Latin America
R. James Ferguson © 2006
Lecture 4:
Cuba: Revolution, Resistance And Globalisation
Overview: 1. Introduction: A Country With Unique Forms of Internationalisation
2. History: Diaspora and Cultural Fusion
3. Early U.S. Involvement in Cuban Affairs
4. The Revolutionary Legacy of the 19th Century
5. Castro's Revolution
6. Conflict and Containment
7. The Case of Elian Gonzalez
8. Modern Cuba: A Unique Culture Playing A Unique Strategy
9. Survival Strategies (Seminar)
10. Bibliography and Further Resources
1. Introduction: A Country With Unique Forms of Internationalisation
Cuba is the largest of the Caribbean Islands and lies strategically at the entrance
to the Gulf of Mexico, controlling approaches to Mexico, the Mississippi valley and
western Florida (MacGaffey 1962, p1). More importantly, it is an island which
developed its own unique cultural and political system that would involve it in a
complex relationship with the U.S. and then find itself at the forefront of the Cold
War superpower contest. Since 1992, the country faced a new challenge: how a
socialist country can position itself in the face of globalisation and an ongoing
economic embargo from the U.S. These pressures have forced the country into
innovative forms of resistance and survival, and, ironically, helped maintain the
regime of Fidel Castro. However, the future nature of a post-embargo, post-Castro
Cuba remains to be resolved.
The country has a fair agricultural resource base, with main crops including sugar,
coffee, and tobacco, and secondary crops including pineapples, bananas, rice and
corn. Alongside these products, Cuba also some mineral resources: iron, nickel,
copper, manganese, tungsten, naphtha, asphalt and a certain amount of petroleum and
gas, which provides only around 38% of the islands energy needs (MacGaffey 1962,
p2; Oil Daily 2002). The island also has industrial potential in sugar refining and
related products, food processing, pharmaceuticals, and industrial chemicals. It has a
relatively well-educated population, a strong tourist industry, and a relatively strong
medical system (see below).
Lecture 4
1
Cuba (Courtesy PCL Map Collection)
2. History: Diaspora and Cultural Fusion
Cuba was first discovered by the West with Columbus' voyage of 1496, though the
island was not permanently settled by Spain until 1511 (MacGaffey 1962, p2).
Cuba had its own unique indigenous people before the arrival of Columbus to the
island, but their relatively small numbers (perhaps 60,000) were eroded by the impact
of European settlement, disease, and famine (Thomas 1971, p21). In spite of
attempted rebellions in 1524-32 and 1538-44 these people were unable to sustain
themselves as an independent society (August 1999, p43). Nonetheless, they formed
one of the elements in modern Cuban culture, in part because the Spanish at first
showed less prejudice towards them racially than towards Africans who mainly
arrived as slaves. Many indigenous natives 'were undoubtedly absorbed in Cuba as
elsewhere into Spanish families and, because of the whiteness of their skin, were
regarded as Spanish (or creoles)' (Thomas 1971, p21). Since 80% of Spaniards who
came to the island in the 18th century were males, intermarriage with other races was
quite common (August 1999, p66). In time the term Creole would come to indicate
any person who was a permanent resident in Cuba and took Cuban interests to
heart, in contrast to those who still felt linked to peninsula Spain (August 1999, p51).
Some leading creole families who had achieved noble status moved from beef and
tobacco production into sugar, and were owners of thousands of slaves (Thomas 1971,
p32, pp46-47). Creole families such as the Herreras and Núñez de Castillo were
ennobled and controlled large estates (Thomas 1971, p47). Although various forms of
racism and discrimination would develop, especially against the descendants of black
slaves, there was no formal apartheid and discrimination in most public places,
schools and the public service were outlawed by 1893 (Thomas 1971, p293). Race
issues, however, continue to remain a challenge to the socialist ideals of modern
Lecture 4
2
Cuba. Contemporary prejudice is more subtly oriented on the basis of appearance and
education. Exclusion here is sometime explained on the basis of aesthetic and cultural
factors, with the loose criteria of buena presencia (good appearance) acting as little
more than a rationalisation of prejudice against those of dark appearance, even though
up to 60% of Cubans have a "significant" degree of African ancestry (Hansing 2001,
pp743-744; de la Fuente 1998, p7; Moore 1997, p13).
The early Cuban economy for a time was based on cattle, hides, and some extraction
of gold, though the economy of the islands declined during the 16th century
(MacGaffey 1962, p4) until new plantation crops began to be developed. The
Spanish in Cuba, however, soon found that they needed massive imports of labour for
their diverse plantations, especially slaves from the west coasts of Africa (see
Thompson 1987). The demand for labour on tobacco, coffee (Topik 2000; Thomas
1971, pp132-133) and especially sugar plantations pushed up the demand for slaves
(Williamson 1992, p436; Jamieson 2001), even when their import was limited at first
by Spanish state monopolies and later on by the British fleet when England outlawed
the practice of slavery from the early 19th century, and tried to intercept the slaving
ships leaving Africa (Thomas 1971, p33, p93, p94).
The African diaspora, of course, was one of the crucial shaping events of the modern
world, and a total of some 15 million people were carried to the Americas between the
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, profoundly shaping the structure of both American
and some African nations (Thomas 1971, pp282-284; see further Thompson 1987).
From the 18th century onwards, it was their labour on plantations that formed the
backbone of the Cuban economy. Sugar production, (sugar cane was first introduced
into the island in the 1520s, August 1999, p46), required a large and ready supply of
slaves, whose procurement amounted to between one third and half the entire cost of
founding a plantation (Thomas 1971, p30). Between 1763 and 1862 some 750,000
slaves were brought into Cuba (August 1999, p47). As a result, during the 19th century
Africans or racially mixed groups formed between 50-60% of the population of the
island (Thomas 1971, p168). ). Slave populations had arrived from most areas of the
west coast of Africa, including Nigerian ports, the Bight of Benin, Dahomey, Lagos,
the Congo, and the Gold Coast (Thomas 1971, pp158-159). Sizeable cultural grouping
included the Ibos, Yorubas and Congolese tribes (Thomas 1971, p40). By the 1820s
Cuba had become a rich colony and for a time 'the largest sugar producer in the
world', pulling ahead of other islands such as Jamaica (Thomas 1971, p61). Other
products, such as copper, beef, and hides were soon moved in a very secondary role in
the economy.
There were some important differences between slavery in Cuba than in other parts of
the free world. Although conditions were generally harsh, especially on the sugar
plantations, local law meant that slaves could buy their own freedom, and that in time
a sizeable Afro-Cuban community emerged in the island, creating their own culture,
religion, literature, and music (Thomas 1971, pp36-37). As a result, though the island
retained a Spanish nobility and a growing immigration of peasants and workers from
Spain in the late 19th century, Cuba thus soon developed a sizeable minority of free
Africans and Afro-Cubans who formed an important part of the national
identity of the island. During the nineteenth century persons of mixed racial
backgrounds sometimes managed to secure places in universities, some became
Lecture 4
3
professors and others entered the bureaucracy, while some poets of African or mixed
origin, such as Plácido, became famous (Thomas 1971, p172)..
One important aspect of this emerging culture was the way the Roman Catholic
Church at first tried to allow a gradual conversion of the customs of natives, tolerating
the syncretism between Catholic and indigenous beliefs. From the early 18th
century this led to the creation of African cofradías (religious brotherhoods), whose
unique blend of religion was most evident during festival and feast days, e.g. at the
Día de los Reyes, otherwise known as Epiphany (Thomas 1971, pp39-40). Eventually
this would lead to more Africanised forms of religion such as Santería. In the
modern period, as well, syncretic religions based in part on African traditions,
especially Santería (also known as La Regla de Ocha), have become extremely
popular in Cuba (Moore 1997, p226). This is one area of personal freedom that has
not been effectively constrained by state ideology. Santería is often expressed through
invoking, playing for, singing to, or writing songs about the Yoruba gods, e.g. the
songs Bilongo, Mayeya and Devuélveme la voz (Delgado 1999). From the 1990s the
cult of Ifa (an Afro-Cuban diviner cult) has also become prestigious and popular
among some groups, perhaps operating in the context of economic crisis and
competition among religious systems (see Holbraad 2004).
Even from an early stage the diverse elements in the island began to interact in
creating a unique music, dance and oral culture, in part as Africans were drawn into
Spanish festivals and the 'fiestas partly Africanized' (Thomas 1971, p40). In time this
led to the evolution of complex Afro-Cuban rituals such as the Abakuá, which
attracted participants from all racial groups (Thomas 1971, p199). Particular dance
forms evolved, such as the chachá, the rumba and the babul (an African dance evolve
in Cuba's Oriente province, Thomas 1971, p178). It was on this basis that
contemporary musical forms evolved, including a number of unique song forms such
as the son and trova (Lam 2000; Sweeney 2001; Yanow 2000). African magic and
religion, too, survived in modified forms, sometimes focused on secret societies and
clubs, while apparently overseers treated African medicine men with great care
(Thomas 1971, p177, p180).
Cuba's first moves towards asserting a character independent of their status as a
Spanish colony were driven by two factors: the effort to improve the economy of the
island, and a sense that Cuba had its own culture, history and place in the world.
Indigenous Cuban planters developed the idea of a Cuban 'liberal economy' (Thomas
1971, p73). They set much of the subsequent train of Cuban history on track by
creating large 'efficient' plantations. In modernising the sugar plantations, however,
the Cubans created an ongoing demand for slaves (Thomas 1971, p84), a demand
which in the end could only lay the seeds of revolt and Cuban nationalism. Already
in 1791 Saint Domingue (Haiti) underwent the first successful slave revolt, and was
an inspiration to slaves and freed slaves throughout the region. Slave revolts were
suppressed in Cuba in 1843-1844 (Thomas 1971, pp204-205).
Sugar in the long run also created the demand for the construction of railways, whose
price could only drop once cheap methods (the Bessemer process) for the production
of steel were invented (Thomas 1971, p273). By the end of the 19th century, it
emerged that the use of railways and new mill technology meant that indentured
Chinese labour (over 150,000 were brought in, though most who survived returned
Lecture 4
4
home) and contracted Spanish peasants were cheaper suppliers (Thomas 1971,
p122, pp185-188, pp274-276). The treatment of these groups was extremely poor, and
in many ways these workers were tied to cycles of poverty and debt that would also
force new revolutions on the island. Ironically, too, the emancipados (legally freed
slaves due to the intervention of the British navy against slavers) of the nineteenth
century were sometimes treated horribly: they were often put into forced labour and
literally worked to death over a seven period, since they had then had no residual
value as property to their overseers (Thomas 1971, p181, pp201-202).
