Assessing Democracy Assistance:
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
1
Cristina Barrios2
Researcher at FRIDE
This report is FRIDE’s contribution to a project entitled ‘Assessing
Democracy Assistance’ that is being carried out by the World Movement
for Democracy. The project aims to gather views on how democracy
support can be improved and its impact enhanced. Other case studies
and a synthesis report can be found at www.fride.org.
Project Report
Assessing Democracy
Assistance
Co-financed by:
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is often considered
a ‘post-conflict’ case, and President Joseph Kabila asserted after
his election in November 2006 that the country was now in a ‘posttransition’ era. However, questions remain as to whether the transition
has been consolidated and whether the Congo has become truly
democratic. General elections are due in 2011 in an environment of
ongoing insecurity and unachieved civil and political rights. The United
Nations (UN), the United States (USA) and the European Union (EU)
are concerned about the limited progress of democracy and have
recently addressed a letter to President Kabila to urge him to proceed
with the elections and conduct the process carefully.
Since building democracy is a long-term process, the 2010 picture
must be put in perspective. The country suffered economic collapse
in the early 1990s, followed by years of civil and regional war. Then,
with the consolidation of peace negotiations (2000–2002), Democracy
Assistance (DA) projects, funds and practitioners flooded into the Congo
in increasing numbers. This report contributes a broad overview of the
DA picture, taking into consideration local perceptions of its impact. It is
based on ample fieldwork and interviews with beneficiaries and donors.
It does not attempt to evaluate one particular donor or follow through
one particular set of programmes and its approach is mainly qualitative.
In this way, it assesses the context of DA and the dilemmas found in
the DRC, enabling the policy community to elaborate more nuanced
answers. The report offers tentative answers to some key questions,
The project ‘Assessing Democracy Assistance’ is supported by the United Nations Democracy Fund, the UK Department for International Development, the Arab Democracy Foundation, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the National
Endowment for Democracy and the Smith Richardson Foundation. The research methodology for this report is explained in the appendix at the
end of the main text. Responsibility for this report and the views expressed are solely those of the author(s), and do not necessarily represent the
positions of either FRIDE, the World Movement for Democracy, or the funders.
2
This report is based on fieldwork undertaken in the Democratic Republic of Congo (mainly in Kinshasa, Bukavu and Goma) in July–August 2009
and interviews conducted in Bujumbura, Paris and Brussels, as well as previous field experience in Equator. The author would like to express her
thanks to the many interviewees who spent precious time sharing their experiences of and insights on the DRC and international democracy assistance, and to Said-Abass Ahamed, Marta Iñiguez, Rigobert Lehui and Paul Nolan for the fruitful discussions that helped nuance her questions
and enrich the outcome of this research.
1
Project Report:
Assessing Democracy Assistance
May 2010
including ‘have DA projects succeeded?’, ‘what have been – and remain – the main challenges in promoting
democracy in the DRC?’ and ‘should the international community continue its support – and if so, how?’
The report has three main sections. First, DRC Background: Mapping Democracy Assistance assesses the
state of democracy in the DRC and provides an overview of the main DA stakeholders and policies. It sheds
light on the complex reality of ‘who does what’ in the DRC, and maps Congolese civil society as a recipient.
Next, the report looks at content: What does Democracy Assistance do? Focus on three goals. This section
analyses the offer and the demand of DA. It highlights three DA goals in the DRC as of 2010, namely human
rights and the media, local elections as a pillar for decentralisation, and capacity-building. Thirdly it looks
at the process: How is Democracy Assistance undertaken? Improving the process. This section deals with
three challenges, particular to the DRC but with resonance in the general DA community and other cases,
such as North-South relations among NGOs, of the role of religious actors and aid efficiency. The report’s
conclusion summarises ‘lessons learnt’ for democracy assistance in the DRC at micro, meso and macro
levels, establishing a more nuanced background for potential next steps.
DRC background: Mapping democracy assistance
Democratisation has characterised the post-Cold War era and international democracy assistance has been
essential in this process. This section retraces the history of engagement in the Congo, the panoply of donors
currently operating in the country and the beneficiaries of this aid. Among the latter, this research contributes
to the mapping of Congolese civil society as a recipient.
With the end of the Cold War, the wave of international democratisation reached Zaire, an immense, resourceful
central-African state on the verge of economic and security disintegration under the rule of Mobutu, who had
been in power since 1965. In response to the mobilisation of national civil society and international pressure,
Mobutu opened up the political space with a national conference and made some concessions regarding civic
freedoms and opposition leaders. However, this transition failed in its early stages for three main reasons.
Firstly, Mobutu was reluctant to share power and repressed meaningful opposition. Secondly, the economic
situation declined fast and dramatically: in 1994 only 2 per cent of the economy was considered ‘formal’, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended Zaire and the World Bank offices there closed. Thirdly, violent
conflict rose exponentially involving both Zairian troops (mutiny of unpaid soldiers and pillage) and diverse
armed groups in the east that sought to oust Mobutu. After the Rwandan genocide and the pro-Tutsi military
victory in Kigali, hundreds of thousands of Rwandese Hutu fled to the Congo, and elements of what had been
the Rwandan army destabilised the region. A complex national and regional conflict ensued between warring
parties (up to eight countries and dozens of armed groups) that shifted alliances and claimed four million
victims (mostly civilians) by 2000. Security threats and ill-treatment of the people continue to this day. During
this time, the international community had an ambivalent relationship with the central African country, which
translated in a poor record of democracy promotion. Overall, Zaire remained a low priority on international
agendas, as did the whole Great Lakes region. Little was accomplished in the name of democracy during the
government of warlord Laurent D. Kabila (in power 1997–2001, he changed the country’s name to DRC) who
faced accusations of human rights violations.
It was only when Joseph Kabila gained power after his father’s assassination that democracy promotion gained
some traction. This translated into successful negotiations of peace agreements leading to a transitional
government, supported by the largest peacekeeping operation ever, the United Nations Mission in the
DRC (MONUC, by its French acronym), in place since 1999. There can be little doubt that the international
community ‘guaranteed’ the transition between 2003 and 2006. It deployed ample diplomatic mediation,
a monitoring authority (the CIAT committee), and funds that sought to demobilise armed factions and to
reconstruct a national DRC army. Both MONUC and post-conflict demobilisation remain essential elements
in the process.3 In terms of DA strictly speaking, the international community supported the electoral process3
comprising a constitutional referendum (2005) and the mould-breaking presidential and provincial elections
(2006). These had an estimated cost of USD 600 billion, 80 per cent of which was financed by the EU.
This report could not overstretch its scope to assess the role of MONUC and of demobilisation and army reconstruction policies. These are
usually not considered DA by donors either, even if all actors agree on links between peace and democracy. Many Congolese are critical of
MONUC’s recent cooperation with the restructured DRC army, though it has arguably succeeded in many respects in protecting both Congolese
and international citizens.
3
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
Interestingly, the DRC illustrates international democratic conditionality: when the domestic political process
makes progress, international support returns (if it had left the country) and increases. This general trend is
illustrated by the allocations of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) shown in the table
below. Donors condition development aid to democratic progress, and are ready to ‘invest’ in it. Like DFID,
the international community raised allocations to the DRC through the 2000s.
