Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
Perceptions of Discrimination Among Atheists:
Consequences for Atheist Identification, Psychological
and Physical Well-Being
Michael J. Doane and Marta Elliott
Online First Publication, November 3, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000015
CITATION
Doane, M. J., & Elliott, M. (2014, November 3). Perceptions of Discrimination Among
Atheists: Consequences for Atheist Identification, Psychological and Physical Well-Being.
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Advance online publication.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000015
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality
2014, Vol. 6, No. 4, 000
© 2014 American Psychological Association
1941-1022/14/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/rel0000015
Perceptions of Discrimination Among Atheists: Consequences for Atheist
Identification, Psychological and Physical Well-Being
Michael J. Doane and Marta Elliott
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
University of Nevada, Reno
Atheists are a marginalized group of people in the United States. Although studies have found that
atheists perceive prejudice and experience discrimination, little is known about the consequences of such
social rejection. To address this gap in research, we examined the associations among discrimination,
identity, and well-being using original survey data from self-identified atheists (n ⫽ 960). We investigated their associations in the context of the Rejection–Identification Model, which posits that group
identification reduces the negative effect of discrimination on well-being. Consistent with extant research
on other marginalized groups, discrimination was negatively associated with well-being while positively
associated with atheist identification. Further, atheist identification was positively associated with
well-being. In support of the rejection–identification process, we found evidence that atheists may
strengthen their group identification in the face of discrimination. Strengthened identification as an
atheist may be a strategy that protects atheists from the harmful effects of social rejection.
Keywords: atheism, discrimination, identity, rejection–identification model, well-being
more strongly with their stigmatized status in the face of discrimination, a coping strategy that has the potential to reduce the costs
of discrimination for well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey,
1999).
Atheists are one of the most stigmatized groups of people in the
United States. Many people hold negative stereotypes of atheists,
believing them to be judgmental, cynical, and hedonistic (Harper,
2007). People also harbor negative feelings toward atheists, including distrust (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011), disgust
(Ritter & Preston, 2011), and fear (Franks & Scherr, in press).
Such negative feelings may translate into discriminatory behaviors, such as slander and ostracism (Hammer, Cragun, Hwang, &
Smith, 2012). Although recent research has documented prejudice
(Gervais, 2013; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012) and discrimination (Gervais et al., 2011; Hammer et al., 2012) targeting
atheists, the consequences of such social rejection for atheists
themselves remain unclear. For example, is discrimination associated with lower well-being among atheists? If so, how might
atheists protect themselves against the harmful effects of discrimination? The purpose of this study was to address these two
research questions. Drawing on research among other maligned
social groups, we expected that atheists’ perceptions of discrimination would be associated with poor well-being, both psychological and physical. We also anticipated that atheists would identify
Who Are Atheists?
Atheists are people who lack any belief in god(s) or explicitly
believe in the nonexistence of god(s) (Cliteur, 2009). Many atheists find religious beliefs and practices to be meaningless in their
lives and inconsistent with their secular worldviews (Zuckerman,
2009). A hallmark of contemporary or “new” atheism is that
atheists are hostile toward organized religion (e.g., Streib & Klein,
2013), yet not all atheists report antireligious sentiments (Cimino
& Smith, 2011). In recent years, atheists have become more active
and visible in the United States (Guenther, Mulligan, & Papp,
2013). For example, several prominent atheists have authored
books challenging religion and promoting atheism (e.g., Dawkins,
2006; Hitchens, 2007). There has also been an increase in both
informal and formal atheist organizations, some of which are
politically active at the local and national levels (Guenther et al.,
2013; Smith & Cimino, 2012).
Researchers have generally defined atheists in one of two ways:
(a) theological atheists, people who do not believe in god(s), and
(b) self-identifying atheists, people who identify as atheist from
among other nonreligious categories. Theological and selfidentifying atheism frequently co-occur, but not always. For example, some theological atheists choose to identify with other
nonreligious categories (e.g., humanist or secularist; Sherkat,
2008). In addition, some self-identifying atheists report varied
beliefs in god(s) (Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen,
2012). This distinction between endorsement of in-group beliefs
and self-identification with the in-group applies to many other
social groups, such as the difference between religious beliefs and
identity among Jews (Dubow, Pargament, Boxer, & Tarakeshwar,
Michael J. Doane, Interdisciplinary PhD Program in Social Psychology,
University of Nevada, Reno; Marta Elliott, Department of Sociology,
University of Nevada, Reno.
The authors acknowledge their appreciation for the assistance of Atheist
Alliance International, especially for the support from Carlos A. Diaz and
Tanya Smith, in addition to the other AAI Directors, members, and
supporters. The authors also thank Joseph H. Hammer for his suggestions
on an earlier version of the survey used in this study.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael
J. Doane, Interdisciplinary PhD Program in Social Psychology, University
of Nevada, Reno, Mail Stop 300, Reno, NV 89557. E-mail: mdoane@
unr.edu
1
DOANE AND ELLIOTT
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2
2000). We defined atheists for this study as people who satisfy
both theological and self-identifying atheism, meaning that they
explicitly state that they do not believe in god(s) and identify
themselves using the label “atheist.”
Large-scale surveys show that atheists tend to be male (Keysar,
2007) and relatively young in age (Pew Research Center, 2008).
Nonreligious people in general tend to be educated (Kosmin &
Keysar, 2006), politically liberal (Hout & Fischer, 2002), and less
likely to live in Southern states or rural areas (Sherkat, 2008).
Although the number of people identifying as atheist—and nonreligious, more broadly—is on the rise (Pew Research Center,
2012), these people represent a relatively small portion of the
United States population. Based on nationally representative samples, estimates place self-identified atheists between 0.7% (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009) and 2.4% (Pew Research Center, 2012) of
the total United States population. These estimates are similar to
those for many minority religious groups, including Mormons
(1.7%) and Jews (1.7%; Pew Research Center, 2008). Figures for
atheists may actually be conservative, as some people who privately identify as atheist do not publically identify as such for fear
of ramifications (i.e., private vs. public self-identifications; Cragun
et al., 2012). Even so, it is clear that self-identified atheists are a
numerical minority in the United States today.
