Magic: A Problem in Semantics
DOROTHY HAMMOND
Brooklyn College, C.U.N.Y.
Anthropologists, from TyIor to the present, have so defined magic that, although it might
shade into or overlap with religion, it is a separate phenomenon distinct from religion.
Theorists have made differentfeatures the chief means of differentiation, but no matter
how defined the distinction cannot be easily or consistently maintained. This paper
suggests that the concept of magic as a distinct entity is the factitious result of ethnocentric classification, and that magic should be included within religion as one fype o f
the practices of which religious ritual is composed. [magic; reltgion; theory, history ofl
T
HE PUBLICATION OF a considerable
number of articles, compilations, and
monographs during the last decade testifies
to movement of the anthropological study of
religion out of its long stay in the doldrums.
Reawakened theoretical interest has been
accompanied by renewal attacks on the
perdurable problem of definition. Current
definitions are not sufficiently incisive. To define religion in Tillich’s terms as “the ultimate
concern” leads to the possible inclusion of
anything from politics to sport and thus cannot single out a specific cultural institution.
The even more prevalent definition by reference to a dichotomy between secular and sacred, the idea of the “set apart,” is a mere
circularity, religion being the attribution of
religious significance. Recent attempts at
definition aim less at universal essences than,
more modestly, at a clear designation of the
topic. The need to provide a ready index for
identification has led a number of anthropologists to resume Tylor’s position that religion entails a belief in spiritual beings
(Goody 1961; Horton 1960; Spiro 1966).
Consistency in the application of Tylor’s
definition commits these writers to another
of his concepts, that magic is to be considered as separate from religion. Spiro thus
includes magic with politics and art as functional alternatives to religion (1966: 116).
Horton describes magic as *’secular’’ (1960:
218). This logical consequence of the definition is disconcerting, for it contains what apAccepted for publication 20 November 1969.
pears to be an inherent contradiction between the ideas of “secular” and “supernatural.” Moreover, the ethnographic data compel recognition that a sharp distinction between magic and religion can hardly be sustained. Spiro, in the course of making a
point about religion in his narrow sense of
the term, illustrates his argument with a
magical belief (1966: 110). This may be the
result of momentary carelessness, but Spiro’s
slip does demonstrate the difficulty of maintaining consistency in the differentiation.
Evans-Pritchard, who also advocates a
clear distinction between magic and religion
(1965:33), attributes the confusion concerning their relationship to semantic difficulties (1965:llO). By this he means the
problems of translating the diverse terminologies from various cultures into anthropological categories. But the semantic problem
is in reality twofold: it consists not only of
the difficulties of translation, but also the
more elementary issue of what anthropologists mean by their own concepts.
As a general rule, twentiethcentury anthropologists do not dichotomize magic and
religion. They tend rather to hyphenate
them and refer explicitly or implicitly to
some sort of continuum. However, the conception of magic and religion as overlapping
or intergrading phenomena still conveys the
idea that the terms denote at least partially
distinct entities. Despite the overlap, they
contrast sufficiently to indicate that the
terms have the same hierarchical status in a
classikation of belief systems.
1349
1350
American Anthropologist
The consensus on some distinction between magic and religion is limited to the
idea that there is a distinction. Beyond this,
a review of the literature discloses irreconcilable disagreements among theorists, as
well as inconsistencies within discussions
and discrepancies between conceptual
schemes and ethnographic data. The source
of the difficulty may well lie in the distinction itself. If the idea that magic and religion have equal categorical status is rejected
and magic subordinated within the more inclusive category, it follows that the distinction makes a part into an equivalent and
separate whole. This mixing of levels of
classification would account for the continuing confusion of which Evans-Pritchard so
justly complains. Anthropologists have been
struggling with the spurious, and therefore
insoluble, problem of the extent and content
of the contrast between religion and magic.
The real problem is what is the place of
magic in religion; how does the part fit into
the whole?
Like most ethnological terminology, religion and magic are words in common usage.
Their employment to classify institutions of
other cultures has necessitated radical redefinition to free the terms from their cultural
matrix and to eliminate inherent value judgments. To what extent all ethnocentrism has
been overcome is open to question. Ward H.
Goodenough holds that anthropological usage still expresses ethnocentric rather than
objective judgment (1963:480). The fact
that current usage continues to reflect theories of nineteenth-century evolutionists supports his charge. The delineation of magic as
a distinct anthropological category is more
the work of Frazer than of any other single
theorist. By redefining religion as belief in
spiritual beings, Tylor had made it possible
to include a wide variety of belief systems in
the same category as Christianity. Magic,
however, he discussed merely as a survival;
thus relegated, the term retained its pejorative connotation (Tylor 1889: Vol. 1, Ch. 4).
