FHSS, Bond University, QLD Australia
Latin America
Department of International Relations
R. James Ferguson © 2006
Lecture 7
The Struggle for Democracy: Chile as a Reform Model
Topics: 1. Democracy? - Which Democracy?
2. Democracy in the Context of Development
3. Chile: From Problematic Socialism to an Entrenched Democracy?
4. Argentina: Military Rule and Re-democratisation
5. Democracy, Neo-Liberalism and Economic Crisis
6. Bibliography and Resources
1. Democracy? - Which Democracy?
'Democracy' is a term routinely deployed in international relations, in newspapers, in
political argument, and in current debates concerning globalisation. It is indeed one of
the most important concepts in the current assessment of the legitimacy of
governments and the kind of prestige they have in the international system.
Disguised behind all this, however, is the fact the term democracy itself is fiercely
disputed and that several different types of democracy can discerned behind this
one word. Nor should be assume that democracy is equivalent to 'liberal democracy'
(with its strong emphasis on liberty and the rights of the individual), nor necessarily
entirely compatible with a rapid shift to free-market capitalism and the current pattern
of financial capitalism (neo-liberalism). We need to pause and briefly look at this
issue before we go on the assess patterns of political change in Chile, and in lesser
detail Argentina and Latin America as a whole (see Schultz 2001). Democratisation,
as it turns out, requires much more than simply a shift to an electoral process with
opposition parties. It involves institutional, cultural and social aspects if it is to
endure through crises and economic down turns.
Democracy, of course, derives from the Greek word demos and literally means the
rule of the people. Traditionally, it goes back to one pattern in Greek city states such
as Athens and Samos, where for a time citizens (excluding slaves and women) had
political power through various forms of direct representation, election officials, and
the democratic jury system (see Farrar 1988; Finley 1985; Ober 1989; Sinclair 1988).
In the modern period, democracies tend to be representative democracies, based
largely on the election of officials into senates, congresses and parliaments (Burnheim
1985; Duncan 1983; Watson & Barbar 1990), and for much of Latin America, the
direct election of the President. On this basis, many of these countries can be said to
be procedural democracies, i.e. that have an electoral process and political system
that look like a democracy. However, as we have seen, Latin American democracies
have also been shaped by Presidentialism and populism, with a strong emphasis on
the executive power of presidents, on an organic corporatist notion of the state, or on a
direct mass political participation (see lecture 2). Neo-populism and new forms of
mass mobilisation, in particular, have had a strong impact on the politics of
resistance in Mexico (ELZN), land reform and social justice in Brazil (the MST and
the politics of the Worker's Party), resistance of indigenous peoples throughout the
Andes' Region, and in the popularity of President Chavez in Venezuela (see lectures
2-6).
Lecture 7: 1
A lot more, however, needs to be established before a country can be genuinely
democratic, i.e. allocating real power to the broad mass of people and diverse groups
in fair or just way, i.e. some degree of political pluralism. Thus elections needed to
contested with a genuine opposition and viable opposition parties, there needs to be a
relatively open media, a relatively fair court system to avoid exclusion and unfair
prosecution of political candidates, and the army has to be willing to accept the
process and outcome of elections, even if a certain degree of political instability and
unpredictable change is generated. Even under these conditions, it is possible that
political elites will tend to dominate established political parties, leading to a selfserving political system in which the real needs and interests of many citizens can still
be marginalised (see Llosa 2001; Coe & Wilber 1985; Di Palma 1970; Graebner
1987; Michels 1958; Miller 1987; Pateman 1970; Riley 1988; Schumpeter 1954), a
problem experienced, as we have seen, to some degree even in contemporary Brazil
and Mexico. This means we need to study democratic transition within its
economic, cultural and developmental context.
Likewise, in modern thought, democracies should not only empower majority rule,
but should also protect minority rights, human rights more generally, and
individual liberties, i.e. we often speak of liberal democracies which balance these
difference needs. We have already seen that in the past, various Latin American states
have fallen short of these requirements even when allowing elections, e.g. Mexico's
Partido Revolucionario Institutional (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI)
limited the ability of a genuine opposition to form through its control of the press and
its vast mobilisation of state resources (Klesner 2001 p107; Ruiz 1992, p449), while
even Cuba has local elections but does not allow genuine opposition parties.
Likewise, a country such as Venezuela under President Chavez has favoured a
mobilisation of popular, direct participation designed to support a strongly
Presidentialist system that undermines the powers of other elected officials (Ellner
2001; Levine 1999).
