The United States and Cuba 1898 - 1959 By Ann-Marie Holmes Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies October 22, 2009 2 We certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies. Committee ______________________________ First Reader (name/date) ______________________________ Second Reader (name/date) 3 Abstract This paper examines the political and economic relationship between the United States and Cuba from 1898 to 1959. In examining this relationship, I intend to illustrate how such a simple relationship based on trade agreements evolved into the complicated relationship that exists today. The time period 1898 to 1959 covers from the start of Cuban independence after the Spanish American War to the rise of Fidel Castro. Data have been collected from Foreign Relations of the United States documents, archives, and existing published research. This paper shows that the arguments that the United States actions were imperialistic or altruistic are false. Instead the intentions behind the United States actions were just as complicated as the relationship they affected. By understanding this past relationship, we can better understand the present relationship. 4 Table of Contents Introduction 7 Before the Spanish American War 10 The Spanish American War 14 1900-1920 19 1920-1940 34 1940-1960 52 Conclusion 83 Appendix A Cuban Presidents from 1899 - 1959 86 Works Cited 88 5 Dedication Page This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Allan and Victoria Holmes, for putting up with me and for motivating me. Thank you to my friends and family for their unending support and well wishes through the course of my research and writing. 6 Acknowledgements I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Dr. Asselin and Dr. Hart for their guidance, critiques, and exceptional advice in the course of my research and writing. And to Dr. Pavkovic, without whom any of this would be possible, thank you. 7 Introduction "This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility for the future good government of Cuba. We have accepted a trust the fulfillment of which calls for the sternest integrity of purpose and the exercise of the highest wisdom. The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must needs [sic] be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be assured. Whether those ties shall be organic or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our own, but how and how far is for the future to determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome, we must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect entity, not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of failure."1 Cuba lies 90 miles off the coast of Florida. This proximity to the United States lent to the viewpoint among many American decision makers, referred to as the law of political gravitation, that annexation of Cuba would be a logical extension of the United States' borders and fulfillment of manifest destiny.2 Cuba's proximity to the United States also meant that its harbors were of strategic importance, Cuba’s harbors could be used by enemies to threaten war on the United States conversely the United States could use those harbors as a first line of defense against enemies. Thomas Jefferson considered the Western hemisphere, especially Cuba and Florida, to be a jumping off point for a new “empire for liberty.”3 Cuba also factored into the economic system of the United States and equally the United States greatly impacted Cuban economics. Beginning with illicit trade in the 1700s, the United States quickly became not only the primary market for exports from Cuba but also the primary 1 William McKinley, State of the Union address, 1899, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters,The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540. 2 “The Right of the United States to Interfere in Cuba”. The Albany Law Journal: A Weekly Record. Volume LVII, From January to July, 1898, 278-281. Albany NY: Albany Law Journal Co. 1898., 278 3 Greg Grandin. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States and the Rise of New Imperialism. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006, 2 8 source of imports into Cuba.4 The United States began to expand that trade with Cuba, including sugar, tobacco, and tourism. As time went on, due to politics and commerce between the United States and Cuba, the United States began to have more of a vested interest in Cuba and thoughts of annexing Cuba became more prevalent among United States policy makers. While annexation was a vision shared by many Cubans, who felt that it would bring stability and wealth to Cuba, it was not without its opponents. Cuban Independentistas held the dream of an independent Cuba, fully sovereign and in control of its own destiny. Cuba gained its independence after the Spanish American War and the relationship between the United States and Cuba continued to grow and strengthen. The United States became fully vested in both Cuban politics and Cuban economics. This investment in Cuba meant the United States assisted Cuba financially, militarily, and to some extent, politically. Cuba sided with the United States in both World Wars and the United States provided weapons and training to Cuba to build their military to aid in the fight against Communism. With the triumph of the revolution led by Fidel Castro and the seizure of Cuba by Communist powers came the end of the friendly relationship between Cuban and United States. Shortly thereafter, Cuba sided with the Soviet Union in the Cold War and before long, the United States embargoed Cuba. By understanding this past relationship and its effect on Cuba's evolution, we can better understand the current relationship. This paper does not attempt to answer questions regarding the current relationship, but instead will relate the history of the relationship between the United States and Cuba, a simple relationship that started out on terms of trade agreements, but soon became more complicated and politically and economically driven. These complications: 4 Louis A. Pérez. Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990, 1 9 economic, political, and military not only formed the foundation of that relationship, but eventually led to the downfall of it. 10 Before the Spanish American War The relationship between the United States and Cuba began based on basic supply and demand. During the Spanish occupation, traders in Cuba and the American colonies established illicit trading contracts to obtain commodities needed in the colonies as well as for colonists to avoid paying colonial taxes on the imports to Great Britain. Over time, trade between Cuba and the United States waxed and waned based on the whims of the Spanish government, the ability of Spain to stop smugglers, and the recognition of local Spanish officials in Cuba of the need for trade with the colonies.5 By the late 1700s, sugar had replaced tobacco as Cuba’s main crop and by the mid 1800s Cuba produced 25 percent of the world’s sugar.6 The United States was a natural market for Cuban sugar; the American public was a heavy consumer of sugar but the United States did not have a sugar industry to meet that demand. In 1884, the international sugar market collapsed and the resulting loss of revenue drove many Cuban sugar mills into bankruptcy. Sensing an opportunity, investors from the United States poured capital back into Cuba purchasing the sugar mills and garnering a stake in the Cuban industry. This influx of revenue brought about an industrial revolution in Cuba’s sugar industry resulting from modernization of the mills and improvements in refining techniques.7 When the American colonies rebelled against Great Britain, in an effort to thwart the British government, Spain quickly made plans with the revolutionaries to establish overt trade relations with Cuba. However, in January 1784, Spain, in an effort to exert more control over Cuba, once again closed Cuba down to outside trade. Over the next decade, the Spanish government continued to open and close Cuba to outside trade depending on who Spain was 5 Perez, 3. Henry Teller. The Sugar Industry and Reciprocity with Cuba, March 18, 1903. 7 Phillip Brenner et al. A Contemporary Cuba Reader. Lanham : Rowman and Littlefield. 2008, 325 6 11 allied with at the time. In 1798, when trade between the United States and Cuba surpassed the amount of trade between Spain and Cuba, Spain once again closed Cuban ports. A year later, when Spain went to war with England again, Cuban ports were once again opened to United States merchants. Cuba's ability to conduct trade with the United States continued to be dependent on Spain's political climate and not on the needs of Cuba. The United States was as important to Cuban imports as it was for Cuban exports, especially in regards to sugar, and by 1818, with Cuba still under Spanish rule, trade agreements between Cuba companies and their United States counterparts began to replace the trade agreements traditionally held with Spain.8 With the acquisitions of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 and Florida in 1819 the borders of the United States expanded down south to the Gulf of Mexico and thoughts of annexing of Cuba moved to the forefront. In 1808, President Thomas Jefferson asked his Cabinet what the United States should do about Cuba. His Cabinet felt the best course would be for Cuba to remain under Spanish control. United States’ and Cuban interests were strongly connected, but the United States should not support Cuban independence, as that would open up Cuba to possible rule by other European nations.9 In 1820, Thomas Jefferson told Secretary of War John Calhoun that the United States "ought, at the first possible opportunity, to take Cuba" and in 1823, in a letter to Mr. Nelson, the Minister of Madrid, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, stated that Cuba offered multiple opportunities, both commercial and political, to the United States and therefore annexation should be considered.10 Adams was concerned that France was going seize Cuba from Spain in 8 Perez, 13 Samuel Bemis. The Latin American Policy of the United States. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co. 1943, 27 10 Carmen Diana Deere. “Here Come the Yankees: The Rise and Decline of United States Colonies in Cuba, 18981930”. The Hispanic American Historical Review 78.4 (November 1998): 729-765., 732 9 12 answer to unpaid Spanish debts. He was also suspicious that Great Britain was planning to join Spain in an alliance against France. Suspicious of these countries, he voiced these concerns to President James Monroe. Monroe turned to Thomas Jefferson for advice; Jefferson felt that Cuba, while important to the United States strategically and economically, could not be obtained except through war. As such, Jefferson felt the next best thing would be a free and independent Cuba.11 It was based on these concerns and thoughts that Monroe announced the Monroe Doctrine on December 2, 1823. It stated that American continents were free and independent, were not to be considered subjects for future European colonization, and any attempt by a European power to extend their territory into the Americas would be considered a threat to American "peace and safety" and dealt with accordingly.12 In the following decades, it became the forefront of American policies to attempt to annex Cuba based on fears of a weak Spain losing control of Cuba to another European power. Annexation was seen as a mission of liberation; annexation was not just an act of manifest destiny for the United States but also one of self-determination for Cubans.13 In 1854, through the Ostend Manifesto, it was recommended the United States make every attempt to purchase Cuba or, if necessary, seize Cuba by force. However, under the anti-slavery climate of the times, it was decided not to acquire Cuba, which was considered by the abolitionists to be another slave territory.14 During the Civil War the desire to annex Cuba waned. The change of interest was not only because of the war, but also because of Cuba’s status as a slave territory and the 11 Monroe, James, and Thomas Jefferson. The Monroe Doctrine: Also, Jefferson's Letter to Monroe. United States: Veterans of the Foreign Wars of the U.S., 1920. Questia. 16 Dec. 2008 http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=10384261. 12 Monroe Doctrine. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/jd/16321.htm 13 Hill, Charles E. Leading American Treaties. New York: Macmillan, 1922. Questia. 16 Dec. 2008 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=9410086>, 317 14 Harry F. Guggenheim. The United States and Cuba; a Study In International Relations. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934, 20. 13 American policy of noninterference in the affairs of other countries. This policy lasted until 1895 when a new separatist war broke out in Cuba. 14 The Spanish American War The United States was concerned with the thought of another conflict in Cuba and the effect of such conflict on American interests there. For thirteen of the previous twenty nine years, Cuba had been the scene of violent conflict. The ten year war of Cuban independence that began in 1868 ended not because one side was defeated but because the combatants were exhausted and agreed to a truce. Then in 1895 another conflict erupted between Cuba nationalists and Spain. This conflict, larger than any previous conflict in Cuba, continued to gain momentum and the United States doubted Spain could prevail. The capital that the United States had poured into Cuba was in ruins. Commerce in Cuba was at such a low level the United States doubted that even if Cuba was able to negotiate peace with Spain peace, the Cuban government would not be able to restore the economy. Taking these facts into consideration, Washington felt it needed to consider America’s duty to its neighbors. The United States considered the Cubans’ suffering and the decimation of commerce and felt that it was no longer reasonable to follow a policy of inaction. Lawmakers in the United States had to consider if they thought Spain would be able to put an end to the war and make peace with Cuba.15 The United States government felt the situation in Cuba could not be ignored. They were concerned not only with American commercial interests in Cuba, but also the effect of the conflict on Americans residing in Cuba. Based on the plan the Spanish government had chosen to stop the conflict, the violence and severity of their efforts, the United States did not believe the Spanish could restore peace or stability. The United States government could not stand by watching American interests in Cuba suffer while Spain made no progress. The United States felt such policy, being of no benefit to Spain, would ultimately hurt the United States. Therefore, 15 Telegram from Sherman to Woodford, July 16, 1897. FRUS 1898, 560. 15 Minister to Spain Woodford was to bring the United States concerns before the Government of Spain and ask that the United States be allowed to help bring about peace in Cuba.16 Spain felt the best course of action for the United States was to leave Spain to conduct military operations, to stick to the neutrality policy, and to stop Cubans living in the United States from sending supplies and weapons to the insurrectionists. The Spanish government wanted the United States government to side with Spain to crush the hopes of the insurrectionists and trusted the United States would assist Spain in its endeavors by not supporting the Cubans.17 The McKinley administration agreed to let Spain attempt to bring about peace, but cautioned the Spanish on their harsh methods. The outcome in Cuba had to be one of lasting peace; the United States government felt no less was due Cuba and no less was possible for Spain. United States lawmakers felt that whatever humane measures the Spanish government used in Cuba to attain that peace would be admirable. Peace in Cuba was necessary to the welfare of the American people and peace would also bring prosperity to the island.18 However, the situation in Cuba did not improve. The United States government felt that the war was more one of inaction rather than action. The economic situation worsened and Spain’s harsh treatment of the Cubans continued.19 In March 1898, the United States once again attempted to purchase Cuba, but the Spanish government felt that that offer encouraged the Cubans to fight harder. The United States government felt peace in Cuba could only come about through American intervention. Woodford maintained the United States must occupy and ultimately own Cuba. He felt if the United States recognized Cuban independence that the United States government would be turning Cuba over to the Cuban population against the 16 Ibid, 561 Telegram from Woodford to Sherman, October 27, 1897. FRUS 1898, 587. 18 Telegram from Sherman to Woodford, November 20, 1897. FRUS 1898, 611. 19 Telegram from Sherman to Woodford, March 1, 1898. FRUS 1898, 669. 17 16 judgment of the upper Cuban classes. If the United States advised the insurgents to lay down their arms and accept Spain’s offer of autonomy, then the United States would be doing a disservice to those Cubans who had fought so hard for independence. Either of those options, he believed, would foster conditions that would ultimately lead to more conflict in Cuba. If the United States were to choose to go to war, then ownership of Cuba needed to be the final outcome.20 Woodford felt Spain could not bring about peace in Cuba and that the insurgents could not defeat Spain. He thought the only power that could bring about such peace was the United States. He did not think the United States should recognize Cuban independence, stating that if the United States government formally recognized the Cuban provisional government then the United States would require approval from the Cuban government to intervene.21 In March 1898, President William McKinley delivered a three-part request to Spain, demanding an armistice; permission to deliver United States relief supplies to the Cubans; and participation of McKinley to mediate the end of the dispute. The Spanish government allowed the United States to ship relief supplies, but refused to cease hostilities in Cuba.22 Woodford felt there needed to be an armistice in Cuba in order for negotiations to succeed. He felt that as long as there was still fighting, neither the Cubans nor the Spanish would see reason.23 On April 11, 1898, McKinley sent a resolution to Congress asking for a declaration of war on Spain. Within this resolution, he referenced the damages done to the commercial productivity in Cuba and the monetary losses suffered by American interests and stated that the conflict in Cuba was a menace to the United States and peace.24 What stands out about McKinley's war message was the omission of any mention of Cuban independence or 20 Message from Woodford to the President of the United States, March 17, 1898. FRUS 1898, 688. Message from Woodford to the President of the United States, March 18, 1898. FRUS 1898, 689. 22 Telegram from Woodford to Day, March 31, 1898. FRUS, 1898, 727. 23 Telegram from Woodford to Day, April 2, 1898. FRUS, 1898, 731. 24 McKinley War Message, April 11, 898. FRUS, 1898. 751. 21 17 recognition of the Cuban provisional government. Those omissions were not lost on Cubans. Prominent Cubans within the United States responded to McKinley's comments by stating they opposed any intervention which would not result in Cuban independence. The provisional Cuban government added that any intervention by the United States based on McKinley's statements would be viewed as "nothing less than a declaration of war by the United States against the Cuban revolutionists."25 These concerns were shared by some Congressmen within the United States, including Senator Henry Teller of Colorado. The United States politicians also wanted assurances that the United States would not annex Cuba after hostilities with Spain ended. As a result, the resolution for war with Spain stated that the people of Cuba had a right to be free and independent, that Spain must relinquish control of Cuba and withdraw its military, and the President of the United States could use American armed forces to carry out those resolutions and the Teller Amendment which stated that the United States disclaimed any intent to exercise sovereignty or control over Cuba and that when the war was over, would leave the governing Cuba to the Cuban people. 