by
defining the abstract notion of “free will.” What follows is an analysis of
incompatibilism by way of elementary logic. My thesis is that
incompatibilism is the only logical position one can uphold in regard to
the free will debate. I then explore the two outcomes this position
entails: libertarianism and hard determinism. Here, I intend to provide
an expository account of both partial and complete determinism. I shall
No Regrets (Aesop Rock)
also refute the compatibilists attempt to reconcile free will with
Famine, Affluence, and
Morality
determinism. Throughout my discussion, I highlight our current use of
Controlling Women
Through the Controller:
Videogames as an
Embodiment of Sexism,
Heterosexism, and
Violence
conclude by addressing the consequences incompatibilism entails
An Analysis of Freedom
and Rational Egoism in
Notes From Underground
Attempting to Understand
God: An Analysis of
Medieval Conceptions of
Divine Attributes
“THE DREAM”: A Study of
determinism as an explanation of specific types of anomalous behavior. I
concerning the issue of moral responsibility.
A Defense of Incompatibilism
A leaf was riven from a tree.
“I mean to fall to the earth,” said he.
The west wind rising made him veer.
“Eastward,” he said, “I now shall steer.”
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Institutional Anomie and
Delinquency within the
Canadian Education
System
The east wind rose with greater force.
Said he: “Twere wise to change my course.”
With equal power they contend.
He said: “My judgment I suspend.”
Down died the winds; the leaf, elate,
Cried: “I have decided to fall straight” (Bierce: 1993, 23).
What is Free Will?
The existence of conscious will seems undeniable. Ostensibly,
consciousness is the alchemy that translates action into intention,
movement into motive, and determinism into decision-making. Our
capacity to will things consciously is allegedly the source of free will.
However, despite the vast amount of evidence that supports free will –
namely, every instance in which a person has consciously felt that they
freely willed an action – there still remain supporters of determinism.
This manichean view of human nature has fueled a hotly contended
battle waged by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists,
theologians, and lawyers alike (Wegner: 2002, ‘Rear Synopsis’). This
paper begins by providing a tentative definition of “free will.” The focus
then shifts to an examination of incompatibilism in order to distinguish
hard determinism from libertarianism. Primary emphasis will be placed
on contrasting two distinct views: partial and complete determinism. I
shall also refute the compatibilist position by appealing to the ‘source
model.’ Moreover, I highlight the moral implications incompatibilism
entails. Ultimately, I contend that incompatibilism is the only logical
position one can maintain with respect to the free will debate.
In Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action, Rogers Albritton (2003) sets
out to refute the claim that someone who is chained up has lost his or her
freedom of the will. He asserts that one’s free will would not be reduced
if one were chained up, or physically constrained in some manner.
Although one would be deprived of the freedom of movement – or
freedom of action – one’s will would be no less free. Albritton draws a
distinction between freedom of action and freedom of the will; just as
automatons can have free action but not free will, humans can possess
free will but lack freedom of action. Free will is characterized by having
the intention or desire to do something. For example, although I am
chained and unable to fulfill certain desires, my being chained does not
impede my ability to will certain things. One may will to get up, even
though one clearly lacks the ability to fulfill this desire. This idea reflects
Descartes’ observation that “the will is so free in its nature that it can
never be constrained” (Dilman: 1999, 119). However, Albritton’s position
requires further development by introducing some criteria outlined by
Frankfurt (2003) in Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.
Building on Albritton, I agree that free will requires our having desires,
but we must also be able to choose which desires we want to constitute
our will. Freedom is more complex than merely “having” or
“experiencing” certain desires and states of will. Albritton’s vision is
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lacking a crucial element since, under his view, addicts, people under
post-hypnotic suggestion, and those suffering from various mental
dysfunctions could be considered to have free will. For example, a person
could be hypnotized into having a particular state of will; yet such a
person clearly does not choose the state of his or her will, and therefore
cannot be free. Thus, we must borrow from Frankfurt who believes that
agents must also be able to reflect and revise themselves by choosing the
desires they want to have. We must possess ownership over our actions
and our desires. In the Phaedrus, Plato (1999) likens the soul to a chariot
being pulled by two horses, one black and one white, with the charioteer
in control (or not, as the case may be). The black horse represents
appetite and the white horse stands for love, while the charioteer is
meant to represent reason (Dilman: 1999, 36-7). Consider the charioteer
to be our deep self.[1] When one gains control over the horses one gains
autonomy through the ability to willingly control one’s desires.