3. Early U.S. Involvement in Cuban Affairs
U.S. involvement in Latin American issues goes back prior to American
independence. Part of the causes of the American revolution lay in economic interests,
in particular the desire to trade freely outside British mandates, including the wish to
trade with Cuba and the French West Indies (Thomas 1971, p66). In the late 18th
century Britain was still concerned to counter Spanish and French interests in the
Americas. Furthermore, North American merchants became major traders with Cuba
from the early 19th century, including even imports of food supplies (Thomas 1971,
pp86-87, p194). In spite of official bans, U.S. ships were prominent in the early 19th
century slave trade, using the American flag in order to resist inspections by the
British navy, though this changed after 1860 with the election of President Abraham
Lincoln (Thomas 1971, p203, pp230-231). By the mid-19th century the majority of
machinery, railway equipment, loans and investments in the Cuban sugar industry
also came from the U.S. (Thomas 1971, p209). The U.S. became the dominate trade
partner with Cuba in the late 19th century, while Cuba was America's main South
and Central American trading partner, with Cuba for a time accounting for 10% of the
U.S.'s total imports (Thomas 1971, pp288-289).
The U.S. was keen to avoid radical solutions in Cuba, and in particular suggested that
the national and revolutionary movements sweeping South America should not
make their way into Cuba and Puerto Rico, while during the 1820s and 1830s the U.S.
was still willing to see regional dependence on a relatively weak Spain (Thomas 1971,
p104). Yet shortly thereafter independence would be recognised by Spain for most
Latin American countries from 1836 down till 1894, with Brazil establishing its
independence from Portugal by 1822 (August 1999, p45).
Indeed, the U.S. from the early 19th century saw control of Cuba as very much bound
up with her own regional security. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had already
developed the idea that the Americas should not be drawn into European conflicts or
penetrated by new patterns of European imperialism or military intervention
(MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, p317). The U.S. had expanded both westward and
southward only recently. California and New Mexico (after the U.S. war with
Mexico of 1846-1848), Louisiana (purchased in 1804), Texas (1845), Florida
(purchased in 1819) and Alaska (purchased in 1867) had been secured either by
purchase, settlement, or as the result of conflict which drew U.S. interests outwards.
It was in this context that many plans were formulated for the U.S. purchase of
Cuba, the first thought up in 1839 by Nicolas Trist, U.S. consul in Havana, but
repeated by different groups in 1847-1848, and again in 1854 and 1857-8, offering
Lecture 4
5
US$100-130 million to Spain for the deal (Thomas 1971, p199, pp211-214, p223).
Other offers included loans to Cuba that would pay off Spanish debts up to US$400
million (Thomas 1971, p222). A last offer of US$300 million was made 1898 just
before the outbreak of the Spanish-American war, but could not be accepted by Spain
(Thomas 1971, p367). Aside from purchase, another American option that was often
mooted was outright annexation of the island, a move that gained force in southern
U.S. states after 1845. Both of these trends were supported by the idea of a wider
'manifest destiny' for the United States as an advanced nation based on a superior
Anglo-Saxon tradition which had a responsibility to use its greatness (Chiodo; 2000;
Thomas 1971, pp210-212). Indeed, during the late 19th century, possession, or at
least control, of Cuba, became 'a fixed ambition of U.S. foreign policy' (Perez
1998).
Others, more impatient, sought an unofficial and more direct solution to securing
Cuba. The rebel Narciso López would find backers in the southern U.S. and launch
several attempted invasions of the island, culminating in his death in 1850 (Thomas
1971, p217). History, as we shall see, would repeat itself. López however, did leave
one lasting legacy to Cuba: 'the Cuban flag from the day of independence in 1902 to
the present day is one designed by López', reflecting both the flag of Texas and of the
Union (Thomas 1971, p217). The hope of some Americans and Cubans had been that
Cuba would declare itself independent, and then join the U.S. as a 'southern' state
supporting slavery (Thomas 1971, p220).
The Flag of the Republic of Cuban
Cubans also formed strong lobby groups in New York and Washington, while a
community of over 18,000 had established themselves in Key West in Florida by
1870 (Thomas 1971, p291). Today this expatriate community, many of them
fiercely opposed to Castro, comprise a large and influential lobby within the
population of Florida (see further below). In the long run it is not surprising that the
U.S. and Cuba have been deeply involved with each other.
4. The Revolutionary Legacy of the 19th Century
The revolutionary traditions of Cuba were played out against the great revolts by
many Spanish American territories which from 1810 began to try to assert their
independence, e.g. Mexico. The first movement for outright independence in Cuba
began in 1809 and led by Román de la Luz, but the attempt was soon broken
(Thomas 1971, pp88-89). The movement gained strength around 1823, this time lead
by mason groups, often appealing to students and 'poorer white Cubans', who were
Lecture 4
6
urged to united with free and slave blacks (Thomas 1971, p101). The movement was
crushed, aided by large numbers of Spanish troops, resulting in martial law that
effectively last some fifty years (Thomas 1971, p103). Likewise, President Lincoln's
proclamation against slavery in the U.S. of 1863 caused great enthusiasm among
blacks in Cuba (Thomas 1971, p235). It was in the 19th century that the first organised
strikes in Cuba occurred and in the 1850s many workers began to create mutual aid
societies (Thomas 1971, p236). In the long run, revolutionary ideas of anarchosyndicalist thought, deriving from Bakunin and Fanelli, would being to influence
Cuba and its labour movements, especially through activists such as Enrique Roig
(Thomas 1971, p249, p291).
Other reformers included Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, who was active from the
1850s and very critical of Spanish policies (Thomas 1971, p243). In 1868 this man led
reformist planters in the east of the island against Spanish rule: his program included
the gradual emancipation of all slaves (Thomas 1971, p245). He quickly mustered an
army of some 12,000 men and launched the war of 1868-1878. Later 'liberators' in the
war would include Antonio Maceo, Calixto Garcia, and later on Máximo Gómez. This
conflict tended to focus on the poorer eastern part of the island, and only after 1875
would carry on raids into the richer plantations of the western section of Cuba
(Thomas 1971, p264). Up to 258,000 - 300,000 (10% of the total population) may
have died during the conflict (Thomas 1971, p269, p423), in large part due to disease
and localised famines as much as from direct warfare. In the end, massive Spanish
military reinforcement and divisions within the rebel camp would lead to the failure of
the rebellion. However, after the war there was some limited move towards
democracy: based on property qualifications, all Cuban were allowed to vote for
municipal and local councils (Thomas 1971, pp267-268). The conflict also inspired
strong support for the freeing of slaves, and laid the basis of the a 'strong nationalist
spirit' in Cuba that has never died out (Thomas 1971, p270). The tradition of Carlos
Manuel de Céspedes and other revolutionary leaders such as Máximo Gómez and
Antonio Maceo helped establish the tradition of heroic Cuban patriotism (Williamson
1992, p437) that would be mobilised in the following century.
Another strong influence on this tradition was the brilliant José Martí (1853-1895),
who remains popular today, in part because of his staunch opposition to the idea of
annexation by the U.S. (Thomas 1971, pp295-298). Operating from the U.S., Martí
founded revolutionary schools and in 1892 formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party
and along with other leaders, especially Máximo Gómez helped launch a rather
premature War of Independence in 1895 (Thomas 1971, pp306-316). Martí was
himself killed in 1895, but left an enduring legacy. The result was a sustained
revolution (see Williford 1998) using the methods of guerrilla warfare that created a
fierce debate internationally, including a major contest for newspaper coverage in the
U.S., with a section of the American press supporting the idea of a free Cuba (Perez
1998). José Martí himself came to be viewed as one of the founders of modern
Cuba, in part through his creation of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (PRC) and
in part because of his voluminous writings. He was one of the strongest explicit
inspirations for Castro (Quirk 1993, p53).
In this context, national identity (Cubanidad) and nationalism began to draw on
these revolutionary legacies. Building on the 19th century revolutionary movement,
Lecture 4
7
the 1959 revolution also promoted a specific sense of national identity through
cultural forms, including music, art and, for a time, architecture: Cubanidad, or the nature of Cuban identity, is a debate that had been taking place
since the 19th century. Jose Marti, who is upheld as the original and most important
intellectual figure in the long-running struggle for Cuban independence, understood
the need to establish a specific culture, free from traditional Spanish domination, that
recognized the fusion of both African and Spanish influences on an equal basis.
Although the development of Cubanidad remained centrally important for the
relatively small intellectual community throughout the first half of the 20 th century, its
influence was subsumed by the continued spread of Western capitalism. It was only
the 1959 revolution that provided the unique opportunity to promote an architecture
that truly reflected Cubanidad. (Foster 1999)
During 1897, the revolution against Spain led to American fears for their economic
and strategic interests in Cuba, and the battleship Maine was dispatched to Havana
to protect U.S. concerns (for the complexity of U.S. public opinion, see Perez 1998).
Unfortunately, the battleship Maine blew up in the Havana harbour on 15 February
1898, with some 260 deaths (Thomas 1971, p361). The cause for the explosion was
never securely identified, whether due to sabotage, an uncharted mine, or an
accidental explosion due to the new gun-powder mixture that was being issued to
American ships. Regardless of the exact causes, the result was a wave of hysteria in
the U.S. against Spain (see Detemple 2001), a wave that pushed ahead the plans of
Roosevelt and others to take control of Cuba, the Philippines and Guam (Thomas
1971, p364-365). In spite of attempted negotiation and the offer of recompense from
Spain, President McKinley and the U.S. Congress declared war on Spain on 25
April 1898, but without recognising the rebel Cuban government (Thomas 1971,
pp376-380). In effect, the U.S. no longer trusted that Spain could keep control of the
island, nor was it willing to recognise the revolutionary forces of Cuba, which were
poised for victory in the field (Perez 1998). In effect, its intervention was against both
the Spanish and Cuban forces.
The Spanish navy, small and old fashioned, had no chance against the modern U.S.
fleet. The outcome of this war was wider than just its impact on Cuba. It led to the
U.S. occupation of the Philippines (where the independence claims of General
Aguinaldo were not accepted) and Guam, control of Puerto Rico, and military
administration of Cuba from 1899-1902. Thereafter, for several decades, the U.S. had
a privileged position with regard to Cuba, where they could intervene either if U.S.
'interests' were at risk, or if any other power seemed to be gaining influence on the
island (Thomas 1971, p402, pp450-454). This was done through the 'Platt
Amendment', which gave the U.S. the right to intervene on almost any pretext if U.S.
interests or the stability of the Cuban government was not assured - the policy was
only reluctantly accepted by the Cuban Constituent Assembly in June 1901 (August
1999, p103). Cuban sovereignty was controlled and limited by U.S. interests (Perez
1998). It also made the career of Theodore Roosevelt, who as a Colonel of the
Roughriders led his famous charge up San Juan Hill (in Cuba). Thereafter, Roosevelt
became governor of New York State and then President. He continued a policy of
unique influence for the U.S. throughout South and Central America. A combination
of indigenous revolution and U.S. intervention had ended Spain's control of
Cuba.