Frazer, however, related magic more closely
to religion, although an underlying ethno-
[72, 1970
centrism assigned magic to an earlier stage
in the evolution of belief systems. Because
he accepted Tylor’s definition of religion,
personification served to differentiate between the earlier and later stages. Unlike religion, magical belief lacks personification,
and its practices exploit supernatural mechanisms (Frazer 1900:48-60). These two
characteristics-impersonal forces and manipulative techniques-remain
as current
critical diagnostic features.
Durkheim and Malinowski each added
another dimension to the definition of
magic. Durkheim based his distinction on
the organization of personnel: religion involves the community and establishes a
church, but magic concerns individuals and
forms only a clientele (1915:4345). Malinowski focused on the purposes of ritual. He
attributed intangible, long-term goals to religious rituals in contrast to the employment
of magic to supplement inadequacies in
technology for the achievement of concrete,
immediate ends ( 1948:67-70).
Because most supernatural belief systems
contain both personified and nonpersonified
conceptions of supernatural power, the criterion of personification only rarely permits
definite assignment. Frazer was entirely
aware of this fact, which he accounted for
as part of the evolutionary sequence. Such
beliefs represented transitions from magic to
religion or the conservative retention of
older elements into the later stage. But without the explanation provided by an evolutionary doctrine, the intermediate is merely
indeterminate, and much of the ethnographic data demonstrate the inadequacy of
the criterion.
The differentiation made by Durkheim received one of its most direct attacks from
Warner on the basis of his fieldwork in
Australia (1937:229-243). Among the
Murngin, the same totemic rituals are used
for individual therapy as for communal welfare; the community is directly or indirectly
participant in transactions between the magician and client, and thus magic has a
church no different from religion. Other de-
HAMMOND]
Magic: A Problem in Semantics
1351
scriptive materials bear out Warner’s point on the conception of supernatural power.
that the line between public and private is Benedict described religion as entailing two
extremely tenuous.
polar attitudes, one of which might predomiMalinowski’s contrast between the practi- nate in a given instance, but both might be
cal goals of magical ritual and the broad so- expressed simultaneously. These attitudes
cial values fostered by religious ritual seems Benedict termed “animism,” Tylor’s conto hinge more on terminology than on sub- cept, and “animatism,” adapted from Marstance. The difference seems to be a stylistic ett. Marett had coined “animatism” to desigchoice of concrete or abstract phrasing. nate a primitive diffuse supernaturalism
Trobriand garden magic for a plentiful har- from which animism and mana had both
vest contributes not only to subsistence but evolved (1914: 14). In Benedict’s usage, adalso to those values to Trobriand ethos ex- mism reflects “mads experience with perpressed in the production of excessive sons” and animatism reflects their “experiamounts of food and its lavish display. The ence with things” (1938:647). Practice folanalysis of what social values mean in spe- lows concept: where the supernatural is percific terms often reveals that the “good life” sonified, ritual strives for rapport; where the
of a people entails, or is symbolized by, supernatural is impersonal, ritual strives for
good crops or increase in cattle herds or control. Mana and its analogues-wakan,
some equally material good. And it is more manitu, and orenda-conceptualize the imthe symbolic significance of these items than personal supernatural. Magic falls neatly
the technological uncertainty that tends to into place as the body of formalized procesurround them with ritual (W. H. Good- dures by which such power is controlled and
utilized.
enough 1963:478; Nadel 1957:193).
Goode, like Benedict, dismisses dichotWhen applied to ethnographic data, none
of these theories completely differentiates omy in favor of a continuum. Unlike Benemagic from religion even in regard to the se- dict, he does not bypass the different criteria
lected critical trait. Nor do they correlate suggested by various theorists but boldly atwith one another; the increase ceremonies tempts to overcome the contradictions
of the Arunta are classed as religion by within and among the separate schemes by
Durkheim but magic by Frazer, and Tro- combining them all into a single structure.
briand garden rituals, which Malinowski His suggested bipolar continuum opposes
terms magic, would be religion according to ideal types of magic and religion in which
Durkheim. If more features are taken into magic contrasts with religion in the concrete
specificity of its goals, its manipulative attiaccount, the line blurs all the more.