Therefore, an agent who lacks control over his or her desires cannot have
free will.
Incompatibilism and the Law of Excluded Middle
In logic, the ‘Law of Excluded Middle’ states that for any proposition P, it
is true that P or not P. If P means “my car is red,” then either my car is
red or my car is not red. If my car is not red, then there are various
alternative propositions that may be true or false. For example, my car
could be partially red, or green, or blue, or perhaps I do not own a car at
all. Regardless, the proposition “I have a red car” is either true or false,
and the falsity of this claim opens up a variety of alternate possibilities.
The universe is completely deterministic. This proposition is similar to
the one above, but it differs in a crucial respect, since the falsity of the
proposition “the universe is completely deterministic” does not provide a
bevy of alternatives. If we negate the statement “the universe is
completely deterministic,” it seems to allow only two alternatives: either
the universe is completely indeterministic, or, at least in part,
deterministic. Thus, the universe is completely determined, partially
indetermined, or wholly indeterministic. I feel comfortable rejecting the
third possibility, since if the universe were completely indeterministic we
would not see the many patterns and causes that take place in everyday
life. Our bodily movements, behavior, and various states of nature are
known to have certain causes. But if complete indeterminism were true,
our limbs would jerk unknowingly, our thoughts would happen
randomly, and the behavior of objects (including us) would occur
haphazardly. Hence, I feel safe in rejecting complete indeterminism. We
are now left with two competing propositions: either the universe is
completely deterministic or it is not. If it is not, then it must be partially
indeterministic.
I have employed the Law of Excluded Middle in order to illustrate that
either complete determinism or partial determinism is true. However,
this picture becomes more complex when we attempt to introduce the
abstract notion of “responsibility.” Inwagen (2005) writes, “There is an
inseverable connection between free will and moral responsibility. The
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inseverable connection is this: if one is morally responsible for anything,
it follows logically that one has had a free choice about something” (2).
Incompatibilism is the doctrine that free will and determinism are
irreconcilable. Since free will is inseverable from responsibility,
determinism and responsibility are also incompatible. Therefore, in
some instances we are entirely free and thus responsible, or, conversely,
completely determined and not responsible. Determinism and
indeterminism, coupled with free will and responsibility, have split
academics into two distinct camps: partial determinists and complete
determinists.
Partial Determinism
Libertarians maintain that freedom and moral responsibility are logically
incompatible with determinism. They believe that for humans to be free,
there must be some instances – fundamentally, human action – which
are not the effects of causal antecedents. But if this were true, then the
human will must be subject to a special kind of explanation. Libertarians
seem to support partial determinism, which suggests a break in the
ongoing process of cause and effect. Under this view, history is not
characterized by a linear progression, whereby one cause produces
certain effects and so on. Instead, life can be described as a vast tree with
an infinite number of branches, which divide into numerous possible
directions. Yet, for human freedom to transcend causal determinism one
of two possibilities must be fulfilled: i) events themselves must be
uncaused and therefore random, or ii) particular events must be causi
sui (the cause of itself).
“The first attempt to soften the blow of determinism was by Epicurus
and his followers, who proposed that random swerves in the trajectories
of some atoms might provide the elbow room for free choice” (Dennett:
2003, 8). Today, we know this view as quantum physics; a world of
subatomic particles where indeterministic ‘rules’ apply. However,
“responsibility conflicts with an indeterministic view of action, since
presumably no one was responsible for the act” (Chisholm: 2003, 29).
