South Asia Water Governance Programme
(SAWGP)
Business Case
22nd June 2012
Intervention Summary
The South Asia Water Governance Programme
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will provide £23.5 million over 5 years, starting from 2012.
The other partners in this programme are Australia (AusAID), Norway (MFA), the World Bank
(WB) and the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).
Why is UK support required?
What need are we trying to address?
Water is a challenge. Water is perhaps the biggest challenge facing South Asia. On the one
hand, the region is blessed with tremendous water resources, with the Himalayas being
described as the ‘water tower’ of Asia. On the other hand, water is behind many of the region’s
biggest problems. Flooding and drought claim scores of lives and cost billions a year. Water
scarcity limits agricultural productivity, electricity generation and industrial activity. Water
pollution impacts on the environment and public health. All these issues combine to fuel
distrust in what is already a tense neighbourhood. Neighbours in the region are quick to blame
each other for water-related problems. So there is a real opportunity to build common
understanding and trust as foundations for future cooperation and to reduce the risk of water
becoming a touchstone or irritant in regional relationships.
Three rivers under stress. Central to unlocking the challenge of water in South Asia is to
focus on its shared rivers. South Asia is heavily dependent on three Himalayan rivers; the
Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra. One billion people rely on these massive rivers, which run
through seven countries – Afghanistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, India, Bangladesh and
Pakistan. Both the rivers themselves and the countries that rely on them are changing fast.
Monsoon rain makes river flows highly variable –ranging from a trickle to a deluge. Climate
change will further exacerbate this variability. At the same time, South Asian countries are
growing fast. In the coming decades, booming cities will demand more water from less
predictable rivers.
Little trust or cooperation. A lack of trust between countries in the region is hampering
effective cooperation and governance of the shared rivers in the South Asian Himalayan
region. In the absence of hard agreed facts, myths have evolved as to why there is too much
or too little water – usually blaming the neighbouring country or region. Countries will often
pursue their own national responses to what is a regional problem. These responses are often
at best ineffective and at worst compound the problem. Poor cooperation is witnessed in the
region’s chronic failure to invest in water management infrastructure, including flood warning,
irrigation, hydropower and water supply. The region’s inability to manage current climate
variability bodes poorly for tackling the climate change impacts of the future.
What will we do to tackle the problem?
Bringing people and ideas together to resolve the challenges of the rivers. The South Asia
Water Governance Programme (SAWGP) will promote regional cooperation on the Himalayan
Rivers to address the challenges of development and climate change. Building on lessons
from the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI, the predecessor to SAWGP) we are moving from a
technical approach to a deliberative approach which will bring together a broad set of
stakeholders from different disciplines and walks of life to identify, frame and resolve the
challenges on these transboundary waters at regional and national levels. These deliberative
multi-stakeholder mechanisms will focus on the three river basins – Ganges, Indus and
Brahmaputra. The ideas emerging from the river basins will be tested in two landscapes, one
upstream at the source of the rivers (Mt Kailash), one downstream at the mouth of two rivers
(Sundarbans).
Building accountability. The approach in each basin and landscape will be to strengthen the
inclusion of stakeholders’ voices, so representatives from the most vulnerable communities,
government policy makers and managers, private investors and civil society engage together
in formulating policy and investment plans. Through a holistic analysis of management options
with these stakeholders, we will deepen understanding of how benefits can be shared and
where trade-offs lie, and so build wider support for investment, policy and regulatory reform.
These mechanisms will lead to more resilient and more accountable decision making at a
national level and strengthen cooperation between and within countries.
Who will be implementing the support we provide?
The programme will be implemented with partners through four components:
1. Component 1: The World Bank will lead the work on the three river basins, the
Sundarbans landscape and regional dialogue through a second phase of the SAWI Multidonor Trust Fund (SAWI-2 MDTF). DFID will provide £11.5m with joint funding from
AusAID, DFID and Norway;
2. Component 2: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) will
coordinate the regional cooperation on the Mount Kailash Sacred Landscape programme.
DFID will provide an accountable grant of £5.0m. GIZ is co-funding Mount Kailash; AusAID
and Norway also fund other landscape work through ICIMOD – and efforts will be made to
ensure these initiatives are complementary;
3. Component 3: DFID (with AusAID contributions) will provide £5.8m funding for work that
complements the WB MDTF by providing support for (i) broadening civil society
engagement in the multi-stakeholder mechanisms for each basin and landscape (£2.5m);
(ii) building media capacity and deepening public understanding of water related issues in
the region (£1.6m); (iii) innovative integrated analysis of how to manage climate change in
the Indus river basin (£1.3m); and (iv) responsive, fleet footed technical advice and analysis
to address issues or to take advantage of opportunities as they arise (£0.4m).
4. Component 4: DFID will fund independent monitoring and evaluation of the programme
(£0.5m) and an additional programme adviser to ensure DFID and FCO engage sufficiently
with partners (£0.7m).
What are the expected results?
What will change as a result of our support?
We expect stronger policy environments to emerge that will deliver fairer, more sustainable
and more accountable policy decisions and investments. This will lead to resilience to climate
change and poverty reduction, improved ecosystem services and increased access to clean
energy. In addition, improved cooperation on water and energy will reduce the potential for
water and energy issues to act as irritants to bilateral relations, reducing tensions and
enhancing security across the region.
In particular, by 2018 the programme will deliver:
 500 million people living in river basins with improved water governance, increasing
their resilience to climate change.
 US$ 1 billion investments – by the private sector and others - secured under formal
or informal regional agreements, publically accepted and influenced to have
international good practice in social and environmental benefit sharing.
 Three hydroelectric schemes in national investment pipelines secured under formal
or informal transboundary agreements, publically accepted and representing
international good practice in social and environmental benefit sharing.
 Seven multi-stakeholder mechanisms established for each river basin and
landscapes to resolve trade-offs and agree principles of fair and inclusive benefit
sharing.
 Five policies influenced that deliver economic, social and environmental benefits
fairly and sustainably – the significance of these policies will be tracked in terms of
the numbers of people that benefit and the financial value of the benefit flows.
 Five strategic basin and landscape integrated assessments, 30 pieces of analysis,
10 professional development events in response to demand generated from the
multi-stakeholder mechanisms.
What are the planned outputs attributable to UK support?
1 Regional output supports a regional process known as the Abu Dubai Dialogue (ADD),
bringing together opinion makers across the region with its’ Knowledge Forum (ADKF) and
Small Research Grants Scheme. It will also supports transparency and accountability
through making knowledge from the river basins and landscapes (data, models, studies
and reports) publically available.
2 River basin and landscape output supporting multi-stakeholder mechanisms that deliver
credible and far sighted policy decisions and investments in the three major river basins the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Indus, through building trust, accountability and holistic
analysis The work at the landscape level will test ideas being promoted in the river basins
in Mt Kailash (source of three rivers) and Sundarbans (mouth of two rivers). This will
deliver tangible benefits in terms of improved ecosystem services, eco-tourism and
diversified livelihoods.
3 Delivering investments and policies output will support the design and development
that are publically acceptable and represent international good practice in social and
environmental benefit sharing. It will tackle the delivery challenge of how to get good
policy and investment implemented. And it will enable innovation in water resource and
ecosystem management, including through interventions to improve the climate resilience
of poor peoples’ livelihoods.
4 Broadening engagement output which will enhance the engagement of civil society in
basin and landscape level multi-stakeholder mechanisms and align donor support. DFID
will fund activities which broaden civil society engagement in deliberative mechanisms at a
basin and landscape level, increase media capacity and public understanding of water
issues and provide an integrated analysis of how to manage climate change in the Indus
basin. This funding will ensure the programme engages sensitively in difficult, political
issues – such as those around the future of the Indus or around hydropower development
– and creates the political conditions for regional cooperation.
How will we know whether the expected results have been achieved?
The expected outcome results, regarding the establishment and functioning of multistakeholder mechanisms supporting deliberation and accountability, will be reported by the
different implementing agencies and be subject to annual review.
The expected impact results are unlikely to be measurable within the time frame of the
programme, but the results pathways and assumptions underlying the theory of change will be
tested at the mid-year review and a final evaluation. The programme management
arrangements will review the basin, landscape and regional game plans six-monthly to ensure
the programme responds to the changing context and continues to represent value for money.
List of abbreviations
ADB
ADD
ADD-G
ADD-KF
AUSAID
BAU
BCR
CBA
CBO
CGIAR
CHASE
CS
CSC
CSO
DFID
DRR
EIRR
ESN
EU
FAO
FCO
GDP
GIZ
GWP
ICF
ICIMOD
INGO
IPCC
IUCN
IWMI
KF
LPG
MDTF
MKSL
NBI
NGO
NGRBA
NL-TA
NPV
NSC
SAARC
SADC
SASDI
SAWI-1
SAWI-2
SAWGP
SBA
SEI
SGS
SIWI
TBI
TOC
TTL
UNDP
UNECE
USAID
VFM
WB
WWF
Asian Development Bank
Abu-Dhabi Dialogue
Abu-Dhabi Dialogue – Group members
Abu-Dhabi Dialogue – Knowledge Forum
Australian Agency for International Development
Business as usual
Benefit–cost ratio
Cost-benefit analysis
Community-based organisation
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Development
Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (DFID)
Civil society
Critical success criteria
Civil Society Organisation
Department for International Development
Disaster Risk reduction
Economic (internal) rate of return
Environmental Screening Note (DFID)
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organisation
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
Gross Domestic Product
Gesellschaftfür Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
Global Water Partnership
International Climate Fund
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
International NGO
Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change
International Union for the Conservation of Nature
International Water Management Institute
Knowledge Forum (of ADD)
Liquid petroleum gas
Multi-donor Trust Fund
Mount Kailash Sacred Landscape
Nile basin Initiative
Non-governmental Organization
National Ganga River Basin Authority
Non-lending Technical Assistance
Net present Value
National Security Council (UK)
South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
Southern Africa Development Community
South Asia Environment, Water Resources & Climate Change Unit (WB)
South Asia Water Initiative Phase 1
South Asia Water Initiative Phase 2
South Asia Water Governance Programme
Strategic Basin Assessment
Stockholm Environment Institute
Small grant scheme (of ADD-KF)
Stockholm International Water Institute
Trans-boundary Initiative
Theory of Change
Task Team Leader (WB)
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
United States Agency for International Development
Value for Money
The World Bank
World Wildlife Fund
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
Context in South Asia
1 The Himalayan plateau is a critical ‘water tower’ for South Asia, providing the
headwaters for three of the largest rivers in
the region – the Brahmaputra, the Ganges
and the Indus. The headwaters originate in
the sparsely populated, but steep,
mountains of the Himalaya, passing
through very densely populated and flatter
lower catchments before emptying into the
sea.
Huge volumes of sediment and
dissolved
minerals
are
transported
downstream to the lower plains, deltas and
eventually out to the sea.
2 Almost one billion people1 (one in seven of the world’s population) live in the
three basins (Brahmaputra, Ganges and Indus), spanning seven countries
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal and Pakistan 2).
3 The countries of the South Asian region face complex social and economic
challenges in addressing poverty. Nearly half the world’s poor (some 700 million) live in
the South Asia region, excluding China. And these are rapidly growing populations,
increasing pressure on the natural resource base, with burgeoning economies
consuming resources and polluting rivers and soils, creating huge environmental costs.
4 Many of Asia’s vulnerabilities are felt through water. The region faces extreme weather on a regular
basis – and is prone to seasonal floods, droughts, cyclones, etc. Large, high-density and poor populations
mean vulnerability is acute, with the poorest women and children most at risk. Climate change will increase
this unpredictability, and adversely affect the vulnerability of people, of economic growth, and of national and
regional stability. For instance, increased frequency and intensity of droughts and floods, reduced water
availability (for household, industrial and agricultural use), saline intrusion and sea level rise will all flow from
climate change.
5 How the shared rivers of the Himalayan region are governed this century is
critical to meeting the poverty reduction, growth and environmental challenges of the
region. This will demand far better water management at all levels, from smallholder farming to
international cooperation on cross-border river basin management. More cooperative action will be required
from across the seven countries that share these Himalayan Rivers for crisis opportunities
to be anticipated, understood and acted on.
Resource demand and supply constraints
6 Population growth is increasing demands on the shared rivers, which will
undermine future economic growth and poverty reduction efforts. In the four
countries with the largest populations in the Himalayan catchments, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Nepal, the urban population has grown from 70 million in 1950, to 350
million today and is projected to rise to over 800 million by 2030 3. This together with
increased incomes and the associated switch in consumption to more water-intensive
foods and products will continue to boost the demand for water and for energy.
7 The rivers are central to the lives, livelihoods and food security of the people in
the region and to the maintenance of the natural environment. The densely
populated lower catchments are highly dependent on water flows from sparsely
populated upper catchments which lie in different national jurisdictions. Most people are
located in the flat fertile plains of the lower catchments of these rivers and are
dependent on the annual flow of water and sediment to maintain their farming systems,
providing food for themselves and the growing urban population. As these rivers flow
through young mountains, they carry high levels of nutrient-rich sediment, and when the
rivers flood they distribute this sediment across fields, maintaining farming productivity in
the lower catchments. And when the sediment is released into the oceans, it enriches
these waters, sustaining the fisheries there. This is particularly evident in the mangrove
rich deltas of the Sundarbans and Indus, where millions of people make a living from
fishing. The fisheries supported by the Indus delta mangroves are worth US$100m a
year4.
8 The ecology of the rivers and their deltas has been affected by both the over
extraction of water and by pollution. Wetlands are under threat and there are sections of
these rivers that are too polluted to support mammals, like the river dolphin. The
mangrove swamps at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal and on the Indus are at risk from
reduced flows of freshwater and increased sea water intrusion5. The Indus delta gets a
quarter of the silt that used to feed it and in some years the river does not reach its
mouth. Salt water intrusion and reduced silt and nutrient flows are changing the delta
which is growing at significantly slower rate and reducing the habitat for the fisheries it
sustains6.
9 Water scarcity and stress are predicted to increase. Average water available per
person in India is predicted to decline from over 1,800 cubic meters in 2001 to under
1,200 cubic metres in 2050. This means increasing water stress (defined as less than
1,700 cubic metre per person per year), with the average availability of water
approaching scarcity levels (defined as under 1,000 cubic metre per year) by 20507.
Estimates of the shortfall vary across the region.
10 Water scarcity will impact production of food and power. Improved irrigation
systems alone are not sufficient to increase agricultural production8.
Irrigation
consumes 80% of water in the region. However, increasing efficiency would improve
water availability for other uses such as urban supply, industry and power production9.
11 Regional cooperation on energy markets remains underdeveloped10. Throughout
the region there are regular power shortages. Supply cannot keep up with increasing
demand driven by growth coupled with urbanisation. The lack of power is a topical
political issue and, increasingly, a binding constraint on economic growth.
12 The potential for hydro-power in the Himalaya region is enormous. In this regional
energy market context, there are likely considerable benefits to investing in hydropower.
Nepal, for example, has an estimated 40,000 MW of economically feasible hydropower
still to be exploited. The private sector in the regional and internationally are looking to
invest, but regulatory barriers and difficulty in engaging civil society constructively limits
their ability to engage.
13 Managing the impacts of water use schemes. The exploitation of water resources
often involves the construction of infrastructure, which may have an impact on local
communities but provide a benefit to the broader population. One challenge is to
balance the legitimate concerns of affected communities with overarching development
needs. This requires a sophisticated and sensitive approach to engagement and benefit
sharing with affected communities, for example, by making anyone who must be
relocated a shareholder in the power produced.
Climate Change Challenges
14 Climate change is directly affecting the water cycle. Although there is considerable
uncertainty surrounding the projected changes in the climate of the region, many of the
changes already observed are likely to continue. Trends suggest an increase in warmer
temperatures, increased intensity of rainfall and an increase in the intensity of
cyclones11. The Himalayan glaciers - the largest body of ice beyond the two ice caps
(as so called the ‘third pole’) – are shrinking overall, but there are too few studies to
suggest a rate12.
15 Changing rivers affect people upstream and downstream. The monsoon rains are
concentrated into a three-month period (during which 80-90% of rainfall falls) which
coincide with snow and glacier melt, leading to large river flows in the summer, followed
by much drier winter months. The variability of the monsoon from year to year means
the river flows are very unpredictable. The Indus and Brahmaputra river flows are
expected to be most affected by climate change impacts. This is because these two
rivers are very reliant on melt water from glaciers and snow. The Ganges will also be
affected but will be better compensated by possible increases in rainfall13. See box 1 for
a description of the issues on the three rivers and two landscapes this programme
focuses on.
16 One in every two people in the region has been affected by a disaster, with the
poor suffering the most. An estimated 750 million people were affected in South Asia
over the last 20 years, causing US$ 45 billion in damages14. It is estimated that
between 2-6 % of South Asia’s GDP is lost to disasters every year 15. These figures do
not include 2010, when the flood in Pakistan affected over 20 million people with total
damage estimated at over US$ 10 billion16. Recent analysis suggests that the increase
in flooding is consistent with the increasing intensity of the global monsoon associated
with climate change17. Many families experience generations of poverty as a result of
these shocks - with women and children disproportionately affected18.
Box 1: Critical River Basins and Landscapes
The Ganges (Bangladesh, China, India and Nepal) is the most populous river basin in the world,
home to some 650 million people, 75% of whom live on less than $2 a day. The river presents
complex challenges and benefits to the countries through which it flows. The South Asia Water
Initiative (the predecessor to SAWGP) began to tackle these challenges through the Ganges
Strategic Basin Assessment. This assessment showed that better governance of the basin provides
big opportunities for private sector investment in hydropower development and energy trade. And the
assessment suggests there is not enough storage in the steep Himalayan valleys to stop flooding in
Bihar and Bangladesh, and finds controlled flooding along with flood warning services are the most
cost effective means to reduce flood damage and protect the livelihoods of vulnerable communities.
Furthermore, it indicates better management of natural stores (aquifers and wetlands) is the most
cost effective means to increase water availability for irrigation, drinking and industry.
