An Extraordinary
Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting
Source Documents
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
Source Documents
With a few exceptions, the documents used in this section have come from the
research collection of John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library (JCPML). The documents have been divided into three categories: Media, Correspondence and
Oral Histories and references to individual documents are sourced on the Contents page.
Media
Excerpts from The West Australian, The Bulletin, The Australian Women’s
Weekly, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian Worker are held on
microfilm at the JCPML. Articles from The Times (London) have been obtained
from the Library & Information Service of Western Australia.
Correspondence
Copies of the cablegrams between Curtin, Churchill and Roosevelt have come
from the National Archives of Australia and from the Roosevelt Presidential Library
and copies are now included in the collection at the JCPML. These and other
letters may be located through the JCPML Website.
Oral History
This section includes transcripts of interviews with people who knew John Curtin,
or had close relatives or friends who knew John Curtin, during World War II. These
interviews were commissioned by the John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library during
the 1990s.
Other Sources
To locate other material about John Curtin, please access the JCPML Website at:
http://john.curtin.edu.au
This website has links to the Roosevelt Presidential Library, the MacArthur Memorial Library and the Churchill Archives (access through Related Sites). To search
the JCPML collection use the Search ERA link to access digitised material via the
JCPML Electronic Research Archive.
2
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
Top cartoon by Peter Dent, FELSSW Newsletter July 2003
Bottom cartoon by William Mahony, Daily Telegraph 1942
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
SOURCE 1: Cartoons
3
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
SOURCE 2: The Herald
Originally, this article was put in the social pages of The Herald because it began
with poetry. It was then rushed through to front page headlines.
The Task Ahead
By John Curtin
The year that begins
next Thursday will be the
most critical in the history of Australia.
Here the Prime Minister (Mr. Curtin) in a special message, tells the
Australian people of the
job that is to be done in
1942.
That reddish veil which o’er the face
Of night-hag East is drawn ...
Flames new disaster for the race?
Or can it be the Dawn?
S
O
wrote
Bernard
O’Dowd. I see 1942 as a
year in which we shall know
the answer.
of the Australian way of life
until a war footing is attained
quickly, efficiently and without
question. ...
I would, however, that we
provide the answer. We can
and we will. Therefore I see
1942 as a year of immense
change in Australian life.
Now with equal realism, we
take the view that, while the determination of military policy
is the Soviet’s business, we
should be able to look forward
with reason to aid from Russia
against Japan. We look for a
solid and impregnable barrier
of the Democracies against the
three Axis Powers, and we
refuse to accept the dictum that
the Pacific struggle must be
treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict.
By that it is not meant that any
one of the other theatres of war
is of less importance than the
Pacific, but that Australia asks
for a concerted plan evoking
the greatest strength at the Democracies’ disposal, determined upon hurling Japan
back.
The Australian government’s policy has been
grounded on two facts. One is
that the war with Japan is not a
phase of the struggle with the
Axis powers, but is a new war.
The second is that Australia
must go on a war footing.
Those two facts involve
two lines of action - one in the
direction of external policy as
to our dealings with Britain, the
United States, Russia, the
Netherlands East Indies and
China in the higher direction of
the war in the Pacific.
The second is the reshaping, in fact the revolutionising,
4
27 December, 1941
*
T
HE Australian Government, therefore, regards
the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United
States and Australia must have
the fullest say in the direction
of the democracies’ fighting
plan.
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I
make it quite clear that
Australia looks to
America, free of any
pangs as to our traditional links or kinship
with the United Kingdom.
We know the problems that
the United Kingdom faces. We
know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers
of dispersal of strength, but we
know too, that Australia can go
and Britain can still hold on. ...
Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid,
and working out, with the
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
*
A
USTRALIAN internal
policy has undergone
striking changes in the past few
weeks. These, and those that
will inevitably come before
1942 is far advanced, have
been prompted by several reasons. In the first place, the
Commonwealth Government
found it exceedingly difficult
to bring Ausatralian people to
a realisation of what, after two
years of war, our position had
become. Even the entry of Japan, bringing a direct threat in
our own waters, was met with
a subconscious view that the
Americans would deal with the
short-sighted, underfed and fanatical Japanese.
The announcement that no
further appeals would be made
to the Australian people, and
the decisions that followed,
were motivated by psychological factors. They had an arresting effect. They awakened the
somewhat lackadaisical Australian mind the attitude that
was imperative if we were to
save ourselves, to enter an allin effort in the only possible
manner.
That experiment in psychology was eminently successful, and we commence
1942 with a better realisation,
by a greater number of Australians, of what the war means
than in the whole preceding
two years.
The decisions were
prompted by other reasons, all
related to the necessity of get-
ting onto a war footing, and the
results so far achieved have
been most heartening, especially in respect of production
and conservation of stocks.
I make it clear that the experiment undertaken was never
intended as one to awaken Australian patriotism or sense of
duty. Those qualities have
been ever-present; but the response to leadership and direction had never been requested
of the people, and desirable talents and untapped resources
had lain dormant.
Our task for 1942 is stern
... The position Australia faces
internally far exceeds in potential and sweeping dangers anything that confronted us in
1914-1918.
The year 1942 will
impose supreme tests.
These range from resistance to invasion to
deprivation of more
and more amenities ...
*
A
USTRALIANS must
realise that to place the
nation on a war footing every
citizen must place himself, his
private and business affairs, his
entire mode of living, on a war
footing. The civilian way of
life cannot be any less rigorous,
can contribute no less than that
which the fighting men have to
follow.