Lecture 4
8
During the 19th century the movement towards independence was augmented first by
the failure of the U.S. to annex the island, and then by the way early 20th century U.S.
interests which developed the island as a 'sugar factory' and strategic naval base
(Thomas 1971, p227). On the 20th of May 1902 Cuba achieved formal
independence under its first President, Estrada Palma, but this would not be the
beginning of a smooth ride for the new nation. Political turmoil continued. Between
1906 and 1909 Cuba was ruled directly by the U.S., while between 1909 and 1921
American troops were sent to intervene in the politics of the island on four occasions
(Williamson 1992, p440).
From 1902-1959 the history of Cuba reads as a long serious of partially corrupt
elections, U.S. interventions in Cuban government (as in 1906-1909), the emergence
of strong labour and socialist or communist parties through the 1920s and 1930s, and
a growing social crisis that could not be averted even by electoral politics. The
Partido Communista de Cuba (PCC) was formed in 1925, at first under the leadership
of Julio Antonio Mella (August 1999, p121). Political violence continued in 19261927, and although the U.S. managed to helped remove the dictator Machado in 1933
through political pressure, a reformist government in 1933 under Carlos Céspedes
could not be sustained (Gilcrease & Dur 2002;Williamson 1992, pp441-442).
Essentially, the period from 1902-1959 saw unstable variants of electoral multi-party
politics in which Liberals verses Conservatives were unable to either provide stable
government or set in train a successful period of economic and social reform (see
August 1999). It was also a period in which U.S. interests politically and
economically remained extremely strong in the island (O'Brien 1993; Nackerud et al
1999). Part of this presence included a strong infiltration of the U.S. mafia in the
island from 1934-1958, with key figures such as Lucky Luciano and Meyer Lansky
operating out of their own hotels on the island (August 1999, p137).
In 1952 Fulgencio Batista organised a coup d'état and took direct control of the state
(August 1999, p140), no longer remaining as a strongman behind the scenes.
Thereafter Batista arrested or harassed opposition groups, as in the 1954 general
elections (Qirk 1993, p79). The Batista government emerged as a military dictatorship
which sought to oppress all serious opposition and coopt most senators, the police,
and the armed forces (Mericle 1998; Quirk 1993, p38). This government also received
military aid from the U.S. through the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. The
U.S. supported this government essentially in order to retain its privileged influence in
the Caribbean, to protect financial investments, and in order to keep communist and
socialist forces in check on the island. Batista's Cuba had 60% of its exports and 80%
of its imports from the U.S. (Nackerud et al. 1999). Appeals to the Organisation of
American States to restore 'legitimate rule' in Cuba were unsuccessful (Quirk 1993,
p39). It was this regime and its harshness that set the stage for a new and eventually
successful revolution.
5. Castro's Revolution
Fidel Castro was one of several young revolutionaries that returned to Cuba in 1956,
and began the formation of a Rebel Army and military operations on the island. A
young lawyer, he turned from political activity on the fringes of the existing Ortodoxo
Lecture 4
9
party towards direct action against the Batista regime (Quirk 1993, pp31-50). Among
those who joined him was Che (Ernesto) Guevara, whose revolutionary gusto and
courage soon gained him a command position. Che would later on try to bring
revolution into South American and would eventually be killed by the Bolivian army
in 1967 (Dorfman 1999). A range of other guerrilla leaders, e.g. Frank País and René
Ramos Latour, would not retain such prominence, nor Castro's favour (Qirk 1993,
pp141-148). This guerrilla war, led from the mountains of the Sierra Maestra,
combined urban resistance and destabilisation campaigns in the countryside
(Williamson 1992, p445; Quirk 1993, p130), culminating in a general insurrection and
the crumpling of the Batista government through 1958-1959. The brutality of the
Batista regime had alienated many Cubans and the Catholic Church (see Super 2003),
while allowing elements in the international media to be sympathetic to Castro's
'heroic' struggle in the mountains, e.g. coverage by the New York Times, the Chicago
Sun-Times and Paris-Match (Williamson 1992, p446; Quirk 1993, pp131-136). It was
in such media coverage the Castro developed the persona of the bearded, riflecarrying guerilla operating at will from mountain strongholds (Quirk 1993, p134).
When the will of Batista's army collapsed, the dictator and some of his followers flew
out of the island. By January 1959 revolutionary forces had secured Cuba. At first
Manuel Urrutia was sworn in as provisional president (Quirk 1993, p216), but it soon
emerged that Fidel Castro and his inner circle of revolutionary leaders directly
controlled Cuba's future (Castro was at first Premier, and later became President).
Fidel Castro himself had earlier on been captured during a 26 July 1953 attack on the
Moncada barracks (see Hickson 1996). His most famous exposition of revolutionary
ideology was made in his two hour defence speech before a closed hearing, called
History Will Absolve Me, and sometimes known as the July 26 Program (August
1999, pp151-153; Castro 1968). Although not yet overtly communist (Fidel was
himself at first a member of the Partido del Pueblo Cuban - Ortodoxo, a progressive
party), it outlined a plan of national liberation based on armed struggle and the
aim of transforming society towards a more just system (August 1999, pp153156). Something of the tone of History Will Absolve Me can be seen in the following:
When we speak of struggle, the people means the vast unredeemed masses, to
whom all make promise and whom all deceive; we mean the people who yearn for a
better, more dignified and more just nation; who are moved by ancestral aspirations
of justice, for they have suffered injustice and mockery, generation after generation;
who long for great and wise changes in all aspects of their life; people, who, to attain
these changes, are ready to give even the very last breath of their lives - when they
believe in something or in someone, especially when they believe in themselves . . .
(in August 1999, p159)
Other aspects of this platform included 'industrialization, redistribution of land, full
employment, and the modernization of education' (Williamson 1992, p445). These
views were further refined during a period in prison and then in exile from 1955
(Quirk 1993, pp57-59, pp85-86). At first, his program might be viewed as more
'utopian than Marxist' (Quirk 1993, p160), but soon drew on a range of utopian and
socialist ideas.
Views on Castro's Cuba tend to be polarised both by political ideology and by
propaganda (those for and those against Castro). Strong anti-Castro lobbies exist in
Lecture 4
10
the U.S., at first mobilised through groups such as the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (DRF) and the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR) which were
active from 1960 onwards (MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, pp264-265). Even by
December 1960 there were 30,000 Cuban refugees in Florida (MacGaffey & Barnett
1962, p273). More recently, the Cuban American Foundation (CANF) has been quite
influential in lobbying and influencing American foreign policy (Vanderbush &
Haney 1999). Today, a very vocal Cuban emigre lobby still remains highly effective
in the U.S., but middle-of-the-road Cuban groups, though critical of Cuba, have tried
to present more moderate views (Lantigua 2000). The point is that statements about
Cuba (from both sides) need to looked at closely and critically.
The Castro government sought from the very beginning to link themselves to
revolutionary tradition of the island: The regime sought to consolidate popular support behind it by identifying the
revolution of 1959 as closely as possible with the nineteenth-century nationalist
movement. The Cuban people consider the decades immediately preceding the
winning of their independence from Spain as the most glorious in their history and
regard the philosophers and patriot-heroes of this period as the noblest men the
country has produced. Revolutionary spokesmen therefore depicted their program of
economic and social reform as the culmination of an idealistic tradition which dates
back to José Martí and the War of Independence. Premier Castro himself regularly
and freely drew on Martí's writings for his public addresses and, when he posed for
photographs, there was often a picture or statue of Martí somewhere in the
background (MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, p271).
Castro's and Che's ideas were at first not directly derived from Soviet thought. Rather,
they combined socialist and utopian elements already developed in the Hispanic
tradition. They aimed not just at a national and social revolution, but also spoke of a
'New Man' free from greed and personal ambition who would be the basis of a
sharing and just society (Williamson 1992, p447).
The policies of the Cuban government included the creation of a single-party state
(based on the merger of several revolutionary parties including the communist,
student, and socialist groups), the development of mass-housing projects to provide
every Cuban with the ability to have their own home, the extension of the health and
education system, and the creation of a nationalised economy in which 80% of
labour would be employed directly or indirectly by the government, and retain state
control of all major publishing, media and film production units (MacGaffey &
Barnett 1962, pp275-278; August 1999, p161). Among the first actions of the Castro
government was the nationalisation of most industry and expropriation of 41% of
land which was divided up and given to peasants (August 1999, p174). They also
promoted the creation of a new news agency for South America, Prensa Latina,
which claimed to provide an independent new service free from 'imperialist'
domination, while suppressing several critical newspapers and magazines (MacGaffey
& Barnett 1962, p279).
Fidel Castro also soon began to create a cult of personal leadership, in part based on
his vigorous speeches and embodiment of revolutionary ideals, e.g. his continued
public appearances in military fatigues and his avoidance of personal luxury. He came
to be regarded 'as a patron, guardian, and guarantor of salvation in a sense that had
both religious and secular overtones' (MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, p285). In a very
Lecture 4
11
real sense, Fidel based his legitimation on cultural and nationalistic grounds as
much as on a platform of left-wing social reform. In following years a strong
personality cult developed around Castro as 'the Maximum Leader' (Quirk 1993,
p255).
The revolution had a serious impact on Latin American politics generally: For the Cuban revolution discredited the cautious reformism of the communist parties,
identifying socialism with long-standing Latin American traditions of armed rebellion. It
also held out the hope of realizing the highest aspirations of nationalism: the forging
of an authentic cultural identity once foreign imperialists and their agents had been
driven out of the country. The Cuban guerrilla struggle was to provide a pattern for
other wars of liberation in the continent, as well as in Africa and Asia. (Williamson
1992, p354)
Originally, the foreign policy of Castro's Cuba was based on good relations with all
American states: hence his government was initially cautiously recognised by the U.S.
and by all Latin American countries (MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, p312). Relations
soon worsened, in part due to the nationalisation of American companies, the U.S.
welcoming of political refugees, and the U.S. fear of communist influence in Cuba.
By January 1961, Cuba and the U.S. had broken off diplomatic relations (MacGaffey
& Barnett 1962, pp320-328). The strongly socialist and nationalising policies of
Castro worried the U.S., and when Castro described his country as Socialist in a
speech of May 1, 1961, this presaged a move towards alignment with the Soviet
Union and the Comecon (socialist) countries (Quirk 1993, p385). In part, this
alignment was based on a need to assure technology, trade and access to petroleum for
Cuba. Through 1960-1961, this also included a conventional arms build up, the arrival
of MiG fighter aircraft, and training from Soviet and Czechoslovakian sources (Hatch
& Johnson 1998). In 1965 a new Cuban Communist Party was formed
(Williamson 1992, p454), also indicating further alignment.
6. Conflict and Containment
The U.S. government soon moved against Castro's government, in part based on
conflicts over 'intervened' and the seized resources of many U.S. companies
(including nationalisation of Esso and Shell holdings on the island), but more
importantly on Cuba's drift towards alignment with the Soviet Union (Quirk 1993,
p283, p319, p348). Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy established the
economic and trade embargo on Cuba. The embargo restricted ships which had
been to Cuba from visiting the U.S., banned exports and imports, stopped the trade in
food and medicines. At its peak: 1) froze all Cuban bank accounts in the United States; 2) prohibited U.S. citizens from
sending money to Cuba, spending money in Cuba, or doing business with any Cuban
form in foreign countries; 3) banned U.S. trade with any country that contained Cuban
components; 4) forbade U.S. companies abroad from doing business with Cuba; 5)
refused to allow international financial institutions to issue credit to Cuba; and 6)
prohibited foreign nations from using U.S. dollars with Cuba (Nackerud et al. 1999).
