Philosophy of Semiotics
Philosophical Aspects of Semiotics
Abstract: This article is based on my research in the field of semiotics, a field in
which I have been involved for over 25 years. Throughout that time, I felt that my work was
situated on the boundary between semiotics and philosophy. Recently, I concluded that all
semiotic activity related to scientific research is part of epistemology, in that it deals with
certain aspects of the acquisition of knowledge.
Semiotic activity is a significant part of all scientific research. Along with observation
and experimentation, it is included to varying degrees in all stages of the scientific process.
Scientists rely on signs throughout their research work, from the time they plan a project
through the summarizing of their conclusions.
Every branch of science develops its own sign-system or systems. The development
process is one of constant and continuous innovation, because the system of signs used by a
science must grow and develop along with the science itself. My research has led me to
conclude that sign-systems evolve in predictable patterns, gradually becoming more
abstract by incorporating increasingly abstract symbols. If we can identify these patterns,
we may be able to determine the stage of maturity of a given scientific theory at a particular
time. The essays in this article are one of the first attempts to begin identifying and
characterizing these patterns.
Keywords: ontological reality; epistemology; semiotic activity; signs and
sign-systems; semiotic reality; conceptual grid
For over twenty years, I have been dealing with topics that belong to the field
of semiotics, the science of signs. All of the semiotic issues I have discussed during
this entire period are near the boundary between semiotics and philosophy. Some of
the problems belong primarily to the field of semiotics, others to the field of
philosophy, and some are mixtures of both fields. In this paper, I will focus on those
issues that are essentially philosophical in nature. I have collected these topics into a
single paper because I think that, together, they offer a fresh viewpoint for handling
established philosophical problems and highlight new facets of these problems.
The boundaries of the field of philosophy are very broad, comprising many
branches, including ethics, theology, political thought, and many other issues. The
philosophic problems I deal with in this paper and in my work in semiotics in
general, belong exclusively to the branch of philosophy called philosophy of
science. By this I mean that my work concentrates on issues that have arisen from
semiotics and are related to the development and dissemination of the sciences.
Other subjects are entirely beyond the scope of my studies.
Within this range of issues, I will also limit my discussion to matters that I
personally encountered during my exploration of semiotic studies, that is, the system
of semiotics that I myself have developed and presented over the past decades.
Nonetheless, I do not in any way aspire to writing a comprehensive treatise on the
philosophy of science. My aim is to survey a number of points that seem to shed
new light on the conventional wisdom in the realm of philosophy of science.
Because of this, this paper contains discussions about a number of distinct issues
that are not closely connected with one another. Each problem is dealt with as a
separate issue in a short essay. All of these are topics of a semiotic nature that
extend beyond the scope of pure semiotics into the philosophic domain, and in some
way contradict its accepted views and its handling of them.
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Philosophy of Semiotics
Issue 1
Semiotics, like many other sciences, grew out of philosophizing
What we recognize today as the sciences have their origins in ancient Greece,
where they developed as an outgrowth of the Greeks’ special approach to what they
called philosophy. Literally, the term “philosophy” means “love of wisdom”. For the
ancient Greeks, this meant the desire to meditate on and discuss what they
considered to be matters of substance, namely, issues that lie beyond the scope of
everyday concerns. They left the business of practical life to slaves and other lower
castes of the population; philosophizing and its implementation in politics and other
spheres, that were deemed lofty enough for patricians, was the realm of the upper
classes, and conversely, was also only open to them. Even among the upper classes,
the very name “philosopher” could only be applied to the wisest of people. Thus,
according to Plato, only philosophers had the right to choose proper words for a
living language.
Because of this attitude towards philosophy, the ancient Greeks were
constantly involved in lengthy conversations about whatever topic happened to
come into their minds. These conversations were recorded in numerous texts, many
of which are preserved to this very day. To us, many of them seem naïve and
senseless, but they represent the very first efforts to understand and explain natural
phenomena, and the sciences as we know them grew directly from these early
reflections. Indeed, by using these philosophic methods, some of the brightest of the
ancient Greeks arrived at far-reaching and surprisingly accurate guesses about the
natural world. For example, they guessed that the Earth was round, that all material
things are composed of tiny particles (atoms), and that all substances are mutable.
(“One can never enter the same river.”)
The most prominent of the ancient thinkers formulated complete theories that
remained influential for long periods of time and were applied for practical
purposes. A classic example of such a theory is Ptolemy’s geocentric structure of the
solar system. In addition, some particularly gifted thinkers worked out complete
structures for certain sciences — structures that have been studied continuously
from the time they were formulated to this day, such as Euclid’s geometry and
Aristotle’s formal logic.
First steps away from pure philosophic discourse
It is only natural that the sciences, when they first became separate from
philosophizing, were rather amorphous and vaguely formulated. Each science began
its existence as a hypothesis based on a few known facts and accompanied by some
ideas about how the hypothesis could be expanded into more coherent forms and
applications. The author of the hypothesis usually tried to classify the pertinent
facts, but given the limitations of the available data, was usually limited to creating
a taxonomy.
To understand what I mean by this, let me clarify that, in my view, there is a
great difference between scientific taxonomy and classification. Taxonomy precedes
classification and relies more on the logical composition of the categories under
scrutiny than on their precise comparison and evaluation. By contrast, classification
requires precise analysis, and, because of this, it develops little by little out of
practical field work.
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Philosophy of Semiotics
Ultimately, classification requires homogeneity among the objects or
occurrences that are grouped together. It is only when signs of a similar character,
representing facts with the same nature, appear, that true classification can take
place. The general rule is this: If the signs in a group have a common character, this
indicates that we have crossed the boundary from taxonomy to classification.
Meticulously built categories (taxons), arranged in a logical order, pave the way to
exact scientific comparisons based on well-defined criteria and findings
(classifications).
Let us take, for example, the birth of contemporary biology. The foundations of
modern biology were laid out by Charles Darwin in his famous work, On the Origin
of Species. In this book, Darwin postulated that the biological development of living
creatures depends on competition between species and on the resistant force of the
species with the best qualities. Based on this idea, Darwin conjectured a
hypothetical series of organisms that evolved one from the other in a sequence that
led ultimately to homo sapiens.
