For the past 50 years, the relationship between Cuba and the United States of America has been
one of animosity and separation but once upon a time, before the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. took an
active role in the affairs of the island. The U.S. supported a myriad of strongmen, and for a time ruled
Our Man in Cuba
U.S.- Cuban Relations in the Batista Era
directly through a governor general, but Fulgencio Batista, the last Cuban ruler close to the U.S.,
epitomized the U.S. influence on the island. The United States supported Fulgencio Batista because he
brought stability, protected American interests, and kept the communists at bay. His reign was one of
economic prosperity, bourgeoisie decadence and ultimately, social turmoil.
On May 20, 1902, the 45 Star American Flag slid down the flag pole in Havana and was
replaced with a new flag, the flag of the Cuban Republic.1 The American General Leonard Wood, who
has wanted Cuba to be one of the stars on the flag, handed over the reins of Cuba to President Estrada
Palma after rigging the elections for him and ensuring that he would run unopposed.2 This exemplified
what would be a close relationship for the next 50 years. A relationship in which Cubans nominally
1
2
Louis A Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution..( New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 338
Antone Christianson-Galina
Richard Gott, Cuba. (New Haven: Yale university Press, 2004) 113 ; Pérez 338
ruled their country but U.S. interests dominated, causing many to believe that the Cuban government
favored the Americans over the Cuban people.3
At the very heart of the political relationship between the Caribbean Island and its allpowerful neighbor to the North lay the Platt amendment.4 Inside the halls of the U.S. Congress, one
year after the beginning of a new, bright century for America, Senator Orville Platt pushed through an
amendment that would feature prominently in the Cuban constitution and give America enormous
power over the island's affairs.5 The amendment asserted the U.S.'s right to intervene in Cuban affairs.6
U.S. Troops had the right to intervene in Cuba whenever Cuban independence and American lives or
property was threatened. The United States could review and approve all Cuban loans and treaties;
Cuba had to lease naval bases to the Americans; and, if Cuba didn't follow the U.S. rules, troops would
make themselves comfortable on Cuban soil.
In 1903, important treaties were signed between Cuba and the U.S. The Permanent Treaty
enacted the Platt amendment and recognized it as governing the affairs between the two nations.
Following the terms set by the amendment, Cuba leased Bahía Hondura and Guantanamo to the United
States which in 1912 gave up its rights to Bahía Hondura in exchange for more territory at Guantanamo
Bay.7 The second treaty, the Reciprocity Treaty, would set an important precedent for economic ties
between the two nations; The U.S. would get tariff reductions ranging from twenty to forty percent. In
return, Cuban food exports to the U.S. would enjoy a twenty percent tariff reduction. The reductions
would tie the two nations economically closer together.
During the early twentieth century, American troops were constantly called into Cuba by
3
4
5
6
7
Gott 112
Geoff Simmons, Cuba: From Conquistador to Castro. ( New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996) 355
Wayne S. Smith, Portrait of Cuba. (Atlanta: Turner Publishing 1991) 54 ; Simmons 355
Platt Amemndment
Pérez 338
2
the Cuban government to restore order and put down rebellions. In 1906 the government faced a
rebellion of 24,000 armed rebels.8An expeditionary force of 2000 Marines came to Cuba protecting not
only the government, but also American property. They would stay on the tropical island for 4 years.9
Another rebellion took place in 1912 and once again, the marines were called to Cuba. As before, a top
priority of marines was the protection of U.S. property, especially the sugar plantations.10
A prevailing feeling at the time in America was that the countries under their influence because
of the victory against Spain, specifically Cuba and the Philippines did not have the necessary
institutions to run themselves and that it was the moral obligation of the Americans to help the nations
reform and organize their countries. Cuba seemed to prove their theory. Amidst the 1906 rebellion, the
Americans sent General Charles Magoon, a Minnesota lawyer, to restore order in Cuba, giving him the
title of “Captain-General.” He would go on to reform the electoral system, establish a small,
