JOURNAL
OF EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD
46,
PSYCHOLOGY
289-323
(1988)
Contextualism: The World View of Behavior Analysis
EDWARD K. MORRIS
Department
The
analysis
contrast
of Humon
De\~elopment.
University
(If Kurrstrs
thesis
of this paper is that contemporary
behavior
analysis-and
the behavior
of child
development
in particular-is
contextualistic
in world
view,
to its traditional
characterization
as being mechanistic.
The contextualistic
character
of behavior
analysis
is introduced
by presenting
field’s
historical
background.
This material,
though,
is not
of the standard
account,
but rather
in a revised
account
movements
matism.
The
the contextualism
with respect
as empiricism,
thesis
is then
associationism.
developed
of behavior
analysis
to five core developmental
(b) development
versus
functional
more
with
positivism.
fully
by
mechanism.
issues:
(a)
some
presented
with
material
on the
in the manner
respect
to such
operationism.
comparing
and
and pragcontrasting
both of which
are analyzed
elementarism
versus
holism.
as response-based
change
versus
structural
analysis,
(d) continuity
versus
discontinuity,
change.
(c) causal
and (e) the passive
versus
active
nature
of development.
Finally.
the importance
of “context”
contextualism
is examined
and organized
according
to current
behavior-analytic
practices.
Concluding
commentary
focuses
on the salutory
effects
of having
behavior
in world
PlC\\.
analysis
and
view.
especially
mainstream
developmental
with regard
to such
in
in
both
psychology
be commensurable
issues
as cognition.
~tl IYXX Acadcmlc
Inc.
In 1942, Stephen C. Pepper published a book entitled World Hypothesis:
In that philosophically
enlightened but sometimes
opaque work, Pepper presented what he took to be several relatively
adequate and autonomous world views-among
them, mechanism, contextualism, and organicism-formulated
somewhat commonsensically
ac-
A Study in Evidence.
This
paper
is dedicated
to Sidney
W.
Bijou-mentor.
colleague.
and
friend-in
celebration
of the 25th anniversary
of his having
founded
the Jorrr-rrtrl
c!f‘Eupc,~i,,?c,/tttr/
Child P.s.w/~h~~.
Appreciation
is extended
to Philip
N. Hineline.
who invited
an initial
version
of this paper
for a 1987 symposium
conducted
at the meeting
of the American
Psychological
Association
(Morris,
1987).
and to Donald
M. Baer,
Lisa
M. Johnson,
Bryan
D. Midgley.
Hayne
W.
Reese,
Susan
M. Schneider.
James
T. Todd,
and Grover
Whitehurst.
who provided
helpful
comments
on other
versions
of the present
manuscript.
The author.
however.
is responsible
for any remaining
alchemy
of argument
or maladroitness
of mind.
Appreciation
is extended
also to the Harvard
University
Department
of Psychology
and to the May institute
(Chatham,
MA)
for their
respective
Spring
and Summer
1988 Visiting
Scholar
appointments.
Reprint
requests
should
be sent
of Kansas,
Lawrence.
to the author
KS 66045.
at the Department
of Human
Development.
University
289
0022-0965/8X
$3.00
290
EDWARD
K.
MORRIS
cording to their respective underlying root metaphors. those being the
machine, the historic event, and the living organism.
For many years. Pepper’s analysis of how these world views interacted
with the conduct of normal science was of little explicit consequence in
developmental psychology for perhaps two related reasons. First. Pepper
argued against the possibility of a strictly empiricist and logical epistemology
devoid of world views (see also Lakatos. 1978; Laudan. 1977), thereby
taking a position that ran counter to the logical positivism that had
dominated psychology since the 1930s. And second, Hull-Spence
S-R
learning theory-a
derivative of this logical positivism-gave
rise first
to dynamic social learning theory (Bandura & Walters. 1963: Berlyne.
1965; Dollard & Miller, 1950; Miller & Dollard, 1941: Mowrer, 1960:
Sears, Maccoby. & Levin. 1957) and then to cognitive social learning
theory (Bandura, 1977), which became the orthodox views within developmental psychology between about 1940 and 1970 (see White. 1970).
stultifying other considerations-in
this case. countervailing ontological
and epistemological
views.
Not until the early 197Os, when a major shift in orientation occurred
within developmental
psychology, did Pepper’s analysis seem relevant.
It was then that Reese and Overton (1970; Overton & Reese, 1973),
among others (see, e.g., Lerner. 1976), adopted Pepper’s distinctions
between the mechanistic and organismic world views as a basis for
understanding the tensions produced by the shift from a learning-theorybased child psychology to a cognitive-developmental
one. These tensions
concerned the criteria for evaluating meaningful research questions, appropriate research strategies, acceptable explanations for empirical findings.
and adequate theories of development in general.
The exemplars of the mechanistic and organismic world views offered
by Reese and Overton at that time were, respectively, Bijou and Baer’s
behavior analysis ofchild development (see Baer. 1970. 1973. 1976: Bijou.
1976; Bijou & Baer. 1961, 1965, 1978) and Piaget’s cognitive-developmental
psychology (see Piaget, 1952, 197 1, 1983: see also Lerner & Kauffman.
1985). Although Reese and Overton presented mechanism and organicism
with impartiality,
the profession of developmental
psychology since then
has generally championed organicism and dismissed mechanism. Indeed,
mechanism has acquired such pejorative connotations that to be cast as
a mechanist can be among the gravest of aspersions.’
’ What
it means
to be mechanistic
ib, of course.
subject
to many
interpretations
(see
Zuriff,
1985. pp. 186-192).
Indeed.
on the positive
side.
to be mechanistic
is. in one sense.
only
to be scientific-that
is. to assume
that the sub.ject
matter
of psychology
i$ lawful:
“Man
is not made
into
a machine
by analyzing
his behavior
in mechanical
term\.
Man
is a machine
in the sense
that he is a complex
\yhtem
hehaving
in lawful
way\”
(Skinner.
productive.
1971. p. 102).
In biology.
That sort
for instance.
of’ mcchani\m
the triumph
ha\ heen
and
of mechanism
bill
continue
over vitalism
to be highly
\*a\
clcxly
CONTEXTUALISM
AND BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
291
But mechanism and organicism were only two of Pepper’s world views.
In the past decade, contextualism has emerged within the developmental
and life-span literatures as a third alternative (Morris, 1986), promoted
initially as a form of dialectics (Riegel, 1975, 1976a, 1976b) and more
recently (a) as an integration of contextualism with either dialectics (Lemer,
Skinner, & Sorell, 1980) or organicism (Lerner & Kauffman, 1985), (b)
as an integration of mechanism and organicism (Lerner, Hultsch, &
Dixon, 1983), or (c) simply as contextualism per se (Blank, 1986; Dixon,
1986); it has an affinity, as well, to developmental
systems theory (e.g.,
Sameroff, 1983). Psychology, more generally, has also begun resonating
to these and similar views, as evinced by Rosnow and Georgoudi’s (1986)
recent Contextualism
and Understanding in Behavioral Science (Morris,
1988b; Taylor, 1988), where the approach has been related, as well, to
transactionalism,
constructionism/constructivism,
and perspectivism. In
none of these cases, however, should contextualism be taken as a dominant
view or as not having raised criticism (see, e.g., Kendler, 1986), for the
other world views still largely characterize contemporary psychology.
Contextualism,
though, is an exciting new alternative as psychology in
all its pluralism continues to evolve as a science.