26 On April 25, 1898, a bill was issued by Congress declaring war against Spain.27 On May 1, 1898, Admiral Dewey attacked and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.28 In October 1898, Spain agreed to meet United States representatives in Paris to finalize the terms for ending the conflict.29 The disposition of Cuba was provided for in Articles I and XVI of the Treaty of Paris. Under Article I, Spain relinquished all claims of sovereignty and title to Cuba and after 25 Perez, 94. Teller Amendment http://www.etsu.edu/cas/history/docs/teller.htm 27 Adams. “War Between the United States and Spain”. House of Representatives, Report No. 1173. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898. 28 George F. Kennan. American Diplomacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 12. 29 Guggenheim, 51. 26 18 Spain’s evacuation, the island would be occupied by the United States. The United States would be responsible for any obligations that may result under international law based on its occupation of Cuba. Article XVI stated any obligations assumed under the treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba would be limited only to the time the United States occupied Cuba. Once the occupation ended, the United States would then advise any government established on the island to assume the same obligation.30 30 Treaty of Paris, http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html. 19 1900 – 1920 The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the past must needs (sic) be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength if its enduring welfare is to be assured. Whether those ties shall be organic or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked with our own, but how and how far is for the future to determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome, we must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect entity, not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of failure. William McKinley State of the Union address, 1899 The United States formally took possession of Cuba on January 1, 1899. A military government headed by Governor General Leonard Wood was established and by February the evacuation of Spanish troops from Cuba was complete. The military government set out to bring order to chaos. Wood began by disarming the Cuban rebels as well as those who had been loyal to Spain, providing aid to the Cuban people, improving Cuba's infrastructure, and setting up a Cuban government. In September 1900, the military government called for a convention to adopt a constitution outlining the relationship between the United States and Cuba and providing for the election of a Cuban government to assume control of the island.31 Before elections took place the United States vetted candidates to restrict, in the words of Secretary of War Elihu Root, the “mass of ignorant and incompetent” and promote “a conservative and thoughtful control of Cuba by Cubans.” 32 Wood worked not only to promote the appropriate, conservative candidates, but also to hinder the opposition. Despite Wood’s and Root’s efforts, members of the Cuban independence party, the Independintistas, prevailed, defeating the majority of American backed candidates in the June elections. In the following 31 Dana G. Munro. The United States and the Caribbean Area. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934. Questia. 9 Dec. 2007 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=6444051>, 8 32 Perez, 102 20 December assembly elections, the same scenario played out and the Independintistas prevailed in the balloting. Wood informed Senator Oliver Platt in a letter after the elections that the people he considered more suitable for the protection of American interests and a stable Cuban government were not well represented. Conventional American wisdom was that Cubans were incapable of effective self governance. The Cuban people had not elected the candidates the United States found acceptable, and as a result the United States considered their judgment flawed. The Teller Amendment provided for a free and independent Cuba, but the United States government felt that based on Cuba’s apparent lack of competent elected officials, the United States couldn’t in good conscience withdraw without ensuring some means of stability for Cuba.33 While the United States officially recognized the outcome of the elections, Root felt that United States’ interests required the United States to insist on certain constitutional limitations which would result in the United States being able to intervene to protect American interests after independence. Wood agreed believing Cuba and the United States needed to establish a Cuban government of and by the people of Cuba and a free government, because that was promised by the United States. But he was also concerned about what he felt were “adventurers” who were currently in the Convention and in many of the municipalities.34 The end result of this thinking was the Platt Amendment which was passed into United States law as part of the Army Appropriations Act in February 1901. The Platt Amendment allowed the United States to maintain control over Cuba without actual annexation. Article I, limited the Cuban government from entering into any treaty or contract with a foreign power that 33 Ibid, 104 Jack McCallum. Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism. New York: NYU Press, 2006, 154. 34 21 would allow that foreign power any control over Cuba, politically or militarily. Article II barred the Cuban government from contracting any public debt, paying interest on any debt, and ensured that the government of Cuba maintained adequate funds for government expenses as well as revenues of the island. Article III stipulated the United States reserved the right to intervene in Cuba for the purposes of maintaining Cuban independence as well as ensuring that the Cuban government was capable of protecting human life and property. Article VIII required these tenets to be incorporated into the new Cuban constitution. Lastly, the Amendment ceded Guantanamo Bay to the United States for use as a naval base in perpetuity.35 News of the Platt Amendment sparked almost immediate protests in Cuba. Many Cubans felt that agreement to these demands would divest Cuba of any real independence. Delegates of the Cuban Constitutional Convention felt the Platt Amendment dealt only with what the United States felt the Cuban people should want in future relations. They thought the stipulations were not acceptable since they modified Cuba’s independence and sovereignty. The delegates believed their duty was to the Cuban people and to the establishment of Cuba as a nation independent of all others, including the United States. If they were to bind themselves to the United States by allowing the United States to retain the right to intervene, to support or displace Cuban governments as they chose, to concede to them the right to acquire lands for naval stations, and to dictate who Cuba can form treaties with, then in fact, while Cuba would appear to be free to the rest of the world, they would never truly be so with the United States.36 The Cuban Constitutional Convention conceded knowing their only choices were limited sovereignty or no sovereignty at all and Cuban patriots were forced to accept the Platt Amendment giving the United States the right to interfere in Cuban affairs in order to avoid 35 36 Platt amendment. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1901platt.html Bemis, 126 22 losing the Republic they had worked so to hard to acquire.37 In June 1901 the provisions of the Platt Amendment were included in the Cuban constitution, verbatim.38 The United State military occupation of the Republic of Cuba officially ended on May 20, 1902, though the United States maintained control of Guantanamo Bay thereafter. The first governor of Cuba, Leonard Wood, was a proponent of the Americanization and annexation of Cuba. He felt that a free Cuba would ultimately, at the request of the Cuban people, seek annexation and as such, strove to promote it.39 An acceptable candidate for president, based on his feelings, was Tomas Estrada Palma. He served as president of the Republic during the 10 Years War of 1868 to 1878. At the time of his nomination, Estrada Palma was living in New York. A supporter of the Platt Amendment, he favored the status quo under the rule of the United States and his policy was one of cooperation. He also felt that Cubans were incapable of truly governing themselves in such a way as to protect American interests and that an association with the United States was necessary to ensure Cuba’s political liberty. Estrada Palma was elected in December 1901, however, it was April 1902 before he even stepped foot in Cuba and May before he arrived in Havana.40 On May 20, 1902 Leonard Wood handed over the control of Cuba to Palma.41 But after the Spanish American War, Cuba suffered a lack of trade money. General James Wilson commented on the need for a treaty of alliance and commerce between the United States and Cuba. This treat would bring relief to an embattled Cuba. He felt a treaty that would allow for the free entrance of certain goods from Cuba into the United States, help establish close relations 37 Fulgencio Batista. Cuba Betrayed. New York: Vantage Press, 1962, 188 Munro, 14 39 Bemis, 138 40 Offner, John L. The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Questia. 11 Dec. 2007 http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=99426981, 4 41 Telegram from General Wood, Military Governor of Cuba, to the Adjutant General of the Army, May 20, 1902. FRUS 1902, 320. 38 23 between the two countries, restore confidence to Cuba, and create an influx of capital into Cuba ideally bringing about a period of prosperity.42 President Roosevelt began negotiations for a Treaty of Reciprocity and even appealed to the American people in August 1902 saying, "Cuba must always be peculiarly relative to us in international politics. She must in international affairs be to a degree a part of our political system. In return she must have peculiar relations with us economically. She must be in a sense part of our economic system. We expect her to accept a political attitude toward us which we think is wisest for both her and us. In return we must be prepared to put her in economic position as regards our tariff system which will give her some measure of the prosperity we enjoy."43 Under the terms of the Treaty of Reciprocity articles listed as being free of duty in either country at the time of ratification would continue to be free, even though subsequent tariffs should make them dutiable from other countries. The United States made a twenty percent concession of dutiable articles when they were "the product of the soil or industry of the Republic of Cuba" and Cuba made a similar concession to the United States. The treaty was submitted to the Senate in December 1902 and passed in March of 1903.44 However, in the House of Representatives, the treaty was not without its detractors. Some, such as Representative John Williams of Mississippi, from the Committee on Ways and Means, felt that it was wrong for the Congress of 1903 to bind all other upcoming congresses to the duty of sugars from foreign countries, including Cuba. They also had concerns about assigning a fixed duty rate to sugar; they felt that this fixing of duty rates would take away the ability of American sugar producers and dealers to effectively do business. They requested a rewording and instead of a reduced duty that all countries pay a set fee per pound of sugar. Even 42 Bemis, 118 Theodore Roosevelt. Message from the President of the United States, November 10, 1903 44 Theodore Roosevelt. Message from the President of the United States, November 10, 1903 43 24 if the bill passed without their requested amendments, the representatives still thought that the good the treaty would do the United States and Cuba outweighed their concerns about wording. They felt that the Treaty would relieve the unnecessary burdens on both Cubans and Americans and that as friends to the new Republic of Cuba and that the Treaty would bring Cuba prosperity and increase the volume of trade between the two countries.45 Other detractors to the treaty did not feel so benevolently towards Cuba. Representative Cooper of Texas, also on the Ways and Means Committee, was more strident in his objections. He felt the United States was under no obligation to grant special consideration to Cuba. He did not feel that Cuba needed to be dependent, politically or economically, on the United States, nor was the United States bound to guarantee Cuba’s success as an independent republic. He also had concerns about the constitutionality of the bill. He felt the presentation of this bill before Congress represented subterfuge since its real effect was to ratify treaties already in place and that is was unconstitutional to “tie the hands” of the House of Representatives in matters of law effecting revenue.46 Despite these opposing views, in November 1903, Roosevelt convened a special session of Congress and stated the passing of this treaty was demanded by our honor. On December 17, 1903 it passed in the House and went into effect on December 27, 1903. The treaty gave Cuba more advantages in the American trade than any other country.47 Palma’s administration was punctuated by small rebellions and in 1905 real cracks began to show: the Cuban Congress refused to approve the budget and an attempt was made on Estrada Palma’s life while he was campaigning for re-election. In August 1906, just months after 45 Williams, John S. “Views of the Minority (to accompany House Resolution 1921). Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903 46 Cooper. “Views (to accompany House Resolution 1921) Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903. 47 Roosevelt, Theodore. “Message of the President of the United States Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress”. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903. 25 Estrada Palma was re-elected against strong opposition and amidst claims of electoral fraud, the “Guerrita de Agosto” broke out. The insurrectionists called for minority representation in Congress and equal representation in the Cabinet.48 Palma publicly declared he was in favor of crushing the rebellion by force, but would be open to outside intervention. The main concern of the United States was the effect of the conflict on the sugar and tobacco crops.49 Despite Palma’s public statement regarding crushing the insurrection, his call for people to volunteer for the militia was met with a lackluster response. Trying to forestall the destruction of the sugar mills, Estrada Palma asked the United States to intervene in Cuba.50 He told the United States he was unable to quell the rebellion and requested that the United States dispatch two ships, one to Havana and one to Cienfuegos.51 Roosevelt was hesitant to intervene. He dispatched the two ships, but stressed to Cuban Consul General Steinhart how reluctant the United States was to get involved. He wanted the Cuban government to exhaust every option available to the Cuban government to put down the insurrection. The United States felt that Palma’s inability to suppress the insurrection suggested that the Government of Cuba was weak and did not have the support of the Cuban people.52 Palma again requested intervention by the United States stating he could not stop the rebellion. He made the decision to resign and turn the Government of Cuba over to whoever the United States designated as their representative.53 Roosevelt sent a commission headed up by 48 Telegram from Chargé Sleeper to the Secretary of State, September 1, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 464. Telegram from Chargé Sleeper to the Secretary of State, September 4, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 467. 50 Jose M. Hernandez. Cuba and the United States: Intervention and Militarism, 1868-1933. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993, 128 51 Telegram from Consul General Steinhart to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 473. 52 Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to Consul General Steinhart, September 10, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 474. 53 Telegram from Consul General Steinhart to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 477. 49 26 William Howard Taft to attempt to work out a peaceful solution.54 On September 29, 1906 Palma and his cabinet resigned and, with Taft as Provincial Governor, the United States assumed control of Cuba until such time as a Cuban president could be elected.55 This instability confirmed American expectations of an incompetent Cuban government and politically unstable Cuba.56 On September 29, 1906 Taft issued a proclamation to the people of Cuba. He stated that since Palma resigned and the Cuban congress did nothing to stop him or to elect a successor thereby leaving Cuba without a government in the midst of an insurrection, the United States had no choice but to step in and establish a provincial government. He also assured the people of Cuba that the provincial government would only be in place for as long as it took to restore peace and order and then hold elections and that even though the provincial government was established under the authority of the United States, it would still be a Cuban government conforming to the Cuban constitution.57 On October 10, Taft granted a general amnesty to the people of Cuba, including the insurrectionists, bringing a sense of peace to Cuba and on the 19th of October, he handed over governorship of Cuba to Charles Magoon.58 In 1908, Jose Miguel Gomez, a Cuban general in the Spanish American War, was elected president of Cuba. He assumed control of the Government of Cuba in January 1909.59 In 1910, word filtered back to the United States of a political disturbance in Cuba and of rumors that the United States was going to intervene. Secretary of State Knox responded to these rumors stating 54 Telegram from the President to the Cuban Minister, September 14, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 478. Epitome of events attendant upon establishment of the provincial government in Cuba, FRUS 1906, Volume I, 490. 56 Antoni Kapcia. Cuba : Island of Dreams /. Oxford, England: Berg, 2000. Questia. 9 Dec. 2007 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102360238>., 63 57 Proclamation, Governor Taft, September 29, 1906. FRUS 1906, Volume I, 491. 58 Epitome of events attendant upon establishment of the provincial government in Cuba, FRUS 1906, Volume I, 490. 59 Telegram from the President to President-elect Gomez, November 16, 1908. FRUS 1908, 251. 55 27 the United States was not interested in taking part in or even expressing concern for the internal politics of Cuba and that the United States would not be in favor of any violent activities that would force American intervention in Cuba.60 In 1911, the United States and Cuba revisited the 1903 Treaty of Reciprocity. While President Taft understood the importance of the commercial relationship between the United States and Cuba and the treaty’s importance in giving Cuba better terms for its products than Cuba was receiving in the European markets and in the promotion of stability in Cuba, he had to take into consideration the complaints of American commercial interests. American businessmen felt the advantages given to Cuba in American markets were much greater than the advantages given to the United States in the Cuban markets. He did not see the point in asking Congress to renew the treaty for five years and then attempting to modify it after the fact. He felt the treaty should be modified with a decrease in duties to American goods.61 At the end of 1911, a new conflict arose in Cuba. Veterans and officers who had fought for Cuban independence against Spain were calling for “guerilleros”, Cubans who had fought for Spain, that were serving in any sort of government capacity to be removed from office. When the Cuban government responded that the guerillos were protected by provisions of the civil service law, the veterans and officers began to “agitate” the Cuban people.62 President Gomez called for a panel to be appointed including one member from the Liberal Party, once from the Conservative Party, two veterans, and a Chairman to be appointed by Gomez. The panel would then meet and discuss on a case by case basis the removal of guerilleros from office. The veterans refused.63 60 Telegram from the Secretary of State to Minister Jackson, June 21, 1910. FRUS 1910, 416 Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Chargé d’Affaires, November 2, 1911. FRUS 1912, 98. 