INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CONFLICTS:
RESOLVING
BORDER &
SOVEREIGNTY
DISPUTES (RBSD)
CASE STUDY APPROACH
In summarily citing almost all most potent Conflicts and Disputes on Earth, this
Treatise serves as an In-depth Inquiry into the Onset, Stages of Escalation and
Application of International Law in the Resolution (R) of the Bakassi Peninsula
Border (B) Disputes and conflict between Cameroun Republic, the Federation of
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea, and the Sovereignty Dispute (SD) Between the
Republic of Ambazonia (Former UN Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons)
and Cameroun Republic, and the wider Geopolitical Implications and analyses.
Justice Muluh Mbuh
Copyright Protected, Justice M. Mbuh, 2002
DEDICATION
To the blessed memories of my Uncle Christopher
Tencha and Sisters Mbuh Euphemia Ngum and
Mbuh Pamela Forkeng.
2
CONTENTS
DEDICATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY/QUESTION
I
Introduction:
A.
Centrality of Cameroun to Case study: Colonial Heritage and Ethnicity
B.
Statement of Problem:
(i)
The Republic of Cameroun and Ambazonia
(ii)
The Federation of Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroun
(iii)
The Relationship of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to (i) & (ii)
C.
Significance of Study
D.
Limitations of Study
II
Research Statement
III
Methodology
IV
Summary of Chapters/Conclusion
CHAPTER TWO
INTERNATIONAL BORDER DISPUTES AND THE LAW
I
Reflections on International Law and Border Disputes
II
“Topdog” / “Underdog” and Perception Analyses
1) The Perception of Leaders
2) The Influence of the International Community
3) Rivalry Between Nations
4) The Influence of a Dominant Partner
Conclusions
3
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONAL LAW SOURCES AND PRACTICE
I
Contributions of Colonialism: A) Wilsonianism
B) Decolonization
C) New Principles of International Law
II
Definitions of International Law
III
Sources of International Law
IV
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Conclusion
CHAPTER FOUR
CASE STUDY: THE BAKASSI PENINSULA DISPUTE
I
Restatement of Problem: The Entire Cameroun-Nigeria Border
II
The Actual Drawing of the Border
III
Contemporary Claims in Historical Context
IV
Alternative Explanation of claims of Disputing Parties
Conclusion
CHAPTER FIVE
PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATION OF CASE STUDY DISPUTES
AND THE LAW
I
II
Philosophers on the Morality of the Good and the Just
Frank Literature from the Nigerian Side:
(a) ‘Ambazonia Republic Claims Bakassi.’
(b) ‘No Win Without Ambazonia.’
(c) ‘Bakassi, A Ruse?’
(d) ‘The Peninsula Belongs to Cameroun.’
II
Assessment of Frank Literature given Political and Legal Realities of Disputants
4
(a) In Ambazonia
(b) Equatorial Guinea
(c) In Cameroun
(d) In Nigeria
IV
International Political and Economic Interest
Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX
THE CLAIMS OF DISPUTING PARTIES
I
The Nature of the Dispute
II
Cameroun Claims and Arguments
III
Nigeria Counter-claims and Arguments
IV
Ambazonia Claims of Sovereignty
Conclusions
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I
The Expanded Nature of the Case
II
Evaluation of the Claims and Factors that Determine Legal Title to Territory:
1) Conditions based on pre-existing Agreements
2) The General Considerations of Convenience
3) International Law Adopted by Tribunals
III
The Decisions of the International Court of Justice
IV
The Independent Opinion of Judges
Conclusions
CHAPTER EIGHT
INTERNATIONAL
JUDGMENT
I
COURT
OF
JUSTICE
(ICJ)
Pre-Judgment United Nations Pre-emptive Diplomacy: Three Articles
5
FINAL
II
ICJ Final Judgment
III Varied Interpretation of Judgment: Sixteen Articles
(a) From Nigerian Side
(b) From the Cameroun Side
(c) From the Ambazonia Republic Side
IV An Uncertain Future: Bakassi Phase II
Conclusion
CHAPTER NINE
EVALUATION OF LEGAL PROCEEDURE AND DECISIONS
I
Summary of Chapters
II
Response of the Republic of Ambazonia Following ICJ Ruling of October 2002
Ruling
III
New Evidence: Admissibility of Third Claimant’s Case
IV
Evaluation of ICJ Statute
V
Important Observations and Recommendations
VI
Flashback on Conflict Literature
VII
Claimants, Judges and Researchers: Friends or Enemies of the Law?
Conclusions
APPENDICES
A. TREATIES:
1. Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 (Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary).
2. Anglo-French Treaty of 1916 (Ambazonia-Cameroun Boundary).
3. General Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial and Other Peoples of
December 5, 1960.
4. The Plebiscite Treaty of October 30, 1960 (Two Alternatives).
5. UN Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1861: Still Unimplemented or Under Breach.
B. AMBAZONIA REPUBLIC:
Three Landmark Documents:
1. The New Social Order, By Fon Gorji-Dinka, March 5, 1985.
2. Open Letter to Cameroun Republic L’etat-Major: Defuse the Time Bomb, May
1985.
3. The Rebellion (Revolt) of Ambazonia, July 11, 1985.
6
C. MAPS:
1) The Map of Kamerun, as of 1913
2) The Map of Cameroun and Southern Cameroons
3) The Cameroons in 1947
4) The Cameroons in 1960
5) Maps of Disputed Area (Bakassi Peninsula Encircled)
6) Map Showing Pillars of the Ambazonia–Nigeria Border, with King Point and
Bakassi Point—both lie West of the Bakassi Peninsula
7) Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaties, 3rd Ed.: British Colonies: Protectorates
and Possessions in Africa, 1908.
8) Nigeria-Cameroonian Oil Platform Locations in the Gulf of Guinea. Original extract
from J.O. Newton’s Ph. D. Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1999; and
present modifications from Defense Mapping Agency, USA, Map of the Gulf of
Guinea: Cape Three Point to Cape Lopez—up till 1965.
9) Map of West Cameroon (herein as Ambazonia), Scotland: Wm. Collins Sons &Co.
Ltd., for Longman Atlases, 1971.
10) Map of West and East Cameroon, 1971; Bakassi Peninsula is in West Cameroon
(Ambazonia) Territory.
LIST OF TREATIES AND CASES CONSULTED.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS/BIBLIOGRAPHY.
7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The realization of this work is due, thanks to many years of perseverance
and constant search for answers to the troubling questions that surround
political behavior of leadership, nation-states and conflicts, particularly in
Cameroun and Africa at large. My position on these questions has greatly
improved and modulated over the years, thanks to the untiring and
knowledgeable efforts of my lecturers at the University of South Carolina
(USC)—from the College of Education to those of the Department of
Government and International Studies (GINT), and those of the Ahmadou Bello
University (ABU) Zaria, Nigeria.
Very special thanks go to Professor Jan Love who has been available to
give advice on my search for focus—especially coming to the United States with
very painful memories of Cameroun (see Inside Contemporary Cameroun Politics,
1stBooks Publishers, 2003) and through from the College of Education to the
Department of Government & International Studies (GINT) of the University of
South Carolina, Professor Jan Love has been there for me to consult without
charge, fear or favor. Many thanks also go to Professor Splittgerber of the College
of Education for the advice and concerns he showed for my educational and
other physical troubles. Thanks too to Professor Mark DeLancey for his support,
which transcends my educational concerns to the enormous contributions to
espouse Cameroun to the International and Educational Community through his
USC course taught in Cameroun every summer, through the various
contributions in the Friends of Cameroun Association of Columbia and his many
published works on Cameroun Politics. He is special in showing others that there
is much good about Cameroun, perhaps with the exception of its politics. I
recognize the contributions of all other Professors who taught me in GINT:
Professor Harvey Starr for International Conflict especially, Professor Jerel Rosati
for US Foreign Policy courses, Professor Charles Kegley for Foreign Policy and
her interrelatedness to domestic policy as well as to international politics or
hegemonic stability, and Professor Natalie Kaufman for courses in International
Law and Human Rights especially; and also Dr. Hendricks Clements of the
History department for courses on US Diplomatic History.
Very special thanks once again go to my thesis committee members
especially my director, Professor Kaufman, who’s understanding and motherly
nature, besides the lessons she taught in international law have enabled me to
produce this work. Gratitude and recognition is extended to Professor Mark
DeLancey who took up time to read this work, make comments and recommend
it for me to defend in fulfillment of my degree requirement. In that regard, I also
thank Dr. Victor J. Ngoh of the History Department of the University of Buea,
Cameroun, whose patience and insightful discussions did much in adding to the
historical analysis, besides moderating the entire thesis.
8
Many thanks to all the members of the Mbuhmegha and Moformukong
family of Pinyin (Santa-Asobo) for their dedication to truth and repulse, and for
recognizing that education investments do not necessarily have to focus on
making one rich but also help pave the right path for society as a whole to
follow. This work is a testimony of their dedication. Special thanks to Dr.
Rebecca N. Amina Mbuh, Dean of Academics at Allen University, Columbia, SC;
Dr. Mbuh Mbuh-Tenu of the Yaounde University; Mrs. Kimeng Florence A.
Mbuh of the Ahmadou Bello University (ABU) Zaria, Nigeria; and Dr. Eunice M.
Mbuh of Frankfurt, Germany, for their great and unwavering family support.
Many thanks also to my friends in the Cameroun and Nigerian Embassies
in Washington DC, and Nigerian Mission at the UN, New York, for their
insightful comments prior to the commencement of this task; the members and
leaders of the Ambazonia Sovereignty Society—North America (AMBASOSNA), notably Mbah Jacob, CE, and Ngang Edwin, of Washington DC; Mr. Albert
Mukong, Chairman of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG), Ni John Fru
Ndi, Chairman of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), and Fon Fongum Gorji
Dinka, Ambazonian leader in exile in London. Recognition is extended to the
Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and its struggle to restore the
rights of Southern Cameroonians (herein as Ambazonia Republic); Mrs. Nyah,
the energetic leader of Cameroun women in their struggle for equality, political
representation and economic self-sufficiency; Mr. Isaac Washington of the South
Carolina Black media (Black News), Dr. Sangeetta Sharma, Dr. Jim Newton, Mr.
Ben Bongang and Ms. April Dairyko for their moral and material support; Mrs.
Johnson-Ross Debbie who has recognized the troubles in Cameroun and is
presently contributing to academia with her dissertation on the Anglophone
Identity; Miss Kitty Russell and her concerns on the welfare of the Camerounian
women, and also the many friends of Cameroun, Nigeria and Ambazonia whom
I have come in contact with and who also share the belief that things can and
should be better. I extend gratitude to those who have contributed towards
brainstorming on African conflicts and particularly those addressed in this work
on the Mwananchi yahoo e-group, Ambasos yahoo e-group, Camnet and
Camenetwork listserv and e-group, respectively, AbujaNig yahoo e-group and
many more. I can never ever down rate their contributions towards shaping and
reshaping of arguments in this work. Special thanks also to the ICJ and West
Africa Magazine for permission to public the entire Judgment and articles they
have published on Bakassi Respectively. Without the involvement of all those I
have mentioned, this work would hardly have taken the shape it does now. I
believe this work will shed much light on the delicate political problems facing
Africa and her contributions to both conflict and her resolution, especially as
concerning contemporary Cameroun, Nigeria and Ambazonia resolving
dispute(s), discussed herein, peacefully. All other shortcomings in this work are
my responsibility.
-- Justice Muluh Mbuh.
9
PREFACE
International Law and Conflicts: Resolving Border and Sovereignty
Disputes (RBSD) is a refurbished work from a Thesis written in Fall 2000 titled
“The Role of International Law in the Determination of Legal Title to Territory:
Case Study of the Bakassi Peninsula Border Dispute,” at the Department of
Government and International Studies (GINT) of the University of South
Carolina (USC). Back then the thesis was predictive of the outcome of the case
between Cameroun and Nigeria pending at the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and also of future conflicts that might result from any judgment when
certain factors are not taken into consideration.
In examining the onset, escalation and attempts at resolve, the work did
espouse the causes from historic to immediate, but warned that the failure of the
Court to take into consideration certain factors might as well end up escalating
the Conflicts rather than resolve them. In other words, this work, both the thesis
and the refurbished treatise charge the ICJ for suppression of evidence or failure
to cross-examine an important evidence provided by one party as a reason for
claiming ownership of the disputed peninsula. Thus in the wake of the Judgment
of the case passed by the ICJ, this error term, or disturbance term which they
failed to examine in the Merit Phase of the Case would definitely cause escalation
at some other level of the post-judgment stage. This work calls this Bakassi Phase
II.
The merits of this new work over the thesis lies in this new predictability,
exposure of the Judgment from the Court, the challenges it faces, pre-Judgment
UN Diplomacy, raising of stakes or attempts at doing so after the ruling, crossexamination of literatures deemed as frank prior to the Merit Phase and which
literatures are a testimony to the on-coming escalation in the post-Judgment
Phase—all of which when viewed properly would justify charges that foul-play
at the world’s highest Court does more damage to the dispute resolution process
than good.
In this regard two chapters have been added: a new chapter five on the
evaluation of case study disputes and the law based on philosophical analysis of
what ought to be good and just judgment, and a chapter eight on the ICJ final
Judgment. In addition to the Judgment pre and post judgment diplomacy are
examine tighter with a whole lot of articles collected from African newspapers
reacting to the judgment. This makes the chapter a challenging task for conflict
researchers and students to ponder as they read throughout the work making
deductions as relating to the conflicts within the work or other related ones.
Other chapters equally underwent an overhaul with improved editing, analyses
and new subheadings all aimed a giving clarity to the case and how best to
resolve future disputes of similar nature. Most prominent is the total overhaul of
the concluding chapter nine. The work has been appended with numerous
10
international legal materials—from treaties of decolonization to those of border
demarcation and most prominently, the three landmark documents that ignited
the struggle for a new Republic of Ambazonia (Former UN Trust Territory of the
Southern Cameroons) following breach of treaty charges against Cameroun
Republic.
In addtion, what the challenge of Ambazonia has done in this work is lead
us to a situation whereby given even the ICJ ruling, we are posed another phase
of the same conflict simply because the ICJ failed to take into consideration or
question certain evidence provided by one or more of the belligerents—thus we
find a situation where attempts at preventing escalation at nation-state level
instead causes escalation at seemingly domestic levels, which would eventually
reverse the trend to internationalize the dispute/conflict due to the very neglect
by say the ICJ to do its job properly. The Ambazonia case, just like that of the
Sudan equally pose a challenge to the African Union because having failed to
give meaning to unity at nation-state level, it becomes hard to see how having
failed to intervene in such disputes, the African Union will make continental
union an asset worth keeping and embracing by many an African nation-states
faced with similar situations.
Finally, what this work does is call on dispute resolution bodies or teams
to never shy away from taking necessary stock of all the factors that lead to
disputes and conflicts and while doing so, cross-examine evidence provided by
belligerents, otherwise the end of most disputes will hardly come by given even
ICJ rulings. International law can only makes sense when it is properly utilized
and applied—that way, it does not become a tool of manipulation in the hands of
the already powerful nations to better serve their interests and promote the
disgruntleness of the weak, which invariably leads to worsening of relations
between nations, states and peoples and hence more conflicts and wars. This
work maintains very strongly that the tools for peaceful resolution of disputes
already exit, how best to apply them is what is at stake, and we ought to do so
more diligently than serving to protect some other persons or state’s own
interest—for in all we protect our every human interest when there is peaceful
co-existence of peoples, nations.
11
CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY
When you act willfully, a long chain of undetermined inferences and
uncontrollable events separates what you think you want from what you
get… The skills and will of others constrain not only the actions that can
be taken, but the outcomes that follow from our actions—often in ways
unknown to us. Evidence, subjective judgments, causal models, and
ideologies contribute to our beliefs about the connections between actions,
outcome, and interests. … If information helps you figure out what
action you want to take, it can also help others figure out what actions
they want to take—and when interests conflict, the actions preferred by
others typically are different from those preferred by you.
-Arthur I. Applbaum, (1987) 1
A.
INTRODUCTION:
This work explores how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) resolves
border disputes—in the case of this study—the determination of legal title over
the Bakassi peninsula, given the various claimants. It examines, implicitly,
procedures for resolving protracted border disputes between nations, and how
the different sources of international law contribute to the judgment before the
court. Disputes arise from unresolved conflicts—especially when parties
involved are unable to arrive at private settlement on a dyadic basis. This work
highlights the central role of international customary law in determining legal
title to territory.
Border disputes, especially in Africa, owe their origin to colonialism.
International law, which changed dramatically during the period of
decolonization (1945—1965), can play a role in resolving them. The border
dispute between Cameroun and Nigeria is a classic example of such colonialinduced disputes. In presenting an analysis of the relationship between border
disputes in Africa as a whole, and the border dispute between Cameroun and
Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula in particular, this work focuses on the
potential role of international law in the determination of legal title over the
disputed territory. By explaining issues of “self-determination,” “territorial
integrity,”
“sovereignty,”
“peaceful
co-existence,”
“plebiscite”
and
“government,” that punctuate the Cameroun versus Nigeria case, we hope the case
study would provide some insight to the settlement of the present disputes.
The Bakassi peninsula dispute arises partly from the fact that the
Cameroun-Nigeria border has never been completely demarcated, and partly
12
from the fact that the governments of the two countries have been involved in
internal conflicts including secession. The cases of Biafra in Nigeria and
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) in Cameroun are glaring examples. Thus, the
need to consolidate national unity in both countries has dominated national
politics—though the dedication of the leadership in confronting the facts that
surround both cases is highly questionable. At present, Cameroun and Nigeria
have taken their case to the International Court at The Hague.
Both countries at the time of submitting the case to the world body were
not aware of the third party claim from Ambazonia that neither Cameroun nor
Nigeria had legitimate claim to Bakassi. Ambazonia submitted its own view of
the historical and current situation, emphasizing the non-implementation of the
plebiscite treaty that put the two Cameroons together at independence. The
claim is that by virtue of the fact that the unity process with Cameroun failed,
and given that it has international boundaries with both Nigeria and Cameroon,
any dispute over Bakassi involves Ambazonia as well as Nigeria and Cameroun.
Moreover, Ambazonia claims that when it was jointly administered with Lagos,
as a UN Trust Territory under British administration, Bakassi was part of
Ambazonia. In order to have a comprehensive view of this picture, this
introduction will further examine the centrality of Cameroun to the case study,
the statement of the problem: as relating to Cameroun and Ambazonia on the
one hand, and Cameroun and Nigeria on the other; and the significance and
limitations of the study.
A.
THE CENTRALITY OF CAMEROUN TO THE CASE STUDY:
COLONIAL HERITAGE AND ETHNICITY
Cameroun is the only nation in Africa with a heritage of three colonial
masters—Germany, France and Britain. The country’s early discovery and its
strategic location between the Congo basin, the Sahara desert and West Africa—
is particularly interesting.
The Carthaginian navigator Hanno and the
Portuguese were the first Europeans known to have made contact with its
people, in the sixth century and 1472 AD respectively. The internal organization,
structure and composition, and ethnicity justify the choice of Cameroun (as it is
today) for this study. Cameroun is made up of about 360-400 ethnic groups,
speaking some 360 languages and dialects, but with a small population of about
twelve million.2 Its historical, geographical and other indigenous variables such
as ethnicity and religious diversity make Cameroun’s case against Nigeria
important in the study of conflict.
Through out this work note should be taken as to the use of the names
Kamerun, The Cameroons, Cameroun, British Cameroons, French Cameroon and
Cameroon. Kamerun represents the German Protectorate that was divided
13
between the French and the British after the First World War (see Appendix I).
“The Cameroons” represents British Cameroons (Northern Cameroons and
Southern Cameroons) and Cameroun represents French Cameroon. The
Southern part of British Cameroons (Southern Cameroons) later became West
Cameroon and Cameroun (French Cameroon) became East Cameroon, after the
1961 plebiscite. According to Victor T. Le Vine (1963), when the alliance forces of
France, Britain and Belgium jointly converged and defeated the Germans in
Kamerun during World War I in 1916, portions of Kamerun that had been ceded
to Germany under the Franco-German treaty of 1911 were returned to the French
Equatorial Africa.3 Thus the boundaries of German Kamerun placed under the
mandate system and the trusteeship system were much narrower than before the
war (see Appendix I & V). Cameroun (Southern Cameroons exclusive) represents
the largest part of Kamerun, which the French governed together with French
Equatorial Africa. It later on became one of two states, which constituted the
Federation of Cameroon, established by the Plebiscite Treaty of October 13, 1960
(see Appendix for entire treaty stipulations). German Kamerun is important in
understanding not only the evolution of the Bakassi peninsula dispute but also
the evolution of Cameroonian nationalism. Le Vine notes,
For Cameroonians of later periods, anxious to attack the French or
British administrations for alleged wrongs of commission or
omission, the brighter the German experience could be painted, the
more useful it became as a political weapon. The “Kamerun”
became, in this connection, an important touchstone for
Camerounian nationalists, a potent and evocative symbol of a halfmythical “golden age” when the Cameroun was one and
undivided.4
Equally important in understanding the case over the Bakassi peninsula is
the evolution of the Cameroons under British Administration. British Cameroons
was divided into Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. The United
Nations sponsored plebiscite of February 11, 1961 was the basis for decolonizing
the Cameroons. The results of the plebiscite separated British Cameroons in to
two: Northern Cameroons voted to be absorbed into Nigeria while Southern
Cameroons voted to become one of two “equal states” (the other being French
Cameroun) to form the Cameroon Federation. The dispute over the
implementation of the plebiscite results, as stipulated in the plebiscite agreement
(jointly signed by Cameroun’s first President Ahmadou Ahidjo and Southern
Cameroons’ second Prime Minister, John Ngu Foncha) and the United Nations
Resolution 1608 of April 20, 1961, is central to both the dispute between the two
14
Cameroons that formed the federation and Ambazonia’s claim of legal title to the
Bakassi peninsula.
Specifically, while Nigeria honored the terms of the Plebiscite, Cameroun
failed to do so. Contrary to the wishes of some Southern Cameroons elite,
Cameroun has instead turned the State of West Cameroon into provinces of
Cameroun. It is with such understanding of this seemingly internal dispute that
the concept of Ambazonia Republic was born. In March 1985, Fon Fongum Gorji
Dinka renamed Southern Cameroons as Ambazonia while charging the
President of Cameroun, Paul Biya, for having seceded from the union of “two
equal states” that created the Cameroon Federation by renaming the United
Republic of Cameroon as simply the Republic of Cameroun (see New Social
Order in appendix).
According to Gorji Dinka, Republic of Cameroun is the name French
Cameroun assumed during a brief period of separate independence and under
which it was admitted to the United Nations as a separate state. Thus, according
to Dinka’s arguments, it was necessary that Southern Cameroons also adopt a
distinctive identity so that its inalienable rights to self-determination and or selfgovernment or independence could be attained unobstructed. So far, the
Ambazonian Restoration Council has embarked on an international campaign,
arguing that in the absence of the Cameroon Federation the only other
alternative left for Southern Cameroonians is not subjugation in an alien
Cameroun culture but the granting of full United Nations membership to the
territory. Given that the Bakassi peninsula is in the Southern Cameroons
territory, it is difficult to actually understand the dynamics of the conflict
without understanding the relationship between the two Cameroons (Cameroun
and Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia) as established by the United Nations
sponsored plebiscite.
The plebiscite took place on February 11, 1961 in both Northern
Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. However, the big contention of a section
of the population of the Southern Cameroons, which was jointly administered
with Nigeria by the British, has continued to object to the manner by which the
French and the Republic of Cameroun “implemented” or did not implement the
Plebiscite Treaty. In violation of the treaty and other provisions of international
law, they unilaterally altered the treaty by making Southern Cameroons
provinces of Cameroun.
This dispute is central to any understanding of the dispute between
Nigeria and Cameroun over what both nations see as their common border.
Thus, throughout this work, the name Cameroun is used in light of Fon Fongum
Gorji-Dinka’s argument that French Cameroun has recolonized Southern
Cameroons in breach of the Plebiscite Treaty. In enhancing the Ambazonia
arguments and defending Bakassi, while laying claims to it, the Southern
15
Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which in 1995 took the Ambazonia versus
Cameroun case to the United Nations, stated that Ambazonia was administered
jointly with the Federation of Nigeria form 1919-1958, during which period,
survey maps prepared by the Federal Ministry of Lands and Survey in Lagos
recognized the Bakassi peninsular as part of the Southern Cameroonian territory.
The SCNC acknowledges that following the reunification of the Cameroons,
Bakassi became part of the newly created Federal Cameroon Republic.