Throughout all of this, behaviorism in general, and S-R learning theory
in particular, has been cast (and castigated) by organicists and contextualists
as being mechanistic and, as such, for adhering to a world view inherently
incapable of representing human development in any adequate fashion
(e.g., Lerner, 1976; Sameroff & Cavanagh, 1979). Such criticisms are
both right and wrong. They are wrong in the sense that Pepper presented
each world view as relatively adequate and autonomous within its own
metatheoretical
framework, meaning also that cross-view criticisms are
misplaced in that they contribute nothing to the intellectual validity of
the alternative programs (Pepper, 1942, pp. 98-99). Those criticisms,
though, do contribute political and emotive validity to their own programs
through rhetorical style (cf. Czubaroff, 1988), which serves to remind
a major positive advance in the scientific (i.e.. mechanistic) development of that domain
of inquiry. Interestingly, though, as the self-actional. vitalist views (the first stage of
scientific evolution) once gave way to the mechanistic views (the second stage of scientific
evolution), so too has mechanism now given way to contextualistic, field-theoretic views
in biology (the third stage of scientific evolution) (see Weiss, 1969; cf. Dewey & Bentley,
1949; Kantor, 1946; Pronko & Herman, 1982). In a like manner, physics had earlier moved
from classical mechanics to the relativity of a contextualistic, integrated-field perspective
(Einstein & Infeld, 1961). So too might we hope that psychology will evolve from its
versions of vitalistic (i.e.. self-actional, sometimes organismic) and mechanistic world views
toward a contextualistic, integrated-field perspective (cf. Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Kantor,
1946; Pronko & Herman, 1982). If so, then perhaps Pepper’s world views are not as
individually adequate and autonomous as originally construed. Perhaps they are stages in
the evolution of science toward an increasingly successful working with the subject matterclearly a topic for another paper.
292
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
us that science is as fallible as the behavior of scientists and as fallible
as the culture in which the science is embedded-an
important pragmatic
concern (e.g., with respect to funding, see Kaufman. 1970) and a not
uncontextualistic
perspective. In another sense, however, the criticisms
are right by their respective internal standards. and they are devastating
in their characterization of the inadequacies of the S-R tradition on that
basis, albeit sometimes mean-spirited in tone.
But a problem exists in all of this: The behavior theory being criticized
bears little resemblance to the actual behavior-analytic
view of child
development (Bijou, 1979, in press). Some distinctions between the two
behavioral traditions have been made of course, but they have largely
focused on relatively nonmetatheoretical
issues pertaining to matters of
terminology
and definition, research design, theory construction (e.g..
inductive vs deductive), and clinical and educational applications (see.
e.g., Cairns, 1983; Stevenson, 1983; White, 1970). Fundamental metatheoretical differences have been largely overlooked or misunderstood
(but see Reese, 1982, 1986).
Reciting litanies of how behavior analysis differs from the S-R learning
theory tradition (or from its typical caricaturizations)
typically evokes
in-unison concurrence within the behavior-analytic community and serves,
as well, internally important clarifying and motivational
functions (see,
e.g., Bijou, 1979; Horowitz, 1975; Todd & Morris, 1983). Such recitations,
though, too infrequently make a substantive enough contribution toward
explicating and expanding the behavior-analytic
program, especially as
that program contrasts with alternative views. The present paper thus
seeks a more ecumenical and constructive spirit: Its thesis is that behavior
analysis is contextualistic
in world view, a thesis that is developed in
three ways.
First, a discussion of the contextualism within behavior analysis seems
appropriately
begun with some historical background, because contextualism’s root metaphor is the historic event. Broadly speaking, this
metaphor directs us to the continually evolving character of behavior,
as well as of the field of behavior analysis: Each interaction is the unique
product of past activity in current context, as well as being. the historical
context for the next interaction.
For present purposes, what it means
for behavior analysis to be contextualistic
can, in part, be understood
in terms of its historical development,
which is presented in the first
section of this paper-however,
not in the manner of the received view,
but in a revised account. In the next section, the thesis is developed
further and more specifically by comparing and contrasting contextualism
with mechanism, and analyzing both with respect to their consequences
for five core developmental
issues: (a) elementarism versus holism, (b)
development as response-based change versus structural change, (cl causal
versus functional analysis, (d) continuity versus discontinuity,
and (e)
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
293
the passive versus active nature of development and related issues in
agent-action locutions and in the trait-situationism
controversy. Finally,
an overview is offered on what is meant by “context”
and the role it
serves in behavior analysis-for context is what gives behavior its meaning.
Establishing this thesis in full unfortunately requires more time, space,
and intellectual acumen than are presently mine, but the following analysis
may offer at least the patina of the rich quality and deep texture of this
material. Moreover, I will not assert the contextual nature of behavior
analysis dogmatically
because, although 1 am strongly inclined to that
position, who could judge the truth of it? The truth will eventually be
rendered pragmatically
as a matter of “successful working” among scientists interacting with the psychological subject matter-at
least that is
the contextual construal of this dilemma. Such an assertion would also
raise difficulties because neither contextualism
nor behavior analysis is
any one thing. As described earlier, contextualism has been instantiated
in a variety of forms and combinations,
not all of them compatible on
all categorical fronts-for
instance, as to whether or not contextualism’s
organism possesses agency and intentionality.
or whether or not contextualism embraces teleological causation (see Rosnow & Georgoudi.
1986, for inconsistencies in these regards). Also, by certain definitions
and under certain circumstances, behavior analysis evinces a mechanistic
character (Bijou, in press: Crabb, 1988: Hayes. Hayes, & Reese, 1988),
albeit a mechanism that is largely derivative, and not categorical. In any
event, I probably go beyond the established philosophical and conceptual
“facts” about contextualism
and behavior analysis, and 1 admit that,
but so too have the advocates of contrary views, and they have been
doing so for many scores of years.
SOME HISTORICAL
ROOTS
The Received View
In the standard account of the history of psychology, behaviorism and
mechanism are taken to be aligned together through the legacy of Democritus’s atomism, the material and reflex side of Cartesian dualism,
Locke’s espousal of an epistemological
tabuln YNSCI,and on down through
the empiricist and associationist movements in philosophy, from Hume
and Berkeley, through the Mills, both father and son. Then, with the
founding of the first systems of psychology, Wundt’s and Titchener’s
structuralism became the thesis for the antithesis of James’s and Angell’s
functionalism,
from which Watson’s (1913, 19301 classical behaviorism
emerged, in part, as synthesis. This synthesis, accompanied by its philosophical legacies of elementarism, reductionism, environmentalism,
and
associationism,
sought scientific credibility,
first, through an admixture
of Comte’s positivism and Loeb’s operationism, and then later and more
294
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
formally through logical positivism. B. F. Skinner’s descriptive behaviorism
of the 1930s-the neobehaviorism
out of which the behavior analysis of
child development evolved (e.g., Bijou. 1955)-is said to have inherited
these central traits, with mechanism being cardinal.
This rendering of the history of psychology and of “behavioristics”
more specifically, is largely in the tradition of E. G. Boring’s (1950) T/ICJ
History of Exprrimentd
Psycho1og.v (see also Boring, 1964). However,
although this account remains widely accepted, recent scholarship has
questioned the narrowness and accuracy with which the lines of psychology’s descent have been drawn, including the relative emphases
placed on, and the inclusions of. particular individuals.
schools. and
systems (see e.g., Buxton, 1985; O’Donnell, 1985: Smith, 1986). Emerging
from this material is a revised account of the history of behavior analysis,
within which its contextualistic
roots may be gleaned.
Nat~rralism crnd mutc~rirrlistn. A more accurate history of behavior
analysis would trace its origins back to the naturalism of Hellenic Greek
philosophy,
particularly
as espoused by Aristotle, the importance of
which was lost in later theologically based reinterpretations of that material
(Kantor, 1963). The subsequent rekindling of naturalistic attitudes toward
human behavior during the Renaissance and the soon-to-come Scientific
Revolution were strongly influenced by these and later theological views,
especially those of Rene Descartes. who established separate paths for
the psychology that followed-one
path interested in the immaterial soulcum-mind and the other interested in the material body. Neither path,
though, characterizes contemporary behavior analysis, for it is neither
mentalistic nor materially reductionistic, especially as the latter has been
construed mechanistically
within S-R psychology (Reese, 1986: Ringen,
1976). In contrast. behavior analysis is focally concerned with the field
of purpose and intention (Day. 1976a), conceptualized in its own fashionalso a major concern within contextualism.