7,000,000 people as though we
were a nation and a people with
the enemy hammering at our
frontier.
*
A
USTRALIANS must be
perpetually on guard; on
guard against the possibility, at
any hour without warning, of
raid or invasion; on guard
against spending money, or doing anything that cannot be justified; on guard against hampering by disputation or idle,
irresponsible chatter, the decisions of the Government taken
for the welfare of all.
All Australia is the stake in
this war. All Australia must
stand together to hold that
stake. We face a powerful, ably
led and unbelievably courageous foe.
We must watch the enemy
accordingly. We shall watch
him accordingly.
*****
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
United States, as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy,
along with British, Chinese and
Dutch forces.
I demand that Australians
everywhere realise that Australia is now inside the firing
lines.
Australian governmental
policy will be directed strictly
on those lines. We have to regard our country and its
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
5
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
6
SOURCE 3: The Times
Wednesday, January 28, 1942
MR. CHURCHILL’S REPLY
TO HIS CRITICS
THE FAR EAST
RETRIEVING OUR LOSSES
W
hile facing Germany and Italy here and
in the Nile Valley, we have never had
any power to provide effectively for the defence
of the Far East. My whole argument so far has
led up to that point. It may be that this or that
might have been done which was not done, but
we have never been able to provide effectively
for the defence of the Far East against Japan. It
has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all
costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we
were sure that the United States would also be
engaged. We even had to stoop, as the House
will remember, when we were at our very weakest point, to close the Burma road for some
months.
I remember that some of our present critics
were very angry about it, but we had to do it.
There never has been a moment, there never
could have been a moment, when Great Britain
or the British Empire, single-handed, could fight
Germany and Italy—or could wage the Battle
of Britain, the Battle of the Atlantic and the
Battle of the Middle East—and at the same time
stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the Malay
Peninsula, and generally in the Far East against
the impact of a vast military Empire like Japan
with 70 mobile divisions, the third navy in the
world, a great air force, and the thrust of
80,000,000 or 90,000,000 of hardy warlike Asiatics. If we had started to scatter our forces
over these immense areas in the Far East, we
should have been ruined. If we had moved large
armies of troops urgently needed on the war
fronts to regions which were not at war we
should have been altogether wrong. We should
have cast away the chance, of all of us emerging safely from the terrible plight in which we
have been plunged.
We therefore have lain, I am putting it as
bluntly as I can, for nearly two years under the
threat of an attack by Japan with which we had
no means of coping, but as time has passed the
mighty United States, under the leadership of
President Roosevelt—(cheers)—from reasons
of its own interest and safety, but also out of
chivalrous regard for the cause of freedom and
democracy, has drawn ever nearer to the confines of the struggle, and now that the blow has
fallen it does not fall on us alone. On the contrary, it falls upon the united forces and united
nations which are unquestionably capable of
enduring the struggle of retrieving the losses,
and of preventing another such stroke from ever
being delivered again. (Cheers)
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
The Sydney Morning Herald 19 March, 1942.
GENERAL MACARTHUR’S ARRIVAL
STIRS AUSTRALIA
E
ND
R
A
M
O M REA
C
A R AC A
W
Z
E
N
M
A
FLOWN HERE FROM
E
RE
H
P
T
THE PHILIPPINES
SU
IN
APPOINTMENT MADE AT AUSTRALIA’S REQUEST
TheWestAustralian19March,1942.
ALLIED SUPREME COMMAND
IN AUSTRALIA
SECRET OF
PLANE TRIP
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
SOURCE 4: Headlines on MacArthur’s arrival in Australia
ENTH
USIAS
M
AT NE
WS
AT U.S. HEADQUARTERS
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
7
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
SOURCE 5: The Times
19 March 1942
PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE
TO MR. CURTIN
CHOICE OF MACARTHUR
FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT
CANBERRA, MARCH 18
T
he United States Army Headquarters
in Australia announces that General
Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia yesterday and assumed supreme command of the forces of the south-west Pacific, pursuant with the agreement of the
United States and Australian Governments.
Lieutenant-General George Howard Brett,
who has been in command of the American
forces in Australia has been designated General MacArthur’s deputy and will also be
chief of the air forces. General MacArthur
arrived at Alice Springs by aeroplane, and
is expected to reach headquarters in a few
days.
Yesterday General Brett communicated to
Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister, the following
message from President Roosevelt:—
The President of the United States directs
me to present his compliments, and to inform
you that General Douglas MacArthur, of the
United States Army, has arrived in Australia
from the Philippines. In accordance with his
directions, General MacArthur has assumed
command of all the United States Army forces
here. Should it accord with your wishes and
those of the Australian people, the President
suggests that it would be highly acceptable to
him and pleasing to the American people for
the Australian Government to nominate General MacArthur supreme commander of all the
8
allied forces in the south-west Pacific. Such
nomination should be submitted simultaneously
to London and Washington. The President is in
general agreement with the proposals regarding the organisation and command of the Australian area, and regrets that he has been unable
to inform you of General MacArthur’s pending
arrival, but feels certain that you will appreciate that his safety during the voyage from the
Philippines required the highest order of secrecy.
Mr. Curtin informed General Brett of his
complete and enthusiastic agreement with the
President’s proposals. It was explained at headquarters that General MacArthur’s arrival in no
way indicated that the American forces were
withdrawing from the Philippines or that the
struggle there was lessening in any degree.
Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister, announcing
that there were very substantial American forces
in Australia, said that they were not only most
heartening in their actuality but in their expression of the spirit of fighting shoulder to shoulder that will give the democracies decisive
strength in the struggle in the Pacific theatres
of war.
The Australian Government (Mr. Curtin continued) extends the warmest greetings to the
American forces. It goes without saying that
they will continue to receive from the Australian people a warm welcome, and enjoy the feeling of being at home that they have already enjoyed in the past few weeks. The warmth of
that welcome will not be motivated by any other
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
In expressing the Australian wish that General MacArthur be supreme commander, Mr.
Curtin cabled:—
Our visitors speak, think and fight like us.
Therefore we can find community of interest
and comradeship with them that will be a firm
basis when the supreme test of battle comes.
There is in this country a feeling of deep gratitude to the President and people of the United
States for this evidence we see around us of aid
in terms of men and munitions, to which the
President recently referred in his report to the
people.
General MacArthur’s heroic defence of the Philippines has evoked the admiration of the world
and has been an example of the stubborn resistance with which the advance of the enemy ought
to be opposed. The Australian Government
feels that his leadership of the allied forces in
this theatre will be an inspiration to the Australian people and to all the forces which will
be privileged to serve under this command.
Great Britain, as Mr. Churchill recently told
the British Parliament, could not carry the burden of the Pacific while engaged in a life and
death struggle with Germany and Italy. The aid
that is given to us from the United States is therefore doubly welcome. We will not be left quite
alone. We are the base from which to strike the
enemy. It is because we have earned our full
membership in the allied team in theatres of war
widely spaced from one another that the strength
of the team is with us.
AN INSPIRING EXAMPLE
The news of the American’s arrival was withheld for weeks for reasons of security. They
began to arrive before the collapse of allied resistance in Malaya. When it was clear that the
leadership in the Pacific must be American, the
Government conceived the idea of obtaining
General MacArthur’s appointment. Ministers
regard the fact that Mr. Roosevelt has made
available the services of probably America’s
greatest contemporary soldier as the best possible guarantee that the United States is determined to assist to the utmost in the defence of
the Commonwealth.
The Australian forces will be under General
MacArthur’s supreme command, and the
American army will retain its entity within the
framework of allied co-operation. Conferences
will soon determine the exact form of the supreme administration and direction for the battle of Australia. It is expected that an allied
war council will be created in the Anzac area,
comprising the chiefs of the three defence services of the American and Australian forces in
the Commonwealth and Anzac area under General MacArthur. The new Australian commander will probably be the leader in the field,
and the Commonwealth’s voice on military
strategy will be freed as much as possible from
administrative detail.
The new organisation may presage a change
in the location and constitution of the Pacific
War Council, at present meeting in London, as
the Government have been urging an alteration
of the system whereby Australian submissions
to this council are relayed to America from London for Mr. Roosevelt’s approval, and want a
more direct contact with America.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
feeling than one of kinship with men and women
who largely spring from the same stock as ourselves.
9
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
10
SOURCE 6: The Times FRIDAY MARCH 20 1942
Imperial and Foreign
THE FALL OF RANGOON
‹
WHY GARRISON WITHDREW
From Our Special Correspondent
MANDALAY, MARCH 13
(delayed)
An authoritative and comprehensive account of events
leading up to the fall of Rangoon has now been made available. The decision to abandon
the capital of Burma was forced
on the British commanders, who
had to choose between withdrawing intact to defend the oilfields and Upper Burma, and
risking defeat by remaining in
Rangoon, which it was impossible to defend, since the enemy
was known to be two or three
times stronger than our forces.
The decision to withdraw was
taken by General Alexander.
The story begins on March
5, when British troops at Pegu,
about 50 miles north of Rangoon, were being hard pressed
by the Japanese from the east
and north east. Our forces in
Pegu were comparatively weak
and the country was found to be
not suitable for the operation of
tanks. However, on the next day
we carried out one or two minor offensive movements and
captured some anti-tank guns,
besides knocking out two or
three tanks which the enemy
had brought up after crossing
the River Sittang. Meanwhile
the road to Rangoon had been
cut by enemy forces operating
west of Pegu. The British made
attempts to break through but
failed.
At about the same time a
new development was reported—enemy parties in considerable strength were landed
from small boats west of the
Rangoon River. The significance of this new development
lay in the fact that there was no
obstacle to prevent the enemy
from cutting the Twante Canal,
which flows westwards from
Rangoon, and he might even get
up to the port of Rangoon itself.
Across the river from Rangoon
lay the Syriam oil refineries,
which were not too strongly
guarded.
SERIOUS LOSS
While the present is no time
for recrimination, it will be necessary to hold a searching inquiry into the reasons why Rangoon had to be abandoned. As
the jugular vein of the lend-lease
route to China, Rangoon was
important enough, but this must
be coupled with the fact that
Rangoon is the major port of a
country which, as is often said,
must be the jumping-off ground
for a counter attack against the
Japanese. These two considerations make its fall a most serious matter for both Great Britain and China, and may profoundly affect the course of the
whole war in the Far East.
The most surprising part of
the battle was the Japanese advance from Pegu towards Rangoon. While it is generally admitted that the enemy adopted
masterly tactics in fighting his
way through the hilly tracts of
Tenasserim, the hope was generally expressed, with guarded
optimism, that we would be able
to hold him in the paddyfields
west of the River Sittang, especially since we had in that area
what has been described to me
as a ‘not inconsiderable’ number
of tanks.