The Marginalization of Atheism
Beyond being a numerical minority, atheists are also a marginalized group of people living in the United States (Gervais &
Norenzayan, 2013). Several nationally representative surveys
highlight the negative views that Americans express toward atheists. A 2007 Gallup poll, for example, assessed people’s willingness to vote for hypothetical political candidates from different
racial and religious backgrounds. Although many potential candidates would earn the majority of people’s votes, including an
African American (94%), a woman (88%), and a homosexual
(55%), the only candidate that would not receive a majority vote
was an atheist (45%; Jones, 2007). In a related survey, a majority
of people (53%) stated that they would be less likely to support a
presidential candidate who was an atheist (Pew Research Center,
2014). This figure representing lack of support was larger than for
all other characteristics, including a gay or lesbian candidate (27%)
and a candidate who had an extramarital affair (35%). As one more
example of people’s negative views toward atheists, 48% of people
would disapprove of their children marrying an atheist (Edgell,
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006). This disapproval rating was higher
than ratings for all other minority groups included in the survey,
such as Muslims (34%) and African Americans (19%). Edgell et
al. (2006) concluded that “atheists are less likely to be accepted,
publicly and privately, than any others from a long list of ethnic,
religious, and other minority groups” (p. 211).
Although these surveys indicate that Americans tend to hold
negative attitudes toward atheists, such studies do not speak to
whether atheists recognize their marginalized status. A few recent
studies, however, demonstrate that atheists do perceive themselves
as targets of social rejection. For example, Cragun et al. (2012)
found that approximately 41% of atheists experienced some form
of discrimination during the five years before their study participation. A related study found that discrimination toward atheists is
pervasive, stemming from various sources (e.g., family members,
friends, and coworkers) and involving such acts as ostracism (e.g.,
being avoided or isolated), coercion (e.g., pressured to engage in
religious activities), and slander (e.g., being told that one is sinful
and immoral; Hammer et al., 2012). Anecdotal evidence also
suggests that social rejection is a common experience among
atheists (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006). Further, even if atheists
have never personally experienced discrimination, they likely recognize their marginalized position in the United States (Cimino &
Smith, 2011).
Although discrimination is a particularly harmful social stressor
for members of many marginalized groups (Weber, Pargament,
Kunik, Lomax, & Stanley, 2012), it is unclear whether experiences
of rejection undermine well-being for atheists. The broader literature indicates that belonging to a marginalized group comes with
psychological and even physical costs (Clark, Anderson, Clark, &
Williams, 1999; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). For example,
perceptions of discrimination are associated with increased symptoms of anxiety and depression among African Americans (Banks,
Kohn-Wood, & Spencer, 2006), lower life satisfaction among
people of multiracial backgrounds (Giamo, Schmitt, & Outten,
2012), and reduced self-esteem among homosexual and bisexual
men (Huebner, Rebchook, & Kegeles, 2004). Perceptions of discrimination are also associated with lower physical well-being
among African Americans (Borrell, Kiefe, Williams, Diez-Roux,
& Gordon-Larsen, 2006) and Mexican Americans (Finch, Hummer, Kolody, & Vega, 2001). In terms of the causal effect of
perceived discrimination on well-being, Schmitt, Branscombe, and
Postmes (2003) found that manipulations of pervasive discrimination lowered self-esteem among women. In addition, Merritt, Bennett, Williams, Edwards, and Sollers (2006) found that manipulating discrimination among African American men led to heightened
cardiovascular responses, which may negatively affect physical
well-being over time. In light of this research, we expected that
atheists’ perceptions of discrimination would be negatively associated with their psychological and physical well-being.
The Rejection–Identification Model
Beyond documenting the relationship between discrimination
and well-being, we also sought to test a process by which atheists
may protect themselves from the anticipated negative effects of
discrimination. As Allport (1954) argued, “misery finds balm
through the closer association of people who are miserable for the
same reason. Threats drive them to seek protective unity within
their common membership” (p. 148). Identification with a devalued group may be one of many ways that individuals respond to
stigma (Goffman, 1963). Similar to other marginalized groups,
atheists may cope with discrimination by finding increased importance in their stigmatized identity—a process of rejection and
identification (Branscombe, Fernández, Gómez, & Cronin, 2011;
Branscombe et al., 1999). The Rejection–Identification Model
(i.e., RIM; Branscombe et al., 1999) posits that perceiving discrimination based on one’s group membership may increase identification with that devalued group. Identification, in turn, reduces
the deleterious effects of discrimination on well-being (Haslam,
Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009). Rooted in Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identification may
provide people with a sense of belonging and perception of having
supportive relationships with like-minded people, providing ben-
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DISCRIMINATION, ATHEIST IDENTIFICATION, & WELL-BEING
efits for well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Haslam et al.,
2009). For example, people who strongly identify with atheism
may seek relationships with other atheists by means of becoming
involved in secular organizations (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010).
Although the RIM focuses on social benefits of group identity,
cognitive processes may also be protective. For example, identification is associated with rejecting minority group stereotypes and
resisting group-related stigma (Crabtree, Haslam, Postmes, & Haslam, 2010). To the extent that discrimination threatens atheists’
sense of certainty about their selves, their secular attitudes may
strengthen (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001), their
group identification may increase (Grant & Hogg, 2012), and they
may further advocate for their beliefs (Gal & Rucker, 2010). As an
example, Farias, Newheiser, Kahane, and de Toledo (2013) found
that relatively secular individuals reported greater conviction in
science when under stress and anxiety. In this way, identifying
with one’s minority group and endorsing one’s minority beliefs in
the face of uncertainty (e.g., when being a target of discrimination)
may be a mechanism to help bolster one’s sense of self.