Empiricism
and assoLirrtiollisn1. The role of British empiricism
and
associationism
in the history of behavior analysis requires revision as
well. With respect to empiricism,
John Locke’s epistemological
tuhrrlrr
rum never negated organismic structure and function as sources of individual differences, within or across children. nor did it negate the
private or inaccessible aspects of what we speak of as feeling, thinking,
or consciousness. Likewise, neither does behavior analysis. Biology, for
instance, is taken to participate in all psychological activity-it
serves
as an ever-evolving context that is necessary though not sufficient for
behavioral development (see Delprato. 1979; Kantor, 1947: cf. Lehrman,
1953; Lewontin,
1976; Schneirla. 1966). Behavior analysis also selfconsciously acknowledges psychological privacy (Schnaitter.
197X). as
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
295
well as psychological activity within the skin, accepting the latter as a
proper though difficult domain for analysis (Skinner, 1945, 1974). Moreover,
biology, privacy, and all behavioral relations are taken as the historical
context for subsequent behavior, which brings some sense of an evolving
rationalism to the behavior-analytic
account of child development in what
is otherwise viewed as a strictly empiricist endeavor.
Behavior analysis is also not philosophically
or psychologically
associationistic (Branch, 1977). Associationism represents a reductionistic
and, in one sense, a “molecular”
view in which fundamental and universal
atomic elements of the mind-now.
formally instantiated as stimuli and
responses-are
taken as “things”
that exist in nature. Multiplied
out
through contiguity in time and succession, the S-S and S-R associations
are then said to produce and explain complex behavior. In contrast,
behavior analysis adheres to a “molar“
perspective in which elementary
stimulus and response units do not exist on an a priori basis, the biological
reflexes notwithstanding.
Rather, behavior is characterized in terms of
evolving, codefining classes of stimulus and response functions in contextsaid interrelationships
being the “structure”
of behavior (see Bernstein,
1982; Thompson & Zeiler. 1986). In this latter view, the extension of
behavioral structure in space or in time is irrelevant to its molarity. That
is, the physical size of the members of the functionally interrelated stimulus
and response classes is not a defining characteristic of behavioral structurebehavior ranges from salivation to grdnd
insaturation.
Also, behavior
analysis does not restrict the functional relationships between classes of
stimuli and responses to temporal contiguity, but rather enriches them
by accepting relationships that exist at a temporal distance. but without
the physiological or mental “aether” needed in mechanism to link them
in contiguity (Marr, 1983). In sum, only at the molar level does behavior
take on meaning (see Day, 1980; Krechevesky,
1939: Verplanck, 1954,
on the gestalt-like nature of behavior analysis).
Structuralisrn und f~tnctionulisrn.
With respect to the first schools and
systems of psychology, behavior analysis is properly aligned with functionalism (cf. Dewey, 1896; James, 1890; Mead. 1934), especially in its
emphasis on the utility and adaptiveness of mind and consciousnessnow, behavior. This does not mean, though, that behavior analysis views
structural concerns with antipathy (see, e.g., Catania, 1972). for at issue
is not the correctness of structural versus functional analyses, but rather
the nature of the questions asked and the use to which the answers are
put. That the province of structural analysis is generally within the purview
of cognitive psychology, and that of functional analysis within the purview
of behavioral psychology, has unfortunately
resulted in the respective
correlation of structural and functional concerns with the disputatious
dualism of cognition and behavior, thereby pitting structural and functional
analyses against one another in a dogma eat dogma world. As in biology,
296
FDWAKD
I(. MORRIS
structural and functional analyses should not stand in opposition or conflict:
They are a false dichotomy whose concerns are orthogonal to the cognitivebehavioral dichotomy, a false dichotomy itself within contextualism.
The issues involved here are, of course, vastly more complex than
just characterized. For instance, within contextualism, differences between
structural and functional concerns are actually matters of the observer’s
temporal perspective and the duration of events. for behavior is never
static, but always active. Nonetheless, disentangling the two analytic
dimensions from cognitive psychology and behavior analysis illustrates
that even when cognitive and behavioral developmentalists
may be differentiated by their respective concerns over structure and function,
those concerns are nondefining of the two orientations and are amenable
to analysis from either perspective (Catania, 1973, 1978).
Behavioral biology. As the material to this point suggests, little of what
has been taken to be the history of behavior analysis is exactly so. Indeed,
contemporary behavior analysis actually owes less to the history of psychological science than to developments in biology, especially as they
evolved from the work of Charles Darwin (1859, 1871, 1872) (Boakes,
1984; Herrnstein,
1969). This heritage yields today a behavior analysis
that adheres (a) to continuity across species in biology and behavior,
without denying the possibility of principles unique to humans (Skinner,
1938, p. 424; see Hayes, 1987): (b) to parsimony in seeking an account
of behavior at the level of behavioral systems in context. avoiding the
tendency to explain by naming (Ryle, 1949); (c) to research practices
derived from Claude Bernard’s (1949) work in experimental
medicine,
not from the social sciences (see Thompson,
1984); (d) to a view of
behavioral adaptation in terms of “selection by consequences”
in a
manner analogous to natural selection (Skinner, 1981); and (e) to philosophical pragmatism, which is elaborated below.
Positivism, operationism,
and pragmatism.
Under the influence of the
Vienna Circle (Carnap, 1935; Popper, 19591, positivism and operationism
of the sorts promoted earlier by August Comte and Jacques Loeb became
an institutional
characteristic of psychology during the 1930s (see, e.g.,
Stevens, 1939). The message seemed clear at the time: If psychology
were to be a real science, it would have to develop objective definitions
for its subjective terms, and exclude that which was not logically or
linguistically
definable from its subject matter. The methodological
behaviorism that grew out of these views, though, had several deleterious
effects on psychology (Moore, 1980, 1981, 1985). First, although ostensively
objective, the movement did not satisfactorily resolve the mind-body
problem because the mind was still presumed to exist, albeit outside the
realm of scientific psychology, thereby restricting the domain of the
psychology to be explained (Moore, 1981; Skinner, 1974). Second, operational definitions and positivistic philosophy became so narrow that
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
297
ANALYSIS
terms lost their ordinary-language meaning, thereby restricting the character
of the behavior that could be understood to an arid truth-by-agreement
(Deitz & Arrington,
1984; Skinner, 1945). And third, too much of the
movement ignored the involvement of the scientist in science, thereby
restricting the proper account of science as the behavior of scientists
and the products thereof (Skinner, 1956, 1957, pp. 418-431; Smith, 1986).
These are matters of epistemology that cannot be glossed over with the
veneer of objectivism (Day, 1983).’
Much of psychology has continued in the mold of this operationism
and positivism,
but not without protest, most commonly from phenomenologists, Gestalt psychologists, psychoanalysts, humanists, and now
hermeneuticists.
Contrary to the received view, however, contemporary
behavior analysis is also critical of such scientism. Specifically, behavior
analysis adheres to a psychological,
not a logical epistemology (Smith,
1986, pp. 259-297), with a line of descent from the inductive positivism
of Francis Bacon (1889; see Smith, 1986, pp. 259-297) and Ernst Mach
(1960; see Day, 1980; Mart-, 1985; Skinner, 1945; Smith, 1986) and from
analytic philosophies reflected in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953, 1958) later
work (Arrington & Deitz, 1986; Day, 1969a; Deitz & Arrington. 1984;
Morris, 1985a). In these views, the problem is not how to make subjective
terms objective by a priori logical definitions and operational, linguistic
conventions, for the subjective-objective
distinction is a false one. Rather,
the problem is how to discover and describe the historical and current
context in which subjective terms are spoken, because context is what
gives those terms their meaning (see Day. 1976b: Malcolm,, 1977; Skinner,
1945, 1957). Behavior analysis never ruled out the subjective and private
as a subject matter; rather. it accepts such activity as behavior in context.
This epistemology,
then, has a phenomenological,
even hermeneutical,
quality to it that belies the mechanistic distinction between the knower
and the known (Day. 1969a. 1969b. 1977, 1988; see Giorgi, 1975; Kvale
& Grenness, 1967).