The Brahmaputra (Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India) is the highest river system in the world and
includes both some of the driest and wettest areas on earth. It is home to at least 120 million people.
This basin provides huge opportunity for trade and economic development. Its significant hydropower
potential (about twice the size of China’s Three-Gorges Dam) remains largely untapped. A number of
challenges converge in this basin including: difficult historical relationships, ambiguity about border
areas and the complex geography of the river itself. Having seen the Ganges assessment, officials
and experts are showing interest in a similar basin wide assessment process for the Brahmaputra. As
with the Ganges, improved flood management would reduce the vulnerability of some very poor
communities.
The Indus (Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan) is the river most dependent on snowfall and
glacier melt in the region and supports the largest irrigation system in the world. It is home to at least
180 million people and like the other rivers, per capita water availability is falling rapidly with
population growth, urbanisation and growing industrial demand. However, it is in the Indus that
climate change is anticipated to have its greatest impact. Changing snowfall patterns and glacial melt
will impact on water availability and agricultural yields. This is important for Pakistan, which relies on
the Indus entirely for water and food security. And there are many misperceptions about the causes
of floods and drought in Pakistan, assumptions that India can control the river more than is actually
possible. So opportunities for this programme include supporting shared learning between the Basin
countries, generating better understanding of issues such as glacier dynamics, river flow variability
and options to manage it and the social impacts of floods, climate change and food security.
The Sundarbans Landscape (Bangladesh, India) is a fragile mangrove ecosystem that extends
across the India-Bangladesh border, at the mouth of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers. Being
the largest mangrove forest in the world, it is rich in bio-diversity, home to a poor and vulnerable
population, who are under threat from freshwater scarcity on one side, and sea level rise on the
other. The poorest of the poor end up there, scraping a living from the forest and from fishing. The
four million inhabitants stand to benefit from potential reforms and investments to improve integrated
water resources management, off grid energy, better fishing techniques, jobs from tourism and
forestry initiatives and flood management through embankments. Improved natural resource
management will also reduce storm surges and cyclone damage to the coast and city of Kolkata.
Mount Kailash (China, India, Nepal), is a fragile, high altitude and biodiverse region at the source of
Asia’s great rivers: the Indus and the Brahmaputra, as well as the Sutlej and the Karnali (major
tributaries of the Indus and Ganges respectively). It covers 31,000 km 2 in south west China, western
Nepal and northern India and is home to 1.2 million people. It plays an important role in regulating the
flow of water and sediment for communities downstream. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s 4th assessment identifies the region as being amongst the most vulnerable ecosystems to
climate change impacts. Careful management of this ecosystem is needed to increase resilience to
climate change and natural disasters and maintain its integrity.
The Politics of Water
17 The political economy of regional cooperation on water in South Asia is complex.
A legacy of border disputes and conflict between the states has created barriers to
greater regional cooperation. As a result, despite the common landscapes and shared
identities that stretch across many of the river systems and basins of the region,
countries have historically developed and managed water resources as if the rivers
started and ended within their boundaries. Unequal power relations between countries
also undermine trust and efforts at strengthening regional cooperation.
18 Lack of river cooperation poses a threat to regional stability. The poor
management of the rivers imposes economic and social costs, leads to inefficiencies in
water supply and increases vulnerability to floods and droughts. These impacts may be
felt not just domestically but also downstream where the effects of poor management of
domestic water resources may be compounded by the poor management of upper
riparians. When poor management results in floods or drought, disputes can emerge,
which if unresolved play into broader political tensions. Water issues can therefore
exacerbate broader tensions, such as those found between Bangladesh and India on
the Ganges basin and between India and Pakistan on the Indus. This in turn may
increase the potential for escalating tension both within and between countries 19.
19 Disputes occur within as well as between countries. Disputes routinely take place
between sub-national government in both India and Pakistan. These are often the result
of incoherent planning and poor utilisation of existing infrastructure. For example,
Punjab, a wealthy farming province in Pakistan, is routinely accused by downstream
Sindh of taking an unfair share of waters flowing in the Indus.
20 Lack of trust hampers cooperation over investment. Downstream communities tend
to object to development by the upper neighbours, and vice versa 20. For example, on
the Indus, Pakistan objects to India’s hydropower developments and Sindhi province
objects to Punjabi projects. These concerns focus on sharing physical volumes of water
– rather than how to share the benefits of river development equitably. Many of the
decisions related to shared water management are essentially political with trade-offs
stretching outside the sector into the wider political economy.
21 There are no institutional mechanisms to promote regional cooperation on water.
As a result, individual states pursue ‘unilateral’ development of shared water resources,
which leads to greater competition over the same resource, with poorer development
outcomes as a result. Where there are existing agreements and treaties, they are
focused on dividing water volumes and procedures to object to water infrastructure
projects rather than fostering cooperation. While there are a number of initiatives in the
region aimed at improving bilateral relations, they tend to be strictly bilateral in focus
(e.g. Track Two dialogues), do not focus on water issues and are not strongly
institutionalised within national bureaucracies. The barriers to adopting a more
collaborative approach to water governance include21:

Information. The poor quality and limited sharing of information and the high
levels of uncertainty in weather and climate change predictions in the region
makes good quality analysis difficult which can be accepted by all parties;

Strategy. The lack of a shared and holistic understanding on the potential
benefits of strategic river basin development including options for robust ‘no
regrets’ investments to manage current climate variability and future climate
change on regional river systems;

Institutions. The lack of institutional mechanisms for coordinating regional action
limits the possibility of exploring sharing benefits from development and
managing the impacts of climate change to achieve resilience.
22 There is also a trust deficit between civil society and governments on water
resource decisions (i.e. on management options, investments). To varying degrees
across the region active civil society lobbies are seeking to increase the priority given to
marginal social groups and environmental considerations in infrastructure decisions (e.g.
the location and design of dams and embankments). However civil society currently has
limited opportunity and capacity to engage constructively in decision-making processes,
for example by offering alternative analysis and strategies, and to coordinate themselves
beyond the very local levels.
23 Regional agreements on water resources are limited. While some regional
cooperation at heads of state level takes place under South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) progress to improve cooperation has been patchy.
SAARC has not engaged on water agreements although it has made some statements
about managing climate change22. There are a number of bilateral water agreements in
the region, but the extent to which they provide mechanisms for a more collaborative
approach to water governance is limited23 (Box 2).
Box 2: Examples of Bilateral water agreements in South Asia
i)
The Indus Water Treaty (1960), the only agreement between India and Pakistan to have survived
two wars, but remains a cause of anxiety and delays development of the river. It allocates the
Indus’s western tributaries to Pakistan and eastern tributaries to India. The treaty has mechanisms
to resolve disputes, but on each development individually rather than the cumulative impact of
many.
ii)
The Ganges Treaty (1996) between India-Bangladesh, is based on sharing the dry season flow of
the Ganges at the Farraka Barrage Dam, which diverts water that would otherwise flow in
Bangladesh - from a point only approx. 16km from the Bangladesh border. The Ministerial level Joint
River Commission (JRC) has a framework for discussion on water resources. However, it meets
irregularly and can only recommend. Negotiations on the Teesta have still to conclude after 35
years.
iii) Nepal and India have a number of treaties over specific investments, for example the Koshi
Agreement (1954) and the Mahakali Treaty (1996). Both cover sharing water at existing barrages
and include agreement to invest in further infrastructure but further investments have not
materialised. It is in part due to the different values assigned to the benefits from the dams, with
India focusing on electricity and Nepal wanting to include flood regulation and dry season irrigation.
iv) The first agreement between Bhutan and India for hydropower on Bhutan’s tributaries of the
Brahmaputra was signed in 1961. The sixth agreement (1996) builds on the partnership between the
two countries, providing a framework agreement for around 30,000 MW of hydropower to be
developed for export to India.
v) China and India have agreed to some, limited, information sharing on the Brahmaputra, where
China provides hydrological data during the monsoon. However, the extent of information sharing is
limited. There is huge potential for hydropower at “the bend” where the Brahmaputra turns towards
India but strong public concern in India about China transferring water from the Brahmaputra to their
other rivers is likely to make this development highly political.
Voice and Inclusion
24 Challenges of scale and diversity. The region’s huge population coupled with the wide
diversity of interests makes meaningful stakeholder engagement particularly
challenging. This is further compounded by the inherent challenges of the issues being
discussed. For instance, the costs and benefits of a hydro-power scheme can be very
different for those living upstream from those living downstream. It is therefore crucial
that special attention is given to ensuring that the right people are represented in
decision-making – to resolve differences and so build ownership.
25 Tailoring engagement. The process of inclusion will need to take into account the skills
and capability of different kinds of actors. For example, in some countries of the region,
there are well-established state, quasi-state and civil society organisations which can
represent the interests of local communities and the poor; but these organisations often
struggle to engage in policy formulation because decisions are framed in technical and
bureaucratic terms which do not allow for authentic multi-stakeholder engagement.
26 Improving accountability. Additional effort is required to ensure all those affected by
decisions are able to influence them and hold governments to account for delivering
benefits fairly. Changes in water availability and water flows affect the lives of women.
However, women’s voices, especially poor women, are rarely heard in policy-making
due to social constraints24. Exclusion of certain groups – tribal, caste and religious - is
pervasive.
What SAWGP will do
27 Headline objective. The outcome the South Asia Water Governance Programme
(SAWGP) is seeking to achieve is increased regional cooperation in the management of
the Himalayan Rivers to deliver sustainable, fair and inclusive development and climate
resilience.
28 Key activities. SAWGP proposes to do this by helping to build an inclusive and
constructive debate leading to increased regional cooperation (within and between
countries) and action on water resources management. It will do this by supporting
regional multi-stakeholder mechanisms that deliver real change in policy decisions and
investments. These mechanisms will: (1) produce holistic knowledge and shared
understanding of the problems and solutions of regional water resource management
and climate adaptation; (2) tackle trade-offs between different users and improve
accountability; and (3) coordinate policy and investment action in water resources
management. A successful programme could potentially have positive impacts on food
security, inclusive economic growth, and poverty reduction across a wide region and, in
the longer term, contribute to greater peace and security in South Asia.
29 Lessons from SAWI-1. The first phase of the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI-1, the
predecessor to SAWGP) delivered significant progress on improving regional
cooperation on water resources. Through, for example, robust analysis of investment
options at a basin level on the Ganges and the Kabul that have been used by some
stakeholders to make the case for more rational investments. It supported a continuing
high level dialogue with continued representation from each of the seven countries –
despite some difficult moments in the regional geopolitics. It has leveraged and shaped
$1.66 billion of investment on the Ganges and Brahmaputra. And it has made a
significant contribution to the ability of countries to negotiate on shared rivers, through
for example, building modelling capabilities in Nepal and Afghanistan.
30 The independent evaluation of SAWI-1 considered the initiatives’ theory of change and
international experience of river basin management, and suggested the following
lessons:
a
Regional processes need to be connected to national policy development and
implementation otherwise they are effectively ‘disembodied’, and exist by virtue of
their very lack of association with real decision making environments.
b
The political economy of regional policy making means that key interests involved in
decision making on what to do with river basin management at a national level, need
to be brought into regional dialogue – otherwise they are highly likely to be ‘outside’
the process and therefore, potentially obstructive at a future juncture.
c
There needs to be a far stronger enhancement in the way knowledge is developed
and applied within deliberative processes at a policy level throughout the region.
31 Building on SAWI. SAWGP’s approach builds on the experience and achievements of
the first phase of the South Asia Water Initiative by moving from a technical expert led
approach to one of deliberation, which:
a
Nuances the benefits of, and makes a stronger case for, collaborative action.
New realities of increasing demand for water and the benefits that can be derived
through joint investments make a strong case for improving regional cooperation and
action. Water availability and access will become a critical future constraint for
countries in the region as populations rise and demand increases across agricultural,
industrial and domestic sectors, and climate change increases uncertainties over
future supply. Potential benefits of more collaborative approaches include: (1)
improving resilience to shocks and disasters (e.g. flood early warning across the
region), (2) improved flow control for agricultural, ecosystem and other uses, and (3)
improving access to energy by developing hydropower as part of wider regional
power-pooling.
b
Emphasizes the importance of accountability, trust building, and stakeholder
ownership so that stakeholder voices are represented at all stages, without which
there will be a poor fit between anticipated impacts and actual development needs.
This requires ensuring that a range of civil society voices, representing both
downstream and upstream interests, women and men, rural and urban populations
can engage in the deliberative processes that lead to policy formulation.
c
Sharpens the strategic focus on specific river basins and landscapes, which
will also identify pragmatic activities that catalyse positive change. It will do so in a
manner that strengthens participatory processes, engages regional governments,
research institutes and civil society, and enhances the on-going multi-stakeholder
Abu Dhabi Dialogue and Knowledge Forum activities.
d
Ensures that knowledge development and institutional arrangements are
embedded in regional and national political processes so that these do not
become disembodied. This approach will also consider how analyses and other
‘soft’ development activities will engage with the harder issues of investment funding
for infrastructure development, and processes of national policy making. These are
major future challenges that can only adequately be addressed through greater
embedding within national policy and engagement in regional and national political
economies.
Box 3: A deliberative approach
Deliberative processes are a way of involving people in decision-making. A deliberative approach differs
from other forms of stakeholder engagement in that it is focussed on giving participants time to consider
and discuss an issue in depth before they come to a considered view.
To be deliberative a process must involve:
-
Discussion between participants in a way which allows new information to be absorbed and
discussed, and an agreed position reached
-
Working with a range of people and information sources, ensuring that a diversity of views from
people with different perspectives, including minority or disadvantaged groups are included, and that
discussions are not dominated by any particular faction
-
A clear task or purpose, related to influencing a specific decision, policy, service, project or
programme
A deliberative approach is particularly relevant to the question of trans-boundary water governance, as
decisions involve many stakeholders, complex issues, trade-offs between policy options, high levels of
uncertainty and low levels of trust. A deliberative approach can help resolve complexity by building trust,
promoting a shared understanding amongst stakeholders of the issues (in particular where these issues
are common across national boundaries), areas of uncertainty, policy options and impacts of different
decisions on different stakeholder groups. Empowering key stakeholder groups to participate in policy
discussions and decisions will result in more robust policy decisions and will facilitate implementation.
32 Enabling private sector investment in water through addressing regulatory barriers
and through developing acceptable and credible investment strategies. SAWGP will, for
example, support DFID’s work on hydropower in Nepal by tackling the barriers to
regional electricity trading with India and Bangladesh. This would contribute to
unblocking four hydropower investments that would deliver 3050 MW, and the private
sector is expected to bear 50-90% of the £2.4 billion investment costs.
Justification for DFID’s intervention
33 There are three reasons why DFID should support SAWGP:
a
Brokering regional partnerships and fostering relationships: Under the first
phase of the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI-1), the UK (DFID and the FCO) have
collaborated with the World Bank (WB) and others to deepen existing relationships
and encourage new partnerships in the region25. This helped to bring together key
opinion formers to strengthen regional knowledge and knowledge networks and to
support a more cooperative approach to managing shared rivers in South Asia26.
Funds managed directly by the UK have complemented the more formal approaches
of the WB, by being fleet footed and politically astute. This complementary work has
facilitated the development of new regional partnerships, created new knowledge to
tackle myths and enabled new voices to be heard that reframe the challenges27. In
addition, as a signatory of the Indus Water Treaty, the World Bank is constrained in
what it can engage in on the Indus, so on this river basin in particular other
organisations need to promote transboundary governance.
b
Comparative Advantage: The UK’s involvement in SAWGP will help to ensure that
the programme is embedded in national political systems and is built around
inclusive and deliberative processes. Although the main implementing agencies, the
World Bank and ICIMOD, are not inimical to such approaches, the UK, as a bilateral
development partner, has a remit to ensure that the programme is inclusive of a wide
range of stakeholders at the regional, transboundary and national levels. This
requires processes to be in place that allows civil society to engage in deliberation
and ensure that civil society has sufficient capacity to undertaken such engagement.
c
Experience and lesson sharing: DFID brings valuable lessons from experience of
supporting similar interventions elsewhere, and can enable sharing of lessons across
regions (see Box 4). DFID also brings the experience of the UK in understanding
climate change impacts on river basins, such as the Thames 2100 plan. Thames
2100 was ground breaking in its approach to handling uncertainty by identifying
decision thresholds i.e. at what point of environmental change would decisions for
different investments need to be made.
Box 4: Examples of DFID support elsewhere
i)
Nile Basin Initiative: DFID support (£14 million, 10 years), alongside other donors including the
World Bank, involved improving the evidence base (hydrological, climate change and economic),
improving management of the river basin and incorporation of social assessment in project
planning and implementation, and support to the wider political process. DFID also provided funds
to a parallel activity that seeks to engage civil society – the Nile Basin Discourse – in the wider
NBI;
ii)
Mekong River (where a river commission has been established to facilitate cooperative planning
on shared rivers): DFID supported production and research outputs, including on co-management
of fisheries in the river basin;
iii) Zambezi and a wider set of trans-boundary rivers in southern Africa where the emphasis is on
developing river basin commissions. Germany and Nordic donors have led the regional water
management initiatives. DFID has also provide £5 million to trans-boundary water management in
southern Africa via GIZ;
iv) Aral Sea, where over the past three decades multiple donors have supported action to promote
cooperative management of the environmental disaster;
v) Central Asia, where the EU, GIZ, World Bank, DFID and UN (via UNECE) are supporting dialogue
and investments on trans-boundary water management.
vi) DFID has also provided limited funds to the EXACT programme in the Middle East to help
develop technical cooperation between Israel, Jordan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in
order to better understand and manage shared groundwater resources.
vii) At the global level, DFID has provided core support to the Global Water Partnership – including
GWP China – and the World Bank Water Partnership Programme to support analysis and action
on trans-boundary water management.