Table 1: DFID Funding to DRC, 2001-2011 (millions of £)
Period
DFID
2001/
2002/
2003/
2004/
2005/
2006/
2007/
2008/
2009/
2010/
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
5.6
12.9
17.2
29.2
58.8
n/a
n/a
70
100
130
funding
Source: DFID
International engagement has thus been clear, but the results remain meagre. Since the election of Joseph
Kabila (2006), the international community has maintained its commitment to the DRC and the government
has stabilised, but there is ample room for improvement and even a danger of backlash.
The most prestigious international indices and reports demonstrate that democracy and human rights,
human development, corruption and the business environment have shown little progress. In 2010, the
Freedom in the World survey by Freedom House considers the DRC is ‘Not Free’; it highlights that liberties
are diminishing, gives the country a negative trend arrow from 2009, and scores it 6 (on a scale of 1–7,
ranking 7 being the lowest) in civil liberties and political rights. The Human Development Index of the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Global Corruption Report by Transparency International
continue to include the DRC in their lowest ranks. The World Bank’s Doing Business report, which measures
how regulations may enhance business activity, ranked the country 182nd in 2009 and 2010.
Democracy assistance and international stakeholders
Assessing DA in the Congo is particularly difficult in view of the wide range of donors, policies and budgets
active throughout the years. This overview is however necessary to understand the origins of DA policyprocesses, detail the main Western donors’ approaches and reflect on cooperation and coherence. Since
2002, national foreign ministries, development agencies, international institutions and NGOs have channelled
funds into the DRC; a safe, conservative estimate would be USD 14 billion in eight years.4 At least a dozen
United Nations agencies are active in the country; UNDP is the most important one in terms of DA, notably
supporting electoral reform and processes. Among the most committed bilateral donors we find the EU and
European countries (the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and also Italy and Spain), the
USA, Canada and Japan
Europe: Both the EU and its member states are the most important donors, but funds and initiatives stem
from many different sources. For example, the European Development Fund allocated EUR 205 million
for the 2003–7 period, and ECHO allocates around 40 million annually -the DRC is the largest recipient of
Commission’s emergency aid. The programmes under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR) target NGOs, and amount to EUR 1.5 million per year.
There is no unified European strategy for democracy. Moreover, the EU has failed to coordinate its democracy,
development and security policies in the Congo.5 On the ground, member states’ embassies and the EU
institutions exchange information at relatively frequent meetings, but they do not implement coordination.
There is a marked contrast between countries with a strong diplomatic presence (such as Belgium), which
have more strategic plans, and countries with limited staff and funds which are approached by Congolese
actors in need (such as Sweden). Many bilateral funds are channelled directly through UNDP. For example,
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) only allocates a minority of its DRC funds
Depending on the data sources and what is included as ‘aid’ (DA is not strictly separate in development budgets), MONUC budgets are sometimes included, but loans and other financial instruments (notably the World Bank cancellation of debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country
initiative) are usually excluded.
5
This report leaves out security policies. It must however be mentioned that the EU has undertaken very few defence and security operations, so
Congolese operations such as EUSEC, EUFOR and EUPOL have set important precedents in this realm. European actors have also led policies
of security sector reform and justice reform/transitional justice.
4
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Assessing Democracy Assistance
May 2010
directly to NGOs and primarily to large international ones, such as the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) or the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA). NGO beneficiaries usually
perceive the EU as a generous donor, less suspect of geopolitical intentions than former colonial powers,
but local perceptions vary depending on experiences.6 In particular, confusion surrounds the EU’s political
role, which has varied with different Council presidencies, security operations or EU Delegation initiatives.
Leadership and guidelines have failed to materialise unanimously and have depended on personalities and
activism of EC development commissioners, Great Lakes Special Representatives, and national leaders.
United States: The U S is the main provider of funding to MONUC and Congolese interviewees overwhelmingly
agree that qualitatively ‘it is the most powerful international actor in the country’. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s visit in the summer of 2009 and Howard Wolpe’s return as President Obama’s Special Representative
have increased the US’s clout.7 Importantly, much of American DA is non-governmental. Large American
NGOs, such as the International Rescue Committee, have been essential to reporting violence in the east,
while many smaller ones have either opened up country-programmes or financed local NGOs.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) are often mentioned by local beneficiaries. Their DA consists of grants that reach small civil society
organisations rather easily, and local actors appreciate this. USAID appropriated USD 223 million for the
DRC in 2008 (up from USD 143 million in 2007), with 40 per cent devoted to humanitarian assistance and
programmes to fight HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. It allocated 9.3 per cent for the goal of ‘governing justly
and democratically’. Within this, different categories separate ‘rule of law and human rights’ from ‘good
governance’, but these categories are rather loose. The difficulties in the conceptualisation of DA affect
all donors and are criticised in USAID reports themselves, but flexibility is appreciated on the ground even
if this makes assessment especially hard, or biased. NED is the largest international donor for local nongovernmental DA; in 2008 it committed USD 1.3 billion to the DRC (from both its annual appropriation and
other Department of State funding). NED’s projects (37 in 2008) average USD 34,000 and often support
civic activism while safeguarding a balance among themes and beneficiaries (women groups, youth public
awareness, free media, etc. in diverse regions).
Cooperation and coherence on the international agenda
This overview underlines the need for further planning, openness, coherence and efficiency on the part of
donors. The international community has recognised its need to improve aid efficiency in the Paris and Accra
agreements, and the DRC is a case in point.
Since 2007, the World Bank has tried to establish a common Country Assistance Framework for major donors,
which account for 85 per cent of DRC development aid (around USD 800 million per year). The Country
Assistance Framework established five priorities on the agenda, including ‘promoting good governance
and consolidating peace’ and ‘promoting community dynamics’.8 This shows the donors’ commitment to
DA at governmental (not only NGO) level, but more detailed prioritising and policy harmonisation are still
needed. Moreover, with time, the themes of health, infrastructure and education are gaining importance
while democracy is falling behind. Indeed, the DRC government has been increasingly included in plans to
implement aid, and they may drag their feet on democracy and community.
International stakeholders thus contribute to a very complex puzzle of DA in the DRC, which must be
understood in the broader context of development aid and even security intervention. Donors’ cooperation
and coherence are hard to establish at high level and there is little discussion on policy-content. In addition,
donors might agree on goals, but not on how to reach them. DA policy makers argue that policies are better
decided at levels closer to the ground any way, where needs can be better identified and opportunities can
be taken. A more strategic mid-way must be found between the vague objectives at international forums and
the needs on the ground that at times just amount to a ‘band-aid’ juxtaposition of programmes instead of a
comprehensive approach.
Many interviewees complained that the EU funds were becoming increasingly difficult to apply for and to obtain, and that ‘the approach had been
dehumanised’. The EU application process was also considered very lengthy.
7
Previously, the head of MONUC William Swing (a former US ambassador) had also proven to be very influential.
8
The others were: consolidating macroeconomic stability and economic growth, improving access to social services and reducing vulnerability,
combating HIV/AIDS.