Indeterminism seems to sever human “freedom” from moral
responsibility, as it would be absurd to hold one accountable for purely
random events. Indeterminism in this sense seems to preclude our
ability to be subject to morally evaluative claims. We must therefore
reject the first sense of indeterminism (randomness), and begin to look
at agents as causi sui.
Our decisions are based on the way we are, mentally speaking. In order
to be free, one must therefore be responsible for the particular mental
state which constitutes their will. However, one’s mental state may be
governed by something that is logically external to oneself. In order to
truly control our will, we must also possess control over our mental
faculties. Yet, to be responsible for our various mental states, we must be
the ultimate source of those particular mental states – but is this
possible? In The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, Galen Strawson
(2003) says that in order to be responsible an agent must be the cause of
him or herself (212). This clearly reflects partial determinism, which
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entails that there are specific instances when humans can transcend
causal necessity. One must have caused oneself by consciously and
explicitly choosing to be in one’s particular mental state. But one cannot
really be said to choose in a conscious fashion to be the way one is,
mentally speaking, unless one already exists pre-equipped with some
principles of choice (such as preferences, values, attitudes, and ideals).
In order for one to bring about one’s conscious mental state, one seems
to require a sort of preconsciousness, whereby one can consciously
choose one’s future mental state. This, however, pushes the problem into
an infinite regress, where one must then require a pre-preconscious state
and so on. True moral responsibility seems to require true selfdetermination, which seems impossible (Strawson: 2003, 213).
Various theorists have attempted to outline a causal theory of action.
Grounded in determinism, the psychological approach has provided
many useful insights in the analysis of behavior. One such theory is
outlined by Hans Eysenck’s (1964) account of behavioral tendencies, a
dominant paradigm in the 1960’s. His explanation of behavior rests on
the relationship between biological, social, and individual factors. He
proposes that, through genetic inheritance, there are individual
differences in the functioning of the cortical and autonomic nervous
systems (CNS and ANS respectively). His hypothesis offers a theory of
personality that is based on the interaction between these two systems.
This view of personality introduced two critical variables: extroversion
(E), which relates to the CNS, and neuroticism (N) which corresponds to
the ANS. Extroversion ranges from introverted (low) to extroverted
(high). Similarly, neuroticism varies from stable (low) to neurotic (high).
Eysenck maintained that the interaction of these four levels could be
positioned on a continuum that outlined four distinct personalities:
stable introvert, stable extravert, neurotic introvert, and neurotic
extravert. Initially, our cortical and autonomic systems are determined
by our biological makeup. Then, through interaction with our social
environments, personality is shaped by the conditionibility of each
person. According to Eysenck, neurotic extraverts are poorly
conditionable, while stable introverts are highly conditionable. For
instance, he asserted that individuals with high E and high N are more
inclined to succumb to deviant behavior due to their poor level of
conditioning caused by the disruptive affects of anxiety (Hollin: 2001,
209-210). The pressure of social factors on biologically determined
characteristics influences our actions. Eysenck provides us with a partial
theory of determinism, since he accounts for some degree of the
formation of behavioral habits.
Caused behavior is also manifest in the works of Bargh (1984; 1994),
who studied the automatic responses of everyday life. He proposed that
while a conscious process is recorded to take place about 500
milliseconds prior to action, some actions were seen to occur between
200-300 milliseconds – preceding consciousness of the stimulus. For
example, when choosing words to use in a sentence or typing at highspeeds, conscious intention is lacking and behavior can therefore be
viewed as automatic. Similarly, the response of jerking one’s finger away
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from a hot pan occurs before conscious intention. Since these actions are
lacking any prior consciousness, they are viewed as uncontrolled and
therefore uncontrollable. Thus, the process of an automatic response
can, once initiated, continue without the intervention of conscious will.