Consequences of not intervening
34 Without DFID, less inclusive. If DFID chose not to intervene, the programme would
still continue but there would be less focus on inclusive processes that engage different
interest groups in deliberation. The programme would take a more technical economic
approach, with a risk that regional processes become disconnected from national
debates, leading to less sustained impact on poverty reduction and economic growth.
The overall initiative would have weaker understanding of poverty impact pathways and
diminished capacity to influence these pathways. Without addressing these issues and
improving regional cooperation over water management, the lives and livelihoods of
large numbers of the worlds’ poorest people will become increasingly riskier and more
constrained given the context of population growth and climate change,
Links to other HMG/DFID strategic priorities
35 SAWGP delivers on UK priorities. The SAWGP programme is a good fit with the UK’s
priorities, both in the region and globally.
a
Adaptation and mitigation. Better water management is part of the adaptation and
mitigation strategies behind HMG and DFID’s climate change priorities. The FCODFID-MoD conflict pool strategy for this region has identified this programme as
taking the lead on water, but will seek to complement and link up with its other work
b
Climate finance. SAWGP directly contributes to a key ICF objective to “help poor
countries to manage their water resources. This can range from initiatives at an
international level, such as cooperation between neighbouring countries on a shared
water resource like a river, to local initiatives”.
c
Security and fragility. SAWGP will contribute to the UK government’s crossWhitehall conflict prevention pool and the wider priorities of CHASE (Conflict,
Humanitarian and Security Department), including by helping in the identification of
emerging risks and in pre-empting crises in a strategically important region.
Other donor partnerships
36 Others are investing in water cooperation. The multi donor trust fund with the World
Bank is supported by the Australians and Norwegians. Others working on these issues
in the region are the Dutch, USAID and ADB – although all three focus on national
institutions or Track II (i.e. informal) bilateral dialogues and do not tackle the wider
issues of regional cooperation over shared water resources. The regional collaboration
being supported, under SAWI and now the proposed wider SAWGP, is unique in South
Asia and there is no alternative approach available to achieve the objectives of this
programme.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
37 The outcome of the programme is “Increased regional cooperation in the management
of the Himalayan Rivers delivers sustainable, fair and inclusive development and climate
resilience.” The achievement of this outcome depends on establishing transboundary
and national governance arrangements that will promote the development of the
policies, investments and practices outlined above.
38 SAWGP will lead to the development of more effective institutional arrangements,
supported by better quality and more publicly accessible data and knowledge. The result
will be a policy environment that is able to equip the region’s decision makers more
effectively to respond to future challenges and for decision making to be more inclusive
and responsive to the needs of the most marginalised and vulnerable stakeholders. This
strengthening will include support to improving livelihoods in environments where the
climate change and poverty relationship are particularly acute, including the Sundarbans
and the important Himalayan landscapes around Mt Kailash.
39 DFID support will result in institutional arrangements and processes that will lead to:
a
Investments of more than $1 billion dollars in water management infrastructure and
systems, including the development of 3 hydropower schemes with the private sector
– that are publically acceptable and represent international good practice in social
and environmental benefit sharing.
b
Water management policies, with at least five that demonstrate progressive
benefit-sharing for local communities and maintenance or improvement of ecosystem
services28;
c
Transboundary platforms on water management issues, with seven that enable
regional, national and local plans to be formulated in the context of the whole river
basin and resolve trade-offs and agree benefit sharing.
40 The programme will be delivered through four strongly mutually reinforcing outputs.
i
Regional output (delivered through the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(SAWI-2 MDTF)): This output supports the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD) and
brings together opinion makers across the region. SAWGP will support the
creation of a Knowledge Forum (KF) and Small Research Grants Scheme, which
will be fully integrated into the ADD. And SAWGP will support transparency and
accountability through making knowledge from the river basins and landscapes
(data, models, studies and reports) publically available.
ii
River basin and landscape output (World Bank SAWI-2, ICIMOD & DFID). This
output involves generating knowledge and supporting platforms for well-informed
and inclusive dialogue in the three major river basins - the Ganges, Brahmaputra
and Indus and tests the ideas being promoted in the river basins on the ground –
Mt Kailash (source of river) and Sundarbans (mouth of river).
iii
Delivering investments and policies output (World Bank SAWI-2 & ICIMOD).
This output will support the design and development of investments and policies
that are publically acceptable and represent international good practice in social
and environmental benefit sharing. It will tackle the delivery challenge of how to
get good policy and investment implemented. It will support innovation in water
resource and ecosystem management, including through interventions to improve
the climate resilience of poor peoples’ livelihoods.
iv
Broadening engagement output (DFID) which will enhance the engagement of
civil society in basin and landscape level multi-stakeholder mechanisms and align
donor support. DFID will manage this work directly through accountable grants
which will deliver: (i) broader civil society engagement in the multi-stakeholder
deliberative mechanisms for each basin and improved civil society coordination
through regional, basin and landscape level civil society charters; (ii) improved
media capacity and deeper public understanding of water related issues in the
region; and (iii) flexible and fleet footed analysis to address issues and take
advantage of opportunities as they arise. Activities under element (iii) could
include: supporting the development and testing of new methodologies and
decision making tools to understand the hydrological, economic and social
implications of climate change impacts and infrastructure on these rivers; and
improving strategic understanding of the water and development-related issues
across the region through informed analysis and regular consultation with a
network of stakeholders.
41 In the long-term, the programme aims to increase climate resilience, promote economic
growth, reduce emissions and build effective regional alliances, around the shared rivers
and aquifers of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra. This is expected to contribute to
long term impact of “Effective governance of regional water resources for climate
change adaptation and poverty reduction in South Asia”. And this will be measured
through:
a
Reduced climate vulnerability of people, through more sustainable agricultural
productivity and less loss of life and livelihoods from floods and droughts - with a
target of 500 million living in river basins with improved water governance by 2018.
b
Economic growth and accelerated poverty reduction in the countries of South
Asia, due to cooperative water management investments by
governments,
multilateral development banks and the private sector in both comprehensive
ecosystem management and new hydropower infrastructure – with a target of more
than $1 billion investments to be leveraged, including from the private sector by
2018.
c
Increased regional cooperation: the programme will encourage trade, especially
through potential joint investments in energy production and distribution, including
between countries with high potential for hydropower and more populous
downstream countries where demand for energy is rapidly growing - with a target of
three hydropower schemes in pipeline that are secured under formal or informal
transboundary agreements by 2018 and representing international good practice in
social and environmental benefit sharing.
d
Improved management of ecosystems: the programme will improve the
management of ecosystems of the river basins and landscapes. With environmental
degradation leading to poor water quality in the rivers and aquifers and people
increasingly exposed to floods, drought, saline intrusion, flash floods and storm
surges, improving the management of the ecosystems is essential to sustaining
progress in economic growth and human development. The target has yet to be set
as it proved challenging methodologically to develop a baseline under SAWI-1, but
this will be a focus on the first year.
e
Regional security and stability: the programme expects to have more intangible
co-benefits with increasing regional security and stability – at least ensuring that
water is not an irritant or flash point in regional geopolitics.
Appraisal Case
A. Feasible options
42 Feasible options were identified following a review of the first phase of the South Asia
Water Initiative (SAWI-1), and a series of workshops held with the proposed
implementing agencies and with think tanks and civil society partners from the first
phase. One option that was considered in detail, but finally not felt to be a real option,
was to stop working through the multidonor trust fund. This was because is there is no
other mechanism for donors and countries to come together to discuss the challenges
for water in this region. The few track two dialogues in the region are single donor
initiatives supporting bilateral relationships, whereas the WB’s SAWI trust fund supports
multilateral dialogues, river basin wide analysis and harmonises the actions of four
donors. Other donors may also join – with the US and the Germans showing some
interest and the Dutch potentially also.
43 Three feasible options were identified:
a
Option 1. Do nothing at a regional level (counterfactual). No DFID funding for
regional water resource co-operation activities, but continue work bilaterally in Nepal
on hydropower and in Afghanistan on managing the Helmand river basin. Countries
and donors would continue to tackle water management issues within national
boundaries, but this would remain piecemeal and uncoordinated. Therefore, barriers
to regional cooperation would not be addressed, for example, barriers Nepal faces to
sell clean electricity to India and Bangladesh would not be addressed. Equally DFID
Bangladesh support for flood warning services cannot extend the early warning of
floods, because it is reliant on regional information sharing. Furthermore, evidence
from the evaluation of SAWI-1 and from other river basins, suggests that this option
will not deliver the transformational change required to address climate impacts on
poor people. SAWI would continue, at least initially with AusAID and Norwegian
funding, but at a smaller scale and with less advisory support (DFID has invested
significant time and led the donor inputs in the past).
b
Option 2. Extension of SAWI-1. This is a real option given the successes of SAWI-1,
where analysis by the programme enabled $1.7 billion of new investment in the
region, high level engagement between all countries and an active debate on
management objectives for the Ganges. This option involves channelling most funds
through the World Bank with a small flexible fund directly managed by DFID
supporting civil society engagement, with no dedicated programme adviser. The
theory of change continues to be that expert led technical analysis offers a good
entry point for dialogue and that trust building focuses on the high level track II
dialogue between seven governments and opinion leaders. The WB work would,
given their internal political economy, focus on areas likely to leverage WB
investment. The main difference between this and option 3 (see below) is that this
option has limited engagement with the interest groups in the river basins, it risks the
WB owning the analysis and technocrats resolving the trade-offs. It is however, a
real option given how much SAWI-1 delivered. Given the potential of coordinated
lobbying by civil society groups to move cooperation forward (as was seen on
Bangladesh-India rivers, leading to the Joint River Commission), underinvesting in
this element would weaken the approach, with the risk a number of one off events
and studies dissipate effort. ICIMOD, the WB and other partners will need significant
support to develop more socio-political and less technocratic approaches.
c
Option 3. More strategic & inclusive process. While building on the achievements of
SAWI-1, and comprising similar activities to Option 2, Option 3 represents a different
approach and emphasis. This option emphasises the governance arrangements for
water management and therefore focuses on decision-making and policy formulation
mechanisms in transboundary landscapes and river basins. Option 3 evolves the
existing technical approach to focus on inclusive and accountable decision making
on policies and investments around three river basins. It expands the high level
regional dialogue to include deliberative dialogues on the three river basins and two
landscapes and it significantly increases funding for civil society engagement. SAWI1 demonstrated that regional dialogues, holistic river basin modelling and
interdisciplinary analysis can enhance debate on water resource governance.
However, SAWI-1’s outputs also tended to be disembodied from national debates
and largely restricted to the technical and economic issues outside the wider political
economy. Option 3 addresses this by grounding the dialogue processes within
specific river basin contexts. It emphasises the potential to engage private sector,
NGOs and parliamentarians substantively in addressing trade-offs between different
users and uses of water – and in coordinating analysis and lobbying on issues – as
has been demonstrated on the Mekong (M-POWER) and on India Bangladesh rivers.
44 Table 1 summarises the different approaches under options 2 and 3.
Table 1: Comparison of approaches under option 2 and 3
Feature
Option 2
(Business as usual)
Trans-boundary
Regional and Basin
Option 3
(Preferred Approach)
Trans-boundary
Regional and Basin
Scope
Water management
Water governance
Domain
Government -centric,
plus related agencies (academia,
etc)
Forum
Technical debate
Wider “society”
General public, CSO (interest groups),
academics, stakeholders (winners and
losers); bureaucrats, politicians
Public debate
Participation/
engagement
Focus
Consultative –
Technocrats engage with interest
groups and public to agree and
implement solutions
Collective action
Deliberative Interest groups, technocrats, politicians
engage with knowledge to define problems
and reach decisions
Collective choices
Knowledge
Knowledge drives decisions
Outcome
focus
Policy documents
Knowledge informs debate, leading to
decisions
Policy formulation mechanisms
Civil society
role
External to process, to be managed
at point in time
Integral part of society - representatives
and voice of interest groups
Context
B. Evidence for each option
Differences between Option 2 & 3’s approaches to generating evidence
45 Option 2 approach to generating evidence. The evidence produced through SAWI is
owned by those who produced it and the technical clients who asked for it. Experts then
use it to influence decision makers, rather than to engage wider constituencies in debate
over how to resolve the conflicting interests in the use, management and governance of
water. In addition, as the programme was led by the WB, it was influenced by the WB’s
incentives i.e. to focus on issues where a WB investment may emerge. The theory of
change is therefore around identifying and influencing key decision-makers usually
within Government to whom evidence can be disseminated, and looking for
opportunities to link collective action to large investment programmes. Evidence for this
approach is strong, based on the experience of Phase 1 and of equivalent programmes,
such as the Nile Basin Initiative.
46 Option 3 approach to generating evidence. Option 3 addresses the issues encountered
by SAWI-1 by giving stakeholders a commissioning role and by anchoring each dialogue
to a specific river basin or landscape context. Game plans will be developed for each
river basin and landscape, which will set out how to engage the critical interest groups.
This process will seek to build on existing or create new transboundary platforms for
inclusive, deliberative decision making. That is, where the interest groups come together
with experts to reach a common understanding of what the problems are. The demand
for information and understanding, in order to reach policy and investment decisions,
would emerge from the deliberative process and, therefore, avoid many of the problems
of dissemination of externally prepared solutions. The interest groups encompass the
technical experts inside and outside government, but also the front line managers from
different sectors, communities from different locations along the river and political
representatives at different levels. It is from this process that interventions, supported by
this programme, would be agreed.
47 Evidence to support the proposed options. The current literature in trans-boundary
water management provides ample evidence in support of the approaches proposed
under options 2 and 3 (see below the ranking of evidence in Table 2 and a summary of
the evidence for each option in Table 3).
48 Evidence on the importance of water management. Grey and Sadoff (2007)
demonstrate that a minimum platform of water infrastructure is needed for a country to
achieve water security and for water to make a positive rather than negative contribution
to growth and poverty reduction. They show how achieving this tipping point requires the
development of water institutions capable of negotiating the social and environmental
trade-offs involved. Evidence from Anders et al (2009) noted the importance and
urgency of ensuring effective transboundary water resources management in order to
secure the livelihoods of billions of people and sustain the resource across the globe.
They also noted how the response of the international water community to the mounting
challenges and pressure placed on shared waters has thus far been inconsistent and
inadequate.
49 Evidence on deliberative dialogue as a way of tackling complexity and delivering better
policy. A large body of literature supports the argument to use a deliberative approach to
improve policy outcomes in complex systems and with the uncertainty of environmental
change processes - articulately summarised in the Australian Public Services
Commission paper on deliberation in 2007 and in the Livelihood Resource Centre’s
synthesis (2012)29. Dryzek (1997) and Holmes and Scoones’s review of 35 case studies
(2000) make the case that deliberation enables interests of different groups to be
resolved – rather than experts or politicians deciding in isolation. This is particularly
important where there are so many competing frameworks for how to enhance
outcomes and given the uncertainty of climate change. Botterweg and Rodda (1999)
have pointed out that transboundary water management is a complex process with
many actors at different levels. The success of management initiatives in systems that
are difficult to regulate was also recognised to be dependent on effective and inclusive
dialogue, persuasion, proportionate incentives and the flow of information between
these actors (Timmerman & Langaas, 2005). Finally, the NEGOTIATE programme
demonstrates how multi-stakeholder processes help to manage the complexity of water
issues (Dore et al 2010).
50 Evidence on the importance of information. The importance of information to support
effective decision making has been highlighted by a number of sources. Gooch et al.
(2003) observed that decision-makers need access to reliable and understandable
information on environmental and water-related issues in order to make functional,
logical and rational decisions. Whereas Bernstein et al. (1993); Bradshaw and Borchers
(2000); Gooch (2004); MacDonald (1994); noted how technical language used by
scientists must be ‘‘translated’’ into lay terms for the information to be useful, to fit the
mind-frames of the receivers. Improving information flows and accountability is central
to how this programme will be delivered, with the strong focus on deliberative platforms.
Timmerman and Langaas (2005) observed how consistent and relevant information on
the status of water systems is indispensable for rational and cost-effective water
management.
51 Evidence on the importance of shared knowledge. Andres et al. (2009) also observed
how history suggests that a perception of common risks can be particularly compelling
motivation to manage and share these risks through cooperation between countries.
This approach was deemed to be particularly relevant to the Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna (GBM) Basin, where complex geo-morphological features, a unique climate and
an intricate network of delicate, interdependent ecosystems determine the need for
transboundary co-operation to achieve sustainability and mitigate risks in the future.
Again this is central to the focus of the programme and demonstrated as likely to be
effective through SAWI-1.
52 Evidence on institutional behaviour. Differences in institutional behaviour were also
noted to hinder cooperation between institutions, while organisational structures are
insufficiently tuned to the needs of the external environment (Timmerman and Langaas,
2005).
53 Evidence on ecosystem services and carbon sequestration. In the specific context of
this intervention, the improved management of transboundary river basins would seek to
also improve climate and environmental outcomes. This will be determined by increased
levels of ecosystem services - such as water purification, flood control and carbon
sequestration that will be achieved from better managed healthier and better functioning
ecosystems. The objective to facilitate hydropower development in the region – with
better social and environmental standards – should substitute for power from fossil fuel
sources, and so reduce carbon emissions.
54 What is the quality of evidence for each option? Evidence from similar programmes
is difficult to apply directly to SAWGP since it depends critically on the unique
circumstances and context in which each intervention has been deployed. As a result,
both conceptual arguments and empirical studies are presented as evidence for the
proposed intervention and approach. The evidence that more holistic analysis of river
basins delivers new opportunities for sharing benefits and costs is strong, not least
through the evaluation of SAWI-1 (Option 1 & 2). The evidence for the effectiveness of
participatory governance approaches for generating better decision making is well
established globally for natural resource management; that public engagement in policy
and investment planning improves public support is well established in the North, with
emerging evidence for the South (Option 2). Whilst there still risks, as evidence also
shows the need for politically astute facilitation for both Option 1 and 2, overall we feel
the evidence is strong (see Table 2), A summary of the arguments and evidence against
each of the options is given further below in Table 4.