Marett is probably the best-known early tude, instrumental character, belief in impertheorist to advance the concept of a magi- sonal power, professional-client relationcoreligious continuum (1914:28). He con- ships, individualism, voluntarism, and uncurred in Frazer’s concept of magic as an scheduled performance ( 1951:52-55).
earlier stage of religion, but his own judgGoode’s model rests on the expectation
ment that belief in mana was as much reli- that on analysis the descriptive data will
gion as animism led him to reject personifi- form significant clusters toward the two
cation as a main criterion and to reject a poles. If the traits do not exhibit substantial
clear-cut distinction between magic and reli- correlation, the ideal types are merely hypogion.
thetical constructs. There seems to have
Benedict, far more than Marett, cogently been little testing of the actual extent of corformulated the idea that magic and religion relation on which the relevance of Goode’s
form a continuum. She disregarded evolu- model depends. Notable exceptions, howtionary sequence and put aside most of the ever, come readily to mind. Australian indiscrepant subsidiary criteria to concentrate crease ceremonies are manipulative but
1352
American Anthropologist
communal and obligatory. Trobriand garden
ritual is instrumental with specific concrete
goals, but it is also obligatory, communal,
and calendrical. Among the Zuni, the gods
may be manipulated rather than supplicated.
Bunyoro magic horns used instrumentally in
behalf of a client become “personalized”
(Beattie 1967:229).
Of the two continuum models, Benedict’s
has had wider influence. Her comprehensive
and economical theory, Norbeck (1961 :35)
notes, provides the conceptual basis implicit
in the analyses of many ethnologists. A sampling of the literature confirms Norbeck’s
comment. There is some shying away from
the term “supernatural”; “nonempirical” is
substituted as though “empirical” were any
less a category of the observer than “natural.” An occasional obeisance is made to
other variables, but discussions largely tend
to follow Benedict’s emphasis on conceptions of supernatural power and the modes
of access to it.
In much of the writing the terms most
frequently associated with magic are “impersonal,” “mechanical,” “automatic,” “compulsive,” “coercive,” “efficient,” “learned
techniques,” and “acquired skills.” Such associations indicate that usage gives more
weight to the employment of power than to
the nature of the power. This emphasis
seems a natural corollary of the shifts in anthropological interest. Nineteenth-century
theorists such as Tylor and Frazer were primarily concerned with the cognitive function of religion. For a considerable time
thereafter, attention turned to sociological
and affective functions. Discussions of these
subjects could refer to the procedures of
magic without much concern for the conception of its power.
More recently, however, reflecting general
intellectual interest in problems of meaning,
anthropologists are again turning to the
study of how men create a meaningful order
out of their experiences in a chancy and indifferent universe: “attempts to provide orientation for an organism which cannot live
in a world it is unable to understand”
(Geertz 1968:314). In Benedict’s analysis
[72, 1970
of primitive religion magic clearly has cognitive value. Benedict, like Marett, relied on
mana or mana-like concepts to explicate the
world view implicit in magic.
The critics of this interpretation have
pointed out its major flaw. Malinowski
surely goes too far in his dismissal of mana
concepts as part of religion at all (1948:
58). Norbeck, however, justly contends that
many ethnographic accounts of magic describe no such concept nor indicate that the
practitioners of magic entertain any idea of
this kind ( 1963 :5 10). Apparent logical necessity or desire for a neat theory are insufficient grounds for imputing its covert presence.
Norbeck (1961 :49), therefore, suggests
that religion includes three power concepts:
personified power, impersonal power such as
mana, and “a conception of supernatural efficiency or power inherent in certain mechanical cause and effect sequences.” In
short, although some magical practices can
be related to mana, a large residue appears
as unexplained automatic efficacy. Magic exploits a seeming cause-and-effect sequence
without any accounting for either the nature
of the cause or the nexus between them.
Some anthropologists take this quality of being inexplicable to be the very essence of
what constitutes magic. It is a “mysterious
art” (Bidney 1963 5 0 5 ) ; magic lacks theory
(Howells 1948:49); magic has no cosmological content (Middleton 1967: ix); magic
specifically refers to that which cannot be
made orderly and comprehensible (Galtier
19635 0 6 ) .
If magical systems are without rationale
or meaning, it is their pervasiveness and persistence that are truly inexplicable. Magic is
presumed to have only expressive functions
and an attributed instrumental utility. But it
is most unlikely that magic can have these
values for human beings unless they somehow perceive its relevance to their conception of reality. Otherwise, magic is utterly
anomalous-a symbol without a referent, a
projection without a source.
There are substantial data to show that
such a position is hardly tenable. The fairly
Magic: A Problem in Semantics
HAMMOND]
frequent attribution of all deaths and major
misfortunes to witchcraft and sorcery, for
example, patently demonstrates cognition in
magic. Witchcraft and sorcery reflect social
conflict and obviously express hostility and
resentment of loss. Rituals are used as instruments of prevention and vengeance, but
they also express a cosmology. The cosmos
is held to be benign or neutral; evil derives
from the character of human beings. No
matter how elliptically phrased, it is a seriQUS statement about the nature and locus of
evil.