As part of his theory, Darwin mentioned some taxons that exemplified the
turning points in this evolutionary sequence. These taxons included creatures whose
characteristics were not entirely defined, but whose existence in their proposed
locations in the sequence derived logically from the general principles of the
hypothesis. Since the theory was accepted as a paradigm of biological science, these
points were used as orientation marks for all future findings. Further investigations
in the field of biology sometimes led to their verification and at other times led to
their partial or complete refutation. Gradually, Darwin’s taxonomy was transformed
into a classification consisting of classes and subclasses that were supported by
convincing biological arguments and physical evidence.
Another example of the distinction between taxonomy and classification can be
seen in modern cartography. All cartographic models (maps, globes, computerized
images, etc.) can be divided into four groups: geocentric models, models of the sky
as observed from the Earth, models of celestial bodies other than the Earth, and
navigational charts. This division is based on the position of the observer and the
field of observation; in addition, a temporal parameter is sometimes added to the
spatial ones.
This breakdown distinguishes between four kinds of cartography, each of
which makes use of different sorts of signs and their syntactic bonds. But from a
semiotic point of view, each of these groups exists in the taxonomic dimension, as
each of them includes different kinds of models that use different kinds of signs. If
we delve more deeply into the components of one of these groups, we can begin to
classify them. For example, if we look at the details of the geocentric kind of
mapping, we will be moving one step from taxonomy towards classification. An
additional step closer to classification brings us to the various types of geocentric
cartography: the cartography of physical space on the Earth, political mappings of
the planet (states and their borders), thermal charts, etc. Within each of these latter
categories we can, at last, find actual classification schemes, because each of these
categories uses the same standard set of signs, and that set of signs is only used for
mappings within the category. Indeed, when we identify the use of a standard set of
signs within a particular scientific field, we can conclude that we have found the
mature science of a particular category.
Semiotics developed in the same way
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Philosophy of Semiotics
Just as the other scientific fields with which we are familiar developed out of
philosophizing, so did the field of semiotics. The first time the real nature of signs
was described was in the works of St. Augustine (354–430). While trying to
substantiate his religious views, he wrote about different categories of signs. In his
De Doctrina Christiana, he identified two types of signs, those we find ready-made
in nature and those people invent in their minds, that is, products of human
ingenuity. In the course of these purely theoretical expositions, he laid out the
foundations of the future semiotics.
The next milestone in the development of semiotics was the theories of Charles
Peirce, who, towards the end of the 19th century (!), gave his tripartite taxonomy of
signs, dividing them into indices, icons, and symbols. This was a continuation of St.
Augustine’s approach, and most scientists use this “classification” in their works
even today. Still, it belongs in the realm of taxonomy, as each of the categories unite
a variety of different signs and sign systems.
My own division of signs and sign-systems, which I have been publicizing for
more than 20 years, also belongs to the taxonomic level of analysis, and is meant to
be an elaboration on Peirce’s taxonomy. The first two levels of my taxonomy of
signs and sign-systems correspond to his first two categories, indices and icons; the
last four flesh out his last category, symbols.
Nonetheless, my system differs from Peirce’s in that it is an ordered list – a
hierarchy from less abstract to more abstract signs. This hierarchy is based on two
interrelated sequences: the order in which the human mind comes to understand
signs and their systems as it develops cognitively (ontogenesis), and the gradual
process by which human thinking has matured over time and become more abstract
(the phylogenesis of the development of the human race). To briefly clarify what I
mean, let me give you a short overview of my system. (The scheme is described in
greater detail under Issue 3 below.)
My taxonomy consists of six categories of signs and sign-systems, arranged in
a continuum from the least abstract to the most abstract.
The first type of sign-system to appear in the history of homo sapiens was the
natural sign-system. This type of sign-system is based on natural signs –
naturally-occurring objects and phenomena from which we can draw conclusions
about a complete picture that is partially concealed from us. Examples of natural
signs are a column of smoke that tells us where a fire is, and foot prints that tell us
about an animal that has already passed by.
In human history, as well as in the individual human mind, natural
sign-systems were followed by iconic sign-systems. These sign-systems are based on
images, which are much more abstract signs than natural ones, since they are not
parts of the whole in existing natural systems, but are invented by humans.
Natural and iconic sign-systems were followed by language sign-systems,
which are composed of linguistic signs. These were followed by notational
sign-systems, which use hieroglyphs as their basic signs, and, finally, formalized or
mathematical sign-systems, which are based on symbols. (This latter type of
sign-system is divided into two sub-categories: sign-systems whose symbols have a
fixed meaning and sign-systems whose symbols have variable meanings that are
assigned ad hoc.)
Obviously, my system of semiotics is far more elaborate than its predecessors.
Nonetheless, although it is much closer to being a classification, it still remains in
the realm of taxonomies. One more step is required in order to arrive at a true
classification model consisting of ontological objects represented by homogeneous
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Philosophy of Semiotics
signs. It would be enough to take the taxon of notational signs (hieroglyphs) and
descend to its various subsections, such as the systems of writing (with letters as
basic signs), musical notations (with notes as basic signs), technical drawing (with
blueprints as basic signs), and we are already in the realm of genuine classification.
Within each of these subsections are subdivisions that are fully part of the realm of
classifications; this is what is being done all the time by scientists in the course of
their research.
Conclusion
Most sciences, including semiotics, were born out of philosophizing about the
things and phenomena people encounter in their ordinary and not so ordinary lives.
Little by little, the topics discussed became separate sciences with their distinct
subjects, special methods of research, and specific signs for notations. But it is
important to note that philosophy did not disappear from the scene completely. It
remains outside of the branches of science and provides a way to observe and
critique each branch. In addition, it can be used within a particular branch of science
to discuss its most general propositions.
Besides, by the characters of the signs used in the science we can judge about
this science level of development.