professional Cuban Army, and reform the bureaucracy during his 3 year rule.11After the situation in
Cuba seemed stable enough Magoon organized proper elections which thrust José Miguel Gómez into
the presidency.12 By 1919 strife and civil unrest again started to boil over in Cuba. The Americans sent
special envoy General Enoch H Crowder to restore order and fix the electoral system. Elections were
held and the Americans left.13
In 1924, after a not only violent but also fraudulent election, Gerardo Machado y Morales came
to power in Cuba. The Americans saw in his regime potential stability and an end to the turmoil that
constantly engulfed the nation. “Stability” meant not only strong economic policies, but also: rule with
8
9
10
11
12
13
Pérez 338
Gott 115
Pérez 338
Gott 116
Gott 118
Gott 118
3
an iron fist, firm control over the political party system, and power based around the army. 14 In 1927,
Morales enacted the Customs-Tariff law to support Cuban industry and manufacturers. In 1930, the
U.S. enacted the Hawley- Smoot Tariff act reducing Cuba’s share in the American economy by
lowering the quota of Cuban imports. 15 Once the Great Depression hit, sugar exports dropped from
200 million dollars per year to only 40 million. University students soon started protesting and
destroying political offices.16 President Roosevelt, with more than enough to deal with domestically,
declared that he would not interfere with Cuban politics unless absolutely necessary. 17 This signaled the
start of a more hand’s off approach by the American’s towards Cuba and by May 1935, the Platt
Amendment was repealed.18 However, Roosevelt dispatched Ambassador Sumner Welles to the island
to mediate between the opposition and government and mediations began in July before a general strike
took away almost all credibility and power from the government. 19
Finally, a group of sergeants who revolted against their commissioned officer led by 35 year old
Fulgencio Batista took control of Cuba starting from the military camp Colombia.20 They quickly
moved to control of the island. Batista took power quickly and efficiently and he boasted that within
one hour and seventeen minutes, the previous government had been taken down and the army put in
control. Troops systematically moved out to control communications, especially radio and newspaper
stations, utilities and the police offices. Cuba was now theirs.21
Because of a desire for legitimacy, the sergeant would install Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, a
14 Gott 130
15 Pérez 339- 440
16 Gott 130
17 Gott 136
18 Pérez 440
19 Pérez 341
20 Smith 58; Gott 137
21 Pérez 220; Frank Argote-Freyere, Fulgencio Batista.( New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2006) 199
4
physician who had worked with the student protesters.22 Grau decided to show off Cuba's independence
and besides refusing to service debt on American loans, he nationalized the electricity industry and
nationalized the sugar mills, angering his friendly northern neighbor.23 In 1934, following the advice of
Sumner Welles, and knowing the importance of Cuba’s relationship with the Unites States Batista
pressured Grau to resign. He would install a series of puppet presidents into the presidential seat until
1940 when he himself would become president.24
Though Batista would not become president himself until 1940, He wielded tremendous power
behind the scenes and was the true leader of the island as Army Chief.25 When he took power in 1934,
the Americans saw him as bringing stability and reform that would end the turmoil of the previous
administration.26 Importantly, he promised to respect American capital and investments on the island.27
When the American ambassador needed to meet with the government, he entertained no delusions on
who was truly in power on the island.28 The American ambassadors of the time, Jefferson Cafferty and
Sumner Wells, were put in a difficult position with the American government; they had to explain why
it was that the Army Chief instead of the president was running the island.29 The compromise reached
was that as long as order was maintained, the Americans would look the other way and continue to
support the balance of power in Cuba.30 Batista at the time could be characterized as a populist dictator;
he enacted rural land reforms and brought hospitals and education to the countryside. He actively
pursued a progressive agenda and enacted a series of reforms quite similar to the “New Deal” reforms
of Roosevelt such as forest conservation and a massive initiative to combat illiteracy; army sergeants