62 Telegram from the American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State, November 11, 1911. FRUS 1912, 236. 63 Telegram from the American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1911. FRUS 1912, 239. 61 28 Consequently, the Cuban Congress passed a resolution accusing officers of the Cuban Army of sedition and called for the President of Cuba to take action against them.64 In response, Gomez issued a decree forbidding officers serving in the Cuban Army from participating in politics; he also forbade them from attending Veteran’s Association meetings. Beaupré, the American Minister, was concerned by the deteriorating situation in Cuba and felt that if the United States showed support for Gomez, it would quell the veterans.65 Woodrow Wilson’s administration issued a statement that the United States government was concerned with the situation in Cuba and that the laws created to keep Cuba as a republic needed to be enforced. They looked to Gomez to prevent the situation from escalating which would force intervention by the United States.66 The veterans acquiesced and entered into an agreement with Gomez for the creation of a board. Based on this agreement the Government of Cuba would publicly recognize those who had fought for Cuban independence and there would be no need for intervention by the United States.67 In 1913, Mario Garcia Menocal was elected president. A graduate of Cornell University in New York, he was very supportive of big business. He ran for re-election in 1916 amidst charges of fraud and military intimidation. A rebellion ensued. In January 1917, in a telegram to the United States Secretary of State, Minister Gonzalez stated Menocal would do everything in his power to secure the majority of the vote including use of force, killing of opposition managers at the polls, and, eventually, declaring himself the winner. Gonzalez felt siding with Menocal would be seriously detrimental to Cuba.68 Gonzalez was directed to meet with Menocal 64 Telegram from the American Chargé d’Affaires to the Secretary of State, January 11, 1912. FRUS 1912, 240. Telegram from the American Minister to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1912. FRUS 1912, 240 66 Telegram from the Secretary of State to American Minister, January 16, 1912. FRUS 1912, 241. 67 Telegram from the American Minister to the Secretary of State, January 20, 1912. FRUS 1912, 242. 68 Telegram from Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, January 22, 1917, FRUS 1917, 350. 65 29 and attempt to settle this in accordance with the law and bring about peace in Cuba. The United States also dispatched a military attaché to Cuba to observe the electoral process.69 Menocal sought the support of the United States over his opponents, former President Gomez and Alfredo Zayas, who was a former secretary of the Cuban Constitutional Convention of 1901 and an opponent of the Platt Amendment. He stated that with support from the United States he would be able to quell the revolution and re-establish order.70 On February 16, 1917, the United States dispatched naval warships to Cuba.71 On February 18, 1917, Washington stated publicly that 1) the government of the United States supported and sustained the constitutional government of Cuba: 2) the armed revolt against the constitutional government of Cuba was considered to be a lawless and unconstitutional act and would not be countenanced; 3) the leaders of the revolt would be held responsible for injury to foreign national and for destruction of foreign property; 4) the government of the United States would give careful consideration to its future attitude towards those persons connected with or concerned in the present disturbances of the peace in the Republic of Cuba.72 In spite of this statement, Cuban revolutionary leaders felt intervention by the United States was best. Gomez responded to the United States stating the revolutionaries were not interested in overthrowing the government, only that they wished for Menocal to respect the constitution and allow for elections free from fraud and abuse.73 The United States issued another statement, this one to Menocal, that in order to end this rebellion, he needed to make clear to the Cuban people that he supported constitutional methods for the settlement of election 69 Telegram from Secretary of State to Minister Gonzalez, February 12, 1917, FRUS 1917, 354. Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cuban Minister, February 14, 1917, FRUS 1917, 360. 71 Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cuban Minister, February 14, 1917, FRUS 1917, 361. 72 Telegram from Secretary of State to Minister Gonzalez, February 18, 1917 FRUS 1917, 363. 73 The President of the Directory and General Commanding the Constitutional Army to Minster Gonzalez, February 18, 1917, FRUS 1917, 371. 70 30 disputes, that if the insurgents would lay down their arms he would give amnesty, and elections will be called in the affected areas.74 Menocal granted amnesty to the enlisted men and granted amnesty to all civilians involved except revolutionary leaders and people who committed criminal acts in the course of the revolution. He also agreed to partial elections being held.75 Despite this, the rebellion continued. In late March 1917, rebel leaders met with American navel officers and stated that only supervision by the United States would ensure a fair election. They would force an intervention by any means necessary, including a “wholesale campaign of destruction” and threatening the lives of Americans, if necessary.76 On May 7, 1917 Cuban Congress declared Menocal President-Elect.77 As tensions continued to build in Cuba, in an effort to show allegiance to the United States, the Cuban government declared war on Germany in May, 1917. On May 15, 1917, the United States issued a statement to the Cuban people. The statement read that as Cuba entered into this war side by side with the United States, this meant that all internal fighting needed to be set aside to focus on the larger, international conflict. Since the United States relied heavily on Cuban sugar production, any effort to interfere in that production would be considered a hostile act and all those in rebellion with Cuba were ordered to restore their allegiance or the United States would regard them as enemies and deal with them accordingly.78 On May 20, 1917, Cuban Minister Carlos Manuel de Cespedes sent word to the United States government that President Menocal and Vice President Nunez were sworn in and would 74 Telegram from Secretary of State to Minister Gonzalez, March 1, 1917 FRUS 1917, 372. Telegram from Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, March 4, 1917, FRUS 1917, 376. 76 Telegram from Commander Hewitt to the Secretary of the Navy, March 20, 1917, FRUS 1917, 388. 77 Telegram from Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, May 7, 1917, FRUS 1917, 401. 78 Department of State, May 15, 1917, FRUS 1917, 407. 75 31 serve terms until 1921.79 In June 1917, Zayas resigned as leader of his party and with Gomez in prison awaiting trial for his actions during the conflict, the revolution was over.80 Despite Cuba’s willingness to side with the United States in World War I, there were still battles being fought over the sugar market. In 1917, the price of raw sugar climbed to 6.75 cents in the New York Market, the highest it had been in the United States since the Civil War. As a result, in August 1917, the United States Congress passed the Lever Act which gave the government power to control the production and manufacturing of foodstuffs. It also created the Food Administration under Herbert Hoover. A dedicated humanitarian, Hoover had been overseeing distribution of food to war victims in Germany. One of Hoover’s first actions was to find a way to control the sugar market; as the war continued, Cuba became one of the sole sources of sugar to all Allied countries and prices in the New York sugar market soared. Hoover wanted control of the sugar supply to fall under a central body, so the United States would not compete with Allied countries for sugar supplies and by placing control of pricing in the hands of the United States government would virtually eliminate Cuba’s bargaining power. Hoover created the Sugar Plan. Under this plan, he proposed the United States and Britain form a single buying agency in New York. This agency would be made up of men appointed by Great Britain and the United States and would then set the price for raw sugar as well as apportion out the Cuban sugar crop among the other purchasing nations.81 Hoover presented this plan to the British government and they agreed. The International Sugar Committee was created. On the Committee were two British and three Americans. Hoover appointed Earl Babst, the head of the American Sugar Refining Company, to head the Committee. One of the first acts of the Sugar 79 Telegram Cuban Minister (Cespedes) to Secretary of State, May 20, 1917, FRUS 1917, 410. Telegram Minister Gonzalez to Secretary of State, June 18, 19197, FRUS 1917, 411. 81 Smith, Robert F. The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960, 20 80 32 Committee was to lower the price of sugar to 4.6 cents per pound plus the cost of freighting to New York. The Cuban sugar producers protested saying that pricing sugar that low would negatively affect Cubans. The price of foods imported from the United States into Cuba was beyond the affordability of most Cubans. Within three months of protesting the Committee’s decisions, there was no flour, no bread, and almost no coal in Cuba. Economic pressure was used to gain Cuban cooperation. Import licenses from the Food Administration were needed in order for Cuba to buy wheat or coal from the United States government. Once the Cuban sugar producers conceded to the price set by the Committee, the import licenses were granted.82 The United States had used “dollar diplomacy” in Cuba since the early 1900s, often supplemented with military force.83 From 1919 through 1933, American businesses came to dominate in Cuba. Investments by American companies increased 536% between 1913 and 1928. In 1913, the 39 American owned sugar mills represented 23% of the sugar mills in Cuba. Cubans owned 67 and Spaniards owned 41, but while the majority of sugar mills were Cuban-owned, they produced smaller amounts of sugar than the American owned sugar mills. This disparity was most likely because the American owned sugar mills were newer and therefore more productive based on technology and location.84 With the Spanish American War over, the United States and Cuba turned their attention to defining their future relationship. The Platt Amendment mandated Cuba to act in accordance with United States wishes, while the Treaty of Reciprocity afforded Cuba a better position when trading with the United States. The first Cuban presidencies were not without issues; Palma 82 Smith, 21 Bemis, 140 84 Ayala, César J. "Social and Economic Aspects of Sugar Production in Cuba, 1880-1930." Latin American Research Review 30.1 (1995): 95-124. Questia. 9 Dec. 2007 <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=95812648>, 107. 83 33 resigned forcing the United States to intervene and set up temporary governorship. With Menocal, the United States chose not to intervene, but Cubans called for the United States to assist them under the Platt Amendment. During these first 20 years, American businesses found profits to be made in Cuba and quickly began to dominate, especially in the sugar markets. 34 1920-1940 In 1921, Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso was elected president. Knowing that Cuba needed economic assistance, Zayas requested a loan of $50 million from the United States. Under Article II of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Cuba was prohibited from assuming or contracting any public debt. The United States took this into consideration and decided to loan Cuba the money with certain stipulations. These stipulations included that the 1922-1923 budget for Cuba be approved by a set date, that Cuba limit its expenditures, and that the Cuban military be reorganized.85 The United States felt Cuba’s economic problems were a result of the failure of the Cuban Congress and the Cuban President to enact a budget. Unless the Cuban Congress acted on the above mentioned stipulations, the United States would have no choice but to intervene.86 While the Cuban Congress was convening to work on meeting the stipulations set forth by the United States, the Cuban Senate passed an Amnesty law making it difficult to punish those arrested for corruption, which had contributed greatly to Cuba’s economic woes. The United States told Zayas that if he did not veto this law, the United States would not agree to lend Cuba the money.87 Zayas agreed and on October 18, 1922, Cuba met the required stipulations set forth by the United States and the loan was approved. Tensions regarding sugar resurfaced when Cuban sugar producers learned that American companies were reselling Cuban sugar for profit on the international market. After World War I, the increased world demand for sugar created an economic boom in Cuba. As a result of the 85 Report on Special Commission in Cuba (Crowder) to Secretary of State, April 9, 1922, FRUS Volume 1, 1922, 1021. 86 Letter from Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs Department of State (Munro) to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1922, FRUS Volume 1, 1922, 1022. 87 Letter from Acting Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs Department of State (White) to the Secretary of State, October 10, 1922, FRUS Volume 1, 1922, 1043. 35 boom, American creditors began loaning money to Cuban sugar producers at a greatly increased rate. The Emergency Tariff Act passed by the United States in 1921 raised the duty of raw sugar imported from Cuba from 1.0048 cents per pound to 1.6 cents per pound. In 1922, the FordneyMcCumber Act raised it again to 1.7648 cents per pound.88 In the mid-1920s the bottom of the boom fell out. Demand for sugar decreased as consumption decreased and sugar prices dropped drastically and the resulting economic distress brought turmoil, both economic and political, to the island.89 In 1923, over a veto by Zayas, the Cuban Congress passed a lottery measure which the United States objected to based on the possibility for corruption. In a conversation with the Cuban Chargé, Dr. Arturo Padro, the Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, stressed the United States’ displeasure and told Chargé Padro that if Cuba insisted on continuing down this road the United States would caution the Cuban government and advise them on a correct path. If Cuba ignored that advice then the United States would not be responsible for the financial downturn that would follow.90 In 1925, Gerardo Machado was elected president. Machado was a Cuban businessman whose administration was one of “business nationalism”.91 When Machado ran for president, he ran on the “Platform of Regeneration”, a platform of political and economic reform with a promise to “win Cuba an independent place in the world”. Although he gained a reputation for being against the Platt amendment, his campaign promises were in keeping with the Platt Amendment, to not incur any foreign debt and to serve only one term as president. Machado had ties to American businessmen as well as Cuban businesses and the United States government 88 Bemis, 182 Leland Hamilton Jenks. Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar. (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928), 277. 90 Conversation between the Secretary and State and Cuban Chargé Padro, FRUS, Volume 1, 1923, 840. 91 Smith, 113 89 36 believed Cuba to be in good hands. Upon election, he told American officials that he intended to increase Cuban commercial relations with the United States. He wanted to modernize Cuba and began making plans for a Cuban exposition to advertise Cuba as a tourist destination and viable commercial market. Machado garnered American praise by arresting pro-Communist factions, a new emergent threat, and promising to protect American businesses and capital in Cuba at all costs.92 Cuban nationalism was rising and Machado was able to manipulate the anti-American attitude by defending Cuban sovereignty and taxing American business interests while still promising the United States to protect its interests. Considered by many to merely be a lackey for the United States, he quickly became the symbol of “dollar democracy” as a sense of prosperity and stability settled over Cuba. He assured the United States that he felt Cuba’s welfare was tied to America and capital flowed into Cuba. However, while that capital temporarily covered some of the cracks in the Cuban economy, it was clear by 1928 that Cuba’s sugar economy was failing.93 Machado did feel that the Platt Amendment was an embarrassment and that Cuba deserved to be free and independent. Knowing that abrogation of the Platt Amendment would increase his popularity, Machado told the Cuban people that for all intents and purposes the Platt Amendment no longer existed. In 1929, a bill was submitted to the Cuban Senate which stated that any Cuban seeking intervention or interference by a foreign power would face imprisonment. Secretary of State Stimson felt that this provision was included with the sole purpose of making it more difficult for the United States to exercise the rights of intervention as allowed under the Platt Amendment. Stimson directed Ambassador in Cuba Judah to remind 92 93 Smith, 113. Bemis, 143 37 Machado that the Platt Amendment was not what gave the United States the right to interfere in Cuba; they merely recognized those rights in writing.94 Judah met with Machado regarding Stimson’s concerns. Machado assured Judah that the bill would not pass and no bill would ever pass that would negatively impact the relationship between Cuba and the United States.95 Originally, when Machado ran, he stated he would only serve one term, but almost immediately he began making plans to extend his tenure. However, many Cuban nationalists no longer felt Machado could be trusted and Machado’s announcement to seek re-election was met with strong opposition. Through bribery and threats, he secured party nominations from the Liberal, Conservative, and Popular parties. The Cuban Congress, mainly Machado supporters, passed amendments extending the presidential term to 6 years and extending Machado’s and Congress’ terms without an election. This amendment violated procedural requirements and the opposition called Machado’s reelection illegal.96 General Crowder, former governor of Cuba, felt the Sate Department should support Machado’s reelection due to his relationship with the United States. After Machado’s reelection reports began to filter back to Washington concerning corruption and repression. After verifying those reports as being true, the State Department was fully informed of the opposition to Machado. The United States continued to support Machado in spite of these claims, but the claims were also forwarded to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Committee passed a resolution calling for an investigation and suggested the United States intervene. American businessmen protested the resolution and stressed to the Committee the importance of the good relationship between Machado’s administration and American businesses. The resolution died 94 Letter from Secretary of State (Stimson) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Judah), April 23, 1929, FRUS Volume II, 1929, 896. 