The process of rejection and identification has received empirical support among many groups, including African Americans (Branscombe et al., 1999), Mexican Americans (Romero &
Roberts, 2003), international students (Schmitt, Spears, &
Branscombe, 2003), and older adults (Garstka, Schmitt,
Branscombe, & Hummert, 2004). This process has also been
documented in cross-sectional (Mossakowski, 2003), longitudinal
(Ramos, Cassidy, Reicher, & Haslam, 2012), and experimental
research (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). For example, Jetten et al. (2001) manipulated perceptions of discrimination among people with body piercings. Participants in a highdiscrimination condition reported stronger identification with other
people who had body piercings compared with participants in a
low-discrimination condition. Higher levels of identification further predicted greater self-esteem. Thus, there is evidence for a
causal relationship of discrimination on identification, and for
identification’s benefits for well-being. Based on this previous
research, we expected that perceiving discrimination would be
associated with a higher degree of identification among atheists. In
turn, identification as an atheist should reduce the negative effects
of discrimination on well-being. There are alternative models,
however, that describe the relationship between discrimination and
well-being. For example, the discounting model (Crocker & Major, 1989) predicts that discrimination should predict better wellbeing under certain conditions. That is, being able to discount
negative treatment resulting from external causes (e.g., prejudice)
may be self-protective for some minority group members. The
maladjustment model, as second alternative account, predicts that
poor well-being may cause people to attribute negative treatment
to discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999). We test for the plausibility of these alternative models in the present study, comparing
results with the RIM.
Rejection–Identification Model and Atheists
We expect that the rejection–identification process is applicable
to atheists for at least two reasons. First, members of a marginalized group tend to increase their group identification when discrimination is pervasive rather than infrequent (Branscombe et al.,
3
2011). The conditions that atheists experience in the United States
best reflect pervasive discrimination. The United States is a relatively religious country where nearly 90% of people are fairly or
absolutely certain in the existence of god(s) and more than 80% of
people affiliate with some religious group (Pew Research Center,
2008). The religious context of this country is relevant as religion
can act as a catalyst for intergroup hostility and intolerance (Silberman, 2005), especially toward groups of people who are in
violation of a given religion’s values (Shen, Yelderman, Haggard,
& Rowatt, 2013; Whitley, 2009). This is important because atheists have been found to be especially threatening to people’s values
(Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2014). Atheists also experience discrimination across many contexts, including slander by popular
media (e.g., TV and newspapers) and social condemnation by
family members, friends, and coworkers (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Hammer et al., 2012). Because the marginalization
of atheism is widespread (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2013), cutting
across personal and public domains of life (Edgell et al., 2006;
Hammer et al., 2012), atheists do appear to experience pervasive
rather than infrequent discrimination in the United States.
Second, members of marginalized groups tend to increase their
group identification when they perceive group differences as illegitimate and when they believe that they can improve their status
by competing with the more dominant group (Branscombe et al.,
2011; Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This second condition is also satisfied for many atheists because they tend to
perceive very distinct group boundaries between themselves and
religious individuals (Smith, 2011), and believe that the difference
in social power across these two groups is illegitimate. The difference in social power may cause some atheists to challenge and
compete with religion (Smith, 2013). By so doing, atheists maintain distinct group boundaries, thus staying closer to, rather than
moving away from, their marginalized identity (Branscombe et al.,
2011). The new atheist movement is an indication that some
atheists join organizations of similar others to respond to perceived
injustices against them by religious individuals and institutions
(Guenther et al., 2013).
Although atheists share experiences that are similar to those of
other marginalized groups included in previous RIM research,
there are at least two features of atheism that make the current
study a departure from most previous work: atheism is a concealable identity, and atheism is belief-based. Previous studies testing
the RIM have largely examined groups of people who have visible
stigmatized identities, such as group membership based on race,
sex, and age. Atheists, however, have the option to “hide” their
identity from other people. Identification as an atheist is similar to
other identities that people can often keep concealed, including
sexual orientation (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Pachankis,
2007; Quinn & Chaudoir, 2009). A recent study examined the
rejection–identification process for gay men and found that behavioral identification in the form of involvement in the gay community mediated the relationship between discrimination and selfesteem (Doyle & Molix, 2014). Behavioral identification implies a
degree of external visibility of one’s identity, such as endorsing
magazines or TV shows directed toward the gay community. The
definition of identification for the present study, however, focuses
on an internal evaluation of the importance and centrality of being
an atheist. In addition to being a concealable identity, people
actively choose to be an atheist by rejecting the notion of a god(s)
DOANE AND ELLIOTT
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4
through a complex process of identity formation (Smith, 2011).
Atheism is a voluntary or chosen identity to the extent that people
can decide their beliefs about religious matters. This type of
identification is different from identities based on ascribed characteristics including race, sex, or other characteristics assigned
from birth. In sum, the atheist identity differs from many other
identities examined with the RIM model because it is both concealable and chosen.
Despite the uniqueness of the atheist identity vis-à-vis other
groups for whom the RIM model applies, we argue that the process
of rejection and identification would occur for atheists because
their experiences in the United States meet two of the RIM’s
conditions highlighted earlier: the experience of pervasive discrimination and the perception of group boundaries as being illegitimate. Thus, there is reason to expect the concealable and voluntary
identity of being an atheist to function similarly to a visible and
ascribed identity in the context of the rejection–identification
process. Identification as an atheist should become important in
defining the self in the face of discrimination.
The Present Study
Although no known research has examined the intersection of
perceived discrimination, identification, and well-being among
atheists, the rejection–identification process offers a rich theoretical model to guide this study. In sum, we expected that (a)
perceived discrimination would be negatively associated with
well-being, (b) perceived discrimination would be positively associated with atheist identification, (c) atheist identification would
be positively associated with well-being, and (d) perceived discrimination would be indirectly and positively associated with
well-being through atheist identification.
