Australian Federalism Australian federalism is characterised by the collective six states and two territories under a central Commonwealth Government. Realised 1 January, 1901, Australian federalism was inspired by the US Constitution and its “less centralised” version of federalism (Zines 1989). Certainly, the framers of Australian federalism considered Canadian federalism too centralised. The then six British colonies sought their independence from Great Brittain and envisaged the benefits of having unrestricted trade throughout a federation, and a single armed force, currency and rate of export excise, but they did not want their powers usurped by a central government. The Australian Constitution provides the framework for Australian federalism. Of particular importance are the following sections: 
s.51, lists the areas in which the Commonwealth Parliament may legislate or exercise jurisdiction, but does so without necessarily depriving the States of authority to legislate in those areas (thus many of the enumerated powers are ‘concurrent’). 
s.71, established the High Court of Australia as the preeminent body to rule on Federal law; 
s.96, allowed the Commonwealth Parliament to provide financial assistence, tied or otherwise, to the States. More recently, it has enabled the Commonwealth to attach stringent and inflexible, related and unrelated, conditions to specific purpose payments and national partnerships; and 
s.109, which stated that in cases of legislative “inconsistency,” Commonwealth law shall prevail. Although the colonies retained their constitutions and jurisdiction over most policy areas, a series of key decisions by the High Court have led to power being increasingly centralised in the Commonwealth. In the so‐called Engineers Case (1926), the High Court effectively annulled the principles of “implied immunities” and “reserved State powers” to give the Commonwealth pre‐eminence over the States. The High Court’s decision in the Uniform Tax Case (1942) gave the Commonwealth the exclusive right to impose income tax. In Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983), the Commonwealth successfully challenged the Tasmanian Governments decision to dam the Franklin River on the grounds that s.51(xxix) of the Constitution gives the Commonwealth the power to legislate in matters where Australia is a signatory to an international treaty. Most recently, a constitutional challenge to the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005, failed because a 5‐2 majority of the High Court deemed that the Commonwealth legislation takes precedence over State legislation in matters pertaining to corporations. There is considerable consternation among federalists who fear a broad interpretation of “corporation.” An ever‐increasing vertical fiscal imbalance, Commonwealth encroachment upon policy areas traditionally recognised as the purview of the States, public frustration with inefficiencies created by multiple levels of government and the persistence of problems with education and health policies, have led some to question the utility of Australian federalism. The long term success, indeed survival, of Australian federalism, appears dependent upon a return to a mutually beneficial form of collaborative federalism. Further Reading: Fenna, A. 2007. The malaise of federalism: Comparative reflections on Commonwealth‐State Relations. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(3): 298‐306. Parkin, A. 2003. The States, federalism and political science: A fifty‐year appraisal. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 62(2): 101‐112. Parkin, A. and Anderson, G. 2007. The Howard government, regulatory federalism and the transformation of Commonwealth‐State relations. Australian Journal of Political Science, 42(2): 295‐314. Selway, B. and Williams, J.M. 2005. The High Court and Australian federalism. Publius, 36: 467‐488. Twomey, A. and Withers, G. 2007. Federalist Paper 1. Australia’s federal future: Delivering growth and prosperity. Available at http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/CA256D800027B102/Lookup/FederalistPaperAustralia'sFederalF
uture/$file/Federalist%20Paper%20Australia's%20Federal%20Future.pdf. Wanna, J., Phillimore, J., Fenna, A. and Harwood, J. 2009. Federalist Paper 3. Common cause: Strengthening Australia's cooperative federalism. Brisbane: Council for the Australian Federation. Available at www.caf.gov.au/documents/FP3%20‐%20final.pdf.