One notable example involves a father who had come home late and
found the front door to his home open.[2] He entered and grabbed the
gun from his bedside dresser and began to search his house. When
searching, he peered down a dark corridor and noticed an unknown
figure approaching him. The father explained that before he had time to
think, he reacted and shot the unknown person dead. The figure was his
son, home from university on a surprise visit. The father was not held
responsible for his actions on the basis of self-defense. However, if we
grant the truth of his story, we could also consider the father innocent
because he lacked any conscious intention. The sluggishness of conscious
will suggests that much of what we do involves the operation of
preconscious mental processes (Wegner: 2002, 57). However, because
these automated responses only occur in specific circumstances, they are
rightly classified as partial accounts of action causation.
Complete Determinism
Spinoza suggested that our world is one subject to causality and
therefore deterministic. He depicts human beings as “merely a small part
of a huge machine that grinds on relentlessly” (qtd in. Dilman: 1999,
128). We believe we are free when we are merely under the illusion that
we are doing some of the moving. The only freedom we can obtain is by
relinquishing our former notions of free will and accepting the ‘bigger
picture,’ namely, that we could never have done other than what we have
done. Spinoza rejects the idea that humans are somehow special and can
be located outside of the demands of causal necessitation.
Many notable theorists have also used psychology to support the notion
that all behavior is causally motivated. Paul d’Holbach (1996) purports a
constructive formulation of the processes involved in decision-making.
In System of Nature, d’Holbach outlines his theory of action, which
suggests that the mind follows a cognitive process that excludes
conscious will. According to d’Holbach, all objects contain specific
qualities that can influence the structure of our mental state. These
qualities cause a modification in our mind that leads to an impulse for
some desire. This impulse then causes the resulting action. Conversely, if
we have an impulse to act, but do not act upon the impulse, this is caused
by our stronger desire to refrain from acting. ‘Choice’ then becomes
nothing more than a behavior resulting from a stimulus. The feeling of
choice does not entail free will. Instead, free will is merely an illusion
created by conflicting desires. Consider the following example. I come
home one day to find that my brother has left a candy bar out on the
counter. Beside the candy is a note that emphatically claims: do not eat! I
consider his plea, but the sweet and delicious object distracts me. I am
tempted by its smell, its touch, its look, and its taste (qualities of the
object). These qualities then modify my brain and I begin to desire the
candy. I have the impulse to eat it, but also, a competing impulse to
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remain faithful to my brother. There occurs an internal battle between
these two opposing desires.
According to d’Holbach, competing desires will eventually result in the
stronger desire emerging victorious. If I eat the candy, it is because my
desire to do so outweighed the opposing yearning to remain faithful to
my brother. It is this internal battle of desires that creates the illusion of
deliberation, and it is the conquering of one craving that produces the
illusion of choice. What’s more, is that because I do not choose my
desires (desires happen to us, and do not result from us), I therefore do
not choose my actions. d’Holbach claims that our actions result from our
desires and do not result from our own conscious intention. Although
some may equate desire with conscious will, I maintain that because we
do not choose our desires we cannot assume that the resulting action is a
product of our will.
This account also has serious implications for what we would consider
morally culpable behavior. Imagine a second example, where as an
alternative to eating the candy, one has the desire to rob a bank.
d’Holbach’s theory of action should remain true in other circumstances,
such as the occurrence of crime. But if robbery and other crimes are the
result of one uncontrolled desire winning over another, then moral
responsibility is clearly precluded. We can no longer justify holding
criminals (or anyone for that matter) responsible for wrongdoing, if the
agent lacked control over his or her conscious will.[3] This creates
serious concern since the foundation of criminal justice relies on
conscious intent. Parole for “good behavior” would be rewarding an
already unstoppable occurrence in the causal chain of impulse and
outcome. If d’Holbach is correct, the illusion of conscious will has
created the largest injustice in history – namely, the punishing of
anyone.[4] This view offers a holistic account of human behavior and
thus differs from partial theories, such as those outlined by Eysenck and
Bargh.