The SCNC contention is that with the effective dissolution of the Federal
Republic of Cameroon in 1972, and the effective secession of La Republique du
Cameroun from the union in 1984, and the systematic return of Ambazonia to the
UN status of Trust Territory, La Republique du Cameroun ceased to share a
common boundary with Nigeria (along the Southern Cameroons-Nigeria
border). Therefore, Cameroun has no legitimate claim to the Bakassi peninsular.
Furthermore, the SCNC,5 considered the occupation of the Bakassi peninsular by
the Nigerian army, although provoked by the hostile behavior of Cameroun
Gendarmes, as entirely illegal. This argument is totally at odds with the
introduction and conclusion given by Richard Akinjide, that the Bakassi crisis "is
not a dispute that the old Calabar was, and still is, part of Nigeria," and that
"Bakassi is part of Nigeria, and the line passing through the Right Bank of the
river Rio-del-Ray from the estuary is the Nigeria-Cameroun international
boundary."6
But contrary to the findings in this work, such introductory and
concluding statements or analogy are found to be lacking in terms of historical
analysis, context and contemporary discussions. This work shows all these and,
furthermore, upholds the argument that, regardless of who owns Bakassi, the
dialectical evolution of the conflict is fueled firstly by colonizers, who in the first
place had no business and no right, whatsoever, to be drawing up boundaries of
other peoples' territories. But that was then, and given that times have changed,
it is only proper that the effects of such colonial influences be examined,
defended or refuted in light of the conflicts under study by taking into
consideration all historic and political factors that shape the claims of recognized
and unrecognized disputants. Such compositions of historical factors are
paramount to any attempts at resolving the Bakassi peninsula dispute, and on a
larger scale, the disputes along the entire Cameroun-Nigeria border.
The Bakassi peninsula dispute reveals that besides having international
implications, some local or domestic conflicts that owe their origins to
16
international treaties can have multiple dimensions, implications and
consequences on the future of relations between and within states and vise-versa.
B.
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM:
This work is centered on the conflict between Cameroun and Nigeria over
the Bakassi peninsula (see Appendix III).7 This conflict, more than other border
disputes with Nigeria, has become militarized and has also escalated into many
sporadic fights with casualties. It has led the Cameroun government to believe
that resolution of the disputes along their common border with Nigeria can only
be done at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In examining the procedures and role of the ICJ in conflict resolution, the
Bakassi Peninsula dispute is important and different from the other portions of
border disputed between the two nations because the evidence and counterevidence to be examined come from a cross section of political, economic, social,
legal and historic backgrounds. These help to shape the arguments from the two
seemingly internal parties—the Federation of Nigeria and the Republic of
Cameroun. The evidence is then contrasted to that of the third claimant—
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons). To understand these premises requires that
we undertake a brief study of the relationship between (i) The Republic of
Cameroun and Ambazonia, and (ii) between the Federation of Nigeria and the
Republic of Cameroun.
(i).
THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROUN AND AMBAZONIA (SOUTHERN
CAMEROONS):
Ambazonia was born out of a long-standing protest by some Southern
Cameroons elite concerning the manner in which French Cameroon (Cameroun)
implemented the February 11, 1961 UN-sponsored plebiscite. The Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) elite charge is that Cameroun authorities have carried on
with illegal manipulations of the name of the Cameroon Federation in violation
of the Plebiscite Treaty.
The turning point in the dispute between the two Cameroons was in
1983/84 when student riots broke out throughout the national territory in protest
of a Cameroun government attempt to harmonize the educational systems of the
two states that constituted the union. Here, we should note that among the many
differences between the two Cameroons, that of the educational system (British
oriented versus French oriented), the legal system (Common Law versus
Napoleonic Codes) and language (English versus French) stand out clearly.
Coincidentally, the student riots culminated with a protest letter addressed to the
Cameroun Head of State and the Attorney General of Cameroun, charging the
President of breach of the Plebiscite Treaty and the constitution by the name
change from the United Republic of Cameroon (born in 1972) to the Republic of
Cameroun. In the letter, the leader of the Ambazonia Movement, Fon Gorji
Dinka, (a traditional ruler of the Widikom kingdom and first United Republic of
17
Cameroon Bar Association President, referring to the Southern Cameroons as
Ambazonia), noted that reverting to the name of the Republic of Cameroun (that
was admitted separately to the United Nations in 1960) meant that the Republic
of Cameroun had seceded from the union.
This meant that the treaty of union between the two states (the Plebiscite
Treaty) had legally collapsed. Accordingly, Ambazonia would be independent of
Cameroun and only a new negotiation (spelt out in his 1985 release titled “The
New Social Order”) would bring the two territories together. But Cameroun
authorities did not agree. They used the repressive arm of the military to crush
the student riots. Even though the educational and legal systems were
untouched, the government jailed the Ambazonian leader; in response to the
student riots he was released and subsequently placed under house arrest for
another year in his hometown of Widikom, from which he escaped into exile.
Ambazonia has since become the name used by some Southern Cameroonians in
place of Southern Cameroons, winning cases8 against the Cameroun and British
governments. Such a multi-dimensional background of evidence gives the
Cameroun versus Nigeria case a unique position—one of a wider struggle for selfdetermination and sovereignty of the entire Ambazonian territory than just the
Bakassi peninsula—one that could be very useful in resolving future disputes
between nations.
(ii). THE FEDERATION
CAMEROUN:
OF
NIGERIA
AND
THE
REPUBLIC
OF
Military rule in Nigeria has taken a toll on the nation especially in terms of
human rights abuses and waste or misappropriation and mismanagement of the
nation’s wealth. Nigeria has for most of the years after independence been ruled
by the military with only brief interludes of civil rule. Cameroun has been ruled
by two civilian dictators for all its almost forty years of independence. The
Ahmadou Ahidjo regime (1960-1982) bears responsibility for failing to
implement the Plebiscite Treaty, while the regime of the second President of
Cameroun, Paul Biya (1983--), pretends the problem does not exist. The
Cameroun government promises liberalization and democratization, but
continues to repress the masses by rigging elections (1992 &1997) to stay in
power. These scenarios have led to leadership crises for both nations—military
rule in Nigeria and almost four decades of civilian dictatorship in Cameroun.
The result of these leadership problems for both nations has been a
distraction from the duty of finalizing their border demarcation on the one hand,
and maintaining good relations on the other. Thus, in the wake of the numerous
border incidents that both nations have reported over the years, it is not
surprising that in the face of these internal crises, the eagerness of the leaders of
both nations for war could be interpreted as diversionary, or as a “wag the dog”
policy.
18
C.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:
This study is significant in many ways. Firstly, in contrast to many works
undertaken on “the Cameroons,” (such as those by Forlemu (1995) Nationbuilding in a Multiethnic State: Cameroon as Case Study,9 Konings and Nyamnjoh
(1997) The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon10 and Newton (1999) The NigerianCameroon Border Dispute: Causes and Consequences of Political Intransigence in
Bilateral Relations),11 this is perhaps one of the first works that directly links
external conflict to the internal ones. This work links the border dispute to the
October 13, 1960 Plebiscite Treaty (which is also part of the Third Claimant’s
argument). The work will explore, interpret, and evaluate the legitimate claims
of title to territory and recommend legal means of resolution.
Secondly, the solutions to the dispute between Cameroun and Nigeria
would be important in the arena of the wider sphere of geopolitical analysis, the
management of conflict and the future of peacekeeping in Africa. This is due to
the strategic importance (geopolitical and socioeconomic) of the Cameroons, the
Central African sub-region, Nigeria and the West African community. Peace in
the Bight of Biafra sub-region is important to the future of most African
countries.12
Thirdly, from an academic point of view, an understanding of the levels of
analysis of these conflicts are useful to students of international law,
international relations in general and also to the practice of politics and
international organizations. This is because, not only does the study reveal the
traditional patterns of conflict and their resolution/settlements, but the
introduction of new evidence, the linkage of historical-external-internal relations
of the conflicts gives it an almost unique and comprehensive posture. The
arguments and evidence are such that if the disputes were examined from the
single dispute of the Bakassi peninsula, it would still lead us to the larger dispute
of the non-implementation of the Plebiscite Treaty and the question of
Ambazonia’s sovereignty.
Alternatively, if the disputes are examined from that of Ambazonia’s
sovereignty over Bakassi peninsula, they will reveal that resolution of one cannot
take place without resolution of the other. However, the resolution of the
sovereignty dispute, say for instance the restoration of the Cameroon Federation,
would give a clearer picture to the Bakassi case, and perhaps give more
authentications to Cameroon claims of title to the territory.
D.
LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
This work is limited only to the Bakassi peninsula dispute, which
constitutes a small fraction of the entire 1630-km border between Nigeria and
Cameroun and the arguments advanced by the former UN Trust Territory of the
Southern Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, herein as Republic
of Ambazonia against Cameroun’s forceful annexation in breach of the treaty of
19
union (see appended documents). The reason for this choice has to do firstly,
with the strategic importance of the peninsula, and secondly, because contrary to
the remaining portion of the entire border, the portion that includes the Bakassi
peninsula is equally claimed by a third party—the Republic of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons). Also, arguments for an independent Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) in no way should be seen as equally igniting or exciting
self-determination struggle for either Biafra or former Northern Cameroons
which with Former Southern Cameroons constituted the British Cameroons. The
situation of the Ambazonia is very peculiar and with her rights from selfdetermination it attained prior to the plebiscite treaty, justification is found in
limiting this study or using Ambazonia as the epicenter.
II.
RESEARCH STATEMENT
This work is designed to determine who has legal title over the disputed
Bakassi peninsula. There are two underlying assumptions: firstly, we assume
that international law is important in resolving border disputes and secondly,
that in border disputes, all major claimants are entitled to present their
arguments. The first assumption is based on the fact that the international legal
framework has provisions to determine legal title to any disputed territories in
post-colonial Africa. The legal bases for claim to title (and a history of
successfully doing so, given cases here) are discovery, prescription, accretion and
cession.13 This work uses the Bakassi peninsula dispute to show that given the
various arguments presented, especially by Cameroun and Nigeria, the
provisions of international law can provide a basis for resolving the dispute.
For instance, central to Nigeria’s claims of sovereignty over Bakassi is
evidence that points to contiguity and conquest; Cameroun’s claims are tied to
prescription; and, Ambazonia’s case rests on discovery and occupation. Nigeria
and Cameroun argue in their Applications that both countries are out to protect
their national interests. The work argues that if the ICJ takes the Ambazonia
arguments into consideration, the Court would find that the evidence provided
is necessary to determine who should exercise legal title to the disputed territory.
In addition, the work argues that among the three claimants, the Ambazonia
claims have greater credibility in establishing claims of title over the Bakassi
peninsula territory, based on the provisions of international law, and especially
given the right to self-determination.
The right to self-determination was the centerpiece of the General
Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples.14 The International Court of Justice has endorsed this principle in
20
many cases including its Advisory Opinions on Namibia and the Western
Sahara. The Principle of self-determination has, however, assumed many faces,
other than that concerned with the freely expressed wish of peoples to be free.
These days, it is common place to talk of not only the right to be free from
colonialism but also the right to remain a colony (Island of Mayotte in the
Comoros and Puerto Rico respectively), the right to dissolve a state, peacefully,
by forming new states (former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia etc),
the right to secede (Bangladesh and Eritrea), the right of divided states to reunite
(Germany and the Cameroon Federation), the right of limited autonomy, short of
secession, the rights of minorities within a larger political entity, and even the
right to internal self-determination (Biafra in Nigeria) in seeking greater
freedoms such as democracy and religious freedom.15
Most relevant to the Bakassi Peninsula case, especially as concerning the
Ambazonia factor/arguments, is Frederic L. Kirgis’s statement that,
The right of self-determination may be seen as a variable right,
depending on a combination of factors. The two most important of
these seem to be the degree of destabilization in any given claim,
taking into account all the circumstances surrounding it, and the
degree to which the responding government represents the people
belonging to the territory. If a government is quite
unrepresentative, the international community may recognize even
a seriously destabilizing self-determination claim as legitimate.16
Similarly, as concerns the claims of sovereign nations, such as that of
Nigeria and Cameroun over Bakassi, the case of state succession that has
witnessed the evolution of Southern Cameroons as a mandated territory through
to its present affiliation under Cameroun should be examined in light of the
treaties that established boundaries and subsequent administering authorities, in
terms of whether or not these were respected.
In doing so, it is hoped that clear claims to title over Bakassi will be
established without giving credence to conquest as a legal process of acquiring
territory. This, as S. Williams & A. Mestral (1987) note, would ensure that
“Personal” treaties (primarily political alliances, pacts of mutual defense,
settlement of disputes, economic—such as commercial etc) are distinguished
from “Real” treaties (or “dispositive treaties”) comprising boundary treaties and
other rights of transit, over territory, which generally survive a change in
sovereignty.17
In doing so, these treaties, as they depend less on the personality of the
state in question, would in this case, ensure that pre-existing treaty obligations
are respected, and that the successor state personally accepts all treaties or states
clearly which treaties it intends to honor (concerning its international
21
boundaries) and why. The statement is very important when we examine the
situation between the Cameroun and Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons).
III.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology is adopted from Robert Yin’s (1994) Case Study Research.
Yin advocates that a case study of this nature should seek out rival explanations
of the focal evidence and examine their plausibility “by looking at their
implications on other data sets and see how well they fit.”18 Since the case study
approaches requires the use of rival hypothesis to control for and improve on
logical thinking, in asking the question “who has sovereignty over the Bakassi
peninsula?” we present three rival questions thus:
i)
How does Cameroun argue her case that she should exercise
sovereignty over Bakassi?
ii)
How does Nigeria argue her case that she should exercise
sovereignty over Bakassi?
iii)
How does Ambazonia argue her case that Bakassi belongs to her
and not to either Cameroun or Nigeria? Given the relationship
between the two Cameroons as of the Plebiscite Treaty, what status
is accorded Ambazonia and would the court recognize its claims as
legitimate?
Specifically, this case study is “exploratory” in nature because we have
little control over the events, and because the focus is on contemporary
phenomena within a real-life context.19 This method has been chosen because it
allows us to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of this real-life
event—the Bakassi peninsula sovereignty dispute. As Yin advocates, our case
study utilizes sources of evidence drawn from documents, archival records,
interviews, direct observations, participant observations and physical artifacts.20
The work will maintain standards aimed at ensuring that another
investigator, in conducting the same case study again, would arrive at the same
findings and conclusions. In concluding, this work will discuss the general
lessons learned from our particular case study.
IV.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
This work has nine chapters, structured to provide a comprehensive view
of the development, evolution and nature of conflicts that face the Cameroun and
Nigerian governments and the possibility of resolving them. Chapter one, in
dealing with literatures that have examined the Cameroons in various aspects,
introduces us to the dispute and shows us how we would proceed to analyze the
dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula. Specifically, it analyzes such headings as
statement of problem, research statement, methodology and limitations of the
22
study. The introduction gives us a sense of where we are going, in terms of the
type of dispute we are dealing with.
Chapter two examines some aspects of international law that are relevant
to border disputes. The chapter treats such sub-headings as the reflections on
international law and border disputes, especially in Africa, and also examines the
literature that provoked the research question in this work. Chapter three
examines the contributions of colonialism to the development of international
law, defines it and briefly discusses its sources—on title to territory.
Chapter four reexamines the dispute and the actual drawing of the border.
It also examines the claims of disputing parties and puts them in historical
context. Further, the chapter evaluates them with contemporary evidence in an
effort to determine whether or not it was possible for both countries to resolve
the dispute without the military confrontations that have characterized the
situation prior and after the institution of the case with the International Court of
Justice, and whether it would have been possible to resolve the dispute without
recourse to the World Court at all. Finally, this chapter seeks an alternative
explanation of the dispute by delving into the abuses of human rights in
Cameroun and Nigeria to defend the possibility of diversionary tactics of the
leadership of both nations from their domestic woes.
Chapter five would take us many steps backwards in time as we
examined philosophical analyses of “Truth” and “Justice” and the purpose these
serve when we are confronted with problems between nations or between the
governors of nations and their inhabitants, as of the magnitude we would
examine within this work. The literature presented from philosophers of old to
modern day servants of truth and other intellectuals are the bases of arguments
in chapter nine which debunks positions raised by articles and the weakness of
the ICJ Judgment in chapter eight.
While chapter six intends to give us a contrasting three-sided story of
claims, it nonetheless lends credence to the historic treaties to be examined
especially in the fourth chapter. Claims of disputants are examined in relation to
international law literature. The work specified the basis of claims of each
disputant—whether they were based on cession, prescription, contiguity,
discovery or conquest—though none of these determinants can singularly be
used to grant claims of title to territory.
Chapter seven takes us a step further by tackling the legal aspect of the
dispute. It emerges with the contention that there is a legal dispute in the Bakassi
peninsula and all else is secondary—notably the Lake Chad area and the
delimitation of the maritime boundary between the States. A notable
development (which is equally secondary) is the argument presented by Nigeria
on the possible involvement of a third state, which as we would be shown,
emerges with Equatorial Guinean intervention. The chapter also laments on the
23
fact that the efforts of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) to become a party to the
case would be undermined by the ICJ and other international intrigues. Finally
the chapter shows that the dispute over Bakassi is secondary to that over the
sovereignty of Ambazonia as a whole. Thus the focus in this chapter is not only
to respond on the ICJ ruling and the barrage of counter-charges emanating from
the Press, especially those of Nigeria, but also to evaluate the claims of
disputants in terms of legal arguments they raised, as opposed to the judgment
and the Ambazonia Republic response that follows in the opening of chapter
nine.
Chapter eight, in presenting pre-Judgment initiatives by Ambazonia and
the UN Secretary General to ensure peaceful co-existence between the
belligerents, especially Nigeria and Cameroun, also presents the Judgment itself.
In addition, post-judgment UN diplomacy by Secretary General Kofi Annan will
be indicated in a posting with other articles from concerned observers—some in
the public service of their nations and others as simple reporters. Others clamor
for the disrespect of the ICJ Judgment while others in showing the consequences
of disobedience on the part of the vanquished, suggest alternatives such as the
intervention of the UN Security Council to moderate the ruling. Unfortunately,
misrepresentations and misperceptions continue to abound as we expose them in
this concluding chapter. For the most part, our arguments would be critical of the
Judgment.
24
CHAPTER TWO
INTERNATIONAL BORDER DISPUTES AND THE LAW
Power over opinion, which is a necessary part of all power, can never be
absolute. International politics are always power politics; for it is
impossible to eliminate power from them. But that is only part of the
story. The fact that national propaganda everywhere so eagerly cloaks
itself in ideologies of a professedly international character proves the
existence of an internationally common stock of ideas, however limited and
however weakly held, to which appeal can be made, and of a believe that
these common ideas stand somehow in the scale of values above national
interests. This stock of common ideas is what we mean by international
morality.
-E.H. Carr, in The Twenty Years Crisis, p.145.
I.
REFLECTIONS
DISPUTES
ON
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
AND
BORDER
When international border disputes arise, states base their claims on
international law, and sometimes they appeal to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). International law is said to exist because states in their actions
reference international law and, for the most part, representatives of
governments behave as if they are obligated to obey international law. States also
violate international law just as individuals violate municipal law. Most often,
however, states defend their actions by denying that the rules they are alleged to
have broken are rules of law.
Sometimes when states disagree about what the law requires, they seek
third party involvement. Third party adjudication is especially important when it
involves the supervision of treaty compliance. This is usually done through the
ICJ or another tribunal, or other forms of third party settlement. If the ICJ is
selected, the consent of the parties involved in the dispute must be obtained;
without it, the implementation of international law through such measures
becomes difficult if not impossible.
25
The main source of international law according to the Statute of the ICJ is
treaty.
Most relevant to this work are the Charter of the United Nations of
January 26, 1945; the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of September 26, 1928; the Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States of December 26, 1933; the Statute of the International Court of Justice of
October 24, 1945; the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18,
1964; the Charter of the Organization of African Unity of May 25, 1963; the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23, 1969; and the Declaration
on the Principles of International Law of October 24, 1970.
Other sources that are relevant include instruments that deal with aspects
of war and peace, most notably, the Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 3,
1950; the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of
1954; and the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression of December 14, 1974.
Concerning human rights, the most important treaties include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948; the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 14,
1960; and the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and
Malnutrition of November 16, 1974.1 These are part of custom or secondary
sources.
Other important relevant human rights tools include the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide of December 9, 1948,
and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crimes of "Apartheid" of July 18, 1978. In the arena of economic development,
earth-space environment, and other miscellaneous topics, international law has
treaties that cover them. Thus, the comprehensiveness of international law can be
measured by the width and breath of its coverage of almost all aspects of human
life. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of January 29, 1980 binds all
the treaties, conventions and agreements.
Here are some cases where the ICJ has settled border disputes. In the case
between the United States and Canada over the legal status of the Northwest
Passage and the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, (despite an agreement signed
by both countries on January 11, 1988), both nations still reserve the right to take
the matter to international arbitration or the International Court of Justice. The
long-standing dispute rested on Canadian claims that the policy of its
government "is to exercise Canada's full sovereignty in and over the waters of
the Arctic Archipelago."2 Canada continued to maintain, "the Arctic is
indivisible," as are its "internal waters" and "historic waters."3
26
The United States on its part claimed that the Northwest Passage is an
international strait and therefore not subject to unreasonable restrictions from
Canada, the coastal state.4 International law, however, recognizes the fact that
even though water is the paradigm res communis, some bodies of water can be
subject to the sovereignty of a state through historic use. 5 Thus in the Norwegian
Fisheries case, the ICJ had declared that "historic waters" are waters which are
treated as internal waters but would not have had that character were it not for
the existence of historic title."6
Concerning the question as to whether or not the Northwest Passage is an
international Strait, one can resort to the ruling of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel
Case between the United Kingdom and Albania, in which the Court stated that
minesweeping operations by Britain were illegal, while Albania could have
informed or warned ships of the existing danger. Since it failed to do so, it was
responsible for damages incurred. The Court further ruled, "States in time of
peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international
navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous
authorization of a coastal state, provided that the passage is innocent."7
When questions of "Actual Use versus Potential Use" and "Actual Use
versus Ownership" come in to play, both the US and Canada, in their case, saw
their limitations when it comes to the matter being decided upon by the ICJ.
Both countries recognized the importance of a political settlement, their strategic
and divergent interests, especially in the wake of the negotiations for the
Canada-American Free Trade Agreement, which matured in 1988. The
importance of greater benefits from peaceful co-existence and cooperation under
the Free Trade Agreement far exceeds what either nation could get from a tiny
territorial claim.
In the case of Thailand versus Cambodia concerning the Temple of Preah,8
the ICJ recognized the historic evidence to deliver its judgment. The case
stemmed from the fact that France, (then colonial master of French Indo-China,
which included Cambodia) had entered into a boundary treaty in 1904 that
established the boundary between Thailand and Cambodia along a watershed
line in the Dangrek Mountains, which naturally divided both countries. The
27
natural divide and the watershed line did not, however, coincide with the true
ownership of the Temple of Preah, which now lay trapped between them. The
1904 treaty had provided that a future commission appointed by the States
[parties] could precisely demarcate the boundary.
Thus upon the request of the commission, French topographers drew a
map ("the Annex I map") which placed the temple in Cambodia even though it
actually was situated on Thailand’s side of the watershed line. Thailand
contested the map and when negotiations failed, Cambodia sought the
involvement of the ICJ. A preliminary objection by Thailand to the Court's
Jurisdiction was rejected, and the Court ruled that,
It is the Annex I map that Cambodia principally relies in support of
her claim to sovereignty over the Temple. Thailand on the other
hand, contests any claims based on this map, on the following
grounds: 1) that the map was not the work of a mixed commission,
and had therefore no binding character; 2) that at Preah Vihear the
map embodied a material error, not explicable on the basis of any
exercise of discretionary powers of adaptation which the
commission may have possessed. This error, according to
Thailand’s contention, was that the frontal line indicated on the
map was not the true watershed line in this vicinity, and that a line
drawn in accordance with the true watershed line would have
placed, and would now place, the Temple area in Thailand. It is
further contended by Thailand that she never accepted this map or
the frontier line indicated on it …as Preah Vihear is concerned…as
to become bound thereby; or, alternatively that, if she did accept
the map, she did so only under, and because of a mistaken belief
(upon which she relied) that the map line was correctly drawn to
correspond with the watershed line.9
As Weston et al (1990) have noted that,
It is an established rule of [international] law that the plea of error
cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party
advancing it contributed to the error, or could have avoided it, or if
circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible
error. The Court considers that the Character and qualifications of
the persons who saw the Annex I map on the Siamese side would
alone make it difficult for Thailand to plead error in law.10
28
Furthermore, "the Court considers that the acceptance of the Annex I map by the
Parties caused the map to enter the treaty settlement and to become an integral
part of it."11
Thus the Court further observed that,
When two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the
primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is
impossible if the line so established can, at any moment, and on the
basis of a continuously available process, be called in question, and
its rectification claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by reference to a
clause in the parent treaty is discovered…such a frontier, so far
from being stable, would become precarious. It must be asked why
the Parties in this case provided for delimitation, instead of relying
on the treaty clause indicating that the frontier in this region would
be the watershed… This could have only been because they
regarded a watershed indication as sufficient by itself to achieve
certainty and finality. It is precisely to achieve this that delimitation
and map lines are resorted to.12
In addition, the Court observed that from the evidence furnished to it, and from
the statements of the Parties themselves, the whole question of Siam's very long
frontiers with French Indo-China had, in the period prior to 1904,
Been a cause of uncertainty, trouble and friction, endangering…'a
state of growing tension' in the relations between Siam and France.