Issue 2
Semiotic shaping is one of the three characteristics of a fledgling
science
In the conclusion to the previous section, I enumerated the three indicators of a
separate branch of science: distinct subject-matter, specific methods of investigating
this subject-matter, and special semiotic shaping. Usually, only the first two are
mentioned; I think it is important to include the third one, the semiotic attribute, in
the discussion. The semiotic shaping of any distinct scientific field consists, in my
opinion, of two facets. The first, which is relevant to all scientific fields, is the
construction of a conceptual grid for the science. The second, which is only relevant
to those scientific fields that are called exact sciences, is the creation of a special
symbolic notation. Let us treat each facet separately.
On the conceptual grid of a science
In my semiotic treatment of linguistics, I have shown that each natural
language includes words (its basic signs) in three categories: proper names, notions,
and concepts. Every language began with proper names; that is, when our ancestors
first saw something, they gave it a name, so that they would be able use the name
even in the absence of the real object. These were the initial units of our languages,
the ones that are the least abstract in their meanings, because each word has its own
single referent.
People soon understood that they could not name each object, its components
and qualities, its transformations and links, with separate words. They began using
notions, which are also words, but have multiple referents. Notions made it possible
to denote many objects of the same class and of various related classes with a single
unit. It was the invention of notions that brought language into existence, but the act
of denotation became very difficult and was often very blurred. Nowadays, notions
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Philosophy of Semiotics
comprise the bulk of any linguistic vocabulary, and they are obviously more abstract
words than proper names are.
When humanity arrived at the modern scientific era, people were not content
with using notions for their scientific discourse, because notions by definition had
very blurred meanings. To deal with this problem, they invented concepts – words
with multiple referents that had strictly defined meanings within the framework of a
specific scientific domain. Thus, for each scientific field, the participants in the field
created a set of concepts that described their activities clearly.
The set of concepts that is used by a particular science, including information
about the relationships between the concepts, is called by me conceptual grid of the
science. Every mature science must have its own conceptual grid, or rather, a
number of interconnected conceptual grids. Lecturers in a scientific field typically
begin their courses by introducing their students to the conceptual grid of the field.
This gives them a structure in which to organize the topics and terms they will deal
with during the course. In professional discourse among scientists themselves, the
conceptual grid is also widely used. In fact, it is impossible for them to exclude it
from their exchanges of ideas.
I could give you an example of what I am talking about from any science. Let
us look at the science of law – jurisprudence. The conceptual grid of jurisprudence
is a sort of ladder that is wider at the bottom than at the top. As you move down the
ladder of concepts, you move from broader concepts to more specific ones. At the
top of the ladder is law – the most all-embracing and meaningful concept in the
domain. On the next lower level, the concept of law can be represented by the names
of different kinds of law: common law, criminal law, civil law, etc. If we descend
one step lower, we can find concepts related to each of the names on the level
above. For example, criminal law is divided into crimes against the state, murders,
rapes, etc. On the next lower level, below murders, we arrive at intentional murders,
murders by negligence, and so on. Each concept in the grid can be divided, level by
level, to bring us to the concept we want to elaborate on.
Work on the conceptual grid of any science continues all the time; the grid is
constantly expanded and modified in response to new findings in the field. This
process of perfecting the conceptual grid of a science plays a decisive role in the
continued development of the science.
On symbolic notation in exact sciences
In my formulation of the different functions of various sign-systems, I mention
the idea that sign-system transformation rules can be used to transform abstract
symbolic signs in lieu of the signs’ referents. This function is relevant for all kinds
of signs, but to different extents and in different ways. When signs become abstract
enough (at the highest levels of my hierarchy), they tend to be used as substitutes for
their referents; researchers work with the signs instead of their ontological
counterparts.
In the so called exact sciences, this is the rule rather than the exception. When
ontological objects are too distant, or too large, or too small, or we simply feel more
comfortable dealing with their written substitutes, we invent special symbols for
them and work with them using the accepted algorithms of the relevant branch of
science. This last point is very important: the existence of special formulas and
special ways for transforming these formulas are definite indications that we are
dealing with a separate branch of science or a special section within a very large
mother science (see below).
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Philosophy of Semiotics
That is why one aspect of every exact science is the invention and improvement
of its symbolism. This is true of chemistry and physics, cartography and
musicology, logic, and, especially, mathematics. The most capable people in each
field are busy working on this aspect of the field, and their work goes on
ceaselessly.
I mentioned above that the appearance of a new system of signs and
transformation algorithms sometimes indicates that a new science has been born, but
at other times the new system is only an aspect of an existing science. This can be
best understood as a continuum of various combinations. To understand how this
continuum works, we have to outline what a sign-system is as a construct. From the
semiotic point of view, each autonomous system of signs must have the following
features:
a) A special set of signs with a weight and role for each sign;
b) A specific combination of syntactic rules for the formation of the field in
which all the signs exist;
c) A set of specific algorithms for sign transformations – the rules of the
system’s syntax.
In view of these features, let us compare the symbols used in three fields:
modern chemistry, musical notation, and modern cartography.
Chemical symbolism began a long time ago, in ancient Greece and Egypt, but it
was not easy to arrive at a complete, systematic set of signs. This objective was
finally achieved in the 19th century by Dmitri Mendeleyev, who constructed his
famous periodic table. In this table, each chemical element was given its own place
and weight. It seemed that chemistry had achieved the semiotic pinnacle with this
table, but nonetheless, organic chemistry was not satisfied with it. It strived for
something else, and got it in the so-called structural signs. Alexander Butlerov and
August Kekule invented these structural signs and opened new horizons with this
new kind of symbolism. Does this mean that they revealed a new stratum of
scientific research? In some ways, yes, but the new kind of symbols they invented
did not lead to the formation of a new science, only to new vistas within the old
mother chemistry. Why? It seems that this was because the new signs included the
same elements and designations as the old system; only new designations of
syntactical ties between the denoted atoms were added.
On the other hand, in musical notation, which also developed over a very long
period of time, the sign transcription method for sounds seemed very stable and
permanent. Yet in the 20th century, jazz and disruptive cacophonic music came into
existence. These developments required other signs for their representation, and they
got them. The syntactic contour of the notation remained, but the sounds received
new notational forms. As with chemical symbolism, the old pattern prevailed and a
single framework of musical notations remained in force, even though very great
changes took place within it.