95 Letter from the Ambassador in Cuba (Judah) to Secretary of State (Stimson), May 2, 1929, FRUS Volume II, 1929, 896. 96 Perez, 181 38 with the Committee.97 Washington believed that as long as the Cuban military remained loyal to him, Machado represented the best hope for order and stability and if Machado could be tided over until the Depression was over, Cuba would return to normal. A stable Cuba meant security and prosperity for American interests in Cuba. The United States stuck to this policy of “dollar diplomacy” even after the revolution began to erupt in 1929. Ambassador to Cuba Harry Guggenheim attempted to persuade Machado to work out a settlement with the leaders of the conservative opposition, but he refused and instead became even more oppressive.98 Guggenheim continued to press Machado to make concessions to the conservative opposition in an attempt to forestall a full scale revolution. Machado ignored this advice and Guggenheim became convinced that Machado needed to be replaced. The opposition group requested intervention by the United States. The United States refused and this negative policy was interpreted as support for Machado. In October 1929, the crash of Wall Street in the United States also brought about an economic crisis in Cuba and the battle over sugar tariffs erupted again. Lobby groups with strong financial backing entered into the fray on Cuba’s behalf. Banks which had taken over Cuban sugar properties after the bottom fell out of the sugar market in the mid-1920s also sided with Cuban interests. The United States set about creating acts to protect American interests, but these actions just further battered Cuba. A duty of 3 cents per pound was proposed, but after much lobbying the pro-Cuban lobby groups were able to get the duty reduced to 2 cents and the Hawley Smoot Tariff Act went into effect. This raise in duty, even lobbied to a lower amount, in turn caused the Cuban share of the American sugar market to drop from 49 percent to 25 percent in just three years. This caused sugar production in Cuba to drop by 60 percent; Cuban exports 97 98 Smith, 116 Bemis, 147 39 dropped by 80 percent, and sent Cuba’s economy into a tail spin.99 American business interests in Cuba were convinced the only way to stabilize Cuba’s sugar economy was through controlled competition. By the end of 1930, the situation in Cuba was deteriorating for Machado, both due to the economic depression and his opponents gaining strength. Businesses, including banks, continued to fail. Unemployment skyrocketed while wages plummeted. The Acts the United States had passed to protect itself, such as the Hawley Smoot Tariff Act, further damaged Cuba’s failing economy. American banks, in an attempt to bolster Cuba’s failing economy, loaned Cuba millions of dollars. Machado also began taking out loans from American banks to cover his personal debts. The banks urged Machado to reduce the budget and seek a compromise with his opposition. As things continued to worsen, United States officials urged the State Department to issue a memo saying the United States no longer supported Machado. The State Department refused, but American businessmen felt that if they could just tide Machado over until the Depression was over and then things would return to normal.100 As Cuba’s situation worsened, opposition to Machado increased greatly with social conflict, hunger strikes, and armed struggles. But as American banks continued to lend Machado money, the United States government maintained its stance of nonintervention. Many Cubans felt this nonintervention equaled backing by the United States. So while the United States publicly announced Cuba needed to be recognized as a sovereign nation, behind the scenes it was widely recognized that getting involved in Cuban affairs would weaken Machado’s regime and undermine his authority.101 99 Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: US – Latin American Relations since 1889. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc, 2000. 76 100 Smith, 134. 101 Perez, 182 40 The Secretary of State stated the policy of the United States remained unchanged. The United States would not intervene in Cuba merely because Cuba was running the Cuban government differently from how the United States thought it should be run.102 Cubans who sought change from within were met time and time again with violent repression. They called upon the United States for assistance. Citing the Platt Amendment, Cubans felt the United States was “duty bound to see that Cuba does not continue in the hands of a dictator.” They felt that under the Platt Amendment, the United States was obligated to see to it that a government was maintained that was capable of protecting life, property, and individual liberty.”103 So many Cubans called for mediation by the United States that Machado’s Congress proposed the passage of a penal code ordering life in prison or long term imprisonment for anyone who sought international intervention in Cuban affairs. As the State Department continued its policy of noninterference, many Cubans began to blame the United States for what they considered to be acts of terrorism by Machado.104 When Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in 1933, the United States and the rest of the world remained in Depression. The unrest in Cuba brought about by the depression was considered by the United States to be of utmost importance. The United States sent Ambassador Sumner Welles to Cuba to mediate between Machado and the opposition. The United States felt that the order and stability Machado provided during his first term and had garnered him United States support for re-election was absent from his second term.105 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had just announced his Latin American Good Neighbor Policy and he needed to 102 Memorandum of Conference by the Secretary of State with the press on October 3, 1930, FRUS 1930, Volume II, 662. 103 Perez, 185 104 Bemis, 148 105 Juan M. Del Aguila. Cuba, Dilemmas of a Revolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, 21 41 resolve this Cuban crisis without military intervention.106 Welles was to offer the friendly mediation of the United States between Machado and the leaders of the conservative opposition and to negotiate a trade agreement to bolster the Cuban economy. He was told to consider the relationship between the United States and Cuba to be between two “sovereign, independent, and equal powers” and that no action would be taken which would lead to the United States intervening in Cuba.107 Welles met with Machado. He told Machado that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was loathe to interfere in Cuba. However, the United States government was concerned with the political agitation in Cuba and with the acts of oppression committed by the Machado administration. He stressed to Machado the hope that Machado work towards conciliation by ending illegal killings, censorship, and martial law. He also spoke of economic relief for Cuba from the United States in terms of a trade agreement if mediation could be reached.108 Welles also met with Cosme de la Torriente, an opposition leader. Torriente told Welles the opposition was opposed to revolution and intervention by the United States, but remained open to mediation by the United States to achieve conciliation with the Machado administration. Welles concluded from this visit that no concessions, financial or economic, should be made to Machado until Welles was sure Machado intended to work with the opposition.109 In June 1933, Welles received word from the opposition that they were open to mediation with Machado, both by the anti-Machado organization called ABC and the Organizacion Celular Radical Revolucionaria (OCRR). He broke his mediation down into three steps: one – getting the opposition to finalize an agreement, two – negotiate that agreement, and three – carrying out 106 The Good Neighbor policy moved the United States away from military intervention in Latin American countries and focused on cooperation and trade. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17341.htm 107 Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador of Cuba (Welles), May 1, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 286. 108 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, May 13, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 290. 109 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, May 25, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 297. 42 the agreement.110 By the end of July 1933, Welles began to have concerns about Machado’s willingness to work with the opposition. He cabled Washington that if he were unable to change Machado’s frame of mind, that there was no possibility that the negotiations would be successful.111 Welles felt continued support of Machado was no longer feasible. He felt if Machado continued to refuse to any sort of agreement with the opposition, then the United States should withdraw its recognition of the Machado administration.112 He informed the United States there was no hope of Cuba returning to normal, no hope economic conditions improving, and no hope for political stability. He recommended official recognition of Machado’s government by the United States government be withdrawn, forcing Machado to resign, allowing for formation of a new government.113 However, if the United States were to withdraw recognition of the Machado administration, there should be an American presence of warships in Havana to protect American lives and businesses. Welles felt Machado resigning was the only real solution.114 The United States government told Machado if he would step down, a shipload of relief supplies would be sent to Cuba. Machado denounced United States intervention in Cuban affairs and called for Cubans to defend their homeland against the American aggressors. But as Machado continued to defy the United States, Cuban military leaders recognized this was a fight he could not win.115 The Cuban military informed Machado they were withdrawing their support and that if he remained in office then he would face an all out revolution.116 The United States government 110 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, July 8, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 319. Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 329. 112 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 8, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 342. 113 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 8, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 344 114 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 9, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 345. 115 Aguilar, 141 116 Telegram Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 12, 1933, FRUS 1933, Volume V, 359. 111 43 succeeded in their attempts to avert a violent overthrow; Machado conceded and on August 12, 1933 he resigned from office and fled to the Bahamas.117 Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, a friend of Welles, was appointed to succeed Machado with the intent of continuing mediation between all of the parties. However, he lacked the necessary support from the military to govern and even mediate effectively. Welles felt the lack of support for Cespedes’ administration meant his hopes for Cespedes being able to continue mediation would be unfulfilled. Cespedes was unable to maintain public order and officers in the Army were becoming increasingly dissident. Welles felt the only course of action would be for the Cuban Supreme Court to declare the Cuban constitution under which Machado was re-elected unconstitutional and call for new elections under the original constitution of 1901. He did not believe the Cespedes administration could maintain power and the only was to forestall another revolution was by holding new elections.118 On September 5, students and sodiers, led by Fulgencio Batista, the son of a laborer and a Sergeant in the Cuban Amry, overthrew Cespedes in the Sergeant’s Revolt. Batiasta, in conjunction with university students and the soldiers in Havana, deposed all of the Army officers, took control of the Army, and formed a revolutionary government naming Batista as Chief of Staff. They issued a statement that their administration was based on consent of the Cuban people and the principles of Cuban sovereignty. They stated they felt Cespedes was not responding to the demands of the revolution: therefore the revolutionary government would take power until such time elections could be held.119 117 Del Aguila, 21 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, August 24, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 373. 119 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 5, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 382. 118 44 The Provincial Revolutionary Government was then headed by Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, a professor of physiology at the University of Havana.120 He issued a statement which included a temporary constitution; within the statement was a paragraph which referred to international treaties spontaneously entered into in the name of the Republic of Cuba. Welles felt that San Martin’s use of the word “spontaneously” implied that San Martin intended to denounce the permanent treaty with the United States and by extension, the Platt Amendment.121 Heading up the first Cuban government created without United States sanction, San Martin set about transforming Cuba. He denounced the Platt Amendment and called for its removal. He lowered interest rates, took control of the phone and electric companies from the United States and lowered utility rates, gave women the right to vote, and passed a Nationalization of Labor decree requiring 50% of all employees in industry, commerce, and agriculture to be of Cuban descent.122 The implications of these changes were more than evident to Washington. The old proAmerican government had been overthrown, the labor changes jeopardized American interests, and the United States government saw the structures it had created being dismantled. The United States had so established itself in Cuba that all changes would ultimately affect its interests negatively. Welles immediately recognized the threats San Martin’s reforms posed. However, he also understood that non-recognition of San Martin’s government by the Roosevelt administration would serve to foster instability and potentially prolong the conflict in Cuba between the parties. In the end, the United States issued a statement that the Roosevelt administration desired Cuba to solve its own political problems and in keeping with the wishes 120 Perez, 194 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 14, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 436. 122 Perez, 195 121 45 of the Cuban people, the United States government would offer recognition to any Cuban government that represented the Cuban people and was capable of maintaining law and order throughout Cuba. However, the United States left out any mention of extending official recognition to San Martin’s administration123 In the fall of 2003, Welles met with San Martin at his office. He told San Martin that he felt Cubans were losing confidence in San Martin’s administration and that the United States had concerns about the safety of American lives and property. Welles told San Martin that public order was not being maintained and that the Cuban government was not stable. San Martin replied that Cubans would support him if the United States extended recognition to his administration. Welles responded that official recognition was a not a tool to be used to gain popularity and that the United States did not intend to use is as a means of control. San Martin told Welles that Batista wanted to be president and that he was concerned that to remove Batista as Chief of Staff would also remove any control over the military.124 The opposition felt San Martin maintained a presidency that did not have the popular support of the people and they blamed San Martin for his part in plunging Cuba into yet another crisis. Opposition leaders told Welles they believed that Batista would either work to oust San Martin’s regime or take control of the government himself and that they needed to work with him to avoid a military dictatorship. The opposition also understood the United States government would not impose a solution and it was up to the opposition to find a solution. But Welles was still concerned about the safety of American lives and property. However, he also felt that intervention, even for the protection of American interests, would give the people and 123 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), September 11, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 424 124 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 11, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 443. 46 government of Cuba the perception that they are not responsible for their actions and that the United States government will always step in to fix whatever is wrong.125 Welles met with Batista and the opposition. Batista stated he was interested in finding a solution that would not involve open hostility. He also told Welles that he was rigorously opposed to Communism. The opposition asked Batista to exert his influence over the students to work with the opposition. Batista agreed. Welles recognized Batista’s influence, but wasn’t sure Batista would be able to accept his point of view. Welles felt the two options available were the current San Martin government, which he called “desultory”, or the formation of a more radical government with no hope of an election. He called upon Washington to issue a statement expressing the unhappiness of the United States regarding the current situation stating he felt that continued non-involvement would be perceived as a policy of weakness.126 Welles looked to Batista to bring about the change he desired. He met again with Batista. He stressed to Batista that the San Martin government did not meet the conditions required by the United States to gain recognition. He also told Batista that he found him to be the only person in Cuba who represented authority. Welles told him that he, Batista, was supported by foreign interests, that he had the support of the press, and that he had the support of the opposition leaders. He urged Batista to use this authority and support to bring about mediation from the different groups. Batista requested to meet with Welles again in the future; Welles agreed. He felt since Batista held so much authority in Cuba, it was imperative for the United States to maintain a relationship with him.127 125 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 18, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 446. 126 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 458. 127 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 472. 47 Welles also felt the United States needed to take some sort of action. The first alternative was to extend recognition to the San Martin administration and in doing so allay the antiAmerican feelings in Cuba, influence economic decisions, and strengthen and maintain the current government. However, this meant recognition of an administration that did not have the support of the Cuban people, concerns that the United States would incur the same sort of reproach incurred by the Hoover administration when Hoover’s administration did not withdraw support of Machado. Finally, Welles felt recognition of San Martin after so many meetings with the opposition would damage the chances for future national elections based on the hostility of the opposing factions. The second alternative was to continue to withhold recognition based on the feeling that United States commercial and export interests could not be revived under San Martin.128 In the meantime, Welles continued to work with Batista and the opposition. At the end of 1933, Welles was replaced by Jefferson Caffery, Personal Representative of the President of the United States. Caffery held many of the same opinions Welles held regarding intervention and even stronger opinions regarding extending recognition to San Martin. Caffery had a very low opinion of San Martin’s administration, calling it “inept”, “inefficient”, and “unpopular”. He felt that unless San Martin voluntarily decided to relinquish power, the only other option would be armed intervention by the United States.129 Caffery met with Batista and San Martin. San Martin stated his main concern was the holding of open elections and that he wanted to stay office to see that happen. However, he also felt if the opposition convinced that wasn’t possible, then he was willing to resign and have 128 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, October 16, 1933. FRUS, Volume V, 1933, 490. 