The Court thinks it legitimate to conclude that…the paramount
objective of the settlements of the 1904-1908 period…was to put an
end to this state of tension and to achieve frontier stability on a
basis of certainty and finality. By a 9-3 vote, the Court found the
Temple of Preah Vihear to be situated in Cambodia.13
The significance of the cases we have examined lies in the fact that treaties that
fix borders between nations and states are important when attempting to resolve
conflicts that affect the borders.
Another territorial case worth reflecting on is the case concerning the
termination of the treaty that gave South Africa the Mandate over Namibia. This
case concerns material breach of an international treaty. The International Law
Commission completed its final draft articles on the law of treaties between
29
States and International Organizations in 1982.14 Breach of treaty continues to be
treated in Article 60 of the Charter, which starts by vehemently stating that: "1. A
material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the Parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its
operation in whole or in part." Similarly, Article 2 (a)(i) states that this could be
done by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or
in part or to terminate it "in the relations between themselves and the defaulting
State or international organization," or (ii) "as between all the Parties."
Furthermore, Article 3 states that a material breach of a treaty, for the
purpose of this Article, consists of (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned
by the present article; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.
In the case of Namibia, the International Court is noted for having quoted
Article 60, that "a material breach" occurred in relation for the mandate for South
West Africa, regarded as an international treaty, and that South Africa had
repudiated the treaty.15 Specifically, the General Assembly noted, "the Resolution
in question is therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right to terminate a
relationship in case of a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations which
destroy the very objective and purpose of that relationship."16
A look at Article 16 of the UN Charter sheds some light on the question of
the mandate system. The Article reads: "The General Assembly shall perform
such functions with respect to the international Trusteeship system as are
assigned to it under Chapter XII and XIII, including the approval of the
trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic."17
Prior to the new Charter, that of the League had sounded a strong
warning against the abuse of the mandate system. Coincidentally, Article 16, (4)
notes that "any member of the League which has violated the Covenant of the
League [such as the mandate] may be declared to be no longer a member of the
League by all the other members of the League represented" on the Council.18
The UN General Assembly further passed Resolution 2145, in 1966, by a vote of
114 to 2 with 3 abstentions, to formally terminate the mandate for South West
30
Africa.19 With this move the Assembly gave a big blow to the ambitions of South
African leaders, especially of then Prime Minister Balthasar Vorster, who was
plotting to annex the territory.20
The cases we have examined so far were intended to shed light on the
various dimensions of border disputes and other claims to territory. The cases of
United States versus Canada and Britain versus Albania are clear examples of border
disputes that have to do with defining international limits against national
claims—besides the fact that nations involved intended to protect their national
interests. The cases of Pakistan versus India, Thailand versus Cambodia, and the
Advisory Opinion on Namibia, typically result from the involvement of colonial
masters in foreign lands. The case of Thailand versus Cambodia, though colonialinduced, singularly displays an example of a dispute over a resource area.
Perhaps if not for the lucrativeness (especially in terms of revenue from tourism)
of the Temple of Preah Vihear, Thailand would never have contested the Annex I
map.
Together, these cases paint a good picture of the nature of inter-state
conflicts and disputes in Africa relevant to the triad nature (as seen from the
arguments of Nigeria, Cameroun and Ambazonia) of the Bakassi peninsula
dispute. Settlement of the dispute requires a close look at the possibility that the
disputed area may not belong to either Cameroun or Nigeria. This work intends
to examine these aspects so that a clearer picture of the dispute could be
presented, far beyond what both countries (Cameroun and Nigeria) have
presented to the ICJ, thus far.
II
“TOPDOG”/ “UNDERDOG” AND PERCEPTION ANALYSES
In light of the above discussions, it is important that any reflection on the
situation facing the Cameroun government in relation to both Southern
Cameroons and Nigeria can be viewed in terms of “national and international
politics”—where “national” interprets the stressed relationship of the states that
constituted the Cameroon Federation and the eagerness of each state to reassert
its status either in relation to the other or above it; and “international” interprets
the relationship between the Cameroon Federation and Nigeria, as influenced by
the decolonization process. In this regard, “topdog”/ “underdog” analyses are
intended to help us understand the base factors that have helped in shaping or
influencing escalation of the triad nature of the Bakassi peninsula dispute. The
literature can be analyzed in four sections:
(1) The perceptions of the leaders,
31
(2) The influence of the international community,
(3) The rivalry between nations, and
(4) The influence of a dominant power in an unbalanced alliance with a
weaker partner.
The perception of leaders in this case, will be limited to the leaders of
Cameroun, Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) and Nigeria. The argument in
most literature holds the premise that over-concentration of power in the hands
of the Cameroun presidents, Ahidjo and Biya, has been a major weakness of its
relations with the international community.21 Since the behavior of these nations
over the Bakassi peninsula is influenced by the four factors stated at the
beginning of this section, it leads us to take into consideration the ranking of
nations as “topdogs” and “underdogs,” in which case, a nation or state that has
rank discrepancy would more likely resort to aggression to resolve a border
dispute.22
In the case of Cameroun versus Nigeria, if one were to take parameters such
as population, size, economic strength (agricultural and industrial output),
military strength, and other internal and external characteristics, one would
simply point to Cameroun as the underdog, with the observation that on almost
all cases where fighting occurred along their common border, residents of the
disputed areas indicated that Cameroun was the first to fire weapons, the
dispute in the Bakassi peninsula taken into consideration.
Cameroun
acknowledges this in their Application by stating that it had to defend its
territorial integrity.
On the behavior of rank discrepant states, specifically, Cashman notes:
Rank discrepant states treat total topdogs as their “reference
group” and aspire to emulate them. If no peaceful channels are
available; the upward mobility may be carried out through
violence. Leaders of states, like ordinary individuals, may perceive
aggression to be a necessary response to frustration…One should
not expect rank discrepant state to initiate wars to change their
position in the system (international system) unless (a) other means
of attaining total topdog have been tried unsuccessfully and (b) the
culture had some practice in violent aggression.”23
32
What is most justifying to this statement is the fact that alternatives
existed after the fighting between both nations (Cameroun and Nigeria)
escalated: Cameroun (underdog) took the matter to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) much to the dissatisfaction of Nigeria (topdog) which accordingly,
and in confirmation to existing literature, preferred bilateral to multilateral talks.
A typical example of where this is also true concerns the dispute between India
(topdog) and Pakistan (underdog) over Kashmir. An examination of the four
factors stated in the opening paragraph of this section will reveal much the same
results—that the Bakassi peninsula dispute is also shaped and influenced by
“topdog”/ “underdog” analysis.
Factors that help to shape or influence escalation can be analyzed to show
how internal-external linkage of factors are important in understanding not only
the causes of the dispute, but also what factors and claims would be more
important in determining what state should exercise sovereignty over the
peninsula. These factors are:
1) THE PERCEPTION OF LEADERS
A close look at the history of Cameroon (and Southern Cameroons) at the
time of independence reveals that the leaders of both states were caught up in
perception (and misperception) troubles. Either deliberately or out of good faith,
they made decisions which when scrutinized today show that they had a serious
bearing on the incremental nature of the disputes under discussion. Perceptions
of historical past thus become an important factor in determining and linking
national self-image or national role conceptions. According to Jiri Valenta (1979),
perception of past leadership behavior influences “the way we view our own
nation and its place in the world.”24
The role of the leaders of Cameroun, Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia)
and Nigeria can be seen in light of the fact that to the world, they were part and
parcel of world leaders, and so were and are part of the anarchic nature of the
international system, as neutral mediators and conciliators, as reliable and
preferred allies, as aggrieved revolutionaries, as pillars of the international
community, and as protectors of the weak, amongst others. Each of the leaders
took decisions, which to them at that time were their own contribution to
executing international and national obligation.
Nothing is more compelling in this regard than the fact that at
independence, decolonization failed to free Southern Cameroons. Thus the
sovereignty of Southern Cameroons, indicated as being at the heart of any
attempts to resolve the Bakassi peninsula dispute, still remains at stake. In legal
theory, sovereignty is the power in a state to which none other is superior.
33
John Austin (first English Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of
London) defines sovereignty thus: “Sovereignty is regarded or defined as the
supreme authority in an independent society. The external sovereignty is of
control from without; internal sovereignty is paramount power over all action
within.”25 Based on this definition, H.N.A. Enonchong, a writer in ABBIA (1965),
commented on the situation facing leaders of the Southern Cameroons and
Cameroun at independence, especially regarding the way they perceived and
manipulated the federation into voidness that “it is in this context that any norm
which is in conflict with this constitutional legal superior norm must be declared
to be ultra vires and to that extent a legal nullity.”26 Taking into consideration
that the union between the Cameroons was a legal as well as a Constitutional
matter, violation of either greatly renders the union and the purpose of it to be
counter-productive.
Leaders of Cameroun and Southern Cameroons saw the unification of the
two Cameroons as a mixture of a means to an end and as an end in itself. While
some believed in the legality of the framework of the plebiscite treaty as a means
of keeping the hopes of pan-Kamerun alive, others saw it as an end of the era of
colonization. The end of colonialism should have set the ground for the
functionality of an independent and free Southern Cameroons, which will have
the free and expressed will to care for the wants of its inhabitants, first, before
any federation attempts could have come in as secondary. While these positions
contrast very sharply with Ahidjo’s notion of national integration, which was
bent on absorbing Southern Cameroons into the mainstream political framework
of Cameroun life, this has been the basis of popular agitations in the former
Southern Cameroons for a return to the federal system or total independence.
Thus, to Enonchong, these conflicting perceptions result from the fact that the
constitutional framework for the Cameroon Federation was never followed. He
observes: “the instrument establishing the Federal Republic of Cameroon is The
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon which came into being on 1st
October 1961.”27 The questions that should follow would be:
1) How could this have been applicable to Southern Cameroons
(underdog) when UN Resolution 1608 was never implemented by
Cameroun (the topdog)?
2) If all laws passed within the federated states had to be in conformity
with the Federal Constitution, and binding on both states, does not the
fact that this constitution was never debated in the Southern Cameroons
34
Assembly (let alone the fact that it was the Constitution of Cameroun that
was amended to accommodate Southern Cameroons) constitute a legal
breach of the trust (of the plebiscite treaty)?
3) With the above two questions taken into consideration, how does
Federal sovereignty in this sense supersede state sovereignty? In other
words, would it be legally beneficial for the indigenes of Southern
Cameroons to succumb to the Federal President’s authority under the
given circumstances—making Federal sovereignty above state sovereignty
and eventually undoing state sovereignty?
The marks of the some Southern Cameroons elite and how they perceived
the unity process has been the source of conflict and debates within Cameroun
polity. Here, the struggles of Albert Mukong, Fon Gorji-Dinka, Sam Ekontang
Elad, Carlson Anyangwe and Simon Munzu, quickly come to mind. Albert
Mukong is famous as President Ahmadou Ahidjo’s “Prisoner Without A Crime”
(the title of a book Mukong wrote to expose Ahidjo’s tyranny) while Dinka is
seen as the person who legally challenged Ahidjo and Biya with his releases in
1985 [“The Rebellion of Ambazonia” (1985, July), “The New Social Order” (1985,
March) and “Letter to the Cameroun Etat-Major: Diffuse the Timed Bomb” (1985,
May) appended herein] when the name of United Republic of Cameroon was
changed to Republic of Cameroun that same year.
The other three—Munzu, Elad and Anyangwe emerged form the struggle
to democratize Cameroun after the “Winds of Change” blew in from Europe and
confronted African Dictators. They became famous because they demanded a
restoration of the Federation of “Two Equal States” and the Federal Constitution
of 1961, seeing it as the only basis from which to commence saving Cameroun as
a whole. The failure of Cameroun authorities to heed the demands of these
Southern Cameroons elite have not only culminated with the rigging of elections
in 1992 which kept the leading opposition political party out of power in 1992,
but also compounded and complemented the arguments advanced by various
opposition groups that are claiming that Bakassi is indeed Southern Cameroons
territory and neither Nigeria’s nor Cameroun’s.
Still, with similar arguments and questions, Emmanuel Chaibi has tied
present day Cameroun crisis to an identity crisis and name changing tactics.28 In
titling chapter XI of his work as “Reflections on the Problem of Identity” Chiabi
evaluates the post-independence politics in a sub-heading titled “In Search of a
New Order by a New Generation” noting that the new generation sees the 1980s
as “years of stock taking and reflection;” the early 1990s as “years of action,”
with 1993’s All Anglophone Conference as the great signal for a return to
35
Southern Cameroons independence.29 Previously, he quoted the Ghananian
scholar, Professor A. Adu Boahan, as having observed: “It would be most
expedient, then, for African leaders to take colonial impact very much into
account in the formulation of their future development programs and strategies.”
By this he meant accepting that some aspects of the colonial impact are
irreversible and hence should be adopted and modified to suit the African
context.30
With regards to Nigeria, the perceptions of its leaders, like those of
Cameroun, are equally influenced by, and emanate from the pre-decolonization
and post-decolonization politics. Most prominent observation during predecolonization politics was the desire of its leaders to see Nigeria retain all of
British Cameroons at independence. This desire did not yield a sweeping victory
as Nigerian authorities had hoped. This strained relations between both nations,
as Southern Cameroons joined Cameroun in the Cameroon Federation and
Northern Cameroons became absorbed into Nigeria as part and parcel of its
national territory as per the terms of the plebiscite treaty.
The political wrangling that came out of the process produced the
plebiscite and its uncontested and unimplemented results—a claim that fortifies
Ambazonian arguments that the Bakassi peninsula belongs to it or former
Southern Cameroons. Traces of this dispute as concerning Nigeria could be
found in the bilateral agreement made between Cameroun and Nigeria during
the days of the quest of Biafra for independence from the Nigerian Federation.
Victor J. Ngoh, in A Hundred Years of History observes:
The love-hate relationship, which resulted from the 1961 plebiscite,
should be added Cameroon’s diplomatic, if not moral support of
Federal Nigeria during the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war. The antiBiafra posture, which Cameroon adopted, was a source of irritation
to the Ibos. It was, probably, with this in mind that Dr. Okoi
Arikpo criticized General Gowon for signing the 1974 Maroua
Accord…Gowon’s decision to ‘give’ part of Nigeria’s territory to
Cameroon was to repay Cameroon for the support it gave the
Federal Nigeria…31
As we will see later, the basis for claiming Bakassi from Nigerian
arguments is based on Nigeria denouncing the Maroua accord as having never
been ratified by the Nigerian Assembly since it was undertaken by an illegal
36
military government; and from Cameroun’s point of view, fortified by the
Maroua Accord and other border agreements including the fact that the
plebiscite treaty made Southern Cameroons part of the Cameroon Federation.
However, the important question is whether prior to the Maroua Accord
there was ever a legal dispute over Bakassi, and if or even so, whether the
Accord should be seen as Nigeria denouncing her claims over the peninsula,
rather than giving it away as a reward? This question emanates from the fact
that at independence, there was no Nigerian claim over Bakassi (but only over
the Obudu Cattle Ranch) and as the maps appended here do suggest, Bakassi has
never been part of colonial Nigeria or post-colonial Nigeria. The perception of
leaders from the two antagonistic neighbors—Cameroun and Nigeria, and how
their misperception of colonial and post-colonial politics is therefore central to
their denial or neglect of the facts that surround the Ambazonian Interpleader and
the claims that Bakassi does not belong to either nation.
2) THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The international community has contributed to the conflict between the
two Cameroons and the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula in two ways: Firstly,
by the very nature of the functioning of the international system—its anarchic
nature—which permits topdogs to exploit and dominate the underdogs, while
the latter, by virtue of the disadvantages of its position strives to reverse the
situation or join the ranks of topdogs. Secondly, the situation could be viewed
from the perspective of the response to change of African leaders—nationalists
especially—to the decolonization process, which gave colonies the opportunity
of joining the ranks of nations.
In the international system, each state is the final judge of its own cause,
and may at any time use force to implement its policies. Since states can use force
at will, preparedness to counter force with force or pay the price of weakness, the
requirements of state action are thus imposed by the circumstances in which all
states exist.32 The rivalry between nations is in part due to the fact that there is no
system of law to check their actions and in part, because each bears responsibility
for its actions and ambitions. Such a situation results, definitely, in conflicts of
interests that make scholars see the international system as anarchic.33
What drives the anarchic nature of the international system is the
principle of "self-help." This leads to power positions and claims of "in our
national interest" that leaders of nations make. As G. Cashman has observed,
"there is danger when power confronts power, but there is greater danger when
37
power confronts weakness."34 Nothing more than confirms this situation than
the resistance and treatment meted to nationalists for daring to take power in
Cameroun at the time of decolonization.
Responses to change—from colonial rule to independence—by
nationalists, is equally an important factor worth examining here. While it could
be said that nationalists in Nigeria, both civilian and military, honored the
plebiscite with regards to Northern Cameroons, the same does not hold with
regards to Cameroun where the failure of nationalists to take over power from
colonial masters has been an impediment to the implementation of the plebiscite
treaty, with regards to Southern Cameroons.
Thus, while decolonization gave Cameroun and Nigeria the opportunity
to join the ranks of nations, it is possible to claim that nations whose leaders fail
to take care of the interests and aspirations of their people or a section of it,
especially where such relations involve international influence, their nations
would hardly be at peace, let alone prosper meaningfully. It is in this light that
the case over the Bakassi Peninsula can be viewed—with the dispute between
Nigeria and Cameroun posing a lesser danger to the peace and stability of the
region than that between Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) and Cameroun.
This conflict and the double dangers that face both Cameroun and Nigeria have
been shaped and exacerbated, especially from the Cameroun side, by the
influence that the French have over that country.
3) RIVALRY BETWEEN NATIONS
Rivalry between nations is a major factor in causing conflicts of interest
that may result in military clashes and war. Rivalry does take the form of
attempts at political dominance, socio-cultural and economic influences, all of
which influence the need for physical expansion of territories. An examination of
the Bakassi peninsula dispute reveals that the multiplicity of all these forms of
attempts at dominance culminates to give shape to the dispute. As stated under
(1) and (2) above, parties or states involved in rivalry naturally take the positions
of “topdogs” or “underdogs”—all of which influence and guide their behavior.
Rivalry therefore, breed different behavior or attitudes from parties involved,
with the end result being thriving perceptions and misperceptions. This is what
Jeffery Z. Rubin, Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim (1996), jointly characterize as
“the persistence of psychological changes.”35
Specifically, Rubin et al have noted:
Like all attitudes and perceptions, negative attitudes and
perceptions tend to endure once established. This is partly because
38
they support each other: negative beliefs validate negative feelings,
and negative feelings make negative belief seem right…. when
these mechanisms are at work, negative view of Other have
consequences ultimately reinforce the views that give rise to them.
These mechanisms involve the self-fulfilling prophecy,
rationalization of behavior, three kinds of selective perception
(which rationalizes one party’s behavior and blames the other’s for
escalation), and autistic hostility.36
What is most evident from the positions of rival parties is the fact that previous
bonds between them are destroyed and replaced with antagonism as escalation
occurs. However, escalation is less likely to occur when each party is aware of
the potentials of such spirals and is concerned about the consequences of such
escalation.37 What this means is that stability (or even stalemate) is sometimes
encouraged by a fear of escalation.38 In this regard, any nation that decides to
aggress its neighbor, should take the “idea of frustration with the idea of
perceiving aggression as a possible way out of the frustrating situation”39 and
humiliations that come with its actions, in the face of the international
community, into consideration.
This leads us to tie the concept of nation to the idea of a territory, usually
contiguous, international politics becomes dangerous precisely because of the
simple metric quality of its dimension. This is because national identity is linked
to territory in a rigid way. Here, if we take into consideration just one form of
rivalry between nations (economics) we may argue that rivalry and aggression
may be curtailed by increasing cooperative dimensions.
Similarly, Galtun has argued that:
World economy can be structured in such a way that wealth
becomes a cooperative dimension so that no unit’s loss can be
another unit’s gain….But even if nations rise together on a
dimension of prosperity there is one aspect of this dimension that
will remain competitive forever: not absolute prosperity, but
relative prosperity. One nation’s gain of the no. 1 position,
regardless of the absolute value, is another nation’s loss.40
39
What is deduced from this statement is that economic development per se will
probably create more, not less rank-disequilibria and hence be conducive to
more, not less aggression.41 In a similar study, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1986)
argues that the self-interest pursuit of gain by national leaders on their own
behalf and on behalf of their nation is a prime cause of international rivalry and
conflict.42
The essentials of expected utility theory reveal that “decision-makers’
choices among opportunities are constrained by the prospects of success and
failure and by the utility, or intensity of motivation, they feel for achieving one
objective or another. Thus structural factors and individual psychology come
together to shape choices.”43 This means that decision-makers should almost
always explore alternate choices before making those decisions that can and do
lead to matters of life and death.
No other example bears better testimony to this than the conflict between
Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. In an elaborate study of Peace
and Disputed Sovereignty—Reflections on Conflicts Over Territory, in 1985, the
Columbia University Institute of War and Peace Studies, concluded:
The Falkland conflict was precipitated by a perceived lack of
resolve in the adversary. Britain had shortly before withdrawn its
only ship from the South Atlantic an Argentinian leaders
discounted Britain’s willingness to fight. They also may have been
misled by episodes in recent history, which indicated that a quick
fait accompli was unlikely to be reversed by the opponent’s
increasing the stakes…the Argentine junta …believed that England
would be satisfied by saving face with militarily meaningless
gestures.44
Based on these and similar findings, the Project concluded:
The escalatory process stressed the process, which the goal of
breaking the will of the other party substitutes for the goal of
achieving a scarce value when a dispute (conflict of interest) is
transformed into a (violent) conflict. Similarly, we can hypothesize
that conflict has deescalated when the parties cease to view the
40
breaking of the will of the other as their objective and revert to a
definition of the situations in terms of conflicting interests.45
Reflecting on the Bakassi peninsula dispute one would certainly find many forms
of rivalry, but in reality, the dispute over title to the territory by conquest is
questionable international behavior. As David Kennedy observed of the right to
conquest:
International society used to have clear rule authorizing title to territory
through conquest. In this century, under the combined assault of selfdetermination doctrine and the prohibition of the use of force, we have
moved away from the traditional rule…although the move to selfdetermination and a norm of peaceful dispute resolution or collective
enforcement certainly seems to herald a more mature international order,
one worries about the hypocrisy in the application of these contemporary
standards.46
Finally, reflecting on international conflict and the role of misperceptions
in fueling escalation, Arthur A. Stein47 holds the premise that “misperception
need not cause conflict even when it does affect actor’s choices and behavior.”
Indeed, he maintains, “Misperceptions can facilitate conflict avoidance, interactor
coordination, and even mutual cooperation. For misperceptions to cause conflict,
the misunderstood actor either must have a dominant strategy of defection or
must be a tit-for-tat reciprocator.”48 Such an actor or party usually has no desire
to mask its true preferences. Accordingly, Stein argues, “If the misperceived
actor recognizes the other’s confusion, its incentive is to signal its true
preferences. Moreover, the misperceived actor’s only incentive to deceive will be
its desire to facilitate the avoidance of conflict.”49
“Topdog” / “Underdog” analyses of rivalry in international politics holds
true for the explanation of forms and trends that are prevailing in the Bakassi
peninsula dispute. How important these and the examples cited are relevant to
the resolution of the Bakassi peninsular dispute is not only the challenge faced in
this work, but also a function of the role of international law in the determination
of legal title to territory—a measure of the roles of, and a much bigger challenge
to the intervention/arbitration of the World Body (UN) and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), respectively.
41
4) THE INFLUENCE OF A DOMINANT POWER
Nothing can be clearer to the analyses of “topdog”/“underdog” than the
relationship between Cameroun and its former colonial master France. While it
has been well documented that Cameroun has managed to establish relations
with many other nations and territories including the Vatican City,50 an in-depth
analysis of the statistics of trade and foreign aid between 1966-1976, for instance,
shows an overbearing or even dominant French presence—(the period being
significant in that it culminated with the termination of multiparty democracy in
Southern Cameroons and in 1972, the manipulation to create the short-lived
United Republic of Cameroun).51 In relation to the Bakassi peninsula dispute and
the wider claims of sovereignty associated with it, we must note that the troubles
of Cameroun as a nation started when the nationalists of the UPC Party were
crushed by a joint Franco-Cameroun military alliance at independence.