The fact that the jungle prevented us from using heavy artillery was a serious handicap to
offensive action. Burma is a
country with few good roads,
and in Tenasserim the British
found communications an exceedingly difficult problem. The
civil telephone and wireless systems were not sufficiently developed to be employed for the purposes of a major war, and as a
result headquarters often found
difficulty in communicating
with the forward areas.
These are some of the physical reasons why we lost the battle of Rangoon. There were also
psychological reasons. The people of Burma were not prepared
for war last December. In spite
of the gathering storm in the Far
East no attempt was made to
educate the masses in the realities of modern war on the ground
that the people would panic. Actually the population in Rangoon
and elsewhere in Burma did
panic when the Japanese rained
down bombs on December 23.
Then there was the amazing action of the authorities in issuing
a surprise order on February 20
for the evacuation of the whole
of the civilian population of
Rangoon in 48 hours. It came
as a shock to the people, who
hurriedly packed up a few belongings and rushed from the
city by train or car—many even
on foot—leaving homes which
represented in some instances
the savings of a lifetime.
Adequate measures should
also have been taken to prevent
looting and arson. During a visit
to Rangoon last week I was
amazed to see residential areas
going up in flames, while no attempt was made to put out the
fires because the fire brigade had
sent its major equipment outside
the city. Rangoon, in my opinion, was given over to the military too late to stop our retreat.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
28 March 1942
Editorial
A FIGHTING
PARTNERSHIP
The fighting partnership of Australia and the
United States has taken another stride forward.
Arrival of MacArthur, hero of the Philippines,
to be supreme commander of Allied Forces in
the Anzac area, gave us a military leader all will
be proud to follow—a man who’s proved himself at the job he has to do, lead an army that
will beat the Japs.
He’s not the only veteran of war with the Japs
among our forces.
Many of our own R.A.A.F. boys who shot
down the enemy over Malaya are back in Australia. They’re being stationed among homebased squadrons so they can pass on what
they’ve learned in combat.
In the air with them in the battle for Australia they have American partners, U.S. Air
Force men who are now at battle stations in
Australia.
The Diggers too, have stalwart Yanks beside
them ready to share any fighting that comes on
Australian soil.
Australia welcomes these men as reinforcements to her own strength, as fighting men who
will care for the common cause as strongly as
the Diggers.
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
SOURCE 7: The Australian Women’s Weekly
And the presence of Dr. Evatt in Washington
will provide the contact necessary to keep the
Australian view well to the fore in discussions
and arrangements necessary in a fighting partnership like this.
The Americans are going to fight in Australia
to save America as well as Australia. So are we.
If together we have to hurl the Japanese off
Australian soil, both Yanks and Diggers will
know that American homes are being saved at
the same time.
—THE EDITOR.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
11
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: MEDIA
12
SOURCE 8: The Australian Worker
9 April 1942
AUSTRALIA’S
I
SUPREME
TEST
t is well that we
Australians, in
this terrific crisis
of our lives, should get
used to the idea of our
inevitable, inherent
aloneness.
In the past we have cherished the thought that Australia was an integral part of a
vast imperial combination, the
members of which would rush
to one another’s aid when peril
threatened.
Of this imperial group,
mighty alike in peace and war,
Great Britain was the political
head and the radiating centre
of energy that swept triumphantly through the whole
wide earth.
we in Australia were safe
from external enemies, it was
believed, mainly because the
warlike virility of Great Britain protected us.
It was a comforting belief.
But it was also a demoralising one. It induced in us a
complacency of outlook that
rendered us haphazard in defence measures, and filled us
with a confidence for which
there was no solid basis in selfprotective efficiency.
To-day we are realising
how fondly we deluded ourselves ...
This colossal conflict in the
ocean laving our shores, has
brought us right up against one
of the cruellest disillusionments of all history.
WE KNOW NOW THAT
AUSTRALIA MUST
STAND ALONE.
We know that we must
fight alone for the perpetuation of civilisation which we
are gradually building up to
ideals of democratic wellbeing
unsurpassed in any land.
Britain cannot help us.
We can help her, and are
doing so with unstinted blood
and treasure, but she is unable
to fire a single shot for us, now
that an enemy as ruthless as he
is formidable is thundering at
our gate ...
Something has happened,
or has made itself apparent under the stress of terrible events,
that changes the position of
Australia for all time.
Only a Valiant
Self-Reliance
Can Save Us
We are left to save ourselves.
Reliance on the far-flung
Empire has gone forever. Only
by our own strength will we
come through this supreme test
victorious…
Because of some outworn
and outmoded tradition, which
the Prime Minister of Britain
still harbors at the back of his
head, Australia is to have no effective say in the grand strategy of the war for which she is
making such home-crippling
sacrifices.
Even the Pacific War Council,
formed to deal specifically
with the conflict in this part of
Dr Evatt put the matter in
the world, is not to be held
in Washington, as the
Australian Government
desired, but in London,
which is remote in every
way from the theatres of
action involved.
Such is Churchill’s decree ...
blunt terms. “Nowhere”, said
he, “did any representative
from Australia meet any representative of the United States
in any council, committee or
strategic body concerned in the
control of the Allied war
against Japan.” ...
The position has reached
such a pass that Australians,
howsoever Empire-minded by
education and sentiment, must
now decide their own course of
action.
With the war right here in
our midst we can’t afford to
follow in the leisurely and prescribed footsteps of statesmen
thousands of miles away in
geographical terms, and ten
times that distance from us
psychologically speaking.