At a deeper level, a democratic country needs not just a democratic procedure, but a
range of democratic institutions, a generally democratic culture that is willing to
accept opposition and debate, and probably the beginnings of a viable civil society if
it is to sustain a balanced democratic system (Nathan 1990; Nathan 1993). The good
news is that over the last fifteen years democratic systems has made serious
progress in many Latin American countries, e.g. in Brazil, Mexico, Chile and
Argentina. The bad news is that the full package needed to support deeply democratic
societies that are also stable has not yet been forged across the hemisphere. This can
be demonstrated through a brief assessment of Chile, drawing in some other
secondary examples.
Several assumptions are often made in foreign policy on the basis of preferring
democratic systems of governance. The U.S., the European Union, NATO and the
OAS in particular, claim to link levels of recognition, trade and membership
requirements, or levels of diplomatic and military support, to perceived patterns of
democratisation and respect for human rights. The EU does this in a fairly consistent
but limited manner (e.g. through democracy requirements within framework and
associational agreements), the U.S. in a more variable way often linked to its
national interest and the needs of domestic and security politics (for U.S. policy in
2
relation to Chile, see Hickman 1998; for these factors in the Bush administration, see
Dobriansky and Carothers 2003). For example, the U.S. was willing to allow and
indeed covertly support the Pinochet military coup in Chile in 1973, but pressure from
the U.S. Congress also led to the reduction of military assistance to Chile due to
human rights problems from 1976 (Webber 2005; see further below). This is done
partly on the basis of old ideological concerns (democracy verses communism from
the Cold War period), but also on the assumption that functioning democracies will be
more peaceful and fit more effectively into the norms of the current global system.
These claims in favour of democracy in the international system, though partially
disputed, include: 1) Claims that democracies are fairer (more just) societies and support
human rights more effectively, but this may require certain legal and
developmental conditions (Silva 1999; Rawls 1971). This may only be true if
democratic leaders have control of the military and police, and so long as
economic conditions do not undermine societies, e.g. a democratic Argentina and
a democratic Indonesia may have fairer political systems than before, but due to
past economic and social crises had severe limitations in how far they can
actively support and sustain political and social rights. Likewise, democratic
transition in Venezuela and Haiti have been violence prone and distorted by
mobilised interest groups.
2) Democracies are sometimes viewed as more compatible with capitalism
and market economies, itself viewed as a form of economic democracy (i.e.
enhancing economic and consumer choices). From this point of view, such
countries may be more likely to open their borders to trade and neo-liberal
reform policies. However, democracies impose limits on elite decision-making,
and allow a strong critique of market capitalism, e.g. in Brazil, Argentina and
India. Furthermore, extremely rapid economic opening may tend to destabilise
new democracies and create severe social problems, e.g. localised levels of
poverty in Mexico. Simultaneous transition to market economies and
democratic systems can lead to serious instability, as almost happened in
Mexico through the mid-1990s.
3) In a line of thought going back to Immanuel Kant's essay Perpetual Peace,
'democratic peace' theory suggests that democratic states are unlikely to go to
war with each other. On this basis, an entirely democratic Latin America would
also be internationally very stable, a vision already established in the early origins
of the Organisation of American States (see lecture 8). This theory, once regarded
as a truism in international relations, has begun to be challenged in certain cases
(see Schwartz 2002; Cederman 2001; De Mesquita 2001). States which are in
transition to democracy sometimes experience high levels of nationalism,
and unresolved historical claims can sometimes be brought into play politically in
discontented states, e.g. in parts of the Caucasus and former Yugoslavia where
procedural (but otherwise very limited) democracies exist. Likewise, it is uncertain
that further democratic reform in Pakistan would end its tensions with India, or
that a more democratic China would automatically agree with the United States
on the future role of the PRC in world affairs. Democratic states have less
internal pressure or domestic benefit from adventurist wars, but may still
compete with other democracies economically and diplomatically, and
Lecture 7: 3
where real interests are at stake might clash violently. Likewise, the democratic
peace theory does not deal adequately deal with revolutionary wars, nor civil
wars, which are sometimes fought out over differing shades of democratic
representation or national self-determination (see Schwartz 2002). In the case of
Mexico-U.S. relations, for example, a more open and democratic Mexico will not
automatically solve social and economic problems across their shared border.