Table 2: Rating of evidence for each Option
Option
Evidence rating
1
2
3
Medium
Strong
Strong
C. Climate and Environment Assessment
55 What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and
environment for each feasible option? Categorise as A, high potential risk /
opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity; C, low / no risk /
opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation summary.
Option
1
2
3
Climate change and environment risks Climate
change
and
environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
B
C
C
B
C
B
56 Climate and environment lie at the heart of this programme. Climate change and
environmental management are two of the central themes of this intervention; therefore
all of the activities considered under its various components incorporate measures that
address concerns related to either one or both.
57 All options are low or medium risk/opportunity. Three feasible implementation
options were identified for this intervention. None of these was deemed to have high or
unmanageable risks for either the environment or future climate. Option 1 (the
counterfactual option) was deemed to have potentially higher risks for the climate and
the environment, as well as presenting no opportunities for improvement. This is
because of the nature of the activities proposed under options 2 and 3, which aim to
promote dialogue between national governments and other regional actors in order to
improve environmental management and adaption to future climate conditions in the
region. Option 3 was deemed to be the best because it presented better opportunities
for improvement in environmental and ecosystems management, as well as climate
change adaptation.
D. Recommended option
58 The three options were assessed against six ‘critical success criteria’ (CSC), which were
defined based on the theory of change, the review of the first phase of SAWI and similar
initiatives in other river basins. Options which perform well against these criteria are,
therefore, more likely to contribute to the potential benefits set out in the strategic case
(Table 3).
Table 3: Critical success criteria
CSC
1
2
3
4
5
6
Description
Embedded in society and wider political debate
Transparent debate on trade-offs and options to ensure equitable and sustainable
management of climate change uncertainty
Deliberative
Linked to policy formulation mechanisms
Comprehensive management of transboundary river basins, integrating social, infrastructural
and ecosystem interventions
Results-focused
Clear policy implementation pathways, including associated policy instruments, structural
reforms, etc
Strategic trans-boundary
Relationships and trust built between countries for cooperation on water resources
Evidence-based
Robust evidence created and used to inform decisions on water resource management
Donor alignment and harmonisation
Maximisation of the potential to build on existing arrangements of donors and implementing
partners
59 A weight was assigned to each of the Critical Success Criteria (CSC) where 1 is least
important and 5 is most important, based on the relative importance of each criterion to
the success of the intervention. Each Option was then scored against each criteria and a
weighted total calculated (Table 4).
Table 4: Analysis of the feasible Options against CSC (Scores 1-5)
CSC
Weight
1. Embedded in a
wider political
debate
2. Deliberative
5
Option 1
Score
Weighted
1
5
5
1
5
1
5
4
20
3. Results-focused
4
1
4
3
12
3
12
4. Strategic transboundary
5. Evidence-based
4
2
8
3
12
4
16
3
2
6
3
9
4
12
6. Alignment/
harmonisation
Total
3
1
3
3
9
4
12
31
Option 2
Score
Weighted
2
10
57
Option 3
Score
Weighted
4
20
92
60 Option 3 recommended. In light of the evidence presented (summarised in Table
5 below), we assessed Option 3 to be the preferred approach as it provided an optimal
balance between risk and return. The main strength of this approach is that it presents
an important opportunity to build regional cooperation through an innovative programme
design and improve living conditions for the largest amount of people. Option 3 builds
on the work and results achieved by the SAWI, by focusing on basin-level dialogues and
inclusive and deliberative national processes.
61 Evidence strong. The preferred option is based on a strong evidence basis, but it also
involves a number of risks, which have been analysed in detail in the Management case
below. Although the risks are higher than for those associated with Option 2, Option 3
was still deemed to represent the best value for money and most effective investment of
DFID resources because of the results it can achieve.
62 Addresses strategic case challenges. Option 3 addresses the challenges identified in
earlier sections. The main focus is on the political and institutional barriers to regional
cooperation, in the context of water resource management. By focusing on wider
engagement in deliberative processes, Option 3 seeks to generate a shared
understanding of options and collective agreement of policy and investment decisions.
Table 5: Summary of comparison of three feasible options
OPTIONS
FOR
AGAINST
Option 1 - Exit:
Continued activity at no cost to
DFID
Missed opportunities to: strengthen
regional
cooperation
on
water
governance; enhance water security;
increase regional trade through joint
investments in energy production and
distribution; and for technical and public
debate

Regional process disembodied from
national policy and investment decisions.

Withdrawal
funding.
of
DFID
No transaction costs for DFID
Option 2 - Business as
usual:
Support WB’s multi
donor trust fund; DFID
manages small flexible
fund
Emphasis
on
Regional
dialogue and analysis of basin
systems
Improved technical debates at
the regional level
Donors are harmonized
Focus on high level
regional dialogue and
river basin analysis.
Option 3 - Preferred
Approach:
Shift focus to inclusive
deliberative processes
for 3 river basins, and 2
landscapes;
Increase civil
engagement.
Evidence Base




Limited engagement of civil society 
(strong government-focus).


Limitations of a single high-level regional
platform.

Countries seldom cooperate in the management of transboundary waters unless they can see reasonable
mutual benefit. (Jakerskog et al. 2009).
Increased dialogue and shared interests between countries facilitate sharing of international water resources
(Timmerman & Langaas, 2005).
Regional processes need to be connected to national policy development (SAWI, 2012).
Knowledge, the political economy of regional policy making, and deliberation is crucial to the improvement of
trans-boundary water management of the Himalayas’ rivers. (DFID, 2012)
Harnessing benefits requires planning for whole river and investing in basic level of infrastructure (Sadoff
and Grey, 2007)
Afghan experience of river basin analysis for cost effective investment planning (WB, 2010)
Lack of policy coherence without mechanisms for cross policy dialogue and deliberation (ISET 2008).
Participatory approaches required for effective river basin management (Langaas et al. 2004).
Sustained, information-based dialogue for shared understanding, productive negotiations, robust cooperative
outcomes (Jakerskog et al. 2009)
Building Trust, Knowledge and Institutions (Jakerskog et al. 2009).
Analysis led by World Bank rather than
end-users
River basin approach, with
deliberation and holistic interdisciplinary analysis
Harder to articulate results
Interest groups – including
community representatives identify, prioritise and analyse
needs, options and results
More management intensive
society
Inclusive:
representative
voices in regional debates
Interventions embedded in
national processes, leading to
more tangible results
Donors engage in broader
integrated approach

More complex intervention


Will need addition of (programme
funded) staff resource (new A2 post)




Deliberative forums of stakeholder groups, shown to develop more effective and relevant policy useful
information and interventions. (Australian Public Services Commission 2007; Blomley 2009; Campbell et al
2011; Chambers 2003; Clarke 2002; Drimie 2011; Fox 2005; Fung 2007; Gaventa and Barrett 2010;
Gaventa 2004; Gaventa and McGee 2010; Datta et al 2011; Green 2008; IFPRI 2011; OECD 2009).
Lack of robust evidence hampers policy development (Knox et al 2011).
Environmental and other decisions should not be left solely to experts, politicians or users; a deliberative
process is required to bring interests together (Dryzek (1997), The Politics of the Earth).
Review of 35 case studies of Deliberative Inclusionary Processes (DIPs): in-depth deliberation is an
important means to build trust and “tease out consensus” in situations where there is more than one
framework and approach to environmental issues. Holmes and Scoones (2000).
Multi-stakeholder alliances provide opportunity to draw in new sources of finance particularly from the private
sector (Mainuddin 2011; WDR, 2008).
Effective governance is more important to deal with water resource management problems than
technological solutions. Participatory approaches advocated (Langaas & Timmerman, 2003).
Case studies within the NEGOTIATE programme (Dores et al. 2010)
E. Theory of change
63 What’s new in the theory of change. The theory of change for SAWI-1 (and therefore
Option 2) is that technical analysis offers a neutral entry point to sharing these rivers and
that analysis of the river as a whole to maximise benefits will offer new insights. The
theory of change for Option 3 (see diagram 1 below) is more challenging since it
addresses how collective choices are framed, made and by whom. This focus on
governance arrangements and embedding the discourse in the regional, national and
local political economy, means that outcomes are harder to define and the responsibility
for ‘outcomes’ no longer lies solely with the implementing agencies. As well as the
quality of the outcomes being dependent on the quality of the processes followed in
each basin and country, results may take longer to achieve and there is an additional
risk that the differences between interest groups are not resolved and are therefore
unable to agree collective decisions.
64 Challenges of river basins. Resolving the challenges in these river basins is what is
known as a “wicked problem”30 i.e. one that deals with:
a
Complex systems with high levels of uncertainty. In the case of these rivers, they
have highly variable flows within a year and between years. Climate change is
compounding this through increasing the uncertainty.
b
Socially complex. The river basins have multiple stakeholders with conflicting claims
for water – and currently there is no mechanism to resolve them. No organisation
has responsibility across the system. And the costs to consuming or polluting more
are not paid by those responsible.
c
Difficult to frame the problem. There are unintended consequences of solutions
because expert-led analysis is too narrow, over simplifies systems in order to model
them and tends to take a ‘national’ rather than basin level view. Bringing together a
wider range of perspectives – from a range of disciplines, from policy makers,
service providers, private sector, communities and parliamentarians, and looking at
the river systems at a basin, rather than national level - helps to capture a stronger
understanding of the whole system and the uncertainties within it.
65 Shifting from a technical to deliberative process. This programme builds on the first
phase of South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI-1), where technical analysis provided new
entry points in the highly contested and sensitive issue of water sharing. It showed how
important it is to understand and manage the whole river basin, not just a portion within
a particular administrative boundary. However, SAWI-1 demonstrated the limits of an
expert led process. So SAWGP will need to expand the early work and develop
institutional mechanisms that engage interest groups in inclusive and deliberative
processes31.
66 Features of an effective deliberative process. A strong deliberative process should
bring interest groups and experts together to share their understanding and knowledge
from a range of perspectives in order to define the problem and resolve trade-offs. To
bring new information, through tools such as integrated systems analysis, strategic
basin assessments, climate scenarios, poverty and social impact analysis, to make the
trade-offs explicit across interest groups, geographies and over time32. And seek to
negotiate and resolve the different interests fairly, by sharing the benefits of investments
and policies rather than sharing the waters themselves.
67 Knock on policy and investment benefits. An effective dialogue process can help to
coordinate policies and investments across administrative and political boundaries, the
governments can move from sub-optimal national investments, to optimising the total
possible benefit from the river basin to deliver improvements in people’s livelihoods, in
economic growth, for ecosystems and biodiversity, and delivering further regional
cooperation, such as trade and increased regional security.
68 Broadening ownership. The alternative approach of preparing comprehensive,
technical solutions to problems defined by experts requires the “owners” of the proposed
solutions to persuade others to take them up. They have to incentivise national
champions to take forward the proposed solutions. They need to build support from civil
society and citizens through promoting of the proposals, in the face of widespread public
ignorance. And they need to convince citizens and communities to change their
behaviour, without having involved them in thinking through the problem and who are
characterised as risk averse and are slow to adopt change.
69 Shared information. When low levels of trust preclude the establishment of necessary
institutional arrangements, and when no single individual or organisation can see the
total picture, holistic analysis which is trusted by all stakeholders can stimulate new and
productive discussion, potentially leading to new institutional arrangements, structures
and processes, from which ownership and consensus can be subsequently
established33. To build the political space for addressing issues around which there are
widespread concern – such as upstream communities “stealing water” or downstream
communities “stopping floods drain away” - the media and parliamentarians also need to
be engaged, so that the issues are represented fairly in the press and in political debate
and a new consensus can emerge34.
70 Marrying the right process and analysis. Holistic analysis combined with a
deliberative process can help to build consensus between different interest groups over
what investments and reforms are needed. As a result, we would expect the delivery of
the investments and implementation of reforms to be more effective and for these
investments and reforms to deliver optimal benefits more efficiently. In particular, water
would not be over-allocated between different sectors and upstream-downstream tradeoffs would be explicitly addressed, therefore not creating lobbying interest against
investments by groups who may perceive a potential threat to their interest.
71 This theory of change suggests some fundamental changes to how the programme is
structured from SAWI-1. This is described more fully in Annex 1.
72 Regional outputs. Given the low levels of trust between countries and between interest
groups, the limited availability of data and the lack of holistic analysis of the river, this
programme will support:
a
Expanding the regional dialogue (Output 1) – the Abu Dhabi Dialogue that provided a
platform for government and opinion formers to share ideas, build a common
understanding and to build trust. This dialogue will continue but link closer to the
knowledge forum, which supports think tanks and academics to collaborate on
addressing common challenges to the region. It will form working groups to tackle
specific challenges common to the region – such as flood warning systems and
hydropower development. And it will invest in increasing transparency and
accountability through public access to the knowledge (data, analysis, reports) that
they need to make informed opinions.
b
Deliberative dialogues on each river basin and landscape (Output 2) – will bring
interest groups and experts together to generate new understanding and resolve
trade-offs. To build the political constituencies for policy reform and investments
through resolving the different interests of those living up or downstream and
developing progressive benefit sharing arrangements. Work on the two landscapes
at the source and mouth of these rivers, will enable ideas developed in the river
basins to be tested and support two new platforms for regional dialogue and for trust
building.
c
Delivering investments and policies (Output 3) will support the design and
development of investments and policies that are publically acceptable and represent
international good practice in social and environmental benefit sharing. It will tackle
the delivery challenge of how to get good policy and investment implemented. And it
will enable innovation in water resource and ecosystem management, including
through interventions to improve the climate resilience of poor peoples’ livelihoods
d
Broadening engagement of less powerful interest groups in the deliberative
processes and improve understanding of water issues amongst the general public
and policy makers to debunk myths (Output 4). This element focuses explicitly on
creating the political conditions for better regional cooperation.
73 Regional outcomes. Regional cooperation will lead to new opportunities to:
a
Livelihoods. Improve the livelihoods of 500 million people living in the river basins,
largely dependent on agricultural businesses for their living, through more efficient
and acceptable allocation of water, improved flood and drought management and
reduced exposure to the increased variability of water supply due to climate change
trends;
b
Energy. Expand hydro-power production in a region where there are currently major
shortfalls of power for both domestic and industrial production, which both affect
people’s livelihoods and limit economic growth. This will provide additional revenue
for governments to fund national development; and
c
Ecosystems. Improve ecosystem services, biodiversity and eco-tourism which will
conserve important landscapes and provide a livelihood for people living in these
fragile environments.
74 Regional cooperation, by itself, will not result in these benefits without significant
additional investments and policies. However, without regional cooperation, policies and
investments in the management of water resources will be sub-optimal (or non-existent).
This is because Governments and private investors tend to plan investments to address
problems within national boundaries, rather than planning to optimise development
across whole river basins. They seek to minimise their own risks by delaying decisions
or by taking excessively conservative decisions when they are unsure of the wider
context for investment. And they use historical averages to plan for the future despite
high and changing climate variability.
75 Dialogue still needs to be translated into policy. Despite the transboundary
dimensions of the challenges and opportunities for better water management, national
and sub-national governments retain ultimate responsibility for policy and investment
decisions. The shared understanding, developed at the basin and landscape level, must
be translated into results and this requires the formulation and implementation of
national and sub-national policies and investments. And in this lies the programmes
critical challenge, to embed the relevant policies and investments in national priorities
and secure agreement to decisions that emerge from the transboundary deliberative
platforms – output 3 focuses on the delivery challenge explicitly.
76 Principles within the theory of change. This theory of change can be translated into a
set of principles for the programme which will, with its partners, seek to be progressively
more:
a
Inclusive and holistic, bringing together different stakeholders and interests groups,
directly and their representatives including recognising transboundary interests and
the different interests of groups within different jurisdictions;
b
Deliberative, allowing reflection and supporting participants to engage with new
evidence and understanding which emerges from scientific study and from the
deliberative processes themselves;
c
Decisive, leading to and requiring decisions to be made in the form of policies,
regulations, programmes, investments and new institutional arrangements, that will
affect results;
d
Informed, proving new, broader and tested evidence with which interest groups can
engage during the deliberative process, in order to build a new shared understanding
of issues and opportunities and
e
Results-orientated, ensuring that appropriate structures, instruments and incentives
are in place to deliver collective decisions and translate them into results.
Measuring Change and Results:
77 SAWGP focuses on deliberative processes that will engage a range of stakeholders to
ensure that different interests are represented, and that they are informed by a holistic
understanding of the current water resource systems and the implications of proposed
changes. The focus of these platforms will be defined by those who participate –
government policy makers and front line staff, civil society and the private sector will
identify the reform processes or investments they feel are most important, drawing on
analysis of risks and opportunities, the incentives and barriers being faced by different
businesses or communities.
78 The risk of SAWGP having any adverse impacts is low, but the potential benefits of
achieving transformational change at scale are large. The real wins are in improving
trust, building shared analysis and common understanding, demonstrating how shared
decisions and transboundary management can work. Other wins include leveraging
private sector investment and better water governance and policies.
79 A key challenge however, will be in establishing how the long results chain, and these
sets of interlinked and complex interventions, lead to impacts for people in the region.
The results framework assumes that better policies and investments will provide a range
of benefits for people living in the region – some larger and more direct, others more
marginal and diffuse. Capturing the benefits of the programme will require detailed
analysis of the investments and policy reforms influenced. The World Bank’s PSIA
methodology could for instance, help to measure the numbers of people and the amount
of benefits distributed to different groups from policy change or investments delivered.
80 A second challenge is in defining a comprehensive set of indicators to measure the
quality of these deliberative processes and mechanisms and their value for money. As
the programme evolves, innovation and learning are likely to emerge. It will be
important to report against these. We are proposing to develop a robust M&E
methodology during the inception phase that develops the scope and methodologies for
measuring change.