The present study expands the net of previous RIM research in
at least three ways. First, this study tests the RIM’s predictions
among atheists, an understudied group of people who face especially negative attitudes from society at-large. Second, this study
adds physical well-being as an independent outcome. Physical
well-being is a key outcome in studies that have assessed the
consequences of discrimination (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009),
yet no known research has tested whether the rejection–
identification process applies to both psychological and physical
well-being. Third, this study tests the RIM using structural equation modeling (SEM). Benefits of SEM include the ability to
model first- and second-order latent factors with confirmatory
factor analysis, to account and correct for measurement error, and
to model direct and indirect pathways (Henseler, 2012; Weston &
Gore, 2006).
Method
Participant Recruitment
Participants for this study included members of Atheist Alliance
International (AAI), an organization that supports education and
activism addressing secular issues. AAI has different types of
members, including individual members (i.e., people who pay a
nominal membership fee) and group members (i.e., a collection of
secular organizations). There are also nonmember supporters, such
as those who endorse AAI’s social media websites. For this study,
AAI agreed to send e-mails inviting its members and supporters to
participate.1 AAI also posted study information to its social media
websites, and encouraged its group members, or other secular
organizations, to distribute study information to their respective
memberships. E-mails and social media posts contained information about this study along with a link to an online survey.
The survey was active for six weeks, and 1,007 self-identified
atheists completed survey items. Of these participants, the majority
(95%) indicated that they did not believe in the existence of god(s).
The other five percent of participants reported beliefs in god(s) that
did not align with theological atheism. For example, some selfidentified atheists were not certain whether god(s) existed. We
excluded this subset of participants from all analyses so that our
sample included atheists as defined by both self-identifying and
theological atheism.2 Demographic characteristics of the final
sample (n ⫽ 960) are displayed in Table 1.
Measures
To test the RIM, we included measures of perceived discrimination, atheist identification, and well-being in the survey. Perceived discrimination consisted of two related measures, including
personal discrimination (i.e., personal experiences of discrimination) and group discrimination (i.e., perceptions of atheists as a
derogated group). Atheist identification comprised the importance,
centrality, and commitment toward being an atheist. Well-being
included measures of both psychological (i.e., self-esteem, life
satisfaction, and negative affect) and physical well-being.
Personal discrimination. Five items assessed personal experiences of discrimination. These items reflected common experiences of discrimination among atheists (see Hammer et al., 2012),
and were modeled from existing measures (e.g., Schmitt,
Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 2002; Branscombe et al.,
1999). An example item included I have felt isolated because I am
an atheist. Participants rated their agreement on a 5-point scale
(1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree).
Group discrimination. Six items assessed perceptions of
atheists as a derogated group in the United States. Items were
similar to Schmitt et al.’s (2002) measure of out-group privilege,
and focused on how atheists fare compared with religious individuals (mirroring the contrast between males and females in Schmitt
et al.’s work). An example item included Religious people have
more opportunities than do atheists in my country. Participants
rated their agreement on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to
5 ⫽ strongly agree).
Atheist identification. Three items assessed a related dimension of identification as an atheist, including importance (i.e.,
Being an atheist is an important part of who I am), centrality (i.e.,
Being an atheist is not a central aspect of my identity; reverse
coded), and commitment (i.e., I am committed to being an atheist).
1
Because of privacy concerns regarding AAI’s membership, no information is available to compute a response rate for this survey. Even if this
information were publically available, participants included people who
may not have been AAI members, but instead received information through
various social media posts.
2
Excluding the 47 participants who endorsed a belief in god(s), from
uncertainty to certainty in the existence of god(s), does not change the
pattern or significance of results.
DISCRIMINATION, ATHEIST IDENTIFICATION, & WELL-BEING
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics
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Demographic characteristic
Sex (1 ⫽ female)
Age
Children (1 ⫽ yes)
Education
Less than secondary school
Completed secondary school
Trade qualification
College/university degree
Postgraduate degree
Social class
Lower class
Working class
Lower middle class
Upper middle class
Upper class
Racial minority (1 ⫽ racial minority)
Marital status (1 ⫽ married)
Employment status (1 ⫽ employed)
Region of residencea
West
Midwest
South
Northeast
Setting of residence
Rural
Suburban
Urban
Secular organization membership (1 ⫽ member)
5
Results
Percentage or
mean (SD)
42%
43.76 (16.03)
52%
2%
16%
9%
46%
27%
4%
19%
35%
40%
2%
8%
66%
56%
27%
33%
27%
13%
18%
50%
32%
79%
Note. The structural model controls for the significant paths between
factors and demographic characteristics. n ⫽ 960.
a
Region of residence was dummy coded, with the Southern region serving
as the reference category.
Participants rated their agreement on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly
disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree).
Self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965) assessed personal self-esteem. This measure included 10
items (e.g., On the whole, I am satisfied with myself) rated on a
5-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree).
Life satisfaction. The Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener,
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) assessed judgments of overall
life satisfaction. This measure contained five items (e.g., In most
ways, my life is close to my ideal) rated on a 7-point scale (1 ⫽
strongly disagree to 7 ⫽ strongly agree).
Negative affect. The Negative Affect Scale of the Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule Short Version (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) assessed the degree to which participants experienced five negative emotions. Participants indicated how often
they felt upset, afraid, hostile, ashamed, and nervous during the
few weeks before their participation on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ very
slightly or not at all to 5 ⫽ extremely).
Physical well-being. One item assessed physical well-being
(i.e., In general, would you say your physical health is . . .) rated
on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ poor to 5 ⫽ excellent). The subjective
assessment of physical well-being reliably predicts objective measures of health including mortality (Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Idler
& Kasl, 1991).
