Behind the Men: The Consequences of Governance Informed by Patriarchal and
Hegemonic Norms on Masculinity
Åsa Ekvall
University of Antwerp
Work in progress, please don’t cite
Abstract
Often attempts to improve governance focus on the empowerment of women, assuming that the
latter will somehow automatically generate better governance. Furthermore, extensive research has
found that an increase in women’s empowerment and rights leads to lower levels of many forms of
violence, including armed conflict, which can be considered the worst result of poor governance. This
paper argues that while an increase in gender equality from a women’s empowerment perspective
seems to lead to changes in governance and to reduce violence it’s not enough. We not only need to
involve women to a larger extent, or look at structures and processes of governance, but we also
need to look into the underlying norms. The norms underlying governance, structured and
confirmed, are hegemonic and patriarchal norms. Research on masculinities does find strong
correlations between patriarchal and hegemonic norms on masculinity on the one hand and poor
governance on the other. It goes hand in hand with several forms of inequality, and positive attitudes
to several types of violence, including armed conflict. Adding women and stir, still a largely favored
approach in many development and especially post-conflict programs does not automatically
generate good governance, not the least because by focusing on entitling and promoting women to
what men traditionally have access to (and almost never the opposite), the traditionally masculine is
still valued more than the traditionally feminine. The underlying inequality structures thus remain in
place.
This paper wants to unpack the linkages between men and masculinities on the one hand and poor
governance, including insecurity and violence, on the other. It will do so by going through the existing
research in the fields of political science, sociology and social psychology. The paper will start with a
discussion of the concept of masculinities and then move on to the concept of governance, including
the normative notions of “good” and “poor” governance. It will then try to unpack how masculinities,
and especially patriarchal and hegemonic norms on masculinities, are related to governance. The
paper will finally examine how governance informed by patriarchal and hegemonic norms is related
to violence and conflict and then conclude with a discussion on the importance of norms both for
understanding and dealing with governance, violence and gender inequality.
Masculinity
Masculinity is a concept that encompasses how we think a “real” man should be, look, think and
behave (Reeser, 2010). As there are many cultural and social norms on how an ideal man should be
and behave there is thus not one single type of masculinity but rather a multitude of masculinities.
Overall, norms on masculinity can be clustered in two groups: patriarchal or egalitarian (Whitehead,
2002).
1
Patriarchal norms stipulate that men are the dominant sex and should behave as such. They should
be strong, proving how brave they are through risky behavior and competitions and not showing
their emotions. Another important component of a patriarchal masculinity is its heterosexual nature,
homosexuality not figuring in a patriarchal scheme of masculinity, homosexuals being often rejected
as weak, women-like and not real men. According to a patriarchal understanding of masculinity, men
should therefore not only dominate women but also weaker men – whatever that may include.
Egalitarian masculinities have not been studied to any large extent. In general the literature refers to
egalitarian masculinities, and egalitarian norms, as opposite to patriarchal. A few attempts to define
them have been made though. To start with, egalitarian men negotiates their masculinities in their
relationships (Schneider, 2007) creating new norms that thrives on mutual benefits. Egalitarian
masculinities involve notably emotional expressiveness, high levels of family involvement (Pyke,
1996), non-violence and no generalized roles (Rankhota, 2002). In this paper egalitarian masculinities
and norms thereof further refers to norms and behavior favoring equality both between the sexes
and among the sexes.
Norms of masculinity have been inventoried in the Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory (CMNI)
(Mahalik , Locke, Ludlow, Diemer, Scott & Gottfried, 2003). The CMNI assesses levels of conformity to
masculine norms in eleven categories: Winning, Emotional Control, Risk-Taking, Violence,
Dominance, Playboy, Self-Reliance, Primacy of Work, Power Over Women, Disdain for Homosexuals,
and Pursuit of Status. The CMNI is based on the idea that socially dominant groups shape the gender
role norms that are communicated to individuals in a society. Individuals’ experiences of these
gender role norms and their level of conformity to such norms are shaped by individual and group
factors (e.g. personality, race/ethnicity), and there are costs and benefits for conforming and not
conforming to gender role norms (Parent, Moradi, Rummell & Tokar, 2009).
As seen above the structures and processes involved in managing and governing our lives are
informed by underlying patriarchal and hegemonic norms. Norms are strong, collective beliefs on
what is right and wrong (Scott & Marshall, 2009) and can be seen as (in)formal guidelines for
accepted and expected behavior, both of ourselves and of others (Feldman, 1984).