Figure 1: Theory of Change
Impact: Climate change adaptation and poverty
reduction in South Asia through more effective
governance and increased cooperation on
transboundary water resources
Climate resilient livelihoods: # people
Econ growth: # kWh Hydro
Ecosystems: Value biodiversity & services
Climate change adaptation
and poverty reduction in South Asia
Assumptions: The multi-stakeholder mechanisms can reach decisions. There are sufficient win wins for upstream and
cooperation is possible. Geopolitics do not undermine possibility of cooperation. Support for regional agreements translated
Outcome: Effective governance of transboundary
water resources deliver equitable and climate
resilient policy decisions and investments.
downstream countries that
into national actions
National policies
(synchronised)
Investment: $1 billion
Hydropower : Schemes x3
Policy reforms: x5
Multi-stakeholder mechanisms
that resolve trade-offs: x7
National investment
(coordinated)
National multi-stakeholder mechanisms
on water resource management that resolve
trade-offs between water uses and water users
Assumptions: multi-stakeholder mechanisms can (a) be inclusive and reach agreements across administrations; (b) reach agreements to share benefits
where beneficiaries compensate cost bearers; and (c) be informed by holistic analysis of the river systems. Stakeholders act on new knowledge.
Output 2. Basin Dialogues:
Output 3. Landscape dialogues:
All countries of the region
• Regional understanding and shared
knowledge of issues and good practice
• Political space and shared strategic aims
Ganges, Brahmaputra, Indus
Synchronised policy through transboundary
dialogues e.g. shift management objectives
to maximise outcomes in “energyagriculture-biodiversity” trade-offs
Sundarbans, Mt Kailash, (Koshi)
Regional and basin concepts tested in
shared landscapes with direct impacts
Focus of cooperation:
•Hydropower benefit sharing
•Regional hydromet/EWS
•Integrated environmental, political, social
and institutional analysis (e.g.PSIAs)
Focus of co-operation:
•Hydro development/trade
•Flood/drought management
•Monitoring systems (EWS, Seasonal
forecasting, climate change)
Focus of co-operation:
• Diversified and resilient livelihoods
• Improved eco-systems services
• Eco-tourism opportunities
• Licit trade in herbal products
Activities:
Regional meetings and dialogues (ADD)
and associated thematic working groups
and knowledge forum/small grants
scheme
Activities:
Basin and national dialogues that coordinate
policy and implementation through inclusive
and informed national deliberation that
considers tradeoffs between options
Activities:
Landscape and national dialogues that
coordinate policy and implementation
through inclusive and informed national
deliberation that considers tradeoffs
Output 1. Regional dialogue:
Output 4. Strategic overview and support to:
Donor
strategies
a) Civil society engagement (basin, landscape and regional levels)
b) Regional public awareness (regional media)
c) Integrated and holistic analysis of climate impacts on river systems
Dialogues
are:
Inclusive,
holistic,
deliberative,
decisive,
informed,
results focused
And deliver:
Trust
Shared
understanding
Resolve trade
offs
F. Costs and benefits
81 Scope of benefits. The nature of SAWGP means that quantifying benefits at this stage
is difficult. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the enormous returns that
investments, leveraged and shaped by the programme, could make. The analysis under
SAWI-1 suggests the total benefits of better governing the Ganges alone is in the region
of US$ 5 billion, with an estimated value to society of £90 million in reduced emissions
due to generating clean power. The section below illustrates the scale of potential
benefits that can be achieved by taking a comprehensive river-basin-wide approach to
exploiting and managing water resources.
82 SAWGP results. the partners have agreed to the following targets by 2018:
 500 million people living in river basins with improved water governance, increasing
their resilience to climate change.
 US$ 1 billion investments – by the private sector and others - secured under formal
or informal regional agreements, publically accepted and influenced to have
international good practice in social and environmental benefit sharing.
 Three hydroelectric schemes in national investment pipelines secured under formal
or informal transboundary agreements by 2018, publically accepted and representing
international good practice in social and environmental benefit sharing
 Seven multi-stakeholder mechanisms established for river basins and landscapes to
resolve trade-offs and agree principles of fair and inclusive benefit sharing
 Five policies influenced that deliver economic, social and environmental benefits
fairly and sustainably – the significance of these policies will be tracked in terms of
the numbers of people that benefit and the financial value of the benefit flows.
83 Numbers of beneficiaries. The total population of the greater Himalayan region is
estimated to be about 1.5 billion people. About two thirds of these people live in the
three main river basins covered by SAWGP. The two landscape programmes in the
Sundarbans and the Mount Kailash affect a small subset of this population. However,
people living in these two areas are likely to experience the effects of SAWGP more
directly than those living in the broader river basins, where improvements in availability
of water or power are likely to be relatively marginal.
Table 6 Population affected, possible investments, outputs and impacts35
Basin/
landscape
Ganges
Population
650 million36
Flood Control
Agricultural yields
Household income
Household health
120 million37
Ground water
management
Water quality
Brahmaputra
Clean energy
Economic growth
Saved mitigation
costs
Public finance
CO2 management
Infrastructure
Environmental
management
Environmental services
Indus
220 million38
Investment
Disaster risk
reduction
Outputs
Impacts
Hydro electric
Total
950 million
(River basins)
Sundarbans
4 million39
Environmental
protection
Livelihood options
Enhanced Livelihoods
Mount
Kailash
1.2 million40
Total
5.2 million
Greater
Himalayan
region
Total
(Region)
Eco-tourism
Eco-services
Environmental
management
(Landscapes)
Dialogue
Media
Information
Livelihood options
Environmental
management
Livelihood options
Environmental services
Eco-services
Enhanced Livelihoods
Shared
understanding
Political space for
reforms, investments
Increased consensus by
public and leaders of action
needed to address climate
change impacts on rivers
950 million
84 Challenges in doing cost benefit analysis. The nature of this intervention means that
a full cost-benefit analysis is not possible at this stage. The scale of the potential
benefits that could be rendered from better coordinated investment within the Indus and
Brahmaputra river systems will only become clear once technical river basin
assessments have been completed. Further, the extent to which SAWGP is able to help
realise these benefits will depend on the degree to which it will be able to influence local,
regional and national decision-makers. This will be an adaptive and uncertain process –
making it difficult to assign a probability of success or allow comparison of expected
costs with expected benefits. Given the multitude of differing types of benefits and the
complexities surrounding them, in terms of attribution, inter dependency, external forces
needing to be in place to make them happen, it is not possible to quantify and therefore
monetize incremental benefits and to attribute them with any degree of certainty.
85 Nevertheless, the potential benefits are huge. There are very large potential benefits
which could arise from the types of investment that this programme aims to catalyse.
For example:
a
Economic benefits. The 23 medium and large hydropower projects already identified
in Nepal have annual net economic benefits of up to US$ 5 billion according to the
Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment undertaken under phase 1 of SAWI41. This
scale of potential economic benefit is consistent with analysis of the potential
benefits from optimisation of infrastructure projects at river basin level for the Kabul,
Zambezi and Nile basins.
b
Emissions benefits. The identified projects on the Ganges could lead to an estimated
reduction in emissions of 52,000 – 56,000 tonnes of carbon equivalent per year
through substituting for conventional (largely coal) power in India and Bangladesh –
with a conservative total value to society of £90 million42.
86 Return on investment. The above figures represent the potential benefits from better
understanding and coordinating investments and interventions across the Ganges basin.
The benefits from the Brahmaputra and Indus basins are still to be established.
However, given those of the Ganges, the total benefits could be extremely high. We are
not claiming SAWGP alone will deliver benefits on this magnitude. Instead, SAWGP will
address some of the critical enabling conditions which need to be in place for the
potential benefits to be realised. Given the scale of potential benefits, only a very
modest impact on investment will be needed to economically justify SAWGP. For
example, the annual economic rate of return on Ganges hydro investment identified by
SAWI-1 appears to be around 15%43. On this basis, if the actions undertaken by
SAWGP led to additional hydro capital investment of only $161m in the Ganges basin,
the resulting economic benefits would outweigh the cost of DFID’s proposed
contribution.
87 The full appraisal is given in Annex 2 and is summarised below:
88 Economic appraisal. The key economic benefits of the programme relate to (detailed
analysis of the economic benefits is provided in Annex 2):
a
b
c
d
e
f
Addressing market failures associated with the lack of information about water
resources, and the lack of a coordinated approach to making economic decisions
about water resources use.
Improving the climate for investment in trans-boundary water resource management,
by influencing development of appropriate policies, regulations and protocols. The
most significant example of this is likely to be in hydropower where SAWGP is
expected to spur interest in transboundary hydropower projects.
Benefits to ecosystem services and biodiversity - as set out in paragraph 87 below.
Reducing the risk of disasters such as floods and droughts by catalysing efforts to
improve resilience to both immediate damage and long term impacts such as
reduced farm investment, productivity and employment.
Improvements in agricultural productivity resulting from improvements in water
resource management. River basin analysis of the Ganges suggests that hydro
investment in the Nepal headwaters could reduce flow variability for downstream
agricultural users, potentially generating economic benefits of between $400 million
and $3.9bn44 under different investment scenarios
Health sector benefits from improved access to water and sanitation. Some of the
investments identified by the programme will contribute to: better access to sanitation
and improved sewerage, particularly for slums; improved solid waste management
and; improved supply of clean water.
89 Institutional & political appraisal. In a region where bilateral relations are in general
characterised by low levels of trust and co-operation, geopolitics and physical
geography have tended make countries nervous about water. As a result, with the
exception of bilateral agreements on specific rivers or projects, countries have tended to
develop national water policies and infrastructure in isolation. A direct link is often made
by politicians, commentators and the media between water resource management and
issues of national security, sovereignty and even national survival. This ‘securitisation’ of
water issues acts as an additional barrier to transboundary cooperation and sharing
hydrological information. SAWGP will do three things to tackle these political issues: (1)
establish inclusive mechanisms for dialogue to resolve trade-offs between interest
groups and resolve disputes; (2) promote river basin wide perspective to water
management on transboundary rivers; (3) generate credible evidence that can act as
reference point for investment planning and negotiations and to tackle prevalent water
myths by policy makers and public. Through these activities, SAWGP will promote an
evidence and dialogue based approach to resolution of water issues which will reduce
the potential for water disputes to escalate into broader disputes. A more detailed
analysis of the institutional and political implications of SAWGP are provided in Annex 2
90 Environmental appraisal. SAWGP is essentially an environmental programme.
SAWGP brings a progressive approach to tackling the underlying pressures on
environmental systems. Rather than only focusing on the technocratic, the programme
looks to address the underlying political and social issues through dialogue. This
approach aims to tackle not just the symptoms of environmental degradation but also
the root causes. And it seeks to tackle explicitly the difficulty of managing these highly
variable rivers given the uncertainty inherent to climate change. The programme will
yield three broad environmental benefits. These benefits also have significant economic
value and as a result were also identified as part of the economic appraisal. The first is
managing the uncertainty of climate change so that countries do not increase their
exposure of climate shocks. Second are the improved ecosystem services including
clean water, healthy soils, protection from floods and reduced soil erosion. The third is
enhanced biodiversity. Through improved water resources management, SAWGP will
help to reverse trends for diminishing stocks of biodiversity in the focus river basins and
landscapes. This in turn will help to reinforce the delivery of ecosystem services. In
addition, the programme will help address the lack of consistent and relevant information
on the status of water systems available to policy-makers, both by generating
knowledge and information as part of the programme, and by ensuring such knowledge
is effectively communicated.
91 Social appraisal. SAWGP presents the opportunity for significant social benefits but not
without some risks. The SAWGP inclusive dialogue process offers the opportunity to
engage representatives of the poorest and most vulnerable. It offers the chance to give
women a voice in decision-making over water resources. The deliberative approach
used in SAWGP will help build trust and relationships between key actors. Some of the
benefits of SAWGP present a degree of social risk. Most significant is the anticipated
boost in infrastructure investment. Large infrastructure schemes can mean resettlement
for some communities. SAWGP will seek to ensure analysis is undertaken on how the
costs and benefits from investments and reforms will accrue to different interest groups,
using for example, Poverty and Social Impact Analysis, and will seek to identify
progressive benefit sharing approaches, such as those displaced having a stake in the
scheme that displaces them. To complement this, SAWGP will also invest in civil society
to build accountability.
92 Sustainability of programme deliverables: Keeping ICAI and NAO guidance in view,
the programme has kept sustainability in mind. Certain elements of the programme will
have inherent sustainability – such as by improving the design of investments,
sustainable benefits would flow from the improved design. Other elements that have
great value may be harder to sustain, however, by the very way the programme works it
will seek to ensure regional ownership of the process and of the innovation in
approaches. For example, by bringing together a full range of stakeholders to tackle
trade-offs and benefit sharing it is likely new champions will emerge within South Asia
for approaches that bring together the whole of government and engage the public –
having had personal experience of how it can work. These may still only be a few green
shoots after five years, but given the existing support for participation in and
convergence between government programmes, it may be more substantive. Equally
through supporting the use of holistic analysis that considers climate futures, the
programme will enable government and non-government actors to build their skills and
understanding of these approaches – which can be drawn on subsequently. And as the
programme will promote new ways of managing river basins in integrated ways, it will
build the evidence base for the costs and benefits of these innovations and how these
cost benefit flows are distributed across different interest groups. This evidence will
itself be a global and regional public good – as managing rivers with climate change is a
fast evolving science.
G. Value for Money
93 What does ‘value for money’ involve? Value for money relates to the (1) efficiency
(cost of delivery impact results), (2) effectiveness (achievements in establishing the
institutional and procedural changes required to achieve the results), (3) economy (the
use of funds) and (4) equity (a fair or “just” distribution of benefits). Value for money
relates to both the measures used to assess value for money and the processes used to
ensure that the “value for money” principles are maintained throughout the programme.
94 A robust monitoring and evaluation approach will be developed during the first year
which will include further defining the set of indicators to measure the value for money
and establishing the baseline. In order to continually improve the performance of the
programme, light touch and frequent feedback from stakeholders will be embedded into
each regional, basin and landscape platform – this will ensure sufficient data for
qualitative tracking of progress where quantitative analysis is difficult.
95 Efficiency (ie. how well are the inputs converted into outputs). At this stage, it has only
been possible to illustrate the range of possible economic, social and environmental
benefits which will result from the programme. The specific outputs the programme will
support will be defined through the basin and landscape dialogues. To assess the
efficiency of delivery of these outputs, we will track:
a Unit costs of multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms (workshops, side events,
debates of analysis) at the regional, landscape and basin levels compared to a
quality rating of how inclusive they are, and how robust the debate is. At mid and
final evaluation, we will also assess how well they influence national actions, how
well they resolve trade-offs and agree progressive benefit sharing arrangements.
b Unit costs of studies compared to a quality rating of how effectively the study
responded to the questions raised by the stakeholders and, through the mid and final
evaluations, how widely the findings were used
c Unit costs of management and administration by our partners (WB, ICIMOD, NGOs)
and by DFID.
96 Effectiveness (ie. how well are the outputs achieving the desired outcome). At the
outcome level, the critical success criteria (CSCs, presented in full in Annex 1) represent
the key conditions required to be in place to create the circumstances from which
impacts are likely to flow. Effectively the CSCs are the key indicators of effectiveness.
They will shape the specific basin and landscape game plans and progress will be
reviewed six-monthly in the light of political and other conditions and the programme
adjusted accordingly. These review meetings with the implementing agencies and their
team leaders will cover each of the intervention plans and are essential to the process of
ensuring value for money is assessed throughout the life of the programme. We will
track the CSCs qualitatively each year as a trends analysis and track estimates of costs
to support those elements:
a The degree of transparent debate on trade-offs and benefit sharing of options - as
measured by: qualitative assessment through stakeholder feedback.
b How linked the multi-stakeholder mechanisms at basin and landscape level are to
national policy formulation mechanisms - as measured by stakeholder feedback.
c How clear are the policy implementation pathways - as measured by the donors’
game plans, the NGOs strategies defined under their charter and by the Abu Dhabi
Dialogue working groups.
d
e
f
How much trust is being built up between countries – as measured by: political
economy analysis in annual updates to game plans; qualitative assessment by Abu
Dhabi Dialogue, landscape and basin stakeholders.
Robust analysis created and used to inform decisions - as measured by: the cost per
piece of analysis with quality rating by stakeholders; cost per piece of analysis
accepted in a peer reviewed journal.
Donor alignment and harmonisation – as measured by: the number of donors in the
MDTF, number of pooled funds or aligned funding behind a common strategy for
each landscape and basin.
97 We also look at mid-year and final evaluation at
a The ERR from SAWI influenced investments, policies and efficiency gains of
investment strategies compared with ERRs and efficiency prior to influence.
b The proportion of analyses where the data, models and analysis are publically
available and being used by others
c Rate and weight the CSCs against substantive deliverables and the cost estimates
98 Economy (are we or our agents buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right
price). The procurement arrangements are described in the Commercial Case. The WB
and ICIMOD both have established procedures of achieving value for money, accepted
as meeting EU standards. We will track:
a The proportion of outputs delivered to schedule (and quality rating)
b The proportion of outputs procured through competitive tender (and quality rating)
c The proportion of outputs procured by nominated tender (and quality rating)
d The proportion of outputs rated as outstanding or good by stakeholders
e The proportion of studies that are accepted in peer review journals
99 Equity. Issues of fairness lie at the heart of the programme, which are addressed in two
ways. Firstly, the programme promotes the voice of different interests through an
inclusive multi-stakeholder approach. Core to the promotion of a range of voices is
support to civil society as representatives of different interest groups and the
development of multi-stakeholder mechanisms in which civil society can engage.
Secondly, the programme will explore mechanisms through which benefits can be fairly
distributed, through state or market mechanisms. The programme will track:
a The inclusiveness of multi-stakeholder mechanisms at the regional, basin and
landscape levels through annual stakeholder feedback, analysis by donors and
partners captured in game plans and annual reviews.
b Comparative analysis between the distribution of costs and benefits analysis planned
and the actual cost benefit sharing arrangements agreed – compared to the cost of
the relevant work supported by SAWGP and of the programme as a whole. This
analysis will be undertaken at mid-year and final evaluations.