In modern cartography, all of the components of the semiotic system were
changed when they were used for new types of maps. (I wrote about this under Issue
1.) Nonetheless, all of these elements, which form some incompatible systems, are
still kept within the same professional framework. This has led me to the conclusion
that they ought to be separated.
Conclusion
Each mature branch of science must be judged not only by the specifics of its
subject-matter and its methods of study, but also by its semiotic shaping. This means
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Philosophy of Semiotics
the accepted conceptual grid of the science, and, for exact sciences, also includes
the specific symbolism of the science. The converse is also true: if we see a new
system of signs, it means that we have either encountered a completely new field of
study or a new realm of research in the existing field.
Issue 3
A new graphic model for scientific representations
It is a well-established practice to use graphic representations to illustrate
verbal explanations, especially for highly abstract themes and points. Thus, in
semiotics, triangles are widely used to show the nature of signs through the
interactions of the parts of the triangles. Yet, this is a relatively simple scheme that
can only be employed for a relatively small number of inferences, even if they are
highly important ones.
Since semiotics discusses also graphic signs, I think it is only appropriate that
it should take an active part in explaining them and their practical implications. No
less important is their philosophical significance in the field of scientific
investigations. That is why I am daring to devote a special section of my work to
introducing a comparatively new graphic pattern for illustrating the development of
a science, which I will explain in detail in this essay.
My first glimpse of the proposed scheme
The first time I came across this scheme was in the works of the famous
developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget (1896–1980), in which he presented his
theory about human cognitive development during the first years of life. The theory
spoke about different “schemata” (Piaget’s term) that are superimposed on one
another over the course of time.
In Piaget’s opinion, during the first phase of human development, children
manipulate material objects while they are within their field of view. As soon as an
object disappears, the infant seems to forget about it.
The next stage of children’s development begins within the next few months of
their lives. During this stage, children learn to remember objects that were perceived
earlier, and sometimes even demand them back. That is, children learn to retain
mental images of objects and can reproduce them in their minds or in their drawings,
even in the absence of the objects themselves. Thus, a new plane of thinking occurs,
along with conduct that corresponds to it.
In the third stage of cognitive development, symbolic representation of things
and events in the outside world begins, initially with the use of words.
The most striking feature of Piaget’s schemata is that each successive stage
appears not after the previous stages have petered out, but during the course of their
development. In addition, each new stage repeats components of the previous stage.
That is, the earlier cognitive patterns continue to grow even as the new ones take
form, and are usually enriched by the new vistas, while the new patterns are
prepared from the old established ones. Moreover, the new patterns even borrow
established forms of conduct. This holds true for each higher level of development;
each one obtains the substance and order of the one that preceded it, and adds its
own fresh overtones to it.
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Although Piaget never created a visual diagram of his schemata, they lend
themselves to a visual presentation. Thus, his schemata have influenced both my
hierarchy of signs and the graphic form I created for illustrating it, that I will
describe below.
My own usage of the scheme
When I wanted to elaborate on how signs develop, I felt it was natural to turn to
Piaget’s works and borrow his pattern of presentation, formalizing it into a scheme.
Earlier in this article, I explained this scheme verbally. Now I will present it
visually, in the form of a diagram. Here is its simplest version:
Let me begin by giving you a general explanation of the diagram. After that, I
will discuss its structure.
This classification scheme is most easily understood when the basic signs of
each type of sign-systems are explained sequentially, beginning with the lowest
level of the hierarchy, as follows:
Natural signs, the basic signs of natural sign-systems, are entities in and of
themselves – visible (or audible) elements of something that represent the entire
thing. These objects allow us to conjure up the entire entity when we cannot sense it
directly. For example, a visible pillar of smoke may tell us that a fire is burning
when that fire is not otherwise within the scope of our senses. Similarly, a light
coming from a window may suggest that the inhabitant of the room is at home.
Images, the basic signs of iconic sign-systems, are not parts of a real object but
a reflection of it; they represent the things they signify because they resemble those
things. Clearly, images are more removed from the things they signify than natural
signs, which are parts of the objects they represent.
Words, the basic signs of language sign-systems, are generally arbitrary signs,
having no intrinsic resemblance to the things they signify. As such, they are more
distant from the things they signify than images are. Yet words do have an
extra-systemic relationship to the things they signify, in that they represent actual
things that exist in reality, beyond the bounds of the language sign-system to which
they belong. For example, the word “table” represents an actual thing that exists
outside of the English language.
Hieroglyphs, the basic signs of notational sign-systems, only exist within
specific sign-systems, and only in relation to the other signs in the sign-system.
Their purpose is to represent something within a sign-system in graphic form. For
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Philosophy of Semiotics
example, the letters of the alphabet are hieroglyphs that represent sounds in graphic
form. Although hieroglyphs are more abstract than words, they nevertheless
maintain a constant relationship with the things they represent. Thus, the written
form of the word “table” is always “t-a-b-l-e,” and the individual letters that
compose the word “table” continually represent the sounds assigned them by the
particular language whose alphabet contains them.
Symbols, the basic signs of mathematical sign-systems, are, more often than
not, chance notations for dealing with ad hoc situations. For example, “z” may mean
weight in one situation and something entirely different in another. Thus, symbols
are signs with the remotest possible connection to their referents. These are the most
abstract of the basic semiotic signs.
The structural peculiarities of this scheme are as follows. Each level in the
structure reflects a separate level of signs and sign-systems that is mastered by a
person in the course of his cognitive development. We begin at the bottom of the
scheme, over which each new level is superimposed. This means that the successive
levels do not stop the development of the levels below them. Each new level can
only appear when the previous level is at least partially mastered. Thus, the previous
levels continue advancing, enhancing their skills from the new horizons added by
the new levels, while these new levels are enriched by those things the lower levels
have already mastered. Their interaction is mutually profitable; the signs denoting
the same ontological objects on each higher level become more penetrating in their
understanding as a result of it.