According to Connell (1995), patriarchal norms on masculinity can also be called hegemonic: men
should not only dominate women, some men should also dominate other men. Hegemonic forms of
masculinity as they are understood today developed from the advent of industrial capitalism and
imperialism (Connell & Wood, 2005). The bourgeois masculinities brought forth by these processes
had many local variations, from the colonial settler elite of Natal (Morrell, 2001) and the urban
establishment of postcolonial Peru (Fuller, 2001) to the corporate employee of Japan (Dasgupta,
2003) and the industrial managers of Britain (Roper, 1994). These variations had important
characteristics in common: association with authority; social conservatism; compulsory
heterosexuality; integration with a family division of labor; strongly marked, symbolic gender
differences; and an emotional – and other - distance between men and women. The very large
majority of managers are still men, especially at the top levels of corporations and organizations
(Hearn & Parkin, 2001). Managers have thus become, as argue Collinson and Hearn (1996), an
important group for the understanding of modern masculinities.
Governance
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There are many definitions of governance. A frequently used one proposes that governance is “the
sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”
(The Commission on Global Governance, 1995:2). Governance can be found at all levels of society,
from local to global. While local governance is made up by different forms of local government and
other local stakeholders, global governance is defined as states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and transnational corporations participating at different levels and in
different constellations in the creation and implementation of international rules with a global claim
of validity (Rittberger & Zangl, 2003). The concept of governance is also used in the corporate sector
as well as in connection with various other actors and activities such as irrigation, the environment
etc. While governance can in itself be seen as a technical and rather neutral concept, the question is
often put forward by organizations, institutions or individual actors of how governance should be,
what type of governance would be good, which led to the development of a whole range of
normative conceptualizations of “good” and “bad” governance.
Good governance was first put on the international agenda by a World Bank study in 1989 (World
Bank, 1989). It is used in international development literature to describe various normative
accounts of how public institutions ought to conduct public affairs and manage public resources.
Unsurprisingly different organizations have defined good governance differently to promote different
normative ends. Generally good governance means open and enlightened policy-making;
accountable and transparent processes; capacity, effectiveness and efficiency; a professional ethos
that combats corruption, bias, nepotism and personal gain; and strict financial control and
management of funding. For more political organizations good governance further involves human
rights, democracy, combatting poverty and inequality, responsiveness and accountability (Pienaar,
2009; de la Harpe, Rijken & Roos, 2008).
Poor governance is the opposite of good governance and involves notably corruption, inequalities,
inefficiency, human rights abuse and general dysfunction (Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Kaufmann & Kraay,
2002). As poor government arguably is detrimental to both individuals and societies, creating
poverty, inequalities, oppressions and violence it is important to look at the underlying norms
informing the choices that lead to poor governance.
The relationship between patriarchal and hegemonic masculinities and governance
The literature puts forward many links between patriarchal masculinities and governance, a couple of
which are rather obvious. Due to patriarchal norms women are often excluded from decision making, from the household up to the highest levels of policymaking. Decisions made and policies
implemented by governance institutions at global, national and local levels help to shape perceptions
of the roles that women and men play in society, as well as determining their access to rights and
resources. Involving women in defining these policies and processes, and in influencing the
institutions that produce them, makes it more likely they will respond to the different needs and
situations of both women and men, and contribute to gender equality (Brody, 2009). For instance,
Caceres-Rodriguez (2013) found that the number of women police officers has a direct effect on the
number of cases filed and the number arrests for sexual assault, meaning that gender can have a
very direct influence on priorities. Reducing patriarchal norms thus have an impact on the way
governance is carried out by involving women.
3
Furthermore, increased women representation in leadership ranks not only influences priorities but
also has a material effect in the allocation of resources. For instance, Dolan (2002) found that women
have different spending priorities than otherwise comparable men. In general, significantly more
women than men believe that spending should be increased for child care, welfare programs, and aid
to big cities to name a few. This is in line with the well-known tendency of women to be more
inclined to vote to the left and men to the right, which in turn can be traced to gender norms, where
social responsibility and welfare are considered to be “soft”, feminine issues (Mackay, Kenny &
Chappell, 2010). Governance processes often exclude people with caring responsibilities - primarily
women. The working arrangements of governance institutions are usually inflexible, making it
difficult for women to balance their work with unpaid caring responsibilities. In turn, the processes
designed to engage citizens in decision-making – such as participatory budgeting – can exclude
women by failing to provide crèches or other facilities (Jones & Prezler-Marshall, 2012). Patriarchal
norms excluding women from decision-making thus has a considerable impact on policies and
resource allocations, leading to gender inequality in the socio-economic sector and to large social
inequalities in general.