Daniel Wegner (2002) offers a unique approach to consciousness in his
book, The Illusion of Conscious Will. In it, Wegner contends: “Yes, we
feel we consciously cause what we do; and yes, our actions happen to
us” (ix). Drawing on empirical data rather than philosophical argument,
he offers a reason to suspect that our willing an action does not
necessitate the causation of action. He even goes so far as to claim that
our experience of willing may be completely absent of a causal relation
between our thoughts and actions. Instead, conscious will arises from
processes that are psychologically and anatomically distinct from the
processes that create action. Our will may simply be a feeling created in
the brain, the same as actions themselves.
On the one hand, there are instances in which a person can lack
conscious will, while still engaging in certain actions. Consider the
example of Alien Hand Syndrome (AHS), a neuropsychological disorder.
According to the literature, the hand operates as if it had a mind of its
own. For instance, such a disorder is evident in the film classic Dr.
Strangelove, where Peter Sellers finds himself steering his wheelchair
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astray and giving the Nazi salute (Wegner: 2002, 4). With this disorder,
one finds that the hand operates autonomously with no input from the
agent’s conscious intent. Although these actions are not willed they can
perform some complicated tasks. For example, one study documented a
patient who would read and turn the pages of a book with one hand,
while the other would continuously try to close the novel. Another
reported case involved a woman who claimed that, while she slept, the
alien hand would grasp at her throat (Banks et al: 1989, 457). Wegner
goes on to suggest that because some actions do not follow from
conscious intention, it leads us to wonder if consciousness plays any role
in causing our actions.
On the other hand, there are also instances when an agent experiences
conscious intention without a resulting action. Consider cases of
paralysis, where a patient has the will to perform certain actions but
lacks the ability to perform such behavior. For example, someone who is
paraplegic[5] could consciously will the movement of their legs but lack
the corresponding action. This idea resonates with Descartes earlier
claim that the will is fundamentally free. Similar to AHS, paralysis
breaks the connection between intentions causing action. Both AHS and
paralysis suggest that there is no necessary link between our intentions
and actions. However, if our will does not always cause action, they may
both be produced by some alternate system. This process may produce
the feeling of will and the corresponding action in synch. It is because
our experience of will normally corresponds with the resulting action
that we infer our will is the cause of that action. In A Treatise of Human
Nature, Hume (1739) states that although we see a cue ball strike a
billiard ball, we cannot view the actual causing of the ball’s movement;
instead, we simply infer that one caused the other. In the same way,
since intention generally occurs prior to action, we infer that one caused
the other – even though we lack the necessary connection between the
two. Will is illusory and arises from our lack of knowing its true origins.
To quote Spinoza in The Ethics (1677), “[People] are mistaken in
thinking themselves as free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of
their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are
determined” (86). Or as Harold Kelly (1980) puts it, consciousness
works like a magic act. We perceive the rabbit disappear into the hat
when the real sequence is often more complicated and not perceived. It
is because we cannot keep track of the complex mental processes that we
develop a belief in will. Intention occurs when we infer that voluntary
actions result from conscious will. However mental processes that are
not consciously willed may cause both our intention and action.
Compatibilism
There is, however, a chance for middle ground. Aside from the two
camps mentioned above, a third sect of philosophers has attempted to
demonstrate that free will and determinism can be reconciled. Under
this view – commonly referred to as compatibilism – the apparent
contradiction between free will and determinism rests on a fundamental
misunderstanding of free will itself. Although it would be misleading to
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provide a single formulation of compatibilism, compatibilists do share
the indispensable agreement that free will and determinism can be
friends. Like the determinist, the compatibilist agrees that human
actions are determined by causation, since prior causes must necessitate
future effects. However, the compatibilist denies that for an action to be
free it must be uncaused. Free acts are not uncaused, but rather caused
by our choices as determined by our beliefs, desires, and our character.