4) In general terms, democracies may allow greater rights to women and
allow their fuller participation in society. In Latin America there were major
social constraints to this participation. They included the culture of male
'machismo' whereby 'male virtues' such as aggression, assertiveness, and
protection of honour were highly prised (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p62).
Furthermore, the female stereotype of marianismo (named after the Virgin
Mary) tended to exalt notions of propriety, humility, sacrifice, and the role of
mothers, thereby also presenting a certain social barrier (Skidmore & Smith
2001, p63). However, female suffrage did come to Latin America, with most
states giving women the vote between 1929 and 1961 (Skidmore & Smith
2001, p64). Since this time, however, women have taken on major political
roles, as leaders, activists in community organisations, and as those willing to
protest crimes conducted by the military, e.g. in Chile and Argentina.
External Resource:
For one mapping of value systems go to the World Values Survey at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
5) Lastly, progress towards a democratic culture may also need to rely on
constellations of related values, including the role of religion, secularisation,
relative wealth, and the degree towards which expressions of individual values
are tolerated and accepted as part of political liberty. In such a system,
political culture may be as important as democratic institutions. One
mapping of such values, suggested by the World Values Survey, would suggest
that high levels of rational and secular tolerance, combined with tolerance for
individual expression, may form the underpinnings for stable democratic
cultures. Thus, it may be necessary to modify the democratic peace theory in
the light of a range of associated cultural factors: Cultural identity has become prominent in studies of world politics in the postCold War era. First, a growing literature in world politics has emerged that
focuses on the impact of social culture, broadly conceived as the shared
religious, racial or ethnolinguistic characteristics of a society. The significance
of this aspect of culture is epitomized in studies focusing on 'ethnic conflicts',
'ethnic security dilemmas', and most prominently in Huntington's 'clash of
civilizations' thesis, which suggests, among other things, that shared
civilization membership is the fulcrum upon which post-Cold War era world
politics rests. Secondly, the impact of political culture, broadly conceived as
the shared norms and institutions guiding political behaviour in a society, has
become increasingly salient, as evidenced by the bourgeoning literature on
the democratic peace thesis, which posits that the extent to which a state (or
pair of states) is democratic is a major determinant of its war-proneness.
Adherents of this view argue either that although democracies are just as
war-prone as non-democracies they rarely fight other democracies, or that
democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies, in general.
(Henderson 2004)
4
2. Democracy in the Context of Development
To understand the broad pattern of political development in Latin America, it is
necessary to briefly position it against the national and economic development of
these countries. Ongoing social, economic, and political changes are to some
degree linked: If we are to understand modern Latin America it must be placed in the context of
global economic expansion, beginning with the Conquest of the sixteenth century.
Within this system, Latin America has occupied an essentially subordinate or
"peripheral" position, pursuing economic paths that have been largely shaped by the
industrial powers of Europe and the United States. These economic developments
have brought about transitions in the social order and class structure, and these
changes in turn have crucially affected political change. We thus begin with a set of
simplified causal relationships: economic changes produce social changes which
furnish the context for political change. (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p42)
This means, that it is possible in very general terms to correlate patterns of
economic development, social change, and political outcomes (see Table 1). The
leading question we ask is: What would a sixth phase look like? Would it simply
duplicate North American or European models, or would specific local features
remain?
Table 1 Patterns of Change in Latin America (adapted from Skidmore & Smith 2001,
Table 2-1, p62).
Economic Development Social Change
Typical Political Outcome
Phase 1
(1880-1900)
Initiation of Exportimport growth
Modernisation of
elite, commercial
sector, new
professionals
Oligarchic
democracy or
integrating
dictatorship
Phase 2
(1900-1930)
Export-import
expansion
Appearance of
middle class, working
class
Co-optative
democracy
Phase 3
(1930-1960s)
Import-substituting
industrialization
Formation of
elite, growing working
class
Populism or
co-optative
democracy
Phase 4
Stagnation in
(1960s - 1980s) import-substitution,
some export growth
Sharpening of political
and class conflict
Bureaucraticauthoritarian
regime
Phase 5
(1980s - 2001)
Increased mobilisation
of middle and lower
classes
Incomplete
electoral democracy,
(with military veto)
Economic crisis,
neo-liberal reform,
gradual recovery
Certain patterns of political authority had developed in Latin America had
developed from the 19th century: either landowners and social elites that keep control
of government and create a limited 'oligarchic democracy' (as in Chile), or a
tendency for a dictator or strongman, often from the army, to seize control in the
Lecture 7: 5
name of law and order, as in the Porfirio Díaz regime (1876-1910) in Mexico
(Skidmore & Smith 2001, p46). However, through the early 20th century, labour
groups and workers begin to able to organise, influence exports, and to claim a greater
share in political and economic power, sometimes leading to partial reform, but in
other cases to political conflict. In particular, urban, professional middle-class interest
in liberal reform (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p51) does not always extend to effective
rural reform for peasants (Kay 1999).