American containment continued with the effort to overthrow Castro's government
through the backing of emigre groups in the U.S. who formed an army and invaded
the island. From 1960 through 1961 military equipment and training camps were
Lecture 4
12
provided for them in Florida, Louisiana and Guatemala, including the training of
pilots in a small number of old B-26 bomber aircraft (MacGaffey & Barnett 1962,
pp266-267; Quirk 1993, p367). The main planning and liaison for the operation was
the CIA, with the U.S. government in general (and President Kennedy in particular)
thereby hoping to plausibly deny that it had staged the invasion of another country.
An invasion force of 1,500 men landed at the Bahía des Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on
April 17, 1961 but were unable to leave the beachhead they had established
(MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, p268). Planning for the operation had disastrously
underestimated the effectiveness of the Cuban army and Castro's intelligence
networks (see Kornbluh 1998). Within days Castro had captured most of the invasion
force (1,189 of 1,500 troops), and made a formal complaint to the Security Council of
the U.N. that this was a mercenary force in the employ of the U.S. (MacGaffey &
Barnett 1962, p329; Quirk 1993, p374). The result was extreme embarrassment for the
Kennedy administration, but worse was to follow.
The Cuban missile crisis had its roots in superpower competition and Castro's need
to secure the island against future U.S. military intervention. The Soviet leader Nikita
Krushchev, in particular, was willing to test the abilities of the new American
President Kennedy, and to try to gain strategic leverage in the Americas. In part, he
hoped to use this pressure to push or leverage the Western powers out of West Berlin
(Quirk 1993, pp408-416). In doing so, he directly challenged the balance of power
between the superpowers, and also began to undermine the Monroe doctrine whereby
the U.S. would resist outside influences in the Americas. To achieve these goals he
began the positioning of medium range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles (SS-4s) in
Cuba (Hatch & Johnson 1998). In fact, the initiative for locating the missiles just off
the coast of the U.S. came from Russia, not from Cuba, and it now seems likely that
Krushchev hoped to trade the removal of the missiles in Cuba for a pledge by the U.S.
not to position nuclear weapons in West Germany (Ulam 1998).
On this basis, President Kennedy decided to impose a blockade (naval quarantine)
of the island, and mobilised U.S. forces to a higher level of readiness. Crisis
diplomacy followed, with the dispute being at last resolved with a series of personal
communications between the two leaders. Soviet ships turned back before a direct
confrontation at sea could occur. Soviet missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, but in
return U.S. medium range Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Turkey and the U.S.
administration undertook not to invade Cuba (Ulam 1998; Quirk 1993, p429). A
directly military confrontation had been avoided, but only just (see Chang et al. 1998).
The outcome for Cuba, however, was a long-term Soviet alignment. Cuba was now
firmly entrenched in the Socialist community of nations, and supported by
preferential trading arrangements and the supply of subsidised oil from the Soviet
Union. Cuba sold sugar at good rates to the Soviets, and received petroleum,
machinery, iron, steel, aluminium, armaments and technical assistance (Quirk 1993,
p295). In 1989, '80% of Cuba's total trade was with socialist economies' (Monreal &
Hammond 1999). Cuba also for a time continued an active policy of supporting
revolutionary movements in South America and Africa, e.g. involvement in the
Congo, Angola, Bolivia (where Che Guevara was killed in 1967), Ethiopia, as well as
sending advisers and workers sent to Jamaica and Grenada (Williamson 1992, p455).
Lecture 4
13
However, in turn, Cuba to was subject to a continued U.S. embargo, which would
begin to seriously undermine the Cuban economy from 1990 onwards.
After 1989 the USSR began to adjust its international policies, including some
reduction in aid to socialist countries around the world, and eventual demands for
hard currency payments for oil and armaments. From 1992, with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the greatly weakened position of the Russian economy, this led to
the loss of the $5 billion annual Soviet subsidy that had helped keep the Cuban
economy viable (Robinson 2000, p116; Nackerud et al. 1999 argues that the subsidy
may have been as high as $8 billion). After an initial 35% reduction in the economy in
the 1993 in Cuba (Monreal & Hammond 1999), growth returned during 1995-1999,
with 6% growth achieved in 1999 (Robinson 2000, p116). This growth was achieved
in part of emphasising trade with countries such as China, but also by a new emphasis
on connections with Europe, emphasis on tourism, and some diversification within the
Cuban economy, allowing a larger private sector (see below). Through the transition
period of 1994-2001 average GDP growth was approximately 4%, but from a
relatively low baseline (see Brundenius 2002). Growth in 2002 was only 1.1%, but
increased to 2.6 through 2003 (NotiCen 2004), with real GDP growth of 3% in 2004
(according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, 5% says the Cuban government,
Economist 2005a). The Cuban government claims 11.8% growth for 2005 (Prensa
Latina 2006b).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War this was not the
signal for the softening of U.S. pressure on Cuba. On the contrary, U.S. pressure
intensified, especially over the issue of lack of a multi-party democracy within Cuba
(August 1999, p19). This can be seen in a range of U.S. legislation designed to
increase economic pressure on Cuba (August 1999, p19), and on countries or business
dealing with Cuba. This legislation included the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (the
Torricelli Act, tightening the embargo), and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 (the Helms-Burton legislation, designed to reduce investment
and aid from other countries). The U.N. has regularly protested again the blockade,
while no other government has agreed to support the embargo to the degree outlined
in the Cuban Democracy Act (Nackerud et al. 1999).
One of the triggers for the support given the Helms-Burton legislation was the
shooting down on 24 February 1996 of two civilian aircraft, piloted by a CubanAmerican exile group (Brothers to the Rescue), by Cuban MiGs and involving the
death of four people (Vanderbush & Haney 1999). The Helms-Burton provisions
include a unilateral policy to prosecute foreign companies and individuals that deal
with Cuba beyond specified levels - a move which the European Union said could
draw counter-measures against American companies if it were ever applied (Tremlett
1998). The use of this internationally unpopular provision was eventually waved by
former President Clinton (Nackerud et al. 1999). An important part of the HelmsBurton law (called Title II) sets out a 'list of conditions that any post-Castro
government must meet in order to resume normal relations with the United States, to
receive diplomatic recognition, seek aid and trait' (Robinson 2000, pp128-129). This
list is highly reminiscent of the earlier Platt Amendment (Robinson 2000, p129), in
which the U.S. tried to dictate terms to Cuba for some 50 years. Most aspects of the
Helms-Burton legislation has been codified into law, meaning that it cannot be
repealed by the President alone, but will need the support of Congress if there is to be
Lecture 4
14
any complete lifting of the embargo on Cuba (Vanderbush & Haney 1999). This
approach does not bode well for future relations, even if the Castro regime falls.
Furthermore, even if the embargo is lifted, there are some $6 billion in U.S. claims
against Cuba's earlier confiscations of property, while Cuba in turn claims that it
should receive $80 billion in compensation for the damage done by the forty years of
embargo (Falcoff 2000). There was some slight softening in the U.S. government
policies against Cuba through 2001-2002, but this has been complicated by the
heightened security needs of the U.S., as well as by some concern that Cuba might
still be directly or indirectly supporting terrorist or guerrilla groups, as well as
possible contacts with the IRA and FARC in Colombia, charges denied by Cuba (for
the Cuban view, see Hernandez 2002).
Ironically, this increased U.S. pressure may have strengthened the Castro regime,
as noted by Linda Robinson: US pressure gave Castro an excuse to strengthen his internal position, a rationale for
his refusal to change and a rallying point to demand greater sacrifices from the
population. An enemy abroad is always a useful ally during times of trouble at home.
Furthermore US policy-makers were unable to deny Cuba the alternative sources of
external support that it sought to cultivate. And, finally, US immigration policy
continued to aid Castro by providing him with an escape valve for internal discontent
that he may not have otherwise been able to manage. (Robinson 2000, 117).
It is interesting to compare the hard line taken with Cuba in comparison to the fact
that the US has normalised relations with Vietnam (Robinson 2000, p118) and China.
Many Americans are beginning to wonder whether the embargo is effective. In a
general 1999 Gallup pole some 71% of Americans thought it was time to renew
diplomatic relations and 51% to raise the embargo (Robinson 2000, p118). The
maintenance of the this hardline U.S. policy in part may be due to a traditional effort
to keep control of Central American affairs, to a frozen foreign policy in Washington
on this issue since 1962, and due to an emigre Cuban anti-Castro lobby that has been
especially active in Florida. Likewise, some business and agricultural groups are keen
to see an easing of restrictions on trade with Cuba.
7. The Case of Elian Gonzalez
The bizarre case of this 6-year old boy which hit the headlines during 1999-2000
helps highlight the strange relationship that exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Elian
Gonzalez and his mother were among a group of refugees that tried to make the
crossing to the U.S. Their boat sank and the mother drowned, but on the 25th of
November 1999 Elian was found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of Florida. He
was saved and found himself temporarily in the U.S. in the care of his great-uncle. At
that point, the relatives of Elian wanted him to receive asylum and stay in the U.S.
However, the father of Elian was still alive in Cuba, and demanded the boy's return.
President Castro vowed to ensure the boy would return, while the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalisation Service decreed that only the father could represent the boy
(Romei 2000). This led to a major series of court cases and public protests in both the
U.S. and Cuba. Efforts by the boy's Miami relatives to have courts mandate asylum
for the boy ultimately failed after several months of highly public activity, and the boy
and his father eventually returned to Cuba at the end of June, 2000.
Lecture 4
15
The incident sparked off deep emotions in both Cuba and Florida. Within Cuba,
millions of people marched in December 1999-January 2000 in support of the return
of he boy, a protest that was not entirely orchestrated by the Cuban government
(Robinson 2000, p126), but which was used by Castro as part of his sustained antiAmerican rhetoric (Tamayo 2000). The case seemed in microcosm to demonstrate
extremism on both sides, and in the long run showed the vitriolic nature of the antiCastro lobby on Florida as well as the political opportunism of Castro. The boy was
eventually returned to his father, and then to Cuba in early July in conformity with the
laws of the U.S. and with international law (Economist 2000). Overall, the case was
something of a victory for those who wished to soften the embargo against Cuba
(Tamayo 2000). Indeed, by late June 2000 moves were initiated to try to lift the
embargo on food and medicine going to Cuba, a policy supported by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (Brasher 2000). However, one cannot help but wonder
about the long term psychological damage to a young boy who was on national
television the day after his mother had died and he had been plucked from the sea
(Morris 2000). In the long term, such events suggested that both U.S. and Cuban
policies were playing out the legacies of the Cold War, in part directed to domestic
audiences.