Data Analysis Strategy
We used Mplus 6 software (Muthén & Muthén, 2010) to test all
measurement and structural models. Measurement models describe
the associations between indicators (i.e., scale items) and their
underlying constructs (i.e., latent factors). Structural models describe the associations among factors (Weston & Gore, 2006). We
used multiple fit indices to assess the goodness of fit of both
measurement and structural models, including the comparative fit
index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA),
and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR). Standards of good model fit are values at or above .90 for CFI, values
at or below .06 for RMSEA, and values at or below .08 for SRMR
(Hu & Bentler, 1995, 1999). We also report chi-square and relative
chi-square values (␹2/df; Wheaton, Muthén, Alwin, & Summers,
1977). As chi-square values tend to inflate with large sample sizes
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), relative chi-square values provide
a better indicator of model fit. A liberal cutoff for a relative
chi-square value is five or less (Wheaton et al., 1977), whereas a
conservative cutoff is two or less (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
of Measurement Models
We first present confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) assessing
model fit for first- and second-order latent factors. Table 2 presents
standardized factor loadings for first-order factors (all loadings at
p ⬍ .001). This second table also reports factor reliabilities that
take into account the loadings and residual variances of their
respective indicators (DeShon, 1998). Table 3 displays the means,
standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the first-order factors.
Perceived discrimination. We estimated first-order latent
factors of personal and group discrimination. The first-order factor
of personal discrimination fit the data well: ␹2(5) ⫽ 16.60, p ⫽
.005; ␹2/df ⫽ 3.32; CFI ⫽ .99; RMSEA ⫽ .05; SRMR ⫽ .02. The
first-order factor of group discrimination also fit the data well:
␹2(9) ⫽ 34.49, p ⬍ .001; ␹2/df ⫽ 3.83; CFI ⫽ .97; RMSEA ⫽ .05;
SRMR ⫽ .03. These first-order factors had a strong and positive
correlation, r ⫽ .63, p ⬍ .001. We treated these first-order factors
as “indicators” of perceived discrimination, the underlying secondorder factor. This second-order factor fit the data well: ␹2(43) ⫽
130.54, p ⬍ .001; ␹2/df ⫽ 3.04; CFI ⫽ .96; RMSEA ⫽ .05;
SRMR ⫽ .03. The standardized factor loadings were .72 (p ⬍
.001) for personal discrimination and .88 (p ⬍ .001) for group
discrimination.
Atheist identification. We estimated the latent factor of atheist identification, which included the three indicators of centrality,
importance, and commitment. Because this factor consisted of
three indicators, no fit statistics for this CFA were calculated.
Psychological well-being. We estimated first-order latent factors of life satisfaction, self-esteem, and negative affect. All factors
fit the data well, including life satisfaction, ␹2(3) ⫽ 12.25, p ⫽ .007;
␹2/df ⫽ 4.08; CFI ⫽ .99; RMSEA ⫽ .06; SRMR ⫽ .01, self-esteem,
␹2(31) ⫽ 155.15, p ⬍ .001; ␹2/df ⫽ 5; 4.08; CFI ⫽ .97; RMSEA ⫽
.07; SRMR ⫽ .03, and negative affect, ␹2(3) ⫽ 7.33, p ⫽ .062;
DOANE AND ELLIOTT
6
Table 2
Standardized Factor Loadings of First-Order Factors
First-order factor
Factor loadings
Personal discrimination (reliability ⫽ .74)
1. People generally think I am immoral because I am an atheist
2. I am treated no differently because I am an atheist
3. I have felt isolated because I am an atheist
4. Being an atheist has not deprived me of any opportunities in my life
5. I have personally experienced anti-atheist prejudice
Group discrimination (reliability ⫽ .74)a
1. The media portray religious people as superior to atheists in my country
2. Anti-atheist prejudice is widespread in my country
3. Atheists are treated no differently than religious people in my country
4. Religious people have more opportunities than do atheists in my country
5. Atheists are pressured to participate in religious activities in my country
6. Atheists have been the victims of hate crimes in my country
Atheist identification (reliability ⫽ .68)a
1. Being an atheist is an important part of who I am
2. I am committed to being an atheist
3. Being an atheist is not a central aspect of my identity
Life satisfaction (reliability ⫽ .90)b
1. In most ways, my life is close to my ideal
2. The conditions of my life are excellent
3. I am satisfied with my life
4. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life
5. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing
Self-esteem (reliability ⫽ .90)a
1. I take a positive attitude toward myself
2. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself
3. At times, I think I am no good at all
4. I feel that I have a number of good qualities
5. I am able to do things as well as most other people
6. I feel I do not have much to proud of
7. I certainly feel useless at times
8. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others
9. I wish I could have more respect for myself
10. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure
Negative affect (reliability ⫽ .76)c
1. Afraid
2. Upset
3. Hostile
4. Ashamed
5. Nervous
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a
.64
⫺.63
.61
⫺.55
.58
.67
.55
⫺.44
.63
.54
.55
.94
.41
⫺.52
.92
.79
.81
.88
.58
.87
.78
⫺.74
.49
.57
⫺.63
⫺.68
.66
⫺.68
⫺.77
.75
.53
.35
.67
.79
Note. All standardized factor loadings at p ⬍ .001.
a
Items rated on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree). b Items rated on a 7-point scale
(1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 7 ⫽ strongly agree). c Items rated on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ very slightly or not at all
to 5 ⫽ extremely).