HEART AND SOUL WE
ARE WITH THE BRITISH
PEOPLE.
Gladly we would do anything
possible for them ... But the
rulers of the British people are
in a different category altogether.
They have placed us in such
a position that we are simply
bound to go our own way in
order to save our country ...
In all that appertains to the
universal, all-compelling instinct of self-preservation, Australia must be strong enough
and proud enough to stand
alone.
H.E.B.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
The first part of this cablegram describes how Roosevelt intends to send 27,000
American troops to Australia which will be used to hold the right flank (Australia and
the SW Pacific).
PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT.
CABLEGRAM.
DECYPHER FROM :
SECRETARY OF STATE
I. 15072
Rec’d: 20th February, 1942.
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. PERSONAL HIMSELF.
... On the other hand the left flank [Burma, India and
China] simply must be held. If Burma goes it seems to me
our whole position, including that of Australia, will be in
extreme peril. Your Australian division is the only force
that is available for immediate reinforcement. ...
While
I realise the Japs are moving rapidly I cannot believe
that, in view of your geographical position and the forces
on their way to you or operating in your neighbourhood,
your vital centers are in immediate danger.
While I realize that your men have been fighting all over
the world, and are still, and while I know full well of the
great sacrifices which Australia has made. I nevertheless
want to ask you in the interests of our whole war effort in
the Far East if you will reconsider your decision and order
the division now en route to Australia to move with all
speed to support the British forces fighting in Burma.
You may be sure we will fight by your side with all our
force until victory.
ROOSEVELT.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
SOURCE 1: Cablegram—Roosevelt to Curtin 20 February 1942
13
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
14
SOURCE 2: Cablegram—Curtin to Churchill 21 February 1942
PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT.
CABLEGRAM.
DECYPHER TO :
THE RT. HON.W. CHURCHILL,
LONDON.
SENT: 21st February, 1942.
(TO BE RE-TRANSMITTED FROM LONDON TO MR. CHURCHILL
IMMEDIATELY).
I have received your rather strongly worded request at this
late stage though our wishes in regard to disposition of
A.I.F. in Pacific theatre have long been known to you and
carried even further by your statement in House of Commons
...
2.
The proposal for additional military assistance for
Burma comes from the Supreme Commander of A.B.D.A. [Australia, Burma, Dutch East Indies and America] area.
Malaya, Singapore and Timor have been lost and whole of
Netherlands East Indies will apparently be occupied shortly
by Japan. ... The Government made maximum contribution of
which it was capable in reinforcement of A.B.D.A. area. It
originally sent a division less a brigade to Malaya with
certain ancillary troops.
A machine gun battalion and
substantial reinforcements were later despatched. It also
despatched forces to Amboina, Java and Dutch and Portuguese
Timor.
Six squadrons of air force were also sent (to
Singapore) together with two cruisers from R.A.N.
3.
It was suggested by you that two Australian divisions
be transferred to Pacific theatre and this suggestion was
later publicly expanded by you with statement that no
obstacle would be placed in the A.I.F. returning to defend
their homeland. We agreed to two divisions being located
in Sumatra and Java and it was pointed out to Page in cable
of February 15th that should fortune still favour the
Japanese this disposition would give a line of withdrawal
to Australia for our forces.
4.
With situation having deteriorated to such an extent
in theatre of A.B.D.A. area with which we are closely
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
6.
We feel therefore in view of foregoing and services
the A.I.F. have rendered in Middle East that we have every
right to expect them to be returned as soon as possible with
adequate escorts to ensure their safe arrival.
7.
We assure you, and desire you to so inform the President, who knows fully what we have done to help the common
cause, that if it were possible to divert our troops to
Burma and India without imperilling our security in the
judgement of our advisers we should be pleased to agree to
the diversion.
CURTIN.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
associated and Japanese also making a southward advance in
the Anzac area, the Government, in the light of advice of
its Chiefs of Staff as to the forces necessary to repel an
attack on Australia find it most difficult to understand
that it should be called upon to make a further contribution to forces to be located in the most distant part of
A.B.D.A. area. Notwithstanding your statement that you do
not agree with the request to send the other two divisions
of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma, our advisers are concerned
with Wavell’s request for the corps and Dill’s statement
that the destination of the Sixth and Ninth Australian
Divisions should be left open as more troops might be badly
needed in Burma. Once one Division became engaged it could
not be left unsupported and inferences are that the whole
corps might become committed to this region or there might
be a recurrence of the Greek and Malayan campaigns.
Finally in view of superior Japanese sea power and air power
it would appear to be a matter of some doubt as to whether
this division can be landed in Burma and a matter for great
doubt whether it can be brought out as promised. With the
fall of Singapore, Penang and Martaban, the Bay of Bengal
is vitally vulnerable to what must be considered the superior sea and air power of Japan in that area. The movement
of our forces to this theatre, therefore, is not considered
a reasonable hazard of war, having regard to what has gone
before and its adverse results would have gravest consequences on morale of Australian people.
The Government,
therefore, must adhere to its decision. ...
15
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
16
SOURCE 3: Cablegram—Churchill to Curtin 22 February 1942
PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT.
CABLEGRAM.
DECYPHER FROM :
THE RT. HON.W. CHURCHILL,
LONDON.
Rec’d: 22nd February, 1942.
FOLLOWING FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRIME MINISTER.
We could not contemplate that you would refuse our request
and that of the President of the United States for the
diversion of the leading division to serve the situation
in Burma.