8. Modern Cuba: A Unique Culture Playing A Unique Strategy
It is not enough to simply dismiss the Cuban political system as an outdated
communist regime. On the contrary, the Cuban system represents a complex mix of
South and Central American political legacies, as well as socialist, cultural and
nationalistic factors that has helped the regime to survive for four decades in the face
of sustained U.S. opposition. Thus, in the Declaration of Santiago, made in the 1959
meeting of the Organisation of American States in Chile, Cuba among other states,
had affirmed the 'seven principles regarding human rights, including the separation of
powers, free elections, equality before the law, and freedom of the press and radio',
though external invention to enforce these principles was not regarded as acceptable
(MacGaffey & Barnett 1962, p330). However, by 1961 the United States had brought
charges against Cuba in the OAS, arguing that it was destroying the inter-American
system by aligning with the Soviets, with Cuba thereafter being effectively excluded
from voting in the organisation (Quirk 1993, p397, p400).
Since that time, fierce debate has raged between Cuba supporters and opponents
(especially among the Cuban exiles in America) as to whether the Cuban government
is legitimate. In particular, however, it must be remembered that the current Cuban
regime has never supported a multi-party system, in part because of the way the
traditional party system was manipulated by elite and U.S. interests through 19021958 (August 1999, p166). Thus Cuba did run relatively free municipal elections in
1997-1998, allowing a range of candidates, but opposition parties were not allowed.
Likewise, there has been a partly circumscribed and limited space for religious
and civil organisations, though a vigorous network of clubs and societies has
proliferated, often oriented around government agenda, e.g. in music, sport, and
education (see below).
There were some real achievements to the revolution: improved literacy, improved
food supply for the poor, provision of housing and education, an effective health-care
system, and efforts to reduce race and gender prejudices (Williamson 1992, p452).
Lecture 4
16
Cuba certainly tried to create a strong welfare and educational system, with the
result that, in spite of the U.S. embargo, the medical system of the country has been
quite strong. Thus Cuba in 1998 received the Health for All Medal from the WHO
(August 1999, pp23-24). Likewise, Cuban doctors developed a meningitis B vaccine
in 1998, which American companies wish to access, a move which Castro supports on
humanitarian grounds (Tremlett 1998). Thereafter, Cuba traded its medical
expertise, services and medicines to Venezuela (in return for oil) and to Argentina
(reducing Cuba's 1.9 billion in debt) in 'swap' deals: '15,000 Cuban doctors and nurses
and a similar number of teachers, sports trainers and other advisers are working in
Venezuela' (Economist 2005a; Rogers 2003). Cuban doctors have also been active in
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, Malawi, Angola, Botswana, Chad,
Lesotho and Tanzania (Africa News Service 2004).
The Cuban view of democracy includes an emphasis on the right to economic and
sustainable development, a view put forward that the Margarita Summit of
American States in 1997 held in Chile (August 1999, pp21-23, p26). Although Cuba
remains an active participant of the Ibero-American Summits, one of the few
international forums open to it (Cuba had been suspended from the Organization of
American States in 1962). This forum re-iterated its stance against the embargo
through 2005:
The US blockade against Cuba suffered unanimous opprobrium at the XV Cumbre
Iberoamericana in Salamanca, Spain, which ended Oct. 15. All 22 member states of
the regional community signed on to a Special Declaration calling for an end to the
economic, financial, and trade sanctions the US has imposed on the island for the
past 40 years. The declaration also demands that the US suspend all laws contrary to
international law, including the Helms-Burton Act . . . and rescind all measures
adopted in the last two years strengthening the impact of the blockade. (NotiCen
2005a)
However, not all member states accepted Cuba's claims to having a legitimate
political system. Strongest critics in the past included 'Argentine President Carlos
Menem and Nicaragua's leader Arnoldo Aleman, known for his fierce anti-communist
stance.' (CNN Interactive 1997) Perhaps 'the greatest achievement was the forging of
a common national spirit, something that most other Latin American republics had
failed to do' (Williamson 1992, p457). In general terms, over the last decade there has
been some improvement in Cuban relations regionally, e.g. with Brazil, Mexico,
Venezuela, and Canada.
At the same time, Cuba has kept extremely tight control on political opposition,
has limited freedom of speech in political matters, and has developed a security
mentality that has led to constant U.S. and more recently UN charges of human rights
abuses (see the annual U.S. Department of State Country Reports for Cuba). Some
commentators such as Arnold August have suggested that lively political debate does
exist in Cuba, indicating some degree of political pluralism (August 1999, p24).
Certainly since 1989 there was some improvement in Cuba's human rights record
(Nackerud et al. 1999), though crackdowns occurred again through 2003 (Bond
2003). There has been an increase in the number of NGOs and relatively
independent organisations on the island. By 1995 some 2,200 NGO's had been
registered with the Cuban government, though it is true that only some of these are
genuinely independent organisations (Gunn 1995). Among these is the Asociación
Lecture 4
17
Cultural Yoruba de Cuba and the Pablo Milanés Foundation, formed in 1990 by a
black singer and aimed at supporting young Cuban musicians and other independent
cultural activities, especially those focusing on Afro-Cuban culture (Gunn 1995). The
Yoruba Cultural Association's registration is significant, since although Yoruba
ceremonies had been legalised by Castro in 1959, the cult itself was strongly
discouraged and viewed by the Cuban Communist Party as a superstitious practice
that should be left behind (Gunn 1995). The Confradía de la Negritud (Black
Brotherhood) has been formed to fight racism (de la Fuente 2001, p34), while other
organisations focus on human rights or religious activities. It useful to distinguish in
Cuba among congos (controlled government organisations), gongos
('government-oriented non-government' organisations), and more autonomous
NGOs in the definitional sense (Fernández 2000, p133), with Cuba currently
demonstrating a wide spectrum of top-down and bottom-up forms of organisation.
The role of many of these organisations has been to draw in social support locally, as
well as to provide information channels for government policy and build international
linkages. Artists, writers (via the National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists
(UNEAC), and musicians have increasingly been forum for debate on social issues,
though from 1996 the Cuban government has slowed the creation of truly
independent NGOs (see Dilla Alfonso 2006). A wide range of Unions and other
associations have some level of partial autonomy, but only within the wider values of
the Cuban revolution: . . . sessions with representatives from the Cuban Women's Federation and a
combined group from the Communist Youth League and the University Students'
Federation, including the Women's group This major mass organization was set up in
1960 at all levels and advises the government on policy, actively seeks increased
participation of women and represents Cuba internationally in women’s forums. 27%
of MP's are women: 66% of the technical and professional workforce and 33% of
decision makers. However women are still mainly employed in education and health
but this is changing with more women than men now in higher education. Successes
achieved include a reduction in domestic violence; non-sexist education; a major
improvement in women's health; generous maternity leave; day care for workers'
children; the rehabilitation of prostitutes; and a life expectancy for women of 78.
(Meggitt 2003)
There are real limits on how far these debates can go in criticising the government,
and official organisation of opposing political parties has not been tolerated. Political
and individual liberties remain strongly limited, and the government moved to
tighten political control through 2001-2003 (Aguirre 2002; Nackerud et al. 1999).
These factors led to the decision of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
(UNCHR) to pass in April 2000 a resolution criticising Cuba's performance in the
human rights area. The resolution, sponsored by Poland and the Czech Republic, was
passed by 21 to 18, with 14 abstentions. In May 2001, some 40 independent
journalists operating in Cuba have asked to be allowed to legally form an independent
journalists association, pledging that they will not accept money from any
government, including the U.S., indicating efforts at more open public dialogue
(Sequera 2001). The criticisms by the UN Human Commission on Human Rights
were re-iterated through 2004, in part responding to a crack down on dissidents
through 2003, a policy also support by the EU and Spain until early 2005.
Recent efforts to open up more civil liberties on the island have included the
Varela Project (asking for a referendum on democratic reforms, a program led by
Lecture 4
18
overseas dissidents such as Oswaldo Paya), and the Assembly to Promote Civil
Society in Cuba (San Martin & Rayes 2002; Agence France Press 2003). This forms
at best a fragmented agenda for reform in Cuba: Another distinct actor is the group of organizations espousing diverse creeds, issues,
and positions that comprises the opposition to the Cuban political regime and, in
contrast to the antiestablishment groups of the 1960s, is characterized by its
nonviolent positions. This actor is also extremely fragmented, heavily infiltrated by the
Cuban state security apparatus and has an international profile that far surpasses its
political influence inside the country.
The organized opposition has achieved indisputable successes including the
formation of coalitions and public support in the form of 25,000 signatures for the
Varela Project, a petition calling for legal reforms. Nonetheless, it has been incapable
of channeling the growing discontent among Cubans. . . .
The Cuban government, for its part, asserts that these groups lack legitimacy
because of their international links with countries and organizations hostile not only to
the Cuban government, but to the historic process of revolutionary change. And while
that argument could be reasonably applied to some of these groups, it hardly explains
the repression of other groups and individuals who do not have such ties and whose
proposals are more socialist than those of the government itself. If these groups exist
and are able to survive in a repressive environment, it is because thousands of
people, for whatever reason, believe that systemic change is necessary. This is
evident in (or at least suggested by) the findings of the few reliable surveys
conducted in Cuba and the outcome of the general elections. (Dilla Alfonso 2006)
Civil society is slowly becoming stronger on the island, but not mobilised enough
to represent a direct path to regime change (see Otero & O'Bryan 2002). The
meaning of these trends should not be exaggerated, and only the basic conditions for
pluralism and an autonomous civil society are being created: Alternative spaces for expression of self identity and meaning have emerged or have
been strengthened in a process that has led to the creation of an incipient proto-civil
society. Youth, artists, and intellectuals have become more critical and daring in their
contestation of state ideology and praxis. Cubans of all walks of life are finding a
voice and a space, as small as it may be, to call their own. Groups of farmers have
formed independent cooperatives. Religious believers and women's groups have
become increasingly proactive in self-help ventures. (Fernández 2000, p113)
Castro has learnt from collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid destabilisation of
communist governments in Eastern Europe and has opted for very little political
reform combined with strictly limited economic reforms (Robinson 2000, p122).
The continual pressure from the U.S., in fact, has allowed him to dismiss internal
opposition as U.S. dupes, and helped to mobilise a strong internal nationalism,
thereby reducing pressures for political opening (Robinson 2000, pp122-123).