100 Guiding principles. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) has
prepared eight Guiding Principles45 to assess value for money. The programme is
assessed against these principles which will be developed further through the baseline
and first years’ game plans and will be reassessed at mid-year and final evaluations
(Table 7).
Table 7: VFM assessment against ICAI principles
ICAI criteria
a
Intended
beneficiaries come first
Assessment
The programme involves a complex set of beneficiaries and stakeholders,
many of whose voices will be articulated through their governments and
through representatives in civil society. The programme aims to be
inclusive and this will be monitored carefully.
For the large number of downstream beneficiaries, spread over a vast area
there will be limited direct involvement in programme activities and policy
deliberations. Hence the programme explicitly funds civil society to engage
with government and the scientific community.
b Aid should always
be
delivered
with
sustainability in mind
c What matters is not
always measurable
d Waste and corruption
must be addressed
robustly
e Demonstrating VFM
does not mean going
for
the
cheapest
approach
f Well managed risktaking
is
to
be
encouraged
g Transparency and
accountability matter
h Drawn
practice
on
best
We assess the initial arrangements are in place, and these will be
monitored carefully. Care will need to be taken in the design of investment
programmes to ensure the benefits for poor people are actually realised.
The programme addresses an increasingly unstable situation. Solutions are
not defined in the programme, but mechanisms are promoted which
encourage stakeholders to reach sustainable solutions. Sustainability was
looked at during the appraisal (see paragraph 92)
The UK’s role is to support and facilitate a process and ensure that it is
inclusive of different interest groups, but the outcomes of those
deliberations are not dependent on UK involvement. If the outcomes
require large scale investments, their realisation will need to be supported
by international finance, especially for some of the smaller upstream
countries in the region. Within SAWI-2 MDTF with the WB, funds are
available to help shape future investment programmes.
The programme is defined in terms of processes and their qualities at the
basin and outcome levels. These will be carefully monitored. The easier to
measure indicators of impact, albeit with harder to define targets will be
tracked and used to adjust programme activities accordingly through six
monthly updates of game plans and regular stakeholder feedback.
The programme will be implemented through well-established agencies, the
World Bank and ICIMOD, with tested procedures. Given the knowledge
uncertainties, a certain degree of risk and replication is expected around
the suite of research activities.
The programme design focuses on inclusive multi-agency deliberation. The
alternative approach of identifying champions who can leverage change at
a point of time has been eschewed in favour of a slower and more robust
process of inclusive multi-stakeholder approaches.
The VFM indicators include quality assessments.
There are risks attached to the whole programme given its setting.
However, the programme itself is relatively risk free, with proven partners
and a tailored and responsive approach.
The inclusive multi-stakeholder process promotes transparency and
accountability. However, it must be recognised that the primary participants
are effectively representatives of different state and non-state interests and
the degree of representativeness will vary. Further, the issues the
programme addresses are not limited to present generations and the voice
of future generations needs to factored into the deliberations.
The programme has been prepared based on a review of the first phase
and of other basin approaches. An extensive review of participatory
governance approaches was also drawn on in the design and development
of DFID’s BC and the WB and ICIMOD’s concept notes.
H. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
101 Value for money statement. The recommended option (Option 3: multi-stakeholder
mechanisms) offers good value for money. However, it is not possible to estimate
overall economic returns at this stage. Option 3 is likely to be more effective and
equitable than the other options, given the focus on inclusive multi-stakeholder
mechanisms which involve a wider range of stakeholders and a more “thorough and
deeply” negotiated process. Option 3 also gives DFID greater scope to shape and
influence the nature of the programme interventions, which take place in a complex and
contested and uncertain environment and, thereby, ensure continued value for money.
Commercial Case
Direct procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement requirements for intervention
102
a
b
c
d
e
Over the course of the intervention, DFID will directly procure £6.3m in services to:
broaden civil society engagement in multi-stakeholder deliberative mechanisms for
each basin and landscape (£2.5m, further details at Annex 3);
build regional media capacity and deepen understanding of water related issues in the
general public of the region (£1.6m, proposal from Third Pole attached at Annex 4);
undertake innovative integrated analysis of how to manage climate change in the
Indus basin (£1.3m, further details at Annex 5);
deliver fleet footed technical advice and analysis to address issues or to take
advantage of opportunities as they arise (£0.4m, further details at Annex 6);
provide independent monitoring, evaluation and financial audit over the lifetime of the
programme (£0.5m).
103 The evaluation of SAWI-1 notes the importance of engaging civil society in
deliberation over future development of South Asia’s transboundary river basins. DFID’s
good understanding of and strong links with existing civil society organisations and
networks and relatively flexible (compared to the WB) procurement processes mean that
DFID is well placed to support and engage civil society more substantially in these
processes. Work procured by DFID will be strongly complementary to and coordinated
with the activities driven by the Bank through the SAWI-2 MDTF.
104 Where DFID undertakes direct procurement, it will do so in accordance with DFID’s
Procurement guidelines, acting in close collaboration with or through PRG as needed.
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial
advantage for DFID?
105 DFID will call for proposals from civil society organisations, commercial entities and
other institutions to undertake the civil society engagement, public engagement and
innovative integrated analysis, technical advice and independent analysis activities.
Organizations or consortia will be required to provide fully-costed technical proposals,
which will be assessed by DFID against the following evaluation criteria:
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
106
Technical merits of the proposed approach and its ability to contribute to the
objectives outlined in the SAWGP Business Case;
Strategic potential of the organisation for influencing national policies and key actors
on regional issues;
Proven ability to build networks and influence key stakeholders;
Capability of evidence generation and testing new approaches;
Capabilities to deliver, including strong internal governance frameworks and a track
record of fiduciary responsibility and accountability;
Regional presence (in South Asia);
Ability to implement and maintain procurement and financial management processes
and a comprehensive M&E strategy.
The evaluation of SAWI-1 has identified two routes to engagement of civil society,
which will be further analysed and developed during the inception phase. These include
the following:
a) Purposive (preferred option): Selecting a grouping of civil society organisation and
encouraging them to submit proposals for support with criteria that incentivise work
across international boundaries; this route involves identifying opportunities for future
benefit sharing through improved transboundary water management. One option
would be to select and fund a lead NGO from each country represented, to establish a
small network of other NGOs in their countries working on transboundary issues and
would focus on deliberation around issues of influence (including filling knowledge
gaps and establishing ways of influencing government at different levels). The overall
focus would be on assisting civil society organisations to establish a ‘charter group’
across the region under which a form of ‘track two’ deliberation on key transboundary
management issues could be established. This would form an important input into
wider regional dialogue under the ADD. DFID will encourage this process through
existing landscape/basin initiatives (Sundarbans, Kailash, Sutlej, Ganga, etc).
b) Competitive: Establishing a system of tendering for support to civil society
organisations using a challenge fund. A call would be announced for a lead NGO
working regionally (preferably one based in a country of the region, rather than an
international NGO) under which to take forward the process described above. This
organisation would embark on the larger task of managing a regional budget,
subcontracting national lead NGOs and overseeing the quality and depth of activities
under a ‘charter group’. This would encourage (and fund) the highest quality proposals
but would also be a lengthier process of management and selection and may result in
a less cohesive approach. Whilst this process could be devolved to a third party
organisation from the region or working in the region, there would be other inherent
risks involved including the dangers of ‘clientelism’ and sectoral bias. These could be
overcome with appropriate oversight procedures.
107 DFID has considered both options, and has concluded that due to the sensitivities
around transboundary water management and the cooperative approach required for
these activities, the ‘Purposive route’ is most appropriate for the civil society engagement,
media capacity building and public engagement and integrated analysis of the Indus
basin. Where individual studies are required to be undertaken for technical advice and
monitoring and evaluation, DFID may pursue a competitive route to get best value for
money and to encourage market competition.
108 DFID will recruit a full time A2 Programme Adviser to help develop these options
further and guide the process. The Programme Adviser will work with NGOs, particularly
at a regional level, helping to facilitate meetings, support written outputs and ensure that
the process continued to engage with wider regional dialogues and debates on
transboundary issues. A draft job description is attached at Annex 7.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
109 Experience from procurement processes under the first phase of SAWI, and from
other regional programmes suggests that, although national civil society capabilities exist,
the capacity of any one civil society organisation to play a leadership role on regional
efforts is limited. This is evidenced by the quality of proposals, and limited convening
capability of any one organisation on the span of regional issues. This is something that
the programme is trying to address. Nevertheless, national civil society presence and
capability exists, and Phase 1 has successfully initiated partnerships between civil
society organisations. Some examples include:
a
b
c
d
e
Observer Research Foundation and Lahore University of Management Studies
collaboration to map of irrigation water-related practices and policies in the ‘two
Punjabs’ (covering an important part of the Indus river system).
Third Pole Project - building a common narrative in South Asia of the impacts of
climate change on the major rivers with sustained media coverage in the region and
internationally
Kathmandu to Copenhagen – a high level regional event building a common narrative
on the challenges of climate change for the region, particularly given their shared
rivers, which influenced the early COP negotiations at Copenhagen.
The Mountain Initiative led by Government of Nepal to continue to raise the issues of
climate change on mountains and the implications for downstream communities.
a two-day workshop in Kathmandu in October 2011, attended by 12 NGOs from the
region (selected by DFID on the basis of existing knowledge).
110 During the design of SAWGP, DFID has consulted extensively with civil society
organisations. There is strong interest from civil society in participating in this
programme, and a number of organisations have put forward initial ideas to DFID.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value
added and how will we measure and improve this?
111 The DFID team will assess the fully costed proposals from civil society organisations
against the results that they are intended to deliver. The cost of the individual proposals
from civil society organisations are unlikely to change. Other activities that are directly
contracted by DFID (such as studies or consultancy) will also be procured on the basis of
payment against deliverables. DFID will continue to monitor progress and any changes
in costs during Annual Reviews.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
112 The World Bank will take forward procurement for the various sub-components under
the Multi-donor Trust Fund mechanism.
113 For the other components, DFID will undertake procurement according to its
established guidelines and processes. DFID will fully consult with PrG in advance of
undertaking procurement.
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life
of the intervention?
114 The DFID SAWGP Team based in the Climate Change and Energy Unit (CCEU) in
India, will manage and monitor the overall programme with close involvement of DFID
India’s PrG section. The team will comprise 1.9 FTEs with additional support from the
South Asia Research hub on the Indus SBA and the Abu Dhabi Knowledge Forum. The
core SAWGP team will include:
 A1 CCEU Climate and Development Team Leader (0.1 FTE): Provide high-level
oversight and guidance.
 A1 Senior Regional Adviser 0.2 FTE): ensure programme delivers and influences
effectively (with particular focus on Indus SBA), manage donor relationships.
 A2 Programme Manager (0.2 FTE): overall programme monitoring and evaluation,
project management (focus on Mount Kailash and Sundarbans).
 A2 Programme Adviser (1.0 FTE, to be recruited): provide oversight and management
of the programme including contracting and supplier performance, support
identification of key civil society organisations, facilitate strategic links and identify
incentives, identify technical assistance and support for critical activities where
required, identify quick results in the initial years and ensure the long-term success
over the duration of the programme, and supervise progress (further details in draft
job description at Annex 7)
 B1 Deputy Programme Manager (0.1 FTE): Project management support and
administration of accountable grants.
 FCO C4 Policy Officer (0.3 FTE): provide guidance and support to ensure
coordination of programme with broader HMG political and strategic objectives,
political economy analysis and support to civil society work and Third Pole project.
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
115
The main funding instruments and procurement strategies are as follows:
116 SAWI-2 Multi-donor Trust Fund with the World Bank (£11.5m), alongside Norway
and AusAid. This will be overseen by a Trust Fund Committee of the MDTF donors
(SAWI partners) operating by consensus in an equal partnership. This component will
include Regional activities (Abu Dhabi Dialogue; and the Knowledge Forum facilitated by
ICIMOD), Basin level (Ganges, Indus, Brahmaputra) and Landscape (Sunderbans)
dialogue and activities. The World Bank will be responsible for all aspects of managing
and administering the Trust Fund, providing the services and activities described in its
project document, and ensuring effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting
on this to donors. Procurement of any services will be administered by the World Bank in
line with its procedures and regulations and will be based on a proposal, work-plan and
budget to be agreed with DFID. A Memorandum of Understanding will set the terms of
the formal agreement between DFID and the World Bank.
117 The World Bank will report to the Donor Steering Committee (which includes DFID,
AusAid, and Norway), to ensure effective and successful execution of the program in
accordance with required fiduciary and financial management practices.
118 The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) will support primarily Bank-Executed activities,
but could also fund eligible Recipient-Executed activities such as small research grants.
119 The World Bank is well placed to deliver on the objectives of the SAWI programme,
making it the main partner of choice for the donors for the following reasons:
a
Strategic capability and mandate to deliver an ambitious regional programme, and to
facilitate dialogues and engagement of key policy makers on sensitive issues of
regional water governance such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue.
b
Track record of delivering on cooperative transboundary water management in many
regions. Most notably, the Bank helped deliver SAWI-Phase 1 which has included
delivery of complex policy–relevant analytical products (e.g. Ganges SBA) and
facilitating critical investments (e.g. $1bn investment for the Ganges). In addition, the
Bank has a network of expertise and is uniquely positioned to leverage additional
regional investment.
c
Robust Trust Fund mechanism and strong fiduciary, programme management and
procurement mechanisms of the World Bank Group provides donor partners with a
credible and reliable mechanism to channel their funds, and helps to align donor
activities on water governance in the region.
120 Accountable Grant with ICIMOD (£5m) for the Mount Kailash Landscape.
Procurement of any services will be undertaken by ICIMOD based on an agreed
proposal, workplan and budget with DFID. A standard accountable grant will set the
terms of the formal arrangement between DFID and ICIMOD, including procurement.
B. Value for money through procurement
121 DFID has considered a range of direct and indirect procurement options during design
and appraisal. However the preferred approach most strongly enables an inclusive,
flexible and deliberative process (rather than a donor driven one) which is essential for
the process to be seen as credible and to get buy-in from regional stakeholders; draws
on available expertise of the Bank and other partners; and has the least transaction costs
for DFID.
122 Within the World Bank, the programme will be implemented and administered in
accordance with the World Bank’s policies and procedures, and the Bank’s standard
procurement policy will apply. These procedures ensure competitive selection where
necessary and measure each procurement option on technical and financial capabilities.
DFID’s MoU and financing arrangement with the World Bank is also premised upon the
delivery of results and performance. DFID and the World Bank will jointly monitor this to
ensure that delivery incentives remain (for the Bank and for other programme partners)
during implementation.
123 Both the World Bank and ICIMOD have good relations with Governments and other
stakeholders in the region and are able to facilitate transboundary platforms and
coordinate programmes.
124 The Trust Fund procurement activities will follow strict World Bank Group
procurement guidelines. These procedures ensure competitive selection where
necessary and measure each procurement option on technical and financial capabilities.
This process will be overseen by the World Bank’s SAWI Core Team who will also be
responsible for operational, procurement and financial management, ensuring proper
execution of trust fund activities, appropriate fiduciary responsibility and value for money.
125 A non-standard cost recovery arrangement will be utilized because the MDTF is a
hybrid with both Bank-Executed and Recipient-Executed components and therefore
qualifies for cost customization under the Bank’s current Trust Fund Management
Framework. The Bank will charge the standard 2% of all contributions, taken off the top,
to defray the costs of the central units. In addition, the managing unit will recover, on the
basis of actual costs incurred, an amount not exceeding 7% to cover the costs of trust
fund administration and programme management.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure
accurate forecasting?
126 Costs: DFID’s contribution is £23.5m. DFID will provide this over five years (2012/13
to 2016/17) in grant financing to the following:
a) SAWI-2 Multi-donor Trust Fund managed by the World Bank (£11.5m) operating
across the region. Other donors include AusAid (with a new commitment of AUD
$12million – around £7.7m over 4 years) and Norway (with their original NOK 18m or
£1.9m, committed for 3 years in late 2010). The further allocation of funds under the
MDTF will be based on the game plans and agreements reached during the meetings
of the SAWI Partners. The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) will support primarily BankExecuted activities, but could also fund eligible Recipient-Executed activities such as
small research grants.
b) Accountable Grant with ICIMOD (£5m) supporting Mount Kailash Sacred
Landscape, which GIZ is co-funding.
c) Accountable Grants from DFID (£5.8m) to support (i) broadening civil society
engagement in the multi-stakeholder mechanisms for each basin and landscape
(£2.5m, for further details see Annex 3); (ii) building media capacity and deepening
understanding of water related issues in the general public of the region (£1.6m,
proposal from Third Pole Project attached at Annex 4); and (iii) innovative integrated
analysis of how to manage climate change in the Indus river basin (£1.3m, for further
details see Annex 5); and (iv) responsive, fleet footed technical advice and analysis to
address issues and take advantage of opportunities as they arise (£0.4m,for further
details see Annex 6). AusAid is also considering making a contribution through a MoU
with DFID of approximately $1m Australian Dollars annually – these funds would be
managed by DFID.
d) Contracts from DFID for monitoring and independent evaluations (£0.5m) and an
additional programme adviser (£0.7m, draft job description attached at Annex 7).
77. Forecasting: DFID expects to disburse expenditure evenly across the five years of the
project as set out in Table 8. This budget is based on projected annual action plans, but
will be revisited during annual reviews. We do not anticipate cost overruns, but there is
some risk of the programme running into FY 2017-18 due to late start up in FY 2012-13.
DFID will closely track disbursement rates and future payments will be made on the basis
of need, spending performance, and progress.
