Karla P. López de Nava
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
Encina Hall West, Room 100
Stanford, CA 94305-6044
(650)-387-1189 (cell)
klopez@stanford.edu
EDUCATION
2001-present Stanford University
Stanford, CA
Ph.D. in Political Science, expected March 2007
Fields: Comparative Politics, Political Organizations, Methodology
1995-2000
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
B.A. in Political Science
Graduated with honors (Main advisor: Federico Estevez)
México City
DISSERTATION
“Government performance and accountability: Assessing the impact of economic
performance and the institutional context on electoral outcomes in Latin American
and OECD democracies, 1970-2005”
Committee: David Laitin (chair), James Fearon, Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto DiazCayeros
Do voters punish the government for a poor economic performance? Are voters myopic,
or do they have the capacity to consider long periods of economic information when
evaluating the economic performance of the government? There is still no consensus in
the economic voting literature and the results are contradictory: Some cross-national
analyses have failed to find a relationship between the economic performance of the
government and its electoral fortunes; while others have found it, but only after
controlling for the political and institutional context. Additionally, the majority of
economic voting studies assume that voters are myopic, i.e., at the most, they only
consider the economic performance of the year preceding the election--- an assumption
that has not been formally tested and that may account for some of the contradictory
results in the literature. Finally, preliminary findings show that the relationship between
economic and electoral outcomes is strong in OECD countries but weak in Latin
America. My research provides an answer to these questions. Using an original data set
that includes elections from 1970 to 2005 in 18 Latin American and 22 OECD countries,
I find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, voters do punish a poor economic
performance and are able to consider long periods of economic information when judging
the performance of the government. I also find that both the political and economic
contexts have an effect on economic accountability: in countries with high economic
volatility and political instability, and in countries where democratic experience is low
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and the political system is fragmented and less institutionalized, the relationship between
economic and electoral outcomes tends to be weak.
RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS
Comparative Politics
Comparative Political Institutions
Elections and the Economy
Electoral and Party Systems in Latin America
Political Economy
Statistical Methods
Regime Transitions
WORKING PAPERS
“Re-specifying the Vote Function: A Cross-National Study of Economic Voting” (to be
submitted)
“Economic Crisis, Elite Bargaining and Transitions to Democracy”
“Veto Players and Fiscal Performance: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Budget
Deficits”
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
“Re-specifying the Vote Function: A Cross-National Study of Economic Voting”
Paper prepared for presentation at the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, September 1-5, 2004, Chicago, Illinois.
“Economic Performance and Accountability: The Revival of the Economic Vote
Function.” Paper presented at the Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political
Science Association, April 15-18, 2004, and also presented at:
-the SCR Fifth Annual Retreat, Princeton University, May9-10, 2003
-Stanford Workshop in Statistical Modeling, 2004
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching assistant: Introduction to Economics
Fall 2006, Instructor: Marcelo Clerici-Arias, Department of Economics
Teaching assistant: Comparative Democratic Development
Spring 2005 and winter 2003, Instructor: Larry Diamond, Department of Political
Science
Teaching assistant: Non-Governmental Organizations and Development in Poor
Countries
Spring 2004, Instructor: David Abernethy, Department of Political Science
Teaching assistant: The Global Politics of Human Rights
Winter 2004, Instructor: Terry Karl, Department of Political Science
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Teaching assistant: Judicial Politics and Constitutional Law: The Federal System
Fall 2003 and fall 2004, Instructor: Andrew Rutten, Department of Political Science
Teaching assistant: Introduction to Comparing Political Systems
Spring 2003, Instructor: David Laitin, Department of Political Science
Teaching assistant: Liberty and the Law
Fall 2002, Instructor: Steven Kelts, Department of Political Science
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant, Beatriz Magaloni (Summer 2006)
Research Assistant, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (Summer 2006)
Research Assistant, David Laitin (Summer 2003)
Research Assistant, Maria Amparo Casar, CIDE (1999-2000)
Research Assistant, Alejandro Moreno, ITAM (1998)
COMPUTER SKILLS
STATA
SPSS
S-Plus/R
FELLOWSHIPS
Department of Economics Teaching Fellowship, Stanford University (2006-2007)
Department of Political Science Teaching Fellowship, Stanford University
(2002-2005)
MANUSCRIPT REVIEWS
Journal of Politics
LANGUAGES
Spanish (Native), English (Fluent), German (Fluent), French (Conversational)
REFERENCES:
David Laitin
Encina West, Room 423
Stanford University
Phone: (650) 725-9556
dlaitin@stanford.edu
Jim Fearon
Encina West, Room 441
Stanford University
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Phone: (650) 725-1314
jfearon@stanford.edu
Beatriz Magaloni
Encina West, Room 303
Stanford University
Phone: (650) 723-2613
magaloni@stanford.edu
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
Encina West, Room 410
Stanford University
Phone: (650) 724-2481
albertod@stanford.edu
Larry Diamond
Hoover Tower, Room 1202
Stanford University
Phone: (650) 725-3420
diamond@hoover.stanford.edu
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