Likewise, the positive immigration policy of the U.S., which readily receives Cuban
exiles, has been used by Cuba. In most cases until recently, more dangerous dissidents
have been arrested, and often offered their freedom so long as they leave Cuba
(Robinson 2000, p123), thereby reducing pressure on the regime. Recent U.S. laws
have made this even more predictable, with a guaranteed 20,000 U.S. visas for Cuba
annually, plus refuge for those viewed as political refugees, who can be readily
granted work permits and residency after one year (Robinson 2000, p124). On the
other hand, 'muted' discontent is very real within Cuba, especially among the
young (Robinson 2000, p125), in part due to lack of political freedoms, but also due
Lecture 4
19
to the economic difficulties the island has endured. Cuba's youth have different
experiences and expectations compared to their 'revolutionary' parents, a fact which
will be crucial in the future, post-Castro period (Dominguez 1999). This has been
confounded by difficult economic conditions, disillusionment, and a growing
recognition of increased drug use on the island (see San Martin 2003). On this basis,
the altering of the constitution to ensure that the ‘socialist system of government’
remains permanent and untouchable may reflect a sense that in the post-Castro period
such discontent may become much more open (BBC 2005a; Robles 2006). Likewise,
information networks remain strongly censored, and there was very limited
Internet and e-mail access on the island, with only some 20,000 Cubans having
official access to e-mail addresses, out of a population of 11 million, though this is
partly due to financial limitations when the average wage is about US$20 a month
(Smith 1999), though Cuba has plans to upgrade this in following years, while seeking
to retain some control of the information flows onto and out of the island (see
Schwartz 2003).
The key issue for Castro's government has been the re-linking of the economy to the
global capitalism system without the undermining its political system. Thus: Over the course of the 1990s Cuba has dramatically changed its trade, technology
and investment partners, modified its institutions of foreign trade, opened the door to
foreign investment, developed international tourism at a breathtaking pace, and
changed, albeit not so dramatically, the product composition of its exports. These
changes represent the beginnings of the country's reinsertion into the international
economy, or to be more precise, into the capitalist world system. This reinsertion - or
"relinking" - follows a previously long period of "delinking" from the same world
system, particularly during the 1980s. (Monreal & Hammond 1999)
One element of this modern Cuban strategy remains the effort to play a strong world
role in marshalling the politics of the developing world. This was clearly seen
when Cuba hosted the meeting of the G-77 developing nations (now in fact
comprising some 133 countries), including a visit by UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. Kofi Annan stated that he was impressed with the social development of
Cuba. Likewise, many Central and South American states have been very critical of
the U.S. led blockade of the islands (August 1999, pp21-22). Cuba is willing to raise
its profile in any international forum - it is probably on this basis that it has tried to
put itself forward as the 2012 venue for the Olympics (Excite News 2001a), an
unlikely bid but one that has drawn some media attention. In January 2004, Cuba also
hosted the 3rd Western Hemisphere Forum opposed to the Free Trade Area of
Americas (FTAA), 'with the participation of more than 1000 representatives of Latin
American social movements' (Xinhua 2004b). This trend has been continued through
2005-2006 with the effort to build alternative development paths for the Latin
American region. The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), would
open up the economies of Cuba and Venezuela to each other, remove tariffs, and
would make use of Cuba’s ‘vast reservoir of human capital’ in return for low cost oil
(NACLA 2006). In the long term, by drawing in countries such as Bolivia, this could
emerge as a wider alternative energy network for Latin America.
Castro has also been willing to turn the tables on the U.S., which after the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966 would received any Cuban who could leave the island and
gain asylum in the U.S. on a preferential basis (Vanderbush & Haney 1999), thereby
Lecture 4
20
hoping to drain much of the talent from Cuba (Nackerud et al. 1999) as well as
creating a strong anti-Castro lobby in the U.S. This was in direct contrast to refugees
from Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua who had a much more difficult
task in supporting their refugee status claims. At times, Castro intentionally let
many of the disaffected leave the island. A total of over 1 million Cubans entered
America in this way, some through a Memorandum of Understanding between the
U.S. and Cuba that allowed 'Freedom Flights' between 1965 and 1973, while in 1980
Cuba allowed some 125,000 to leave the port of Mariel (Nackerud et al. 1999). It was
therefore predictable that during the tense period of the middle 1990s Castro was
willing for a time to open the doors of Cuba, letting any who wished to leave to do
so. As explained in one account: A new series of attempts by Cubans to leave the island began in the summer of 1994.
Initially the departures were largely be means of commandeering ships. Hijackings of
tugboats, ferries, and even a naval passenger transport ship took place in the Bay of
Havana between 13 July and 8 August. The hijackers were occasionally assisted by
the U.S. Coast Guard and later given political asylum in Miami. Frustrated by the
government's actions and accusing the United States of encouraging the departures,
President Fidel Castro announced that henceforth Cubans were free to leave the
island, and thousands of balseros (rafters) proceeded to leave on whatever small
rafts they could construct. (Vanderbush & Haney 1999)
The result was a wave of refugees that unsettled neighbouring Central American
states, as well as the U.S. More than 8,500 Cuban were temporarily housed in camps
in Panama (riots in these camps resulted in the deployment of 5,000 U.S. soldiers to
maintain security there), while some 28,000 were temporarily kept in safe haven
camps, many at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a concession area
from the early 20th century (Nackerud et al. 1999; Williamson 1992, p439). The cost
to the U.S. of these emergency programs was over $300 million. In the end, an
agreement had to be reached whereby the U.S. would receive up to 20,000 Cuban
immigrants each year, but Cuba would not allow an uncontrolled exodus. The
ongoing trickle of refugees from the island continues to provide a kind of safety valve
for internal tensions, but also continued to heighten tensions between Cuba and the
U.S.
Castro has also moved to improve relations with the Vatican. For meetings with the
Pope in 1998 for the first time he wore a normal suit rather than military mufti. It
must be remembered that although many Cubans remained religious, Castro had
moved to remove the political influence of the Catholic Church by nationalising it
rather than letting its political leadership remain overseas: hence the creation of the
Episcopal Church of Cuba (August 1999, p25). The Pope has spoken out against the
embargo of Cuba, arguing that it hurts many ordinary Cubans (Newsday 1998). In
return for this diplomatic recognition, Castro has improved the ability of the
Catholic Church to operate on the island. Although only some 150,000 Cubans
openly practice their religion since controls on religious organisations were softened
in 1991, it is believed that many more are sympathetic, with some 40% being baptised
(Newsday 1998). Of course, Cuba has a wide range of its own syncretic Afro-Cuban
religious cults, including Ifa and Santeria that largely fall outside institutionalised
religious systems (see above).
Cuba has also been very active in promoting a critical view of the actions of the
U.S. globally. Hence it has been extremely vocal over the NATO air campaign in
Lecture 4
21
Kosovo in 1999, perhaps because it recognised that this pattern of humanitarian
intervention might make Cuba in turn a possible target (Robinson 2000, p122). In
May 1999 Castro launched a strong indictment of U.S. policies, but made sure that
there was no direct incident that could result in strengthened U.S. action against him
(Robinson 2000, pp122-123). Likewise, Cuba has scrupulously followed the 19941995 bilateral immigration accords it has made with the U.S., and has sought greater
cooperation in clamping down on the narcotics trade in the Caribbean, even asking for
U.S. training for its police in this area (Robinson 2000, p124). Recently, in May 2001,
proposals put forward by U.S. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman to provide
US$100 million in aid to Cuban dissidents was ironically 'endorsed' by the Cuban
government, which noted that receiving money from subversive foreign government
was a crime (Rice 2001). In the propaganda war with the U.S., Cuba has learnt to use
international media as well as its own information networks effectively. It thus
remained generally through 2001-2006 critical of the U.S. over Iraq, Iran, the FTAA
project, and Venezuela. From late 2001-2002 this criticism has been somewhat
reduced: in the light of the events of 11 September, Cuba argued that the U.S. had a
right to defend itself and detain suspects, but was continued about the role of largescale interventions in the name of the 'war on terror'. However, through early 2003,
Cuba moved to continue dialogue with Cuban exiles in Miami, with Cuba's top
'diplomat' (from the Cuban Interests Section in Washington) Dagoberto Rodriguez
meeting over a 100 people to talk about improved transport links, emigration, and US
relations. Opposed by hardliners among the exiles, this remains a controversial issue
(Elliot 2003). Reconciliation between these different communities may be crucial
in any post-Castro Cuba.
The events of September 2001, with the terrorist attacks on the U.S., also had an
impact on Cuba. Tourism declined, as did remittances to Cuban as the U.S. economy
slowed (Schweilmer 2001), though there has been a strong rebound in tourism
through 2003-2005 (Prensa Latina 2006). Likewise, a decline in market prices for
exports such as nickel and sugar have also negatively affected Cuba (Snow 2001).
Castro was more deeply concerned about the announced closure in October 2001 of
a Russian listening post in Cuba, which yielded a rent of US$200 million annually,
but also symbolised that strong security cooperation between the two countries.
Russia had done this on the basis of the need to use this money and allocated
resources in military reform at home, but it is possible that improved cooperation with
the U.S. in the 'war against terrorism' may have changed Russian priorities. Castro has
spoken out against terrorism, but also expressed opposition to the air war against
Afghanistan (Snow 2001) and Iraq on the basis of unacceptable civilian casualties,
views also expressed by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (Morales 2001).
Through 2003-2005 Cuba has sought to rebuilt economic relations with Russia and
China, though still relying on trade links with Canada, Europe, and Venezuela.
Cuba Timeline 2001-2005 (BBC 2005a)
2001 November - US exports food to Cuba for the first time in more than 40 years after a
request from the Cuban government to help it cope with the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle.
2002 January - Prisoners taken during US-led action in Afghanistan are flown into
Guantanamo Bay for interrogation as al-Qaeda suspects.
2002 January - Russia's last military base in Cuba, at Lourdes, closes down.
Lecture 4
22
2002 April - Diplomatic crisis after UN Human Rights Commission again criticises Cuba's
rights record. The resolution is sponsored by Uruguay and supported by many of Cuba's
former allies including Mexico. Uruguay breaks off ties with Cuba after Castro says it is a US
lackey.
2002 May - US Under Secretary of State John Bolton accuses Cuba of trying to develop
biological weapons, adding the country to Washington's list of "axis of evil" countries.
2002 May - Former US president Jimmy Carter makes a goodwill visit which includes a tour
of scientific centres, in response to US allegations about biological weapons. Carter is the first
former or serving US president to visit Cuba since the 1959 revolution.
2002 June - National Assembly amends the constitution to make socialist system of
government permanent and untouchable. Castro called for the vote following criticisms from
US President George W Bush.
2003 March-April - Crackdown on dissidents draws international condemnation. Seventy-five
people are jailed for terms of up to 28 years; three men who hijacked a ferry in an attempt to
reach the US are executed.
2003 June - EU halts high-level official visits to Cuba in protest at the country's recent human
rights record.
2004 April - UN Human Rights Commission censures Cuba over its rights record. Cuban
foreign minister describes resolution - which passed by single vote - as "ridiculous".
2004 May - US sanctions restrict US-Cuba family visits and cash remittances from
expatriates.
2004 October - President Castro announces ban on transactions in US dollars, and imposes
10% tax on dollar-peso conversions.
2005 January - Havana says it is resuming diplomatic contacts with the EU, frozen in 2003
following a crackdown on dissidents.
2005 May - Around 200 dissidents hold a public meeting, said by organisers to be the first
such gathering since the 1959 revolution.