129 Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1934. FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 96. 48 someone replace him that was acceptable to both San Martin and the opposition.130 Batista recognized the validity of his position hinged on the United States recognition of the government and as such did as Welles had desired and moved against San Martin. He transferred his support to the opposition group, Union Nacionalista, and their leader, Carlos Mendieta, who was an opponent of Machado. Caffery requested the United States extend recognition to Mendieta. He was concerned that if they could not get mediation, Batista would either turn to the Communists or declare himself a military dictator.131 On January 15, 1934, San Martin finally agreed to resign and turned the office of Provincial President over to Carlos Hevia, Secretary of Agriculture.132 Serving just four days, Hevia was then replaced by Mendieta on January 19, 1934 and on January 23, 1934, the United States extended official recognition to Mendieta’s administration and the crisis brought on by the depression gradually came to a close. 133 For the first six years, Batista served as Chief of Staff of the Army under President Mendieta. During this time, former Ambassador Welles and other politicians, Cuban and American, came to believe the Platt Amendment caused problems historically in Cuba as officials used the Platt Amendment to push the United States into intervening in Cuba during conflicts for their own benefit. As a result, in 1934, a new treaty was written and Cuba and the United States formally agreed to abrogation of the Platt Amendment. In the Treaty of 1934, the 130 Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State, January 11, 1934. FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 97 131 Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, January 14, 1934. FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 98 132 Telegram from the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1934. FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 101 133 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President (Caffery), January 23, 1934. FRUS, Volume V, 1934, 107. 49 United States gave Cuba tariff benefits for sugar and Cuba gave United States concessions on duties, taxes, and a promise of no new restrictions on payments for goods.134 In 1935, the United States released a statement in Cuban newspapers, that the new Treaty of Relations signed on May 29, 1934 replaced the Treaty of 1903 and put an end to the “special relations between the United States and Cuba”. The signing of the new Treaty of Relations meant the United States would no longer intervene, directly or indirectly, in Cuba’s politics nor favor any political party over others.135 In 1936, Laredo Bru was elected president of Cuba and things remained stable until 1940, when Cuba was once again on the brink of revolution with Batista in the middle. Elections were due and the opposition was refusing to name a candidate to run against President Laredo Bru. The opposition, headed by Batista, wanted the elections postponed until June instead of having them held in April, but was unwilling to commit to the current government. They wanted the Constituent Assembly to exercise executive powers in the interim.136 Bru agreed to extend his time in office if necessary to mediate with Batista. The United States was concerned that if Bru resigned the office at the end of his term without new elections having been held Batista would attempt to take the presidency by force and Cuba would be in a situation similar to that preceding Machado’s downfall.137 Batista ran for president and was legally elected. While in office, he expanded trade with the United States, worked on improving relationships with the Communists, and worked to improve the living conditions for the general Cuban population. However, these moves to 134 Perez, 159 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Caffery), March 4, 1935. FRUS Volume IV, 1935, 476. 136 Telegram from the Chargé in Cuba (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State, January 11, 1940. FRUS Volume V, 1940, 738. 137 Telegram from the Chargé in Cuba (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State, January 11, 1940. FRUS Volume V, 1940, 740. 135 50 strengthen labor were not necessarily enough to disrupt the balance of his government; instead, these moves were made to ensure he had union support of his presidency. But while he passed social reforms to benefit workers, he could still be counted on to defend American interests if needed. Despite his moves towards Communists, he became the symbol of stability to many American politicians. Batista broached the idea of a military alliance with the United States. If the United States was willing to deliver military equipment for the Cuban Army then Batista would be able to increase the effectiveness of the Cuban military. Batista felt it inevitable that the United States would be drawn into the war in Europe, in which case, Batista felt, because the Cuba’s friendship with the United States and the policy of inter-American defense, Cuba would also be drawn into the war.138 The United States agreed and under a Lend-Lease Act for the defense of the Americas sent Cuba over $7m in arms deliveries.139 In 1942, this defense of the Americas continued with the signing of a series of further agreements to open up Cuba as an American military training ground.140 The rest of his presidency passed without incident and in 1944, after Ramon Grau San Martin was elected to replace him, Batista left Cuba and retired to Miami, FL. After World War I, the boom in the sugar market rose and then ultimately crashed. The resulting loss in revenue brought turmoil to Cuba, this turmoil worsened as the world felt the effects of the Depression. Machado’s hold on Cuba also deteriorated as the Depression deepened. The implementation of the Latin American Good Neighbor Policy meant the United States was not going to intervene in Cuba and assist in the conflict, this policy would effect many 138 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, June 19, 1941. FRUS Volume VII, 1941, 104. 139 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of the American Republics (Walmsley), October 27, 1941. FRUS Volume VII 1941, 122. 140 Agreement between the United States and Cuba for Military and Naval Cooperation, September 7, 1942. FRUS 1942 Volume VI, 280. 51 decisions the United States made regarding Cuba. It was also during this time that Batista entered into the political scene in Cuba. He led the Sergeant’s Revolt and worked with American Ambassadors in Cuba to end the conflict between San Martin and the opposition. Even as Batista left office at the end of the 1940s, he remained a serious player in Cuban politics. 52 1940 – 1960 As the war in Europe progressed, the United States wanted Cuba to lease them more land for use as military bases. Ambassador in Cuba Spruille Braden met with President San Martin to discuss this. San Martin stated they would lease air bases in San Antonio de los Banos and San Julian for the duration of the war and six months after, but not longer than that. Also, as a matter of sovereignty, the United States could not further lease the bases to anyone else. While the Cuban government accepted the arrangements made years ago for Guantanamo Bay, San Martin made it clear that the government of Cuba would not grant any foreign power the lease of any Cuban territory for military purposes. Braden felt the only option was to wait until Cuba needed something from the United States and then broach the topic again.141 The United States agreed to this, but felt the air base at San Antonio de los Banos, Batista Field, to be of great importance to the United States. Batista Field was generally considered to be the most outstanding airport in the Caribbean and would suit the United States for use of the heaviest bombers. The United States Secretary of State needed the Ambassador in Cuba to present the land lease to the Cuban government in a way that emphasized the benefit to the Cuban people, especially the economic benefit to the surrounding regions in terms of Cuban civilian labor and to stress the diminished value of the base were Cuba to reject American financial support of its operations. Cuba agreed and the land was leased to the United States.142 The war in Europe ended on the 2nd of September, 1945 and on the 24th, Cuba called for the United States to make the necessary arrangements to begin the process of turning the bases, 141 Telegram from Ambassador in Cube (Braden) to the Secretary of State, January 12, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume IX, 896. 142 Telegram from Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, August 22, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume IX, 906. 53 including Batista Field, back over to Cuba by the end of March.143 San Martin had concerns that the United States was gaining more from the negotiation in returning the bases and that talks needed to include Cuba’s need for weapons, ships, and training. He also thought the United States should expand the opportunities of American units permanently stationed in Cuba to work with Cuban Defense Commissions. He refused to negotiate further until the United States returned the base to Cuba.144 The United States began to withdraw from Batista field removing anything deemed appropriate in order for the base to be returned to Cuba. Knowing how valuable the removed equipment was, the United States maintained it as property and refused to surplus it to Cuba.145 On May 20, 1946 the United States turned Batista Field and the other bases back over to Cuba. No details had been established however, regarding the basing of United States aircraft on Cuban territory or the stationing of United States Air Force personnel on Cuban bases.146 In June, Colonel Camilo Gonzalez Chavez, Chief of the Cuban Air Corps, requested a meeting with the Military Air Attaché of the United States. Chavez proposed there be a reciprocal agreement of unlimited air base use in both countries without necessity of previous permission. The agreement would also grant preferential treatment to military personnel by immigration and customs. Chavez further stated that the agreement would be effective June 10 and all United States military aircraft were welcome to use Cuban air bases as desired. This change of heart, according to Assistant Military Attaché Rigley, was because the United States had begun requiring Cuban pilots who landed in the United States to pay cash for all repairs, gas, 143 Cuban Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State, September 24, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume IX, 909. Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to Secretary of State, December 24, 1945. FRUS 1945 Volume IX, 915. 145 Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), March 22, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume X!, 703. 146 Chargé in Cuba to Secretary of State, June 19, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume XI, 709. 144 54 and any services received. He stated that Cuba realized the United States was no longer interested in being Santa Claus and that the cash system was an embarrassment to Cuba.147 The United States continued to be interested in Cuba – Soviet relations and communist activities in Cuba. The United States was also concerned with certain circumstances in Cuba they felt would lead to the eventual domination of communism in Cuba. Those circumstances were the wealth of a relative few people in Cuba driving up food prices in Cuba and causing poorer Cubans to adopt a higher standard of living, the weakness of the other political parties who only seemed to want to win and profit and the Partido Socialista Popular might align itself with winning candidates of other parties, the poor actions of many Cuban officials made many made the communists look good in contrast, and the possibility that Cuba would forge a secret friendship with the Soviets as a form of insurance if there was trouble with the United States. The United States also felt there were factors that would equally discourage the rise of communism; the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the many facets of the relationship, including the Cuban sugar market, the stronger economic growth of the United States over the Soviets, and the presence of Cuban interests in services and industries the communists would nationalize. San Martin walked a fine line with the communists. On one hand, he accepted their collaboration in order to secure their votes and there was a certain comparison of his social crusades and the communists’ social objectives. On the other hand, San Martin condoned public attacks on the communist ideology made by his vice president.148 When Carlos Prío Socarrás was elected president of Cuba, he was very interested in maintaining a close relationship with the United States. Prío, a former law student at the University of Havana, participated in the coup to overthrow Machado and served as the Minister 147 Secret Report by Assistant Military Attaché (Rigley), January 17, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume XI, 710. Secret report from the Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1946. FRUS 1946 Volume XI, 719. 148 55 of Labour under San Martin, his family also fought in the battle for Cuban independence, because of this background, he had a sincere friendship with the United States. Under Prío a new treaty was drafted between the United States and Cuba, the Convention of Establishment and Economic Development. Under this treaty, the United States would provide technical support to Cuba based on Cuba’s needs, Cuba would ensure such technical assistance would be effectively utilized, and the United States would extend credit to Cuba.149 In Cuba, however, there was opposition to such a treaty. The communists stated such treaty harkened back to the days of imperialist expansionism and charged the Cuban government with the intent to betray the Cuban people with the same kind of treaty rejected in previous years by other administrations. As such, Prío could no longer entertain the notion of such a treaty; instead he wanted Cuba and the United States to focus on a treaty that would stabilize market for Cuban sugar within the United States. He was also interested in the inclusion of an economic treaty of provisions relating to an exchange control of currency.150 The United States had to consider their policies with Cuba and in 1951, the Department of State issued a comprehensive statement regarding the United States objectives in Cuba. With the end of World War II and the emergence of the United States and Soviet Republic as the two remaining Super Powers, countries began to align themselves with either the United States or the Communist Soviets. The onset of the Cold War heightened United States vigilance in Latin America and amplified United States concerns in fighting Communism in Cuba. The United States wanted the continued support of the Cuban government and people regarding defense of the Western hemisphere, to assist in the development of Cuba’s economy, to promote mutually 149 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Butler), February 23, 1949. FRUS 1949 Volume IX, 623. 150 Memo of conversation by Eugene Desvernine at the Division of Caribbean Affairs. Señor Doctor Oscar Gans, Ambassador of Cuba, Ambassador Albert F. Nufer, Doctor José Guerra, Director of the Currency Stability Fund, Eugene Desvernine.. August 9, 1949. FRUS 1949 Volume IX, 637. 56 advantageous trade between the United States and Cuba, and to encourage the Cuban government to observe all of its international commitments as well as strengthen the friendship between the United States and Cuba.151 Washington felt that Cuba was important to the United States based not only on its proximity and historic ties, but also on its commercial relationship, based both on imports and exports.152 Although Communists had been present in Cuba since the 1920s and had even supported Batista during his first presidency, the Cold War brought these groups to the forefront and Washington began to grow concerned at the increasing number of Communist groups in Cuba. Washington felt the Communists wanted to weaken the relationship between the United States and Cuba by discrediting the United States, disillusioning the Cuban people regarding the motives of the United States in Cuba, and encouraging Cubans to withhold support from the United States in the event of conflict with the Soviet Republic.153 The growth of communist influences in Cuba could be based on many things: a resentment of United States control over Cuban commerce, especially sugar, leftover resentment that the support by the United States made it possible for Machado to stay in office, and resentment by San Martin and his followers because the United States refused to offer official recognition to the San Martin administration. Much of the Cuban population felt as if they had nothing to lose by turning to communism and as a result the disparity of wealth in Cuba between the rich foreign national and poor Cubans was the impetus of many poor Cubans turning to communism.154 151 Department of State statement, January 11, 1951, FRUS 1950 Volume II, 843. Ibid, 844. 153 Telegram from Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1946, FRUS 1946 Volume XI, 530. 154 Comments by Norweb on the Question of Whether direct Coordination of the Communist Party has been Renewed since Dissolution of the Convention, March 29, 1946, FRUS 1947, Volume VIII, 736. 152 57 Cuba still criticized the United States over the Platt Amendment and many Cuban businessmen were concerned about their economic dependence on the United States. They were striving to reduce their dependence on sugar by diversifying their economy. The United States was concerned by Cuba’s adoption of nationalistic employment laws, under both San Martin and Batista, which had a negative impact on American businesses in Cuba. Despite these issues, Cuban President Carlos Prío Socarrás continued to want preferential treatment from the United States, especially in regards to sugar.155 The security of the United States was still the Department of State’s first objective. Imperative to that defense was Guantanamo Bay. United States policies in Cuba must consider Guantanamo and must remain alert to any threatening situation that might develop.156 Second to the security of the United States was the security of Cuba. Cuban stability and prosperity were linked to the export markets and prices for sugar. With the United States being the largest single market for Cuban sugar, any policy set by the United States would have a direct effect on the Cuban economy. As such, the United States government recognized its dependence on Cuban sugar during the past wars and its continuing dependence on Cuban sugar should another war erupt, so it was to the benefit of the United States to have a mutually advantageous agreement with Cuba regarding the sale of Cuban sugar in the United States.157 In 1952, Batista ran for president again. However, feeling that he wasn’t going to win, he staged a military coup and seized power from Socarrás in March and took power on April 4, 1952. Although Batista was supported by the United States government and the Cuban elite, the majority of Cuban people resented the seizure and multiple opposition groups, including Fidel Castro’s and Socarrás’, popped up. Castro, a nationalist opposed to the United States, had 155 Ibid, 845. Ibid, 846. 