What this analysis begs, of course, is a truth criterion. That, though,
is found in pragmatism. Not only did William James establish functional
psychology, but he was also central, along with Charles S. Peirce, in
developing pragmatism both as a philosophy and as a method for defining
truth and value (James, 1907; Peirce, 1923, 1940). In the hands of James
and Peirce, as well as of John Dewey (1896) and G. H. Mead (1934),
and as influenced by the biological concept of adaptiveness, pragmatism
takes knowledge to be relative, with absolute truth a categorical impossibility. Simply put, “knowing”
refers to behavioral relations, and behavioral relations are a function of their historical and current context.
’ As Ira Gershwin
might have lyricized.
had he known
science,
“You
say Popper and I say Pepper.”
more
about
the philosophy
of
29x
EDWARD
K.
MORRIS
“Knowing the truth” can never step outside of itself (i.e., outside the
stream of behavior) for some absolute evaluation because that evaluation,
too, is a behavioral relation in context. and so forth. Under this pragmatic
philosophy, the criterion for knowledge and truth is “successful working.”
which again reflects a psychological.
not a logical or linguistic. epistemology. Within behavioranalysis,
this criterion is spoken ofas “effective
action,” whether in basic or applied research or in conceptual analysis
(see Day. 1980, pp. 134-237, 1983: Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Lamal.
1983: Skinner. 1974, p. ?I: Zuriff. 1980. 1985. pp. 257-%I).’
Although this revised account of the history of behavior analysis is
insufficiently developed, the lines of descent show a decided contextual
lineage, much different from the mechanistic heritage that is commonly
presumed-if
the account has not been overly “presentist.”
As for
contextualism
itself. it was literally born of the pragmatism of Peirce,
James, Dewey, and Mead. Indeed, contextualism may be said to be the
modern instantiation of philosophical pragmatism. These lines of descent,
though, are more hints and suggestions than direct argument that behavior
analysis is contextualistic
in world view. For the latter. let me turn to
the next section of the paper in which the typical rendering of Pepper’s
view of mechanism is contrasted with the contextualism
of behavior
analysis, especially with respect to the consequences these two views
have for several core developmental
issues.
MECHANISM AND CONTEXTUALISM
According to the mechanistic world view, as presented in the developmental literature (see, e.g., Overton & Reese, 1973; Reese & Overton,
1970). behavior and environment are reduced, respectively, to responses
and stimuli, both existing as primary, universal, unchanging, discrete
elements out of which the whole of development in all its complexities
and qualities is built. As for causation, the elements are said to act on
’ Although
“successful
working”
is contextualism’s
pragmatic
theory
of truth.
to adopt
the behavior-analytic
“effective
action”
version
of this truth
criterion-as
in, for instance,
effective
“prediction
and control”-is
not necessarily
to adopt
contextualism
as a world
view.
“Successful
working”
and “effective
action”
are not precisely
interchangeable
(Reese,
1984).
though
both
are still beyond
the arid truth-by-agreement.
’ For more
thorough
treatments.
see Kantor’s
(1963.
1969) two-volume.
The Scirntific
Er~lution
ofPsvcho/o,q~,
which
presents
a historical
treatment
of the development
of a
natural
science
of psychology;
Day’s
(1980)
chapter.
“The
Historical
Antecedents
of Contemporary
Behaviorism.”
which
covers
the philosophical
lineage
of radical
behaviorism
more specifically:
and Smith’s
(1986)
Behaviorism
md Logicd
Positi~ismt
A RCLISS~.SS~IC~I~
c?f’the ANiuncr.
which
clarifies
the psychological.
as opposed
to logical.
epistemology
of
the neobehaviorists-Tolman.
Hull.
and Skinner.
For other
treatments
of the history
of
behaviorism,
see Boakes
t IY84) and O’Donnell
(1985).
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
299
one another as do physical forces, the results of which are chain-like
connections between, or sequences of, stimuli and responses. Causation
flows from stimulus to response in a manner that is immediate, contiguous,
and efficient. The truth criterion of these causal mechanisms is correspondence: Given that knowledge in mechanism is knowledge about the
nature of a realist ontology, the truth of that knowledge is found in the
correspondences across domains of the activity of the machine or in
predictions between what is said about the machine (e.g., hypotheses)
and how the machine operates (e.g., confirmations).
Finally, according
to the mechanistic view, the developing organism and its responses are
characterized as being passive and inherently at rest. They are “being”not at all “becoming.”
Mechanism’s
locutions are nominal and thingbased.
As for the world view of contextualism,
it will be introduced more
inductively and elaborated on more fully in the material to follow. For
present purposes, however, a brief description will suffice. In contextualism,
behavior occurs in context and must be studied as such, for context
gives behavior its meaning (i.e., its function)-the
whole is primary, the
elements are derived as abstractions or constructs. The meaning of behavior
emerges from the ever-evolving historic context (i.e., through historical
causation) and is instantiated in the current context, as the present becomes
past for subsequent behavior-hence
the root metaphor of the “historic
event” for the ongoing act-in-context.
In the historic event, change is
categorically given, thereby making the ontology of the psychological
present both active and evolving, and obliging epistemology to be forever
relative. Because knowledge about the world is never final, but rather
inductive, inferential, and conceptual, the criterion for truth is the everpragmatic “successful working.”
Finally, behavior is characterized as
active and inherently developmental
(evolutional) in nature. It is never
“being,”
but always “becoming.”
Contextualism’s
locutions are verbbased and active.
With mechanism and contextualism
now sketched, some of their consequences for core issues in developmental
psychology are compared
and contrasted, thereby illustrating further the contextual nature of contemporary behavior analysis. Before beginning, however, let me offer
one caveat: The main thesis of this paper-that
behavior analysis is
contextual in world view-does not yet find broad, explicit acknowledgment
within the field of behavior analysis, even in the most informed of presentations (e.g., Branch, 1987; Michael, 1985; E. P. Reese, 1986), but
neither is the thesis novel (see, e.g., Hayes, 1986, 1988; Hayes, Hayes,
& Reese, 1988: Morris, 1982; H. W. Reese. 1982. 1986). In general,
though, the perspectives and arguments used in making the present case
may be implicitly found in, and are supported by. the mainstream behavioranalytic literature. To be specific, not only does this material characterize
300
EDWARD
K.
MORRIS
radical behaviorism as a philosophy of the science of behavior (Skinner,
1945, 1953, 1957, 1969, 1971, 1974), but it is also clearly pronounced in
the integrated-field
nature of interbehavioral
psychology (Kantor, 1950.
1959, 1971, 1981, 1984; Smith, Mountjoy, & Ruben, 1983) (see Morris.
1982, 1984; Morris, Higgins, & Bickel. 1982, 1983; contra Parrott, 1983).
Indeed, a blend of the radical behavioral and interbehavioral perspectives
seems exactly what Bijou and Baer sought to achieve in their behavior
analysis of child development,
especially in its later forms (Bijou, in
press; Bijou & Baer, 1978).
Enough background and academic fastidiousness. Let me turn to the
consequences of mechanism and contextualism
for five core issues in
developmental
psychology (see also Morris, 1988a). the first of which is
elementarism versus holism.
Elementarism
versus Holism
Mechanistic theories of development are said to adhere to elementarism,
as opposed to holism, and to represent children and their environments
as but collections of materially fundamental, atomic response and stimulus
elements. Complex action is then but an associative compounding of the
basic elements and their interrelations, in which identical response elements
and identical stimulus elements are taken, respectively, to have identical
meanings or functions-such
is the character of a machine. In both cases,
the whole can always be reconstituted in terms of its parts because the
parts are unchanging.
But this is not the behavior-analytic
view-for
at least two reasons.
First, behavior is the unit of analysis, not the spatiotemporally
defined
response or “muscle twitch” (Skinner, 1931, 1935; see Thompson &
Zeiler, 1986). A response per se is a physiological and anatomical entity.
such that the analysis of behavior in terms of responses alone would be
elementaristic
at best and reductionistic
at worst-superficial
in either
case. In contrast, behavior is a dynamic, synergistic, and active interrelation, not a thing, in which a response is but one component. The
unit of behavior includes not only responses, but more importantly
the
functions of those responses, along with their interrelated stimulus functions
in current and historical context (see Bijou, in press; Skinner, 1935, 1938:
Kantor, 1959). The behavior-analytic
view, then, is holistic in that neither
responses nor stimuli have psychological meaning, function, or significance
in themselves, but only in their interdependent
relationships with one
another and their context, through which they are codefining features of
behavior. Behavior analysis knows no fundamental, atomic stimulus or
response elements definable a priori or out of context. The stream of
behavior and its lines of fracture are fluid and ever-changing.’