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Gott 139
Gott 140
Smith 58
Pérez 341
Argote-Freyere 199
Pérez 220
Argote-Freyere 203
Argote-Freyere 207
Argote-Freyere 199
5
would be sent to rural schools to teach the children and adults of the countryside, raising literacy and
building his support base.31 When Franklin D. Roosevelt sent an invitation, it went directly to Batista,
not the president. Between 1940, and 1944 Batista became the democratically elected president of Cuba
and kept on with his reforms. 32 In 1944, Batista stepped down to allow the newly elected Grau, the
same man who he had earlier opposed, to take the presidency even though Grau had run against him in
1940 and had beaten his handpicked candidate in 1944. 33
Following Grau, between 1948 and 1952, Carlos Prío Socarrá ruled Cuba34.Between Prío and
Grau, government corruption had become endemic on the island with Grau himself being charged for
the misappropriation of $174 Million dollars.35 Batista, who had planned on waiting for elections
before returning to Cuba from his home in Florida, saw that officers were planning a coup and decided
to join them as leader.36
Batista returned to the island in 1952 in what was called “The Dawn.”37 He promptly brought
the country under his control by raising wages of the military and filling positions of power with his
supporters.38 On March 10, 1952, Batista appeared on the cover of Time Magazine with the caption,
”Cuba’s Batista: He got Past Democracy’s Sentries.39”
Most Americans however, saw an idealized view of Batista’s regime; a beautiful happy tropical
paradise.40 During prohibition, Americans came in droves to Cuba to drink and dance.41 Since the
twenties Cuba had transformed into a playground for the American rich and this image was promoted
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
Argote-Freyere 215
Argote-Freyere 273
Pérez 214
Gott 146
Simmons 257; Gott 145
Gott 146
Gott 146
Clifford L. Staten, The History of Cuba.( New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 72
Staten 69
Cuba - The Land and the People. Washington D.C.: Coronet Instructional Films, 1950. the film archive.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l25WhKf_fyM (accessed September 22, 2010).
Smith 57
6
by Cuban leaders up to Batista.42 Cuba became a “non-stop dance” 43 filled with nightclubs, brothels,
and casinos catering to vacationing Americans. The relationship was not one-way; almost anyone of
importance in Cuba had experienced life in the U.S. and saw it as a model for their country and
welcomed American influence on the island.44 The economic elite supported not only America, but also
Batista.45
Throughout Batista’s rule over Cuba, the Cuban economy was almost entirely reliant on sugar
and the Americans had a stranglehold on Cuban sugar production. Cuban sugar production was kick
started in WWI. Prior to 1913, the biggest sugar producer in the world was Germany, using beet sugar.
Two thirds of Britain’s sugar imports came from either Germany or Austria-Hungary and when war
broke out, these supplies were rapidly cut and sugar prices soared.46Cuban income from sugar doubled
due to the Great War.47 WWII left even more of the world in ruins, including sugar producing regions
and between 1944 and 1948, Cuban sugar production soared forty percent; by the end of the war, 90
percent of Cuba’s exports were sugar.48The United States meanwhile, steadily bought up Cuban sugar
plantations and mills. In 1906 Americans controlled 15 percent of sugar production. By 1920,
Americans controlled 50 percent and by 1929, 75 percent.49
It was not only sugar that the Americans dominated; the U.S. was by far Cuba’s greatest
economic partner. Besides owning 40 percent of Cuban sugar lands, by the end of Batista’s regime,
American companies owned 90 percent of Cuban mines and mineral concessions, 80 percent of
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
.49
Gott 131
Smith 57
Gott 144
Staten 72
Simmons 225
Gott 125
Pérez 217
Smith 57
7
utilities, two thirds of Cuba’s imports and almost all the oil industry.50 The tariff reduction deals left
Cuban industries unable to take root and left the island dependent on. Being in the American sphere of
influence, Cuba sloshed with American capital which Batista promised to respect, solidifying
America’s support for the strongman. 51
One major reason that the Americans tolerated Batista was his ability to keep economic
growth continuing on the island. 1957 was one of the best years economically for Cuba, earning Batista
support from labor leaders.52 Early on, he even had the support of the Communist party of Cuba.53