157 Ibid, 847. 156 58 planned to run for Congress, but when Batista took power he cancelled the elections. Castro planned to charge Batista with violating the Cuban constitution, but Cuban courts denied his petition. This was the basis of his opposition to Batista and what set him on the course of revolution. Socarrás’ supporters wanted to overthrow Batista and were using the United States as a base of operations. Batista’s administration told the United States that arms shipments from the United States were being sent to Cuba for “revolutionary activities”. The United States responded to these charges by stating the policy of granting safe haven to political exiles in the United States has long been established, but the State Department would look into it.158 On July 26, 1953 Castro launched an attack on Batista. The attack failed and many of the rebels were killed in the ensuing skirmish. Castro and his followers fled to the Oriente Province in the east of Cuba. Fidel and his brother, Raul Castro, were both captured and sentenced to prison. In July 1955, the House Agricultural Committee passed a resolution which extended the current Sugar Act until 1962 and proposed the Cooley Bill. The Cooley Bill, named after the Chairman of the Committee Harold Cooley, provided that once consumption of sugar in the United States passed 8.3 million tons, Cuba could only provide 25.6 percent of that sugar, the remaining 75 percent would be provided by domestic producers and countries paying full duty.159 Cuba sugar mill owners had serious concerns about this, stating as their oppositions that the Cooley Bill would result in Cuba becoming the last residual supplier of the United States sugar market and an increase in quotas of full duty countries would result in those countries expanding their sugar production at a time when there was already a glut of sugar on the market. 158 Memorandum of conversation, Department of State, Ambassador Campa of Cuba, Mr. Holland (ARA), Mr. Hoyt (MID), July 1, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 820. 159 Editorial note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 827. 59 They were also concerned that this treatment of Cuba reflected a serious change in what had been the basis of Cuban and United States economic relations for the last fifty years.160 After review of the proposed legislation and testimony by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Holland before the Senate Finance Committee, the Committee changed Cuba’s share of the American sugar market to 96 percent until 1956, but thereafter it would be reduced to 29.59 percent.161 Batista was still concerned. He told President Eisenhower that the present poor condition of the sugar market was adversely effecting Cuba’s economy and reminded Eisenhower that sugar comprised the majority of Cuba’s exports as such Cuba relied heavily on the American sugar market. He wanted to improve trade relations with the United States and recommended a panel of experts be set up to study the social and economic development of Cuba. He also suggested an expert on crop diversification be hired.162 By 1959, Cuba was exporting only half of its sugar to the United States and 40 percent of those profits were going to American owned companies.163 In 1955, Fidel and Raul Castro were pardoned and fled to Mexico. There, Castro formed the 26th of July Movement named after the failed attempt to overthrow Batista, and met Che Guevara, a revolutionary and Marxist. Guevara convinced Castro that the only way to bring down Batista was a revolution.164 In May 1956, after repeated attempts to weaken his administration, Batista suspended constitutional guarantees for 45 days and attempted to reorganize the military. The fact that the military was beginning to show signs of dissent posed a 160 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Holland) to the Acting Secretary of State, December 14, 1955. FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 829. 161 Editorial note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 830. 162 Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador’s residence, Panama City. The President, The Secretary of State, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Assistant Secretary Holland, Mr. Jack Neal, President Batista, Foreign Minister Gonzalo Guell, July 23, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 833. 163 Smith, 175. 164 Julia Sweig. Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground. MA: Harvard University Press, 2004, 6. 60 huge problem to Batista, as that was where he derived the bulk of his support. But the factors in his favor were the general overall support of the military, the economic prosperity assisted by the influx of tourists, feuding within oppositional groups, public apathy, and the desire of the labor leadership for a peaceful solution.165 Nonetheless, Batista was predicting an insurrection attempt before the end of the year. He insisted it would come from Socarrás, but his opposition also included Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement and other, miscellaneous groups. The 26th of July Movement was calling for a general strike and planned to use that strike to promote further disorder. The Unites States government felt the chances of this succeeding were slim. Batista stated he was planning to hold elections in 1957-1958.166 Batista also accused the Dominican Republic of plotting to overthrow him by financing Socarrás who was exiled to the United States. The United States government did not consider the thought of invasion by the Dominican Republic to be of serious concern, but told Batista Washington would not be happy with open conflict between any Caribbean countries.167 The United States began to grow concerned with Batista’s tactics in stopping the insurrection, but they also felt he best represented their interests in stopping the spread of communism.168 The continued sale of arms to Cuba by the United States was interpreted as support for Batista and the opposition to Batista, particularly Castro, became very anti-American. The United States felt Castro represented the most determined opposition Batista faced. However, the United States still felt Batista, who had the support of the Cuban people and the Cuban military and who continued to protect American interests in Cuba, had the situation under 165 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affiars (Holland) to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI, 831. 166 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Gardner) to the Secretary of State, October 16, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 835. 167 Editors Note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 837. 168 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Gardner) to the Secretary of State, February 15, 1957, FRUS 19551957, Volume VI, 840. 61 control and that the size and importance of Castro’s movement were greatly exaggerated. They also felt the opposition was fractured based on conflicting objectives and ambitions.169 On August 5, 1957, the United States government received intelligence regarding a plot to overthrow Batista within a few days. Castro’s forces planned to convince Batista to give up control of Cuba to a junta government with Colonel Ramon Barquin, one of the opposition leaders, serving as provincial president until order was restored. If Batista refused, then he would be deposed by force. This attempt was thwarted by disorganization of the opposition and Batista’s awareness of the plot and prompt action.170 Under the Military Defense Assistance Agreement, the United States government continued to supply arms to Cuba. Batista used American supplied F-47 fighter jets and B-26 bombers to bomb rebel hideouts. Traditionally, the United States required that military assistance program weapons, especially internally, be only used with United States permission. Cuba had not obtained this permission. However, the United States was concerned that any criticism by the American government of Cuba’s actions would result in a weakening of Batista’s regime.171 Batista requested eight M-4 tanks from the United States, but in January of that year, when they delivered seven M-4 tanks to Cuba which were then used in subsequent internal conflicts, Washington was subjected to criticism from both Cubans and the American people. The United States government had since been criticized by both the American people and internationally for what was considered to be the bolstering of the Batista regime through arms sales, so Washington decided to defer delivery of the tanks pending resolution of the 169 Editors note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 841. Editors note, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 843. 171 Telegram from Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 ,Volume VI, 846. 170 62 conflict.172 Batista was convinced that this indicated American support for Socarrás. He expressed concerns that the United States’ tolerance of Socarrás in the United States permitted Socarrás a base from which to ship arms to Cuba in a continued attempt to overthrow Batista. Earl Smith, the Ambassador to Cuba, told Batista this was not the case and the primary objective of the United States was a stable government in Cuba capable of maintaining law and order and which would also live up to its national and international obligations.173 Batista began to put pressure on the United States regarding Socarrás. He told Ambassador to Cuba Smith that he would not be able to restore constitutional liberties, including the holding of elections, unless the activities of Socarrás in Cuba were stopped. The United States government had planned to convene a grand jury to investigate Socarrás’ activities in the United States. However, Secretary of State John Dulles instructed Smith to inform Batista that the United States had no interest in bargaining with him over the investigation and that the investigation was strictly a judicial process. They felt Batista’s intent to use punishment of Socarrás as a bargaining chip would only give Batista’s opposition more ammunition against him.174 As the violence in Cuba escalated, including the possible threat of violence towards American property and lives, and Batista’s administration began to appear to be a dictatorial government, the United States began to consider its options. Washington held Batista and the opposition equally responsible for the conflict. Batista had called for elections to be held in January 1958, but there were concerns they would not be free and Batista would continue to rule 172 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State of Inter –American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Political Affairs (Murphy), September 23, 1857, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 853. 173 Telegram from the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) to the Secretary of State, September 23, 1957, FRUS 19551957, Volume VI, 855. 174 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Cuba, November 18, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 864. 63 behind the scenes. The two main oppositional leaders, Socarrás and Castro, had no interest in elections; only in overthrowing Batista. The United States did not currently consider Castro to be a Communist, even though Batista accused him of that. The United States still had concerns about the harsh countermeasures and brutality Batista’s forces employed. Since Batista was incapable of stopping the opposition and the opposition was incapable of overthrowing Batista, the United States’ main concern was that this state of violence could continue indefinitely. Washington was worried that the overthrow or assassination of Batista or the holding of fraudulent elections would create exactly the kind of chaos the communists needed to seize power. However, if Batista continued on the path as dictator, sooner or later another rebellion would erupt resulting in more bloodshed. Neither situation was an outcome the United States desired. Therefore, Smith felt the best course of action would be to work towards a free election. This would require effort both on the part of Batista and the opposition. The first step would be the restoration of constitutional liberties, the second step would be working with the opposition to make an acceptable arrangement for elections, and that short of intervention; the United States would bring pressure to bear to ensure an equitable outcome.175 By the end of December the United States government considered the situation in Cuba to be a serious threat to American lives and property. The Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, Weiland, came up with a course of action to influence Batista to a favorable outcome. Phase one would be to work on getting Batista to initiate measures which would allow for compromise with the opposition. If phase one succeeded, then phase two would be working on the holding of free and open elections. Phase three would only come into play if the opposition refused to compromise; then the United States would provide full and open support to 175 Dispatch from the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 869. 64 Batista, supplying arms and holding elections without the opposition. Phase four would only come into play if Batista refused to undertake the measures of phase one and phase two; then the United States would publicly announce the cessation of sales of arms to Cuba and the withdrawal of any military assistance program equipment based on usage of equipment by Cuba without prior authorization from the United States. The outcomes of the actions of phase four would be to hasten the fall of the Batista regime.176 The United States continued to supply Batista with arms. Batista assured Smith that he would restore the constitutional guarantees that had previously been revoked no later than January 27, 1958, provided he could rely on the cooperation of the United States. Smith felt it imperative to his objective of stabilizing Cuba that the United States makes good on promised arms deliveries.177 Opposition to Batista was strong in Cuba, including Fidel Castro’s forces in eastern Cuba and support given by Cuban exiles living in the United States. In an attempt to maintain control, Batista suspended constitutional rights six times in 1957, but based on assurances by Smith that the United States government considered his government to be the duly constituted government, he promised to lift the suspensions. In order to make Batista more cooperative in terms of holding elections in June 1958, the United States decided to approve all arms purchase requests made by Batista.178 The United States had promised armored cars to Batista; however, Congress was strongly opposed to the sale of what was considered heavy equipment to a dictatorship. Congress wanted Batista to take steps towards ending the violence in Cuba and to create conditions in Cuba that 176 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), December 19, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI, 876. 177 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, January 11, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 7. 178 Memo from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State, January 17, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 8. 65 would be conducive to fair elections in June. The United States called upon Batista to curtail excessive brutality by his officials, remove the more “violent and sadistic” army and police officials, and for Batista to issue an order for the Cuban Armed Forces to enforce the law impartially and legally. If such conditions were not met, the United States would cancel the sale of the armored vehicles.179 Ambassador Smith was to inform Batista that the armored cars would be delivered provided Batista cooperate in creating conditions that would minimize negative reactions in the United States and elsewhere against the United States. They recommended Batista restrict the official publicity concerning the arrival of the shipment and lime the use of said equipment to training and that reactions in the United States would play a large part in whether future requests would be approved.180 Weiland read a copy of a speech Batista gave in January to the Cuban National Convention, he felt that Batista’s speech inferred actions contrary to what had been previously recommended by the United States and as such delivery of the armored cars should be suspended.181 By mid-February, some felt the situation in Cuba was improving. Constitutional rights had been restored, the campaign to overthrow Batista and destroy the economy seemed to have failed, and conditions in Cuba returning to normal. Castro was losing prestige and the revolutionary opposition, while outspoken, was splintered and disorganized. So, even though the opposition was interested in the elections, unless the opposing political parties united, the Government of Cuba had little risk and would no doubt have their candidate elected. Batista informed the United States that Castro was being actively supported by Communists. Smith told 179 Memorandum from Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Weiland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), January 17, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 13. 180 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, January 22, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 13. 181 Letter from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Weiland) to the Embassy in Cuba (Smith), February 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 21. 66 him to get proof, as such proof would negatively affect Castro’s ability to gain support from in the United States.182 Homer Bigart, a reporter for the New York Times, spent two weeks with Castro. He reported that Castro evidenced no anti-American bias, but instead Castro just felt the Cuban government would need to re-examine contracts between the United States and Cuba that were negotiated by Batista and cancel any contracts that were not in Cuba’s favor. Castro also felt the only way Batista had been able to maintain power so long was due to backing by the United States. Castro had terms for a ceasefire, but Bigart doubted the terms would be acceptable to the Government of Cuba. The terms included withdrawing the military from the Oriente Province, declaring a general amnesty, and postponing elections until Castro’s 26th of July Movement could organize a political party with Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleo as their presidential candidate. Castro spoke of his support from the Cuban people for his movement, but Bigart felt Castro’s impression of the strength of his movement outside of the Oriente Province was exaggerated.183 He also met with Che Guevara. Guevara stated that he was not a Communist, but was a leftist and liberal. He had very strong anti-American sentiments; he called the United States imperialistic and felt that American governments for years meddled in Latin American affairs, supported dictators, and acted contrary to the will of the Latin American people. Bigart asked Guevara if his actions in Cuba could also be considered meddling. Guevara did not answer. Bigart asked Castro why he would take on Guevara given Che’s reputation as a Communist. Castro replied that he had taken him on because they needed a doctor and that it did not matter 182 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 20, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 28. 183 Despatch from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, February 28, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 38. 