Cameroun had antagonized many African states with the way it treated the UPC
insurrection. Most noted were strained relations with Ghana, Guinea and
Egypt—countries that served as a safe-heaven for the UPC exiles, and which
equally provided them material and financial support. According to Ngoh,
Cameroon’s expansionist tendencies at independence went far beyond acquiring
Southern Cameroons, for President Ahidjo’s concept of a “greater Cameroon”
meant:
Extending Cameroon boundary to the boundaries created by the
Kamerun Protectorate of the German colonial period, and this, in
effect, meant absorbing Equatorial Guinea. Furthermore, Cameroon
wanted Fernando Po for strategic reasons especially since Nigeria’s
interest in the island was an open secret. When Rio Muni and
Fernando Po became independent in 1968, becoming Equatorial
Guinea, Ahidjo’s dream for Fernando Po vanished.”52
Thus, when it comes to the extension of the Bakassi peninsula dispute to
include the sovereignty question over Southern Cameroons, the expansionist
tendencies of Cameroun, from every indication, this has been made possible by
an overbearing influence that the French have over its former colony
(Cameroun). Similarly, when it comes to the blatant disregard of international
law that put the two Cameroons together, traces of Cameroun’s “topdog”
behavior over Southern Cameroons can be seen in the blatant disregard of the
influence of UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarsjold, who visited the territory
at independence. As Emmanuel Chiabi has observed, “the last French
42
Commissioner, Xaxier Torre had also left…. Ahidjo (ruled) for some twenty-five
years, always with the French by his side (so while French rule was relegated to
the archives as Ateba Yene suggested, French influence never left the streets and
offices of Cameroun).”53 This overbearing relation has dominated Cameroun’s
(underdog) foreign relations over the years with the French (topdog)—most
often to the disadvantage of the Cameroons. As M. DeLancey, (1989) notes,
The French colonial administration had played a critical role in
determining who would be the recipient of power in that
independent state…through the various agreements of cooperation
signed by France and the Ahidjo government, France remained in a
position to strongly influence Cameroun domestic and foreign
policy for years to come.54
As we would see at many instances in this work, this relationship is one
that is of central influence in both the crisis over the implementation of the
Plebiscite Treaty between the two Cameroons and in the crisis between
Cameroun and Nigeria, over the Bakassi peninsular. DeLancey further notes that
Cameroun's foreign policy (and this work would argue—even Cameroun's
domestic policies) can be described as a struggle to expand its relations beyond
France to other capitalist powers while simultaneously exploring and developing
relations with the third world especially African neighbors.55
The overbearing influence of the French government in Cameroun matters
has marred the unification process from the day the idea was expressed. French
posturing as protector of its former colonies was a policy adopted after the
Second World War. For fear of being victimized by the Charles De Gaulle
government that came to power in France in 1958,56 most of French-speaking
Africa acquiesced, Cameroun inclusive. Because of this, the French Government
followed up by signing bilateral agreements with its imposed leadership in
French Cameroun, including defense, which are exercised constantly when
fighting erupts between Cameroun and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula. The
case of February 1994 is most glaring. As West Africa Magazine noted, " a French
military team arrived in Yaounde`, (the capital of Cameroun) on February
27…from Bangui, the capital of nearby Central African Republic, carrying a
43
detachment of French paratroopers and two jeeps, followed by two Puma
helicopters."57
Secondly, given the circumstances of the relations between the Cameroons
on the one hand, and between France and Cameroun on the other, the resolution
of the dispute over Bakassi cannot be legally solid if it disregards the charges that
Cameroun violated the terms of the Plebiscite Treaty. If the failure of the
Federation does take away Yaounde's authority over any border dispute that
involves the international boundary between Ambazonia and Nigeria, how then
will the international organizations charged with resolving such disputes explain
how their decision was arrived at?
Thirdly, in advancing proposals for resolving the conflicts, this work
argues that the right route is neither the diplomatic discussion between
Camerounian and Nigerian authorities (as proposed by Nigeria) nor that taken
by Cameroun, to have international mediation, while having not exhausted local
remedies. If local remedies were to be exhausted, (which would include
diplomatic and other bilateral encounters between Cameroun and Nigeria) the
restoration of the Cameroon Federation, as a priori to 1972, is a prerequisite. At
the same time, there is the absolute necessity of bringing together the former
colonial masters in a joint forum to redress and finalize the demarcation of the
border. This position is guided by colonial documents, contemporary literature
and my position, and based on experience, that neither of the two governments
(Cameroun and Nigeria) could be trusted to come up with a lasting solution to
this crisis. Contemporary evidence seems to suggest a "Wag the dog" influence
in the behavior of these governments, given their human rights record and the
anti-democracy (Nigerian military governments) or manipulative-democracy
(Cameroun civilian dictatorships) positions of the two governments. 58 This
nullifies or weakens arguments that their national interests influence both
countries in their behavior.
CONCLUSION
The Treaties that fixed and redressed these borders will come under
scrutiny in this work. While the colonial masters created the border between
British Nigeria and German Kamerun, the redressing of the borders following
the defeat of Germany in World War I created Southern Cameroons and 1985
Ambazonia was born out of resistance to total Camerounization. Ambazonia
roots begun firstly as a region within British ruled Nigeria, then secondly, as a
self-governing territory still within Nigeria, then as a region under scrutiny for
independence, and lastly, by the Plebiscite Treaty, as one of two equal states for
44
the creation of the independent Cameroon Federation. In all cases, international
treaties exist to back the demarcation of the borders of the proposed Ambazonia.
The psychic-social readjustments concerning the Bakassi peninsula
disputes require that the disputing parties respect and comply with the terms of
treaties that defined their borders. To do so requires that we explore further
territories for more evidence to back whatever conclusions we may arrive at.
Thus it is necessary that we examine what international law is, and the role it can
play in resolving the dispute, and also what the arguments of the disputing
parties are concerning the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula.
Once this is done, we will stand a better chance that a ruling on the question of
sovereignty over Bakassi would be forthcoming. Any settlement that ignores
these historic realities would only breed chaos for the entire region.
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNATIONAL LAW SOURCES AND PRACTICE
For the first time in two centuries, the world of the 1990s entirely lacked
any international system or structure…Where was the consortium of
great powers, which had once established, or at least formerly ratified
disputed frontiers? Where were the victors of the First World War who
supervised the re-drawing of the map of Europe and the World, fixing a
borderline here, and insisting on a plebiscite there? Where, indeed, were
those working international conferences so familiar to the diplomats of the
past, so different from the brief public relations and photo-exercise
summits, which had now taken their place?
-Eric Hobsbawn (1994) The Age of Extremes, p.559.
Historic realities or events are in themselves responsible for the
development of international law, its sources and practice. Prominent among
these developments is the contributions of colonialism to the development of
international law (which we herein use the developments symptomatic of
Wilsonianism, Decolonization, and the development of New Principles of
45
International Law as its testimonials). This chapter examines these developments
and how they shape the course, sources and practice of international law.
I.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF COLONIALISM
International law existed before colonialism. But our concern in this work
is limited to the modern era, which according to Hobsbawn (1994) dates from the
beginning of colonialism. The Berlin Conference of 1884 and Berlin Congress of
1885 gave the 19th Century great powers of Europe the legitimacy to move freely
into Africa (and other parts of the world) and partition it among themselves.
As Berlin fell in World War 1, the League of Nations was born with a
Covenant that resolved the balance of power in Europe and instilled in the minds
of their power brokers a new mentality. Leaders were stirred to move away from
imperialism and colonialism, in favor of freedom for the colonies, or selfdetermination and the promotion of liberal democracy.1 Such norms became the
talk of all times. But the Old World of power rivalry between European nations
had not really gone.
World War II broke out in 1939 and Berlin fell again in 1945. As the guns
of War went silent and other weapons of destruction crawled to a halt, the
victorious allies seem not to have forgotten the lessons of the Old Order—they
still believed in dividing-up the territories and belongings of the vanquished
nations, and imposing a heavy war indemnity on them. Unfortunately for them,
things turned out to be different: they were caught in a more freedomdemanding world. The new Charter and the many treaties that accompanied the
birth of the United Nations (which was modified from the Covenant of the
League of Nations) provided the avenues for such freedom demands. The new
Charter and the many treaties, declarations and conventions that came after were
seen as a new moral international law that was better than the old "Carthaginian
Peace." During the Cathaginian Peace era the winning side executed entire
defeated populations.2 This practice ensured that the capitulated nation(s) never
rose again to pose the same threat.
Summarily, the defeat of Germany in both world Wars is significant to
this chapter in two ways. Firstly, the Second World War produced the United
Nations. This was a change from the League of Nations with its Covenant,
derived from President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.3 The new Charter
set out to solve all of mankind's problems. Central in it are laws that govern
issues of the environment, international economic development, international
human rights, and conflicting claims of national security, war weapons and their
usage and proliferation among others.
Secondly, the First World War produced one fundamental result:
Germany lost all her possessions the world over, especially Kamerun (See
Appendix I). Kamerun and other German territories were divided between the
British, French, Belgians and other powers. Though the division of Kamerun was
46
unequal, the two separate parts were to be jointly administered as U.N.
Mandated and then, after World War Two, Trust Territories (see Appendix II &
V), part with Nigeria, and the other with French West Africa.4
A significant development of the defeat of Germany in the Second World
War, especially for the Cameroons, is that it robbed the people of another chance
at regaining control of the territory that was once carved out by the Germans as
Kamerun. Thus for over four decades the two Cameroons underwent different
orientations and developed cultural differences (reflective of the cultures of the
colonial masters of the UN Trust) that underlie not only their modern state
systems but is also central to the crisis under discussion. An understanding of the
contribution of colonialism, and the various stages at which it was manifested
and reinvented, and how these affect the development of modern international
law, is therefore crucial to the understanding the legal issues that surround the
Bakassi peninsula dispute.
A). WILSONIANISM
The most notable contribution of colonialism to international law,
therefore, is the response given to anti-colonial movements after the First World
War. Before the war, there was confusion as to what really is self-determination.
The notion of collective freedom can be traced back to the American Revolution,
which ignited the new principle of self-determination—the declaration of
American Independence on July 3, 1776, manifested in armed rebellion against
an oppressor power. In this regard, President Woodrow Wilson (and his famous
Fourteen Points at the Paris Talks that ended World War One) came to be selfdetermination’s most famous proponent.
However, the confusion that rocks the term arises when one has to view it
in light of "internal" or "external" self-determination. External self-determination
refers to when people have the right to choose their own sovereignty—that is, to
be free from external coercion or alien domination.5 Wilson upheld this notion of
self-determination when he, in identifying American war aims in 1917, spoke of
upholding what he neatly phrased as "the liberty, the self-government, the
undictated development of all peoples…No people must be forced under
sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hand
except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and
liberty.”6 That no other definition befits self-determination than that expressed by
Wilson, to the best of this author’s understanding, is no exaggeration.
On the other hand, the internal participation of peoples in their
governments or the process of deciding the form of government and/or social
order represents “internal self-determination.” Regardless of criticisms against
47
the principle of Self-determination, and regardless of the fact that Wilson
underestimated the complexity of applying the principle after World War I, it
has endured the test of time and the various degrees at which it has been deemed
necessary or demanded. Among the shortcomings of self-determination during
the Wilsonian era are the following important points, discussed elaborately in
Morton et al (1990):
(a) Ethnicity did not coincide with new political boundaries;
(b) The "Self" in self-determination did not have to coincide with an
ethnic group, especially since it was not clear if the "self" which was to
free itself from "alien" rule was synonymous with the nation. Selfdetermination did not necessarily require the coincidence of the
ethnographic and political maps.7
(c)
The great power influence in the creation of new territories was
influenced by their perceptions of economic and strategic benefits to
them, especially when it concerned counterbalancing the Soviet Union
and Germany. Morton et al (1990) have cited the example of the
creation of Hungary, stating that this result created a large
discontented minority in the Balkans—the ripple effects were seen
yesterday in Bosnia and are visible today in Kosovo.
(d) The great powers did not apply the principle of self-determination to
their own people. The dispute over parts of Finland known as Aaland
and the ruling by the League of Nations is a glaring example of the
selective and limited application of the principle. In the ruling that
followed the dispute, Aaland was denied its preference to join Sweden.
B) DECOLONIZATION
Regardless of the shortcomings of the principle of self-determination in its
early years, it took a more serious turn in the era of decolonization. The strength
of the principle of self-determination during the era of decolonization is derived
from Article 76 of the UN Charter. According to Chapter XII, the Trusteeship
system was set up by the UN to promote "progressive development" in the Trust
Territories "towards Self-government or independence," regardless of any
internal ethnic, linguistic, or religious divisions, with colonial boundaries serving
as the boundaries of the emerging states.8 From every indication “progressive
development” “towards self-government or independence” are phrases that fall
short of describing the evolutionary process and maturity of the “Southern
Cameroons,” which by every indication had attained advancement well ahead of
the United Nations’ position on the so-called “Trust Territories.”
Equally worth noting is the point that the emphasis on territory rather
than ethnicity limited the "self" that was entitled to move towards selfgovernment. This, as has already been noted, became the source of future tension
48
between the principle of self-determination and the competing principle of
territorial integrity, which worked against the self-determination of ethnic
groups and minorities within territories that were administered (as a single unit)
by colonial powers.9 As in the case of the “Southern Cameroons,” evidence of the
truncated formula can be found in the fact that the territory had attained “Selfgovernment” and all that was needed was the recognition of this fact as evidence
of territorial integrity and sovereignty and not the other way round.
In the Bakassi peninsula dispute and the bigger dispute over the territory
and sovereignty of Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons), the evidence of the
abused 'self' is overwhelming. It is equally clear that the failure to redress and
settle the present disputes would exacerbate the prospects for future disputes.
This is because the present dispute is deeply rooted in colonial influence and the
manner of transfer of power to succeeding states. Thus, whether the succeeding
states abused the laws that were laid for the future of the territories that
decolonization liberated is the central question, which if answered will resolve
the Bakassi case, most hopefully.
C)
NEW PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Another notable development from colonialism and decolonization was
the 1970 General Assembly Resolution 2625,10 known as the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States. The resolution expanded the scope of the right to selfdetermination by arguing that it can be implemented through both sovereign
and independent states, " the free association with an independent state or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by the people." The
Declaration also emphasizes the preservation of territorial integrity of states,
stating, "The right to self-determination should not be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states."
Also worth noting is a qualification in the Declaration, which in
distinguishing it from other resolutions on self-determination specifies that "the
protection of territorial integrity applies to states possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
race, creed or color." The Declaration has been criticized for being too open—so
much as constituting an "ambiguous affirmation of the applicability of the right
of self-determination to peoples inside the political boundaries of existing
independent states in situations where government does not represent the
governed."11 As Morton notes, this interpretation seems to create a category of
"peoples" possessing a right of self-determination outside the colonial context.
The Declaration is also criticized for having far less sweeping implications,
especially where governments fail to meet the requirements of "representative
government" as was the case of racist South Africa. Morton et al (1990), have
49
noted that regardless of the fact that there is an international legal right to selfdetermination in the context of decolonization, how this right is to be extended to
non-colonial situations has not been clear even after the Cold War.12
Presently, how the principle of self-determination is to be safeguarded
when it comes to disaffected minorities within states has come to be the main
focus of the international community. The cases of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union,
Tamil claims in Sri-Lanka, Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, Kurdistan, Kashmir,
Kosovo, Tibet, Palestine, Kurds and Shiites in the north and south of Iraq
respectively, East Timor and Ambazonia in Cameroun, are some of the most
heated situations of claims that demand urgent international attention.
With regards to international attention over the Bakassi peninsula dispute,
colonialism certainly contributed in creating the problem when the right to selfdetermination for Southern Cameroons was made conditional, given the 1961
plebiscite options of either Nigeria or Cameroun. Secondly, Post -colonial politics
worsened the situation when the same international community has ignored
reports of the violation of the terms of the plebiscite that defined the conditions
for the unity of the two Cameroons, which deliberately or by error of judgment
created the situation. The creation of a united Cameroon Federation would have
been right, on the part of the international community only if the transition
process was supervised then and afterwards. As will be shown later in this work,
this process was totally wrong from the onset, because it neither set out to
recreate German Kamerun, (which would have become the logical outcome or
result of self-determination and/or the granting of independence), nor did it set
out to free the disparate states that the evolution or transition from "Protectorate"
to "Trust Territories" had created.
These errors committed by the international community have now
resulted in tensions that may become militarized between the Cameroons and
are already escalating the dispute between Cameroun and Nigeria, as colonial
boundaries now come into question. Summarily, the dispute between Nigeria
and Cameroun is one that is highly influenced by the perceptions of the leaders
of both Nigeria and Cameroun over Ambazonia's entire territory.
Most specifically, one may characterize the dispute as being the byproduct of the infamous "Two Alternative" that blew a hole in selfdetermination, besides the fact that colonial masters and the United Nations did
not take into consideration ethnicity and other distinctive features that make a
people to be different from another. Differences in colonial cultures, especially
those between the French and the British, whose ambitious and imperial quest
for territories abroad let to the First World War, (which with only two years into
the war resulted into the division of German Kamerun—noting the AngloFrench Treaty of 1916), should have been considered seriously when granting
50
independence to colonized territories, and the people of German Kamerun in
particular.
II.
DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Among the most prominent changes brought by the birth of a new World
Order after the Second World War was the birth of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). It was hoped that this is where disputes between peoples and their
nations, and disputes between nations would be resolved, with the use of
international law. So what do we mean by international law? Several authors
have attempted defining it, besides the provisions contained in the Charter and
the subsidiary organs of the UN. International law is defined in Weston Burns
Burms et al (1990) as:
Law (that) governs relations between independent states. The rules
. . . binding upon states therefore emanates from their own free will
as expressed in Conventions or by usage generally accepted as
expressing principles of Law and established in order to regulate
the relations between these co-existing independent communities
or with a view to the achievement of common aims 13
Here, emphasis is on "free will," commitment to treaties and the
recognition of the differences between different communities as being a
necessary condition for peace—the common aims. This equally means that
conflict would develop and escalate depending more on the perceptions of one
community by another and depending also on the inability of leaders of such
communities, states or nations to recognize and agree on their differences.
J. Brierly (1963) in The Law of Nations, says "The Law of Nations or
international law", "may be defined as the body of rules and principles of action
which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another."14
Brierly's emphasis on "civilized states" is particularly important. In exploring the
causes of conflicts and wars, it is important that we recall that one of the most
serious causes lies with the perceptions or misperceptions of leaders of nations.
When we class these leaders as "civilized" or "uncivilized," depending on how
they recognize and deal with differences, this particular variable of causes of
conflict and war, (that is, the perceptions or misperceptions of leaders) may
surface as the most important cause of all in modern times.
For instance, anti-democracy leaders and military regimes may be classed
as "uncivilized" and thus would hardly go to the table to settle their differences
amicably. In this light, we may conclude that the leaders of Cameroun and
Nigeria are "uncivilized" since for the most part, military dictators and civilian
dictators have ruled Nigeria and Cameroun, respectively—hence the warproneness of the two states. It appears that international law seems to have been
recognized by these dictators. This may seem contradictory, but it is not—
international law, in their eyes, is simply being used for convenience sake—not
51
because they believe deeply in it as the best means of resolving their differences,
short of open military confrontations.
Otherwise, how can one explain this choice by dictators, especially the
case of Cameroun (Nigerian Preliminary Objections denounced the use of
adjudication in favor of bilateral talks!) given that the Plebiscite Treaty, which the
Cameroun government claims gave them the authority over the Ambazonia
territory, is being ignored? How can international law bring about a peaceful
resolution of the dispute without bringing to light the fact that the treaty of union
was never implemented? —a breach of treaty situation—meaning that
Cameroun's claims to sovereignty over the entire Ambazonia territory and the
Bakassi peninsula is not only questionable but based on very shaky evidence—a
very bogus and lame argument, that displays the ability or inability of nation
states and statesmen to manipulate and violate international law by claiming a
“national interest” argument. This is where the question of the conduct and
obligations of both the Cameroun and Nigerian governments, as far as both
international versus national laws are concerned, comes in.
In the Digest of International Law (1963), International Law is expressed
as,
The standard of conduct, at a given time, for states and other
entities subject there to. It comprises the rights, privileges, powers
and immunities of states and entities invoking its provisions, as
well as the correlative fundamental duties, absence of rights,
liabilities and disabilities . . . in a continual state of change and
development. In certain of its aspects the evolution is gradual; in
others it is avulsive. International Law is based largely on custom,
e.g. on certain practice, and where as certain customs are
recognized as obligatory, others are in retrogression and are
recognized as non-obligatory, depending upon the subject matter
and its status at a particular time.15
This definition is centered on "standard of conduct," "obligation" and
"non-obligation" of states in the international arena. However, it is clear that
universally accepted standards, once established and accepted or endorsed by
member states become binding. The recognition given to customs as "obligatory"
and "non-obligatory" is particularly interesting in terms of continuity and
change. The question becomes who accepts what given a change in
circumstances and who rejects what? This is perhaps the dilemma that
international law now faces—the question of enforcing compliance to previous
agreements now becomes important since in international law, there are
acceptable standards and norms that are seen as protecting the freedoms and
independence of all peoples.
Finally, to Grigorii I. Tunkin; contemporary international law is,
52
The aggregate of norms which are created by agreement between
states of different social systems, reflect the concordant wills of
states and have a generally democratic character, regulate relations
between them in the process of struggle and cooperation in the
direction of ensuring peace and peaceful coexistence and freedom
and independence of peoples, and are secured, when necessary, by
coercion effectuated by states individually or collectively .16
The idea of “aggregate of norms” calls our attention once again to the fact
that differences do exist between states, while “democratic character” re-enforces
the idea, for instance, that only “civilized” leaders can guide their nations
towards diplomacy, and away from unnecessary escalation of conflicts. The
“freedom and independence of peoples” re-enforces the idea that once
differences exist, so much that they could lead to conflict situations or war, these
differences should be recognized not suppressed. It is possible therefore, given
“civilized” governments, to recognize differences, recognize and guarantee the
self-determination of peoples, while at the same time preserving the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of nations. This is where the role of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) comes in, especially when differences arise in the
interpretation of the laws that govern the behavior of nations.
We assume here, that the International Court of Justice is the highest court
in the world and that it has the ability to interpret both domestic and
international norms (since international law is derived from such practices) to the
very advantage of world peace and security. Thus, it will be a devastating blow
to the very existence of this court if it allows the integrity and reputation of it
offices and judges to be manipulated, especially by the selfish interests of
uncivilized governments, under the pretext of their national interests, as the
Bakassi case suggests: in Bakassi we see a mixture of the interplay of both
international and national laws, and the emptiness of the arguments of the two
rival claimants, seems to suggest a trend towards further escalation rather than
resolution.
III.
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ)
The seat of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is at The Hague. This is
where the case Ambazonia versus Cameroun and Cameroun versus Nigeria has
reached and settlements are still pending. The functions of the ICJ are very
significant in terms of treaty interpretation, implementation or application,
particularly where the powers of states or international organizations, such as
the UN come under scrutiny or question. However, the jurisdiction of the ICJ is
based on consent, as article 34 of the ICJ statute suggests, and cases are decided
according to customary international law. This limits the ability to reform or
make established rules of law to be flexible. However, given the preponderance
of such customary international law material in the cases under study, we can
53
only but hope that those who have been done injustices, both internationally and
locally, would have their fair chance of remedy.
However, the ICJ has its own Statute, which is also an integral part of the
UN Charter. The main task of the Court is to decide legal cases between nations,
and all members of the UN are parties to its Statute of the World Court, with
only Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and San Marino as nonmembers. But these
nonmembers can also use the Court by accepting either its jurisdiction or its
adjudication. As the principal judicial organ of the UN, and the only global
tribunal vested with powers to examine and decide matters related to alleged
violations of international law, its main functions (based on Art. 94 of the
Charter) are:
1.
To decide matters submitted to it by states. This is known as its
"contentious jurisdiction," and
2. To give advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by the
General Assembly or the Security Council. This function is known as
the "advisory jurisdiction."
Article 36 of the Statute permits but does not require nations that are
parties to the Statute to declare in advance their acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court in certain types of disputes.18 The judgments of the Court are rendered
in accordance with the general principles of international law. Also a judgment
of the Court must contain the reasons for the decision, and is final and binding,
and no appeal may be made--even though the court has no means of enforcing
its rulings (Articles 56, 59 & 60 of the Statute of the ICJ).
