Power of Propaganda by David Welch
Source
History Today, August 1999
Power of Persuasion - Propaganda
David Welch
David Welch argues that propaganda has had an essential, and not always dishonourable,
role in conduct of affairs in the twentieth century.
PROPAGANDA,' SAID ITS MOST NOTORIOUS EXPONENT, Josef Goebbels, `is a much
maligned and often misunderstood word. The layman uses it to mean something inferior or
even despicable. The word propaganda always has a bitter after-taste.' Goebbels was
speaking in March 1933 immediately after his appointment as Minister for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda in Hitler's first government, a role in which he was to do more
than most to ensure and perpetuate that `bitter after-taste'.
`But,' Goebbels continued:
If you examine propaganda's most secret causes, you will come to different conclusions: then
there will be no more doubting that the propagandist must be the man with the greatest
knowledge of souls. I cannot convince a single person of the necessity of something unless I
get to know the soul of that person, unless I understand how to pluck the string in the harp of
his soul that must be made to sound.
It is ironic that Goebbels should set himself the mission of rescuing propaganda from such
misconceptions, for it is largely as a result of Nazi propaganda that it has come to have such
pejorative associations. Modern synonyms for propaganda include `lies', `deceit', and
`brainwashing'. It is a widely-held belief that propaganda is a cancer in the body politic to be
avoided at all costs.
But is this really the case? Propaganda in itself is not necessarily something evil. Throughout
history the governors have always attempted to influence the way the governed see the
world. Propaganda is not simply what the other side does, while one's own side concentrates
on `information' or `publicity'. Modern dictatorships have never felt the need to hide from the
word in the same way that democracies have done. As the Nazis had their Ministry of
Propaganda, so the Soviets had their Propaganda Committee of the Communist Party, while
the British had a Ministry of Information, and the USA an Office of War Information.
The origins of the word can be traced back to the Reformation. The Catholic Church found
itself struggling to maintain and extend its hold in non-Catholic countries. A Commission of
Cardinals was set up by Pope Gregory XIII (r. 1572-85), charged with spreading Catholicism
and regulating ecclesiastical affairs in non-Catholic lands. A generation later, in 1622,
Gregory XV made the Commission permanent, as a sacred congregation de propaganda fide,
tasked to manage foreign missions and financed by a `ring tax' assessed on each newlyappointed cardinal. The first official propagandist institute was therefore a body charged with
improving the dissemination of a group of religious dogmas. The word `propaganda' came to
be applied to any organisation set up to spread a doctrine; then it was applied to the doctrine
itself which was being spread; and lastly to the methods employed in the dissemination.
During the English Civil Wars, propaganda by pamphlet and news-letter was a regular
accessory to military action, Cromwell's army being concerned almost as much with the
spread of religious and political doctrines as with victory in the field. The employment of
propaganda increased steadily, particularly at times of ideological struggle such as the
American War of Independence and the French Revolutionary wars. For example, the
Girondist faction distributed broadsheets among enemy troops offering rewards for desertion.
In the hundred years from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the Great War
there were no revolutionary wars in Europe, and thus few occasions where intense
propaganda, on a national scale, was called for.
In 1914-18 the wholesale employment of propaganda by both sides as a weapon of war
served to transform its meaning into something sinister. The First World War demonstrated
that public opinion could no longer be ignored as a determining factor in the formulation of
government policy. Morale came to be recognised as a significant military factor, and in
Britain propaganda began to emerge as the principal instrument of control over public opinion.
This process culminated in the establishment of the Ministry of Information in 1917 under the
press magnate Lord Beaverbrook, and a separate Enemy Propaganda Department at Crewe
House under Beaverbrook's rival Lord Northcliffe. By means of strict censorship and tightlycontrolled propaganda campaigns, the press, films, leaflets and posters were all utilised and
co-ordinated in an unprecedented way to disseminate `officially' approved themes.
Britain's wartime consensus held firm, partly through the skilful use made by the government
of propaganda and censorship. After the war, however, mistrust developed on the part of
ordinary citizens who realised that conditions at the front had been deliberately obscured
behind patriotic slogans and by `atrocity propaganda' that had fabricated obscene stereotypes
of the enemy. The population also felt cheated that their sacrifices had .not resulted in the
promised `land fit for heroes'. Propaganda became associated with falsehood, and the
Ministry of Information was wound up. The government itself regarded propaganda as
politically dangerous and even morally unacceptable in peacetime. It was, as one official
wrote in the 1920s, `a good word gone wrong -- debauched by the late Lord Northcliffe'. The
dislike of propaganda was so deep that when in the Second World War the government
attempted to `educate' the population on the existence of Nazi concentration camps, the
information was widely suspected of being `propaganda', and not believed.