Cuban National Income per Capita in 1957 was estimated at 870 dollars per year while people living in
the rest of Latin America had an average income of less than 285 dollars per year.54
However, middle class Cubans were not using Latin America as a frame of reference; they were
using America, where the GDP per capita was at 2000 dollars per year.. Havana was one of the most
expensive cities in the world and boasted the largest number of Cadillacs per person. Since tariff
barriers between the two nations had been gradually torn down, U.S. Imports to Cuba jumped from 515
million in 1950 to 777 million in 1958; when comparing themselves to the United States instead of
Latin America, they did not seem so well off.55 By 1958, even though the Cuban economy was growing
at a steady pace, its growth seemed negligible when compared to the prosperous U.S.; as Cubans
looked more and more to America as a frame of reference, they felt less and less successful. Batista
50
Kennedy
NSC BREIFING (Central Inteligence Agency, 1958), http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000132323/DOC_0000132323.pdf
(accessed October 24, 2010). ; Pérez 220
52
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws,
COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN , 86th Cong., 2d sess. (August 27, 1960),],
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-cuba/gardner-smith.htm (accessed September 23, 2010).
53
Cuban Political Trends (Central Inteligence Agency, 1948). http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000258380/DOC_0000258380.pdf
(accessed October 24, 2010)
54
Political Stability in Central America and the Caribbean through 1958. (Central Inteligence Agency, 1957),
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000027099/DOC_0000027099.pdf (accessed October 24, 2010);
"Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at Democratic Dinner, Cincinnati, Ohio," October 6, 1960. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
and Museum. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches JFK/JFK+PrePres/1960/002PREPRES12SPEECHES_60OCT06b.htm (accessed September 23, 2010).
55 Pérez 225
51
8
gradually began to lose Cuban support do to his failure to deliver the economic gains they wanted but
he still could call on American support in the beginning of 1958.
The United States, in the wake of a growing Communist movement in a World where a
third of the world's people were under Communist rule, did anything they could to stop the
Communists from gaining power in a struggle that pitted Bourgeoisie Republicanism vs. Communism.
At the time of Fulgencio Batista, the CIA had immense influence over the affairs of Cuba, their actions
could make or break the government and during Batista’s second term in office, this held true more
than ever. Cuba is only 90 Miles from Key West, so close that Ambassador Arthur Gardener called
Cuba the “Show window of Latin America.”56 The Americans kept a very close eye on their southern
neighbor, especially the political trends since any election or power shift would have consequences for
the Americans.57 The United States dreaded the idea of a Communist satellite within bomber and later
missile range of their country.
Batista was an important player in the CIA’s anti-communist plans. In 1956 wheelchair
ridden CIA operative Lyman Kirkpatrick traveled to the Capital in Havana and told Batista personally
that he had the unconditional support of the United States to fight Communists in Cuba. 58 The United
States signed a mutual aid pact with Batista, similar to those made in many other countries in the
region; the United States would sell off its old military equipment (the Second World war had left
plenty of surplus) to its allies in Latin America who's forces would then be trained by Americans to
help fight the Communists and any other enemies that might spring up.59 The CIA helped Batista form
56
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws,
COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
57 Cuban Political Trends (Central Inteligence Agency, 1948),http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000258380/DOC_0000258380.pdf
(accessed October 24, 2010).
58
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick The Real CIA (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1968), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cubanrebels/kirkpatrick.htm (accessed October 24, 2010).
59 Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, COMMUNIST
THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN.