Most often, the Court faces great difficulties in deciding which claims, by
parties, are founded in law and which are not. As Monique ChemillierGendreau (1996) 19 notes, "unnoticeable in its results, [the] functioning of the
Court is the product of the enduring conditions of the World it claims to
regulate, and comes in part from its composition and therefore from the origin of
its judges." The Court has fifteen judges, each elected by an absolute majority of
the Security Council and the General Assembly, voting independently of each
other. The composition of the Court is supposed to reflect the main forms of
civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. Monique (1996) states:
"the process is intended to guarantee their independence and assure good
representation. This safeguard does not exclude the automatic representation of
all five permanent members of the Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia and
China) nor the overrepresentation of Europe, which occupies a third of the seats."
The distribution of the judges among the various regions of the world is
particularly interesting, if not a cause for suspicion. As of 1993, the Court had 4
judges from Western Europe, 2 from Eastern Europe, 3 from Africa, 3 from Asia,
2 from Latin America, and one from the United States—and ironically, no two
judges may come from the same country. One can therefore measure the exact
54
degree of the independence of the judges with regards to their own states or its
allies, in three ways: all decisions are signed; minority judges can explain the
reasons for their disagreement (known as dissenting opinions); while the others
may express their reticence or offer justifications even though they agree with the
majority decision (individual opinions).20
Monique further criticizes what she terms "the primitive nature of the
international society," in which only 59 nations out of 185 members of the UN
have recognized the obligatory competence of the Court. Thus, the Court is
bound to have a contradictory record, amidst the power struggle between the
most powerful nations and their poor behavior; "the never-ending flow of
memoranda, counter-memoranda, rejoinders and petitions, discouraging the
reader by their very abundance of annexes, even as they are exchanged in
pleadings that are superfluous when compared to legitimate explanations."21
Also, the Court is accused of abusing its prerogative, and its behavior lacks both
imagination and the boldness to confront states in order to extend its
competence.
The contradictory record is most pronounced when the Court in trying to
respect the sovereignty of states, avoids creating losers and winners. This
approach is common in territorial disputes, "where there is concrete object of
disagreement and the potential for shared advantage."22 In some cases, the Court
tries to give the losing state at least some satisfaction of principle. Such was the
case when the ICJ ruled in 1966 that Ethiopia and Liberia [Plaintiffs in the case
against South Africa] had no legal standing to act against South Africa and its
apartheid policy. This decision, disappointed many.23
The ways in which states express their sovereignty, the problems
generated by the 'Balance of Power' and continuous power struggle between
nations on ideology and otherwise, together with the lack of an institutional
center, all make it difficult for the unification of all laws under international law.
This is especially so since international law flows primarily from treaties and
customary norms. Perhaps the most significant development in international
law today is the fact that not only states are its principal players or clients. As
Buergenthal, T. & G. M. Harold (1985) 24 states in Public International Law in a
Nutshell, today actors in international law include intergovernmental
organizations, to a much more limited extent, even individuals, "are and can be
the subject of rights and obligations under international law."
IV.
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law flows mainly from treaties and customs. But
understanding these two sources requires that we tackle some historic aspects of
the law. Historically, international law came into being as a separate legal system
with the emergence of the modern state system in the 16th and 17th centuries.
Prominent as law were the terms of peace treaties, the exchange of diplomats,
55
and the rules that applied to them, which dated far back in time immemorial.
Many of the rules emanated from Roman (Canon) laws, which drew heavily on
principles of natural law (Buergenthal, 1985).
Early writers in international law also contributed significantly to its
development. These writers include Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) (Dutch) who is
commonly called the father of modern international law, in De Jure Belli Ac Pacis
(1625) emphasized on the law of war and peace; and another work, Mare Liberum
(1609) on the freedom of the seas, laid the foundation for the basic principles of
international law.
Others such as Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) were among the first to
recognize the universal character and applicability of international law. A
German writer Samuel Pufendorf capitalized on the view that natural law was
the source of basic international law. A Swiss diplomat, Emmerich de Vattel
(1714-1767), considered as the individual whose work [The Law of Nations (1758)]
rivaled that of Grotius, was widely cited by governments even in the 19th
century.25 But contrary to Pufendorf and others who defended natural law as
being the prime source of international law, an English legal scholar, Richard
Zouche (1590-1660), was one of the early positivists who looked to state practice
as the source of international law, seeking the basics of this law in the consent of
states--its subjects. Thus it became clear that theories in international law came
primarily from natural law and the custom established by the practice of states.26
However, international law would not have become what it is today if not
of some important events that have taken place throughout history. Among
these is the Peace of Westphalia (1618-1648), which ended the Thirty Years War
establishing a treaty-based system. Also worth noting is The Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna (1815), which formerly ended the Napoleonic Wars and gave
way to a multilateral system of political and economic cooperation in Europe,
until the First World War. In providing Europe with a substantial body of
international law, the Peace of Westphalia contributed significantly to the
development of international law.27
56
Another milestone in history is the Treaty of Versailles, which in ending World
War I, gave birth to The League of Nations, which on its part not only codified
international law but also established the first Permanent Court of International
Justice, open to all states.28 As Buergenthal (1985) emphasizes, besides
contributing to the development and codification of international law, The
League set its legal precedents. The United Nations and the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) could thus be seen as born out of the weaknesses of the League
system. But the greatest weakness of the international system may lie in the fact
that it still lacks a constitution that can be viewed as a fundamental source of
law--hence its primitive nature.
Weston Burns et al (1990) breaks down the sources of international law as
comprising treaties, backed by the principle of pacta sunt servanda—that nations
are bound to keep the promises they make.29 Treaties are important in
international law because they are instruments of cooperation in international
relations, often involving a change in the relative positions of states involved.
Thus treaties are "instruments of change—a point, which is forgotten by those
who regard international law as an essentially conservative force."30
Customs are another source of international law. They involve unwritten
rules that are evidence of a general practice of states accepted as law. Such
customs as concerning the conduct of warfare, refraining from killing or maltreating innocent civilians and the prisoners of war are some examples that date
back to antiquity.31 But some ("Voluntarist ") hold the opinion that rule of
customary international law applies only to those nations that have participated
in the custom.32 However, the most important elements of Custom include:
(a) Concordant practice by a number of states with reference to the type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations;
(b) Continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;
(c) Conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with
prevailing international law; and
(d) General acquiescence in the practice by other states also known as the
Hudson Criteria. Some international lawyers argue that for a given
rule of customary international law to be binding (or not) upon all
states, it has to go beyond the Hudson criteria, and not worth arguing
about. Important cases that reflect heavily on custom include the
"Lotus" case between France and Turkey and the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case, which involved Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands.33 General principles of international law are another
source of international law that supplements treaties and customs.
57
In international law, general principles come into play when neither
treaties nor customs can be used to resolve a case. Some international lawyers
stress the use of natural laws, while others stress that general principles can be
international law only if it is derived from customary international practice. But
according to Professor Janis, the use of the techniques of comparative law would
be most appropriate in determining the applicability of general principles to
cases.34 Other sources of international law include judicial decisions, the
teachings of highly qualified publicists, consensus, United Nations resolutions,
equity, and statements of public officials.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to show how the case under study
was influenced in its developmental stages by historical factors. The literature on
conflict and international law helps us to show how the problems originated,
evolved and matured, and also what factors are more important when the
settlement of the disputes becomes an academic and international organizational
assignment. I have hope that in showing its historic and contemporary evolution,
we would understand the significance of sources of international law in dispute
settlement. Pondering over the literature reveals a situation whereby idealism
clashes with realism--the quest for a more just and orderly world confronts that
of power-hungry nations and conscienceless leaders, whose main objective was
and still is domination, and nothing but domination.
Whether or not Woodrow Wilson's self-determination policy (others call it
higher realism) was out to serve the interest of and promote an ideal world or
whether it strengthened the world of realists is only as important as each nation
or state interprets global phenomena, to suit their interests. But the sources of
international law, which law has been codified ever since the days of Wilson, are
the key place to rely when attempting to settle any international dispute. These
source are also important almost only when we study their application to
individual cases.
In the case of Cameroun versus Nigeria, the next chapter will show that
while both nations seemingly ignore the significance of historic contributions to
their dispute, their arguments reveal Cameroun as playing the "Hawk" and
Nigeria the "Dove"—a game which this author believes both nations are playing
consciously, but which as evidence would show, both would end up in many
ways, as losers. In "Hawkish" and "Dovish" game, both nations are failures when
it comes to the prescriptions of international law, serving the interest of their
peoples in particular, and protecting the peace of the region and that of the
international community at large.
58
CHAPTER FOUR
CASE STUDY: THE BAKASSI PENINSULA DISPUTE
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no White man's
foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes
59
to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew
exactly where the mountains and rivers were.
-Lord Salisbury, in "Bakassi? Whose Bakassi?" (West Africa, 18-24
April 1994).
I
RE-STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Among the many border disputes that Cameroun and Nigeria have had in
the years since independence, the Bakassi peninsula stands out very clearly as
the most serious dispute of all. This portion of the disputed border draws
increasing attention, as it became public knowledge that the peninsula is very
rich in petroleum and natural gas. The show of arms, especially in the past
seventeen years, has left many dead and wounded. Fighting occurred on the
lands surrounding the peninsula, (which are equally disputed), on the peninsula
itself, and on the sea. The big question that faces both nations is that of
sovereignty over the mineral rich peninsula—and in answering this question,
both nations resorted to the use of military force to claim the territory.
The military struggle between the two nations has resulted in some form
of partition of the islands. Given the disadvantage that Cameroun's population is
about one-tenth that of Nigeria (roughly 16 million to 160 million), it is no
surprise that Cameroun naturally resorted to accusing Nigeria for using its
population advantage to populate the Bakassi peninsula—a tactic of claiming
ownership.1 From the Nigerian end, it is common to hear accusations of
Cameroun Gendarmes and their tax-drive assaults on Nigerians living in the
area. Thus Cameroun initially claimed it had to exercise its sovereignty and
protect its territorial integrity by taxing those who live on its soil, and Nigeria,
while not relinquishing its claims of sovereignty over the peninsula had to send
in troops to protect its citizens from Cameroun aggression.
Things became heated very on May 16, 1981. A Cameroun national radio
news report informed the world that a Nigerian military patrol army violated
Cameroun's territory by penetrating the Bakassi peninsula as far as the Rio del
Rey and opening fire on the Cameroun Navy. Cameroun troops in returning fire
killed five Nigerian soldiers. Cameroun alleges that this incident has provided
the Nigerian authorities the pretext for exploiting the incident politically and for
trying to put the blame on Cameroun.2 Using diplomatic means, both nations
had laid to rest the incident that resulted in the death of Nigerian soldiers but it
seemed to have raised the question of sovereignty over Bakassi to the forefront of
relations between both nations since then. Even with the question over the
60
sovereignty of Bakassi hovering over the politics of both nations, Nigerians,
generally hold the opinion that both nations still enjoyed, for the most part
cordial relations.3 Both nations exchange delegations on a regular basis, and the
Heads of States customarily send messages of congratulations to each other on
festive occasions. A noted example is the visit of a Cameroun delegation to
Nigeria in 1995 "in order to canvass support for Cameroun's membership in the
Commonwealth."4
However, armed assaults continued to plague the Bakassi region over the
years, and in expanded fields. For instance, in 1992-1993, faced with multiparty
democratic challenges, and the growing militantism for Anglophone autonomy,
the Cameroun government resorted to open oppression in which some Nigerian
civilians in Cameroun were killed. Many were forced out of Cameroun during
many embarrassing and harassing tax-drives. As Africa Confidential noted,
"Nigeria's…decision to deploy a thousand troops on the peninsula was in turn a
reaction to the harassment of Nigerian fishing vessels and traders by
Camerounian Gendarmes."5
The Bakassi border dispute escalated with two more serious incidents of
incursion that provoked more shooting, recording many casualties and deaths of
soldiers of both countries. The first incident was the open hostility that broke the
stalemate over Bakassi on February 18-19, 1994.6 It was after this incident that
Cameroun decided to take the border dispute to the ICJ for its adjudication.
Cameroun's application was deposited on March 29, 1994, amidst accusations
from Nigeria that Cameroun was not committed to bilateral negotiations to
resolve the matter locally.
A second notable incident that escalated the dispute was recorded on
February 3, 1996. As has already been noted, the strategic importance of the
Bakassi peninsula and the increasing awareness of this same factor have been at
the core of escalation. No other paper gave the situation a more proper picture
than Jeune Afrique. In its November 13, 1996 edition, the editor noted that "…tous
les ingredients d’un conflict majeur sont reunis"—emphasizing the point that all the
factors that lead to a major conflict are present in the Bakassi peninsula dispute.
The editorial further noted "…les enjeux economiques et strategiques sont autrement
importants…” in stressing the strategic economic importance of the peninsula as a
factor for escalation. The article further expressed the fact that the region harbors
61
two very important seaports—Douala and Calabar, with a total of five million
inhabitants, and for the developed countries with petroleum companies
operating in the area, the risk of a major war are frightening. Noting the
importance of the region to the French, the editorial did not hesitate to comment
on France's "l’ alternative du diable,” which has provoked much criticism from the
Nigerian side.7
The devil's alternative indeed! France defends its involvement in the
dispute in favor of Cameroun by citing defense treaties signed at and after
independence. But this does not sink well either in the Cameroons, where an
angry opposition sees frustrations of the democratization process as due to
French involvement, nor in Nigeria where France's investments far exceeds what
they have in all French Speaking Africa, put together. France is seen therefore as
fueling the escalation of the conflict for reasons best known only to them. The
pending question that confronts the French is whether their diplomatic
endeavors in trying to prevent further escalation of the dispute could be taken
seriously, given its position that Bakassi belongs to Cameroun. This is especially
troubling to many Nigerians.
The February 1996 escalation of the border dispute has another
interpretation--that of the Ambazonian (Southern Cameroons) side. Anglophone
distrust of governments in Cameroun, which accordingly failed to implement the
Plebiscite Treaty that was supposed to have united the Cameroons under a
Federal form of government (inter-parliamentary union), feeling cheated and
mistreated now demand from the United Nations its total independence.
Besides, it sees Bakassi as its own. In an Interpleader submitted by the Southern
Cameroons Restoration Movement8 to the ICJ was rejected for lack of Statehood,
they laid their own case stressing treachery on the part of Cameroun. They noted
that in the absence of a Cameroon Federation, and given the lack of any
documentation to back the illegal transformations that the Cameroons have
undergone since independence, Cameroun has no case because it has no
boundary in the disputed Bakassi region with Nigeria.9
Following the incident of February 1996, the Southern Cameroons
Information Bulletin of March 8, 1996, stated that the Bakassi war between
Cameroun and Nigeria escalated when Cameroun soldiers who presently occupy
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons), shot and killed a Nigerian in Victoria,
Ambazonia. When the corpse of the fallen Nigerian was conveyed home, a
battalion of Nigerian soldiers disguised as onion merchants took off in a boat for
62
the Cameroons. When they were stopped at the border by a Cameroon patrol
team, they opened fire killing several soldiers from the Cameroons. The bulletin
noted that the figure of two dead reported by the Cameroun government was an
underestimation. The bulletin article further lamented the fact that the Cameroun
government was sending only Anglophone soldiers, who were less equipped to
the border region, noting, "Those killed in the recent escalations are largely
Southern Cameroonians."10
Still concerning the escalatory nature of the dispute, Global Threat
Analysis11 in an article titled “Showdown Over Bakassi,” Reuters News reported
fresh clashes between Nigerian and Cameroun soldiers over the potentially oilrich Bakassi Peninsula. Reuters noted that since mid-April Nigeria has
repeatedly accused Camerounian forces of attacking its positions in the
peninsula, in the Gulf of Guinea, which is also rich in fish. Cameroun denies this
and insists that Nigeria is the aggressor. Lagos-based Diplomats said the recent
clashes seem to stem from the mid-March interim ruling by the World Court at
The Hague on the case brought before it by Cameroun to adjudicate on the
dispute, Reuters News reported. According to the report, the Court had ordered
the two sides to cease hostilities pending the final outcome of the case. Military
sources said both sides wanted to maintain a strong foothold in the
impoverished islands, hoping this would help their claim to the territory, the
news report further indicated.
The biggest problem the ICJ would face in attempting to settle the dispute over
the Bakassi peninsula, according to arguments advanced in this thesis, (other
border portions between the two belligerents not withstanding), emanates from
the fact that the case is taking a triangular twist—not only are Nigerians claiming
ownership, but Ambazonians are coming in with a much more bigger case that
would not only complicate matters for both Nigeria and Cameroun, but would
cause the latter to be dealt a very heavy blow, because the intrigues of the
unification process would be made known to the world. It is not unlikely that in
settling the Bakassi peninsula dispute, the ICJ may end up ruling on
Ambazonian identity as a nation. Such a ruling may become the biggest outcome
of the Bakassi peninsula dispute, especially since the case is solidly planted in
historic treaties, which examination would reveal more treachery on the
Cameroun side than that of Nigeria.
II
THE ACTUAL DRAWING OF THE BORDER
At ordinary glance, one can be tempted to conclude like Ian Brownlie
(1979), that the border has been completely demarcated and that there are no
63
disputed portions. In African Boundaries Ian Brownlie traces the actual
demarcation of the Cameroun-Nigeria border from whence the German
Protectorate of Kamerun was established on July 12, 1884 to the time of the
Plebiscite of February 11, 1961, when the territories of Southern and Northern
Cameroons voted separately to join Cameroun and Nigeria (on different terms)
respectively. Relevant treaties and agreements cited by Brownlie include:
i) Notification to the European powers and the United States on October
15, 1884, concerning the German Protectorate of Kamerun following the
July 12, 1884 treaty that established the Protectorate;
ii) Notification to the Signatory Powers of the General Act of the Berlin
Conference on June 11, 1885 and May 13, 1885, of the British Protectorate
of Lagos, renamed Niger Coast Protectorate;
iii) Exchange of notes dividing the British and German Protectorates from
April 1885-July 1886 and the treaty of July 1, 1890;
iv) Delimitation agreements from April 14, 1893-March 19, 1906 and the
exchange of notes of February 22 and March 5, 1909;
v) The Anglo-German Treaty of April 12, 1913, which presents the
boundary sectors between Gamana and Cross River, and between Cross
River and the Bight of Biafra;
vi) The Milner-Simon Declaration of July 10, 1919, which partitioned
German Kamerun between the British and the French;
vii) And with respect to the British and the French Mandates established
in 1922;
viii) The trusteeship agreement approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on Dec. 13, 1946;
ix) And the 1959 and 1961General Assembly Plebiscites held in the
territories of Northern and Southern Cameroons respectively, and
establishing with conformity, the boundaries between the Cameroons and
Nigeria. Further, Brownlie notes that "since independence, neither of the
successor states has challenged the principle of the boundary."12
The Nigeria-Cameroun border has four sectors. The first is the Lake Chad
Tripoint to the Horere Gesumi Uplands. The second is the sector of the River
Gamana (boundary pillar 64) eastwards to the Kombon Mountains. From pillar
64, the third sector of the boundary runs eastwards to pillar114 at the Cross
River. The forth sector runs from the Cross River down to the sea.14 The relevant
64
portion of the border is described in the Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913,
as following the Thalwag of the Akpakorum (Akwayafe) River, dividing the
Mangrove Islands near Ikang and goes as a straight line to join Bakassi Point and
King Point (March 11, 1913 Anglo-German treaty, XVIII). Further, it was agreed
by the two powers (Britain and Germay) that:
XIX. Should the thalweg of the lower Akwayefe, upstream from the line
Bakassi Point-King Point, change its position in such a way as to affect the
relative positions of the thalweg and the Mangrove Islands, a new
adjustment of the boundary shall be made, on the basis of the new
positions, as determined by a map to be made for the purpose.
XX. Should the lower course of the Akwayefe so change its mouth as to
transfer it to the Rio del Rey, it is agreed that the area now known as the
Bakassi peninsula shall still remain German Territory. The same condition
applies to any portion of territory now agreed to as being British, which
may be cut off in similar way.
XXI. From the center of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi
point and King Point, the boundary shall follow the center of the
navigable channel of the Akwayefe River as far as the three-mile limit of
territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this boundary, the
navigable channel of the Akwayefe River shall be considered to lie wholly
to the east of the navigable channel of the Cross- and Calabar Rivers.
XXVI. The fishing rights of the native population of the Bakassi peninsula
in the Estuary of the Cross River shall remain as heretofore.
XXVII. It is agreed that within six months from the date of marking out
the boundary natives living near the boundary-line may, if they so desire,
cross over to live on the other side, and may take with them their portable
property and harvesting crops.15
Other provisions of the treaty took care of navigation on the Cross River,
which accordingly, remained open to German ships. Further evidence of the
demarcation of the Cameroun-Nigeria border are contained in the Franco-British
Declaration of July 10, 1919, commonly Known as the Milner-Simon Declaration
(named after Viscount Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies of the British
Empire, and M. Henry Simon, Minister for the Colonies of the French Republic);
and the Declaration made by the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria and the Governor of French Cameroons defining the boundary between
the British and French Cameroons.
Amidst the many adjustments that were made by the British and German
boundary negotiators, regardless of claims that the boundary divided many
65
tribes,16 the Anglo-German Treaty of April 12, 1913 is the only and most
important ground from which reference concerning any territorial dispute along
the border between the two countries could be made. Equally of importance are
the international boundaries between the Cameroons [Ambazonia (Southern
Cameroons) and Cameroun) before independence. The map of Ambazonia when
the British jointly administered it as a UN Trust Territory with Nigeria is central
to understanding the positions of the claimants. This position is supported by
Olayinka Y. Balogunin in his study of "The Process of Cartographic Definition of
Nigerian Boundaries," when he insinuates that "The original boundary between
Nigeria and German Kamerun had been demarcated with pillars by 1913, but
with the post-World War One developments, the only internationally valid
sections of the demarcated boundary are a part of the Yola Arc and the section
from the Rio del Rey Creek to a point where the Gamana River crosses the old
boundary.” According to Olayinka, "this boundary would be valid only if
Cameroun respects the protocol signed by Britain and Germany regarding this
mutual boundary…From Gamana River eastward to Kombon and northward to
the tripoint with Chad, the Cameroun-Nigeria boundary is yet to be
demarcated."17
The weakness of Olayinka's argument does not concern the AngloGerman Treaty of 1913, but rather the fact that he regards the boundary between
Ambazonia (then Southern Cameroons), which was jointly administered with
Nigeria by Britain as not being an international boundary. The correct notion is
that as long as all the treaties were binding on the signatories, their international
nature will continue regardless of whether or not Ambazonia is seen only as
provinces in present day Cameroun or back then in British ruled Nigeria. What
Treaties has Cameroun with Ambazonia that effectively dissolved the
international boundaries of the latter?
On the contrary, both Nigeria and Cameroun are not respecting the
boundaries and the agreements that created them. This may be partly because
Nigeria wonders what has become of Ambazonia, which by the terms of the
Plebiscite Treaty was not supposed to cease existing as a State, and in part,
because it has instead been absorbed illegally by La Republic du Cameroun.
Nigeria now wrestles with Cameroun in order to get a chunk of the now
entrapped Ambazonia—which probably to them is a "no man's land." There
doesn’t seem to be any other logical explanation why both nations, in violation of
international law, are bent on fighting each other-or as Africa Confidential put it—
"blundering into battle"—over Bakassi.
66
III
CONTEMPORARY CLAIMS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Dispute along the Cameroun-Nigeria border has been a matter of historic
proportions, especially along the Cross River to the Sea section where in lies the
Bakassi peninsula. As we have already noted, the most important document that
concerns the demarcation of the border between the Cameroons (then Southern
Cameroons and Cameroun) and Nigeria is the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty.
Confidential documents made public in London now shed light on how
important an instrument the treaty was. Not only are the pillars of the treaty the
only pillars that completely marked the entire border, but also, the entire
confidential documents reveal a high degree of reliability—so much that not
even Her Majesty's government dared to temper with the treaties that fixed the
pillars.