We knew that if our ships proceeded on their
course to Australia while we were waiting for your formal
approval they would either arrive too late at Rangoon or
even be without enough fuel to go there at all.
We
therefore decided that the convoy should be temporarily
diverted to the northward. The convoy is now too far north
for some of the ships in it to reach Australia without
refuelling.
These physical considerations give us a few
days for the situation to develop and for you to review the
position should you wish to do so. Otherwise the leading
Australian Division will be returned to Australia as quickly
as possible in accordance with your wishes.
CHURCHILL.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
*Note the use of code names for particular correspondence items.
PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT.
CABLEGRAM.
DECYPHER TO :
SENT: 23rd February, 1942.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, LONDON.
MOST IMMEDIATE.
In your 233* it was clearly implied that the convoy was not
proceeding to the northward. From 241* it appears that you
have diverted the convoy towards Rangoon and had treated
our approval to this vtial (sic) diversion as merely a
matter of form. By doing so you have established a physical
situation which adds to the dangers of the convoy and the
responsibility of the consequences of such diversion rests
upon you.
2. We have already informed the President of the reasons
for our decision and, having regard to the terms of his
communications to me, we are quite satisfied from his
sympathetic reply that he fully understands and appreciates the reasons for our decision.
3. Wavell’s message considered by Pacific War Council on
Saturday reveals that Java faces imminent invasion.
Australia’s outer defences are now quickly vanishing and our
vulnerability is completely exposed.
4. With A.I.F. troops we sought to save Malaya and Singapore falling back on Netherlands East Indies.
All these
northern defences are gone or going. Now you contemplate
using the A.I.F. to save Burma. All this has been done in
Greece without adequate air support.
5. We feel a primary obligation to save Australia not only
for itself but to preserve it as a base for the development
of the war against Japan. In the circumstances it is quite
impossible to reverse a decision which we made with the
utmost care and which we have affirmed and re-affirmed.
6.
Our Chief of General Staff advises although your 241
refers to the leading division only the fact is that owing
to the loading of the flights it is impossible at the
present time to separate the two divisions and the destination of all the flights will be governed by that of the
first flight.
This fact re-inforces us in our decision.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
SOURCE 4: Cablegram—Curtin to Churchill 23 February 1942
17
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
18
SOURCE 5: Letter—Miss D Cameron to Curtin 30 January 1942
Newtown,
Sydney
30th January, 1942
J. Curtin, Esq.,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Canberra A.C.T.
Dear Sir:
What is the matter with you that you so insistently demand that
Australia look to America for aid rather than to Britain? After all,
has America done so well in safeguarding her possessions in the Pacific
that we can look to her with so much confidence. England has not
done so badly on 22 fronts in 2 1/2 years. I wonder if America
would have done so well.
The newspapers are certainly clamouring for Australia to have
more say. Is this in Australia’s interests or merely so that they will be
able to “scoop” the news and make better headlines.
I, for one, do not want to change my nationality, even in
thought, from British to American, and I know of a number of people
working in the same building as I who think the same. You have lost
my vote through your disparaging remarks about England, and I
don’t suppose I am the only one. If you think so highly of America’s
effort why don’t you, like all the rest who think the same, go there.
I admire America for lots of things, but let England lose her
“bulldog” grip on events and we’ll see how far America can take us
along the road to safety. Anyway it is about time England let Australia stand alone—as you seem to think she wants to—and see what
she can do.
Yours faithfully,
(Miss) D. Cameron
P.S. I was born in Australia too.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
AUSTRALIAN LEGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
April 3rd,
1942.
Dear Mr. Curtin:
... It was very cheering to me to hear your voice on the radio telephone. It made
me feel not so far away.
The American people are in sympathy with us in Australia, for many of them have
told me how akin they feel to our people. They are anxious to co-operate I am sure. It is
the organisational difficulties which hold us up but [we] are really working night and day to
get the allocations necessary to us.
... I myself have been meeting members of some of the women’s organisations and
the Press, Congressmen, and members of the Government.
Great enthusiasm was shown here over General MacArthur’s appointment and
excellent publicity and some good wire photos have been appearing in the papers nearly
every day.
... Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hopkins are good friends of Australia but we find there
are many bottlenecks in the Administration. Still we feel more hopeful now about the
general position and I can promise you will leave nothing undone that we can achieve here
in the interests of Australia.
Dr. Evatt, and Mr. Smith join us in sending sincerest regards to you and Mrs.
Curtin.
Sincerely yours
Mary Alice Evatt
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
SOURCE 6: Letter—Mrs Evatt to Curtin 3 April 1942
19
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
20
SOURCE 7: Letter—Curtin to Australian-American
Cooperative Society 11 April 1942
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
PRIME MINISTER.
Canberra, ACT.
11th April, 1942
COPY SP.
Dear Sir,
I am in receipt of your letter of 30th March, 1942, and thank you for the information
regarding the objectives of the Australian-American Co-operative Movement ad its present
activities ...
You may be assured that the Commonwealth Government has constantly in mind the
importance of furthering all measures within its power practical co-operation and mutual
understanding between the peoples of Australia and the United States. I may refer, in this
connection, to two specific instances which fall within the objectives set out in your letter.
First, the decisions recently taken by the Commonwealth Government to establish direct radio
telegraphic communication between Australia and the United States, and to facilitate the
transmission of press messages between the two countries; second, the endorsement given on
behalf of the Government by the Minister for External Affairs in the House of Representatives
on February 25th to the Mutual Aid Agreement concluded in that month between the United
States and the United Kingdom.