Freedom, therefore, should be contrasted with constraint, rather than
with causality. For example, there is a deep-seated difference between a
person who quacks like a duck because they feel like it, and one who does
so under hypnotic coercion. Although both instances require antecedent
forces to cause one’s actions, one who performs such an act under
hypnosis is not free, while one who does so because it stems from his or
her will is free – and consequently morally responsible.
Despite the allure of the compatibilist reconciliation of free will and
determinism, this position can be subject to a powerful critique. The
‘source model’ holds that an agents control consists in one’s ability to
play a crucial role in the production of one’s actions. Freedom consists in
more than being caused by our choices as determined by our beliefs,
desires, and character. Although the compatibilist would argue that the
agent is in control when one acts in accordance with one’s will, the
‘source model’ contends that one’s actions must issue from oneself in a
suitable manner, or in a special metaphysical sense. Under this view,
determinism conflicts with the compatibilist model of free will. The facts
prior to one’s birth, when combined with the laws of nature, provide
causally sufficent conditions to shape the beliefs, habits, and desires of
the individual agent. If this is true, then although the agent may be the
source of his or her actions, the original or ultimate source originates
outside of the agent altogether. Therefore, if an agent is not the ultimate
source of his or her actions, then actions must be the outcome of external
conditions which guarentee their occurrence.
Freedom and determinism become mutually exclusive under the ‘source
model.’ Despite the ingenuity of the attempt to resolve the free willdeterminism tension, compatibilists must concede that our beliefs,
desires, and characters still remain fundamentally determined by forces
external to the individual. Yet, if free acts are merely choices caused by
our beliefs, desires, and our character, then our ‘free’ acts stem from
desires shaped entirely by external antecedents. For the compatibilists,
individual agents are merely intermediate variables; although the agent
may be the source of his or her actions, the agent remains determined by
further antecedent factors. Since freedom requires the agent to be the
ultimate source of action, the compatibilists will find it impossible to
adequately reconcile freedom and determinism. If determinism is true,
no one is the ultimate source of his or her actions. Therefore, no one acts
of their own free will. This seems to defeat the compatibilist position.
Weighing Incompatibilism: Determinism Against Libertarianism
Illustrated above are two competing views of determinism: partial
determinism and complete determinism. Partial determinism has
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already been accepted in many instances. Under this view, certain
behaviors may be characterized as pathologically different from other
people. Schizophrenia, temporary insanity, battered woman syndrome,
and many other psychological disorders are arguably causal motivators
in necessitating certain actions. Although we can see some truth in
partial determinism, the notion that these actions are the result of causal
antecedents leads us to wonder whether determinism is true beyond this
limited context. Although both partial and complete determinism rest on
the same principle,[6] they differ in the degree to which determinism is
assumed. Regardless of which theory one accepts, there are serious
implications on our capacity to make morally evaluative claims.
Both forms of incompatibilism have their positive aspects and their
shortcomings. The completely deterministic position is appealing
because it is strongly supported by modern science. Laws of physics,
psychological laws, and natural law appear to suggest that all events in
the world are preceded by causes. Free will seems to be a pre-scientific
dream from which we are now awaking; “We never really had free will,
and never really could have it” (Dennett: 2003, 11). However, we must
not forget that to accept determinism is to deny our own introspective
feelings of deliberation, control, and choice. For some, accepting
determinism is accepting defeat. It entails the forfeiture of our
uniqueness as human beings. And since freedom and responsibility seem
inseparable, determinism also entails the rejection of humans as morally
responsible agents. Freedom and responsibility are so tightly fused that
the denial of one seems to necessitate the rejection of the other. But
perhaps responsibility and punishment are not fundamentally linked.
There are determinists who believe that we can maintain punishment
while rejecting responsibility. Consider how we punish animals but do
not consider them worthy of moral evaluation. If moral responsibility is
inseverable from free will, then the determinist could replace moral
responsibility with something more suitable to determinism – i.e.
punishment as a behavior modification tool.[7] Regardless, the truth of
determinism seems to undermine many of our current assumptions
concerning responsibility.