However, governance informed by patriarchal and hegemonic norms has other consequences than
the obvious gender inequality related ones. Dominant forms of masculinity are associated with major
forms of social power (Connell & Wood, 2005). Moreover, the most powerful institutions today,
except only a few major states, are transnational corporations operating in global markets. Connell
(1998) argued that these two facts should be put together and that the global corporate economy
might be the setting for a new pattern of hegemonic masculinity, found particularly among globally
mobile managers. Furthermore, what has been identified in the organizational and business
literature as a dominant discourse of managerial masculinity focused on aggression, decisiveness,
strength, efficiency, action and vision (Collinson & Hearn, 1996; Whitehead, 1999). Such norms
obviously lead to a very specific type of governance and management, where short-term gain is
primed over social equality and social justice.
Governance of global finance has a great influence on domestic finances, political unrest and
ultimately on the lives of groups and individuals as the crisis a few years ago showed us. Griffin
(2013) states that the relationship between ideas about responsibility, masculinities, and global
finance is intricate and intimate. The global financial services industry is understood here as a sort of
‘‘boys’ club’’, meaning a sphere where certain types of masculine subjectivity predominate and
within which the prevalence, form and effects of dominant models of masculine behavior are
important to consider (Griffin, 2013). The gendered nature of the financial industry makes it a
community wherein certain groups and/or types of activity create and sustain a culture that offers
incentives for, and rewards, certain types of behavior (e.g., aggression, competitiveness,
individualism, risk taking), while delegitimizing others (Knyght , Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin,
2011). Aggression, competitiveness and risk-taking are part of the Masculine Norms Inventory as
seen above, making the global finance sector a stronghold of patriarchal and hegemonic masculinity.
An example of how traditional patriarchal and hegemonic norms can be made visible is through the
clarification of their opposites as seen in the outspoken take-over of the Icelandic financial sector by
women after the financial crisis that almost brought the island nation to bankruptcy. The focus of
these new female financial leaders has been on what they qualify as feminine values: risk awareness;
profit with social and environmental principals; emotional capital; straight talking and, independence
4
(Sunderland, 2009). These values are perceived as being the opposite of the values their predecessor
used, be they men or women.
Patriarchal and hegemonic norms on masculinity do not only influence governance in the area of
finance and corporate business. As a number of studies have pointed out, state policies such as
welfare retrenchment have acted to create pools of low-waged female labor that have proven
indispensable to state strategies of export-led industrialization through the attraction of foreign
development investment (FDI) (Pearson, 2004; Kopinak, 1995; Bahramitash, 2005). An example of
the gendered relationships between global capitalism and “developmental” states seeking to attract
FDI has been provided by Ling (1999), who demonstrates how states in East Asia have promoted a
particular vision of economic development that involved authoritarian, patriarchal–Confucian states
pursuing economic development strategies that both confronted and incorporated elements of the
dominant Western-centric neoliberal development paradigm. Ling discusses the notion of “hypermasculinity” to convey the glorification of aggression, competition, accumulation, and power that are
a hallmark of these states’ development strategies and thus impacts the different types and levels of
governance in the region.
Patriarchal and hegemonic norms are not only linked to the rather visible behaviors associated with
aggression, competition, risk-taking and power-hunger, they are also connected with a concept that
is mostly perceived as neutral, namely professionalism. Kerfoot (2002) argues that professionalism
has historically strongly overlapped with masculine discourses of management. She explains that the
identity of professional is one associated with specialized knowledge, skill, emotional disengagement,
instrumentality and rationality. Thus, the embodied discursive subject which is the ‘professional’ is
the masculine/man/male. This can be linked to one of the arguments found in the governance
literature today, namely that the private sector has a potential and capacity that is missing from the
public sector (Jones & Little, 2000; Rai, 2004). This dichotomizing of the private and the public is
gendered where the private sector is masculinized as efficient, decisive, robust and risk-taking, while
the public sector is feminized as passive, inefficient, weak, and slow-moving (Little & Jones , 2000) .
That governance is closely linked to patriarchal norms was further shown by Jones & Prezler-Marshall
(2012). They list five gendered social institutions that cover a range of discriminatory sociocultural
and patriarchal dimensions, thereby providing a number of useful entry points into the governance
challenges entailed in effectively tackling gendered experiences of poverty and vulnerability: 1.
