LAUREN FEILER
California Institute of Technology
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Mail Code 228-77
Pasadena, CA 91125
E-mail: lauren@hss.caltech.edu
Phone: (626) 395-8772
Fax: (626) 405-9821
Website: www.hss.caltech.edu/~lauren
EDUCATION
Ph.D. Candidate, Social Science, California Institute of Technology, expected June 2007
M.S., Social Science, California Institute of Technology, June 2004
B.A., magna cum laude, Economics and Psychology, Mount Holyoke College, May 2000
FIELDS OF INTEREST
Behavioral economics, experimental economics, applied microeconomics, game theory
DISSERTATION
Title: Behavioral Biases in Information Acquisition
Committee: Colin Camerer (chair), Jacob Goeree, and Leeat Yariv
Summary: A chapter on selective exposure to information focuses on biased acquisition of
information about a preferred state, while chapters on information avoidance study a failure to
acquire information as a means of justifying self-serving decisions.
RESEARCH
 Research Assistant for Professor Leeat Yariv, Division of Humanities and Social Science,
California Institute of Technology (6/2005-9/2005)

Research Assistant for Professor Colin Camerer, Division of Humanities and Social
Science, California Institute of Technology (6/2004-5/2005)

Assistant Economist (8/2001-8/2002) and Research Associate (8/2000-8/2001), Domestic
Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY

Research Assistant, Economics Department, Mount Holyoke College (6/1999-8/1999)

Honors thesis, Mount Holyoke College: Concepts of Fairness in Ultimatum Games (9/19995/2000)
TEACHING
Teaching Assistant, Division of Humanities and Social Science, California Institute of Technology
 Introduction to Economics, with Professors Charles Plott (Fall 2006), Preston McAfee
(Winter and Spring 2006; also served as guest lecturer), and Simon Wilkie (Winter 2004;
also served as guest lecturer)
 Human Evolution, with Professor Joseph Manson (Fall 2005)
 Strategy, with Professor Preston McAfee (Spring 2004)
 Organizational Design, with Professor Colin Camerer (Fall 2003)
WORKING PAPERS
 An Experimental Study of Selective Exposure, with Jacob Goeree and Leeat Yariv
Observations on the tendency to choose information structures that can confirm prior inclinations,
rather than maximize expected payoff, in an experiment with induced preferences and an externality
treatment.

Information Seekers and Avoiders
A test of the relationship between the amount of information one chooses to learn about a charity and
the size of donations to that charity, and an examination of motives for seeking or avoiding
information.

Patterns of Information Avoidance in Binary Choice Dictator Games
An experimental study of which dictators avoid information about recipients’ payoffs and when they
tend to do so, with an assessment of several potential models of information avoidance.

Code Creation in Endogenous Merger Experiments, with Colin Camerer; under review at
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
A study of the difficulty that can be caused by firms’ use of specialized language, or code, when
organizations merge, and participants’ valuations of mergers, given this difficulty.

The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps, with
C. Mónica Capra, Tomomi Tanaka, Colin Camerer, Veronica Sovero, and Charles Noussair;
under review at Economic Journal
An experimental approach to studying the effect of institutions, such as the ability to make public
announcements or vote, on economic growth.
AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS
 Haynes Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Summer 2006
 Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Fellowship, Fall 2002-Spring 2003
 Phoebe Tulman Perlman Prize, for excellence in independent honors work in Economics, May
2000
 Phi Beta Kappa, National Honor Society, May 2000
 Virginia Galbraith Undergraduate Prize in Economics, October 1999
CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP PARTICPATION
 Economic Science Association North American Regional Meeting, Tucson, AZ, September
2006, Information Seekers and Avoiders
 Economic Science Association International Meeting, Atlanta, GA, June 2006, Selective
Exposure in the Lab
 Economic Science Association North American Regional Meeting, Tucson, AZ, September
2005, Patterns of Information Avoidance in Binary Choice Dictator Games
 Budapest Workshop on Behavioural Economics, Budapest, Hungary, July 2005
 Economic Science Association North American Regional Meeting, Tucson, AZ, November
2004, The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps
 Lee Center Fourth Annual Workshop on Advanced Networking, Pasadena, CA, May 2004,
Information Aggregation of Conditional Probabilities through Parimutuel Betting Mechanisms,
with Charles Plott and Joel Grus
REFERENCES
Colin Camerer, Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics
California Institute of Technology
Mail Code 228-77
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: (626) 395-4054
E-mail: camerer@hss.caltech.edu
Jacob Goeree, Professor of Economics
California Institute of Technology
Mail Code 228-77
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: (626) 395-5800
E-mail: jkg@hss.caltech.edu
Leeat Yariv, Associate Professor of Economics
California Institute of Technology
Mail Code 228-77
Pasadena, CA 91125
Phone: (626) 395-8924
E-mail: lyariv@hss.caltech.edu