’ In Skinner’s
words,
“As
it stands.
I’m
not
sure
that
‘response’
is a very
useful
concept.
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
301
ANALYSIS
The second reason why the mechanistic depiction of development is
not the behavior-analytic
view pertains to the form-function
distinction
and their interrelationships.
Given that responses and stimuli have no
psychologically
inherent meaning or function, then physically identical
responses and stimuli need not have the same meaning or function across
or within individuals (Baer, 1982). Indeed, they can never have precisely
the same meaning given that the contexts of each individual’s
history,
and hence the function of the present circumstances, are unique and
ever-changing. Relatedly, physically dissimilar responses and physically
dissimilar stimuli can have respectively similar meanings or functions
(i.e., be members of the same stimulus and response class). Thus, individual
differences in form-function
relationships are ubiquitous across a lifetime,
and the process-achievement,
means-end relation between them is a
highly dynamic one (cf. Kantor, 1933).
In sum, inherent in this contextual characterization of behavior analysis
is a holistic quality in which neither responses nor stimuli have meaning
unto themselves. Rather, meaning is an emergent property of their interrelationship
within their historical and current contexts. all of which
constitutes a dynamic unit of analysis.
Development
us Response-Based
Change versus Structural
Change
A second consequence of the mechanistic and contextualistic
world
views pertains directly to what it is that develops. From the mechanistic
perspective, development comprises changes in responding across chronological age. It represents a continuous, linear succession of cause and
effect, wherein changes in responding are reducible to, and exactly predictable from, their prior immutable forms. In contrast, the contextual
character of behavior analysis focuses on development as the ongoing
evolution of interrelationships
among stimulus and response functions in
context-the
interactions being mutual and reciprocal, and constitutive
of behavior’s structure. In this sense, development refers to broad generalized changes in the organization or structure of the behavioral relations
(i.e., changes in “acts,” not in mere responses, see Lee, 1987).
This approach to structure has been characterized as a behavioral
system (Delprato, 1986; Ray & Delprato, in press) or integrated field of
factors (Kantor, 1959)-a view that is receiving increased conceptual and
empirical attention (see, e.g., Bernstein & Brady. 1986; Lubinski &
Thompson,
1986; Sidman, 1986a, 1986b; Wahler & Fox, 1982). From
this perspective, the analysis of behavior is an analysis of its sequential
patterning across time (sequential analyses) and/or among its concurrently
Behavior
is very fluid; it isn’t
I will live to see a formulation
20-21).
made up of lots of little responses
packed together.
I hope
which takes this fluidity
into account”
(Evans.
1968. pp.
302
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
interrelated stimulus and response functions in context (concurrent analyses). Such analyses thereby largely require multiple-response
research
methodologies
not only for relations among Ss and Rs, but also for
relations among Ss and Ss, and Rs and Rs-no matter what the level,
from dispositional analyses of personality (Lubinski & Thompson, 1986),
to psychopathological
symptomology
(Kazdin, 1982). to sequential dependences in clinically significant behavior (Reid. Patterson, & Loeber.
1982), to response substitutions,
both normal (Bernstein & Ebbesen.
1978) and deviant (Wahler & Fox, 1982), and to the distribution
and
organization of operant behavior in laboratory contexts (see, e.g.. Collier,
1982; Henton & Iversen, 1978; Rachlin, 1982).
As an important aside, the “mutualism”
among the relations within
the behavioral structure not only stresses that development
refers to
changes in response functions, but also to changes in stimulus functions.
It is a psychological fallacy to conceive of the environment as if it were
an extant physical thing to which children must somehow accommodate
their responses throughout their lifetimes. In contrast, in the behavioranalytic view, the behavioral (psychological)
environment develops in
mutual, reciprocal interaction with the behavioral (psychological) organism-there
is no parsing of development into child and environment as
separable causes, or into the mental and the environmental.
Not only
does contextualism go beyond dualistic accounts of development in which
the environment
is represented in the mind, but it also goes beyond
environmentalistic
accounts in which a realist physical environment
is
taken to be external to behavior (see also. Gibson, 1979). Instead, the
stimulus function of the environment is part of, or internal to, the unit
of behavior. In contextualism, child and environment. and stimulus function
and response function, evolve, develop. and stand in a largely systematic.
that is, a structural, interrelationship
with one another (Dewey. 1976;
Waddington,
1975; see Pronko & Herman, 1982).
Unfortunately, the term “structure” suggests that behavior has a static,
thing-ness quality to it, whereas the contextual implications of behavior
analysis are quite the opposite, so let me comment further. The behavioral
system is a fluid, ongoing, living system. As such. the structure of behavior-that
is, the interrelated stimulus and response functions in context-has not only evolved to the point of the psychological present, but
it continues to evolve as present becomes past for more present. Through
this, the historical context is altered for the next interaction. and so
forth. Put differently, the behavioral structure adapts by assimilating and
accommodating changes in stimulus and response functions, the dynamics
of which are organized according to the basic behavioral processes or
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
303
ANALYSIS
principles which keep the system from becoming dispersive.” This is an
active, organized system, one in which development is not derived, but
in which development is categorically given (see Delprato, 1980). Indeed,
both contextualism and behavior analysis are inherently “developmental”
in this sense.
Causal versus F~rnctioncrl Antriysis
In mechanism, the scientific task is an analytic account of behavior
in terms of antecedent-consequent,
if-then relations, that is, in terms
of contingent and contiguous cause-and-effect between independent and
dependent variables (see Russell, 1953). As a conceptual and experimental
tactic, such parsing is central to the methods of contemporary psychological
science, just as the parsing of behavior into the three-term contingency
(i.e., discriminative
stimuli, operant responses, and reinforcing stimuli,
that is, SD+R+SR)
has become central to behavior-analytic
practices
(e.g., control of the developmental
process, cf. Baer, 1973).
Contextualistically,
however, the analysis of behavior proceeds differently. As suggested in the previous section, it focuses first on the
general function of behavior as adaptation, and second on the general
structure of behavior as the systematic interrelation
of stimulus and
response functions in context. Within this perspective, the typical notion
of efficient cause-and-effect relationships between dependent and independent variables, or between antecedents and consequents, gives way
to an integrated-field perspective of functional interdependencies.
In the
latter, “cause” loses any essential meaning when causation becomes the
entire field of currently interdependent factors necessary for understanding
behavior (cf. Einstein & Infeld, 1961).
This contextual view comports well with the approach Skinner (1931,
193.5) took in his early analysis of the generic nature of stimuli and
responses, in which he emphasized the organization of codefining and
interrelated stimulus and response classes, not their temporally antecedent
and consequent relations. When viewed in terms of classes of events,
stimulus and response functions stand in direct interrelationship
with one
another, a view that contrasts with conceptualizations
of the unit of
behavior as a temporal ordering of independent and dependent variables,
which is how they appear from the standpoint of observers, but not from
the standpoint of the events themselves (i.e., their codefining functional
relationships and the mutual evolution of those functions over time).
Indeed, characterizing behavior in terms of independent and dependent
variables and making the former into “causes” has more to do with the
behavior of scientists than with the functional interelations under study.
6 In contrast,
others
have sometimes
merging
contextualism
with organicism
sought to solve
(see. e.g.. Lerner
the problem
& Kaufman.
of dispersion
1985).
by
304
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
Similar issues arose in behavior analysis when respondent and operant
units of analysis were abstracted out of the generic stimulus and response
classes, and with the concommitant organization of the stimulus functionresponse function interrelationships
along a temporal dimension (i.e., the
S-R reflex and the SD+R+SR
three-term contingency) (Skinner, 1938).