9
the BRAC, el Buro Para la Represion de Actividades Comunistas, or Bureau for the Repression of
Communist Activities.60 When it seemed as if he had the Communists under his control, the American's
gave him their unconditional support.61
However, the relationship was not totally one-sided. The CIA followed Batista's request
never to officially meet with his enemies. A picture of a CIA agent with an enemy of his in the
newspaper could cause a precipitous drop in his support; the Cuban people would be under the
impression that the CIA was on the side of the rebels.62 Batista once had a picture taken of him and the
unwilling Lyman Kirkpatrick. The next day, against the CIA operatives wishes, he posted it in 11
newspapers to show that he still had CIA support.63 Once the CIA withdrew most of its support, the
armed forces and labor leaders lost much of their faith in him.64
In 1958, the CIA stopped sending Batista arms and his regime collapsed by the end of
the year. A major reason that the CIA stopped its arms shipments was their disgust of the widespread
brutality present in his regime.65 Batista murdered 20,000 Cuban citizens, a higher proportion of the
Cuban people than Americans who had died during the Second World War.66 The CIA ended up
deciding against supporting him due to the brutality and also the fear that his regime was about to
collapse regardless of their support. 67Even though the flow of arms was cut off, the Americans kept on
training Batista's men.68 This ended up being an exercise in futility. As the US support of the regime
60
Kirkpatrick.
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws,
COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN.
62
Kirkpatrick.
63
Kirkpatrick.
64
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws,
COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN ; NSC BREIFING (Central Inteligence Agency,
1958)], http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000132323/DOC_0000132323.pdf (accessed October 24, 2010).
65
Kirkpatrick.
66
Kenneddy.
67 Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, COMMUNIST
THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN.
68
Kennedy.
61
10
waned, so did Batista's support by the Cuban people. After it was clear that the Americans would send
no more arms shipments, Batista's troops were so discouraged that they lost the will to fight.69 Earl E.T.
Smith would later write that the arms embargo, “had a devastating psychological effect,” on the army,
“and was the most effective step taken by the department of state in bringing down the Batista
government.70
There were multiple attempts made to overthrow Batista. One in 1957 reached the halls
of the Capitol building.71 On December 9th 1958, American Financier William D. Pawely asked Batista
to step down and retire in Florida.72On December 31st Batista, after hosting a farewell reception in
Camp Libertad, left Cuba, never to return to his beloved island again.73 An exodus of middle and upper
class Cubans followed along with American companies such as Texaco and Nicaro Nickel and their
employees.74 A new era opened with the New Year as bearded revolutionaries under Fidel Castro made
themselves comfortable the capitol building. Our man in Cuba, Fulgencio Batista had failed to bring
stability, protect American interests, or keep the communists at bay. Our man in Cuba was now our
Man in Florida
Appendix
Platt Amendment (1903)
Whereas the Congress of the United States of America, by an Act approved March 2, 1901, provided as follows:
Provided further, That in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the joint resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, entitled "For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain
69
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services Security Act and other Internal Security Laws,
COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN.
70 Pérez 235
71
Political Stability in Central America and the Caribbean through 1958.
72 Pérez 239
73
Kirkpatrick
74
NSC BREIFING (Central Inteligence Agency, 1958), http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000132323/DOC_0000132323.pdf
(accessed October 24, 2010).
11
relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters,
and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into
effect," the President is hereby authorized to "leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people" so soon as a
government shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance
appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:
"I.-That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will
impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by
colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgement in or control over any portion of said island."
"II. That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable
sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of
government shall be inadequate."
"III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for
discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and
undertaken by the government of Cuba."
"IV. That all Acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights
acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected."
"V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be
mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases
may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern
ports of the United States and the people residing therein."
"VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future
adjustment by treaty."
"VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence
of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United
States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United
States."
"VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the
United States."
Bibliography
Secondary Sources
Argote-Freyere, Frank. Fulgencio Batista. New Brunswik: Rutgers University Press, 2006.