This process is reflected in the diagram’s “laddered pyramid” appearance: each
new level is shown as a higher step on the pyramid, which shows that the degree of
abstractness (and also the level of understanding) is higher on this step than on the
previous ones. Yet the main heuristic characteristic of the scheme is that each level
of presentation includes all the steps above it. That is, for example, the level of
natural signs comes to include, as it continues to develop, all of the stages shown in
the scheme: there are natural signs per se, natural signs encapsulated in images, in
words, in written signs, and even in formalized images (like graphs representing the
results of vision or hearing tests).
The same is also true of all the other levels in the pyramid. Even if we start at
the top of the pyramid – the highest formalized level of signs – we can find elements
of the other levels. For example, in arithmetic, we find aspects of natural
sign-systems in counting by means of material objects (such as fingers and toes);
aspects of images (like cuts on the stick by Robinson Crusoe); words; arithmetic as
it is taught in schools, and as it is used in algebraic formulas. In each case, it is
arithmetic, but it is implemented using different signs from all of the levels of the
semiotic reality.
And this leads us to a very important practical application: in this spring-like
design, we can visualize a very specific way of thinking, replaying itself again and
again, but at different levels of complexity. This compels us to pay attention to the
structure as a whole and to the importance of not omitting any of the parts it
includes. If, for example, when I was discussing a level in my scheme, I could not
give any information about any of its components, I knew I had to stop and to think
it over. In this respect, the scheme is even more helpful than the periodic structure
invented by Mendeleyev for his table.
Some other implementations of the scheme
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A very interesting book is devoted to the same design: Gödel, Escher, Bach: an
Eternal Golden Braid1, by Douglas R. Hofstadter. In this book, the author states his
belief that this pattern of thinking (in loop-like designs, as he calls them) is typical
of the human mind and is one important trait that distinguishes our minds from any
machine algorithm that is supposed to simulate “thinking”. In the book, Hofstadter
analyzes Bach’s fugues and canons, Escher’s drawings, and the famous theorem by
Gödel. He comes to the conclusion that all of them are built in accordance with the
same pattern as the one in the structure above.
Here is how he describes the structure of a canon in music, using the Russian
song Uncle Vanja as an example. The initial line is sung by the first voice, which
then goes on to sing the second line. Simultaneously, the second voice repeats the
first line in its own register. The first voice goes on with the third line, while the
second voice sings the second line and the third voice repeats the first line in its
particular register. In this way they sing in chorus, each one singing the same
melody and the same words, but in their own special rendering. Hofstadter considers
this to be one kind of what he calls a loop-like design; the same pattern appears in
all of his examples.
Conclusion
This is the same pattern that I am trying to publicize among the scholars of
different professions in this essay.
Issue 4
Semiotic reality and its qualities (1)
At the beginning of this century, I proposed a new semiotic concept, that of
semiotic reality 2 . This concept now seems to have been the most important
contribution to the philosophy of semiotics that I have made thus far, since I began
contemplating the nature of this science. In the course of time, I even began to
include semiotic reality in the tripartite definition of what semiotics means as a
branch of science: “it is a science about signs, sign-systems, and semiotic reality.”
The new concept has a lot of potential implications, some of which will be discussed
below. Clearly, the three implications I have chosen are not the only possible ones,
and there are many more. But one must take into consideration that the concept
itself is very young and there has not yet been enough time to examine it as carefully
as it deserves.
What is semiotic reality?
We are born into a world that already exists and to which we must adapt in
order to live. That is, by the very fact of our coming into this world, we encounter
the surrounding reality and try to discover its laws so that we can utilize them to our
advantage. This world in which we live is usually called ontological reality. Each
generation encounters its own ontological reality, which is different from the
1
The book was translated into Russian and published by Bachrah-M in 2000 under the title
“Гëдель, Эшер, Бах: эта бесконечная гирлянда”. Since I only have the Russian version of the
book, I will cite it in English in my own words.
2 Solomonick, Abraham (2002). On the Disparities between Ontology and Semiotic Reality .
Retrieved September 2010 from http://www.countries.ru/library/semiotic/two_realities.htm.
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ontological realities that humans had experienced before it. Each generation of
humans accepts the surrounding reality in its entirety as it is, and is unable to choose
something different.
In order to adapt to our ontological reality, we begin to study it, at school and
by ourselves. This acquisition of knowledge and the conclusions we draw from it
about ontological reality proceeds with the help of signs. Every thought we have,
and the expressions of our thoughts, are formed using signs: our speech consists of
signs (words are signs of their referents), and so are the pictures, maps, diagrams,
etc., that we use to explain ourselves. All cultural events – literature, ballet,
sculpture, and so forth – are infused with signs. Our scientific investigations are
performed using signs and their systems, and the results are also expressed in signs.
All of these signs and sign systems are gathered together in a special plane of our
life which I call semiotic reality.
Semiotic reality is a collection of semiotic findings about our surroundings, our
lives, and our own selves that are preserved in special receptacles, such as libraries
and computerized databases. From these receptacles, particular items can be
retrieved, studied, and worked upon; and thereafter they can be returned to their
receptacles for continued storage. Sometimes these receptacles are organized
according to the type of knowledge they contain, at other times, they gather all kinds
of information. The most important point is that these receptacles are all used for
safeguarding semiotic data.
Humans use semiotic reality to help them cope with ontological reality. With
its unwavering support, we penetrate into the essence of real objects, understand the
ways things work or behave, and sometimes even change the course of events for
the benefit of the human race. During some recent centuries, scientists using
semiotic reality succeeded in introducing many changes in our lives, making them
more comfortable and agreeable. With the help of semiotic reality, we have
succeeded in creating a lot of artificial amenities which have completely changed us
and improved our surroundings. Some of these changes were of material character;
these were added to ontological reality. Others were of a semiotic nature, and
improved our semiotic tools for further and more effective use.
As I mentioned above, there are many things that distinguish semiotic reality
from ontological reality. The rest of this article is actually devoted to elaborating on
the distinctive qualities of semiotic reality. The rest of the current essay is concerned
with its most significant distinction, a distinction that lies at the base of all the
others: that signs are material entities – in fact, they are no less material than
ontological entities – but their materialness is of a different nature than that of
ontological entities.
The materialness of signs
Signs are material in that they are recognized by our senses, just as any
ontological object is. If something is not recognizable, it cannot serve as a sign. On
the other hand, if a sign is written down in some way, it can exist even when it is
outside of our perception, just like any other material object, such as a chair or a
book.