Through the 1960s and 70s import substitution industrialisation strategies did not
lead to sustained economic growth, and this combined with increased unemployed
and political crises led to the forceful intervention of the military which ran repressive
regimes, e.g. Brazil 1964, Argentina 1966, and Chile 1973 (Skidmore & Smith 2001,
p56). In turn, these regimes created 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' states designed to
clamp down on dissent, restore economic growth, and consolidate cooperate with
international economic forces and transnational corporations (Skidmore & Smith
2001, p57), often with a strong technocratic orientation. At the same time, many of
these countries increased their borrowing and debt, e.g. Latin American debt rose
from $27 billion in 1970 to $231 billion by 1980 (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p58). This
led in the 1980s to a debt crisis in most of these countries, with high levels of debt
servicing, and in many cases the intervention of the IMF (International Monetary
Fund) to help these countries, but only under stringent conditions of structural
adjustment. This locked many of these countries more firmly into the global
economy, but also reduced their ability to maintain government initiatives, social
services and developmental programs (see Brown 1999). We have seen several
examples of this already, e.g. Mexico and Brazil. We can no look further at two very
divergent examples. Chile seems to have adapted relatively well to these pressures of
globalisation, while Argentina's path has led to a viable but troubled democracy.
3. Chile: From Problematic Socialism to an Entrenched Democracy?
Chile from the 19th century developed a relatively strong economy based on
agriculture, nitrates, silver and copper mining, and in the 1990s emerged as a
diversified free market economy (Hudson 1994). During the 19th century a small elite
managed to run a 'oligarchic democracy' based on control of the political system, at
first through the Conservative Party, then via the influence of 'strongman' Diego
Portales through the 1830s (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p107). By the later part of the
century, however, this elite wished to continue effective government but avoid the rise
of dictators: this led to the new Constitution of 1871 which stopped Presidents from
serving two consecutive terms, and improved the power of Congress to hold
government ministers accountable. The period of 1861-1891 thus came to known as
the period of the Liberal Republic, but economic problems in the later 19th century led
to creation of the Radical Party (1863) and the Democratic Party (1887) which
articulated 'mass demands' for workers rights, free education, and a more open and
democratic political system (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p113).
In general, Chile seemed to have strong political credentials and a strong historical
trend towards democracy: Chile, after Uruguay, traditionally has been one of South America's best educated
and most stable and politically sophisticated nations. Chile enjoyed constitutional and
democratic government for most of its history as a republic, particularly after the
6
adoption of the 1833 constitution. After a period of quasi-dictatorial rule in the 1920s
and early 1930s, Chile developed a reputation for stable democratic government. Like
Uruguayans, Chileans have benefited from state-run universities, welfare institutions,
and, beginning in 1952, a national health system. (Hudson 1994).
In general terms, the Constitution of Chile was inspired by that of the United States,
while after 1833 Chile decided not to follow a federal model (Hudson 1994).
Improvements in copper mining, the early mainstay of the economy, the strong
reliance on copper exports through the 20th century, the issue of foreign control
(largely U.S. ownership) of copper companies, and the development of unionised
workers, first in the nitrate mining of the north, then in other mining areas, helped
create a volatile mix of economic dependence and political grievance (Skidmore &
Smith 2001, pp110-111). Even through 2005-2006, the government of Chile has
remained reliant on strong copper prices to help underwrite its promises for improved
education and social welfare policies.
Chile: Selected Political Timeline 1540-2000 (updated from Hudson 1994)
1540
Feb. 12, 1541
1603
1759-96
Sept. 18, 1810
Oct. 2, 1814
Feb. 12, 1817
1817
April 5, 1818
August 1818
1818-30
April 17, 1830
1830-61
1830-37
1833
1836-39
January 1839
1861-91
1879-83
1883
1891
1891-1925
1925
Sept. 4, 1970
Sept. 11, 1973
Sept. 1973-90
1980
1988
1990
March 11, 1994
January 2000
Pedro de Valdivia conquers Chile.
Valdivia founds Santiago.
First army-like force, or militia, established in Chile.