In making these abstractions. behavior analysts represented the two units
in terms of antecedent-consequent,
independent-dependent
causal relationships, foregoing the earlier view of behavior as a systematic correlation
of stimulus and response classes (or functions). The relative success of
such parsing has unfortunately
led some behavior analysts to overlook
their own context theory of meaning and to be “conditioned”
into a
more mechanistic view than their actual metatheoretical allegiances should
allow. Thus, although such causal analyses are not necessarily categorical
in behavior analysis, some tension clearly exists with respect to the
mechanistic view these units imply (Baltes & Reese, 1977; Midgley &
Morris, in press).
The preceding notwithstanding, current trends in the analysis of behavior
have a more contextualistic flavor, especially with respect to the structure
of behavior (e.g.. Bernstein, 19821, the concommitant
necessity of more
systems-like research strategies (e.g.. Delprato, 1986; Henton & Iversen,
1978; Ray & Delprato, in press), and an emphasis on integration and
synthesis, as well as analysis (e.g., Thompson & Zeiler, 1986).
Continuity
versus Discontinuity
With respect to the character and course of development, the mechanistic
model views development as a process of continuous, quantitative change
in responses over time, as opposed to qualitative discontinuous change
in behavior. Development,
then. occurs in linear succession of cause
and effect in which changes in responding are, in principle, exactly
predictable and reproducible from prior responding and its causes. All
of this follows straightforwardly
from the foregoing descriptions of the
mechanistic world view.
In contextualism,
however, change is categorical-behavior
is never
static. And, given that change occurs in the context of an ever-unique
historical context, then behavioral development is discontinuous in the
sense that the behavioral structure of functional relationships undergoes
qualitative reorganization with each interaction. As mentioned previously,
neither responses nor stimuli have meaning unto themselves, but only
through their interrelationships
with one another and their context; the
whole is more than the sum of its material constituents. Thus, when one
the systems of functional stimulus-response
interrelations
changes-a
ubiquitous character of “becoming’‘-then
the general character of the
entire behavioral structure changes. Such change may facilitate or inhibit
subsequent development, hence grounds again for denying the pernicious
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
305
aspects of philosophical
empiricism attributed to behavior analysis. In
any event, in the sense that these changes in functional interrelations
represent a reorganization of the behavioral structure, then developmental
change is of a qualitative, novel, and discontinuous sort.
Two seemingly paradoxical consequences fall from this view. First,
the categorical position with respect to discontinuity does not deny continuity in the sense that behavior, constituted of stimulus and response
functions in context, is continuously active. That is, behavior is emergent
and its development proceeds as a continuous process. Second, adhering
to discontinuity might seemingly require that development be characterized
in terms of qualitatively
discrete stages, but this is not necessarily so.
Behavior, as a historic event, evolves on a moment-to-moment
basis,
reflecting a dialectical process of change and interchange within its structure
(Krapfl, 1977). These changes are indeed qualitative and novel, but typically
inappreciably revolutionary for the usual concept of developmental stages
to have significant meaning. Still, behavior may display organization on
different levels (see Thompson & Zeiler, 1986), where at some point the
concept of stages may have sufficient heuristic descriptive and predictive
value to warrant formalization.
In any event, the typical stage concept
is derived from contextualism’s
discontinuity-it
is not categorical to it.
The Passive versus the Active Organism
A fifth and final issue on which the mechanistic and contextualistic
world views converge is on the passive versus the active nature of
development. Within the mechanistic account, causation is characterized
in terms of the effects of efficient independent causes on dependent
material-material
that is otherwise at rest. Stimuli and responses are
taken to be linearly sequenced as cause and effect, a view sometimes
represented in the behavior-analytic literature in terms of the “responsive”
organism (e.g., Baer, 1976; see Reese, 1976). This is not to say that
mechanists do not talk about bidirectional
causality, but such talk is
usually about back-and-forth
linear causality-from
the effects of the
environment on responses to the effects of responses on the environment,
and so forth. Research on child effects on adult behavior (see, e.g., Bell
& Harper, 1977), for instance, is not inherently contextualistic;
it can
be construed in mechanistic sequences of weak reciprocal interactions
as well, and usually is.
As described earlier, even though the unit of behavior in behavior
analysis is parsed into stimuli and responses, the focus is on their functional
interrelations
in context. More importantly,
those functional relations
stand in a strong reciprocal interaction or better-in
Dewey and Bentley’s
(1949, p. 108) terminology-in
a transactional relation with one another;
306
EDWARD
K.
MORRIS
they are mutually defining and implicative.’
From this perspective. both
stimulus and response functions contribute to behavior, and behavior
may thus be said to be active, not passive. This view is pertinent to two
interrelated
problems within psychology: The locutional problem of
speaking about behavior in agent-action terms and the problem of traits
and situations. the latter of which is a pseudo-problem within contextualism.
Both of these are discussed below.
7’hr locrrtioncrl
problem.
To put the contextual construal of the activepassive problem in an organism-based locution, children are said to be
the active agents of development through the unique. individual meaning
they give to their behavior, that is, to the stimulus functions they give
their environments and to the response functions they give their activitiesall through the action of the child on the environment.
Development,
though, may also be put in an environment-based
locution, where the
environment is said to be the active agent through the unique, individual
meaning it gives to behavior. that is, to the stimulus functions it gives
to stimuli and to the response functions it gives to child activity-all
through the action of the environment on the child. The first locution,
though, makes the environment
appear passive, which it is not, while
the second locution makes children appear passive, which they are not.
Unfortunately, neither organism-based nor environment-based locutions
capture the essence of contextualism,
in which stimulus and response
functions are mutually defined by their transactional relationship, for the
two locutions align too closely with the organismic and mechanistic world
views, respectively. Not only are these two locutions misleading, but,
to compound the problem, their grammatical forms seem easily acquired
and spoken in ordinary English or in “Standard Average European”
(Whorf, 19.56). The latter may be a consequence of the disposition of
our grammatical
structure to agent-action syntax, to agent nouns (i.e.,
organisms, traits. structures, representations-and
the environment) reified
from verbs, adverbs, and adjectives (actions and their qualities), and to
the priority of things and agents over action and change. In contrast,
our language offers few fluid, nonawkward, or easily understood grammatical structures for speaking contextuahstically;
hence such talk is
difficult for speakers and writers, and often obscure to listeners and
readers (sic). English grammar and syntax simply seem mismatched with
the subject matter of psychology (Hackenberg,
1988; Hineline,
1980;
Lee, 1988; see Whorf, 1956).
The deep structure of organism-based locutions no doubt has had its
benefits for the organization of social order and moral responsibility that
see
and
’ For further
commentary
Pronko
and Herman’s
Beyond”
(see
also
on the transactional
(1982)
“From
Dewey’s
Keehn.
1980).
nature
of contemporary
Reflex
Arc Concept
behavior
analysis,
to Transactionalism
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
307
ANALYSIS
emerged in the Renaissance; likewise, the deep structure of environmentbased locutions had its benefits for the subsequent conduct of naturalistic
inquiry that emerged from the Scientific Revolution.
Interestingly,
the
organismic and mechanistic world views largely inherent in the two locutions overlap considerably with the respective character of the first
two stages of scientific evolutionthe self-actional and the mechanical
(see Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Einstein & lnfeld, 1961; Kantor. 1946;
Pronko & Herman, 1982). At this point in the history of psychology,
however, our language’s lack of a deep structure for speaking contextualistically may be hindering the emergence of the third stage of scientific
evolution-the
intergrated-field stage-with its underlying contextualistic
world view. At the very least, the linguistic inadequacy is hindering
fruitful interchange between behavior analysts and developmental
psychologists, who, with their respective environment- and organism-based
locutions, seem to identify very different subject matters and causal
schemes, thereby obscuring their common interest in “development.“*
In any event, in arguing for the active character of behavior, the
behavior-analytic position is not that children are self-actional, autonomous
agents. Likewise, though, neither do (or should) behavior analysts assert
that the environment is an autonomous cause, the practical utility of the
latter notwithstanding
(Hayes & Brownstein. 1986). The tension here
between these views of causality is at the heart of the trait-situationism
debate, in which are embedded the locutional problems described above,
as well as some of the logical characteristics and flaws with the naturenurture issue so closely aligned with the presumed contrast between
developmental
psychology and behavior analysis.