Conversely, the partial determinist picture is alluring because it does
satisfy our common sense assumptions about freedom. The freedom
offered by the libertarians accounts for our own introspective feelings
concerning free will. It depicts humans alone as being unique and
capable of moral assessment. This allows us to maintain our current
belief system concerning reprehensibility and punishibility. However,
this position also has its difficulties. The libertarian position seems to
satisfy our common sense assumptions only because it stems from them.
As Schopenhauer maintained, “a free will is one that is absolutely
independent of any cause” (Dilman: 1999, 165). It is for this reason that
he concluded freedom was impossible. Freud shares this sentiment when
stating, “are you asking me, gentlemen, to believe that there is anything
that happens without a cause?” (Dilman: 1999, 236). He, too, seems to
find the possibility of self-causation inconceivable. How can one prove
that the will is uncaused, while maintaining that it is not the result of
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random occurrences? Can there be a third possibility? If so, the
libertarian must also distinguish which actions are outside the scope of
causal necessity. Surely all human actions cannot be causi sui, for we
already have evidence of automated processes in everyday life. Thus,
deciphering which actions are caused (and which are not) creates a
whole new level of problems. Peter van Inwagen (2005), a known
proponent of libertarianism, has stated that after thirty years of
philosophical debate, if you ask him how the will is free, “he simply
hasn’t a clue. Free will is a mystery.” To this Noam Chomsky adds that
perhaps “there is something about our biology, something about our way
of thinking that is hardwired into our brains, that renders it impossible
for us human beings to dispel the mystery of metaphysical freedom” (qtd
in. van Inwagen: 2005, 7).
Concluding Remarks
Determinism and free will are incompatible; logically, we cannot have
both. If complete determinism is true, then we are not free. If partial
indeterminism is true, then we have the trouble of locating and
distinguishing which actions are not subject to cause, but are also not
results of randomness. One must question whether the notion of a causi
sui agent is possible. If it were, humans alone would be unique from the
rest of nature, being able to somehow resist the necessitation of
causation. Our conception of humans as moral beings seems to depend
on our having minds that obey a different physics from the rest of
nature. However, the libertarian view seems to be the only possible way
we can be responsible and free. If our actions are random we are not
free. If we are determined we are not free. Can there be a third option?
The libertarians think this option exists, but this requires far-reaching
assumptions about the nature of the self.
Incompatibilism leaves us with two options: partial or complete
determinism. In this conflict we see that our commonsense is at odds
with itself. On the one hand, we have the commonsense belief that all
events have causes. On the other hand, we have the commonsense belief
that humans are inherently free. Regardless of which incompatibilist
position we assume, it seems to inevitably involve both rejecting and
sustaining our commonsense. It is hard to imagine that conscious will
happens before any mental process has begun, for this would clearly be a
case of the ‘ghost in the machine.’[8] To assert that we cause our own
actions is to assume that we can begin inventing intentions before the
mind itself has initiated the process. Humans would have to exist as
unmoved movers – a position some attribute only to God. It is for this
reason that the idea of causation is alluring. Contrary to our
introspective feeling of conscious will, our mind may initiate the process
and only later causes this feeling.[9] Although there are degrees of how
deep determinism may be entrenched, one cannot deny the many factors
outside our own conscious control which determine us to some extent.
Our race, gender, parents, generation, friends, genes, desires, (the list
goes on…) all play some factor in our mental make-up and consequently
our choices. I have attempted to illustrate that some element of
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determinism is undeniable. This leaves us with two options: either
complete determinism is true or partial determinism is true.
Nevertheless, the incompatibilist position is the only tenable stance one
can maintain with respect to the free will debate.
Works Cited
Albritton, Rogers. “Freedom of the Will and Freedom of Action.” Free
Will. Ed. Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp.
408-423.
Ayer, A.J. Freedom and Necessity. Reason and Responsibility: Readings
In Some Basic Problems of Philosophy. 12th ed. Ed. Joel Fienberg. New
York: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2005. pp. 430 – 435.