Bourbon reforms give Chile greater independence from Viceroyalty of Peru.
Criollo leaders of Santiago declare independence from Spain.
The Reconquest Spanish troops from Peru reconquer Chile at Battle of Rancagua.
Troops led by Bernardo O'Higgins Riquelme, father of Chile, and General José de
San Martín defeat Spanish in Battle of Chacabuco.
O'Higgins (1817-23) becomes supreme director of Chile.
Chile wins formal independence after San Martín defeats last large Spanish force in
Battle of Maipú.
First provisional constitution approved in plebiscite.
Period of civil wars.
Liberals defeated by Conservatives at Battle of Lircay.
Period of Conservative rule.
"Portalian State" initiated by businessman Diego Portales Palazuelos, who dominates
politics.
New Portalian constitution implemented.
Chile wages war against Peru-Bolivia Confederation.
Chile wins war by defeating Peruvian fleet at Casma and Bolivian Army at Yungay.
Period of Liberal rule.
Chile wages war against Bolivia and Peru in War of the Pacific.
Chile seals victory with Treaty of Ancón.
Civil war pits supporters of President José Manuel Balmaceda Fernández against
Congress, which wins.
Period of Parliamentary Republic.
Chile's second major constitution approved.
Popular Unity's Salvador Allende Gossens wins presidential election.
Military led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte overthrows Allende government.
Period of military rule under General Pinochet.
New military-designed constitution is approved in a plebiscite.
Plebiscite held on Pinochet rule.
Transition to democracy begins with presidency of Patricio Aylwin Azócar.
Presidency of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle
Ricardo Lagos, socialist candidate, wins elections
Lecture 7: 7
In spite of some political opening by the elite, this relatively peaceful political
system received a rude shock in the civil war of 1891. In part this was driven by
President Balmaceda's desire 'to increase government intervention in the economy' in
order 'to pay for the building of new railways, roads, and urban infrastructure'
(Skidmore & Smith 2001, p113-114). It was also a conflict over Congressional
verses Presidential powers, with the efforts of the President to select his successor
being blocked. Conservative financial and mining interests also opposed the
president's reforms, with the President being defeated in a bloody civil war from
which a Parliamentary Republic emerged (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p114). This
democracy, though not widely based, did have a strong Congress which could limit
presidential power, though Congress in turn tended to be dominated by landed elites
(Hudson 1994).
Instability emerged again in 1921 when President Alessandri tried to push through
labour and welfare reforms opposed by conservatives: the military intervened to end
the deadlock in 1924, with the army taking on a major role. From 1925 this led to
emergence of Colonel Carlos Ibãnez as a strongman who was elected president by
Congress in 1927 and maintained power down to 1931, jailing opposition elements
and suspending civil liberties (Skidmore & Smith 2001, pp116-117). This indicated
that the military was willing to play a role in managing the state, with interventions
occurring in 1891, 1924, 1925, 1932 and 1973 (Hudson 1994). However, from 1932
down to 1973 Chile was able to maintain a mass democracy with widely
divergent parties competing for power, making its system somewhat similar to
West European rather than Latin American systems (Hudson 1994).
In the post-World War II period party politics became extremely active and
fiercely contested, with an active and relatively well informed electorate: 80% of
registered voters turned out for elections (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p121). Indeed, by
this period political parties had 'policitized schools, unions, professional associations,
the media, and virtually all other components of national life.' (Hudson 1994). From
1952 the strongman General Carlos Ibãnez returned to the scene, was elected and
sought to cure the problems financial problems by turning to the IMF, but soon found
this path extremely unpopular with the unions and with a range of leftist parties
(Skidmore & Smith 2001, p121). From 1958 President Jorge Alessandri also pursued
conservative economic policies designed to avoid inflation, but in the end was unable
to gain more revenues from the largely foreign-owned copper companies, incensing
nationalists and leftist alike (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p123). In part this explains the
victory of the Christian Democratic party's candidate Eduardo Frei in 1958, who came
forward as a centrist candidate, in part winning support from the rightist parties (and
gaining some CIA election funding) as a way of heading off the policies of the left
(Skidmore & Smith 2001, p124). Indeed, recently revealed documents suggest that the
US had spent a total of $1 billion dollars up to 1970 in support of moderate and
rightist parties in order to prevent a feared left-wing take over (Webber 2005
following Kornbluh 2003). President Frei also tried to solve the problem of
gaining more for the national budget from Chile's main resource, copper mining.