The @air-situation&
prohlenz.
From a contextual perspective, stimulus
functions and response functions develop historically and exist simultaneously with respect to one another. and are defined in terms of each
other in context. As such, stimulus functions have no more “control”
over behavior than do response functions-the
two are interdependently
* Verplanck
have produced
(1954)
has
unfortunate
commented
astutely
misunderstandings
on how differences
about
Skinner’s
in locution
experimental
and
and
vocabulary
conceptual
analyses:
Because
of the existence
in Sherrington
and Pavlov
[Skinner]
believes
are needed
[for his system],
he has
and applied
some
of their
laws
in defining
behavior.
been
misinterpreted.
In his choice
of terminology,
work
and those
of his followers
will be read easily
Guthrie
and only
with emotion,
if not with difficulty.
of sets of data of the kind
adopted
many of their terms
As a consequence,
he has
Skinner
has assured
that his
by the followers
of Hull
and
by those
who have selected
the organismic-field-Gestalt-force
family
of words
to work with. Skinner’s
conditioned
responses
seem
to many
readers
just as ,nere
as those
of Pavlov
or Hull,
with
the extraordinary
result
that
he has been
classed
with
Hull
rather
than
with
Tolman.
with
Guthrie
rather
than with
Lewin.
in his general
position.
(p. 307).
308
EDWAKD
K. MORRIS
and mutually defining. A situation does not compel a response to occur
except through a child’s historically derived response functions for that
situation, but neither does a child compel a response to occur except
through the situation’s historically derived stimulus functions for the
response. Thus, situations do not possess independent or inherent power
to control behavior any more than children possess independent or inherent
power for such control. Both are products of unique. ever-changing
interactional histories, a point commonly misunderstood in appraisals of
behavior analysis (see, e.g., Bowers, 1973).
Interactions may display qualities attributable to personal or situational
control, depending on how the interactions are viewed or investigated,
but those attributions
are merely shorthand conventions derived from
an overemphasis on organismic and mechanistic thinking, as opposed to
a contextual world view. What is most objectionable here, though, is
the reification and causal status given to the child as a relatively autonomous, active agent, as per organicism. or to the situation as a relatively
autonomous physically stimulating force, as per mechanism. Behavior,
of course, can be predicted on the basis of information about children
or about the situations in which they find themselves, but the ability to
do so does not thereby bestow causal power on either. Attributions
of
such causal powers have more to do with the behavior of scientists than
with child development.
To assert that such power exists at all moves
the analysis of behavior away from the contextual account it requires in
contextualism.
Summary
To this point in the paper, a case has been developed that behavior
analysis is contextual in world view, as opposed to being mechanistic,
by examining, first, its historical development and, second, some consequences of its contextualism
for five key developmental
issues. The
presentation of this material has been highly conceptual in nature, perhaps
even ethereal for the empirically minded child psychologist; thus. let me
focus the third and final section of this paper on a more concrete. operational
sense of “context” -wherein context is what gives meaning to behavior.
THE CONTEXT IN CONTEXTUALISM
Within the past decade or so, psychology has shown an increased
interest in “context.”
This is evinced not only in psychology as a whole,
where much of this focus has been on an ecological orientation (Gibbs.
1979; Wicker, 1983). but also in its various subdisciplines, for instance.
in studies of social psychology, personality, language, and development
(see Rosnow & Georgoudi,
1986), and in specific empirical research
areas, such as memory (Jenkins. 1974: see Marr. 1983). perception (Gibson.
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
309
1979; see Costall, 1983), and the psychology of learning (Balsam & Tomie,
1984; see Mandell, 1986).’
In most of these domains, context usually refers to the contextual and
multiple determinants of behavior, that is, to broad, complex, and numerous
antecedent causes, and to the interplay of the various concurrent levels
at which behavior occurs (e.g., personal, social, and cultural; see Bronfenbrenner, 1977. 1979). Although “context” often provides more facade
than facts in these cases because of its lack of specificity and precision,
these moves to broaden the scope of psychology seem obviously quite
right and quite necessary.
To give contextual determinants their due, however, is not necessarily
to embrace contextualism as a world view (see Valsiner & Benigni, 1986,
for parallel problems with the ecological perspective). Such determinants
can be handled mechanistically,
as well, in the sense that all causes have
contexts. Within this latter world view, any sophisticated and thoughtful
analysis of behavior would of course incorporate multiple, complex, and
interlocking
mechanisms, as well as inhibitory and facilitory servomechanisms, as illustrated, for instance, in the S-R model of learning (Hull,
1952) and in the currently fashionable computational
models of cognitive
science (see, e.g., Block, 1980, 1981; Haugland, 1981). In contrast, within
contextualism,
context of a different and more specific sort is categorical:
Context imbues behavior with meaning-the
meaning of behavior emerges
from its context. Behavior is not the mere interplay of materially defined
stimuli and responses, but rather is represented by strong reciprocal
interactions among stimulus and response functions in conrext-where
those functions emerge from their context and from nowhere else.
Within behavior analysis, context can be organized into the historical
and the current, each of which serves distinctive functions. The function
of the historical context-both
phylogenic and ontogenic-is
to establish
what stimulus and response functions may occur in behavior, whereas
the current context-its
structure and its function-establishes
what particular behaviors can and will occur, respectively. And, of course, all
three contexts interact to affect and change one another over a lifetime.
The Historical
Context
With respect to phylogenic history, it is not only the source of (a)
species-typic boundaries and preparedness in biological structure, but is
also the source of species-typic boundaries and preparedness in behavioral
function through the inheritance of (b) the basic behavioral processes
(e.g., reinforcement and operant behavior) and (c) the initial relationships
9 As a matter of historical
note, these concerns
over context
are hardly new, for they
were an integral part of much important
psychology
of an earlier era (e.g., Barker,
1968:
Brunswik,
1952; Koffka,
1935; Kohler.
1929: Titchener.
1910; Tolman,
1932).
310
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
among stimulus and response functions (e.g.. unconditioned respondents
and unconditioned
reinforcers)-as
well as a source of variability in all
three domains. Given a phylogenic history. ontogenic history then begets
the subsequent individual-typic
boundaries and preparedness in biological
and behavioral form and function, and variability in both.
With respect to behavioral form and function, in particular, the ontogenic
history has been a fundamental and explicit characteristic of behavioranalytic research on such topics as adult-child
social interaction history
(e.g., Redd, Morris, & Martin, 1975), reinforcement
schedule history
(e.g., Weiner, 1981, 1983). and the integration of independently acquired
response repertoires (Epstein, Kirschnit. Lanza. & Rubin, 1984: Epstein,
Lanza, & Skinner, 1981)-all of which elucidates sources of intra- and
interindividual
differences.
Overall, then, historical causation is central to behavior analysis, for
the historical context establishes the form and function of behavior as
the context for subsequent behavior (see Skinner, 1981).
The Current Context
Given that the historical context functions to establish what behavior
may occur, the particular behavior that roil/ occur and that can occur
depends, respectively, on the actualizing and enabling character of the
current context. What will occur (or be actualized) depends on the behavioral function of the current context; what can occur (or be enabled)
depends on the physical structure of the current context. As for the
latter, the structure of the current context exists materially as the biological
organism (i.e., the child’s anatomy and physiology), the environment
(i.e., the environment’s
physical ecology), and as changes and variability
in both, thereby enabling what behavior can (or cannot) physically occur.
In turn, the function of the current context actualizes behavior by imbuing
stimuli and responses with their dynamic and ever-evolving functions
(i.e., their meaning).
Albeit sometimes conflated with multiple causation and the structure
of the current context, the function of the current context has been an
implicit consideration within behavior analysis for many years. For instance,
concerns about the function of the current context were extant in Skinner’s
(1931) “third variables” (e.g., deprivation, fatigue, drug effects), Kantor’s
(1946, 1959. p. 95) “setting factors,” Bijou and Baer’s (1961. p. 17)
“setting events,” Goldiamond’s
(1962, p. 295; Goldiamond
& Dryud,
1967, pp. 74-75) “state” and “potentiating”
variables, and Gewirtz’s
(1972) “contextual
determinants.”