6
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
Democracy assistance and Congolese civil cociety
Democracy assistance is implemented by a myriad of actors, who are the beneficiaries of donor aid. This has
positive implications regarding diversification, specialisation and networking with both global and grassroots
partners. But it also creates challenges for a coherent strategy, follow-up and subsequent improvement of
field action. In the DRC, latent conflict makes action difficult for international actors; when crises break out
(especially in the east) they evacuate personnel and close programmes, retaking positions or shifting policies
later on. Local actors in civil society are thus crucial, but they are highly volatile and struggle with the DRC
informal economy and poor infrastructures. Beneficiaries often complain that DA is short-term and projectdriven, while they need continuous support.
DA is in any case made possible by civil society, funded internationally and through complex networks. For
example, the international NGO Search for Common Ground (SFCG), which specialises in conflict zones,
is mainly funded by European and other non-US governments. But it also obtains significant USAID funds
for many projects in the Congo, and UN funds for its media-related projects – training for journalists, radio
and television broadcasting, etc. SFCG, well-established in Kinshasa and eastern Congo, cooperates in turn
with local NGOs. Sometimes such partnerships are long-term and wide-ranging, as is the case with SFCG’s
work with the Collectif des Jeunes Solidaires du Congo Kinshasa (COJESKI), a long-standing, country-wide
NGO that works with youth and touches on a variety of themes, notably human rights, good governance, and
conflict mediation. On other occasions, SFCG finances programmes in the short-term.
Donors have made an effort to map the field of civil society in the Congo to get a better picture of the ‘3W
– Who does What Where’, classifying hundreds of NGOs. A huge documentation effort was undertaken
with funds from the EU, including brief NGO descriptions and some project-allocation in five Congolese
provinces.9 Other reports include the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s 3 W10
and a domestic report by the Congolese Ministry of Planning. These documents are extremely important
and should constitute a first-stop for donors and the national public as they plan their DA. However, they
suffer from a lack of publicity and poor distribution, and their reliability is limited because of local NGO’s high
volatility.
A long-standing civil society tradition
Donors often express concern that Congolese civil society might be instrumentalist, and NGOs created to
fulfil international demand. This is sometimes true because of the precarious economic situation, where
many Congolese see DA as job opportunities for an ad hoc wage. This encourages nepotism, which is
denounced first of all by Congolese civil society. As one interviewee said, ‘there is the elite civil society at the
top, and the true civil society at the bottom’.
Indeed, civil society has a very rich tradition in the DRC, going back at least to the demise of the Mobutu
government in the late 1980s and early 1990s.11 Mobilisation by individuals, groups and the masses can
be traced back to colonial times and has continued thereafter. Civil society groups were explicitly included
in the National Conference of the early 1990s, the peace agreements, and the dialogue forums to design
new institutions. Civil society’s contribution remains essential to the consolidation of democracy, notably
that of human rights defenders, churches, youths groups, women, students, neighbours and professional
associations.
Training, expertise and jobs can rightfully exist in the realm of civic activism, and donors privilege NGOs that
seem better prepared. But local groups of business leaders and enterprises such as CADICEC, INADES
or CEPAS in Kinshasa12 complain that they traditionally received international support, and now they face
competition from ‘professional NGOs’ and ‘elite civil society’ that tailor their programmes and reporting to
TRANSTEC, Cartographie des acteurs non-étatiques en RDC, volume 1, Kinshasa, 2008 [project ANE].
The inventories are especially detailed for Kinshasa and for the provinces of North and South Kivu. See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 3W - Who does What Where: contact list by organization type, 2008.
11
In one of his latest ‘country tours’, Mobutu sought to re-connect with the population, and civil society organisations demanded to be given separate audiences from the traditional gatherings with members of the national political party and from institutions. This was a recognition of the civil
society groups as separate actors in society.
12
The Action Centre for Christian Corporate Directors and Executives in the Congo, the African Institute for Economic and Social Development and
the Study Centre for Social Action, by their respective French acronyms.
9
10
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May 2010
Western language. They denounce Western responsibility for the ‘NGO-isation’ and narrow projects.
Civil society ‘versus’ the state and institutions
Democracy Congolese civil society defines itself as distinct from the political class and excludes political
parties. In this way, it has become the regime’s ‘alter ego’ in a confrontational way; a space for freedom and
a provider of basic needs insufficiently met by the state and institutions (such as building roads and latrines,
providing education and healthcare). In this scenario, civil society is portrayed as embodying democracy and
stands in opposition to the regime, the state and institutions, which are perceived as anti-democratic.
By rightly seeking to support civil society (an essential aspect of democracy), international DA may have
reinforced such confrontational dynamics. This is explained because the DRC lacks human security, a
concept that calls for international intervention when the state does not protect citizens and is not accountable.
Indeed, Congolese civil society needs DA in view of its meagre means and the ongoing repression; it plays
a key role as watchdog and channels mobilisation. Nevertheless, the international community must redress
the current imbalance and also focus on the democratisation of the Congolese regime, state and institutions.
Civil society can then function, as in any democracy, as a counterweight but not an ‘enemy’ of state action.
Concentration of DA in Kinshasa and the Kivus
Democracy assistance has been primarily concentrated in Kinshasa and the eastern provinces of North
and South Kivu, followed by Ituri and Maniema. In Kinshasa, there is resentment that ‘all aid goes to the
east’ because of the war. In the rest of the country, resentment is directed at both the east and Kinshasa,
to which programmes and actors gravitate because it is the capital city. Indeed, other than Bas Congo
and (sporadically) cities such as Kisangani, the rest of the Congolese territory receives little aid, both
because international donors do not extend their operations that far, and because there is less civil society
organisation. Indeed, a very lively civil society has existed in the Kivus for decades in terms of agriculture,
market organisation, and also the defence of basic rights, such as education, while organised social activism
is poor in the Kasais and Bandundu.
A local NGO activist confirmed that in Goma (North Kivu) alone, more than 500 international NGOs have
undertaken projects in the past years. Similarly, an EU official confirmed that most responses to their
calls come from Kinshasa and the Kivus. The EU is trying to redress this by sending teams to explain and
encourage applications in other provinces, for example in Bandundu. Yet they find that interlocutors there are
less prepared (illiteracy, lack of organisation and extreme poverty), and much of the country remains simply
inaccessible. Some groups have succeeded in cross-country mobilisation, through students and churches.
Some NGOs (such as COJESKI) or labour unions may aspire to have such an impact, but this sometimes
leads to disputes on budgetary power and logistical difficulties among the antennas. These challenges are
ever more important because the DRC needs to link decentralisation and democratisation, and it intends to
do so on the basis of a new provincial distribution.
This section has illustrated the diversity of donors and recipients, which makes it difficult to map democracy
assistance actors in the case of the DRC. As a final example, we can follow the policy process at DFID. First,
it gives only general information on its projects and funds, and mixes categories of DA with humanitarian aid,
development aid (for example water, and transport projects), disarmament, election assistance and justice
reform. DFID then allocates funds for many agents (mostly large and small NGOs) to undertake information
and capacity-building workshops, roundtable negotiations among leaders or among members of civil society,
and many other activities. Among other projects, DFID has financed the cooperation of the Congolese NGO
Initative pour un Leadership Cohesif with the American Woodrow Wilson Center (a renowned scholarly institute
that fosters negotiation), a concept paper by International Alert (a medium-size NGO based in London), and
a centre for human rights in Bukavu. By contrast, most DFID funds for election assistance were channelled
through the EU mission during the presidential election and through UNDP for the current process of local
elections. The UK contributions to MONUC and to the EU operations Artemis and EUFOR-Congo came from
different, non-development-related budgets and thus outside of DFID. The mapping results in an interesting
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
DA picture where transnational networks of practitioners and civil society manage to carry out very important
work in a pragmatic way, even if strategy and coherence on a broader level would improve the outcome.