Castro, too, has sought to quietly prepare Cuba for the post-Castro period. In
particular, he has designated considerable authority to several officials he trusts to
carry Cuba forward. These are Ricardo Alarcon, President of the Cuban Parliament
and an expert on US-Cuba relations, Carlos Lage, an expert in the economy, and
Felipe Perez Roque, foreign minister (Robinson 2000, p126; the former foreign
minister, Roberto Robaina, was quietly removed from the Communist Party on the
basis of misuse of funds, Australian 2002). Castro's brother, Raúl, though powerful
as minister of defence, might continue as a transition leader, but a collective
leadership is a possibility in the post-Castro period (Robinson 2000, p126;
Dominguez 2003). This group is recognised as capable, live modestly, and do not
seem to be involved in large-scale corruption (Robinson 2000, p127). On this basis,
there is no certainty that they would be swept aside as were the officials of creaking
communist parties in Eastern Europe. We should also remember that Castro remained
vigorous in his mid-seventies, and only recently showed public signs of serious illhealth, while from late 2005 the CIA has suggested that he has Parkinson's disease
(Robles 2006). Likewise, there has been some slight improvement in the standard of
ordinary living, but many people remain poor and only survive with the aid of
Lecture 4
23
subsidised food and special welfare support. In particular, the Cuban leadership
admits that they have not captured the heart and minds of much of the youth of
the island, and that it is with them that the revolution will stand or fall - simply
institutionalising the revolution (Robles 2006), health care and Cuban culture is not
enough to ensure its future. Various models of peaceful transition have been
suggested, ranging from power sharing through to a gradual opening of the economy
and then the political system. There is no guarantee that the U.S. will be able to
steer this process, in spite of plans from 2003 to try to begin this: Faced with growing dissatisfaction in October 2003 from a small but aggressive
segment of his electoral base, Bush offered this faction the promise of a major
initiative against Cuba: the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. He mandated
the Commission "to identify ways to hasten the arrival of that day" when "Castro's
regime is no more."
The outline of the new policy became clearly evident in the "Report to the President"
released in May 2004 by the Commission. The last five chapters of the 500-page
report describe a post-Castro, U.S.-governed transition to a market democracy.
(Brenner & Jimenez 2006)
The question we can ask is whether Cuba can plan its future and engage the
'globalising world order' (see further Amaro 2000). At present, its policies have begun
to re-link the country into the world economy (see Seminar 4), but not enough to
completely transform social relations on the island. It remains open to question,
however, whether the current Cuban policy makers will be able to retain control of the
Cuban economy (see Monreal & Hammond 1999). In the long term, Cubans will face
the choice of whether they retain their revolutionary legacy, or whether this will be
too expensive and difficult to maintain in its current form. Their cultural and historical
experience, however, means that they are unlikely to lose their unique pride in being
Cuban. Eventual normalisation of relations with the U.S., if and when if comes, may
well be a mixed blessing. Here Cuba's unique culture and history may be crucial
in giving the island the resilience to negotiate a unique solution in the face of
pressures from globalisation. The post-Castro period will be a period of enormous
opportunity, and risk, for Cuba.
9. Survival Strategies (covered in Seminar session)
10. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resources
Factiva is a useful database of newspapers with worldwide coverage. It can be
searched from BU Library database page via www.bond.edu.au
Cuba in Transition contains a useful collection of articles that can be accessed from
http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/ The authors assume economic and
political transition on the island, providing a range of useful data.
Lecture 4
24
A collection of current Cuban news, from a wide range of sources, generally
critical
of
Cuba,
will
be
found
from
Cuba
News
at
http://www.cubanet.org/cubanews.html
Useful background data can be found at the Cuban Experience Website, at
http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/index.shtml
Voluntary Further Reading: You Might Like to Look at One of the Following AGUIRRE, Benigno B. "Social Control in Cuba", Latin American Politics and Society, 44 no.
2, Summer 2002, pp67-99 [Access via Ebsco Database]
BOND, Theresa "The Crackdown in Cuba", Foreign Affairs, 82 no. 5, September-October
2003 [Access via Infotrac Database]
BRENNER, Philip & JIMENEZ, Marguerite " U.S. policy on Cuba beyond the last
gasp", NACLA Report on the Americas, 39 no. 4, Jan-Feb 2006, pp15-24 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
BRUNDENIUS, Claes "Whither the Cuban economy after recovery? The reform
process, upgrading strategies and the question of transition", Journal of Latin
American Studies, 34 no. 2, May 2002, pp365-395 [Internet Access via Infotrac
Database]
DILLA ALFONSO, Haroldo "Cuban civil society: II. future directions and challenges",
NACLA Report on the Americas, 39 no. 4, Jan-Feb 2006, pp37-43 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
FERNÁNDEZ, Damián Cuba and the Politics of Passion, Austin, University of Texas Press,
2000
OTERO, Gerardo & O'BRYAN, Janice "Cuba In Transition: The Civil Sphere's
Challenge to the Castro Regime", Latin American Politics & Society, 44 no. 4,
Winter 2002, pp29-57 [Access via Ebsco Database]
KOONT, Sinan "Food Security in Cuba", Monthly Review, 55 issue 8, Jan 2004, pp11-20
[Access via Infotrac Database]
ROBINSON, Linda "Towards a Realistic Cuba Policy", Survival, 42 no. 1, Spring 2000,
pp116-129
SUCHLICKI, Jaime Cuba: From Columbus to Castro and Beyond, N.Y., Brasseys Inc, 1997
SCHWARTZMAN, Kathleen C. "Can International Boycotts Transform Political
Systems? The Cases of Cuba and South Africa", Latin American Politics and Society;
43 no. 2, Summer 2001, pp115-146 [Access via BU Library Databases]
Bibliography
Africa News Service "110 Cuban Doctors Expected", 9 January 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Agence France Press "Dissident Paya Says Opposition in Cuba has Entered a New Phase", 4 February 2003
[Access via Nexis Database]
AGUIRRE, Benigno B. "Social Control in Cuba", Latin American Politics and Society, 44 no. 2, Summer 2002,
pp67-99 [Access via Ebsco Database]
AMARO, Nelson "Models of Development and Globalization in Cuba", ASCE, 10, 2000, pp277-288 [Internet
Access at http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba10/amaro.pdf]
AUGUST, Arnold Democracy in Cuba and the 1997-1998 Elections, La Habana, Editorial José Martí, 1999
Australian " Video reveals fate of 'disloyal' Cuban minister", 2 August 2002, p7 [Access via Nexis Database]
BBC "US Airline Starts Flights to Cuba", BBC Online, 1 November 2001 [Internet Access via Cuba News]
BBC
"Timeline
Cuba",
BBC
Online,
14
December
2005
[Internet
Access
via
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1203355.stm]
BOND, Theresa "The Crackdown in Cuba", Foreign Affairs, 82 no. 5, September-October 2003 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
BRASHER, Philip "40-year-old Cuba Embargo May End : Senate Committee OKs Sale of Food and Medicine ",
Detroit Free Press, March 24, 2000 [Internet Access]
BRENNER, Philip & JIMENEZ, Marguerite " U.S. policy on Cuba beyond the last gasp", NACLA Report on the
Americas, 39 no. 4, Jan-Feb 2006, pp15-24 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Lecture 4
25
BRUNDENIUS, Claes "Whither the Cuban economy after recovery? The reform process, upgrading strategies and
the question of transition", Journal of Latin American Studies, 34 no. 2, May 2002, pp365-395 [Internet
Access via Infotrac Database]
CANTOR, Judy "The Cuba Controversy", Billboard, 110 no. 35, 29 August 1998 [Access via Ebsco Database]
CANTOR, Judy "Cuban Rap Act Orishas Returning Home", Billboard, 112 no. 50, 9 December 2000, p69
[Access via Ebsco Database]
CASTRO, Fidel History Will Absolve Me, N.Y., Grossman, 1968
CHANG, Laurance et al. Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, N.Y., New
Haven, 1998
CHIODO, John J. " Teaching about Manifest Destiny: Clarifying the Concept", The Social Studies, 91 issue 5,
September 2000 [Access via Infotrac Database]
CNN INTERACTIVE "'Cuban issue' among topics of Latin summit", CNN Interactive, November 9, 1997
[Internet Access]
DE LA FUENTE, Alejandro Recreating Racism: Race and Discrimination in Cuba's "Special Period",
Georgetown University, Cuba Briefing Paper no. 18, July 1998
DE LA FUENTE, Alejandro "Race, Ideology, and Culture in Cuba: Recent Scholarship", Latin
American Research Review, 35 no. 3, 2000, pp199-210
DE LA FUENTO, Alejandro "The Resurgence of Racism in Cuba", NACLA Report on the Americas,
34 no. 6, 2001, pp29-34
DELGADO, Abel "The Death of Salsa", Descarga Newsletter, 25 October 1999 [Internet Access via
http://www.descarga.com/cgi-bin/db/archives/]
DETEMPLE, Jill "Singing the Maine: The Popular Image of Cuba in Sheet Music of the Spanish American War",
The Historian, 63 no. 4, Summer 2001 [Access via Infotrac Database]
DILLA ALFONSO, Haroldo "Cuban civil society: II. future directions and challenges", NACLA Report on the
Americas, 39 no. 4, Jan-Feb 2006, pp37-43 [Access via Infotrac Database]
DOMINGUEZ, Jorge I. "Temas (Youth, Demographics, Social Change: Cuba)", Foreign Policy, Winter 1999
[Internet Access via http://www.finarticles.com]
DOMINGUEZ, Jorge I. "Cuba: His Bother's Keeper", Foreign Policy, issue 139, Nov-Dec 2003, pp34-35
DORFMAN, Ariel "The Guerrilla: Che Guevara", Time, 14 June 1999 [Internet Access via BU Library Databases]
Economist "The Americas: Mala Vista Social Club", The Economist, 23 October 1999 [Internet Access via BU
Library Databases]
Economist "United States" All About a Boy", The Economist, 22 April 2000
Economist "The Dollarised Revolution: Cuba's Economy", The Economist, August 2, 2003a, p37 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
Economist "With help from oil and friends; Cuba's economy", 15 January 205, p35 [Access via Infotrac Database]
ELLIOTT, Andrea "Cuban Diplomat Visits Miami to Plan Talks", Miami Herald, 5 February 2003, p1 [Access via
Ebsco Database]
EXCITE NEWS "Cuba Eyes 2012 Olympics", Excite News, 1 June 2001a [Internet Access]
EXCITE NEWS "German Minister to Head Cuba Trade Mission", Excite News, 31 May 2001b [Internet Access]
FALCOFF, Mark "Cuba After Castro", Chief Executive, April 2000, pp28-30
FERNÁNDEZ, Damián Cuba and the Politics of Passion, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2000
FOSTER, Michael "Cubanidad Revisited (Review)", Building Design, 1 April 1999 [Access via BU Library
Databases]
GABILONDO, Jose M. "Sending Signals: Using Rent-Seeking Theory to Analyze the Cuban Central Bank",
Houston Journal of International Law, 27 no. 3, Spring 2005, pp483-525 [Access via Infotrac Database]
GILCREASE, Christopher " US diplomacy and the downfall of a Cuban dictator: Machado in 1933", Journal of
Latin American Studies, 34 no. 2, May 2002, p255-282 [Access via Infotrac Database]
GUNN, Gillian Cuba's NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society?, Georgetown University, Cuba
Briefing
Paper,
No.