Britain's propaganda in the First World War provided the Germans with a fertile source of
counter-propaganda against the Versailles peace treaties and the Weimar Republic. Writing
in Mein Kampf, Hitler noted:
'In the year 1915, the enemy started his propaganda among our soldiers. From 1916 it
steadily became more intensive, and at the beginning of 1918, it had swollen into a storm
cloud. One could now see the effects of this gradual seduction. Our soldiers learned to think
the way the enemy wanted them to think.'
By maintaining that the German army had not been defeated on the battlefield but had
succumbed to a disintegration of its morale, fed by skilful British propaganda, Hitler was
providing historical legitimacy for the `stab-in-the-back' legend. Regardless of the true role
played by British -- or Bolshevik -- propaganda in Germany's collapse, it was widely believed
that Britain's 1914-18 experiment in propaganda had been a great success, and provided the
blueprint for other governments to follow. Hitler himself paid the British a compliment when he
wrote:
Germany had failed to recognise propaganda as a weopon of the first order whereas the
British had employed itt with great skill and ingenious deliberation.
It was no surprise that he established a Ministry of Propaganda under Goebbels as one of his
first acts on assuming power in 1933.
The function of propaganda, the Nazi leader argued, was to bring the attention of the masses
to certain facts, processes and necessities `whose significance is thus for the first time placed
within their field of vision'. Accordingly, propaganda had to be simple, concentrate on as few
points as possible, and be repeated frequently, with emphasis on such emotional elements as
love and hatred. Through the continuity and sustained uniformity of its application,
propaganda would, Hitler concluded, lead to results that are `almost beyond our
understanding'. The Bolsheviks, unlike the Nazis, made a distinction between agitation and
propaganda. In Soviet Russia, agitation was concerned with influencing the masses through
ideas and slogans, while propaganda served to spread the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.
The distinction dates back to the Menshevik theorist Plekhanov, who wrote in 1892:
'A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents only one
or a few ideas, but presents them to a whole mass of people.' The Nazis regarded
propaganda, by contrast, not merely as an instrument for reaching the Party faithful, but as a
means for the persuasion and indoctrination of all Germans.
The German propaganda effort under Goebbels was more sophisticated than in 1914-1918.
Among methods employed were the setting up of fake `fifth column' radio stations, purporting
to be broadcasting from inside Britain, and the use of pro-Nazi Britons to broadcast
propaganda from Berlin. London answered with its own `black propaganda' radio stations,
partly staffed by Jewish refugees and anti-Nazi exiles from Germany.
After 1945, lessons drawn from the Second World War use of propaganda were utilised as
part of the wider `communications revolution'. Political scientists and sociologists theorised on
the nature of man and modern society -- in the light of the rise of both the consumerist society
and totalitarian police states. Individuals were viewed as undifferentiated `and malleable,
while an apocalyptic vision of mass society emphasised the alienation of work, the decline of
religion and family ties and a general decay in moral values. Culture had been reduced to the
lowest common denominator for the purposes of mass consumption and the masses were
generally seen as politically apathetic and yet prone to ideological fanaticism and vulnerable
to manipulation. Accordingly the view of propaganda shifted again: it was now seen as a
`magic bullet' or `hypodermic needle' to enter the thoughts of the masses and control their
opinions and behaviour.
This bleak view was challenged by American social scientists like Harold Lasswell and Walter
Lippman who argued that, within the context of an atomised mass society, propaganda was
merely a mechanism for massaging public opinion and acting as a means of social control.
Recently, the French sociologist Jacques Ellul has taken this a stage further, arguing that a
technological society has so conditioned people that they now feel `a need for propaganda'.
In this view, propaganda is most effective when it reinforces already held ideas and beliefs.
The notion of the `hypodermic needle' has thus been replaced by a more complex model
which, while acknowledging the influence of the mass media, also recognises that individuals
seek out opinion formers from within their own class or sex for confirmation of their own ideas
and attitudes. Most writers today agree that propaganda confirms rather than converts, and is
most effective when its message is in line with the existing opinions and beliefs of those it is
aimed at.
