What were the effects on Iran of the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia during the
19th century?
“Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia. To many these words breathe only a sense of utter remoteness
or…romance. To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the
domination of the world.”1
Lord Curzon (1859-1925) former Viceroy of India and British Foreign Secretary
From the end of the 18th Century, the largely agricultural and tribal order which existed in the
Middle East and Central Asia began to be disturbed by the rapid penetration of western capital
and commerce, and the imperial designs of Europe. Iran, coming under the influence perhaps
later than others of the Great Powers of the time found herself trapped between powerful and
ambitious Tsarist Russia and the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the British Empire, India. The scope of
the rivalry which existed between these two European powers extended over matters of Politics,
Territory and Economics, and the effects of what became known as ‘The Great Game’2 continue
to echo throughout Iranian history and politics to this day.
The British were primarily concerned with establishing influence over Iran in order to secure the
region as a ‘buffer zone’ between India and the Russian Empire, which they viewed as a
potential threat, especially in light of Russia’s territorial claim over parts of northern Iran. They
also recognised Iran as being resource-rich, and were keen to exploit the country’s economic
potential. Russia similarly was keen to take advantage of Iran’s economic promise, and also used
its military might to annex a sizeable area of Persian territory following its four wars with Iran
from the mid-17th to the mid-18th Century. Iran’s borders and sovereignty were indeed
determined by its relations with Britain and Russia, with its claim to the city of Herat (in
modern-day Afghanistan) also quashed in the 1856 Anglo-Persian war.
The historian Joseph Upton divides this period of the 19th Century into two parts when
considering the British-Russian rivalry over Iran. The first, until 1870, is primarily characterised
by overt military pressure and the desire for territorial gains, the nature of which is briefly
outlined above. Following this begins a period of economic and commercial competition, which
Upton suggests is only fully realised upon Iran’s granting of the Reuter concession of 1872.3 The
first significant economic concessions Iran granted to a foreign power occurred as terms in the
Treaty of Turkmenchai, which ended the 1828 Russo-Persian war. The Shah agreed to exempt
Russian traders from customs duties, which local Persian traders were obliged to pay, and agreed
to grant extraterritoriality status to Russian citizens in Iran, so that they were in effect operating
‘above the law.’ This was later extended to include all foreign powers, such as Britain in 1841 in
a treaty which included the famous ‘most favoured nation’ clause. Nikki Keddie states that this
had the effect of “opening up the country to Western trade and businessmen, while refusing it
protection over its own economic life or often that of its own subjects.”4
1
Kazemzadeh, Firuz., 1968. Russia and Britain in Persia; A study in Imperialism. Yale University Press. Pp. 3
‘The Great Game’ was a term used to describe the rivalry between Britain and Russia in Asia, and was introduced
into mainstream vernacular by the British novelist Rudyard Kipling in his book Kim (1901).
3
Upton, Joseph M., 1960. The history of modern Iran; an interpretation. Harvard University Press. Pp. 7
4
Keddie, Nikki R., 2006. Modern Iran, Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale University Press. Pp 41.
2
1
Iran’s entry into the Europe-dominated global economy had disastrous implications for its local
industries, traders and craftspeople. Iranian textiles and hardwares could not compete with the
influx of cheap, European-manufactured goods which flooded the country following the signing
of trade agreements favouring British and Russian imports. There was also intense competition
over the granting of development and infrastructure concessions, which often had the effect of
paralysing the projects themselves. The rivalry between Britain and Russia over the construction
of railways in Iran for example resulted in each country effectively blocking the others efforts for
strategic reasons- even by 1900 Iran had less than 32km of functioning rail lines.5
The aforementioned concession granted in 1872 to the British Baron Julius Reuter was the
largest ever approved by the Shah, and awarded the exclusive rights for the construction of all
railways, canals and dams in the country, as well as privileges in the mining and agricultural
industries. The Shah received in payment only a modest initial sum and a promise of future
royalties. In the face of mounting public outrage (as well as Russian objections) the Shah was
forced to cancel the concession in 1873. The murmurings of dissent which began with the Reuter
Concession reached a fever pitch in 1891, upon the Shah’s decision to award Major GF Talbot, a
British subject, and his company Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia a full monopoly over
the production, sale and export of Iranian tobacco for 50 years. Keddie makes the point that this
concession in particular caused more uproar than any other as far from being a resource
unexploited by local businessmen, it was widely grown with many landowners, shopkeepers and