Primitive societies rarely produce their
own theologians. Usually the task of abstracting conceptual content from symbolic
expression in myth and ritual devolves on
ethnologists who have tended to concentrate
on myth. Kluckhohn (1965: 147) suggests
that the preference reflects the importance
of statements of belief in Western religions.
Perhaps it has seemed easier to move from
one set of words-the myth-to another set
of words-a statement of its meaning-than
to translate rituals into statements. That
which is communicated by a gesture is often
hard to put into words.
With difficulty or not, a reasonably close
reading of the anthropological literature discloses that magic ritual does indeed communicate its meaning. The gesture is understood, but the commenters seem to resist
recognizing their own insight. Those who
deny cognition in magic seem not to be listening to what they themselves say. Howells,
for example, in one passage finds no adequate explanation for the potency of magic
(1948:49-50); elsewhere he writes that
magic gives man the “conviction that he can
take care of himself. . . Man can put his
best foot forward with magic; he can act on
his own behalf. . (1948:63).
Statement after statement can be found
that point to the central concept in magic.
“In magic man depends on his own strength
. .” (Frazer 1900:711). “Magic is the one
and only specific power, a force unique of
its kind, residing exclusively in man. .”
(Malinowski 194856). “Magic is not
thought to take place by itself.
It is only
.
.”
.
.
.. .
1353
when men make magic . . . that results are
to be expected” (Beattie 1964:206). Magic
“is never looked upon as one of the forces
of nature which can be utilized by man, but
is regarded as a cherished cultural possession which derives its powers from man’s
abstinence and from his knowledge of tradition” (Evans-Pritchard 1967:4). The power
that makes magic effective is a projection of
man’s capacity to act effectively by means of
his knowledge and skill.
Analysis of myths for the meaning of
magic also seems to have encountered some
anthropological resistance. It is true, as Nadel remarks, that there are magical systems
without associated myths (1957: 192); but
this sometimes can also be said of other
kinds of rituals. According to Evans-Pritchard, the relatively few Zande myths about
magic do not account for its power (1967:
10-12). Although Trobriand mythology is
much richer, Malinowski emphasized that it
too lacks such explanation (1948: 117).
There are, however, myths elsewhere that do
have bearing on what magic signifies. In
Winnebago mythology Hare achieves a
sense of identity with his human kinsmen;
with the acquisition of arrows, a bow, and
the skill to use them he acquires the symbolic essence of human culture. And thus, as
the exemplar of what is truly human, he
proceeds to make curing rituals (Radin
1948).
It is hard to see how a myth could more
plainly state its meaning than the Nupe myth
that tells of a man who once attempted to
seek out god. His long arduous quest was
fruitless, and he returned to report that god
was both distant and indzerent. Men, therefore, must help themselves by learning how
to make “medicine” (Nadel 1954: 17-18).
The reluctance to find the rituals and myths
of magic meaningful might hint that anthropologists too share the attitude Malinowski
(194851 ) describes: “ ‘Magic’ seems to stir
up in everyone some hidden mental forces,
some lingering hopes in the miraculous,
some dormant beliefs in man’s mysterious
possibilities.”
These human potentialities are not 80
American Anthropologist
1354
mysterious. Norbeck (1961 : 5 0 ) suggests
that magic has its mundane analogue in
technology. To a certain extent this is obviously true, and yet it seems to miss the main
point. Horton (1968:66) argues that a technological prototype tends to give rise to explanatory models that are secular or scientific in character. Although this sequence
need not be universally true, it supports the
idea that magic and technology per se are
not closely linked. Magic seems to concern
techniques far less than the user’s skill,
knowledge, or talents. Leach’s comment that
mark. But “libido” in the strictly psychotency” (1967:98) is perhaps closer to the
the mark. But “libido” in the strictly psychoanalytic sense-and judging by the tenor of
his article that is how Leach means itscarcely refers directly to man’s capacity for
effective action on the basis of culturally acquired skills. Lhi-Strauss plainly considers
magic to be a projection of human action,
but he does not make entirely clear the
grounds for his interpretation. Moreover, his
analysis seems to involve an unnecessarily
complex sequence of processes of projection, introjection, and reprojection ( 1966:
220-22 1)
On the whole, it seems both economical
and reasonable to reinterpret Norbeck‘s
triad of power concepts on the basic assumption that these are best understood as
projective symbols. The power of spiritual
beings reflects the authority of other people.