What does democracy assistance do? Focus on three
goals
In the past few years, DA has focused on three main goals in the DRC. First, support of civic and political
freedoms. Second, fostering local elections as a pillar of decentralisation and a final step of the electoral
process. Third, ‘capacity-building’ to improve the functioning of state institutions. In all three, international DA
has been crucial to make a difference. Even if counterfactuals are difficult to assess, it can be safely argued
that had there not been international DA, democracy activists would be in an even worse position and the
local elections would have fallen off the agenda. For capacity-building, the net impact might have been less
dramatic, but it matters as a complement of civil-society policies.
Supporting the precarious environment of human rights and the
media
The DRC suffers from a hostile environment for civil liberties. Political leaders not aligned with the government,
human rights defenders and journalists see their freedoms restricted and repression is a reality. Local activists
consider support for human rights and for free media is essential. They feel that it has worked so far and that
it must continue.
The international DA community is aware of this situation and actively supports individuals and associations.
However, local civil society denounces a negative trend towards poorer oversight mechanisms and less
denunciation in 2009, leaving victims and activists unprotected. International bodies may have taken for
granted that the Kabila regime, stabilised and legitimised by elections, would relinquish control and open
up space. The international community may dangerously accept the authorities’ calls for ‘patience’ and
‘cooperation’. Local activists warn against this, as repression continues and self-censorship rises as a reaction
to less protection. One activist summarised the situation in this way: ‘there is no more widespread plasticage
[a term referring to the repression during Mobutu’s time, when plastic tape was used to shut meeting rooms
and press houses], but there is an alarming amount of self-censorship’.
The Federation Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH) is a well-known association of 154 human rights
organisations worldwide, linked to local networks and NGOs. It published a report on the DRC in July 2009,
documenting and denouncing the Congolese regime’s ‘authoritarian turn’. In 2009, human rights defenders
and democracy activists were arrested or questioned (such as Golden Misabiko and Robert Ilunga Numbi)
and Floribert Chebeya was found dead in June 2010. There is an increasing fear of expressing criticism
and a worsening environment for basic freedoms. The call for solidarity and support from fellow African,
Western and worldwide associations is loud and urgent in the Congo. As human rights are supported by
some international networks (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), DA has more specifically targeted
citizen activism. Since they are all related, this strategy is quite realistic and dynamic. For example, some
NED projects have sought to promote advocacy and public meetings with officials because the population is
not well-informed about its rights and needs assistance to defend them
The government has a very strong presence in public television and radio stations, and many parties own
their own media outlets. For instance, when FIDH published its report, information was only made available
through some newspapers in Kinshasa (many are owned by political parties and rather misinform people)
and Radio Okapi, which was created and funded by the international community. Another laudable exception
is the journal Le Souverain, one of the few publications without links to any party or church in eastern Congo.
Le Souverain is run by a small and motivated team in Bukavu who struggle to publish it – the press is only
available in Kinshasa – and is supported by a Belgium-based NGO. Other associations in the east, notably
3-Tamis, are carrying out very important work both to keep information and critical public opinion alive, and to
denounce the ongoing criminalisation of press freedoms. In September 2009, they protested at the provincial
assembly to raise awareness and lobby the provincial government. International support has been essential
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Assessing Democracy Assistance
May 2010
members of Congolese civil society. Much DA is currently directed to NGOs working on the media and with
women. One NGO in North Kivu (Association des Femmes et des Medias, AFEM) was able to use funds from
three different donors (including NED) to distribute 350 radios and batteries to women (at a cost of USD 5 per
set), and bought air time in several stations for women-focused programs. Supporting AFEM, DA improved
the local situation, for radios are usually owned and controlled by the men in the family.
The DRC institutions remain weak. Indeed, the High Authority for the Media was conceived as a pillar of the
transition with the role of watchdog, but governmental officials often disregard it. An activist denounced a case
when the UNDP organised a workshop with this institution: civil society members attended, but summoned
officials did not bother to come. Active repression still affects local programmes, radio stations and even the
international media. For example, in summer 2010, the Congolese government cut off the transmission of
Radio France Internationale (widely followed in the country) because of its criticism of the national army.
Locals consider media DA (especially radio) to be very important and think that support should continue.
In general, they appreciate the international interest and outreach that comes with this cooperation, but
currently fear that funding will run out or be increasingly restricted to specific projects (such as a cinema
festival) instead of daily functioning. Technical support and journalism training (even by Western interns for
2–3 month stints) is also greatly appreciated as this is not provided for locally. In this regard, the Congolese
do not fear a ‘neo-colonial attitude’ when they get help; instead they see it as a means for their emancipation
and hold on to their independence and choices, just like any other professional or activist in the world.
Local elections and decentralisation
Along with the peace agreements of 2001 came the commitment to a Congolese electoral process at local,
provincial and national (assembly and president) levels. The first election that took place was the constitutional
referendum of 2005. Then, many in the international community and in the Congo recommended organising
the local elections before the presidential and provincial ones, in order to create a democratic basis and build
institutions that were in direct contact with the people and their daily issues. However, budgetary problems
and a political priority at country-level prevented this, and national elections were held in 2006. These were
a breakthrough, but change and improvement have not materialised as expected.
Local elections are still pending and have not been a priority on the donors’ agenda, except for the DA
community. Only the UNDP is pushing for them because presidential elections are scheduled for 2011 and
there is risk of distortion if both are held together. Yet the Congolese political authorities are rightly viewed as
spoilers of this process, which people actually want. The national government refuses its share of the budget
for these elections, even if it is reduced to 19 per cent of staff costs for the Independent Electoral Commission
(CEI, by the French acronym), with the international community paying the rest. An interviewee explained
that ‘Congolese are paying the price of political quarrels’, and that ‘international pressure is still low’. Indeed,
the national assembly blocks the updating of electoral laws and CEI authority. The provincial assemblies
challenge the central authority and some block the voter registration process, as they are interested in
gerrymandering and overseeing the process.
This is further complicated by the fact that the decentralisation of the provinces differs in theory and in
practice: the 2005 Constitution has a ‘new distribution’ of 26 provinces, but this has not been carried out and
the old 11 provinces remain in function.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
Box 1: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(‘old’ provincial distribution)
Source: La documentation française
In a country as large and diverse as the DRC, decentralisation is necessary but also very complex, both
conceptually and pragmatically. It is difficult to strike a balance between a centralised state authority and
the provinces, and sub-dividing provinces such as Katanga is far from accomplished. This is where statebuilding and DA have to go hand in hand, but there has been no programming. Most Congolese blame
ongoing corruption, parochial self-interest and widespread impunity; a political activist described the situation
as a desperate ‘mobutuism without Mobutu’. DRC civil society denounces this; for example bishops and
university professors circulated two ‘open letters’ that were successfully publicised in the media. They also
denounce that the international community has not been critical enough of the situation, indirectly condoning
the regime.