7,
February
1995
[Internet
Access
via
http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribe/bp7.htm]
HANSING, Katrin "Rasta, Race and Revolution: Transnational Connections in Socialist Cuba",
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27 no. 4, October 2001, pp733-747
HATCH, David A. & JOHNSON, Thomas R. "Full Length Synopsis of the Cuban Missile Crisis", NSA and the
Cuban
Missile
Crisis,
National
Security
Agency
USA,
Internet
Access
at
http://www.nsa.gov/docs/cuba/synopsis.htm
HERNANDEZ, Rafael "Frozen Relations: Washington and Cuba After the Cold War", NACLA Report on the
Americas, 35 no. 4, January 2002, pp21-44
HICKSON, Jill "The Day that Launched the Cuban Revolution", Green Left Weekly, no. 239, 24 July, 1996
[Internet Access at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43b/084.html]
HOLBRAAD, Martin "Religious 'Speculation': The Rise of Ifa Cults and Consumption in Post-Soviet Cuba",
Journal of Latin American Studies, 36 no. 4, November 2004, pp643-663 [Access via Infotrac Database]
JAMIESON, Ross W. " The Essence of Commodification: Caffeine Dependencies in the Early Modern World ",
Journal of Social History, Winter, 2001 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
KOONT, Sinan "Food Security in Cuba", Monthly Review, 55 issue 8, Jan 2004, pp11-20 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
Lecture 4
26
KORNBLUH, Peter (ed.) Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba, N.Y., New
Press, 1998
LAM, RaFael "Compay Segundo, The World’s Oldest and Most Famous ‘Trovador’ de Las Montañas", Granma
Internacional, 15 June 2000 [Internet Access].
LANTIGUA, John "Meet Miami's Cuban Moderates", Salon.com News, 7 April 2000 [Internet Access]
MacGAFFEY, Wyatt et al. Cuba: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New haven, HRAF Press, 1962
MEGGITT, Peter “'A Report on Grass-Roots Organisations and Unionism in Cuba: Cuban Alternative
Visions', Gold Coast, Australia Cuba Friendship Society, February 2003
MERICLE, David et. al. "Fulgencio Batista 1901-1973", The Cuban Experience, 1998 [Internet Access at
http://library.thinkquest.org/18355/peoplens.html]
MONREAL, Pedro & HAMMOND, Jack "Sea Changes: The New Cuban Economy", North American Congress
on Latin America (NACLA) Report on the Americas, 32 no. 5, March-April 1999, pp21-29 [Internet
Access via BU Library Databases]
MORALES, Magdalena "U.S. Seeks Form Anti-Terror Support from Venezuela", Excite News, 9 November 2001
[Internet Access]
MOORE, Robin Nationalizing Blackness: Afrocubanismo and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 1920-1940,
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburg, 1997
MORRIS, Jim "Elian's Well-Being Debated as Court Considers Case", CNN News, 19 April 2000 [Internet Access
via Netscape]
NACKERUD, Larry et al. "The End of the Cuban Contradiction in U.S. Refugee Policy", International Migration
Review, 33 no. 1, 1999, pp176-192
NACLA "Cuba in the Americas Looking Inward, Reaching Out", NACLA Report on the Americas, 39 no. 4, JanFeb 2006, p14 [Access via Infotrac Database]
NEWSDAY "Pax Cubana: Let Papal Visit Thaw U.S.-Cuba Relations", Newsday, 18 January 1998 [Internet
Access via Electric Library]
NotiCen "Cuban Economy Showed Modest Growth in 2003", NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs,
January 15, 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
NotiCen "Blockade Against Cuba Slammed at Summit", NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs, Oct 20,
2005a [Access via Infotrac Database]
O'BRIEN, Thomas F. "The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Cuba", American Historical Review,
June 1993, pp765-785
Oil Daily " Cuba Hopes to Raise Output", 52 issue 34, Feb 20, 2002 [Access via Infotrac Database]
OLAVARRIA, Margot "Rap and Revolution: Hop Hop Comes to Cuba", NACLA Report on the Americans, 35 no.
6, May/June 2002, pp28-30
OLSHAN, Marc A. "Lessons from Cuba", Humanist, May-June 1998 [Internet Access via
http://www.finarticles.com]
OTERO, Gerardo & O'BRYAN, Janice "Cuba In Transition: The Civil Sphere's Challenge to the Castro Regime",
Latin American Politics & Society, 44 no. 4, Winter 2002, pp29-57 [Access via Ebsco Database]
PADGETT, Tim "Cuba's New Look", Time, 6 December 1999 [Internet Access via BU Library Databases]
PEREZ, Louis A. Jr. "Between Meanings and Memories of 1898 (The U.S., Cuba, An Ocean of Mischief)", Orbis,
Fall 1998 [Internet Access via http://www.finarticles.com]
Prensa Latina "Cuban Tourism Increase 13% in 2005", 30 January 2006 [Internet Access via
http://www.plenglish.com/]]
Prensa Latina "Cuba GDP Grow Shows Economy Strength", 14 January 2006 [Internet Access via
http://www.plenglish.com/]
PROMAR INTERNATIONAL Cuba, Si!: Opportunities for US Food and Agriculture, Strategic Consultant
Series, Promar International, December 2000 [Commercial Study at
http://www.promarinternational.com/Brochures/cubaWsamples.pdf]
QUIRK, Robet E. Fidel Castro, N.Y., W.W. Norton, 1993
RICE, John "Cuba 'Endorses' Dissident Aid Bill", Excite News, 24 May 2001 [Internet Access]
RITTER, Archibald & ROWE, Nicholas "Cuba: From 'Dollarization' to 'Euroization' or 'Peso Reconsolidation'?",
Latin American Politics and Society, 44 no. 2, Summer 2002, pp99-123 [Access via Ebsco Database]
ROBINSON, Linda "Towards a Realistic Cuba Policy", Survival, 42 no. 1, Spring 200, pp116-129
ROBLES, Frances "Rare unease in Cuba on survival of revolution", Miami Herald, 8 January 2006 [Internet
Access via http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/cuba/13573535.htm]
ROGERS. Graciela Iglesias "Argentina and Cuba Agree on Trade of "Drugs for Dollars", The Lancet, 25 October
2003 [Internet Access via Infotrac Database]
ROMEI, Stephen "Elian Given Hero's Welcome Home", The Australian, 30 June 2000, p12
ROSSET, Peter M. "Alternative Agriculture Works: The Case of Cuba", Monthly Review, July-August 1998
[Internet Access via http://www.finarticles.com]
SAN MARTIN, Nancy "Cuba Gets Tough On Drugs: Usage Jumped in Past Decade", Miami Herald, 5 February
2003, p5 [Access via Ebsco Database]
SAN MARTIN, Nancy & REYES, Alba "Terrorism and Tourism Among Topics at Summit for Spanish-,
Portuguese-speaking Countries", Miami Herald, 15 November 2002 [Access via Ebsco Database]
SCARPACI, Joesph L. " Globalization and work: economy, remittances, and joint ventures in post-soviet Cuba",
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 14 no. 2, Fall 2004, pp499-515 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
Lecture 4
27
SCHWARTZ, Nikki “Iran, Cuba Dictate Internet Rules”, Information Management Journal, 37 no. 5, Sept-Oct
2003, p10 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SCHWEIMLER, Daniel "Terror Attacks Fail to Blight Cuba's Outlook", Financial Times, 1 November 2001
[Internet Access]
SEQUERA, Vivian "Cuban Journalists Form Association", Excite News, 31 May 2001 [Internet Access]
SMITH, Geri "Yahoo, Stay Home", Business Week, 29 November 19999 [Internet Acess via BU Library
Databases]
SNOW, Anita "Castro Seeks to Allay Cuba's Fears", Excite News, 2 November 2001 [Internet Access]
SUAREZ SALAZAR, Lius " Cuba's foreign policy and the promise of ALBA", NACLA Report on the Americas,
39 no. 4, Jan-Feb 2006, pp27-33 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SUPER, John C. "Interpretations of church and state in Cuba, 1959-1961", The Catholic Historical Review, 89 no.
3, July 2003, pp511-530 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SWEENEY, Philip The Rough Guide to Cuban Music, London, Rough Guides, 2001
TAMAYO, Juan "Exiles Assist a Coup for Castro", The Australian, 30 June 2000, p12
THOMAS, Hugh Cuba: Or, The Pursuit of Freedom, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971
THOMPSON, Vincent The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas 1441-1900, Harlow, Longman, 1987
TOOTHAKER, Christopher "Venezuelans Protest 'Cubanization'", Excite News, 26 May 2001 [Internet Access]
TOPIK, Steven C. "Coffee Anyone? Recent Research on Latin American Coffee Societies", The Hispanic
American Historical Review, 80 no. 2, May 2000, pp225-266
TREMLETT, Giles "In Cuba, The Businessman In Front is a European", The European, 11 May 1998, pp26-27
[Internet Access via Electric Library]
ULAM, Adam "Missile Mystery", The New Republic, 218 no. 12, 23 March 1998, pp15-17
VANDERBUSH, Walt & HANEY, Patrick J. "Policy Toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration", Political
Science Quarterly, 114 no. 3, Fall 1999, pp387-408
WADE, Peter et al. "Making Cultural Identities in Cali, Colombia", Current Anthropology, 40 no. 4, AugustOctober 1999, pp449-471
WILLIAMSON, Edwin The Penguin History of Latin America, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1992
WILLIFORD, Brad "The Cuban Revolution of 1895-98", The Spanish American War Centennial Website, 1998
[Internet Access at http://www.spanam.simplenet.com/cubanrev.htm]
WORLD TRADE "Cuba Goes Euro", World Trade, 12 no. 8, August 1999, p20
Xinhua "Cuba Strives to Boost Tourism", Xinhua News Agency, August 27, 2003a [Access via Infotrac Database]
Xinhua "Cuba's Foreign Cooperation Projects Approach 700 Mark", Xinhua News Agency, Jan 2, 2004a [Access
via Infotrac Database]
Xinhua "Anti-FTAA Forum Opens in Cuba," Xinhua News Agency, Jan 27, 2004b [Access via Infotrac Database]
YANOW, Scott Afro-Cuban Jazz, San Francisco, Miller Freeman Books, 2000
ZYTARUK, Melinda "Life after oil: Cuba's fossil fuel shortage has inspired innovations that combine sustainable
agriculture and renewable energy", Alternatives Journal, 29 no. 4, Fall 2003, pp22-26 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
Lecture 4
28