67 what Che’s political beliefs were since Castro was the leader of the movement and determined all policy.184 Gonzalo Güell y Morales de los Ríos, the Cuban Minister of State, assured the United States that the Government of Cuba was determined to hold open elections and maintain law and order. He also stated that Batista would invite the world press to witness the elections and requested a representative from the United Nations to observe the elections to ensure fairness.185 A week later Güell met again with Smith. He stated that the situation in Cuba was very serious and that in order for the Government of Cuba to be able to hold open elections, Batista believed constitutional guarantees would need to be suspended, Güell also stated that Batista was prepared to postpone elections as Castro had requested. Smith told Güell that the United States hoped for a peaceful solution. The Eisenhower administration would be disappointed if constitutional guarantees were suspended again, that the United States government policy was one of nonintervention and would be sticking to that, and that the Government of Cuba would be criticized by the American press if they took these actions.186 On March 12, 1958 Castro issued an ultimatum with 22 points of action. Within those points was a call for a strike in April with an increase in attacks against Batista, orders that all rail and highway transportation into the Oriente Province was forbidden effective April 1st, and instructions that beginning April 1st rebel forces would fire on all vehicles entering the Oriente Province. Officials who continued to serve in the armed forces or government after that date 184 Despatch from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 46. Telegraph from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 4, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 50. 186 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 12, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 53. 185 68 would be considered traitors and all Cubans should stop paying taxes. In answer, Batista suspended all constitutional freedoms.187 The United States continued to be concerned with the safety of American people in Cuba. Batista said he could control the situation and in order to protect American lives and property he was increasing the size of the Cuban Army. He also stated Communism was spreading and the Government of Cuba was certain that Communists were involved in the attempted overthrow of the government. He agreed to postpone elections as the opposition requested and, if the Government of Cuba was voted out, he would leave office willingly on February 24, 1959 when his term expired.188 Manuel Urrieta and other Cuban exiles met with Weiland and Deputy Director, Office of Middle American Affairs, C. Allan Stewart in Washington, DC. Urrieta urged the United States to cease shipping arms to Batista. He felt use of American military advisors as trainers and supply of arms to Cuba created ill will towards the United States. Urrieta also stated Batista was misusing arms that had been sold only for hemispheric defense which was a violation of the United States-Cuba Military Assistance Agreement. The exiles stated an oppositional unified front had been created with Socarrás, Castro, and others all working together. They requested the United States withdraw its military mission from Cuba. Stewart responded there was a strict policy of non-intervention. Urrieta responded that withdrawal of the mission was not intervention. Weiland replied that “interpretations are put on non-intervention on the basis of whether the act harms or helps the cause of a particular group.”189 187 Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 55. Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, March 14, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 57. 189 Memorandum of conversation between Manuel Urrieta (exiled 26 th of July leader), Raul Chiba (exiled member of the Orthodox party), Angel Santos Bush (exiled 26 th of July member), William A. Weiland (Director, Office of Middle American Affairs), and C. Allan Stewart (Deputy Director, Office of Middle American Affairs), March 17, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 63. 188 69 The United States felt that should Castro’s 26th of July movement be successful in its attempt to overthrow Batista, there was nothing about its leadership that inspired confidence in restoring order to Cuba. While the Eisenhower administration did not believe Castro to be a Communist, they did find him to be immature and irresponsible. They felt a third alternative to the continued rule of Batista or a Castro dominated regime would be a military civilian junta which would overthrow Batista but deny Castro a dominant position.190 On April 9, 1958 Castro’s forces unsuccessfully attempted to launch a general strike. They also failed in an attempt to seize arms in Havana. The strike failed for multiple reasons, not the least of which was preparedness by Batista and lack of organization and communication by Castro. 191 The United States supplied arms to Cuba under three bases: the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, sales by the Department of Defense under the Mutual Security Act, and sales by private American companies. The decision to suspend arms shipments to Cuba was to ensure the arms were used in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Consequently, Batista turned to outside sources. Therefore it was recommended that shipments continue to be withheld, sales by the Department of Defense or private dealers be allowed provided such sales also further United States foreign policy objectives, and sales of noncombat items continue.192 The United States government called for compliance from Cuba in regards to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and requested the Government of Cuba stop using Military Assistance Program trained men and supplied equipment in combat and that the Military 190 Memorandum from Deputy Director of Intelligence (Arneson) to the Secretary of State, April 1, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 77. 191 Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 82. 192 Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to Acting Secretary of State, May 6, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 92. 70 Assistance Program supported unit be returned its equipment.193 Smith felt that this in addition to the current arms policy would only serve to further strain relations between the United States and Cuba and serve to strengthen the Communists. He requested the Government of Cuba be allowed to send a letter explaining they have not violated the terms of the Military Defense Assistance Agreement, since they are fighting Communists, protecting lives and property, and attempting to prevent an overthrow of the government.194 The United States faced a dilemma in Cuba. On one hand the Batista regime was becoming more disliked due to repression and on the other hand it was becoming more likely Batista supported candidates were going to win the election and Batista would continue in power behind the scenes. The Government of Cuba was engaged in an all out offensive in the Oriente Province against Castro’s forces and was using United States trained men and United States supplied equipment. This brought about much criticism both by Cubans and Americans. The Government of Cuba charged that Castro was a Communist, but the United States found nothing to support that. The suspension of shipments of arms to Cuba had not resulted in any change of the political situation, so the United States saw no reason to reconsider the decision.195 On June 26, 1958 Castro’s forces kidnapped eleven Americans from the Moa Bay Mining Company. On June 27, they kidnapped twenty four United States Naval personnel, including eleven Marines. By the end of June, a total of forty three Americans and three Canadians had been abducted. The United States felt the rebels were doing to this to force United States intervention in Cuba. However, the United States still felt a policy of non-intervention was best. 193 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, June 13, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 106. 194 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, June 16, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 108. 195 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of Political Affairs (Murphy), June 26, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 113. 71 The United States received the demands for the release of the American hostages; no more arms shipments, assurance Guantanamo Bay would not be used to supply arms, and compliance by both the United States and Government of Cuba with the Military Defense Assistance program.196 Raul Castro claimed he ordered the kidnappings without the authority of Fidel and stated he blamed the United States for supplying arms and for supporting Batista and sought to publicize the situation. This illustrated to the United States that the rebel program was not clearly defined beyond the fanatical hatred of Batista and while Batista believed there was a Communist influence, Fidel Castro continued to claim otherwise.197 In a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations pointed out that as of the first kidnap incident the Government of Cuba had suspended all air and ground attacks against the rebels in an attempt to ensure the safety of the hostages. He felt that so long as the attacks were suspended the rebels would either not release the captives or would release them over an extended period of time while increasing demands from the United States. The reputation of the United States had been damaged and would continue to suffer if they did not secure a release of the hostages.198 Smith also felt the United States needed to take a firm stand, regardless of the release of the hostages. The rebels had achieved their goals: publicity, cessation of attacks by the Government of Cuba, and dealing directly with the United States. Smith believed kidnappings would continue and the only way to stop them was with a sufficiently severe penalty.199 196 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 125. 197 Telegraph from Embassy in Cuba to Department of State, July 3, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 127. 198 Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 10, 1958. FRUS 19581968 Volume VI, 140. 199 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 12, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 149. 72 As Raul delayed the release of the captives, Smith began to believe the rebel forces were holding the Americans in an attempt to give them time to mount an offensive. Smith thought the United States had underestimated the size and extent of the rebel movement and did not feel the Cuban Army was capable of defeating the rebels in the hills.200 On July 18, 1958 the rebels unexpectedly released the hostages. When they returned, the released hostages reported that couriers had arrived at the detention center just prior to their release.201 Correspondingly, on July 20, 1958 the opposition groups signed a unity pact with the 26th of July Movement. Smith felt the recent kidnappings really highlighted the Communist’s influence on Raul Castro. Ultimately, the Communists and the 26th of July movement shared the same goal, the overthrow of Batista. It was clear to the United States that the strength of the Communist party in Cuba, if not reflected in their numbers, was definitely reflected in their organization and dedication.202 In a memo, C. Allan Stewart laid out his thoughts concerning Cuba. He felt Batista’s regime was unpopular and he did not have the public’s support of honest elections, conversely, Fidel Castro’s insurrection was gaining strength rapidly. Also, that the United States policy of withholding arms from Batista was approved by opposition forces and he felt that a change in that policy could lead to reprisals against Americans in Cuba. Stewart was concerned that the United States decision not to sell ten T-28 trainers to Cuba could result in Batista cancelling contracts with the United States and ordering United States missions to leave Cuba. He also though that ff Batista did not get control of and improve the situation in Cuba, then Castro would only grow stronger and all out support of Batista by the United States would draw strong criticism and only delay the inevitable. Lastly, he believed the United States needed to consider 200 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 17, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 154. 201 Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI 157. 202 Despatch from Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 24, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 160. 73 alternative courses of action to resolve the situation before Castro grew so strong that he would be able to dictate how Cuba would be governed.203 Smith felt there were two alternatives confronting United States policy. One, that the United States allow the situation in Cuba to continue status quo, the end result being a polarization of centers of power by Batista and the opposition with the United States being blamed by all sides. Two, the United States discreetly work with the opposition to get them united behind one candidate. He also felt the current policy needed to be modified to allow Batista to effectively fight the Communist infiltration in the Oriente Province.204 Smith met with Batista. Batista felt that in light of the continued rebel activity he could not reinstate constitutional guarantees, but if the United States would give him arms and equipment he would station men to defend American properties. He stated that by withdrawing support from the Government of Cuba, the United States was providing aid and comfort to the Communists. Batista also assured Smith that elections would still be held in November.205 The United States had several alternatives for action in Cuba. Stick to the current policy of neutrality, the concern being the longer the conflict continued, the more advantageous to the Communists. Work toward unification of opposition and replace Batista through open elections. This would have been ideal if the obstacles to it, including disruption of the elections by revolutionaries and people not wanting to vote, were not so overwhelming. Encourage the military to overthrow Batista and establish a provincial government. This would mean direct intervention in Cuban politics and no real guarantee of success. Support Batista within legal 203 Memorandum from Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow), July 24, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 162. 204 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, July 25, 1958, , FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 173. 205 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, August 1, 1958, , FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 180. 74 confines. The United States did not believe the Batista regime had the support of the Cuban people nor would it continue for any period after February 24, 1959. Give moral and material support to the opposition. Given the infiltration of Communists into Castro’s 26th of July movement this was the least favorable of the alternatives. So long as there was a chance of the opposition uniting and putting up a candidate the United States could not rule out the electoral method as a solution. While it was recognized that strict neutrality was not an ideal solution, it was believe that it best served the interests of the United States.206 The United States still has to answer the question should arms sales to Cuba resume now that the hostages had been released. Rubottom recommended there be no change in policy regarding the shipment of arms, that the United States take no further action to ensure compliance by the Government of Cuba to the Military Defense Assistance agreement, and the ten t-28 trainers not be sent.207 Although Smith thought Batista would hold honest elections as he promised, he felt that the opposition would prevent the elections from solving the political problems in Cuba. He thought it would be necessary for the newly elected President to remove Castro from the opposition, potentially by making him a Senator. He also thought if Batista remained in Cuba after his term, this would only cause more problems for whoever succeeded him. Batista intended to restore constitutional guarantees forty five days prior to the election, provided the Government of Cuba could control the 26th of July movement, but felt the lack of support, via arms sales, from the United States was the reason they were failing in these efforts. 208 Much of the contention between the United States and Cuba lie in the fact that Cuba requested the ten T206 Paper prepared by the Embassy in Cuba, August 8, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 186. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State, August 11, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 192. 208 Memorandum of conversation between Embassy in Cuba (Smith) and Foreign Minister Guell, August 15, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 195. 207 75 28 trainers and the United States failed to deliver them. The United States felt that based on the overwhelming evidence that Cuba would use the delivery of the planes to demonstrate renewed support for Batista by the United States, the negative reaction such delivery would cause in the United States, and that promises by the Government of Cuba that the planes would not be used for this purpose were not satisfactory, that the Government of Cuba be informed the T-28s would not be shipped.209 In September 1958, Terrence Leonhardy, Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, met with Ernesto Betancourt, an agent for the 26th of July movement. Leonhardy expressed concerns that many of the anti-American articles being circulated by the 26th of July movement followed the Communist party line and had been printed by the Communist party. He asked Betancourt why Castro did not disavow the Communist party publicly. Betancourt stated that Castro was hesitant to do so since he had no other social program to present to the Cuban people, had previously been accused of supporting the higher classes, and did not want to anger them since their presence was so strong in the 26th of July movement. Betancourt also felt the members of the 26th of July movement that were Communist were also young and would become more conservative as they matured. He thought the United States could counter their negative image by gradually withdrawing troops from Cuba, sure to be perceived by the opposition as a sign the United States was gradually withdrawing support from Batista.210 Smith felt it best for United States interests if Batista remained in power until February 1959, when his term ended. If he were overthrown, the Communists might use the ensuing 209 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Weiland) to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow), August 29, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 201. 210 Memorandum of conversation between the Office of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt, September 19, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 207. 76 chaos to emerge stronger, if not the victors, in Cuba.211 The United States still had concerns about the political environment in Cuba not being conducive to holding free elections. They based this on three factors: the repeated suspension of constitutional guarantees, the stated purpose of the rebels to disrupt the elections, and the lack of confidence in any of the candidates. The United States felt that elections would be held and that Batista’s candidate, Andrés Rivero Agüero, would win. If Agüero could maintain the support of the military, then potentially he would be able to block any overthrow of the government as well as block any gains the Communists or the 26th of July movement hoped to make.212 The 26th of July movement continued to grow stronger and was unequivocally opposed to the coming elections. They also had been demanding tax payments from American sugar companies operating in eastern Cuba. In a meeting with Leonhardy, Betancourt stated he felt he failed in his attempts to bring about a better relationship between the 26th of July movement and the United States. He also understood the United States support of Batista, but felt that the United States needed to understand the strength and dominance of the Castro movement and the fact that it would prevail in Cuba.213 During the first nine months of 1958, American companies in Cuba sustained over $2million in losses due to disruptions caused by rebel forces, including arson, theft of equipment, and disruption of electrical service.214 On November 3, 1958 elections were held in Cuba. Even though the United States government felt their concerns regarding constitutional guarantees, intent of the rebels to disrupt elections, and weakness of the candidates would result in an apathetic response, they held the 211 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, September 24, 2958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 214. 