Against this background, local civil society has mixed views on DA devoting disproportionate attention and
funds to the upcoming elections. Congolese interviewees urge the international community to uphold the
agenda with monitoring and observation as with the former electoral process. In their view, civil society
initiatives should not suffer cuts.13
Most agree on the importance of the local elections to create a new layer of authority closer to the people and
to finalise the transition. The head of the women’s association Renforcement du Leadership des Femmes
also suggests that the elections may provide a chance for some women to reach decision-making positions,
for they are largely absent from national and provincial politics, and are usually disregarded in political parties
and traditional chiefdoms.
Similarly, groups working on justice and human rights hope that they can pressure the authorities and political
parties.14 For this, they claim that they need more funds to counterbalance some candidates’ unfair campaigns
and to undertake civic education programmes. Along these lines, NED has financed some groups, such as
the Initiative Congolaise pour la Justice et Paix, which appreciate NED’s grant disbursement compared to
UNDP action. In their view UNDP often disregards ownership because local actors are brought in only at
implementation stages, and it focuses on technicalities.
Nevertheless, a member of Pole Institute, a think tank in Goma, fears that the elections might provide another chance for political parties to
instrumentalise the ethnic question, that is, to enhance allegiance and representation based on ethnic instead of political criteria.
14
One NGO has demanded the CEI to guarantee that convicted criminals will not become candidates and to lower the price of candidacy to avoid
elitism.
13
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A broader criticism is the lack of comprehensive DA. Some Congolese NGO members think donors should
envisage policies to improve party functioning in this incipient democracy. But donors are overwhelmed
with short-term difficulties, such as updating voters’ lists (managed by UNDP). This process is still in its initial
stages, as electoral kits from the previous elections are supposed to be used for some 2000 registration
desks country-wide, but staff training and payments have not been secured. The view on the ground is that
local elections and representatives’ accountability are crucial, but that the necessary means and enthusiasm
may falter. Disillusionment is also high because politicians elected in the past have not delivered on theis
promises. As some Congolese citizens need to walk 30 kilometre distances to register for the local elections,
their motivation may wane.
Capacity-building: targeting both the state and civil society
Both the state and civil society need DA in the DRC. The DRC maintains its full sovereignty, but the lack of
capacity and systemic bad governance make it a case for both democratisation and state-building. ‘Capacitybuilding’ seems to fill that gap, falling short of blank-cheque budgetary aid to the Kabila regime but also going
beyond civil society assistance and strengthening institutions.
The nuance is important here because many donors have decided to shift to budgetary aid in recent years.
The British DFID acknowledges that it is following this trend, underlining that state-building is a priority; the
European Union DRC Delegation also confirmed the overall shift to budgetary aid in summer 2009. Yet DFID
also maintains links with NGOs, especially large Western ones, such as Save the Children. Similarly, an EU
official confirmed ‘the participation of civil society’ as part of their aid programming. The question is whether
this will replace broader civil society support, and whether this will ‘corrupt’ civil society dynamics in the DRC.
The local view is that the donors’ shift is already having an impact on ‘softening’ Congolese civil society. When
they ask for ‘civil society participation’, donors introduce a form of conditionality where the DRC government
must accept civil society, but has ample leeway to co-opt the partners they prefer. This means competition,
division, and potential hypocrisy within civil society. In Kinshasa, where institutions and governmental bodies
are numerous, these dynamics are already visible in an ‘elite civil society’ disconnected from the grassroots
and involved in governmental and international circles.
More specific capacity-building programmes aiming to strengthen the public administration and democratise
its dynamics are needed, according to numerous interviewees. The EU currently has capacity-building
programmes in six provinces. An interesting case of international, African and Congolese cooperation is the
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the Programme de Renforcement des Capacités de la
Société Civile dans la Prévention et la Gestion des Conflits en Afrique Centrale (PREGESCO). The ACBF
works with the World Bank, UNDP and the African Development Bank as main donors, and involves the
Congolese organisation PREGESCO to implement its programmes on transparent and efficient management
of resources and staff. PREGESCO gets additional assistance from DFID, Japan and the Ford Foundation.
PREGESCO has managed to win international competitions for consultancy and training contracts, and
sometimes hires Western companies and consultants itself. It has offered capacity-building to the Congolese
state, for example attending cabinet meetings and giving comments on their functioning, and leading
workshops on management for different ministries and institutions. Different donors finance these workshops,
which can be for governmental or NGO actors. For example, DFID financed a capacity-building programme
for a ministry secretariat, while Oxfam financed one for members of selected NGOs. PREGESCO’s own
organisation seems exemplary; the organisation has a separate accountant for budget control, its vision is
long-term, and gender equality forms part of its culture. Some may consider the organisation an instance of
‘elite civil society’, but it also seems to be in active contact with the grassroots and open to cooperation. Another
interesting aspect is its regional scope, as eight countries15 in the region are integrated into PREGESCO and
seek to network and foster activities at the domestic level. Such Congolese civil society initiatives seem to
be doing excellent, professional work; they demand additional support and the international pressure for
transparency and efficiency, in order to change the widespread culture of corruption.
15
Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Chad, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
11
DA is also related to capacity-building in the field of justice and the rule of law, but here its impact has been
minimal. This is regrettable, but reform in this area is difficult to achieve. However, there were some positive
signs in 2009, such as the removal of several eminent judges following charges of corruption. This move
was welcomed in civil society, but interviewees agreed that a symbolic ‘purge’ is not enough. Impunity is
widespread and further complicated in the east in connection with violations by the military and armed groups.
Some reform and capacity-building programmes are currently underway there, financed by the European
Commission, Belgium and the Netherlands. This DA usually includes technical training and financing salaries
for officials in order to counter systematic bribes. These may remain mere drops in the ocean if international
pressure on the Congolese government is not effective. Political solutions are required to change entrenched
corruption, and international monitoring should continue. For example, an NGO in South Kivu claimed that
some Congolese judges refuse international colleagues in ‘compound’ courts on human rights because
they want to keep their prerogatives. But civil society members argue that the domestic processes are often
corrupt; that international lawyers bring in guarantees, and that Human Rights Watch, Global Rights, and
Amnesty International are still needed to voice the victims’ claims. DA can clearly make a difference in this
regard, but more and more imaginative programmes are needed to democratise public institutions without
undermining sovereignty.
How is Democracy assistance undertaken? Improving
the process
One finding of this research was that sometimes, the democracy assistance process weakens its impact;
problems arise in aid disbursement, dynamics among actors, and policy formation and implementation. Some
of the challenges to improve the accountability and efficiency of aid are widespread, and some lessons can
be learnt from past cases and experiences shared from one region to the other. Nevertheless, each case
also involves specific challenges, and this section focuses on three main findings from the DRC. Firstly,
North-South relations are sometimes perceived by local NGOs as unfair competition rather than partnership.