This biography on Batista was enormously helpful in my research. This work humanized him
and from it I learned much about who he was. The book however ends at his landing in 1952 so much
of the information was not strictly relevant.
Gott, Richard. Cuba. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
This source has large amounts of relevant information on my period but looks at it as a period
leading up to the revolution. Much of the information is seen only in context of the revolution.
12
Pérez, Louis A. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. 3rd ed. 1988. Reprint, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006.
This book is full of information about Cuba’s relationship with America in the 1950’s and
seems a reliable source.
Simmons, Geoff. Cuba: From Conquistador to Castro. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996.
This highly in depth source has 100 pages of information relevant to my topic, page 164-263.
The book is critical towards U.S. involvement in the island and discusses it in great depth. My essay
focuses on the U.S. involvement so it will be directly relevant.
Smith, Wayne S. Portrait of Cuba. Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1991.
This book is meant for a more causal aufience. It has much relevant information but is
dominated by beautifull, glossy pictures.
Staten, Clifford L. The History of Cuba. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
This source provides a relatively non-biased look at Batista’s regime. It explains the American
involvement and the heightening social tensions within the regime. The relevant information only spans
45 pages and the especially relevant information only 18, the source will give plenty of information but
will not be to in depth.
Primary Sources
Cuban Political Trends. Central Inteligence Agency, 1948.
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000258380/DOC_0000258380.pdf (accessed October 24,
2010).
This document is a CIA overview of the political situation in Cuba in
1948. With much detail, it describes all the different political parties and who
was in the way or helping American political interests. It is all about American
interests in the area.
Cuba - The Land and the People. Washington D.C.: Coronet Instructional Films, 1950. the film
archive. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l25WhKf_fyM (accessed September 22, 2010).
This is an educational document giving a basic overview for the American public of their
Caribbean neighbor to the south. The document shows how america viewed Cuba. It shows how sugar
is grown in Cuba for the U.S. It shows how tobacco is grown for the U.S. It shows how pineapple are
13
grown, again for the U.S. This film is all about Cuba’s relation to the U.S.
Kirkpatrik, Lyman B. The Real CIA. New York: The Macmillian Company, 1968.
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/cuban-rebels/kirkpatrick.htm (accessed October 24, 2010).
This primary scource is a detailed account of CIA operative Lyman Kirkpatrick’s doings in
Cuba under the Batista regime. It was written by Kirkpatrick himself.
NSC BREIFING . Central Inteligence Agency, 1958.
http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000132323/DOC_0000132323.pdf (accessed October 24,
2010).
This document gives a picture of the last days of the Batista Era. It describes the struggles faced
by his government and the power struggle. This is valuable in showing the CIA’s feelings towards
Batista in his last days in power.
Political Stability in Central America and the Caribbean through 1958. Central Inteligence Agency,
1957. http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000027099/DOC_0000027099.pdf (accessed
October 24, 2010).
This heavily censored document describes and outlines who the U.S. supported in Cuba at the
time. It also describes in detail the situation Batista faced at the end of the rule and the CIA’s actions in
protecting their interests. It is all about the protection of American interests.
“Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at Democratic Dinner, Cincinnati, Ohio,” October 6, 1960. John
F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+
Pre-Pres/1960/002PREPRES12SPEECHES_60OCT06b.htm (accessed September 23, 2010).
These remarks made by president John F. Kennedy at a dinner in Cincinnati, strongly support
my thesis. For one part, he focuses on what America’s role in the Batista Regime was.
. “The Platt Ammendment.” In Cuba: From Conquistador to Castro. New York: St Martin’s Press,
1996.
This is the full Text of the Platt Amendment.
U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Services
Security Act and other Internal Security Laws. COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN. 86th Cong., 2d sess. (August 27, 1960)
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/us-cuba/gardner-smith.htm (accessed September 23, 2010).
14
This is the Testimonial of the American ambassador to Cuba in 1953. This is filled with
important information about the U.S.’s relations with Cuba. This is a very valuable source.
15