This change of emphasis highlights a number of common misconceptions about propaganda.
It is widely held that propaganda implies nothing more than the art of persuasion, serving only
to change ideas and attitudes. More often, though, propaganda is concerned with reinforcing
existing trends and beliefs, to sharpen and focus them. A second misconception is that
propaganda consists only of lies. In fact it operates with many different kinds of truth -ranging from the outright lie, through half-truths to the truth torn out of context. During
conflicts like the Gulf War the British public have been reminded of Dunkirk, the Blitz or the
`Falklands spirit'; it has been asked `who governs Britain?' during industrial disputes; it has
been assured that inflation can be reduced `at a stroke'; it has been promised that taxes will
not rise `under this government' and that `the pound in your pocket' has not, and will not,
decrease in value. Since 1997 people have been urged to think of themselves as living in
`Cool Britannia'. Propaganda, far from being a malignant growth, is a key part of the political
process.
Modern political propaganda can be defined as the deliberate attempt to influence the
opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for a specific
persuasive purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their
political masters, either directly or indirectly. In this, propaganda is distinct from information which seeks to transmit facts objectively -- and from education, which hopes to open its
students' minds. The aim of propaganda is the opposite: to persuade its subject or public of
one point of view; and to close off other options.
Propaganda is also limited in its effects. Recent research has examined `resistance' or
`immunity' to it. In the short term it may carry its audience away on a wave of fervour; but in
the longer term propaganda becomes less effective, as the audience has the time and
opportunity to question its assumptions. As Goebbels remarked: `propaganda becomes
ineffective the moment we are aware of it'. If propaganda is too rational, it runs the risk of
becoming boring; if too emotional or strident it can look absurd. As in other forms of human
interaction, to work properly propaganda must strike a balance between reason and emotion.
Censorship has been described as both the antithesis of propaganda and its necessary
adjunct: but it is a blunt instrument. More subtle forms of propaganda include the plundering
of history: London's biggest railway terminus is called Waterloo, and its central square is
named Trafalgar; Paris has its Gare d'Austerlitz and its Pont Wagram. Propaganda can
manifest itself in the form of a building, a flag, a coin, as well as the more obvious channels of
communication. The images of heads of state on stamps and coins offers a ubiquitous
reminder of the power of their regimes, and a legitimisation and personalisation of those
regimes. As Goebbels maintained, `In propaganda, as in love, anything is permissible which
is successful'.
Propaganda may be overt or covert, black or white, truthful or mendacious, serious or
satirical, rational or emotional. Propagandists assess the context and the audience and use
whatever methods they deem the most appropriate and effective. Typically, propaganda will
utilise the latest methods of communication. In the First World War this was the press; in the
Second, radio and cinema newsreels; post-1945 conflicts have made full use of television. In
the war over Kosovo both sides understood the importance of manipulating news to their own
advantage. Moreover, the current cutting edge in communications -- the Internet -- has been
exploited to disseminate propaganda. Having decided to make war on Serbia -- or, more
accurately, on Slobodan Milosevic, `a new Hitler' -- Nato sought to justify its war aims by
stressing the `humanitarian goals' of its aerial bombing campaign and the accuracy of its
weapons. Jamie Shea, the Nato spokesman, repeatedly insisted: `Our cause is just'.
Milosevic also used the media for propaganda purposes. By allowing the BBC and CNN to
continue to broadcast from Belgrade he hoped to fragment Western opinion with stories of
innocent civilians killed by Nato air strikes. As the most effective propaganda is that which can
be verified, Nato was placed on the defensive in the propaganda war when forced to concede
the accuracy of some Serb claims of civilian bombing casualties. The Kosovo conflict was
only the latest war to reinforce the central importance of propaganda in war, an importance
that can only increase in a globalised information environment.
E.H. Carr reminded us in 1939: `Power over opinion is not less essential for political purposes
than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art
of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader.' If we
can divest propaganda of its pejorative associations, we can see its significance as an
intrinsic part of the whole political process. Perhaps we need more propaganda, not less, to
arouse participation in the democratic process.
David Welch is Professor of Modern European History and Director of the Centre for the
Study of Propaganda at the University of Kent at Canterbury. His latest publication Germany,
Propaganda and Total War 1914-1918 is forthcoming from Athlone/Rutgers UP.3