Secondly, religious actors play an exceptional role in the Congo, compared to other cases or regions. Thirdly,
awareness of strategic impact and efficiency is high and actors are tackling these questions.
Complexity of North-South relations
The DA network is a true example of ‘global civil society’; non-state actors share advocacy and expertise in
transnational networks. Yet it is also subject to the potential unbalance of donor-beneficiary relations. Funds
are usually raised in the North, while fieldwork takes place in the South. The wide range of actors, links and
power-relations involved may lead to North-South tensions in programme design, partner selection and aid
allocation. Local actors appreciate the expertise and interest from the North and understand donors’ concerns
about accountability and efficiency. Nevertheless, they would like to see improvements in DA procedures to
avoid hypocrisy and conditionality. In particular, interviewees underlined that locals hardly win any of the
large calls for proposals, which usually go to international, Western-based NGOs. ‘The West has a ‘return
guarantee’ system whereby they get back part of the aid they donate with jobs and business for them’, one
denounced.
There are problems in the procedure, with requisites and long applications that are not adapted to the
ground. A European Union official commented on their calls for Human Rights or Civil Society, illustrating
the complications and unrealistic requirements. ‘EU projects require that applicant NGOs prove that they
have managed funds of at least EUR 30,000 per year in the past, which local NGOs are highly unlikely to
have done’, she says. This excludes many valuable NGOs outright and reinforces the trend of ‘elite civil
society’, because NGOs that have succeeded in winning a past contract stand a higher chance of winning
again. Aware of the problem, the EU official argues that ‘an alternative for local NGOs is to partner up with
Northern NGOs’. As a result, some of the more established civil society actors, including associations,
universities or churches, do not even apply for these contracts. The EU receives 60–70 applications in
response to its annual and biannual calls, which are evaluated by a team in the Kinshasa delegation. The
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EU evaluation teams (comprising 2–3 people) do try to show good will, encouraging local NGOs to partner
up with European NGOs, but these may impose their own terms. The EU official acknowledged they tend
to consider candidates that ‘almost’ meet the EUR 30,000 condition, or NGOS that have managed such an
amount over several years. This shows flexibility, but most of the EUR 4.5 million (in a three-year programme)
will be ‘return guarantee’ because Western NGOs will win most of the contracts. Congolese actors denounce
this trend as ingrained in the system.16 Practical difficulties also arise, such as the need to write applications
in English, which is not widely spoken,17 or the requirement that project leaders hold degrees which they
cannot study for locally.18
Other difficulties are political and harder to tackle, but maintain North–South inequality. For example, OCHA
is responsible for reporting massacres and violations of human rights, but it only trusts large, international
NGOs as witnesses. They argue that local sources cannot be verified and may be inaccurate or politicised,
but local civil society finds this frustrating and highly problematic. For example, killings continue in the Cabinda
region, where the DRC state army is accused of abuse. There is no deployment of international NGOs there
because there is no security, hence there is no denouncing or campaigning, just a black hole of non-events.
There is no optimal solution to this, other than strengthening national–international links in DA: on the one
hand, locals do not feel supported by an international community that requires their ‘clearance’ to be credible
in their own country, but on the other hand, it is true that accusations or data might be falsified because of
the conflicts between factions.
Similarly, the Congolese claim that Western expatriates usually hold management positions for large
programmes and for provincial and national offices, and their salaries take up a big percentage of the
funds. This may be a way to avoid corruption and to bring in expertise, but it also gives the impression that
locals do not know how to communicate with headquarters, or are not trusted. In this way, for a project in
North Kivu financed by the European Union, 40 per cent of the funding went to EU staff and 7 per cent to
auditing processes, leaving 53 per cent for actual investment. Projects also frequently require the purchase
of Western materials. For example, a local recipient of an NDI-funded project in North Kivu (also involving
Burundi participants) argued that all cars, IT equipment and so forth had to be American brands, which are
always more expensive than others (especially the Chinese). NDI argues that it gets USAID waivers to
purchase non-US vehicles and that other purchases under this award did not involve geographical origin
requirements. This shows there is a history and embedded practices of Western politicisation in DA, but that
donors are tackling this shortcoming.
Indeed, there are many cases of fruitful and balanced North-South cooperation. One example is Oasis
Ndjili, an NGO in Kinshasa which grew from personal and small-group contacts between Belgian students
and the Congolese Committee for Human Rights and Development (CODHOC, by the French acronym), and
is currently registered both under Belgian and Congolese NGO laws. They developed projects on culture
and media, and later got to cooperate with other Congolese associations and Western NGOs, notably
under the Belgian framework 11.11.11.19 This case also demonstrates the links between state and non-state
actors. Oasis Ndjili survives through public aid granted by the Belgian institutions for Development and for
Culture, and EU funds, and members have sometimes used Belgian military flights for transport to and in
the Congo.
Another telling example is the Pole Institute, a think tank in Goma (North Kivu) that employs about 10 people
locally, and occasionally hires consultants or researchers from Western countries. It relies on international
networking and support from associates in the West to broaden its scope,20 but its work and perspectives
are grassroots-based. Donors welcome these opportunities but are sometimes disappointed because there
is no Congolese response. For example, UNDP launched a project (financed by DFID) involving Congolese
academics in democracy assessment, but this has been pending since 2008.
One NGO that won important contracts in the 2007 round had actually been created by former EU staff, so they knew many of the rules as
insiders and could adapt their application. Along the same lines, a large international organisation for the environment recently won a project on
food security, showing a drift from the local focus on poverty and underdevelopment towards the more international agenda of environmental
protection.
17
A member of an NGO in Bukavu mentioned that some NED calls had been in French in recent years, but at the start they were only in English.
18
For example, there is no degree in Journalism in Kivu universities.
19
11.11.11 is a Belgium-wide network of about 100 NGOs focusing on development cooperation; they claim their goals are advocacy, information
and project-funding.
16
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
13
North-South DA also benefits from regional forums, such as the Africa Democracy Forum (ADF) which is based
in South Africa and connected to the World Movement for Democracy. A regional meeting of the Forum took
place in Kinshasa in July 2009 and allowed democracy activists from Central and Western African countries
to exchange experiences and strengthen solidarity networks. This kind of activity must be organised very
carefully to avoid potential ‘NGO elitism’. Here, this was avoided by using the local relay structure to open up
the Forum. For example, a member of the NGO Anges du Ciel, who had been invited to the ADF, invited a
member of another NGO whose work in a Kinshasa neighbourhood she deemed important. International and
local organisers do their best to organise these kinds of events and maintain the networks, and civil society
activists think the experiences are very beneficial, despite the logistical and political challenges.
Cooperation with religious civil society actors
The role of religious actors in civil society is very important in the Congo and as such a particularity of this case
of DA. But this can also be enlightening when comparing with cases of DA in the Muslim world, where there
is a debate on whether to engage with religious actors. The Catholic Church has always been considered a
pillar of Congolese society, and many more churches are well established throughout the country (including
the Mennonites). They develop their own networks, such as the Église du Christ au Congo (ECC), and sisterassociations are often created by individuals or local groups to undertake community work, such as the
Fondation pour l’Éducation et la Famille (founded by a Jesuit father in the Plateaux Bateke north of Kinshasa
in 2003). Similarly, a considerable number of religious actors from Western countries are involved in projects
in the Congo, ranging from the renowned Comunità di Sant’Egidio and Secours Catholique to smaller groups
as Solidarité Protestante (Belgium), Misereor (Germany) or the Church of Sweden. The smaller groups may
be able to donate up to USD 150,000 per project.