Another quality of signs is that they must be comprehensible; otherwise they
also cannot serve as signs. If we do not understand a foreign language and do not
understand the meaning of its words, they can’t be considered proper signs for us.
Still, signs as material entities are distinctly different from ontological entities.
The most basic difference is in their origin: whereas ontological objects are not, for
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Philosophy of Semiotics
the most part, created by humans, all signs come from our minds. When we deal
with ontological objects, our influence on them may be very limited: we can only
have an impact on minor things, while larger elements do not obey us. By contrast,
we can do whatever we like with any sign and any sign-system – they are of our
own creation, and we can manipulate them at will. All other distinctive properties of
signs and sign-systems included in semiotic reality derive from this fact. Semiotic
reality develops in connection with and in accordance with ontological reality, but
as soon as it arises, it begins to exert its own laws and influence.
The principal function of semiotic reality: introducing individual
innovations into the common corpus
Collecting all existing semiotic facts under one roof turns all individual
endeavors into our common property. This is not always done intentionally; it is just
what the semiotic reality does de facto as it collects each and every individual
intellectual innovation. It is no secret that all of the human race’s progress is pushed
forward by individual efforts. But the individuals need other people’s approval,
support, and help with implementation in order to fully develop their ideas. These
can come into play only after other people learn about the proposed innovation. If it
remains in the private repository of its creator, it may never become generally
known and actualized.
By being published in printed or computerized form, an innovation
immediately becomes collectivized. People begin to scrutinize it, to criticize it, or,
conversely, to incorporate it into their own frames of reasoning. Sometimes a
proposed invention is tested empirically in experiments using specially crafted
instruments. Sooner or later, the innovation is either accepted by the scientific
community, and then by society as a whole, or it is rejected by them. The condicio
sine qua non for this is its appearance in the semiotic reality in a publicly accessible
format (in scientific publications, teaching aids, etc.).
Incorporation into the corpus of accepted truths is the ultimate indicator
of scientific approval
Once a scientific innovation has been incorporated into the semiotic reality, all
further discourse related to it must be judged with reference to the knowledge that is
already accepted. A proposal’s compliance with this body of knowledge, as
expressed by the approval of those who are familiar with it, is one of the conditions
for its incorporation into that body.
This approach to accepting innovations has proven to be reliable over the last
few centuries. This is why I disagree with the pessimistic opinions of many laymen,
and a few scientists, who assume that the weaknesses of our individual perception
means, that the sum of these perceptions must be even weaker and less defensible.
The involvement of semiotic reality in the scientific process seems to be a reliable
counterbalance to this weakness. Collective control on all proposed innovations and
their experimental examination (when necessary) seem strong enough tools for
managing the acceptance or rejection of a proposal.
What hinders us in our progress?
Through this process of innovation and public review, science becomes
international and is disseminated all over the world. Yet progress is still hindered by
certain factors. I am aware of three such obstacles. The first obstacle that interferes
with the dissemination of scientific innovations is that all research is explained in a
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Philosophy of Semiotics
particular national language. This is a very serious obstacle that prevents the rapid
circulation of new knowledge among all concerned parties. Two solutions for this
problem have been put forward: the introduction of an artificial language (like
Esperanto, for example) or the use of an advanced national language that all
scientists will learn. Both suggestions have pros and cons. Over the past hundred
years, a sort of natural experiment comparing these two options has been in
progress, and the second option seems to have won a decisive victory. English
seems to be on the ascent in every respect and invariably becomes the language of
choice for scientific communication.
The second obstacle, or rather difficulty, that scientists are trying to overcome,
is the purely technical problem of how to make sure that all concerned people are
aware of relevant innovations and can locate information about them. The
introduction of computers and fast audio and visual communication among people
all over the world are the surest ways of overcoming this difficulty.
The third difficulty follows in the wake of the second one. It is that the quantity
of new suggestions is so numerous, and the bulk of scientific material in the
semiotic reality is so large, that to find a required piece of information becomes very
hard, if not completely impossible. Many discussions are devoted to this aspect of
modern scientific research at various forums. As a partial remedy, I proposed the
introduction of special classification tags for the works of each scientific school.
This would be similar to the use of bar codes in supermarkets: just as we can use bar
codes to help us find particular products in a huge supermarket, we can use tags to
help us find scientific output. I realize this is a debatable suggestion, but I still think
it is worth discussing.
Conclusion
Semiotic reality is a special plane of human thinking. It consists of signs and
sign-systems that are all of human origin; in this they are different from ontological
reality. As soon as semiotic reality is formed, it acquires its own rules of behavior,
which are different from those that apply on the ontological plane. One of these is
the ability of semiotic reality to convert individual human endeavors into the
common property of all of mankind.
Issue 5
Semiotic reality and its qualities (2)
The previous discussion can help us comprehend the next distinct quality of
semiotic reality: that semiotic reality is readily accessible to us, and that we can,
therefore, corrupt it to our advantage. Because of its complete dependence upon our
cognitive efforts, we can easily forge anything out of signs that we ourselves
created. In this I see one of the most striking traits of semiotic reality. It is
completely different from the situation with ontological reality, which was not
created in our minds and hence strongly resists our interference.
Signs can be managed easily and effortlessly, and all kinds of liars and
demagogues benefit greatly from this fact. The classical example of such
manipulations was presented by George Orwell in his famous book, Nineteen
Eighty-Four. In this book he describes the imaginary state in which there are three
prominent ministries: the “Ministry of Truth” (for propaganda), the “Ministry of
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Philosophy of Semiotics
Peace” (for waging wars), and the “Ministry of Love” (for internal security). Their
oppressive activities affect all aspects of life in the state, where all the freedom and
dignity of the citizens are obliterated. The principal instrument for this oppression is
the manipulation of the language and the history of the country. The main
character’s professional work consists of constantly rewriting history in accordance
with the current needs of the ruling clique.
After Orwell, these ideas hardly seem novel. Nonetheless, I would now like to
suggest a rather new idea, related to these, that has never been discussed before.