The first noted conflict over the Cameroons and Nigeria coastal area could
be traced to the dispute between the Germans and the British over German
success in signing treaties with the Cameroon Kings of Akwa and Bell Town in
Douala on July 14th 1884. The treaties in effect, proclaimed the German
Protectorate extending from the Rio Del Rey area to Gabon. This angered the
British Consul, Hewett whose treaties were signed late18 (we recall here the
popular saying in Cameroon history of "Too late Hewett!" The British, perhaps to
save face, or perhaps genuinely, criticized the German move but went ahead to
downplay the loss of the territory terming it "the flat, swampy, and unhealthy
Cameroons-especially as we retain, in the coast of Ambas Bay and the
neighboring mountains, almost the only part of that region that can be inhabited
by Europeans."19 Moreover, a dispute over the disrespect of German flag, inciting
the natives to rebel against German rule, and the fact that British explorer Hewett
would preside over court cases in Douala as if Germans did not exist equally
fueled tensions between the two European powers. A rebellion of the natives led
to the death of one German. Even though it was crushed, it provoked bitter
reaction from Germany, which led Bismarck, in his traditional way, to demand
compensation with land west of Ambas Bay to the Rio del Rey. After some
hesitation Britain complied and a new boundary line was made along the Right
Bank of the Rio del Rey to its source and to extend from there to the Cross River
Rapids. Later the British bargained that Germany surrender claim at St. Lucia in
South Africa in exchange for Victoria in the Cameroons. These agreements were
contained in exchange of letters dated April 29, 1885 and May 7, 1885.20
67
All along both the British and the Germans had mistakenly believed that
the Rio del Rey was a river. When mapping the Old Calabar (Cross) River in
1889, Captain Graf Bernstorff discovered with much amazement that:
1) The Akwayaffe River did not end in the Old Calabar River as the
English maps had shown, but rather entered directly into the sea;
2) That the Rio del Rey was not a River, but a seaway, and that the
Akwayaffe was connected to the Rio del Rey by channels to the east;
3) That the Ndian River on the map prepared by the English Consul
Johnson is, according to Weladji, "unknown to the natives of the Rio del
Rey who instead call it the Ofa."21 Commandant Pullen for Her Majesty’s
Government confirmed these German findings. These findings provoked
maneuvers from both sides in an effort to secure Ndian River on the part
of the British, and to secure the acceptance of the Akwayaffe as a
substitute for the nonexistent Rio del Rey, on the part of the Germans.
Accordingly, Article 4 of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 firmly
secured the findings.22
The importance of these findings lie in the fact that the Germans insisted
that from 1885, the waterway, whether river or creek, belonged to her and that
the 1890 Agreement had changed nothing in this regard. And to this, the British
agreed, noting:
There is no doubt that under the agreement of 1885-86 both banks of the
river were given to Germany, and that from that time to 1890 she held this
waterway…the resulting Agreement signed on 14th April, 1893 defined
the Rio del Rey boundary with greater clarity and a pointer to things to
come--neutralized the [Bakassi peninsula dispute].23
In 1901, an agreement was reached as to the proposed boundary between the
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Colony of Kamerun, between the
British and the Germans. This agreement reconfirmed the April 29-June 10, 1885;
July 27-August 2, 1886; July 1, 1890; April 14, 1893; and November 15, 1893
Agreements on the boundary lines between the Rio del Rey and the rapids of the
Cross River. This Agreement was done in a meeting in Buea, Kamerun on April
1901, and is the basis of all subsequent boundary Agreements—1906, 1909, and
1913—with minor amendments.24
68
Articles 3 of the Buea Agreement stands out clean and clear on Bakassi. It
states:
In lieu of the boundary line commencing in the Rio del Rey at the
point given in the maps 'West Pt.' and 'West Huk' respectively, it
should commence at the South West Point of Bakasi Peninsula
marked 'Bakasi Head' and follow the West Coast Line until Bakasi
Point at the mouth of the Akpa Iyefe (Akwafe) River is reached,
thence it shall follow the center of the river as far as the Urifian
Creek on the left bank of the said river, in such manner as to
through the Bakasi Peninsula and the area between the Peninsula
and the Creek, formerly in British territory, into the German colony
of Kamerun, provided that the engagements in Article 3 of the
Agreement of 14th April 1893 (mentioned in Article 3 herein), shall
be observed, and no trade settlements be allowed to exist or be
erected (see Appendix VI & IV for the new position establishing
Bakassi Point).
This Agreement has stood the test of time, surviving through the World Wars
and the settlements thereafter, through the period of decolonization of the fifties
and sixties.
Recently declassified documents of the British Archives shed more light
on the nature of some other dispute in the Bakassi area of the Cameroun-Nigeria
case. Summarily, the documents reveal that all through British rule of the
Cameroons and Nigeria, the boundary pillars laid by the Germans were
untouched and that any attempt at redressing the border were resisted. A clear
case in point is the dispute over the Obudu Cattle ranch. The question is whether
it was on Nigerian soil, or in the Cameroons, or whether it overlapped the
border. This dispute was dealt with through the exchange of note in which the
British expressed fear of being entangled in a border dispute of the nature of
Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
The Obudu Cattle Ranch dispute arose from a Shell Company aerial
survey map, which showed that part of the Obudu Cattle Ranch was in fact, on
the Cameroonian side of the border. Because a team of surveyors from Southern
Cameroons (Ambazonia) was embarked on tracing the borderline of the State,
the British feared that if the surveyors saw the Shell map, they might use it to
confirm the boundaries of Southern Cameroons. To the British, this would
greatly hurt Nigerian feelings, a thing they would like to avoid. In an inward
telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, the correspondent advised that the
Colonial Office should "instruct Southern Cameroons Government to desist
69
forthwith from any attempt to demarcate this boundary."25 This telegram
provoked a series of correspondence aimed at resolving the matter.
Sensitivity over the Southern Cameroons-Nigerian border arose from the
fact that in 1954 the Nigerian government single-handedly, but also to its
disadvantage, inaccurately redefined the border, leaving out the Obudu cattle
ranch, which lies inland, north of Bakassi.26 In attempting to instruct Southern
Cameroons to desist from carrying out the survey, the British government
showed preferential treatment when it failed to question why and how the
Nigerian government could have made such a mistake. As later correspondence
would show, irresponsibility on the part of the Nigerian government was equally
responsible for triggering the squabble over the Obudu Cattle ranch.
In a correspondence to the Commonwealth Office, E. C. Burr 27 noted that:
"2. Party are not specifically surveying Southern Cameroons/Nigeria border but
will naturally record border points to enable boundary to be shown on maps."
Three days latter, E.C. Burr28 again communicated Commonwealth Relations
Office stating, "…we see nothing sinister in all this; it is in fact no more than the
usual work of the Directorate of Oversea Surveys and is on a joint Eastern
Nigeria/Southern Cameroons scheme. The Nigerian bit is one of your technical
assistance schemes." Burr then cautioned that any attempt to curtail activities of
field party would of course make preparation of maps impossible, and
demanded that the Nigerian government be so informed.
The most intriguing observation from the declassified documents is found
in the document marked WAF 441/110/01, which states, "The actual boundary
will not be shown on the first editions of the new maps if there is any objection
from either side in doing so." In another document29 Greenhill stated that
although the British could undertake not to show the boundary, or for that
matter the position of the existing boundary pillars, on the first edition of the
new maps, they "find it very hard to resist pressure from the Southern
Cameroons Government to stop omitting such essential information from maps
of the Southern Cameroons." In addition, he said "the Southern Cameroons
Government have asked for mapping of Southern Cameroons to be continued by
us after the transfer of power of some form of U.K. Technical Assistance."
70
Although it was latter on determined that the Obudu Cattle ranch lay on the
Nigerian side, it is not clear how this conclusion was arrived at.
Even though Greenhill observed that the foregoing dispute was due to
"lack of liaison between the various departments of the Nigerian Federal
Government concerned," one would not help but have the feeling that the
colonial masters were tolerant to Nigeria, and would let them do as they pleased.
Specifically, D. W. S. Hunt had written to the Colonial Office, asking Geofrey
Lamarque, (to whom he equally sent copies of the correspondence), to
…see that Southern Cameroons direct their attention elsewhere. If
this particular area is to be mapped let it be done from the Nigerian
side. Above all, before any boundary line is printed on the maps,
the Nigerian authorities must be fully consulted and given the
opportunity of working out their own ideas of where the line
should run.30
Hunt’s position was however downplayed by J. Chadwick, who on June 6,
1961, wrote the Commonwealth Office stating,
After all the Nigerians have given tacit approval to the existing
boundary between them and the Ambazonia by failing to protest at
the time of the Plebiscite, when the boundary must have been
defined as between those who voted and those who did not…But
obviously we do not wish to offend Nigerians. If they wish to
protest …it would be better if we were in no way involved in the
issue. If the matter does come to a head and resolve itself into a
possible boundary adjustment dispute, the protagonists after
October 1st would be the Nigerians and, presumably, the United
Federal Cameroon Republic. Must we make our selves a third party
by laying down the boundary at this stage?31
Still in another correspondence dated May 30, 1961, M. L. Woods blamed
the Nigerian government for making unduly heavy weather over the border
issue.32 Perhaps this may be true too of the Bakassi peninsula dispute today, for
as one can clearly observe if the Obudu Cattle ranch case was settled using the
Anglo-German treaty of 1913, why then can the present border dispute not be
resolved in like manner?
Akinjide R. expresses one such opinion that drums up the premise that the
1913 Anglo-German treaty is not binding on Nigeria. In an article published by
71
West Africa magazine, in April 1994, Akinjide enumerates many treaties that
were signed by the Chiefs and Kings of the Old and New Calabar area
demanding British protection (The Oil River Protectorate). Akinjide further
insinuates that because the Order-in-Council of November 22, 1913, which came
into force on January 1, 1914, bringing together the Protectorate of Northern
Nigeria and Southern Nigeria in to a single Protectorate of Nigeria, though still
separate from the colony of Lagos, and that because the Anglo-German treaty
was signed before this act, that the treaty is not binding on the new Nigeria.
Akinjide further states that the British government within months of it
denounced the treaty birth. Thus the treaty is not a treaty in force. Besides
believing that the treaty between Britain and Germany was not binding, Akinjide
continues to hold yet another wrong notion of the area.
For instance, he continues to make reference to the Rio del Rey as a river
(he does so seven times and once as a port), even though it was long proven that
it is not. All this is done to uphold the premise that the Bakassi peninsula, which
is in the area of the Rio del Rey belongs to Nigeria. Specifically, he says the
Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 is not a treaty in force because " since something
cannot emanate from nothing, the 1913 Treaty cannot therefore be the judicial
basis for a claim to the Bakassi Peninsula by Cameroon."33
What Akinjide fails to question is why all along, international agreements
thereafter continue to respect the said Treaty, why the Nigerian government and
the British government accepted maps of Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) that
showed Bakassi as its territory and not Nigeria's—even when the said territory
was jointly administered by Britain together with Nigeria, and specifically the
stipulations of the Franco-British Declarations of July 10, 1919, which also, for the
most part, honored the 1913 Treaty. Note should be taken of the fact that the
boundaries of Southern Cameroons, have since the days of the 1913 treaty,
remained the same—only to be contested by Nigeria when it is known that the
Southern Cameroons nation has become nothing but a mere colony in
Cameroun—the answer can not be far fetched.
The answer as to why Nigeria and Cameroun suddenly find themselves
fighting over Bakassi seems for the most part to hover over the identity crises
surrounding the State of Southern Cameroons. The position of the Southern
Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCRM) and the Ambazonian Republic
leaders has been made clear on numerous occasions, including their 1995 visit to
the UN in demanding adult membership of that World Body. Concerning
Bakassi, the position of the leaders has equally been clear—that from 1919-1958
when Southern Cameroons was jointly administered with Nigeria, maps
prepared by the Federal Ministry of Lands and Surveys in Lagos recognized the
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Bakassi peninsula as being part of Ambazonian territory. They also hold the
belief that for the short duration of the Federal structure that the Cameroons
adopted after the Plebiscite, the Federal Cameroon Republic had Bakassi as part
of it Federal Territory.34
In commenting on declassified documents from the Public Records Office
of the UK, N. N. Susungi notes that in trying to forge a unification process where
the Ambazonians would be integrated in to an independent Republic of
Cameroun, President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroun, committed fatal errors that
have placed the unification process in jeopardy. This has led to a situation where
both Cameroun and Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) would be better off if
legally separated by the UN. Notably, Ahidjo failed to prepare a draft
constitutional document to be signed between him and John Ngu Foncha during
and after the Foumban Conference, and so there is no document to show that the
unification process ever took place. Thus UN Resolution 1608 was never
implemented in constitutional terms since there was no constitution signed by
the leaders of the two states. Finally, internationally recognized territorial
boundaries are in doubt. Citing the Bakassi border dispute, Susungi demands to
know if under such circumstances the Cameroun government can lay claim to
sovereignty over Bakassi.35
IV
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF CLAIMS OF DISPUTING
PARTIES
Another explanation as to why Cameroun and Nigeria were gradually
drifting to war is that both governments are using the border dispute as a means
of diverting attention away from their poor human rights records. In both
countries, it is common to easily enumerate instances of gross human rights
violation, resulting from the dire desire of the masses for genuine democracy and
good neighborliness. This position is backed by the works of Albert Mukong
(1985), and as Executive Director of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG)
in Cameroun; Joseph Richards (1978) and Africa Confidential—all shade light on
the human records of both nations—Cameroun and Nigeria.
For almost four decades of independence, Cameroun can boast of having
only two presidents. Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroun ruled almost singlehandedly, for twenty-five years. During his terms of office detention for no
crimes other than that one made a negative political comment were very
common. Thus Ahidjo operated many maximum-security prisons in which
political detainees were kept. No other works have told his story better than
Joseph Richard's (1978) Gaulist Africa: Cameroun Under Ahmadou Ahidjo, and
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Albert Mukong's (1985) Prisoner Without A Crime. Both authors believe that as
many as 25000 people died as a result of the Union de Populations Camerounaise
(UPC) insurrection, another 5000 by tortures in the Brigade Mixte Mobile (BMM)
while an estimated 20000 shed their blood in passing through the detention
camps.36 But regardless of these crimes Ahidjo managed to stay in power for so
long, that Mungo Beti commented that "Ahidjo appears condemned to commit
fratricide…all Cameroonians of any talent are either in exile or prison; all
progressives, or even oppositional tendencies have been destroyed with
ferocity."37
It is however surprising that after Paul Biya took over power from
Ahidjo, things got worse—both in terms of fundamental human rights and the
national economy. If there was one thing that Cameroonians of all domains did
not complain about, it was the economy. Under Paul Biya the economy has
recorded its worst setbacks since independence, and workers have been reduced
to nothingness, having had their salaries cut by as much as 70%. But this is not
the case with the earnings of those in the armed forces. The salaries of
Gendarmes, and the Army have almost doubled since Biya became President due
to almost annual salary increments. Such behavior translates directly in to that of
the repressive nature of the polity in that government has clearly bought the
loyalty of the forces in its bid to rig elections and crush mass resistance just to
maintain power.
Thus the struggle to democratize Cameroun, especially since the "wind of
change" of the 1990s, has been a dismal failure. Democracy, at least of the type
once practiced in Ambazonia became a far-fetched dream. Hundreds of
casualties were recorded in trying to earn it. And as for human rights, thousands
are presently in jail for one political offense or the other, just because freedom of
speech was policy only on paper. A case in point concerns letters written from
one of Cameroun's maximum-security prison (BMM) in Yaounde, to the Director
of the Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG), Albert Mukong.
The political detainees were all from Ambazonia, and their crime--that
they participated in a signature referendum that demanded the total
independence of Ambazonia. In these letters, the detainees lamented about the
conditions under which they were being held and prayed that Albert Mukong,
who was very familiar with these conditions, should not give up efforts in trying
to free them. Some of the victims they noted had already lost their eyesight, and
some had contracted tuberculosis. They were not being given any medical
attention. The detainees begged Mukong to " Sir…use your high office to see
74
about our problems and if government does not want to judge us, let them
transfer us to our areas of jurisdiction."38
Our area of Jurisdiction?—Even these detainees know that they have been
abducted and are pending trial in an alien land, under laws that do not only
contradict those they grew up in, but are a serious violation of their fundamental
human rights. The Common Law practiced in Ambazonia is totally different
from the Napoleonic Codes that serve as the law in Cameroun.
Still in another letter signed by one of the leaders in detention, a list of 61
Anglophone political detainees from Ambazonia, held at the Kondengui Central
Prison, sincerely appreciated the efforts being made to liberate them. The leader
noted that they were being starved to death, and lamented about the plight of
their children who were now out of school. Specific reference was made of the
children of Ngek Simon from Oku, whose children were reported to be street
beggars. The leader of the group noted that these children have now become,
…Orphans in their own country without shelter. As you know,
Yaga Grace, the mother (of the children, I suppose), Ngek Simon
the father and the eldest son Ngek Adalbert are all here under
detention in Kondengui and Mfou prisons…though we are dying,
we believe that one or some will survive this persecution to relate
the history.39
It is important to note that a list of detainees drawn up on September 3,
1998, contained the names and place of birth, the date of death and place of
burial of seven detainees who were victims of the Cameroun government's
cruelty. The overall human rights situation in Cameroun at the time of
depositing the Application against Nigeria was so bad that in writing about it,
West Africa magazine40 (in commenting about the report of the United States
Department of State concerning its world wide survey of human rights for 1993)
captioned the story a "damning report." The report had criticized the Cameroun
government for "abusive practices that often target political dissidents and
community leaders opposed to President Paul Biya's regime." These abuses
included routine beatings, torture and illegal detention.
However, recent reports from Cameroun indicate that thirteen of the freed
detainees from the Kondegui and Mfou Central Prisons have disclosed that they
were subjected to all forms of inhumane treatment. According to Isaha'a Boh's
75
Cameroon bulletin,41 the detainees reported that they were forced to rape women
in front of the Gendarmes and equally carry out homosexuality—a thing, which
as they lamented they "have never known or thought of doing." Amnesty
International, USA, has contacted officials of the Cameroun Embassy in
Washington D.C. to get their response to these stories but the officials declined to
comment, but demanded instead whether Amnesty International believed them,
Isaha’a Boh reported. If this picture of Cameroun today is alarming, then one
should wonder what would be said of human rights abuses in Nigeria, where
both land mass and population are more than that of Cameroun.
The main trouble with Nigeria has been that of continuous and
overbearing military dictatorships. More than any other country on earth,
Nigeria seems to have recorded more military coups and counter coup attempts
in which thousands died. The effect on the national polity has been recourse to
other domains for a search for a cure to the power crises, which is poisonously
punctuated by religious differences and a dangerous North—South dichotomy.
For example, Christians see the Military Coups as dictated by religious
inclinations and dominance from Muslims, and yet, another Grande Nord
strategy. Thus, religious riots—even in University campuses across the nation
continue to plague the national consciousness, resulting to thousands of deaths
also. To the best of my recollection, only the Alhadji Shehu Shagari regime was
the only civilian President that lasted for a while, with the exception of the
regime that lead Nigeria to independence up till 1966, though he too was a
Muslim, not to talk of the fact that he was from the North. Also, all the Military
leaders, perhaps with the exception of Johnson Ayuiyi-Ironsi, have been
Muslims—Murtala Mohamed, Yakubu Gowon, Olusengun Obassanjo,
Mohammed Buhari, Ibrahim B. Babangida, and Sani Abacha. With the exception
of the Shehu Shagari regime, all the military regimes recorded gross human
rights abuses.
It is easy to recall also the death of Dele Giwa, a newspaper editor who
wrote elaborately on peace between Nigeria and Cameroun. Dele was killed by a
letter bomb on 21 October 1986, and his death was seen and reported as a
political killing. We would recall also the persecution of former Governor of
Kaduna State, Balarabe Musa and his aid, Professor Balla Usman of the
Department History of Ahmadou Bello University (ABU), Zaria, in the early
eighties, and of recent, the death of Mushood Abiola in detention for their
struggles to democratize Nigeria. It would equally not be of service to the cause
of the people who struggle that Nigeria should be law-abiding, if one should
forget the torturous years that the Lagos-based Lawyer Gani Fawehinmi went
through, especially those many months he spent in the Maiduguri jail, Bornu
State, for threatening to put President Babangida and his wife, Marriam
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Babangida on the stand for corruption, drug trafficking and human rights
abuses.
So too would it equally be a disservice to all Africans if one were to forget
the expulsion of Sociology Professor, Patrick Wilmot, of ABU, Zaria, in 1988, and
the charges trumped-up on him for being a US-Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) spy. Wilmot was deeply concerned about the political future of Nigeria
and predicted too often, many things about Nigeria that came true. For instance,
Wilmot was critical of the Babangida regime and the promises he made for
returning Nigeria to civil rule. Wilmot had dismissed these promises as quibbles,
stating that Babangida had no real intention of returning Nigeria to Civil Rule.
He stated, and his bet was that Babangida was making plans for another military
leader to take over power from him.
For his political maneuvers and deceitfulness, Babangida was known all
over Nigeria and beyond by the phrase: “I.B.B. na Maradonna!”—That Ibrahim B.
Babangida (IBB) is Deigo Maradona! He, like Biya in Cameroun never kept to a
single promise, and dribbled the masses just as Maradona does when he goes
through the soccer field, meandering with no real challenger to stop him, or as if
there are no players on it.
Even though the long run has proven Babangida wrong, in his times,
Patrick Wilmot earned a 48-hour marching order (to leave Nigeria) for, as
Americans would say, "running his mouth." Today we know that Wilmot's
prediction all came to pass, and that the ex-president owes him an apology, as he
does to all Nigerians.42 Perhaps the most stinking record of human rights abuses
was the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others, in November 1995, for
protesting the misuse of the revenues and natural resources from the Delta
region of Nigeria—their area of origin, and the resultant degradation caused to
the environment of that area. Amnesty International Annual Report on Nigeria
for 1998, indicated that at least 20 other Ogoni people are still in detention, and
without trial on identical murder charges. These human rights abuses do not
ignore the many thousands who have been detained for participating in prodemocracy demonstrations, or those who lost their lives in the process. The
brutal killing of the wife of Abiola with machine gun fire, in broad day light on
the streets of Lagos a year ago is a case in point.
These glimpses are intended to show that the leaders of both Cameroun
and Nigeria were, prior to the deposition of the case over the Bakassi peninsular
with the ICJ, facing serious internal frictions and thus a dispute with a
neighboring state that could likely result to war, served them well in diverting
the attention of their masses to this external crisis. As Africa Confidential noted:
77
The trial of strength is dangerous, not just because Biya and Abacha
believe Bakassi worth fighting for but because both see the dispute
as a way to shore up falling domestic support. Their grip on power
is threatened by a rise in ethnic nationalism, economic collapse and
restive soldiers; while a full-fledged border war would be
damaging, even catastrophic, because of the instability it could
spark, this prospect may not prevent them from blundering into
battle. Given the diplomatic failures that have marked the dispute,
the most probable brake on further escalation appears to be the
sense of failure of the Cameroonian and Nigerian governments to
convince the majority of their people that the peninsula is worth
fighting for.43
Africa Confidential went further to indicate that almost as important as the
Bakassi dispute, are the disputes within the two countries in that both nations
face serious challenges to their integrity as nation states. Specifically, the paper
notes:
Several Nigerian ethnic groups are demanding a break-up of the
Federation while Cameroon's substantially Anglophone minority in
the south argues as part of its agenda for self-determination that
Bakassi's future has to be negotiated from Bamenda (Buea, it meant)
(the capital of Ambazonia) and not from Yaounde (the capital of
Cameroun).44
The article then elaborated on the role being played by the French, accusing them
for wrong footing, by its policy of backing Biya, Cameroun's president.
The most recent case of ethnic showdown in Nigeria was reported by the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) at 6.00 a.m. Monday July 19, 1999. The
news reported a clash between the Yoruba and the Haussa in the town of
Shigamo, about 50km from Lagos in which ten people were killed. The fighting,
BBC reported occurred because during a Yoruba festival that requires people to
stay off the streets, a Haussa woman did not respect the order and was killed.
This then sparked a fight between the Yoruba and the Haussa. On November 18
1999, at precisely 6:20 am ET (USA), BBC reported yet another ethnic clash—this
time in the Esuku ethnic group. The tribes were fighting over pipelines leftover
by petroleum industries. These pipelines are useful to the natives for the
channeling of water. According to the BBC report, 40 civilians and 4 police
officers were killed in the clashes. The report was suggestive of the fact that the
Esuku ethnic group is one of the poorest in Nigeria in terms of development, but
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is in the richest region, with oil. The clashes, BBC noted has once again put
government policy on the line. Thus clash of traditions is not restricted to the
Yoruba and Hausas of Nigeria; it threatens every region of both Nigeria and the
Cameroons. Worst still is the feud between the Anglophone and the
Francophone, which is at the nerve center of Cameroun government malpractice
of human rights abuses predominantly aimed at the Anglophones
(Ambazonians), election rigging and her contradictory, if not hypocritical
posturing claim of sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula.
Another alternative explanation of the Bakassi peninsula dispute comes
from N. N. Susungi in his article titled "Cameroon-Nigeria: The Bakassi Peninsula
Conflict," (most notably part II of it titled "Foncha, Muna and the Foumban
Conference of 1961 about Southern Cameroons--Foncha and Muna did not betray
Southern Cameroons,"). Susungi laments about the fan fare that surrounded the
handing over of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997. In comparing the situation
to the hand over of Southern Cameroons to Cameroun, he charge that Southern
Cameroons leaders then did not have the constitutional mandate to negotiate.