␹2/df ⫽ 2.44; CFI ⫽ .99; RMSEA ⫽ .04; SRMR ⫽ .01.3 These
factors were strongly correlated, including life satisfaction with
self-esteem, r ⫽ .74, p ⬍ .001, and negative affect, r ⫽ ⫺.51, p ⬍
.001, and self-esteem with negative affect, r ⫽ ⫺.66, p ⬍ .001. We
treated these first-order factors as “indicators” of psychological
well-being, the underlying second-order factor. This second-order
factor fit the data well: ␹2(159) ⫽ 559.52, p ⬍ .001; ␹2/df ⫽ 3.52;
CFI ⫽ .96; RMSEA ⫽ .04; SRMR ⫽ .05. The standardized factor
loadings were .75 (p ⬍ .001) for life satisfaction, .98 (p ⬍ .001) for
self-esteem, and ⫺.68 (p ⬍ .001) for negative affect.
Structural Model
After estimating and assessing model fit for first- and secondorder latent factors, we estimated the final structural model to test
the RIM. In this model, we specified paths from perceived dis-
crimination to atheist identification, psychological well-being, and
physical well-being. We also specified paths from atheist identification to both psychological and physical well-being. We allowed residual variances to covary between psychological and physical well-being. This final structural model fit the data well: ␹2(778) ⫽
1563.91, p ⬍ .001; ␹2/df ⫽ 2.01; CFI ⫽ .93; RMSEA ⫽ .03;
3
We allowed residual variances to covary for several sets of indicators
within the first-order latent factors of psychological well-being, each of
which was theoretically defensible (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008).
For example, the residual variances for the indicators At times, I think I am
no good at all and I certainly feel useless at times of the first-order latent
factor of self-esteem were allowed to correlate. These two indicators are
very similar and may measure a unique concept beyond self-esteem. The
correlated residual variances do not change the pattern or significance of
results.
DISCRIMINATION, ATHEIST IDENTIFICATION, & WELL-BEING
7
Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Among First-Order Factors
Measure
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Atheist identification
Personal discrimination
Group discrimination
Life satisfaction
Self-esteem
Negative affect
Physical well-being
Mean
Standard deviation
1
2
3
ⴱⴱ
4
ⴱⴱ
—
.14
—
.24
.63
—
4.20
0.78
3.22
0.88
4.18
0.63
.06
⫺.19ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺.12ⴱⴱ
—
4.98
1.40
5
ⴱ
.08
⫺.16ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺.10ⴱⴱ
.74ⴱⴱⴱ
—
4.34
0.70
6
7
⫺.04
.16ⴱⴱⴱ
.09ⴱ
⫺.51ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺.66ⴱⴱⴱ
—
.09ⴱ
⫺.11ⴱⴱ
⫺.07ⴱ
.38ⴱⴱ
.39ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺.22ⴱⴱⴱ
—
3.36
0.99
1.64
0.60
Note. All measures represent first-order factors except for physical well-being, which is a one-item, manifest
variable.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.
SRMR ⫽ .05. Figure 1 displays all standardized coefficients of the
pathways in this model.
Findings were entirely consistent with the rejection–identification
process. First, perceived discrimination predicted both psychological well-being (␤ ⫽ ⫺.26, p ⬍ .001) and physical well-being
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.13, p ⫽ .002). Participants who tended to experience
discrimination and perceive atheists as a derogated group reported
lower psychological and physical well-being. Second, perceived
discrimination predicted atheist identification (␤ ⫽ .29, p ⬍ .001).
Aligning with the RIM, perceptions of discrimination may encourage stronger identification as an atheist. Third, atheist identification was a positive predictor of both psychological well-being
(␤ ⫽ .15, p ⬍ .001) and physical well-being (␤ ⫽ .12, p ⫽ .002).
As expected, the two indirect pathways were also significant in
this structural model. Perceived discrimination had indirect and
positive effects via atheist identification on both psychological
well-being (␤ ⫽ .04, p ⫽ .006) and physical well-being (␤ ⫽ .03,
p ⫽ .012). According to the process of rejection and identification,
perceiving discrimination may encourage identification as an atheist, which in turn appears to convey benefits for well-being. Given
that the direct effects of perceived discrimination on psychological
and physical well-being were larger than their total effects
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.26 vs. ␤ ⫽ ⫺.21, and ␤ ⫽ ⫺.13 vs. ␤ ⫽ ⫺.10, respectively), and the total effects were statistically significant, atheist
identification appears to be helpful in reducing, but not eliminating, discrimination’s ill effects on well-being. Findings are adjusted for significant effects of several demographic characteristics.4
identification). Counter to the predictions of the discounting
model, perceived discrimination was a negative predictor of both
psychological well-being (␤ ⫽ ⫺.22, p ⬍ .001) and physical
well-being (␤ ⫽ ⫺.10, p ⫽ .010). An additional model excluding
physical well-being revealed the same pattern: perceived discrimination is a negative predictor of psychological well-being
(␤ ⫽ ⫺.22, p ⬍ .001).
We also tested a maladjustment model, which predicts that
people with relatively low well-being are more likely to perceive
a hostile environment characterized by discrimination directed
toward them. This alternative model included pathways from psychological and physical well-being to perceived discrimination.
Only psychological well-being was negatively associated with
perceived discrimination (␤ ⫽ ⫺.12, p ⫽ .015). In contrast,
physical well-being did not significantly predict perceived discrimination (␤ ⫽ ⫺.05, p ⫽ .241). Relative to these alternative
models, the RIM receives the most support in validating the
predicted relationships among perceived discrimination, atheist
identification, and psychological and physical well-being.
Discussion
Alternative Models
Perceiving discrimination based on one’s group membership is
generally associated with less favorable psychological and physical well-being (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). Both early (e.g.,
Allport, 1954) and recent researchers (e.g., Branscombe et al.,
1999) have argued that perceptions of discrimination can increase
identification with one’s marginalized group. Under certain circumstances, increased identification confers benefits for the individual. According to the rejection–identification process (Branscombe
In addition to testing the RIM, we tested alternative models.