The importance of such functions,
however, has recently become a more explicit concern, as evidenced
both in conceptual analyses and in basic and applied empirical research
on, for instance, “setting events” (Bijou & Baer, 1978, pp. 26-28; Wahler
& Dumas, in press; Wahler & Fox. 1981. 1982). “establishing operations”
CONTEXTUALISM
AND
BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
311
and “establishing
stimuli” (e.g., McPherson & Osborne, 1988; Michael,
1982), the “conditional
stimulus control” character of the relationships
involved in stimulus equivalence (Sidman, 1986a. 1986b), and “functionaltering, contingency-specifying
stimuli”
(e.g., “rules,”
Blakely &
Schlinger, 1987; Schlinger & Blakely, 1987). The relationships to which
these terms refer are not all identical: for instance, some terms refer to
the effects of context on the eliciting function of stimuli (both conditioned
and unconditioned),
others to effects on the discriminative
function, and
still others to effects on the reinforcing function (both unconditioned and
conditioned).
These relationships
are organized more generally here,
though, as the “function”
of the current context, in that they all function
in one manner or another to imbue, potentiate, or actualize the functions
of stimuli and responses for behavior.
Summary
In light of the foregoing discussion, behavior analysis can be said to
adhere to a context theory of meaning-the
context being both historical
and current. Context, though, has typically been controlled for within
behavior analysis, both as a source of variation due to the historical
context (e.g., species and individual history) and of variation due to the
structure (e.g., current biological and physical parameters of the organism
and experimental setting, respectively) and function of the current context
(e.g., deprivation and instructions). As a consequence, context has not
until recently been an explicit character of the behavioral unit of analysis
or a subject matter for experimental analysis in its own right. Rather, it
has been taken as a source of variation to be held constant.
This relative inattention given to context, as opposed to the “contingencies of reinforcement,”
has contributed to the appearance that behavior
analysis represents the child as but a “black box,” and usually an empty
one at that-both
biologically and psychologically (Todd & Morris, 1983).
The current concern over context, however, begins to clarify a source
of such misunderstandings
from outside the field, and to encourage from
within the field an increased scope of analysis for phenomena that behavior
analysis is said to have dismissed or overlooked-phenomena
that heretofore have largely been the province of the rest of developmental
psychology and that have been explained in other conceptual systems. Among
the latter are phenomena described and explained in terms of the structure
and function of the personality (e.g., traits) or in terms of cognitive
structures (e.g., schemas and rules) and processes (e.g., expectations
and perception) (see Baron & Perone, 1982; Harzem, 1984). Contextualism
offers a fresh new perspective on these issues, a point touched on in
closing.
312
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
CONCLUSION
The present characterizations
of behavior analysis, of contextualism,
and of behavior analysis as contextualistic remain, of course, unfinished
and underdeveloped.
Indeed, for mechanists and organicists alike, the
argument may seem merely to have translated mechanism into a contextualistic language without having actually presented contextualism as
an alternative view. Moreover. contextualism
itself rests on a slippery
slope-it seems forever about to slide into organicism or into mechanism
(Pepper, 1942). Nonetheless, 1 trust that the foregoing analysis has elucidated the contemporary behavior-analytic
metatheory as being clearly
nonmechanistic
in world view, at least to the point that some version
of contextualism
is the only viable alternative among Pepper’s world
hypotheses.
The implications
and import of this argument, of course. extend in
more directions than a conclusion can contend with. One specific point,
however, seems worth making-it
has to do with the consequences of
the current moves of both behavior analysis and developmental psychology
toward contextualism,
and of how these moves will affect the analysis
of cognition as process and as product. I raise this issue because cognition
is generally taken to be pivotal to distinctions between behavior analysis
and developmental psychology-it
is said to be something behavior analysis
overlooks.
For the past 20 years, behavior analysis and developmental psychology
have largely been speaking across world views, or across cognition as
process as opposed to content, or hardly speaking at all (Morris et al.,
1982). Developmental
psychologists, for instance, have often dismissed
behavior analysis for being mechanistic in world view, for being environmentalistic,
and, if you will, for being cogniphobic, that is, for being
blind to cognition as a developmental process, or at least as a behavioral
product (i.e.. behavioral content). Behavior analysts, in turn, have often
dismissed developmental psychology for being organismic in world view,
for being maturationist
and mentalistic,
and for being cogniphilic, that
is, for being self-absorbed in considering cognition to be the central
process and content of development.
From a contextual perspective, the fundamental conflict is largely a
matter of differences in world views-mechanism
and organicism-and
only superficially a matter of cogniphobia and cogniphilia. That is, although
behavior analysis and developmental
psychology have been taken to be
incommensurable
because of their respective positions on environmentalism, on mentalism.
and on cognition as process and content, the
incommensurability
has actually been more a function of fundamental
paradigmatic
differences between mechanism and organicism. With a
convergence of both behavior analysis and developmental
psychology
toward contextualism,
however. they become commensurable
in world
CONTEXTUALISM
AND BEHAVIOR
ANALYSIS
313
view. And, with that, environmentalism,
mentalism, and the conceptual
and empirical place of cognition in child development become cast as
concerns orthogonal to the defining characteristics of the two world
views.
In addition, cognition becomes a content domain or quality of development to be explained, as opposed to being an underlying process that
does the explaining (Ryle, 1949; Schnaitter, 1985), because a contextual
or ordinary-language
analysis of the term “cognition”
shows it to be
behavior-in-context
or behavioral content (Arrington & Deitz, 1986; Day,
1969b; Deitz & Arrington,
1984; Morris, 1985a, 1985b; Skinner, 1945;
cf. Wittgenstein,
1953, 1958; see also Costa11 & Still, 1987). That is,
cognition refers to a broad domain of development-a
domain whose
existence is commonly enough contacted that a socially shared and conventional language has developed for describing it. In other words, and
to use the vulgar behaviorese of an environment-based
locution: To speak
(“tact”)
the word “cognition”
is to emit a verbal operant under the
discriminative
control of the occurrence of certain behavioral relations
in their historical and current contexts-relations
that, in turn, may come
under finer discriminative
control so as to be tacted as further and finer
subclasses of ordinary language terms such as perceiving, remembering,
and problem-solving.
In any event, and contextualistically
speaking,
“cognitive”
is an adjective, “cognitively”
an adverb, and “cognizing”
a verb-all
describing particular characteristics of child development.
There is no such agent, process, or thing as cognition:
Cognizing does not begin and end in one’s head or at one’s skin; it is not superordinate
to our relationships, for our thoughts are our relationships. Attributions, motivation,
perception, and personality-what
it is to be a person-are re/trrio,lship.s. not
things going on in any one locus, whether that be a stable “package” of schema
or biological processes or a subjective phenomenological reality. (Blank. 1986,
pp. 121-122)
Or, as befitting the ubiquitous nature of “cognition”
in our ordinary
language, Descartes’s well-known dictum-“Cogito,
ergo sum”-is perhaps
better rendered as “Sum, ergo cogito.”
In closing, I am not arguing that behavior analysis and developmental
psychology will soon, or even necessarily, become one--that would be
overly optimistic.
Rather, my point is that as they evolve toward the
common world view of contextualism,
then neither can dismiss the other
on the basis of paradigmatic incommensurability,
and hence each must
confront important issues, such as cognition, from a common and commensurable perspective. Moreover, by adhering to contextualism,
both
behavior analysis and developmental
psychology may also become more
effective in their respective conceptual and empirical practices. And
finally, they may be able to work together successfully. along with a
314
EDWARD
K. MORRIS
contextually construed anthopology/sociology
(e.g., Harris, 1980), evolutionary biology (e.g., Dawkins, 1986), and physiology (e.g., Gollin,
1981; Schneirla, 1966; Weiss, 1969), toward the common goal of understanding child development in all of its contexts. That would be a historic
event.
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