(Whether this is the authority of the clan as
Durkheim had it or that of the father in the
Freudian view is here immaterial.) Magical
power reflects the capabilities of the self,
and mana, the dynamic forces of the physical universe.
Man’s ability to acquire skills and use
them to shape his world is thus projected as
one of the universal superordinate powers.
The traditional hostility between deistic belief and magical belief is understandable. An
ideology that holds man to be wholly dependent on powerful gods must view a conception of man as one of the ruling forces in
the cosmos as hubris of a most literal and
damnable kind.
.
[72, 1970
Erwin R. Goodenough, discussing the
persistence of magical practices in Judaism,
writes that religious symbols “originally of
direct and inherent power
have gradually been made to refer in addition to more
remote spiritual forces” (1953: 160). The
use of the adjective “remote” is highly suggestive. In small-scale societies, effective action is performed by the self and by familiar
others. In large-scale societies, the exercise
of power by distant authorities or even unknown agents may provide the source for
the projection of “remote spiritual forces.”
But the immediacies are never wholly superseded, and even those religions that place
most weight on a transcendent omnipotent
deity retain practices expressing the projection of the immediate.
Spiro, who defines religion narrowly as
belief in superhuman beings, argues that the
child‘s dependency on adults “develops images of powerful figures” and that these
“deep-seated perceptive sets, acquired in the
very early experience of the child, comprise
the essential basis for the actor’s conviction
that the beliefs which comprise the religious
tradition of his society are true” (1964:
113). On the same basis it can be argued
that the validity of magical belief is equally
rooted in the child’s experience. The child
quite early discovers his own power to summon and dismiss, to grasp and release, to
build and destroy. Maturation and enculturation further his sense of mastery, and this
experience will be repeated every day of his
effectively functioning life. Magic is no mere
compensatory fantasy to palliate the inadequacies of primitive technologies. The simpler hand technologies would more likely induce a greater sense of mastery than machine technolog, no matter how productive
and efficient. Witness the satisfaction in
building a fire, even with the help of a box
of matches and the Sunday paper, compared
to resetting the thermostat. Moreover, it is
not the incompetents of a society who are
granted magical power.
The awareness of the power of the self is
by no means necessarily limited to mastery
over technological processes and material
...
HAMMOND]
Magic: A Problem in Semantics
objects. Although it is the dependency of the
child that “develops images of powerful figures,” this need not develop an accompanying feeling of utter helplessness. The beloved
child in almost any society may well have a
keen sense of his own ability to manipulate
adults, In the give-and-take of intimate association those in subordinate positions are not
without means to gain compliance with their
desires from their superiors. And those in
positions of authority are obviously able to
control the actions of other people.
One must also recognize that beliefs in
impersonal power, such as mana, have an
equally early and significant base in the
child‘s experience with pressure, motion,
heat, light, and all the other manifestations
of a dynamic universe. There has been no
attempt in this paper to analyze mana concepts. It has, however, been assumed that
the existence of impersonal power is one of
the fundamental postulates of many religions.
The position that religious cosmology is
comprised of three equally legitimate concepts of superordinate power makes the reality of magic as a separate entity altogether
doubtful. The potency symbolized in magical practices is interwoven with the other
powers. It can be used to exploit mana or
constrain the gods. Conversely, such power
may be the gift of a supernatural being. It
seems appropriate then to limit the range of
meaning of the term-to restrict “magic” to
the designation of mechanical religious practices. This is, in effect, the way many anthropologists actually use the term, although
they do so without any explicit rationale.
Magic would serve as a denotation for one
type of ritual behavior, and thus belong to
the set of terms in that category, such as
prayer or sacrifice. With these propitiatory
rites it is contrastive, not with religion.
Just as prayer and sacrifice express the belief that the universe is governed by personified beings whom one can reach by words
and gifts, so magical practices express the
belief in human powers as effective forces.
The use of such practices in rituals addressed to the gods is not a discordant intru-
1355
sion of magic into religion. The composite
ritual states-that the gods do not rule done;
their will and power are accompanied by the
will and power of men.
Examination of the concept indicates that
the distinction between magic and religion,
whether phrased as dichotomy or polarity, is
unwarranted. Magic is not an entity distinct
from religion but a form of ritual behavior
and thus an element of religion. That the
distinction has led only to confusion supports the judgment that the abstraction is
based on misinterpretation. It has not only
falsified the relation between religion and
magic, and led to obscurantism concerning
magic, but it has also given rise to a truncated concept of religion as a whole. The
cosmological concepts inherent in religions
are more complex than belief in spiritual beings only. Because the index of “belief in superhuman beings” recognizes only one aspect of religion, it seems preferable to substitute the definition that religion entails belief in superordinate agencies.
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