Discriminatory family codes: parental authority, inheritance laws, early marriage practices, family
structure and resulting rights and responsibilities (including polygamy, multigenerational households,
female-headed households). 2. Son bias: unequal investments in the care, nurture and resources of
sons and daughters within the household. 3. Limited resource rights and entitlements: girls’ and
young women’s access to land, microfinance, property and natural resources. 4. Restricted civil
liberties: restrictions vis-à-vis freedom of movement and freedom of association /participation in
collective action, freedom of dress. 5. Physical insecurity: gender-based violence in the household,
school, workplace and community and harmful gendered traditional practices, such as female genital
mutilation, religious or domestic servitude. As we shall see below, three of these social institutions,
namely physical insecurity, discriminatory family code and polygamy, are the three best indicators of
armed conflict, effectively linking governance based on patriarchal norms with war.
5
Moreover, feminist academics have since a long time pointed out the privileging of masculine values
and practices and the parallel denigration of femininity in security policies, militaries and
peacekeeping operations. They have argued that this produces a variety of dysfunctional outcomes,
from sex trafficking by peacekeepers and sexual violence in wartime to the systematic exclusion of
women from processes of post-war reconstruction. While a number of Security Council resolutions in
the new millennium have formulated an agenda on “women, peace and security”, they have largely
failed to problematize structures of gender subordination and associated militarist masculinities
(Enloe, 2008). Moreover, Myrttinen (2003) states that militarized imagery and the use of military
accessories can be seen as manifestations of a militarized concept of masculinity, an aggressive
hyper-individualism that is also dominant in the current neo-liberal discourse. Furthermore, conflict
situations tend to reinforce narrow views of masculinity, giving the men with weapons power. Also,
men are often expected by tradition to be either warriors and/or protectors, and failure to live up to
these expectations can lead to violence against those perceived to be in an even weaker position.
Global security governance is thus solidly based on patriarchal and hegemonic norms.
Closely linked to security governance are foreign policies and national policies on minorities.
Hegemonic masculinities are closely related to nationalism (Elias, 2008) which in turn can influence
both domestic and foreign policy. Looking at how masculinized state identities are rooted in a
gendered politics of nationalism presents us with radical reformulation of international politics
(Steans, 1998). This reformulation points not only to the relationship between nationalistic
constructions of hegemonic masculinity and foreign policy making (Nayak, 2006), but also to the
importance of looking below the nation-state at how national identities are formed at the
intersection with specific localized gender relations and identities. Moreover, an extensive literature
on militarized masculinities has investigated and found relationships between nationalism,
citizenship, and militarization (Bickford, 2003; Banerjee, 2006; Gill, 1997; Moon, 2005; Nagel, 1998),
as well as between militarized masculinities and alternative gender identities that challenge not only
the institution of the military, but the whole masculinity myth on which national identities are built
(Britton & Williams, 1995; Sasson-Levy, 2003).
As we have seen in the examples above patriarchal and hegemonic masculinities inform and
influence governance at all levels, leading to competition, aggressiveness, low levels of welfare and
social justice. There is reason to believe that this can be detrimental to individuals and societies in
many ways. In the next section we will see how governance informed by patriarchal and hegemonic
norms is linked to various forms of violence.
How is governance informed by patriarchal norms linked to violence?
As has been seen above, patriarchal and hegemonic norms on masculinity includes norms approving
of, or even encouraging, aggression, competition, risk-taking etc. The previous section revealed that
such norms are also informing structures and processes of governance. This section draws on
literature that shows us that poor governance due to underlying patriarchal and hegemonic norms
can lead to violence both directly and indirectly, though inequalities and poverty.
First of all, the large majority of violence in the world is conducted by men (Flood, 2013).
Furthermore, many studies find strong correlations between patriarchal norms on masculinity (such
as a need to be dominant; to have power over women; disdain for homosexuals; to be strong and not
show emotions; to win whatever competition or battle is at stake; and to take risks (Mahalik et al.,
6
2003))and tolerant or even positive attitudes to different types of violence (Higate & Hopton, 2005;
Kimmel, 2000), such as violence against women (Dworkin, Colvin, Hatcher & Peacock, 2012; Flood &
Pease, 2009), between men (Jones, 2009; Vandello, Cohen & Ransom, 2008), homophobic violence
(Kimmel & Mahler, 2003), armed conflict (Ekvall, 2011; Hudson, Ballif-Spanwill, Caprioli and Emmet,
2012) and militarism (Enloe, 1987). Many of these studies share the assumption that there is a causal
link between patriarchal norms on masculinity and (attitudes to) violence.