Most relevant to this study is Crocker and Major’s (1989) discounting model, which posits that perceptions of discrimination
may be associated with better, rather than worse well-being under
certain circumstances. According to this model, individuals who
make an attribution to discrimination may protect overall wellbeing by shifting the cause of rejection from the self to external
discriminatory practices (Crocker & Major, 1989). We tested a
model in which discrimination predicted psychological and physical well-being (excluding atheist identification since the discounting model does not make any specific predictions for the role of
4
The only significant demographic characteristic that predicted perceived discrimination was age (␤ ⫽ ⫺.18, p ⬍ .001). Significant predictors
of atheist identification were age (␤ ⫽ .17, p ⬍ .001) and setting of
residence (ranged from rural to urban; ␤ ⫽ .09, p ⫽ .009). Significant
predictors of psychological well-being were setting of residence (ranged
from rural to urban; ␤ ⫽ ⫺.08, p ⫽ .010), having children (vs. not having
children; ␤ ⫽ .21, p ⬍ .001), being married (vs. not being married; ␤ ⫽
.13, p ⫽ .001), and being a member of a secular organization (vs. being a
supporter; ␤ ⫽ .07, p ⫽ .028). Significant predictors of physical well-being
were setting of residence (ranged from rural to urban; ␤ ⫽ ⫺.09, p ⫽ .004),
education (␤ ⫽ .14, p ⬍ .001), and being employed (vs. not employed; ␤ ⫽
.11, p ⬍ .001).
DOANE AND ELLIOTT
8
Self-Esteem
.93***
.79***
Psychological
Well-Being
Life
Satisfaction
-.69 ***
-.26***
(-.21***)
Negative
Affect
e
.15***
Personal
Discrimination
.75***
Perceived
Discrimination
.29***
Atheist
Identification
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.37***
Group
Discrimination
.83***
.12**
-.13**
(-.10*)
Physical
Well-Being
e
Figure 1. Structural model of the rejection–identification process. ␹2(778) ⫽ 1563.91, p ⬍ .001; ␹2/df ⫽ 2.01;
CFI ⫽ .93; RMSEA ⫽ .03; SRMR ⫽ .05. This figure displays standardized regression coefficients. Total effects
of perceived discrimination on well-being are in parentheses. n ⫽ 960. ⴱ p ⬍ .05, ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01, ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.
et al., 1999), identification weakens the negative effects of discrimination on well-being. This model has received empirical support
among various marginalized groups, including African Americans
(Branscombe et al., 1999), Mexican Americans (Romero & Roberts, 2003), and Filipino Americans (Mossakowski, 2003). The
current study adds to this previous research by finding support of
the RIM among a sample of atheists living in the United States.
Atheists’ perceptions of discrimination (i.e., personal experiences
of discrimination and perceptions of atheists as a derogated group)
were associated with lower psychological and physical well-being.
While having a direct negative effect on well-being, perceptions of
discrimination also had an indirect and positive effect on wellbeing through increased identification as an atheist. In the face of
social rejection, atheists may be resilient by drawing benefits from
their identification as an atheist. To our knowledge, this is the first
test of the rejection–identification process among atheists.
Although findings from this study add to current literature on
the rejection–identification process, a few limitations warrant further discussion. First, the data are cross-sectional, so we cannot
conclusively claim any causal links between the paths outlined in
the RIM, including perceptions of discrimination affecting atheist
identification and well-being. There are alternative accounts for
the link between discrimination and identification. For example,
group identification plays a role in how members of marginalized
groups experience discrimination and attribute events to discrimination (Eccleston & Major, 2006). In one longitudinal study
among African Americans, Sellers and Shelton (2003) found that
the centrality of participants’ racial identity predicted future experiences of discrimination after controlling for initial experiences of
discrimination. There is also experimental evidence demonstrating
that highly identified members of marginalized groups (e.g.,
women) are more likely to attribute ambiguous and negative
events to discrimination compared to less identified members
(Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003).
Previous research, however, has tested for a causal link of
discrimination on group identification, as posited by the RIM. For
example, Jetten et al. (2001) demonstrated that manipulating perceptions of discrimination led to increased identification among
people with body piercings. Relevant to atheists, Ysseldyk, Haslam, Matheson, and Anisman (2012) found that manipulating
feelings of threat increased atheists’ own positive feelings toward
other atheists. In addition, Merritt et al. (2006) found that the
manipulation of discrimination heightened cardiovascular responses among African American men. In light of these various
findings, it is clear that the relationships among discrimination,
identity, and well-being are complex. Though there is evidence of
a causal link of perceived discrimination on identification, for
example, their effects are likely reciprocal. As Cragun et al. (2012)
suggest, highly identified atheists are likely to experience more
discrimination because of the heightened attention an atheist identification yields from other people. Highly identified atheists are
also likely to find themselves in situations in which they experience more discrimination, such as when protesting. To ensure that
similar causal patterns emerge among atheists as posited by the
RIM, future research should manipulate perceptions of discrimination to measure its causal effect on both atheist identification
and well-being.
Second, this study examined the rejection–identification process
among many “card-carrying atheists,” or people who both selfidentify as atheist and join or support organizations catering to
nonreligious people (Caldwell-Harris, Wilson, LoTempio, & BeitHallahmi, 2011). Atheists may join or subscribe to online organizations for various reasons, such as perceiving online spaces as
places to “come out, speak out, and ‘meet up’” (Cimino & Smith,
2011, p. 31). Atheists who strongly identify as such are probably
more likely to join organizations relative to their less identified
counterparts. Descriptive analyses suggest that participants in our
sample were indeed highly identified as being atheist, scoring an
average of 4.20 (SD ⫽ 0.78) on a 5-point scale of atheist identification. Thus, our results can only speak to atheists who are
(a) highly identified, and (b) seek organizational involvement. It is
possible that atheists who are more isolated (i.e., without organi-
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DISCRIMINATION, ATHEIST IDENTIFICATION, & WELL-BEING
zational affiliation) might suffer more from their stigmatized status, and identification might do little, if anything, to offset stigma’s
ill effects. That is, atheists who do not join organizations might
lack the apparent benefits of an atheist identity as a result, at least
in part, of not having a social network of like-minded others.