The discrepancy between ontology and semiotic reality may solve some
long-standing philosophical paradoxes
The classic philosophical paradoxes were introduced already in ancient Greece.
In the 5th – 4th centuries before Christ, the famous Zeno of Elea, who was known
for his paradoxes, lived. Zeno was a follower of Parmenides, who was also from the
city of Elea. Parmenides wanted to prove that nothing ever changed in time or in
substance. That contradicted the data people received from their senses, so a lot of
people opposed his views. Zeno strongly supported Parmenides’ theory. In his
writings, he presented some paradoxes which to his mind “proved” that nothing
changed; the opposing view came only from incorrect impressions that people got
because of the imperfection of human sensory data.
Since then, a long series of paradoxes have been conceived that seemed to
show that what common sense tells us cannot be reconciled with philosophy and
science. In modern times, Bertrand Russell collected the paradoxes of Zeno and
declared them extremely ingenious and profound. He also added some examples of
his own creation to them. Some other philosophers have also pursued this line of
thinking. I believe that the concept of semiotic reality can solve all these
discrepancies with a single stroke.
Before I explain this, let us have a look at one additional source.
The opinion of Willy Kreimer
Willy Kreimer is a Jew from Russia who some years ago repatriated to Israel.
Some months ago, I received an e-mail from him. In it, he said that he had read one
of my articles on the difference between the two types of realities (ontological and
semiotic) on the internet, and he had included a kind of review of it in his new
book3. I immediately followed the link to his book, and this is what I read. Since the
text is in Russian, I present it here in my own translation:
«Lately, the theory of signs got a significant push from the Israeli
scientist, Abraham Solomonick. In his work, “On the Disparities between
Ontology and Semiotic Reality,” he introduces the notion of semiotic
reality and scrutinizes the interaction between the two planes …
In the course of creating semiotic reality, people invented signs and
sign-systems that did not have counterparts in ontology, and these latter
comprise a very considerable part of culture – mythology, religion, art,
and a great portion of science. Thus, semiotic reality reaches far from its
initial boundaries. It becomes a thing in its own right and starts to study
sciences, arts and literature, not only for their practical use, but for
ethereal philosophizing and self-indulgence. In ontology, new assertions
3
Kreimer, Willy (2010). Phychology and Symbols of the Jewish People.
Retrieved September 2010 from
http://peoples-peace.blogspot.com/2010/07/blog-post_13.html.
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are tested via practice; in semiotics, this is replaced by other criteria: the
theory’s completeness, how comfortable it is to work with and apply, its
harmony, the beauty of its contents, and how well it fits what already
exists. They are no less important than its practical usefulness, but only
within the framework of semiotics itself.
Solomonick’s deductions from the above are: both types of realities
are in principle alike, they depend on one another, but at the same time
they are autonomous in their essence and are developed through their own
laws… The division of these two planes allows him to avoid the
cul-de-sacs into which Zeno, Russell, and Henry Bergson lead us by not
discriminating between the rules of sign transformations in ontology and
those in semiotic reality. The seemingly incontestable discrepancies, from
the point of view of logical positivism, are senseless, if we apply the
analyses of the two differing realities.
Let us look, for example, at the paradox B. Russell uses in the article,
“Why I am not a Christian.” In it, he asks: “Can God create a stone that He
won’t be able to lift?” We see some notions from ontology in this — can,
create, stone, and lift. On the other hand, he uses the notion of God, which
is taken from theology (purely semiotic reality). This implies the meaning
Almighty, though it cannot be proved in ontology. As a result, we merge
quite different and incompatible meanings from the two planes of
thinking, which makes the answer unattainable. From the impossibility of
the answer follows the logical incompatibility of the formulation of the
paradox».
Another instance of the same order
Let us now look at Zeno’s trademark paradox, about Achilles and the tortoise.
The general idea of the paradox is as follows: Achilles and the tortoise decide to
compete in a race. Naturally, Achilles gives his opponent a head start, and then he
starts to run. In a short period of time, say, half an hour, he covers the entire distance
between the starting line and the tortoise, but when he arrives at the tortoise’s
location, the tortoise has already moved forward, so Achilles has not caught up to it.
In the next leg, Achilles once again nearly reaches the tortoise, yet the tortoise also
keeps moving, and is a bit ahead of Achilles when he arrives at the tortoise’s
location. So it goes on and on, in the same way, endlessly: Achilles seems to
overrun his rival, but the rival, nevertheless, succeeds in moving forward just a little
bit further while Achilles is catching up to it, so Achilles never manages to catch it.
According to mathematics, this process will never come to an end – the distance
between them becomes infinitesimally smaller with each additional leg of the race,
but the tortoise still keeps slightly ahead.
This conclusion decisively contradicts the reality in which we live. It is clear to
every Tom, Dick, and Harry that Achilles can easily overrun his clumsy opponent. It
is only in the mathematics of certain patterns that this truth does not hold. For nearly
two thousand years, this conundrum has captivated philosophers. But it can be easily
solved if we understand that what is correct in semiotic reality can sometimes be
wrong in ontology. It is not always wrong, of course, but it can be wrong. If we
apply the proper math to Zeno’s scenario, we can easily solve the problem. If you
formulate the proper math conditions for this paradox (it is not difficult), you will be
able to handle the problem in a trice.
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Philosophy of Semiotics
In light of what I just said, I formulated a theory of four types of logic which
we apply each time we use a sign-system. The four types of logic are:
The logic of matching for the two types of reality. In designing sign
transformations, we try to follow the processes we observe in practical life as
closely as we can. In each step of sign transmutations, we try to match the real
mutations that occur in ontological reality. We also apply experimental tests to see
whether our transformation rules are correct.
The formal logic of our thinking that is inherent in any human activity.
The logic of the sign-system we are using. It is obligatory that we act according
to the “rules of game”; otherwise, the system becomes unmanageable.
The logic of application, which makes the result readable for all types of users.
This leads us to the conclusion that when we work with a sign-system, we have
to employ all four types of logic. Ignoring any of them will result in failures of the
type we discussed in this essay. In essence, what we analyzed in this essay are cases
in which users of a sign-system ignored its rules.