A specific example of patriarchal values can be found in the concept of so-called honor cultures.
Sev'er (2005) points out that what unites all patriarchies is the obsessive control over women's
freedom, sexuality and reproduction and studies on so-called honor cultures show correlations
between high levels of control over women’s bodies, sexuality and freedom of movement and high
levels of interpersonal violence (Pinker, 2011; Begikhani, 2011; Inglis & MacKeogh, 2012; Ijzerman &
Cohen, 2011; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2010). So-called honor cultures are not only accepting and using
violence against women as is commonly known but they are also more accepting of the use of
violence in general than other societies (Ekvall, 2013). So-called honour cultures do not only exist in
the Middle East as is notoriously believed, they exist to different levels all over the world. The many
studies of the honor cultures of the American South show that several mechanisms keep this culture
in place. At the macro level there are social policies and institutional practices that accept violence in
response to insult or threat. These range from formal laws allowing citizen greater freedom to own
guns and to kill in self-defense to informal norms acted out by people and institutions, which fail to
stigmatize those who kill to uphold their honor (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle & Schwarz, 1996). These socalled honor norms that lead to many forms of violence, not only violence against women, are thus
kept in place by structures of governance based on patriarchal norms.
Furthermore, hegemonic masculinities not only impact governance and societies, they also have
ways of defending the existing order and norms. Rai (2008) shows the state is mobilized in defense of
the dominant social norms through constitutional, legal and policy frameworks as well as through
modes of policy implementation – police personnel, for example, are often participating in or at least
ignoring violence perpetrated against transgressors of community norms. This means that such
violence is seen as a “legitimate” means of regulating communities, securing its cultural borders
(patriarchal and hegemonic) and insuring against transgression of its norms (Rai, 2008). Governance
based on patriarchal and hegemonic norms on masculinities thus uses violence to maintain its
structures and processes.
Governance based on patriarchal and hegemonic norms not only leads to violence directly but also
indirectly, through inequalities and poverty. To start with, governance based on patriarchal and
hegemonic norms lead to inequalities (part of poor governance). There are strong connections
between gender inequalities and different types of violence, including armed conflict. In fact Hudson,
Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli and Emmett (2012) has shown, based on research using the WomenStats
Database that the three best predictors of violent conflict are women’s physical security, unequal
family law and polygamy – three phenomena identified by Jones & Prezler-Marshall (2012) above on
their list of gendered social institutions posing a challenge for governance. Gender inequality, of
which these three phenomena are indicators, although far from a new occurrence, is thus
maintained by poor governance. Gender inequality in turn can lead to violence as seen above (Ekvall,
2013).
7
Other forms of inequality can also lead to violence. Both Beyer (2014) and Pinker (2002) argue that
inequality is one of the strongest external factors that cause violence between individuals and on the
international level. Inequality has also been empirically linked to cause crime, violence and wars.
Wilkinson (2004) shows how the most well established environmental determinant of levels of
violence is the scale of income differences between rich and poor and that more unequal societies
tend to be more violent. Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) furthermore show a clear positive correlation
between income inequality and homicide rates. Greater income inequality moreover increases the
chance that an individual will support revolt (MacCulloch, 2005). Again inequalities, produced by
poor governance and its underlying patriarchal and hegemonic norms, lead to violence.
The hypothesis of poverty and inequality contributing to civil wars also is strongly supported (Dixon,
2009; Nafziger & Auvinen, 2003; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009). Intra-national inequality has been
shown to contribute to fighting amongst parties within a given country (Ostby, 2005; Cederman,
Weidman & Gleditsch, 2010). Ostby (2003) believes that an important factor that differentiates the
violence from the peaceful multiethnic societies is the existence of severe, systematic inequalities
between ethnic groups. She refers to such inequalities between groups as horizontal inequalities.
The violent consequences of poor governance and inequality are not limited to intra-state violence.
Poor governance on an international level can lead to/maintain inequality between states. Galtung
(1964) argued that rank discrepant states are most likely to engage in aggression in order to change
their status in the system, particularly when other avenues for change have already unsuccessfully
been tried and when there is a culture or experience of violent protest.