Alternatively, some atheists who are less engaged in organized
atheist activities might use more individualist coping strategies to
deal with social rejection, including keeping their identification as
an atheist concealed from others. Concealing this marginalized
identity may reduce the direct experiences of discrimination
among such isolated atheists. Because atheists are a hard-to-reach
population of people, soliciting participants via online sources is
convenient and an appropriate first step, yet future studies should
aim to reach a broader selection of atheists when possible.
Third, the present study assessed identification as a composite of
importance, centrality, and commitment, yet identification includes other dimensions. For example, Giamo et al., (2012) tested
the RIM with a comprehensive measure of multiracial identification based on Leach et al.’s (2008) five dimensions of group
identification: in-group solidarity, identity centrality, selfstereotyping, identity satisfaction, and in-group homogeneity. By
using this multidimensional approach, Giamo et al. (2012) examined the specific aspects of multiracial identification that uniquely
mediated the effect of perceived discrimination on well-being.
Among multiracial participants, self-stereotyping (i.e., extent to
which people see themselves as similar to an average member of
the in-group) was the only aspect of identification to emerge as a
significant mediator within the context of the RIM. The measure of
identification in the present study closely resembles that of identity
centrality, or the importance of one’s identification as an atheist. It
is unclear whether identity centrality alone explains our findings,
or whether one or more aspects of identification (e.g., in-group
solidarity or identity satisfaction) would prove useful in explaining
the indirect path predicted by the RIM. Future research is necessary to determine the unique effects of different dimensions of
identification on well-being among atheists specifically, and people of other marginalized groups more broadly.
Fourth, whereas the present study modeled a direct link between
atheist identification and well-being, future avenues of research
should explore the mechanisms through which identification conveys its benefits (see Crabtree et al., 2010). For example, identification may provide individuals with opportunities for developing
social relationships and enhance perceptions of social support
(Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). Identification also provides people with a sense of purpose, belonging, and acceptance, which has
the potential to promote well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995;
Haslam et al., 2009). The benefits of identification work through
cognitive routes as well, including the rejection of minority group
stereotypes (Crabtree et al., 2010). The benefits of atheist identification on well-being are indirect, yet research needs to distinguish the mechanisms that explain social identification’s benefits
for both psychological and physical well-being.
Future Directions
There are at least two broad research aims related to the present
topic that should guide future research. First, although there has
been substantial interest in studying the possible role of religion in
promoting well-being, nonreligious people are rarely included in
9
such studies. The general exclusion of the nonreligious has been a
criticism of this line of research (see Hwang, Hammer, & Cragun,
2011). However, there are a few recent and notable examples of
research that addresses such criticism, and these should provide a
model for future studies to follow. For example, in a comparison
across 64 countries, Stavrova, Fetchenhauer, and Schlösser (2013)
found that the gap in happiness and life satisfaction between the
religious and nonreligious is wider in countries where religiosity is
more normative (Study 1). These researchers further demonstrated
that religious individuals living in countries that are more religious
perceive greater social respect and recognition relative to their
nonreligious counterparts, partially accounting for their gap in
well-being (Study 2). Similarly, Diener, Tay, and Myers (2011)
found that social support, perceived social respect, and sense of
purpose or meaning mediated the relationship between religiosity
and indicators of subjective well-being (Study 2). Further, the gap
in subjective well-being between the more and less religious was
larger in relatively religious countries compared with less religious countries. Other studies have demonstrated a similar effect
whereby the benefits of religion for well-being are context-dependent: religion is beneficial in countries that are more religious but
not necessarily in countries that are less religious (see Gebauer,
Sedikides, & Neberich, 2012; Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2010). Researchers should aim to document other moderators of the link between
religion and well-being, such as the degree of government restrictions on individual liberties (see Elliott & Hayward, 2009; Hayward & Elliott, 2014).
Second, because being an atheist is associated with stigma, an
important social issue emerges regarding how the United States
and other countries can actually reduce stigma toward atheists. A
recent line of research points to the effects of atheist prevalence
(Gervais, 2011) and secular authority (Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012) on attenuating antiatheist prejudice. For example, religious
individuals in countries with larger numbers of atheists report less
negative attitudes toward atheists compared with religious people
in countries with fewer atheists, and people’s perceptions of the
prevalence of atheists has a causal impact on reducing antiatheist
prejudice (Gervais, 2011). In addition, increasing people’s awareness of secular authority decreases distrust toward atheists (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012). Given that we have demonstrated that
discrimination is associated with lower well-being among atheists,
future research should continue to examine ways to reduce the
negative attitudes that people harbor toward atheists.
Conclusion
There is very little research focusing on atheists, including
examining the consequences of marginalization for these people
(Brewster, Robinson, Sandil, Esposito, & Geiger, 2014). This is
surprising as atheists continue to rank among the least accepted
groups of people in the United States. Like people who belong to
other marginalized groups, perceptions of discrimination predict
poor psychological and physical well-being among atheists. One
way that atheists may cope with such discrimination is by further
believing that being an atheist is important and central to their
identity. This rejection and identification process may ultimately
protect well-being by reducing discrimination’s negative effects. It
is our hope that this study will provide the impetus to document the
potential consequences of social rejection for atheists. As research-
DOANE AND ELLIOTT
10
ers have noted (e.g., Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), many nations
around the world are experiencing a transition from religious
fervor to religious disinterest and even disbelief. It is increasingly
becoming important to understand further the atheist experience,
from the development of atheist identification and its impact on
well-being to intergroup relations between atheists and their religious counterparts.
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Received November 26, 2013
Revision received August 1, 2014
Accepted August 28, 2014 䡲