Banks, G. et al. "The Alien Hand Syndrome." Clinical and Postmodern
Findings: Archives of Neuropsychology Vol. 46, 1989. pp. 456 – 459.
Bierce, Ambrose. The Devil’s Dictionary. Dover Publications: New York,
1993.
Borgh, J.A. "Automatic and Conscious Processing of Social Information."
Handbook of Social Cognition, Vol.3, 1984. pp. 1 – 43.
---. "The Four Horsemen of Automaticy: awareness, intention, efficiency,
and control in social cognition." Handbook of Social Cognition, Vol.2,
1994. pp. 1 – 40.
Chisholm, Roderick. "Human Freedom and the Self." Free Will. Ed. Gary
Watson. Oxford University Press: New York, 2003. pp. 26 - 38.
Dennett, Daniel. Freedom Evolves. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
Dilman, Ilham. Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction.
London: Routledge, 1999.
Eysenck, Hans. Crime and Personality. London: Routledge and Kegan
Press, 1964.
Fischer, John. "Frankfurt Style Compatibilism." Free Will. Ed. Gary
Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 190 - 212.
Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”
Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
pp. 322 - 337.
Holbach, Paul. “The Illusion of Freewill.” Reason and Responsibility:
Readings In Some Basic Problems of Philosophy. 12th ed. Ed. Joel
Fienberg. New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2005. pp. 416 –
421.
Hollin, Clive. "Personality Theory." The Sage Dictionary of Criminology.
Ed. McLaughlin, Eugene and John Muncie. London: Sage Publications,
2001. pp. 208 - 210.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Oxford University
Press, 1888.
Kelly, Harold. “Magic Tricks: The Management of Causal Attribution.”
Perspective on Attribution Research and Theory, 1980. pp. 19 – 35.
Libet, Benjamin. “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and The Role of
Conscious Will in Voluntary Action.” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
Vol. 8, 1985. pp. 529 – 566.
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Skinner, B. F. Walden Two. New York: Macmillan Co, 1985.
Spinoza, Baruch. The Ethics. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company,
1992.
Strawson, Galen. “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” Free Will.
Ed. Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 212 229.
Strawson, Peter. “Freedom and Resentment.” Free Will. Ed. Gary
Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 72 - 94.
Van Inwagen, Peter. “An Argument for Incompatibilism.” Free Will. Ed.
Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 38 - 58.
---. “Van Inwagen on Free Will.” The Determinism and Freedom
Philosophy Website. Date of posting N/A. Ted Honderich. October 20,
2005.
---. “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom” The Determinism and
Freedom Philosophy Website. Date of posting N/A. Ted Honderich.
October 20, 2005.
Wegner, Daniel. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Bradford Books, 2002.
Wolf, Susan. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” Free Will.
Ed. Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 372 388.
[1] See Wolf’s (2003) Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
[2] In When You Accidentally Kill Someone, Oprah interviews several
guests who accidentally killed someone. The episode featured a father
who killed his wife and daughter, a woman who killed a young girl, and a
father who killed his son. The episode aired on 11/11/04.
[3] We can no longer justify punishment unless, of course, we radically
rethink what we mean by responsibility. I shall briefly touch on this idea
later in the paper.
[4] Though on this view the punishers themselves could not justifiable be
held responsible for making this “mistake.”
[5] Complete paralysis of the lower half of the body including both legs,
usually caused by damage to the spinal cord.
[6] The principle that effects are fundamentally determined and rooted
in antecedent causes.
[7] Several theorists have suggested such a position; see Skinner (1985).
[8] A ghost in the machine is the unknown cause or unexplainable
behavior of a machine or computer.
[9] Benjamin Libet studied conscious will through a series of brain
stimulation experiments throughout the 1980’s. His findings showed
that the conscious willing of movement occurred before the actual
movement, but after the onset of brain activity. This suggests that the
brain starts operating before the person experiences consciousness.
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