You will recall that a significant article of the Agreement provided for agreed action by
the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries of like mind directed to the objectives outlined in the Atlantic Charter. I venture to think that the common pursuit of this goal
will, in itself, lead to a high degree of increasingly close relations between Australia and the
United States.
... You will of course agree that the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur as
Supreme Commander in the South-West Pacific, and the public response to that appointment,
have contributed outstandingly to the mutual cordiality and understanding between the two
countries ...
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.) J. CURTIN
Prime Minister
Captain E. K. White, M. C.,
President of the Australian-American
Co-operation Movement,
Prudential Building,
Martin Place, SYDNEY
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
The Royal Society of St. George
7th January, 1942
The Hon. John Curtin, M.H.R.,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Parliament House, Canberra
Dear Sir,
My Council desires to advise you that at a special meeting of the Sydney
Branch of the Royal Society of St. George was held on the 5th instant, at which the following
resolution was unanimously carried, namely:—
“THAT the Sydney Branch of the Royal Society of St. George having very carefully
read and considered the Prime Minister’s message to Australia, published in the Sydney
Morning Herald on the 27th December last, deeply regrets that Mr. Curtin should in conveying
that message have used the following disparaging words:—
‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United
Kingdom.’
“As a result of the natural and spontaneous resentment which those words roused
throughout the world in the hearts of the loyal British subjects, Mr. Curtin published in the
Sydney Morning Herald of the 30th December 1941 the following explanation:—
‘There is no part of the Empire more steadfast in loyalty to the British way of living and
the British institutions than Australia.
‘Our loyalty to His Majesty the King goes to the very core of our national life. It is
part of our being. That is the reason why this great continent, peopled by his subjects, is, in
my view, absolutely vital.’
‘I do not consider Australia a segment of the British Empire. It is an organic part of
the whole structure. But I do not put Australia in the position of a colony. Australia is a
Dominion.’
“The Sydney Branch of the Royal Society of St. George accepts Mr. Curtin’s explanatory statement and on behalf of all its members reiterates ... its loyalty to ... His Majesty
the King and its patriotism and love for the Mother Country, acknowledging with deepest
gratitude and appreciation the gift of Australia and the continuous protection and guidance
given to this great Dominion since its foundation.”
Yours sincerely,
Edward Lawrence
Hon. Secretary.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: CORRESPONDENCE
SOURCE 8: Letter—Royal Society of St George to Curtin
7 January 1942
21
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: ORAL HISTORY
22
SOURCE 1: Dr Malcolm Mackay
Mackay worked with the Australian Navy in World War II. He entered Parliament as
the Liberal Member for Evans (NSW) in 1963 and was Minister for the Navy 1970-2.
Q: During the war John Curtin changed Australia’s orientation from Britain to the
United States. How significant do you think this change was?
It was plain good arithmetic and good geography. ... Britain already had its hands very full: it had
its resources stretched to the utmost and there weren’t too many leftovers to be directed away
down south. And when the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk later it indicated that the
strength of Britain at sea, for instance, was greatly under challenge. We couldn’t have won the
war without the enormous contribution the Americans made: not just with the Battle of the Coral
Sea, which was the turning-point, but with the amazing construction of their Liberty ships which
now decorate our Great Barrier Reef as wrecks. There were these hundreds of ships produced
to, as quickly and cheaply as possible, convey the necessary sinews of war around the world.
We certainly benefited from that in Australia, which Britain could never have provided.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Dr Malcolm Mackay.
SOURCE 2: Col John Buckley
Buckley was a Colonel in the Australian army during World War II and later worked as
a high level public servant in the Department of Defence.
Q: During the war John Curtin changed Australia’s orientation from Britain to the
United States. How significant do you think this change was?
At the time there was no alternative. ... Britain couldn’t do much to help: especially after those
two major battleships were sunk at Singapore, and Singapore was captured. So what help
could we expect from Britain? And what could we do to help Britain? ... I don’t blame Britain
one way for not helping, because they just couldn’t. ... Thereafter [America] decided that Australia would be one of the jumping off places for any subsequent attack on the Japanese, and it
was in the American interest to help out. They realised that we had a huge land mass which was
quite suitable for aerodromes; we had established ports; we had very good railways; and we had
an excellent supply of food, surplus food; and surplus other materials—so the Americans came in
to help themselves as well. I’ve got a very clear mind that Britain couldn’t do much to help us;
and the Americans came in because it suited their own war strategy.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Col John Buckley.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
Paul was a member of the South Fremantle branch of the ALP in the 1930s and
Chairman of the Fremantle Branch of the Railway Officers’ Union from 1960-70.
Q: How would you appraise John Curtin as a wartime Prime Minister?
I don’t think there was anybody better than John Curtin in the world when Australia became
involved. With his general friendship with General MacArthur—between the pair of them they
did a lot of plotting that benefited Australia. And John Curtin, he ignored the people in England
about saving the castles of England first, and then after that help the colonies. He brought our
soldiers back from the Middle East to defend our own country. I think he took a big stand, took
it on his own, and didn’t care what was going on the other side of the world.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mr George Paul.
SOURCE 4: McLaughlin Family
Fred McLaughlin was John Curtin’s Private Secretary in the Defence Department
throughout the war.