212 Despatch from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, September 26, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 217. 213 Memorandum of conversation between the Office of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt, September 30, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 233. 214 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Weiland) to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), October 10, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 240. 77 position that this was an internal matter in Cuba and therefore would not get involved. There was a very small voter turnout, less than five percent in Havana, and Rivero Agüero was declared the winner.215 Smith felt the United States needed to determine to what extent Communists had infiltrated the 26th of July movement. He also thought, as did former President Marquez Sterling, that to stop more youths form joining the movement the United States needed to step up support for the Government of Cuba and renew the sale of arms. If the United States were not willing to do that then it should at least stop air drops of arms to rebels from Cuban exiles in Florida, enforce neutrality laws, and give no moral aid to the Castro movement.216 Batista told Smith that he felt that by refusing to sell arms to the Government of Cuba, by refusing to officially recognize the state of civil war in Cuba, and ignoring the ease in which the rebels obtained arms and ammunition from the United States that the United States was, in fact, intervening in Cuban affairs.217 Weiland met with Ricardo Artigas, a former general who served under Batista and a Cuban exile residing in the United States. Artigas stated the Castro movement was growing stronger and that a Castro victory would result in serious, adverse consequences for the United States. He also felt that whether Batista remained in office or Agüero succeeded him, the revolution would just intensify. Artigas thought the Cuban military should overthrow Batista while blocking Castro’s bid for power. He stated the Cuban military needed support from the United States to do this and, by support; he meant the United States should have American military officers in Cuba discreetly tell Cuban officers that there should be a change in 215 Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 249. Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, November 6, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 251. 217 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, November 16, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 258. 216 78 government. Weiland told Artigas the United States would not get involved and Cuba needed to work this out internally.218 The holding of elections and the pending swearing in of Agüero had no impact on the continuing impasse in Cuba. Castro, while continuing his guerilla warfare, was not capable of overthrowing Batista and the Cuban military was incapable of suppressing the rebels. In terms of breaking the political deadlock between Batista and the rebels, the United States felt the Cuban military held the most importance. The Cuban military could depose Batista and install a junta, then promise the opposition a place in the provincial government.219 The United States could not commit to supporting Agüero once he took office unless he illustrated that he was taking positive steps to restore stability in Cuba and that limiting Batista’s role in Agüero’s government would be a key factor in obtaining such support. The United States felt that unless Batista left Cuba and absented himself from the Government of Cuba, Agüero had no chance for success.220 Smith met with American businessmen in Cuba. They felt the situation in Cuba was deteriorating rapidly and that without support from the United States Batista would not last until the end of his term. They were concerned the 26th of July movement was Communist and an overthrow by Castro would be more bloody and violent than when Machado was overthrown. They wanted the United States to promote a military civilian junta which would enlist wide public support and ultimately weaken the Castro movement. Smith considered the support of a junta to be dangerous to the United States and instead proposed that Batista turn the Government of Cuba over to Agüero early and that the United States give full support, including militarily, to Agüero. He specifically felt that if the United States maintained 218 Memorandum of conversation between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) and Ricardo Artigan, Department of State. November 18, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 259. 219 Special National Intelligence Estimate, November 24, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 265. 220 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, November 26, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 270. 79 its current course of non-intervention Communists would be the only ones to profit from the chaos and the United States would have to intervene for humanitarian reasons anyway.221 On December 4, 1958 the 26th of July movement formed an executive committee and decided once they had overthrown the Government of Cuba, they would legalize Communism.222 Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, became more concerned that Batista would not be able to regain control of the situation in Cuba. The Government of Cuba was consistently losing ground to Castro in the conflict and businesses, American and Cuban, were paying the price.223 While Cubans were paying the heaviest price for the conflict in Cuba, American businesses also suffered due to kidnapping, extortion, and depredation both by the Government of Cuba and the rebels. The United States had been concerned with the deteriorating situation, but continued to adhere to the non-intervention policy. However, consideration had to be given to what could be done within the confines of that policy to help stabilize the situation.224 On December 9, 1958 the United States sent special emissary William Pawley to meet with Batista. Pawley told Batista if he were to depart Cuba to the United States, the United States would stop Castro. However, the government that the United States would install would be made up of Batista’s enemies. This would force Castro to either lay down arms or admit he was in it for the power. Batista did not accept the offer.225 Batista’s position continued to deteriorate. The Cuban Armed Forces were showing signs of demoralization and many had been arrested for complicity in a military conspiracy against the Government of Cuba or for refusing 221 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, December 2, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 276. 222 222 Telegraph from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, December 5, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 278. 223 Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 278. 224 Circular telegraph from the Department of State to certain diplomatic missions in the American Republics, December 8, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 279. 225 Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 281. 80 to fight. The rebels were damaging the economy through attacks on sugar plantations and the constant drains on the economy by the Government of Cuba to fight the rebels were compounding the problem. There was considerable talk in Cuba that a military junta was needed to overthrow Batista and stop Castro, but no one knew who could lead it. There was concern that if Castro could not be stopped the civil war would spread and the military, tired of the conflict, would either join Castro or turn on Batista, moves that would only serve to strengthen Castro regardless.226 Dulles felt that Batista would never muster enough strength to stop Castro and that Castro was bound to emerge victorious from what had become a civil war. President Eisenhower suggested that Batista be persuaded to turn the Government of Cuba over to his successor and it was agreed that such an attempt be staged to look like a coup.227 Smith met with Guillermo Belt, a former Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Belt felt that Batista should leave Cuba, at which point they would establish a junta government and the United States should give full support including arms, at which point the junta government would declare the election results null, dissolve all political parties, negotiate peace with Castro, and punish members of the Batista regime responsible for human rights violations. He believed that if Castro gained power there would be massive bloodshed, a social revolution would occur, and Communist would control Cuba.228 Castro’s ability to start with thirteen men and then grow to the size his movement was then indicated a large portion of the population either supported him or was anti-Batista. As such, if Batista was not overthrown, the civil war would just continue. On the flipside, if he were 226 Special National Intelligence Estimate, December 16, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 295. Memorandum of a discussion at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council, December 18, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 312. 228 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, December 29, 1958. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 315. 227 81 overthrown the struggle for power among the opposition would still prevent the return of peace to Cuba.229 The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the effects of the arms embargo on Cuba. Cuba was forced to purchase arms from other nations, the embargo weakened Cuba’s goodwill towards the United States, and impaired the ability of Cuban forces to defeat the rebels and protect American interests in Cuba. Therefore, it was recommended the United States stop the embargo of arms to Cuba, re-emphasize the importance of the Good Neighbor Policy, and restore United States-Cuba relationships.230 The United States had been concerned with the thought of full out civil war in Cuba and the establishment of Communism there. The United States government had urged the Government of Cuba for many months to strengthen its military and support and end the internal strife so that the United States could give the requested support. The Government of Cuba failed to do so and as such the Eisenhower administration felt this was what ultimately hurt Batista. The United States felt any increase in military support at that point would expose them to widespread criticism, reprisals against American interests in Cuba, and alienating Cubans. Nor did the United States feel that such an increase at that time would have solved the crisis in Cuba.231 The United States did not set out to weaken Batista, but by not continuing to send arms, it sapped his strength and hampered his ability to fight Castro. On January 1, 1959, Batista 229 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Central American and Pan-American Affairs (Stewart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), December 29, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 316. 230 Editorial note, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 321. 231 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba, December 31, 1958, FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 330 82 departed for Santo Domingo and many members of his administration fled to the United States.232 World War II bought a new era to the relationship between Cuba and the United States. With the onset of the Cold War, the United States became focused on stopping Communism and looked to Cuba to aid them in this fight. This was also the time Fidel Castro came on the scene, while not originally a Communist, he did harbor strong anti-American feelings and his hatred of Batista and what he stood for ran deep. As the conflict between Castro and Batista escalated, the United States grew concerned that Batista was using weapons the United States provided in a manner not keeping with their arms agreements. As a result, the United States made the decision so stop supplying weapons to Batista. This decision would eventually lead to the fall of Batista as the Cuban Army became demoralized and he lost the support of the Cuban people, and, ultimately, the support of the United States government. 232 Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State, January 1, 1959. FRUS 1958-1968 Volume VI, 332. 83 Conclusion So, as the United States considers a future Cuba without Fidel Castro as president, it is important to understand how the United States past relationship with Cuba contributed to the relationship the United States has with Cuba today. That relationship, initially based on trade agreements, soon became one based on politics, economics, and the military. The bases for this relationship were also the bases for the end of friendly relations between Cuba and the United States. When the Spanish American War ended, the United States government passed the Treaty of Reciprocity with Cuba to assist Cuba’s economy as well as build good relations with Cuba. However, this relationship was soon strained, when after World War I, Cuban sugar producers found that American sugar buyers were reselling Cuban sugar for a profit. When the Depression hit, in an effort to protect the American economy, the United States government passed a series of acts that cut the Cuban share in the American sugar market by half, sending the Cuban economy into a tailspin. Tensions were raised again in the 1950s when the United States government limited how much Cuban sugar would be bought for the American sugar market. Batista warned Eisenhower that this reflected a serious change is what had been the basis of United States and Cuban relations for fifty years and would have a profound negative impact on the Cuban economy. From the end of the Spanish American War, the United States was also involved in Cuban politics. When Machado was president of Cuba, the United States government supported him in spite of his actions towards the Cuban people. As the situation worsened in Cuba during the Depression, opposition to Machado called upon the United States to intervene. Aware of the worsening situation in Cuba, the United States government still refused to intervene and this 84 nonintervention was seen as further support for Machado. On the flip side, when San Martin took over the presidency after the Sergeant’s Revolt, the United States refused to officially recognize his administration. The United States government was concerned about decisions and policies San Martin was setting. The United States government knew that without official recognition, San Martin would be hard pressed to restore stability to Cuba and this lack of recognition could also prolong conflict in Cuba. When Batista took office again in 1952, he once more had the support of the United States government; however, he did not have the support of the Cuban people. Castro planned to charge Batista with violating the Cuban constitution. His petition was denied by the Cuban courts. This denial and the continued support of Batista by the United States government set Castro on the course to revolution that would eventually bring about the fall of Batista and the end of good relations between the United States and Cuba. Over the years, the United States and Cuba signed a variety of agreements regarding the sales of arms in Cuba, not the least of which was the Military Assistance Program. Under this program the United States provided financial assistance, military training to Cuban military personnel, as well as arms, which included fighter jets, tanks, and other vehicles. The purpose of the assistance was to assist the United States during the Cold War and provide “hemispheric defense”. However, Batista began to use arms provided under the Military Assistance Program to subdue his opposition, most notably, Fidel Castro. As the United States government became more concerned about Batista’s use of the weapons, they began to decline requests from Batista for more assistance and more specifically, more weapons. This in turn negatively effected Batista’s ability to fight Castro and eventually led to Batista’s downfall. 85 Even though economics, politics, and the military were the foundations for the good relationship between the United States and Cuba, as each of these foundations began to become strained over time, they eventually became the cause for the failure of that relationship. 86 Appendix A Cuban Presidents Governors 1 Jan 1899 - 23 Dec 1899 23 Dec 1899 - 20 May 1902 President 20 May 1902 - 28 Sep 1906 Provisional Governors 29 Sep 1906 - 13 Oct 1906 13 Oct 1906 - 28 Jan 1909 Presidents 28 Jan 1909 - 20 May 1913 20 May 1913 - 20 May 1921 20 May 1921 - 20 May 1925 20 May 1925 - 24 Aug 1933 (left Cuba on 12 Aug 1933) 12 Aug 1933 - 13 Aug 1933 13 Aug 1933 - 5 Sep 1933 5 Sep 1933 - 10 Sep 1933 10 Sep 1933 - 15 Jan 1934 15 Jan 1934 - 18 Jan 1934 18 Jan 1934 (hours) 18 Jan 1934 - 11 Dec 1935 11 Dec 1935 - 20 May 1936 20 May 1936 - 24 Dec 1936 John Ruller Brooke Leonard Wood Tomás Estrada Palma Non-party/PM William Howard Taft Charles Edward Magoon José Miguel Gómez y Gómez Aurelio Mario Gabriel Francisco García Menocal y Deop Alfredo Zayas y Alfonso Gerardo Machado y Morales Alberto Herrera y Franchi (provisional [acting for Machado]) Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada (provisional [acting for Machado to 24 Aug 1933]) Executive Commission of the Provisional Government - Ramón Grau San Martín - Guillermo Francisco Leopoldo Portela y Möller - José Miguel Irisarri y Gamio - Sergio Carbó y Morera - Porfirio Franca y Álvarez de la Campa Ramón Grau San Martín Carlos Hevia y de los Reyes Gavilán (provisional) Carlos Manuel Agustín Márquez Sterling y Loret de Mola (acting) Carlos Mendieta y Montefur (provisional) José Agripino Barnet y Vinageras (acting to 13 Dec 1935, provisional from 13 Dec 1935) Miguel Mariano Gómez y Arias Partido Liberal Partido Conservador Partido Popular Cubano-Liga Nacional Partido Liberal Military ABC Sociedad Revolucionaria Partido Revolucionario Cubano Partido Liberal Partido Conservador Partido Popular Cubano-Liga Nacional Partido Liberal Partido Revolucionario Cubano Partido Revolucionario Cubano Military Unión Nacional Unión Nacional Unión Nacional 87 24 Dec 1936 - 10 Oct 1940 (b. 1875 - d. 1946) UN 10 Oct 1940 - 10 Oct 1944 10 Oct 1944 - 10 Oct 1948 10 Oct 1948 - 10 Mar 1952 10 Mar 1952 - 1 Jan 1959 14 Aug 1954 - 24 Feb 1955 1 Jan 1959 - 2 Jan 1959 2 Jan 1959 (hours) 2 Jan 1959 - 17 Jul 1959 Federico Laredo Brú Rubén Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar Unión Nacional Coalicion Socialista Democratico Ramón Grau San Martín Partido Revolucionaro CubanoAuténtico Carlos Prío Socarrás Partido Revolucionaro CubanoAuténtico Rubén Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar Military/Partido Acción (Chief of State to 4 Apr 1952; provisional to Progresista/Partido Acción 24 Feb 1955) Unitaria Andrés Domingo Morales y del Castillo (acting for Batista) Anselmo Alliegro y Milá Partido Progresista (acting) (did not take office) Carlos Manuel Piedra y Piedra Non party (interim) (did not take office) Manuel Urrutia Lleó Non party 88 Works Cited Primary Sources Adams. “War Between the United States and Spain”. 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