Many of the religious groups undertake projects connected to development cooperation, including education
(e.g. opening a school or paying the school fees for poor students), agriculture (e.g. donating tractors), housing
and sanitation. In addition, they reinforce the links with peace and democracy (as part of the ‘virtuous circle’),
playing a key role in the implementation of policies on the ground. For example, religious groups have often
been in charge of civic education and made a great effort during the electoral process in 2005–6. Religious
personalities and authorities (bishops, the Episcopal Conference) can occupy key positions, for example
in the Independent Electoral Commission, and issue influential statements to criticise the government. The
international community cooperates with religious actors and often uses their logistics for transport or housing
as ‘safe’ channels to reach rural places and people. Indeed, these frameworks usually work better than, and
at times substitute, the state’s virtually inexistent public services.
Religious actors have been very active in two DA areas, namely the media, and conflict resolution or mediation.
Through the media, the churches inform citizens and raise public awareness of the state of reforms. In South
Kivu, Caritas has two radio and television programs a week that are very successful, inviting guests and
conducting political debates. Radio Mandeleo, which has operated in South Kivu since 1993, is associated
with the Catholic Church. It illustrates cooperation between international and national actors, as it is financed
by the NED, Misereor and the Institut PANOS Paris (an NGO devoted to the media) and brings in local
journalists. This station gives voice to a number of associations, including religious actors (several Dioceses,
Bahai, etc.). Religious groups have also contributed to attempts at conflict resolution and mediation, which
are indispensable in a war-torn country such as the DRC. While these groups may sometimes be ignored
by international diplomats in high circles and neglected by traditional forms of mediation, some individuals
and groups have proven very influential. In 2009, the Congolese government itself made an official call for
mediation with Rwandese and Congolese armed groups in the eastern provinces. There, the Église du Christ
au Congo (ECC) was essential in the negotiations with Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defence
of the People (CNDP, by the French acronym) that led to the current agreements. An ECC priest who has
been very active in these negotiations recommended that ‘when MONUC attempts the reintegration of rebels
in the Congolese army, it must move away military groups (or individuals) instead of keeping them in the
regions where they committed crimes’. Local religious actors offer very specific advice for the international
community, but they feel that their views are not taken into consideration.
The Pole Institute has cooperated with research partners at Tufts University (USA), International Alert (UK), Paarz (Project GTZ Switzerland
- Senegal), ISS (South Africa) and Caen University (France), among others. It has received funding from Evangelische Entwicklungsdienst (Germany), Novib (The Netherlands), the EU and DFID. More specifically, Tufts sends research interns to Goma and hosts a guest researcher from
the DRC.
20
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In the eyes of the Congolese population, religious groups have much more credibility than political actors,
and it seems positive that they are involved in issues such as the setting up of elections, civic education
and peace negotiations. Nevertheless, this maintains the afore-mentioned picture of opposition between a
democratic civil society and the state and institutions. In addition, religious actors have their own agendas,
which they convey in their civic education and activism and which may not coincide with state-wide, public
interest. For example, most churches strongly challenged the Maputo Protocol on the rights of women (a
protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights) and mobilised the population against its
ratification.21
Enhancing policy efficiency
Policy efficiency must be enhanced and Congolese actors suggest that both national and international
dynamics need change. In civil society, there is competition and instrumentalisation of DA as NGOs
sometimes try to raise their profiles instead of planning efficient policies. At state and international level,
the World Bank and OECD are debating guidelines on efficacy and the DRC participates actively. In this
regard, a high level forum was held in Kinshasa in 2009 as a first step to improving aid efficiency before
the international meeting that will take place in South Korea in 2011. This forum brought together staff from
several Congolese ministries and agencies as well as some of the donors. The resulting report identified as
main problems on the international side the lack of transparency, the short deadlines and the disconnection
from local priorities (as funds tend to be tied to ‘hot topics’). On the DRC side, the forum admitted to a useless
multiplication of committees and a lack of accountability. If the report circulates and the topic remains visible,
there might be increased pressure for change, but there is little evidence that these kinds of meetings and
official publications translate into new organisation and implementation.
Two issues are especially relevant to the question of efficacy in the Congo. The first concerns how DA tasks
should be divided up among local and international actors. Some believe that international practitioners
still do too much themselves and ultimately fail to empower Congolese civil society or institutions. As an
example, the head of CADICEC, an association fostering local private businesses, mentioned EISA and
the organisation of the 2006 elections. ‘EISA is an international NGO that won many international contracts
to organise the elections, bringing its own personnel and hiring many international citizens to undertake
voter registration, constitute the lists and manage IT, while few Congolese citizens participated’, he said.
‘As a result, now that expertise is needed again to organise the local elections, there is no local capacity,’
he argues. ‘Many students or young Congolese could have been trained and deployed back then, so that
the authorities would not be struggling with lack of personnel now’. Along the same lines, ballot papers and
materials for the poll stations all came from abroad instead of using or creating local production for long-term
efficiency. The donors understandably continue to distrust local and national institutions at times. EISA feels
that there is a lack of capabilities and an entrenchment of nepotism and corruption in Congolese political and
economic life that reach DA policies. DA efficacy thus belongs to political, and not only technical, agendas.
The second issue is whether Congolese civil society should unify or remain diverse at the risk of dispersion
and duplication. In the DRC, some NGOs call for more coordination in order to stand as ‘one voice’ against
abuse, and to cross-check the Kabila regime. In contrast, there are also calls from other NGOs to maintain
diversity, thematic expertise and, above all, independence for action: small Congolese NGOs fear they will
be instrumentalised in larger networks, and denounce the jockeying for funds and turf wars among bigger
actors. Indeed, in any healthy democracy civil society is diverse and actors are independent. Nevertheless,
at this stage networks and coordination would enhance grassroots contact, raise awareness and create
strategies at meso-level. Recipients underlined such dilemmas, beyond the usual criticisms about wasted
resources due to poor management, duplication and short-sighted policies, which they also acknowledged
as DA challenges.
Conclusion
Without doubt, international DA has been and continues to be essential for democratic prospects in the
Congo, and its impact has been significant and overall positive. This report has overviewed DA ‘on the
ground’, where international and local practitioners overwhelmingly agree that aid should continue. Their
The Protocol includes provisions regarding the right to separation or divorce and to fertility control (including abortion). This instrument was
signed by the DRC in 2003, but not ratified until February 2009.
21
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
15
observations and many examples offer new hints for donors and implementers to reverse negative trends
and increase efficiency. One generalised claim underlines the need for stronger political will and diplomatic
pressure to prevent the Kabila regime from backsliding. As a case of democratisation connected to statebuilding and post-conflict policies, the DRC faces some specific challenges, ranging from the constitution of
a national army (including factions and individuals that were former enemies) to the regional pacification of
the Great Lakes (including the cooperation of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi). But many of the challenges
it faces are simply typical of transition processes, including guaranteeing freedoms and rights, and the
democratisation of elites and institutions.