He notes, "even though Hong Kong is full of some of the brightest
Chinese…Britain could not have allowed Hong Kong itself to conduct such
negotiations on its own behalf with the Beijing authorities. But that is exactly
what Britain did in the Southern Cameroons in July 1961.45
Quite to the contrary, the declassified file of London show that London
had negotiated secret deals with Yaounde, such that Commissioner J. O. Field
stayed in Buea on July 1961 instead of being in Foumban where the so-called
negotiations were supposed to be taking place. On this count it is clear that
Britain betrayed Southern Cameroons, by secretly agreeing with Ahidjo that the
British would create a vacuum of the territory, which President Ahidjo would
then fill with his own troops. This explains why to many people who grew up in
Southern Cameroons; life has always been as if they live in a perpetual state of
emergency—one that continues to push them into seeking political asylum in
foreign countries. The soldiers ever since Ahidjo illegally acquired sovereignty
over Southern Cameroons had never ceased to be on a state of alert. Britain did
not only betray Southern Cameroons but by its actions also abused the mandate
entrusted on her by the international community.
Perhaps the most pressing evidence from the Cameroun side for the
argument that the government would prefer an external conflict to the internal
one (so as to divert the attention of the masses from its ills) comes from the Beti
and Bulu tribes that were seen as benefiting most from Biya being in office. The
Biya regime seems to have suffered some opposition from his own tribesmen,
notable from former Governor and Minister Ayissi Mvodo and the former
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Secretary General at the Presidency Titus Edzoa. Mvodo had switched camp
from the Government ruling Cameroun Peoples Democratic Movement and was
being rumored to join hands with the Anglophone—led Social Democratic Front
(SDF) of John Fru Ndi, to be the National Opposition candidate. Besides Mvodo,
Titus Edzoa, the Secretary General at the presidency, was about to announce to
the public some of Mr. Biya's terrible deeds so as to oust him from power. Biya
countered with a few surprising and dazzling moves and like most other
political opponents, Mvodo died in mysterious circumstances just a few days
after his announcement that he was going to join the Cameroun opposition.
Titus Edzoa got a more humiliating treatment. He was bundled to the
deplorable Kondengui prison on charges that he embezzled from roads-work
projects. The truth of the matter is that if there were any two people in Cameroun
that could bring down Biya with just a few words, it was Mvodo and Edzoa. As
The Herald46 noted, Beti were mobilizing to fight Biya following discontent over
the death of Ayissi Mvodo and the arrests of Edzoa and others such as Remy Ze
Meka, the former Secretary General at the Prime Minister's Office.
This clampdown on former Secretary-Generals speaks for itself and in
support of the fact that Biya is more concerned with staying in power than caring
for Cameroun's national interests. Besides, why would top government officials
including the President bring charges of corruption and embezzlement on people
only when they threaten to reveal these same practices? What has Mr. Biya done
to the former Minister of Finance Etienne Ntsama, who in the late eighties stole
sums of money close to half of Cameroun's national budget and stored it in his
ceiling? The truth is that as long as one does wrong to the nation and does not
threaten to act against the President, such people, like Ntsama, would always
remain in high offices and never to be investigated or sacked.
The extension of the Killing arm of Government opponents used to be a
typically Anglophone tragedy, but because Francophones were showing signs
that the Anglophone led opposition concerning the way government is run in
Cameroun was being bought by many a majority of Francophones, bad
leadership has become a national emergency and the killing of political
opponents, a national tragedy. But the glaring truth is that Cameroun has been a
state on emergency ever since that UN-led mistake of fusing a democratic
Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons) with a Cameroun, which at that time was at
war with itself. Though some critics of such a theory could argue that the filing
of the case against Nigeria was done in 1994, we should recall that by 1994
Cameroun had witnessed strong and very organized opposition from the
political parties that were born between 1990-1993. A leader caught in such
80
power frenzy, will surely and most likely resort to external war with a neighbor
to divert national attention.
The relevance of these findings to the Bakassi border dispute is clear in
that not only does Nigeria charge Cameroon soldiers for being the perpetrators
of acts of aggression, but also, Ambazonian leaders at home and abroad hold this
same belief. Yaounde would definitely go to war with Nigeria not because it
cares about the territory and the people (Ambazonians) who truly own the land,
but because of resources they would acquire from there. Ever since the faked
unification, the concern of the Yaounde governments has been centered only on
extracting the riches of Ambazonia, free of charge, and does nothing in return to
the citizens of this ill-fated territory. This position can be verified by simply
examining the revenue of the Cameroun petroleum industry and the fact that
government does not account for it ever since 1977 when production started,
because the resources are from a territory that it knows it illegally acquired. The
Cameroun government cannot be proud enough to say how much of these
petroleum funds have been invested or used to improve living conditions in
Ambazonia. To the best of my knowledge, not a dime has been used in the
territory of Ambazonia.
Coupled with these gross violations of international law at the time of the
plebiscite, is the fact that since then, Ambazonia has been isolated in terms of
communication. Besides poor infrastructure the territory is almost impossible to
reach by telephone--all other (French-speaking) provinces of Cameroun are
accessible since most of them have been equipped with modern digital systems.
Thus the Bakassi peninsula dispute in this regard—the alternative explanation,
could be seen as a dispute over the wider territory of Ambazonia and not just the
islands of the Bakassi peninsula.
CONCLUSION
These alternative explanations of the claims of disputants over Bakassi are
in themselves, evidence that should be used by the Judges of the ICJ to determine
who truly should exercise sovereignty over the peninsula. While the restatement
of the problem shows some aspects of the chronological development of the
dispute to its present level, the actual drawing of the border and contemporary
claims in historical context all help us to understand the importance of one
instrument—the Anglo-German Treaty of March 11, 1913. Any suggestion that
because Britain and France hatched a plan to take over German Kamerun, which
of course, is one of the least, mentioned causes of World War I meant the Treaty
ceased to be enforceable is not reasonable.
We have shown that subsequent treatment of the Kamerun territory on
the Nigerian side continued to respect that agreement, besides, the bitter truth
that the only boundary instrument, such as pillars along that close-to-2000km
long border are those planted into the ground by the Germans. The 1913 Treaty
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is a legally binding document constitutionally and by the weight of its evidence
on the ground—the boundary pillars—are a very reliable, and perhaps the only
reliable premise from which to make judgment as to who owns Bakassi. A close
look at the cases of the disputing parties will give more credence to this Treaty
and the role it will play in determining who should have sovereignty of the
Bakassi peninsula.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATION OF CASE STUDY
DISPUTES AND THE LAW
The Semai are not great warriors. As long as they have been known to the
outside world, they have consistently fled rather than fight… they have
never participated in war or raid until the Communist insurgency of the
early 1950s, when the British raised troops among the Semai… Initially,
most of the troops were probably lured by wages, pretty clothes, shortguns
and so forth. Many did not realize that soldiers kill people. When I
suggested to one Semai recruit that killing was a soldier’s job, he laughed
at my ignorance and explained, “No, we don’t kill people, brother, we just
tend weeds and cut grass.”
--Robert Knox Dentan, The Semai: A Nonviolent People of
Malaysia.
Perhaps the first point that strikes us when we reflect upon our notion of
Justice is its connexion with law. There is no doubt that just conduct is to
a great extent determined by law, and in certain applications the two
terms seem interchangeable. Thus we speak indifferently of ‘Law Courts’
and ‘Court of Justice,’ and when a private citizen demands Justice, or his
just rights, he commonly means to demand that law should be carried into
effect. Still, reflection shows that we do not mean by Justice merely
conformity to law…the only sense in which Justice requires a law to be
equal is that its execution must affect equally all the individuals belonging
to any of the classes specified in the law. And no doubt, this rule excludes
a very real kind of injustice: it is of the highest importance that judges and
administrators should never be persuaded by money or otherwise to show
‘respect of persons.’
--Henry Sidgwick in Justice and Social Policy (1961, p. 4-5).
Morality demands that those who have schooled enough to defend and
distinguish truth from falsehood should take it as a challenge to do the right by
the Law of a Nation or the Law of Nations. In doing so they will be in the service
of all humanity, and not just in their interest or that of their nation of origin.
Some who have schooled for a very long length of time and accumulated a
wealth of knowledge would definitely be doing a disservice to humanity if they
should suddenly renege their talents to falsehood just because they want to serve
or protect them self or their nation’s national interest. Many a Nigerian Scholars
and lawyers, for example, have displayed that talent and servitude to humanity
especially in the wake of the dispute between Cameroun and Nigeria over the oil
rich Bakassi peninsula. Thus, the “Philosopher King,” if he were here today to
reign, would definitely not be dissatisfied with the world in which he is charged
with power, for there exist people who stand up in defense of Truths and repose
83
against deceit and fraud. Many Philosophers have laid the premise of reason
where intellectuals and Professionals charged with say, resolution of disputes
ought to based their thinking, so much that, in the words of John Morley, “they
who temper with veracity, from whatever motive, are tempering with the vital
force of human progress… We have to fight and do life-long battle against the
forces of darkness, and anything that turns the edge of reason fatally blunts the
surest and most potent of our weapons.”1
The fight against deceit and fraud is one that demands of its soldiers, that
they consult experts and in so doing, think as freely as possible to avoid
impartiality, or any judgment that would or could subsequently become the
subject of ridicule and challenge. Thus morality demands that the intellectual, in
his pursuit of right from wrong and truth from falsehood, should be diligent in
his or her investigative search for the truth, avoiding to be disingenuous as to
insist on consistency and continuity in preserving their findings for posterity.
Such would avoid mistakes made by some in historic times who in attempting to
be poetic decided to shred truth from Scriptures. Mathew Arnold did just that
when he sought to,
Disentangle the moral from the theological content of the Bible, had
virtually sacrificed his integrity of mind; for it was playing fastand-loose with language in the most ridiculous manner, to regard
the long series of passionate appeals to God by his faithfulness and
his mercy and his truth as mere efforts of poetry, while all the
words describing the moral conceptions of man were interpreted
with scientific strictness.2
Like the reformers before and during the times of Martin Luther,3 those charged
with resolving human conflict, especially between nations, out to be guided by
devotedness to truth and nothing else, saving the temptations of being bought by
many an interested party with money for the devil and the evil with which he is
served. In this regard, and in order to understand how some Nigerian
intellectuals defended truth as far as the Bakassi dispute is concerned, it is
important that we take a look at what ‘Truth,’ a derivative of ‘Good’ means in
philosophical terms.
I.
PHILOSOPHERS ON THE MORALITY OF THE GOOD AND THE JUST
In speaking about Truth, Morality, the Good or the Just, many
philosophers come to mind, from Socrates through Plato to Aristotle, Hume,
Kant, John Locke and more. In Nichomachean Ehics, translated by Martin Ostwald,
Aristotle, like Plato before him is noted for teaching that man possesses logos, the
power of speech and reasoning—that man alone, of all animals possesses reason,
which gives him the capacity of organizing his various activities by means of
thought in a way no other animal can.4 In addition, since this power makes man
to be different from other animals, “it constitutes the essential element in his
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definition, and only insofar as man acts rationally can he be said to act as a
rational being at all.”5 Thus Aristotle, just as Plato taught, “acting as human is
tantamount to acting like a rational human being, and acting like a rational
human being is the same thing as acting like a good human being.”6
Furthermore, in upholding Theoretical Sciences above Productive and
Practical sciences, Aristotle notes that this is because Theoretical Sciences are
charged with protecting the highest level of knowledge: “intellectual
wisdom,”7—with “politics as the master science of the good…. this good, one
should think, belongs to the most sovereign and most comprehensive master
science, and politics clearly fits this description.”8 Politics is so encompassing,
broad and elaborate in it coverage that with her involvements and control of
human relations—especially as man relates to one another, to the State, State to
States and vice versa, life, human life would hardly be as meaningful as it has
been and will continue to be. Politics uses every other science and art, legislating
what people can do, ought to do and what they should not do. Therefore, any
interpretation of phenomena, which relates to disputes concerning man or
between man and State or between states, ought to be for the good of man in
ensuring that the outcome resulting from such interpretations does not inflame,
as it is suppose to heal the dispute and last for as long as it takes to keep the
peace and the love of one another, nation or the individual. The end of such
interpretations as is the end of politics should be for the good of man. Thus notes
Aristotle,
The good is the same for the individual and for the state, the good
of the State is clearly the greater and more perfect thing to attain
and to safeguard. The attainment of the good for one man alone is,
to be sure, a source of satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and
states is nobler and more divine. In short, these are the aims of
social and political matters.9
This line of thought is supported by many popular philosophers including
Hume,10 with the phrase that “we ought to obey God rather than man,” as
contradicted by “further allows us, in special emergencies, to violate rules
generally good, for ‘necessity has no law,” analogy. Once again, choice becomes
important here: would man chose to obey the laws at all times or violate them at
certain times while making excuses when some other party is (or parties are)
hurting? Law observance,11 Intuitive Morality,12 and Common Sense, which is
forced into practical utilitarian conceptualization of law, and Justice,13 merged
with the exigencies and derivatives from Kantian Categorical Imperatives,14
upholding the following:
An end, we must say, stands in much the same relation to the
morality of principles as do the “facts” in relation to the truth of
propositions, and we can no more decide what principles are and
85
are not moral, by means of consistency alone, without reference to
ends, than we can settle what propositions are true, by means of
consistency alone, without reference to “facts.”15
Where we are called upon when faced with disputes between nations, we
ought to weigh these facts and the consequences of violations of the rule of law,
knowing that at some point in the historic future, the weaker nation might just as
well have the opportunity to retaliate. Hence, we ought to take into
consideration, also, reciprocity in making sound and lasting judgments. Nothing
serves the intellectual more than standing by the fact that,
No principle is fit to be a moral principle unless it is fit that it
should be universally adopted and universally applied, though a
principle may be unfit for universal adoption, even where universal
adoption is logically possible. Our attitude to a principle cannot be
a distinctively moral one unless we are prepared to accept, and
sometimes to recommend, its universal application.16
To achieve good judgment by itself is not an easy task. Most often,
training takes almost a life-time and such people who get involve in such matters
as pertaining to the well-being of a nation’s politics and laws within it and as
relating to other nations: hunger for virtue all their lives, as prescribed and
guided by intelligence and right order, is their main stay. Only then would their
word be taken seriously and unchallenged when uttered in matters of law as in
matters of state. We are concerned more with the outcome of the decisions by
such judging minds, especially in disputes between nations, as we are afraid of
the consequences of such judgment when they are biased to the point of
displaying glaring arrogance or evidence of foul play. Practical wisdom and
intelligence should guide participants and even observers of such persons in
given disputes or conflicts, that when such evidence is pointed out, those who
bring them forth should not be targets of destruction, oppression or elimination,
out-rightly. The law should always protect what is right, for the good of all
peoples.
The reason for demanding that justice, the law and good should always be
protected as are those who point out serious discrepancies in their application
has to do with the fact that leaders of nations feel badly wounded when matters
between nations result in some national lose. Governments being what they are
in covert matters as in those held in town halls hardly hide her desire to have
control of the situation. Most often force could be used on some individuals or
some groups deemed to have had influence that resulted in the national loss.
Thus if we frown at violence against other nations, we ought to do same with
violence perpetuated by government on the governed, especially when the
governed express opinions that are contrary to what government official position
is. Seyom Brown (1987) notes,
86
Countries in the modern nation-state system are especially
susceptible to internal political violence, given the popularity of the
nationalist principle that there should be an identity between
nation and state… and—in its more democratic variants—that the
government of a nation-state should function according to the
consent of the governed. Many nation-states are bloodied in crises
over the legitimacy of the government—over whether the state
does broadly represent the nation or nations in its jurisdiction—
over appropriate means of obtaining the consent of the governed,
and over what in fact the governed have consented to.17
It becomes an imperative, therefore, that those charged with protecting
law and order, justice and the general good for all humans ought to take into
consideration the relationship between a people and their government, as they
do the relationship between nations when matters of conflict arise. Thus when it
comes to international conflict especially, the relationship between the
belligerents and other nations that serve as their allies, due for the most part to
historic links ought to be scrutinized by learned minds when attempting to serve
the law.
In terms of the Bakassi Peninsula Border dispute between Cameroun and
Nigeria, failure to understand the relationship between the Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) and Cameroun Republic would definitely put to question
the decisions of the Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when the
case if decided. The quest for unity, democracy, and accountability in
government has marred the relationship between the two former United Nations
Trust Territories so much that Ambazonia now demands that Cameroun should
respect the international boundary between them. While some Ambazonians
have fought hard via political parties to pressure government to change her
dictatorial habits, others have concentrated on restoring the Statehood of
Ambazonia as a distinct nation from Cameroun. Thus domestic violence between
what would have been the Cameroun Federation would put to question
whatever decision the Judges come up with, and while Cameroun would view
such a decision as victory for her, Ambazonians would simply see the ruling as
restoring their boundary with Nigeria and could even go the extra mile of
starting a war of liberation against Cameroun to force the Francophone nation to
respect their common boundary.
Camerun has for the past forty-one years maintained her presence in the
Ambazonia by coercion. It has denied her autocratic and dictatorial nature,
claiming and feigning democracy which it terms advanced, while at the same
time using brutal force to crush any attempts at resurrecting the status of the
Ambazonia to that of nation-state that it once was. Cameroun has equally
charged Nigeria on numerous counts for attempting to subvert her internal
stability, politically as well as economically by aiding such insurgence and
87
smuggling of goods from Nigeria into Ambazonia to hurt Cameroun. Notes
Seyom,
Understanding the patterns of political violence inside countries is
pertinent to the study of the causes and prevention of war between
countries for two reasons: First, as mentioned, domestic violence
can precipitate military intervention across national boundaries…
Second, the analyses of violence within countries can provide
insight into the relationship between the way a society is organized
and the prevalence of the use of force within it, as well as into the
relative efficacy of deterrence or accommodation in dealing with
threats to peace.18
Understanding the works of philosophers on human thought and actions
that have national and international concerns such as law and order, and the
relationship between nations is critical in understanding how Cameroun and
Ambazonia are related on the one hand, and how Cameroun and Nigerian
claims and the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would be
understood and interpreted as far as the double disputes over Bakassi and the
sovereignty of Ambazonia are concerned, on the other hand. Nothing gives
clarity to the nature of the dispute and speculates on its future better than what
Nigerian authors and legal minds committed to altruism have put out.
II
FRANK LITERATURE FROM NIGERIAN INTELLECTUALS
When it became obvious that the Bakassi case was to become more
militarized than the border incursions and flash attacks from both Nigeria and
Cameroun had already indicated over the past decade, Cameroun hurried to sue
Nigeria at the International Court. Word quickly reached the Ambazonian leader
in exile about this twist or turn of events. Ambazonia quickly saw the trap
Cameroun was attempting to set—for if Ambazonia fails to raise the stakes in
questioning the Cameroun claims, such would be used against them should the
Court rule in favor of Cameroun in the future when Ambazonia attempts to
regain her territory from Cameroun exploits. Ambazonia Restoration Council
quickly responded with an Interpleader Summon to the ICJ and secured
exchanges with the Registrar to that effect, to the very least.
(A) “AMBAZONIA REPUBLIC CLAIMS BAKASSI”
The news of the Interpleader Summons broke out in Nigeria and the
Guardian daily newspaper published it in their front-page headlines on June 19,
1994: “Ambazonia Republic Claims Bakassi.” In the front-page article, the staff
reporter, Amanze Obi shed light on attempts by Cameroun and Nigeria to
resolve the dispute peacefully, and did not hesitate to point out that any such
resolutions would not be successful without the Ambazonian question coming
into play. He observed,
88
Last week’s attempt by the heads of state of Nigeria and Cameroun
at the 30th Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in
Tunis to see an early resolution to the dispute between the two
countries over the Bakassi Peninsula may have suffered a setback
after all. This is because the Republic of Ambazonia, a nascent
entity which is claiming independence from the Republic of
Cameroun, has intervened in the Bakassi dispute.19
The Guardian then went on to show relevance of the Ambazonia
intervention by examining the history of the territory (from Mandated Territory
to UN Trust Territory and as part of the British possession jointly governed with
British colony of Nigeria) and the people’s relationship with Cameroun. It
informed the readers of the fact that Ambazonia had sued Cameroun in
Cameroun’s High Court in 1992—a judicial act (HCB/28/92) accorded
recognition of the state of Southern Cameroons as the Republic of Ambazonia,
the paper went on to indicate that Cameroun’s Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria when
contacted, refused to comment of the nature and details of the Ambazonian case
against Cameroun. It then concluded that “the United Nations Secretary General
who received Ambazonia’s formal declaration accepting the Jurisdiction of the
ICJ has been notified to ensure compliance as soon as Nigeria and Cameroun
have been served with the order to show cause.” 20
(B) “NO WIN WITHOUT AMBAZONIA”
A Nigerian professional international lawyer also analyzed the
Interpleader Summons in West Africa magazine. In an article titled “No Win
Without Ambazonia,”21 Chinedu Munir Nwoko,22 did not mince words when he
summarily stated,
International Law acknowledges Ambazonia as a state with
internationally recognized boundaries (fixed by the League of
Nations, inherited by the United Nations and which remains so
today). Cameroon23 has been forced to drop the politics of claiming
that Ambazonia is part of a single Cameroonian nation. In its
litigation it, in effect, claims that it is suing Nigeria in exercise of a
mandate given to it by the Ambazonian people. According to
Cameroon’s statement of claim, the Ambazonian people gave
Cameroon that mandate through the United Nations plebiscite of
February 1961.24
Nwoko then went on to show how the state of Ambazonia developed and
matured with secured international boundaries. In demanding whether “the UN
had the legal authority to conduct the said plebiscite in Ambazonia after the
Trusteeship had technically been terminated with the promulgation of the
territory’s independent constitution in October 1960?” Nwoko further questioned
what the objective of the plebiscite was and whether the UN ever implemented
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the Ambazonia plebiscite. Noting that the plebiscite manifesto or The Two
Alternatives, as it is popularly called, states that if the people opted for joining
Cameroon, then there would be a post-plebiscite UN Conference to work out a
draft constitution which Ambazonia and Cameroon would then submit to their
populations for approval, he concluded that the UN did not fulfill this promise.
Notes Nwoko, “the UN soon realized that the plebiscite in Ambazonia was
without legal authority and the mandate it purported to give the UN was
invalid. So the UN dropped the proposed confederacy and scrapped the
commission of experts, which it had appointed for that purpose. So to this day
no such conference has been convened.”25 According to Nwoko, Cameroon’s
claims collapsed even before Nigeria could issue a counter memorial. The
remainder of the article is analyzed substantively in chapter seven of this work.
For now, what is important is that as far as the current dispute is
concerned and as far as one can make a forecast with surgical precision about the
future of conflicts in the region of the Gulf of Guinea, resolution of the dispute
over Bakassi does not preclude the sovereign questions over the Republic of
Ambazonia. Thus any resolution that is based solely on the claims of Nigeria and
Cameroun would bound to be seen as an incomplete job, for there is every
indication that there is a potential for a protracted conflict between Cameroun
and Ambazonia, with or without the Bakassi ruling.
(C) “BAKASSI, A RUSE?”
March 1994 must have been the ides of March for Nigerian newspapers.
The literature that came out of that nation was enough to lead the government to
immediately halt any attempts at pressing for war or making preparations to
contest Cameroun charges, however flawed they may be, in the ICJ at the Hague.
Not surprising, therefore, still, on March 21, 1994, The New, another Nigerian
newspaper came up with this article titled “Bakassi, A Ruse?” Webster Noah
defines a ruse as “to dodge, get out of the way, an artifice, tricks, stratagem,
wile.”26 This definition is made more explicit by the many expressions attached
to the word rush, as in ruse—meaning “late roundabout course.”27 By
implication, the Nigerian authorities who were either pushing for war over
Bakassi or for Nigerian to take the case in the ICJ seriously were virtually
wasting their nation’s time and resources.