merchants profiting heavily from its sale.6 Mass protests erupted throughout Iran, initially
orchestrated by the bazaaris or merchant class, with the mantle quickly taken up by the
influential Shi’a Ulama, who sought to protect domestic Persian interests from external
domination. In an act widely seen as establishing their political legitimacy within Iran, the most
important religious figure within the Ulama, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, issued a fatwa against the use
of tobacco- any person doing so would be transgressing the laws of Islam and would be in
offense to the Hidden Imam.7 The boycott which resulted was a resounding success, and the
Shah was forced to once again drop the concession, at a cost of £500,000.8 From this moment
onwards, the Ulama was seen to be a defender of the Iranian people and their rights, at the
expense of the unpopular Shah and his corrupt regime. The experience of the Tobacco Boycott
was for the Ulama (who had made tentative forays into politics before- most notably in declaring
jihaad on the Russians in the 1828 war and in the fatwa they issued during the Griboyedov
Affair of 18299) a kind of political awakening- for the first time the Iranian people demonstrated
that they were “receptive to calls for political activity based on Islamic frames of reference.”10
The Shah continued his disastrous economic policies into the early 20th Century, making three
extravagant trips to Europe between 1900 and 1905 funded by two large loans from Russia, with
Iranian customs receipts serving as collateral. These debts themselves reflected the continuing
5
Cleveland, William and Bunton, Martin., 2009. A History of the Modern Middle East. 4th Ed. Westview Press:
Philadelphia. Pp. 115
6
Keddie, Nikki R. Op. Cit pp. 61
7
Cleveland, William and Bunton, Martin. Op. Cit.
8
Keddie, Nikki R. Op. Cit. pp 62
9
The ‘Griboyedov Affair’ involved a Russian diplomatic mission to Iran which held the objective of obtaining
reparations for their 1828 war. Confusion arose over the conversion to Islam of the Georgian wives of several
prominent Iranian figures, which resulted in a fatwa being issued and the murder of most of the Russian party.
10
Cleveland, William and Bunton, Martin. Op. Cit.
2
intense Anglo-Russian rivalry, the terms of which required Iran to pay off all British debts and
not to enter into any further borrowing without Russian consent. The amount of foreign debt the
Shah amassed during this period truly was colossal- between 1901 and 1903 Iran borrowed more
than its entire 1900 budget.11
Popular dissent continued to ferment in response to the Shah’s poor economic management, with
a “peculiar coalition”12 emerging made up of secular nationalists, bazaaris and the Ulama
religious leaders agitating for change and the end to foreign influence over Iran’s affairs. Riots
erupted in 1905 in Tehran over the collection of tariffs, with mass civil unrest resulting in the
Shahs eventual capitulation and the establishment of Iran’s first constitution and parliament in
1906. The Shah however remained in power.
All of these relatively short-term developments can be traced back in one way or another to the
rivalry which existed between the Imperial Powers of Britain and Russia in the 19th Century, a
struggle to exercise political, territorial and economic control over Iran which despite a
momentary lull during the period of the Constitutional Revolution continued well into the 20th
Century. Two very important long term effects can be drawn from this damaging ‘Great Game,’
the results of which are very much still alive in Iranian policies today. Firstly and most obviously
there is the immense political power of the Ulama, which had its birth in the struggle against 19th
Century Imperialism and has grown following the 1978 Islamic Revolution, into an allencompassing religious-political doctrine, still vehemently hostile to any hint of western
interference as evidenced in events such as the 1979 American hostage crisis and Iran’s current
defiance in the face of international pressure over its nuclear program. Secondly, there is an
undercurrent of deep-set anti-Imperialist resentment which can be found at all levels of society,
built up over two centuries of western meddling in Iran’s affairs which extends from the painful
treaties signed after the Russo-Persian wars to the Allied occupation of Iran during the Second
World War to the CIA’s overthrow of Musaddeq and the events of the 1978 Revolution. It will
be some time yet before Persia will learn to forgive and forget the rivalries of Britain and Russia,
and the consequences of her Imperial past.
11
Milani, Mohsen M., 1994. The making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic. 2nd Ed.
Westview Press: Colorado.
12
Keddie, Nikki R. Op. Cit.
3
Bibliography
Cleveland, William and Bunton, Martin., 2009. A History of the Modern Middle East. 4th Ed.
Westview Press: Philadelphia
Kazemzadeh, Firuz., 1968. Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914- A study in Imperialism.
Yale University Press
Keddie, Nikki R., 2006. Modern Iran, Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale University Press
Milani, Mohsen M., 1994. The making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic
Republic. 2nd Ed. Westview Press: Colorado
Upton, Joseph M., 1960. The History of Modern Iran; An Interpretation. Harvard University
Press
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