The point is that a given semiotic procedure may not be appropriate for a
particular purpose. One has to choose the right semiotic shaping of a problem in
order to deal with it properly. If we come across a case that we cannot solve with the
existing semiotic tools, we must invent new and stronger ones. With Newton’s math,
we could solve the geocentric problems in the cosmos. When we come to new
problems, like those related to immeasurable distances and dimensions in the
universe, some Einstein usually appears out of nothing and saves humanity by
suggesting a new semiotic treatment of the problem. Let us believe in the collective
strength of human intellectual cooperation, which is reflected most clearly in the
process by which semiotic reality — the fruit of human cognitive capabilities — is
created.
Conclusion
Distinguishing between the two planes of reality, ontological reality and
semiotic one, allows us to decipher the riddles of philosophical paradoxes that have
troubled scientists for a long while. But the main usefulness of semiotic reality is
revealed under other circumstances, to which we will dedicate the next, and final,
essay of this work.
Issue 6
Prognosticating power of signs
Signs have other uses besides lies and forgeries. In the sciences, signs are
widely used for their predictive power. The fact that they are distinct from the things
they denote means that we can use them to predict outcomes when we would not
otherwise have any way to do so. This is an inherent quality of signs, and it is
discernable in each and every type of sign.
There are a number of stages in the development of the predictive ability of a
set of signs. The first of them is the search for appropriate signs. This is followed by
the use of certain signs as taxons exemplifying the key points of a developing
theory. But sign-systems are the most powerful predictors, because their algorithms
allow us to model what will happen in ontology.
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Search for appropriate signs
The search for appropriate signs was the first stage in the process of man’s
becoming a symbolic creature. It is also our first task when we encounter a new and
unfamiliar situation. In this, it can be said, we behave like any other animal. When a
cat finds itself in new surroundings, it begins to smell all the things around it in
order to familiarize itself with them. The same is true of humans; when we find
ourselves in a new situation, we try to familiarize ourselves with it by looking for
obvious features – that is, for signs. But when we select signs to use for orientation,
we go much further than any animal, because we have a much greater intellectual
capacity for performing this task.
Searching for proper signs becomes second nature to us in our normal lives. It
also becomes a professional habit for those who must frequently cope with new and
dangerous situations: pathfinders, detectives, and the like. The Pathfinder, Sherlock
Holmes, Hercule Poirot, and thousands of other heroes are famous, first of all, for
their ability to quickly find the signs that are clues for deciphering mysteries and
secrets.
The signs we discover must be clearly understandable in order for them to lead
us to their practical applications; otherwise, they cannot serve as clues. Yet, in some
situations, signs exist that do not possess any practical value. For example, a portrait
remains a sign even though it does not lead us to any knowledge of who it is meant
to represent, what its history is, and who created it. It may also be valued from an
esthetic point of view – that is, it is valued as an object of semiotic reality.
The search for signs can be long and arduous, but finding new kinds of signs
always opens new vistas for furthering scientific investigations. This point becomes
clear when you think about Butlerov’s structural formulas or Kekule’s discovery of
the structure of benzyl molecules, with double bonds between the atoms. The latter
kind of investigation leads us from single signs however complicated they may be,
to systemic ones and to their combinations. But, before I discuss this, let me first
discuss another role of some single signs, that of serving as taxons.
Signs as taxons in scientific theories
I spoke of taxons in detail in the first essay of this work, and I come back to
them now to show how the concept can relate to some single signs, signs that fill a
much more important role than those described above. When someone introduces a
new general theory, they must give some explanation of how the theory is expected
to evolve – what the pivotal turning points will be as it develops further. These
significant points, representing bodies of knowledge that are not yet known, are
themselves signs – signs that are taxons, exemplifying the most striking
characteristics of the signs that will later form the body of the theory. If the theory is
accepted as a paradigm for further research in the field, these taxons will be an
essential part of it, and will remain the focal points of the theory throughout its
development.
One example of this scenario is Darwin’s theory of the development of species.
To this day, the taxons Darwin chose as intermediate stages for the theory of
evolution continue to serve as touchstones for the approval or rejection of any new
discovery in the field. Other theories of large scale development (geological or
climate changes, for instance) can also serve as examples. In fact, I myself proposed
something of this kind when I introduced my theory of semiotic development and
identified the taxons that I believe are, or should be, the main focal points of
semiotic research.
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Predictive power of sign-systems
Sign-systems are much more powerful predictors than single signs. They allow
us to formulate algorithms for dealing with special kinds of situations and, once
these algorithms are tested, to apply them in ontology. This is true of spatial and
temporal relations, periodic processes, and many other things. If, for example, we
want to know what time sunrise will be tomorrow, we analyze the relevant data
about the movements of celestial bodies and derive the required information. To do
this, we usually use the standard mathematical procedures and formulas that were
developed for this purpose, and insert the relevant concrete values. Similarly, if we
want to be able to know the speed at which a car is traveling, we prepare a special
tool that uses the appropriate algorithms to calculate the speed when we enter the
relevant information into it.
The most striking feature in this process is that we can sometimes manage to
get to the right results without even knowing the physical substance of the process
itself. In fact, this seems to be the rule rather than the exception. When Newton
deduced his laws of gravity, he did so without knowing what physical processes
were behind them. We do not even know them now. When Faraday empirically
studied electricity and formulated the laws of its behavior, he did not know anything
about the essence of electric current and its components. His conclusions were
applied in practice and changed our lives, and still people had no inkling of the real
processes in electromagnetic fields. Only much later were the structures of atoms
and of their particles discovered, so that the real substance of electrical currents
could be identified.
Some people say that if it is sufficient to know the outcome of an event, there is
no need to know the real essence of the event, as long as we know that it really takes
place and produces the necessary effect. There is even the facetious expression to
this end: “One can draw a strait line without knowing that it consists of dots.”
Others are ready to dedicate their lives to trying to discover how and why things
happen as they do. And because of people like these, the process of innovation goes
on and on – because of scientific enthusiasm and inquisitiveness. But we must not
forget that all this proceeds with the help of signs and sign-systems, and in the realm
of semiotic reality.
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