Table 8: Budget
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Total by
Component
2012-2013 2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
component
1. SAWI-2 MDTF (WB) focal areas
Ganges (25%)
375,000
500,000
500,000
750,000
750,000 2,875,000
Indus (15%)
225,000
300,000
300,000
450,000
450,000 1,725,000
Brahmaputra (15%)
225,000
300,000
300,000
450,000
450,000 1,725,000
Sunderbans (15%)
225,000
300,000
300,000
450,000
450,000 1,725,000
Regional Cooperation (30%)
450,000
600,000
600,000
900,000
900,000 3,450,000
SAWI-2 MDTF (WB) total:
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000 3,000,000 11,500,000
2. Mt Kailash (ICIMOD)
630,000
1,170,000
1,300,000
1,070,000
830,000 5,000,000
3. Civil Society engagement (Charter)
20,000
430,000
650,000
700,000
700,000 2,500,000
4. Public engagement (Third Pole Project)
240,000
280,000
360,000
360,000
360,000 1,600,000
5. Innovative integrated analysis (Indus SBA +)
40,000
300,000
400,000
400,000
200,000 1,340,000
6. Responsive, supportive, fleet footed (TA)
20,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
50,000
370,000
7. M&E
20,000
50,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
520,000
8. A2 Adviser
70,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
150,000
670,000
Overall Total
2,540,000
4,480,000
5,110,000
5,930,000 5,440,000 23,500,000
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
127
Funds will be drawn against the programme resources budget from the ICF.
C. How will funds be paid out?
128 DFID will disburse funds to the World Bank’s SAWI-2 MDTF on an annual basis
against an agreed payment schedule, as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding.
The World Bank will utilize the grant to implement the objectives as set out in their
concept note and this Business Case. Payments will be made annually against a request
for funds against an agreed workplan, and subject to annual reviews of progress against
outputs. In addition, the World Bank will provide an annual statement of expenditure
detailing actual expenditure to date (committed and spent).
129 DFID will make payments to civil society organisations (e.g. ICIMOD, Third Pole
Project) through Accountable Grant arrangements. Payments will be made on a
reimbursement basis (quarterly or six-monthly) against receipt of a detailed statement of
expenditure according to the agreed workplan. An assessment of overall progress and
financial spend will be undertaken during annual reviews.
130 Any unused balance from the Grant Account (e.g. resulting from less-than-predicted
uptake of the funds) will be returned to HMG at the end of the programme, subject to
adjustments as set out in the World Bank Trust Fund Memorandum of Understanding and
the Accountable Grant arrangements with partners.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
131 For the multi-donor Trust Fund, the financial and fraud risks have been assessed as
low as it will be managed by the World Bank according to standard Bank guidelines on
procurement and financial management.
132 For the accountable grants, financial and fraud risks are also assessed as low as they
will be managed by a full- time DFID A2 Programme Adviser according to DFID
guidelines. DFID will also assess separately fiduciary risk at annual reviews.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
133 Expenditure will be monitored, reported and accounted for on an annual basis, and
will form part of the Annual Review cycle. The DFID team will be responsible for ensuring
that all procedures for financial reporting, accounting and audit are fully complied with.
DFID may also undertake separate financial review to assess the economy, efficiency
and effectiveness with which grantees have used DFID resources in discharging their
functions under the grant.
134 The World Bank will administer and account for the grant resources in accordance
with its financial regulations and other applicable rules and procedures and practices, and
keep separate records and accounts. Grant resources will be held in a separate account
so that these can be separately accounted for. The Bank will make available annual
statements of expenditure for DFID funds, duly certified by its external auditors. In
addition, on a six-monthly basis, the Bank’s SAWI Program Manager will also provide
details of actual and forecasted expenditure for the DFID Grant. Within six months from
the end of the DFID-funded programme, the Bank will provide DFID with a final financial
report showing the receipts, income and expenditure under the Grant Account and the
remaining balance, if any.
135 For Accountable Grants with civil society or other organisations, annual audit
statements are required to be submitted to DFID for expenditure in the financial year.
136 DFID also reserves the right to appoint its own auditors, if deemed necessary for any
part of this Grant.
137 The UK’s Grant funds will not be used to procure any capital assets under this
programme.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the
programme?
138 The DFID SAWGP Team (see paragraph 114 for team structure) will closely monitor
the expected results related to the programme over 5 years. In addition, overall progress
on all elements of the programme will be presented and discussed at the annual donor
meetings to help maintain a comprehensive approach to SAWGP.
139 Progress against the strategic objectives of the overall programme will be subject to
joint oversight by the SAWI partners (DFID, AusAid, Norway, World Bank) on a sixmonthly basis.
140 DFID will also develop a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework
which will be used to assess the impact and outcomes of the programme. This M&E
Framework will be harmonized with other donors’ reporting requirements as much as
possible to improve reporting efficiency.
Figure 2: Stakeholder Engagement
141 SAWI-2 MDTF: an annual meeting of the MDTF Committee (SAWI Partners) will be
held in October or November of each year to review progress, update and agree the
Focus Area Strategies for the three Basins and two Landscapes, and finalize an Annual
Report. Given ICIMOD’s role in the ADKF and Mt Kailash work, the Director General will
be invited to participate in the MDTF Committee as an observer. The Annual Report will
be submitted at the end of every calendar year, reporting on the previous fiscal year (July
to June). A mid-year video conference and quarterly email communications with SAWI
Partners will sustain communications between the annual meetings. These quarterly
communications will be used to review progress and changes if any to the game plans
and programming priorities.
142 A SAWI core team within the World Bank will be responsible for the day-to-day
administration of the MDTF. The overall MDTF will be supervised by the Bank’s SAWI
Program Manager, reporting directly to the South Asia Sustainable Development (SASDI)
Sector Manager and assisted by SAWI core team members. The SAWI Program
Manager and SASDI Sector Manager will process all proposals in accordance with
required fiduciary procedures and the objectives of the Trust Fund. The SAWI Program
Manager will ensure effective reporting lines exist and that the program is implemented in
a timely and efficient manner. Individual Task Team Leaders will be appointed to
manage each grant funded activity (Focus Areas) supported by the Trust Fund. They will
be responsible for the development of the focus area game plans, for reporting progress
as well as ensuring compliance with all relevant policies and procedures of the Bank. The
governance structure is designed to ensure a flexible approach, with the responsibility of
'no-objection' to activities resting with the World Bank.
143 DFID funded accountable grants to ICIMOD, and to deliver civil society
engagement, public engagement and media capacity building and integrated
analysis of the Indus basin will be managed directly by the new DFID Programme
Adviser. The Programme Adviser will work with civil society to support development of
their “charter” on regional water governance with prioritised actions (in partnership with
our counterparts in AusAid). Additionally, the Programme Adviser will manage the
responsive fleet footed technical advice to for civil society (NGOs, universities, think
tanks, MPs, journalists etc) to support basin game plans and multi-stakeholder
mechanisms as well as work under the regional charter (in partnership with counterparts
in AusAid). The Programme Adviser will ensure that DFID (and AusAid) funded elements
are coordinated with the overall programme. DFID will therefore update the SAWI-2
partners on progress and forward plans under these elements via the annual donor
meetings, the mid-year video conference and quarterly email communications.
144 Within DFID Asia Regional Team/Climate Change and Energy Unit, the
programme will be led by the A1 Asia Regional Climate Change and Water Adviser of the
Asia Regional Team, and managed by the A2 Programme Manager within the Climate
Change and Energy Unit (CCEU), with inputs from the FCO in Delhi, and DFID’s C&E
advisers based in South Asia. DFID will also have a full time A2 Programme Adviser to
support delivery of this programme. The CCEU will liaise closely with DFID’s Research
and Evidence Division, and with Climate Environment Department to support lesson
learning and any read-across with other work planned on climate resilience, hydro-power,
and disaster risk reduction. The CCEU will also work closely with the FCO regional
offices and South Asia Dept, with direct support by the FCO’s Resource Security lead in
the CCEU.
Table 9: Management and Reporting Functions
Area
1. Programme
Oversight
Lead Responsibility
a. Donor Strategy Group
b. DFID-CCEU Team
Monitoring Function
Strategic
oversight;
progress against the
trust fund
Reporting
a. Annual MDTF meeting
and report;
six-monthly
video-conference meetings;
quarterly communications
2. Regional Dialogue
and Knowledge
World Bank SAWI Core
Team
and
ICIMOD
facilitated
3. Basin and
Landscape delivery
(SAWI-2 MDTF)
4. Mount Kailash
delivery (Accountable
Grant)
5.
Civil
society
engagement,
public
engagement
and
media
capacity
building
and
integrated analysis of
Indus basin
World Bank SAWI Core
Team facilitated
Abu Dhabi
(annual)
Dialogue
Knowledge Forum
Delivery of 3 Basin and
1 Landscape Strategies
ICIMOD facilitated
Delivery of 1 landscape
strategy
DFID (with
contributions)
Regional civil society
Australia
b. DFID regular monitoring
and annual reviews
Annual reports; Quarterly,
six-monthly updates to the
donor group
Annual Reports; Quarterly
and six-monthly reports to
the donor group
Annual Report; Quarterly
and six-monthly reports to
the donor group
Six-monthly updates to the
donor group
DFID’s own monitoring and
annual reviews
Independent
evaluation
(end of programme)
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
Category
Risk
Probability
Impact
Risk Description
Proposed Mitigation Measure /
Risk Owners
A. Regional
tensions or
reversals of
cooperation
Medium
High

A legacy of
persistent political
tensions and
mistrust between
countries leading to
slow or stalled
progress on
SAWGP activities.

Geopolitics around
other issues do not
undermine
possibility of
regional
cooperation or
investment.
 The Abu Dhabi Dialogue continues
to promote dialogue and maintain
relationships between stakeholders
throughout implementation period.
 Evidence generated from the SBAs
is used to deepen understanding,
foster trust, and build dialogue.
 The approach of game plans (basin
and landscape level) will help to
ensure context-specific approaches
and results (even though progress
may not be even across all areas).
 Opportunities for co-benefits are
identified by SAWGP partners.
 Early wins are identified and
delivered.
[Owner: SAWGP donor partners,
World Bank]
 SAWGP is aligned with national
policy priorities and programmes
.
 Cross political support is developed
through engaging a range of MPs
and political parties in understanding
the issues.
B. Country
capacity and
buy-in
Medium
Medium
 Domestic political
support for SAWGP
weakens and/or
political opposition
hampers the process
 Decrease of
conducive policies to
support effective
water governance
 The transboundary
multi-stakeholder
mechanisms and
C.
Engagement
of Key
Stakeholders
(policy
makers, civil
society)
D.
Medium
Medium
associated national
processes are not
effective mechanisms
in reaching decisions.
 Reluctance of key
stakeholders to
engage in the
dialogue process.
 Trans-boundary
dialogue, national
policies and
deliberations are not
informed by
knowledge generated
by the programme
and the latest
understanding on
water management
systems.
Medium
Medium
 Public investments
 The civil society fund and the basin
platforms will reach out to
government decision makers and
build alliances between the range of
interest groups.
[Owner: World Bank, SAWGP
donor partners]
 During the design phase, DFID has
assessed the capacity and interest
of existing civil society groups to
form partnerships
 The game plans for each focus area
will analyse the political economy to
ensure activities engage interest
groups and knowledge generated is
relevant
 The DFID Programme Adviser will
provide ongoing support to promote
linkages and networks throughout
the implementation phase.
[Owner: World Bank, SAWGP
donor partners]
 The multi-stakeholder mechanisms
Investments
Leveraged
(public and
private)
E. Capacity
constraints of
implementers
not well targeted or
do not generate
required returns to
achieve SAWGP
sustainability
objectives
 Low interest from
private sector to
invest
Medium
Medium
 Inadequate Bank
staffing and financial
resources for
successful
implementation of
activities;
 Civil society
implementation
partners do not have
the adequate
capacity, skills and
resources to
successfully deliver.
F.
Performance
Medium
High
 Delayed progress
under the SAWI-2
MDTF in clientexecuted activities.
 SAWI-2 MDTF does
not achieve adequate
performance results
as agreed
G. Lack of
or poor
Alignment/coordination of
donor support
H. Fraud &
Corruption
Low
Medium
 Risk of overlap with
other initiatives / or
disparate approaches
by donors.
Low
High
 Grants provided to
civil society by the
World Bank will be
mismanaged.
will analyse potential investments in
terms of social, political, economic
and environmental cost and benefit
flows to identify the most
progressive outcomes
 The private sector will be engaged
in the multi-stakeholder
mechanisms to ensure their
perspective of viability of options is
included in the analysis
[Owner: World Bank, SAWGP
donor partners]
 A dedicated Bank core team based
in South Asia (with more staff
resources than Phase 1) will be
established, with dedicated leads for
each basin and landscape.
 The forming of consortia should
address the lack of capacity of any
single organisation by pooling
resources and skills
[Owner: SAWGP donor partners,
World Bank, implementation
partners – ICIMOD, TPP etc]
 The SAWGP partners will monitor
progress to ensure key milestones
are being met.
DFID’s A2 Programme Adviser will
pro-actively identify issues, monitor
progress, build networks to help
achieve SAWGP-2 objectives.
[Owner: World Bank, SAWGP
donor partners, implementation
partners]
 A single MDTF instrument and close
coordination between SAWI
partners through quarterly meetings.
[Owner: SAWGP donor partners,
World Bank]
 The MDTF will adhere to well
established World Bank
Procurement Guidelines, and will
absorb fiduciary risk.
 Civil society funds will be closely
managed by DFID, and will be paid
out following DFID procedures and
safeguards. Financial management
and technical progress will be
routinely supervised during
implementation.
 DFID has set aside (£0.5m) for
independent evaluation and financial
audit.
[Owner: UK, World Bank]
Table 10: Risk Matrix Summary
IMPACT
MEDIUM
A, F
B, C, D, E
H
G,
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
PROBABILITY
HIGH
HIGH
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
145 All DFID funds will be disbursed as Technical Assistance. There is no financial aid
component for this programme. For the SAWI-2 MDTF, DFID’s procedures on Trust
Funds with the World Bank will apply. For accountable grants, DFID’s procedures on
Accountable Grants and contracts will apply.
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
146 A comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework will be designed by
the SAWI partners at the Inception stage (first 6 months, led by DFID) and will be used to
assess the impact and outcomes of SAWI over the life of the program. This M&E
Framework will harmonize with DFID and other donor reporting requirements as much as
possible to improve reporting efficiency. Once the framework is in place, the baseline will
be set, through the game plans for each basin and landscape led by partners and agreed
with donors and through a wider regional analysis, undertaken by DFID and agreed with
donors and partners.
Monitoring
147 Monitoring of progress and impact will be done with reference to the log frame, annual
workplans, deliverables and key milestones. The World Bank will provide annual
workplans that map against the logframe, and six-monthly progress updates against
these. The Bank will also prepare an annual Progress Report (including financial
report) which will form the basis of discussions between the World Bank, DFID and other
donor partners during annual reviews.
148 In addition, the Bank will develop outcome indicators and process results for the
Game Plans (landscapes and basins) in collaboration with donors partners, and will
closely monitor, update and report progress against these every six months.
149 For Mt Kailash, ICIMOD will also provide DFID and GIZ with separate annual
workplans, six-monthly updates, and annual progress reports. ICIMOD and DFID will
share key findings with other SAWI partners.
150 Stakeholder feedback will be elicited annually through the multi-stakeholder
platforms and ad hoc around flagship processes by the WB, ICIMOD and civil society
partners. This is essential to ensure the programme continually improves and responds
to the range of stakeholders that it needs to engage.
151 Annual reviews, involving all SAWI partners (DFID, Bank, AusAid, Norway, ICIMOD),
will take stock of overall progress against planned results, agree forward strategic
priorities and work plans, identify key lessons and risks, and consider what changes are
needed maximize the likelihood that long term outcome indicators are achieved. Annual
reviews will keep a close eye on the staff capacity to manage this programme in the WB
and within DFID itself.
152 A Mid-Term review is proposed to be carried out in the third year to assess progress
towards outcome and impact, test the theory of change and to determine any mid-course
amendments.
153 In the final year of the programme, an end of project review and an independent
evaluation will also be carried out to assess overall performance, sustainability and
impact.
Evaluation
154 An independent evaluation will also be undertaken in the final year to assess
outcomes and impact. The main objectives are to:






Unpack the long results chain, and assess the theory of change, considering how
these sets of interlinked and complex interventions have led to impacts for people in
the region (social, environmental, economic, see para 79); and identify ways that this
can be sustained;
Rigorously assess whether SAWGP has achieved transformational change (at
scale), the resulting benefits (outcomes and impacts level) and how.
Provide a realistic chain of attribution (where possible), as well as capture factors
entirely independent of the programme;
Assess VfM - whether that funds have been used effectively and efficiently to deliver
results;
Assess, compare and contrast innovative approaches to delivery (e.g. the different
approaches and sequencing of technical and deliberative processes in the 3 basins)
Identify lessons of what works, what doesn’t and why; and, identify good practice and
regional, global public goods that build on knowledge and fill evidence gaps as
identified in the business case.
Methodology
155 The project logframe and theory of change will act as the reference point. The
evaluation will link with HQ on their evolving work on ICF indicators and methodology.
Where possible, the evaluation will rely on established methodologies – for instance the
World Bank’s PSIA methodology could help to measure the numbers of people and the
amount of benefits distributed to different groups from policy change or investments
delivered.
156 Furthermore, the M&E framework will also incorporate a set of indices to measure
the quality of the multi-stakeholder mechanisms and their value for money (para 77). This
is likely to include, but is not limited to: identifying co-benefits of regional cooperation
(cross-country, multi-sectoral, socio-economic levels); impacts on women and other
vulnerable communities; building trust, shared analysis and common understanding;
demonstrating how shared decisions and transboundary management can work;
leveraging private sector investment; and better water governance and policies.
Process and Timing
157 The evaluation process will be led by DFID, and its approach and methodology will be
developed during the inception phase and discussed with SAWI partners at the donor
meeting. DFID will contract out the evaluation to independent, technical experts and will
draw up a full terms of reference for this and move to contact within the first 6 months of
the programme. The SAWI partners will remain fully informed of progress and emerging
results / lessons during the evaluation. The SAWI partners will agree any corrective
program actions at the donor meetings.