Nothing could be more explicit than the summary to the article in The
News, which Doifie Ola unequivocally stated, “For the first time since the
turbulent history of the Cameroun-Nigeria border dispute, the Nigerian
government appears to be reversing the policy of neglect in the Bakassi
Peninsula. But who really owns the controversial oil-bearing zone? Some
embarrassing truths.”28 Overall, the article was out to paint a picture that,
Nigeria, besides having neglected the predominantly Nigerian population on the
Bakassi Peninsula, many instances exist during which the Nigerian government
acknowledged to the Cameroun government that Bakassi was Camerounian
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territory. The article was centered on the letter written in 1972 by then Nigerian
Attorney General, Professor Taslim Olawale Elias to the External Affairs
Commissioner, Dr. Okoi Arikpo. An unambiguous letter according to The News,
which “embodied legally, Nigeria’s decision to cancel its contested claims over
Bakassi, a peninsula in the South Eastern flanks on Nigeria.’ ‘Every effort,’ Elias
said in the letter, ‘should be exerted on our side to ensure that Nigeria does not
show ingratitude to a sister country that stood by us during the civil war.’”29
Besides revealing stages which made Nigerian claims to be baseless, such as
tracing instances during which Nigeria should have contested the peninsula,
including instances when Bakassi was include as part of then Southern
Cameroons (Ambazonia) even when the UN Trust Territory was jointly
administered with Nigeria, the plebiscite of 1961 when Bakassians voted as
Southern Cameroonians, and numerous diplomatic exchange of visits that maps
examined confirmed Bakassi as Camerounian territory, The News also revealed,
overall, that “Nigeria is paying for the shortsightedness and inaction of its
successive leaders.”30
Furthermore, The News noted, that Nigerian arguments are worsened
when we examine statements by public officials on how Nigeria got permission
from Cameroun to utilize the peninsula to monitor the importation of arms by
the Biafran Rebels. Notably, Professor Augustin Kontchou Kohmegni,
Cameroun’s Minister of State in Charge of Communications, in addressing
Journalists on March 5, 1994, acknowledged that General Gowon pleaded for and
was granted permission to use Bakassi during the Biafran war. Noted the
Minister, “You don’t ask for authorization if the territory is yours… even if
Nigerians were a majority in the disputed Bakassi Peninsula, there was little
doubt that the territory is Cameroun’s.”31
In addition, in answering its own question why Nigerians have been
languid on Bakassi, the article charge: “Does it suggest that some people
occupying powerful positions of wealth and authority are benefiting concretely
and substantially from this embarrassing posture? Perhaps so,” it concluded
strongly. In comparing an contrasting what it called “Cameroun’s current
posturing” could be linked to a coup d’etat, stating,
Before the Cameroun government embarked on their recent move
to assert its sovereignty over the disputed territory, the diplomatic
community in Caameroun was briefed thrice; first by Paul Biya
himself and then by novelist Ferdinand Leopold Oyono,
Cameroun’s External Affairs Minister and then by the Defense
Minister. The source further revealed that the intervention of
France, apart from the so-called defence pact was premeditated. Till
date, Nigeria has not found it worthy to brief anyone. The fact that
a military government is in power has not helped the good will
Nigeria could have gathered from the international community.32
91
Nothing makes the position held by the newspaper article to be most worthy of
the praise and admiration of many inquirers of the rule of law and international
conflict and how best to resolve than the very letter that provoked it, in the first
instance.
(D) “THE PENINSULA BELONGS TO CAMEROUN”
As already noted, this was a letter written by then Attorney General of
Nigeria Professor Teslim Olawale Elias to the Nigerian Ministry of External
Affairs. In the letter, the Attorney General not only traced treaties which
indicated that Bakassi was not Nigerian, but also cautioned that “Nigeria is
bound to honour a number of pre-independence treaties and other international
agreements inherited from Britain by virtue of the Exchange of notes of October
1, 1960, between us and the United Kingdom on treaty obligations.”33
Furthermore, in calling and imploring Nigeria to show respect for the principle
of good faith in international relations, the Attorney General warned,
According to the information received from the Federal Directorate
of Surveys, the Bakassi Peninsula has never been included as part
of Nigeria in the administrative maps of Nigeria since the then
Southern Camerouns34 ceased to be part of Nigeria in 1961. Also,
the Northern Region, Western Region and Eastern Region
(Definition of Boundaries) Proclamation 1954 (L.N. 126 of 1954)
showed the Bakassi Peninsula as forming part of the then Southern
Camerouns. Moreover, by a Diplomatic note No. 570 of 27, 1962,
from your Ministry to the Embassy of the Camerouns in Lagos, to
which was attached a map prepared by the Federal Surveys,
Nigeria, recognized the Bakassi Peninsula as forming part of
Cameroun.35
What these literature from Nigerians does indicate is that there is the dire
need for law to be respected but that many people confuse politics as if it were
distinct from the law-abiding process itself. The call by the Attorney General
above is suggestive also of the fact that observance of pre-independence treaties
is not only an obligation for Nigeria but is applicable also to Cameroun. In other
words, we see here the significance of the role of the Ambazonia Interpleader
summons at the ICJ in putting a lasting end to this dispute and the other over her
sovereignty. It would be important to keep this observation in mind when we
draw conclusions on this work as to how well this factor was taken into
consideration or ignored by the Judges of the International Court of Justice, and
the wider ramifications that emanate from their final Judgment on the Bakassi
peninsula dispute. For if they fail to take into consideration how Cameroun has
equally shown respect or disrespect for pre and post independence treaties and
agreements, the final judgment of the ICJ must therefore be seen as biased and
92
having failed to resolve the dispute diligently, as it seems more to have inflamed
the situation between the belligerents.
III ASSESSMENT OF FRANK LITERATURE GIVEN POLITICAL AND
POLY-LEGAL REALITIES OF DISPUTANTS
The political and legal (Poly-legal) realities of disputants we are referring
in this case are four; we start with the least mentioned to the most conspicuous:
Ambazonia, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Cameroun. This arrangement is
important in that, as we made mention in the preface to this work, this is a
situation where by resolution of a dispute at some high level by ignoring some
low level dispute of factor could back-fire and reverse and worsen the entire
resolution process—making fools of many a knowledgeable participants—from
National representatives to Court Judges. Call it a situation of conflict resolution
reversal. In this case, the ignored factor or factors suddenly become the most
important. These are factors that were neglected in the initial resolution process.
This statement is strong and holds ground especially in the situations or case
under scrutiny in this work.
(A) AMBAZONIA
The political situation in Ambazonia is currently one full of confusion, but
one thing is clear: the line between politics and what is legally the rights of
Ambazonians is what the future would depend on, not the politics played in
favor of Cameroun by some elites of the region for their selfish benefit and to the
utter disregard of the rights of Ambazonians. This has been the situation since
the fateful plebiscite—as no one stood beside then West Cameroon (Ambazonia)
Prime Minister Augustine Ngom Jua, who opposed Ahidjo’s marginalization
ploys which from every understanding were a prelude of the worse days to
come, now being lived as the reality of the union between Ambazonia and
Cameroun. While Jua did not only put his life on the line but eventually died
because he was devoted in attempting to redress the situation, those who had
previously served as Prime Ministers of Ambazonia were busy enjoy the crumbs
that fell from the master’s table in Yaounde, Cameroun. Former Prime Minister
John Ngu Foncha was serving Cameroun’s dictator Ahidjo as Vice President of a
very poorly conceptualized Confederation in the name of the Cameroon
Federation, while Former Prime Minister Solomon Tandeng Muna was serving
as Speaker of the National Assembly of the Cameroun.
Neither can we ignore the poor treatment meted to the Ambazonian
Nationalist leader Dr. E. M. L. Endeley who was opposed to Ambazonia joining
Cameroun. He favored remaining with Nigeria. Endeley, the man who ignited
Ambazonian nationalism way back in the late forties and early fifties with the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality against participation in Nigerian politics
suddenly found himself in the cold when Cameroun joined Nigeria. His change
of heart that Ambazonia remains with Nigeria was probably due to that fact that
93
he perceived unity with Cameroun as far more disastrous than remaining with
Nigeria, especially since the United Nations and Britain had conspired to prevent
Ambazonia from attaining total and unfettered independence. Cameroun
isolated Endeley and like how the government neglected those other individuals
who favored remaining with Nigeria or propagated total independence for
Ambazonia, the same treatment befell those areas that voted massively for
joining Nigeria. The leaders who either fanned the total independence of the
Ambazonia or proposed that it should remain with Nigeria were simply left to
fade as none entities. Most eventually died as poor rats and their families
prevented from even being heard in any public arena in Cameroun.
Victimization is the word that has reigned since the fateful plebiscite in
Ambazonia.
Many would think that to them, whatever came out of the attempts at
having a Cameroon Federation, regardless of the shortcomings, is a done deal.
They forget that annexation of Ambazonia or any other country by another by
means of coercion of its leaders or some of them is legally unacceptable—so,
whatever their politicking was building in the name of unification was definitely
going to crumble in the future when the law questions the process and their
intentions.
Worth noting has been the attempts at redressing the imbalanced
relationship—one whereby Cameroun and Camerounians are the masters and
Ambazonia and Ambazonians are the farm, pried upon in every way imaginable
and exploited with impunity—by way of forcing multiparty democracy on
Cameroun’s current head of state Paul Biya. No one blew the storm more than
former “Prisoner without a Crime,” Albert Muwah Mukong and John Fru Ndi
who created the Social Democratic Front (SDF) party, educated Francophones
such as the Douala-based lawyer Yondo Black on the constitutionality of the
move. When SDF was founded even on paper, the government resisted,
blackmailed its leaders and attempted bribing them into submission that the
process was going to ruin Cameroun and that it should be abandoned. When
government failed in this process, it then embarked on an all out war against the
SDF. It delayed giving her the position it held as the first opposition political
party to be created in what we can call modern Cameroun by legalizing other
mushroom parties created with the help of the ruling party as her affiliates. What
was to become the process of democratization for better government was soon to
become a nightmare as the usual Anglophone (Ambazonia)—Francophone
divide would mar the entire process, creating suspicion here and there especially
as Cameroun was guilty of illegally and forcibly annexing the territory, it was
clear that resistance built-up against the predominantly Anglophone-borne party
was in fear of Anglophonizing Cameroun should such a party eventually win
elections and the presidency.
94
Also worth noting from the Ambazonia side is the development or rather
the fortification of the struggle to either restore the Cameroon Federation or
secure Cameroun’s withdrawal from the territory, out-rightly. Activities of the
Ambazonia movement led by Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka and those of the
Cameroon Anglophone Movement quickly come as a pointer here. What was
even more fearful was the fact that it was hard t distinguish member of CAM
from those of Ambazonia, and even worse, members of these two movements
were equally members of the SDF. In other words, the fears of Cameroun’s
government might have been genuine but her worse fears should have been their
own violations of the laws that were suppose to put the two states, Ambazonia
and Cameroun, together.
Ambazonia secured a legal advantage over Cameroun with Cameroun
failing to contest the case against her in Cameroun’s own high Court in 1992
(HCB/28/92) as we have already seen in the literature above. This was used as
reason to suppress the SDF, so unfortunately, rather than use her for
solidification of national unity. Realpolitik would dictate that the SDF provided
that advantage but Cameroun crude politicians failed to utilize the opportunity
from the very foundation of the party.
Faced with the Bakassi crises, it is hard to see how right intentioned
Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would not question Cameroun’s
claims (that she got the mandate to claim sovereignty of the peninsula by way of
the plebiscite). The failure to make this link is what would fuel future conflicts
that would certainly be more deadly than the current dispute between Nigeria
and Cameroun and far more, expose many an intrigue coming from the World
Body—the UN an her affiliated associations and organs—in the name of some
lies of working to ensure global security, peace and good relations between
nations. Quite intriguing indeed!
(B) EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Ambazonia has not been the only victim of Cameroun expansionism.
History holds that Northern Cameroons, (which together with Southern
Cameroons or Ambazonia made up British Cameroons) that voted to join
Nigeria during the February 11, 1961 plebiscite, had been Ahidjo’s greatest
ambition. This was because he sought to increase the population of the Northern
Cameroon so as to have advantage over the South. Unfortunately form him, not
only did the masses of Northern Cameroons vote against union with Cameroun,
but also, Ahidjo’s petition and case at the International Court of Justice against
Britain in attempting to recover Northern Cameroons was equally lost. In
grudgingly accepting Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) as the other state in the
union of Two States that the Cameroon Federation was to represent, Ahidjo
never forgot his other ambition of annexing Fernando Po into Cameroun. His
numerous attempts at having Fernando Po come into such an alliance and union
95
failed when the Island united with Rio Moni to attain separate independence in
1968.36
But Cameroun ambitions soon turned into aggression. The maritime
boundary with Equatorial Guinea soon became a problem for both states as
Cameroun disregards Equatorial Guinean rights over her own quarter of the
close to 40 nautical miles of sea water between them, besides harassment of her
citizens fishing in international waters.37 One the greedy aspect of Equatorial
Guinea’s claims, it is also worth noting that had this nation been very clean and
truthful in her international, as well as domestic dealings, they would never have
ignored the suffering of Ambazonians in Cameroun and would have included
statements in their memorial to the effect that their historic boundary with
“Southern Cameroons” was being violated by Cameroun. This again would have
made the 1961 UN plebiscite, its legal setbacks notwithstanding, the only
reference point by which Cameroun could have claimed Bakassi, short of which
the only legal entity to have legal title to the territory would be Ambazonia. It is
so unpardonable that Cameroun would play the bully of the region, attempt to
intimidate democratic Ambazonia into submission and sea-lock Equatorial
Guinea that is even tinnier and get away with her illegalities by utilizing the very
international law to blame and charge another wrongful claimant over Bakassi
and the maritime boundary with Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. Cameroun
must be stopped, humbled like every other dictatorial regime when confronted
with the technicalities of the law and liberal democracy. Failing to stop such
nations will be tantamount to sponsoring dictatorship and the disrespect of
international law.
(C) CAMEROUN
Surmounting evidence does exist to justify the fact that the union between
Ambazonia and Cameroun was illegal, not only in legal terms as we already saw,
but also in political terms. Given that Cameroun has never been a democracy and
that at the time of the union Cameroun was at war with her self (the Union du
Populations Camerounaise (UPC) insurrections and the aftermath, during which
the government attempted to totally subdue any internal resistance or the
reoccurrence of insurgency), the Cameroun polity has always been autocratic,
oppressive, especially when compared to that of the Ambazonia prior to the
union of the two states. The ambitions of expanding the national territory which
the union of Ambazonia with Cameroun gave that nation; that of utilizing
Ambazonia’s surmountable resources at her expense; and that of making
Cameroun the second country to Canada with two national languages, English
and French and two systems of law and almost everything else, Cameroun
sought to gain international fame and recognition as a unique system. It sought
membership into the Commonwealth of Nations in the late 1990s after equally
enjoying membership of La Francophonie—France’s own neo-imperial
organization.
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Why suddenly this quest for Commonwealth membership in the 1990s?
Was it just coincidental that this was taking placing right when Ambazonian
nationalism was on their necks and when at the same time Cameroun’s
opposition was closing ranks against the government in power? Was it just a
coincidence that this was happening right when Cameroun and Nigeria were at
loggerhead over the question of the Bakassi Peninsula sovereignty? Far from
being just a simple multiple coincidence, the timing of the quest for the
membership of the Commonwealth of Nations was strategic as it was a
deliberate government policy aimed at shooting many birds with one stone.
Cameroun was and is definitely pregnant with many domestic and international
questions, which if left unresolved would only implode in all manners in the
very near future.
The very uncomfortable political and legal situation facing Cameroun is
one, which is typical of any nation and leaders who breach international and are
oppressing their masses. The dire need for internal legitimacy as well as
international recognition are symptomatic of the desperation of her leaders,
gradually watching power slip out of their hands or watch their so-called united
Cameroun break up. Corrosive forces are attacking the Cameroun government
from every angle—from human rights violations to non-implementation of
promises made to international organizations such as the Commonwealth and
IMF to liberalize or democratize, to those facing her for fabrication of claims over
Bakassi which even when she wins over Nigeria would be uncovered when
questions of Ambazonia’s boundary with her and those surrounding the breach
of treaty argument are brought to light. And we have not forgotten the evergrowing internal oppositional forces and eminent charges of corruption and
large-scale embezzlement of public funds by those who mistook national
economy for their private investments. Besides there is foreign investment to
protect and the dangers of domestic chaos looming over the national polity are
an indication that such investments would be at risk when a weary population
either of the Ambazonia peoples only or of entire Cameroun or of both jointly
rise up to overthrow the system.
The question facing the international economy and organizations is
whether they would want such a situation to occur of question Cameroun for her
breaches and seek meaningful answers. Let these organizations and even the
multinationals not be fooled by the power of some Western Nations who have
the right to veto or initiate and undertake unilateral action in intervening to
protect their investment. The initiators of such conflict would definitely be those
who have lost everything and commanded less attention from them and by
attacking the ruling status quo they would have nothing, even their own lives to
protect. This is a dangerous situation, they type we saw in Somalia, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Congo and even Ivory Coast in the last half decade. All
these conflicts point to the inactivity and poor articulation and application of
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international law in both preemptive phases and resolution when these disputes
escalated. This work is an appeal to the international community to act fast and
properly this time concerning Cameroun for time is running out, so says my
thermometer—the heat is rising.
(D) NIGERIA
No other country stands to lose from the frank literature than Nigeria
itself. Judging from the literature, one wonders why the government seemed to
behave so indecisively and at times contradicting her self on matters as
important as Nation policy on defense and relations with other nations in
general. Failure to heed the warnings from many an intellectual minds that have
committed themselves to telling and defending truth for the good of all mankind,
regardless of country of origin and regardless of who benefits is what has led to
the continuous blunder on the part of the Nigerian government to even go ahead
with the Bakassi case. From every indication, the warnings and opinions of these
Nigerian minds are enough to have resolved the dispute at nation-state level,
and with some pressure from the international community, demand that
Cameroun honor her agreements with the Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons)
such that future conflicts as concerning her own breach of treaty of union could
be avoided.
While Nigerians have been quick to point to the fact that numerous
agreements exist to booster Cameroun’s claims of sovereignty over Bakassi, these
arguments do not hold well when examined with arguments from Ambazonia,
especially that there is an international boundary between the two states—
Cameroun and Ambazonia—as per the 1916 Anglo-French Treaty which
effectively partitioned Kamerun between France and England. Justice will be
served only when evidence from both sides is cross-examined and when serious
thought is given to the charges of Ambazonia Republic on the international
community for imposing a plebiscite on them that was never concluded and by
which Cameroun has used to not only abuse their rights as a sovereign people,
but also to illegal seek to have sovereignty over Bakassi. Nigerian truth-telling
minds have done the international community a great service by standing to
these truths, that Justice can be served indiscriminately, for lasting peace and
good neighborliness.
IV. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEREST
Economically speaking, the Bakassi Peninsula is located in the heart and
crossroad of global trade. Located at the eastern end of West Africa at the curve
where the Sea Road to India once passed, and sitting in an oil-rich region named
the Gulf of Guinea, nothing can be more damaging to international politics and
commerce and the interests of many great a super powers than a conflict in this
region that results into massive use of armaments. The resolution of the Bakassi
Peninsula dispute without giving necessary thought to the sovereignty question
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of the Ambazonia is typical behavior of postponing a just solution. Many
international companies have located in this area in the field of agriculture and
raw material production, especially the mining of crude oil. Given that all four
disputants are potential oil suppliers, there is no telling how these trades would
be affected in the event that the Ambazonia decide to wage a war of
independence having had due process denied by the ICJ. For serving as one
important source or raw materials and even its natural fauna and the crossroad
of world trade winds and much more natural advantages, the peninsula and the
entire Gulf of Guinea is one example of a strategic area in global economy as well
as politics.
Politically speaking, the interest of many great super powers does
converge here—from pro-communist Kamerun (UPC days) to the procommunist Congo now caught between various ideologues—from dictatorships
through feigning affection for some kind of social democracy to the resistance to
die-hard crude capitalists, and crossing the basin of French West Africa and
French Equatorial Africa as they converge with British West African possessions
of yester years, together with the growing American political and socio-economic
influence, no one would dare question the strategic importance of the Gulf of
Guinea when it comes to geopolitical and economic importance. Clearly,
avoidance of any conflicts in this region is direct avoidance of the convergence or
the emergence of all these forces. No other conflict possesses this great challenge
than the Bakassi Peninsula Border dispute and the sovereignty question ignored
and suppressed by the International Court. Resolution of one without the other,
especially given that one claimant at least, is bearing claim based upon a treaty
which links both territories—Bakassi and Ambazonia, would certainly not be
serving Equity or Justice.
CONCLUSION
What the lesson on Philosophers and Trust, Good, Justice and Equity has
done is link the natural evidence and those invoked by belligerents to the
resolution of the disputes such that further conflicts in the region of a wider
scale, could be avoided. We equally did address the philosophical ideas in line
with the reasoning of some First Order positions or what the Nigerian The News
calls “some people occupying powerful positions of wealth and authority,” to
show that evidence examination seemed to be limited to only what Nigerians did
or did not do or ought not to have done. The dispute or conflict is a lot more
complex than that and any attempt by the Court to serve Justice without
addressing the sovereignty question over Ambazonia is like reading John Lock’s
Two Treatise of Government and starving the reader of knowledge of Lock’s most
important philosophical idea—that of religious freedom—for understanding the
nature of the case between Ambazonia and Cameroun is the corner stone of
knowing who truly should have sovereignty and exercise it over the Bakassi
Peninsula.
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Sovereignty and inalienable rights are so linked in that the abuse of one
cannot take place without the other necessarily coming under similar assault or
perpetuating it in some way. The same holds true for a conflict of sovereignty
when we attempt to resolve it without necessarily examining people’s inalienable
rights. Standing in defense of Truth, Justice, Good and Equity is difficult, but it
could be made easy when we do apply the rule of law without being biased. It is
hard to see how anyone would see any court ruling over Bakassi as a judiciously
well-done job when the sovereignty question over Ambazonia has been
suppressed. How would any one expect Ambazonians to be loyal to any
government that has run over their territory and imposed alien laws on their
masses? Or as John Locke likens sovereignty and inalienable rights to the right of
inheritance and obedience to God and Natural laws, how would anyone expect
the relationship between the Governor and the Governed to be without conflict,
and how would the Governors expect the Governed to be law-abiding? Thus
laments Locke,
For if all Political Power be derived from Adam, and be to descend
only to his Successive Heirs, by the Ordinance of God and Divine
Institution, this is a Right Antecedent and Paramount to all
Government; and therefore, the positive laws of Men, cannot
determine that which is it self the Foundation of all Law and
Government, and so to receive its Rule only from the Law of God
and Nature. And that being silent in this Case, I am apt to think
that there is no such Right to be conveyed this way: I am sure it
would be to no purpose if there were, and Men would be more at a
loss concerning Government and Obedience to Governours, then if
there were no such right: since by positive Laws and Compacts,
which Divine Institution (if there be any) shuts out, all these
endless inextricable Doubts, can be safely provided against; but it
can never be understood, how a Divine Natural Right, and that of
such moments as all Order and Peace in the World, should be
convey’d down to without any Plain Natural or Divine Rule
concerning it…. For if only one Man hath Divine Right to the
Obedience of Mankind, no body can claim that Obedience, but he
that can shew that Right; nor can Mens Consciences by any other
pretense be obliged to it. And thus this Doctrine cuts up all
Government by the roots.38
The call that Lawyers and Judges apply the rule of law as if they are called
upon by God to obey and teach his own laws dates back into the days of John
Locke when Civil Lawyers, Professors of the Civil or Roman Law, and right into
the age of Justinian age, were called upon to deliver Justice without bias. It is in
such light that Lockean philosophy likens obedience to God without obedience
to natural laws or inalienable rights as being a state without any law-abidance at
all. Examining the Bakassi Peninsula dispute and the claims of Ambazonia with
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multiplicity of evidence provided by our Nigerian Truth-telling minds, would
only confirm yet another Lockean Proposition or Doctrine by which he states, of
a Conqueror, such as Cameroun is to Ambazonia (Southern Cameroons),
That the Aggressor, who puts himself into the state of War with
another, and unjustly invades another Man’s right, can, by such an
unjust War, never come to have a right over the Conquered, will be
easily agreed upon by all Men… From whence ‘tis plain, that he
that Conquers in an unjust War, can thereby have no Title to the
Subjection and Obedience of the Conquered…And the Conquered
People are not, I hope, to be Slaves by Conquest… the Conqueror
gets no Power but only over those, who have actually assisted,
concurr’d, or consented to that unjust force, that is used against
him. For the People having given to their Governours no Power to
do an unjust thing, such as to make an unjust War...and he has no
more title over the people of that country who have done him no
injury…39
The Bakassi Peninsula disputes has revealed all the ingredients of
international conflict and for the most part educated us on how best to tackle
such disputes with multiple factors and claimants. From every indication, it
would be sowing more seeds of discord if the illegal occupation of Ambazonian
entire territory and the submission of false evidence to the International Court of
Justice by Cameroun should be pushed under the table. There is absolutely no
doubt in my mind that the dispute over the sovereignty of Ambazonia would
escalate into armed conflict if the World Body does not intervene to remedy the
situation. John Locke of all Philosophers has cautioned us that Cameroun’s
behavior is typically and inarguably unjust and allowing such behavior to
continue, to be perpetuated and executed by Member states of the United
Nations and signatories to international treaties and Conventions is tantamount
to giving the right to build an empire to Pirates!
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