[Pearl Harbour] made the Americans come in. Douglas MacArthur came over and it made all
the difference with Mr Curtin. He just felt that he could relax. I don’t know what would have
happened if he hadn’t come over.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mrs McLaughlin.
The memories I have of him [John Curtin] personally are fairly vague... Most of my memories
are, well, anecdotal from our father. They were the things like his grief, his anxiety, when the
troops were at sea coming home ... The war really was not John Curtin’s scene at all: he was a
pacifist. He was very much affected by it—emotionally and physically. And he became more
and more depressed and would go into his room and wouldn’t come out ... And [my father]
would go in [to John Curtin’s office] and they would just talk and pray. And they would get a
better perspective on it, and open the door and get on with it again ...
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with McLaughlin’s daughter—Mrs Barbara Ross.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: ORAL HISTORY
SOURCE 3: Mr George Paul
23
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: ORAL HISTORY
24
SOURCE 5: Mr John McNamara
McNamara’s father was a good friend of John Curtin.
I suppose up until the 1939 war Australia largely rode along the coat-tails of Britain ... When it
came to the decisive situation of having to conduct a war and save Australia from invasion,
obviously our priorities and our allegiances had to be re-evaluated. When the Americans gladly
accepted the role of using Australia as a base for fighting back the Japanese ... I daresay that
forever changed the attitude of people who had previously no other allegiance but to Britain.
Without the Americans, well, we wouldn’t have been a free country as we are today ...
Q: How did you feel about John Curtin standing up to Winston Churchill?
I think he did it and he did it very effectively and very decisively. He had to absolutely bully his
way to get in what he wanted for Australia and Australia’s troops and the use of them. He
wanted them back in Australia to defend Australia and New Guinea; whereas Churchill wanted
them to go to Burma ... He had to be very strong to stand up to a very strong man like Churchill
who usually got his way. But in this case Curtin got his way.
... Curtin agonised over every decision he had to make where troops had to be sent into action
or a ship had to be sent somewhere ... He was a man of very deep compassion and deep
emotion.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mr John McNamara.
SOURCE 6: Mrs Mary Brocklebank
Mrs Brocklebank worked for the War Cabinet Secretariat in Canberra and Melbourne during World War II.
Yes, I remember the troops coming home from the Middle East ... They came home from
Singapore in a single vessel without an escort. I have heard since that Mr Curtin walked the
grounds of Government House while the ship was coming home because the Japanese had gone
into the war ...
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mrs Mary Brocklebank.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
Mayor’s mother was part of the cast of ‘Battle for Australia’, a revue produced by
the Moral Re-Armament Society.
Of course we look back now and see that it was inevitable that the Japanese would not win the
war in the Pacific. But at that time we just didn’t know. I lived in Sydney—we had the invasion
of the submarines into Sydney Harbour; Sydney was shelled by the Japanese; we had the invasion of Papua New Guinea. We really didn’t know what was going to happen ... without question [John Curtin] was a man that nobody thought of as a party leader really—they thought of
him as the father of the nation through very difficult testing days.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mr Chris Mayor.
SOURCE 8: Mr Frank Davidson
Davidson spent sixty years in publishing and worked as a journalist and editor of
the Mirror.
... [Curtin] was a genuine speaker. That’s why he ‘got into holts’* with Churchill, Curtin came
out as the honest man; whereas Churchill was the man who wanted to run the whole war personally. Churchill would make a decision affecting the Australian troops, and Curtin objected to him
marshalling Australian troops and sending them off to fight in Burma. Curtin said if they’re going
to fight anywhere, they’re going to fight in Australia. Churchill finally agreed to that, but when
they got to sea, Churchill then diverted the Australian troops to Burma. That’s when Curtin had
to step in and jump on Churchill very thoroughly. But he was like that: he was a man of complete
honesty ...
Naturally a lot of people resented the fact that we were no longer just a British suburb. And that
was a masterstroke, really, the way he gathered together support for the Alliance with the United
States ... I think nobody could have gathered complete support for the combination of Australia
and the United States, nobody could have done more to hold that together than Curtin did. He
was assisted in that, of course, by the way Churchill tried to just trample over him.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mr Frank Davidson.
* An expression of the era meaning to have heated arguments.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: ORAL HISTORY
SOURCE 7: Mr Chris Mayor
25
SOURCE DOCUMENTS: ORAL HISTORY
26
SOURCE 9: Mr James Coulter
Coulter was a journalist with the West Australian and an RAAF pilot in World War II.
The first one was to comment on what he’d said on his arrival [in Britain]. Because he got
practically all the front pages of the British press with his statement on arrival of warm commendation for Britain standing alone—and the gratitude that he expressed on behalf of himself and
‘seven million Britons abroad’. I said what an inspired phrase I thought this was. And he said,
‘It’s what I genuinely felt; I felt it to be the truth’.
Whereas Churchill may have been a more natural man of war, Curtin was a very Australian man
of war in that he’d have much preferred not to be at war—but if he was at war he was going to
give it absolutely his whole heart. ... The fact that Curtin had the guts to stand up to Churchill was
not only right for Australia but was also right for Churchill.
*****
I felt that Curtin ... was a man ahead of his time. That he lived in the world scene: he could mix
it with Churchill, he could mix it with MacArthur—and yet he was inherently a creature of his
country. So there was greatness there: and I would long to see my country rejoice in greatness
rather than trying to make us all ordinary.
Excerpt from transcript of JCPML interview
with Mr James Coulter.
An Extraordinary Allied Nations’ Summit Meeting—Simulation Game