158 The timing of the evaluation is as follows: Year 1: agree TORs and evaluation
approach with partners and contract (DFID, 1st 6 months); Year 2.5: mid-term review
links with evaluation interim findings; mid-course corrections undertaken; Years 3, 4:
progress reporting to SAWI partners: Year 5: evaluation complete and reported.
Logframe
Quest No of logframe for this intervention:
References:
Acreman et al (2008) Review of issues on water storage in international development. DFID internal paper
Andersson, E.; Fennell, E.; and Shahrokh, T. (2007) Making the Case for Public Engagement. How to
Demonstrate the Value of Consumer Input. Consumer Focus and Involve. http://www.involve.org.uk/makingthe-case-for-public-engagement/
Anders, J; Mark Zeitoun, and Anders Berntell (2009): Addressing Transboundary Water Management
Challenges: Getting it Right; Stockholm International Water Institute, SIWI
Australian Public Services Commission 2007 Tackling wicked problems: a public policy perspective. Canberra.
http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications07/wickedproblems.htm
Bandyopadhyay, J and Gyawali, D (1994). Mountain Research and Development Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1994),
pp. 1-24
Benfield, Aon, (2011), “Waters of the Third Pole: Sources of Threat, Sources of Survival”, UCL Hazard
Research Centre, London
Bernstein BB, Thompson BE, Smith RW (1993) A combined science and management framework for
developing regional monitoring objectives. Coastal Manag 21:185–195
Blomley, T 2009 Evaluation of the work of the Forest Governance Learning Group 2005-2009. Acacia
Consulting, Reading.
Botterweg T, RoddaDW(1999) Danube River Basin: progress with the environmental programme. Water Sci
Technol 40(10):1–8
Bradshaw GA, Borchers JF (2000) Uncertainty as information: narrowing the science-policy gap. Conserv Ecol
4(1):7 http:// www.consecol.org/vol4/iss1/art7
Brodie, E; Cowling, E; Nissen, N; Ellis Paine, A; Jochum V.; Warburton, D. (2009) Understanding Participation:
A Literature Review. Pathways through Participation. http://pathwaysthroughparticipation.org.uk/;
Campbell, JG et al. 2011 The challenges of growing with complexity: the mid-term evaluation of the Rights
and Resources Initiative. Mountain Institute, West Virginia
Cannon, T and Muller-Mahn, D. 2010 Vulnerability, resilience and development discourses in context of
climate change. Natural Hazards 55: 621-635
Chambers, S 2003 Deliberative democratic theory Annual Review of Political Science vol 6(307-26)
Clarke R 2002 New Democratic processes: better decisions, stronger democratic democracy IPPR, London
Datta, A., Jones, H, Febriany, V., Harris, D. Dewi, RK, Wild, L, Young J., 2011. The political economy of policymaking in Indonesia: Opportunities for improving the demand and use of knowledge. ODI/SMERU. Overseas
Development Institute, London
Dore, J., Robinson, J. and Smith, M (Editors) (2010). Negotiate: reaching agreement over water. IUCN, Gland.
120.pp.
Dore, J and Lebel, L. (2010) Deliberation and scale in Mekong Region water governance. Environmental
Management, 46(1): 60-80.
Drimie, S. 2011. Creating a ‘safe’ space to advance evidence-based policy. Science and Development
Network.
Dryzek, J (1997) The Politics of the Earth: Environmental discourses, OUP
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Foundations (2012) Edited by
Pushpam Kumar; Routledge.
ESPASSA, 2008: Ecosystem Services and Poverty Alleviation Study in South Asia (ESPASSA): A Situation
Analysis for India and the Hindu Kush Himalayan Region. New Delhi: The Energy & Resource Institute
Few, R.; Brown, K; and Tompkins, E.L. (2006) Public Participation and Climate Change Adaptation. Tyndall
Centre for Climate Change Research. http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp95.pdf
Fox, J, 2005 Empowerment and institutional change: mapping ‘virtuous circles’ of state-society interaction. In
R.Alsop (ed) Power, rights and poverty: concepts and connections. World Bank, Washington D.C.
Fung, A. (2004) Deliberation’s Darker Side: Six Questions for Iris Marion Young and Jane Mansbridge.
http://www.archonfung.net/papers/FungDeliberationDarkNCR04.pdf
Fung, A. 2007. Minipublics: Deliberative Designs and Their Consequences. In S. W. Rosenberg (ed).
Deliberation, Participation and Democracy: Can the People Govern? New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 259-184.
Gaventa, J 2004 Towards participatory governance: assessing the transformative possibilities. In S.Hickey and
G. Mohan (eds) Participation: from tyranny to transformation. Zed Books, London.
Gaventa, J and Barrett, G. 2010 Citizenship, participation and accountability: so what difference does it make?
IDS Working Paper 347, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
Gaventa, J. and McGee, R. 2010 Citizen Action and National Policy Reform: Making Change Happen. Zed
Books, London.
Gooch GD, Hoglund P, Roll G, Lopman E, Aliakseyeva N (2003): Review of existing structures, models and
practices for transboundary water management in Europe - The implementation of transboundary water
management - identification of present problems and a design for future research. In: Bernardini F, LandsbergUczciwek M, Haunia S, Adriaanse M, Enderlein RE (eds) Proceedings of the international, conference on
sustainable management of transboundary waters in Europe, 21–24 April 2002, Miedzyzdroje Szczecin,
Poland pp 285–293 http://www.unece.org/env/water/meetings/conf2.htm.
Gooch GD (2004): The communication of scientific information in institutional contexts: the specific case of
transboundary water management in Europe. In: Timmerman JG, Langaas S (eds) Environmental information
in European transboundary water management. IWA Publishing, London, pp 13–29 ISBN: 184339 038 8
Green, D 2008 From poverty to power: how active citizens and effective states can change the world. Oxfam,
Oxford.
Grey, D and C Sadoff, 2007. Sink or swim? Water security for growth and development. Water Policy 9 (2007)
545–571
Holmes T., I. Scones (2000), Participatory Environmental Policy Processes: Experience from North and South,
IDS Working Paper No 113. http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC7863.pdf
HDR, 2008. The Human Development Report 2007/2008
ICIMOD, 2007 (Xu, Shrestha, Vaidya, Eriksson and Hewitt). The Melting Himalaya. Regional challenges and
local impacts of climate change on mountain ecosystems and livelihoods. ICIMOD, Kathmandu.
ICIMOD, 2011. Mount Kailash Sacred Landscape Feasibility Study. International Centre for Integrated
Mountain Development
IFPRI, 2011. The political economy of agricultural policy reform in India. New Delhi.
Immerzeel, Ludovicus, van Beek, Marc and Bierkens (2010). Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water
Towers. Science, 328
IPCC, 2012: Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate
Change Adaptation (SREX), Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change.
ISET 2008 Climate adaptation in Asia: knowledge gaps and research issues in South Asia: full report of the
South Asia Team, Institute for Social and Environmental Transition ISET, Boulder USA.
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/8125_ClimateAdaptationSASept081.pdf
IUCN (The World Conservation Union), 2003: Indus Delta, Pakistan: economic costs of reduction in freshwater
flows. Case Studies in Wetland Valuation No. 5, Pakistan Country Office, Karachi
Jägerskog, A. Mark Zeitoun, and Anders Berntell (2009): Addressing Transboundary Water Management
Challenges: Getting it Right - Stockholm International Water Institute, SIWI
Jeng, H. and Hong, Y. J. (2005) ‘Assessment of a natural wetland for use in wastewater remediation’,
Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 111 (1-3): 113-131.
Kale, S. (2002): “Fluvial geomorphology of Indian rivers: an overview”; Progress in Physical Geography
September 2002 vol. 26 no. 3, pg. 400-433
Knox, JW, Hess, T.M., Daccache, A., Perez Ortola, M. 2011 What are the projected impacts of climate change
on food crop productivity in Africa and S.Asia. DFID Systematic Review, Cranfield University.
Langaas S, Ahlenius H, Hannerz F, Nilsson S (2004): Towards GISand Internet-based information systems for
transboundary river basins. In: Timmerman JG, Langaas S (eds) Environmental information in European
transboundary water management. IWA Publishing, London, pp 135–152 ISBN: 1 84339 038 8
Langaas, S. & Timmerman, J.G. (eds) (2003) The role and use of environmental information in European
transboundary river basin management. London: IWA Publishing.
Livelihoods Resource Centre (2012). Synthesis of evidence and experience on role of deliberative fora in
policy processes. HTSPE
Ludi, E., Jones, L. Levine, S 2012 Changing focus? How to take adaptive capacity seriously: evidence from
Africa shows that development interventions could do more. ODI Briefing Paper 71. Overseas Development
Institute, London.
MacDonald L. H. (1994) Developing a monitoring project. J Soil Water Conserv 1994: 221–227
Mainuddin K. 2011 Planning and costing agriculture’s adaptation to climate change in the salinity-prone
cropping system of Bangladesh. IIED, London.
McGray, H.; Hammill, A.; Bradley, R. (2007) Weathering the Storm. Options for Framing Adaptation and
Development. World Resources Institute.
Miller, Rees, Warnaars, Young, Collins and Shrestha (under review in 2012). What is the evidence about
glacier melt across the Himalayas? A systematic review. CEE
National
Consumer
Council
(2008)
Deliberative
Public
Engagement:
http://www.involve.org.uk/deliberative-public-engagement-nine-principles/
Nine
Principles.
OECD 2009. Focus on Citizens: Public Engagement for Better Policy and Services. Studies in public
engagement. (See also EVIPNET (Evidence informed policy network) for evidence of use of deliberative policy
processes (Organization of 'safe haven' deliberative forums involving policymakers, and researchers and
citizens groups to stimulate context-specific, evidence-informed local action).
Ostrom E 2001 A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science
325:419–422.
Oxfam International (2008) Rethinking Disasters
Oxfam International (2009) Even the Himalayas have stopped smiling: climate change poverty and adaptation
in Nepal. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/nepal-climate-change-poverty-adaptation-0908.pdf
Pettengell, C (2011). Why is innovation important in a changing climate?
practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2011/09/why-is-innovation-important-in-a-changing-climate
http://policy-
Renner, M (2011). Water and energy dynamics in the Greater Himalayan region: opportunities for
environmental peace building. NOREF Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre
Sadoff, C. and Grey, D. (2008) Why share? The benefits (and costs) of transboundary water management.
Chapter 2 in, Sadoff, C., Greiber, T., Smith, M. and G. Bergkamp (eds.) SHARE - Managing Water Across
Boundaries. IUCN. Gland, Switzerland. 2008.
Sauer, Klop, Agarwal, 2010. “Over heating: financial risks from water constraints on power generation in Asia”
(HSBC)
Shields and Nicols (2012): SAWI- review of Phase 1 (independent review), [yet to be published].
Sterrett, C 2011 Review of climate change adaptation practices in South Asia. Oxfam Research Report,
Melbourne, Australia. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-climate-change-adaptation-southasia-161111-en.pdf
Strategic Foresight Group, 2009. Challenges of water stress and climate change in the Himalayan River
Basins. A collaborative dialogue. Experts Call for Himalayan Sub-Regional Cooperation to Promote Water
Security and Peace in Asia. Kathmandu, 6-7 August 2009.
TEEB (2010) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A
synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations of TEEB
Timmerman JG (2004) Incorporating user needs into environmental information systems. In: Timmerman JG,
Langaas S (eds) Environmental information in European transboundary water management. IWA Publishing,
London, pp 108–124 ISBN: 1 84339 038 8
Timmerman J.G. & Sindre Langaas (2005): Water information: what is it good for? The use of information in
transboundary water management; Reg Environ Change (2005) 5: 177–187 DOI 10.1007/s10113-004-0087-6
UN Water, 2010: the UN Water Report
Wakeford, T; and Singh, J. (2008) PLA 58: Towards Empowered Participation: Stories and Reflections. IIED.
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/14562IIED.pdf
Webster, Toma and Kim, 2011. Were the 2010 Pakistan floods predictable? Geophys. Res. Lett., 38.
Wilby, 2009. An inventory of activities in South Asia. DFID internal paper.
Wirsing and Jasparro (2007). River rivalry: water disputes, resource insecurity and diplomatic deadlock in
South Asia. Water Policy 9: 231-251
WDR 2008 World Development Report: Agriculture and Poverty Reduction, World Bank, Washington DC.
World Bank 2009: South Asia: Shared views on climate change and development
World Bank, 2010:”Scoping Strategic Options for Development of the Kabul River Basin: A Multi sectoral
Decision Support System Approach”; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (2011) Gender and Climate Change: Three Things You Should Know
World Bank (unpublished): The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment.
End Notes
1See
population estimates in appraisal, derived from bottom up analysis under the WB Ganges Strategic Basin
Assessment (to be published, 2012) and ICIMOD, 2007.
2 With the exception of Afghanistan, all these countries have borders with India.
3 Benfield (2011)
4 Acreman et al (2008)
5 IUCN (2003)
6 ESPASSA (2008) The Energy and Resource Institute.
7 UN Water (2010)
8 World Bank (unpublished), Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment
9 Water scarcity is likely to become one of the binding constraints as 80% of India’s planned coal power
stations are to be located in places that are already water scarce (and thermal power stations consume
significant amounts of water for cooling). Sauer et al, 2010.
10 World Bank (unpublished)
11 The performance of global climate models for the South Asia monsoon is poor, and there is not a clear signal
as to whether there will be more or less rainfall overall. However trends are emerging and the global models
agree over some variables, such as temperature. See SREX, 2012; Wilby, 2009 citing: Bhutiyani, Kale and
Pawar, 2009. Climate change and the precipitation variations in the north-western Himalaya: 1866-2006.
International Journal of Climatology. Singh, 2007. Long-term trends in the frequency of severe cyclones of Bay
of Bengal: Observations and simulations. Mausam, 58, 59-66.
12 Miller et al (under review in 2012).
13Immerzeel et al, 2010.
14World Bank 2009
15 Oxfam, 2008
16 And whilst 2010 was particularly extreme, in 2007, severe flooding on the Ganges and Brahmaputra affected
more than 13 million people in Bangladesh (and cost US$1 billion).
17 Webster et al, 2011.
18 The death rate for women in Bangladesh’s 1991 cyclone was 5 times that of men; 15 months after the 1998
flood, 40% of undernourished children at the time of the flood had not recovered their original (poor) status;and
more generally in South Asia, when subsistence farmers are hit by a shock, children, especially girls, are taken
out of school and women and girls’ meals are reduced first (HDR 2008)
19 Renner, 2011
20 Upstream communities tend to object to downstream development because any development
creates the “right” to use a certain amount of water based on prior use. So India objects to Pakistan
development as much as Pakistan would object to Indian infrastructure.
21 Strategic Foresight Group, 2009
22 Over the last five years, SAARC statements have regularly made commitments for tackling climate
change through better cooperation, including improving sharing of climate information. See Renner,
2011
23 Wirsing and Jasparro (2007).
24 World Bank (2011)
25 In 2006, the FCO organised a first meeting of the seven countries (the Abu Dhabi Dialogue), with senior
political, government and non-government participants, to look at water security in the rivers emerging from the
Himalaya. The WB shared experience from the Nile Basin, and was requested to facilitate an on-going
process. DFID’s support to SAWI, with the World Bank, began in 2009. This was subsequently strengthened
by the involvement of AusAid and Norwegian Aid as partners. There have been 5 Abu Dhabi Dialogues
spanning five years and bringing together some 70 key individuals from the seven countries.
26 An independent evaluation of SAWI-1 notes that the initiative leveraged US$ 1.66 billion in national
investments and supported policy work that will strengthen the country’s ability to more effectively manage
shared rivers and negotiate with its neighbours. For example, in India SAWI supported the institutional
analysis for setting up the National Ganges River Basin Authority. In Nepal, it strengthened the analytical
capability of the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, enabling them to do the benefit analysis to
negotiate with India on river development.
27 Under Phase 1, DFID’s inputs supported new partnerships to develop in the region, such as between think
tanks in India and Pakistan to analyse water practices in both Punjabs’ and a regional editorial project to
encourage better reporting on the climate change impacts of the Himalayan rivers. They also led to more
explicit attention to managing the uncertainty of climate change in decision making and to systems analysis
rather than narrowly defining challenges in the water sector. For example, DFID supported analysis under this
initiative of the social implications of climate change and of opportunities to strengthen climate observation that
have influenced the approach of the WB and other investors.
28 The range of policies which might emerge includes how to address low-flows in the dry season, flood impact
mitigation, and ways of enhancing water quality and maximising the regional benefits that can emerge through
joint investment.
29 See also Blomley 2009; Campbell et al 2011; Chambers 2003; Clarke 2002; Datta et al 2011; Drimie 2011;
Fox 2005; Fung 2007; Gaventa and Barrett 2010; Gaventa 2004; Gaventa and McGee 2010; Green 2008;
IFPRI 2011; OECD 2009
30 Australian Public Service Commission (2007).
31 Holmes T., I. Scones (2000); Andersson et al, (2007); Australian Public Service Commission (2007);
Brodie et al, (2009); Few, (2006); Fung, A. (2004); McGray, et al (2007); National Consumer Council (2008);
Wakeford et al (2008)
32Dryzek, J (1997)
33 Holmes T., I. Scones (2000)
34Political crisis, Mediated Deliberation and Citizen Engagement: A case study of Bangladesh and Nirbachoni
Sanglap 11/3/2008
35 Derived from Renner (2011) and from SAWI donor workshops held in 2011.
36 WB, unpublished.
37 ICIMOD 2007
38 ICIMOD 2007
39 Sundarbans theory of change (WB document provided to DFID in 2011)
40 ICIMOD 2011
41 World Bank Ganges SBA (unpublished)
42 DFID calculation for SAWGP economic appraisal (Annex 2)
43 The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment identifies a suite of hydropower investments with a capital cost
(discounted to 2010 prices) of around $35 billion, that would generate annual benefits (discounted to 2010
prices) of around $5 billion
44 World Bank (unpublished)
45 ICAI’s approach to Effectiveness and VFM, Report 1, November 2001