This report has focused on the experiences and observations of actors on the ground, and provided practical
feedback as well as an overall assessment of perceptions of DA in the Congo. Some lessons can be drawn
and translated into better practices at micro, meso and macro-level. DA should thus interiorise this feedback
along with lessons learned and, benefiting also from other experiences of democracy promotion, strengthen
its strategy for the DRC at the different levels.
At micro-level, local actors believe that they should have more input in defining the projects they work on, and
receive funds both to deliver output (workshops, media programmes, electoral observation, etc.) and to cover
basic institutional functioning (including salaries and premises) on a yearly or biannual basis. Efficacy is
often hindered due to numerous ‘distractions’ that make practitioners focus on the donor rather than on local
needs. North-South cooperation is appreciated, but the applications and contracts should be more adapted
to the field. Conditions or uneven partnerships should not be imposed on the Congolese.
At meso-level, there is a risk that ‘hot topics’ are prioritised to the detriment of others. For example, donors
in eastern Congo have moved away from the issue of child soldiers (popular four years ago) to the current
priority of sexual violence. Similarly, any overwhelming focus on elections should be thought through, as local
elections will only lead to representative authorities and decentralised power if there is accountability and
rule of law. The roles of political parties, parliament, and elements of checks and balances must materialise
through democratic functioning. Here, there is a need for better knowledge of the reality on the ground and
adapted knowledge of democratisation processes. Awareness of preconditions and of long-term strategic
thinking are often absent in DA, because donors and bureaucracy policy-makers have their own criteria, and
country expertise at this meso-level (not only on programmes at micro-level) is missing. DA donors must also
continue their efforts to coordinate under the World Bank or the EU’s Policy Coherence for Development, but
this is not enough. Local input and sensitivity to the national and international politics of reform should feed
into this knowledge and into the funding and implementation processes.
Finally, at macro-level, there is room for optimism: the DRC is now in a better, more democratic position
than back in the early 2000s and the 1990s. However, the international community must remain alert so that
democracy assistance does not turn into Kabila regime assistance. DA must target both state-building and
civil society: civil society must fulfil its democratic role of advocate and watchdog, but it is not a substitute
for the provision of security, welfare, infrastructures and legal order. The ‘virtuous circle’ of development,
peace and democracy seems to work within a state framework, so the shift to increased budgetary aid to
the DRC is understandable. But Congolese civil society also needs ongoing international support both to
denounce abuses and to evolve towards the kind of counterbalancing role found in mature democracies. For
the DRC to attain this, DA should develop better ways of breaking the dynamics of corruption and nepotism
in political elites and institutions, and international donors should complement their policies with political will
and pressure. Powerful civil society activism and free media are indispensable in guaranteeing the people’s
rights, and in generating long-term, systemic change in the institutions. DA is still needed, but ultimately it will
be Congolese political elites and civil society that embed democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo
institutions and functioning, so that the country can live up to its name.
Project Report:
Assessing Democracy Assistance
May 2010
16
Appendix: Country Report Methodology
Scope and aims of this report
This report assesses external democracy assistance in one country according to the views of local democracy
stakeholders.
The report does not aspire to provide an exhaustive record of external democracy assistance to the country
in question. Neither does it aspire to be a representative survey among local civil society at large. The scope
of this project allows reports to provide only a rough sketch of external democracy assistance to the country
assessed, and of the tendencies of local civil society activists’ views on the latter.
Sample of interviews
The report’s findings are based on a set of personal interviews that were carried out by the author between
spring and autumn 2009.
For each country report, between 40 and 60 in-country interviews were carried out. The mix of interviewees
aimed to include, on the one hand, the most important international donors (governmental and nongovernmental, from a wide range of geographic origins), and on the other hand, a broad sample of local
democracy stakeholders that included human rights defenders, democracy activists, journalists, lawyers,
political party representatives, women’s rights activists, union leaders and other stakeholders substantially
engaged in the promotion of democratic values and practices in their country. Wherever possible, the
sample of interviewees included representatives from both urban and rural communities and a selection
of stakeholders from a broad range of sectors. While governmental stakeholders were included in many of
the samples, the focus was on non-governmental actors. Both actual and potential recipients of external
democracy support were interviewed.
Donors
The term ‘donor’ is here understood as including governmental and non-governmental external actors
providing financial and/or technical assistance in the fields of democracy, human rights, governance and
related fields. Among all the donors active in the country, authors approached those governmental and nongovernmental donors with the strongest presence in this sector, or which were referred to by recipients as
particularly relevant actors in this regard. An exhaustive audit of all the donors active in this field/country is
not aspired to as this exceeds the scope of this study. While many donors were very open and collaborative
in granting interviews and providing and confirming information, others did not reply to our request or were
not available for an interview within the timeframe of this study. While we sought to reconfirm all major factual
affirmations on donor activities with the donors in question, not all donors responded to our request.
We do not work to a narrow or rigid definition of ‘democracy support’, but rather reflect donors’, foundations’
and recipients’ own views of what counts and does not count as democracy assistance. The fact that this is
contentious is part of the issues discussed in each report.
Anonymity
External democracy assistance to local activists is a delicate matter in all the countries assessed under this
project. It is part of the nature of external democracy assistance that local non-governmental recipients,
especially when openly opposed to the ruling establishment, fear for their reputation and safety when
providing information on external assistance received to any outlet that will make these remarks public. In a
similar vein, many donor representatives critical of their own or other donors’ programmes will fear personal
consequences when these critical attitudes are made public on a personal basis. In the interest of gathering
a maximum of useful information from our interviewees and safeguarding their privacy and, indeed, security,
we have ensured that all interviewees who requested to remain anonymous on a personal and/or institutional
basis have done so.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Cristina Barrios
17
Interview methodology
In order to carry out field work, authors were provided with a detailed research template that specified 7 areas
of focus:
1.A brief historical background and the state of democracy in the country;
2.A short overview of donor activities;
3.A general overview of local views on impact of democracy aid projects on the micro, meso and macro
levels (including best practices and variations of the local and international understandings of the concept
of ‘democracy’);
4.Local views on specific factors that have weakened the impact of democracy aid;
5.Local views on diplomatic back-up to aid programmes (including conditionality; diplomatic engagement;
donor coordination; relevance, quality, quantity and implementation of programmes, etc);
6.An illustration of the above dynamics in one or two key sectors of support;
7.A conclusion outlining the main tendencies of local views on external democracy assistance.
Along these lines, semi-structured one-on-one interviews were carried out by the authors in the country
between spring and autumn of 2009.
Key sectors of support
Transitions to democracy are highly complex political, economic and social processes. No study of this scope
could aspire to fully justice to them, or to external assistance to these processes. Aware of the limitations
of our approach, we have encouraged authors to let their general assessment of local views on external
democracy support be followed by a closer, slightly more detailed assessment of the dynamics in one or two
key sectors of support. These were chosen by the respective authors according to their estimated relevance
(positively or negatively) in the current democracy assistance panorama. In none of the cases does the
choice of the illustrative key sectors suggest that there may not be other sectors that are equally important.
Project Report:
Assessing Democracy Assistance
May 2010