As seen above poor governance, i.e. governance informed by patriarchal and hegemonic norms, not
only leads to inequalities but also to poverty. Rose-Ackerman (2004) states that poor governance is
an important reason why some countries are poor and have low or negative growth rates. Poverty is
one of the greatest challenges to human security and basic human needs and can in many instances
be seen as structural violence (Galtung, 1969). Sen (2004) suggests that the neglecting, or what he
terms ‘comparative indifference’ to the importance of the social needs demands a more innovative
multilayered approach than a market-based logic, a different type of governance in other words.
Miguel (2007) argues that there is increasing evidence of a poverty-violence nexus, at both the macro
and micro levels of analysis. Poverty and falling income are influencing the sparking of civil conflicts.
This may either be because poverty breeds armed violence aimed at looting assets and natural
resources or, because poor states simply have limited institutional capacity to repress armed
uprisings. A region that is neglected by the central government in terms of public investment and
jobs may become poorer due to its political marginalization, leading to violence. Moreover, Collier
and Hoeffler (2002) find strong correlations between national income levels and economic growth
rates on one hand and the occurrence of civil conflict on the other. They make the theoretical point
that joining an armed group becomes more attractive, especially for unemployed young men, when
legitimate income-earning options are scarce. There are often numerous lucrative looting, mining,
and smuggling opportunities open to armed groups in many developing societies.
Poor governance leading to structural poverty causes alienation in those born into relatively little
material comfort, who observe other strata enjoying exponentially greater material security. In
addition to this, the “countries where violent crime is an endemic problem are those in which
prosperity […] is confined to some sectors of the population and denied to others” (Currie ,
8
1998:115). Thus, we can see that there is a powerful connection between inequality and poverty on
the one hand and the levels of violent crime on the other.
As shown above poor governance based on underlying patriarchal and hegemonic norms can lead to
violence in many ways. Firstly it can lead to violence directly as patriarchal and hegemonic norms are
closely interlinked to positive or tolerant attitude to violence in many forms, including violence
against women, between men, homophobic violence, military violence and more. These attitudes
have an impact on governance, for instance when it comes to legislation (more or less tolerant) on
different types of violence and related practices such as gun ownership and promotion of military
service and actions. Secondly, governance based on underlying patriarchal and hegemonic norms can
lead to violence indirectly as they tend to create societies characterized by socio-economic and
gender inequalities as well as poverty, which first of all can be called structural violence and
furthermore is linked to physical violence as seen above. Considering these links it is time to address
these underlying patriarchal and hegemonic norms in our search for better governance, leading to
less violence.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to unpack the relationships between patriarchal and hegemonic norms on
masculinity, governance and violence. It showed that governance based on patriarchal and
hegemonic norms can lead to violence both directly and indirectly, through socio-economic and
gender inequalities and poverty.
Based on the literature discussed above it seems likely that a qualitative change, i.e. a change in
norms, where both men and women get more egalitarian and less patriarchal norms instead of the
more traditionally proposed quantitative one, i.e. the “add women and stir – approach”, would lead
to a type of governance that is less aggressive and competitive than what is usual today. Such a form
of governance would also involve a higher level of social responsibility, prioritizing so-far neglected
un-paid activities such as caring, nursing etc. Furthermore, less patriarchal and hegemonic systems of
governance would likely lead to a more egalitarian society thus leading to less conflict and violence.
A qualitative change would mean a refocus of today’s equality promoting policies and activities
which are mainly targeting women’s empowerment, promoting women’s rights and possibilities to
do what men traditionally do, to a situation where both men and women are encouraged to leave
their traditional gender roles and do and behave in whatever way suits them, regardless of
traditional gender norms. Patriarchal and hegemonic masculinities are not only oppressing women,
they are oppressing men as well. Jones (2009) shows how due to norms favoring risk-taking,
aggression, emotional control and idealizing the soldier etc. men are more likely to die from both
work-related accidents and other accidents than women; they will get sentenced harder for the same
crime than women, commit more suicide than women and are forced to participate in armed
conflicts to a totally different degree than woman. Furthermore, men in most countries have little
possibilities to be home on parental leave and are thus denied the right to be with their children, a
right that is taken for granted by women in most countries. The list of negative effects for men due
to patriarchal and hierarchical masculinities can be made long. Still we address gender inequalities
and patriarchal norms as mainly a problem for women. When we take into account the effect these
norms have on the totality of the population, taking into account other factors such as class and race,
we have a real opportunity to change.
9
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