His plan for the Chilean government to buy further ownership of the mines to secure
51% of ownership and then invest in expanded processing facilities was controversial,
with left verses right debating the value of this approach to Chile (for differing
interpretations, see Skidmore & Smith 2001, p125; Hudson 1994). Land reform
policies were also carried out slowly, and did not meet popular expectations.
8
This history helps explain the strong boost received by the Communists and
Socialists alliance (UP, Unidad Popular) in the 1970 elections and the 36.3% victory
for their presidential candidate, Salvador Allende, more than his opponents
(Skidmore & Smith 2001, p126). Allende then proceeded towards strongly socialist
policies based on his electoral victory, including a prices freeze, an increase in wages,
nationalisation of the coal and steel industries, nationalisation of the main foreign
copper firms, and of 60% of the private banks, as well as an expansion of fiscal
spending by approximately 70% (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p127; Hudson 1994;
Posner 2004). Almost 500 firms would be nationalised (Hudson 1994). Workers often
took the initiative, occupying the offices of foreign firms such as ITT and Ford until
they were nationalised - this led to a partial financial blockade by the U.S., which
reduced bilateral aid as well as the withholding of loans via the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Skidmore & Smith
2001, p127; Rogers & Maxwell 2004. For the debate on the level of U.S. involvement
in 'destabilising' or 'engineering' the collapse of Allende's government, see Rogers &
Maxwell 2004; Hitchens 2001; Komisar 1999). Washington also secretly gave $6
million in funding to opposition parties and press outlets (Rogers & Maxwell 2004).
The economy was soon dislocated, with depressed exports earnings and emerging
economic chaos brought on by a combination of external pressures and internal
problems. By mid-1972 massive demonstrations for and against Allende were
being staged, including strikes by copper workers and truck-owners who were
negatively affected by the economic slow down (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p130).
Political violence began to increase. The 1973 congressional elections did not solve
this conflict: Allende's Popular Unity party secured 43% of the vote, enough to avoid
impeachment but not enough to break the political stalemate (Hudson 1994).
In this context, the Chilean army began to mobilise, supported both by right-wing
elements in the country and by tacit U.S. support via the CIA (see now Kornbluh
2003; Webber 2005). General Augusto Pinochet led a well-organised coup that
began on 11 September 1973, leading to a mass rocket attack (from airforce jets) on
the presidential palace in the heart of Santiago, where President Allende had chosen to
make his last stand. He died, either in fighting or by committing suicide in order to
avoid capture (for differing views, see Hudson 1994). Scattered resistance to the army
was followed by widespread oppression and large number of arrests of leftists,
largely conducted by the Chilean 'secret police', the intelligence agency DINA. Some
2,000 may have died, and thereafter many went missing in a campaign to depoliticise
society (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p131). The later National Commission on Truth
and Reconciliation (the Rettig Commission) could document the deaths of some
2,115 Chileans, while thousands of others were imprisoned or tortured (Hudson
1994). Other sources suggest that in total up to 40,000 people were detained at various
times, and 9,000 were exiled and some 4,000 killed (Komisar 1999; see further
Kornbluh 2003). The Allende government, though democratically elected, was
destabilised by a vigorous political culture in which there was little comprise, an
overly ambitious socialist program, strong international opposition from the U.S. (see
Kornbluh 2003; Webber 2003 for strong U.S. pressure to destabilise the Allende
government), and the onset of economic crisis. The intervention of the military under
an ambitious and autocratic leader sealed the fate of this experiment in elected
socialist democracy.
Lecture 7: 9
However, in turn the Pinochet regime would not be able to establish itself as a
government that could switch from authoritarian to democratic modes of
governance. The 'bloody coup seemed incongruously violent for a country of Chile's
democratic and civil traditions' (Hudson 1994). In retrospect, the coupe was a failure
in deep civil support for peaceful power-sharing among the different parties and
interests within the country: Many analysts would concur that there was ample blame to go around. In the view of
many Chileans, groups at all point on the political spectrum helped destroy the
democratic order by being too ideological and too intransigent. Many observers agree
that a minority president facing adamant domestic and foreign opposition was
extremely unlikely to be able to uphold democracy and create socialism at the same
time. (Hudson 1994).
The Pinochet regime soon moved to establish military government, removed
opponents, stopped political activity, controlled the media, and launched a strongly
guided neo-liberal trade policy designed to boost exports, following the ideas put
forward by 'the Chicago boys', economists trained in the free trade agenda (Hudson
1994). Major trading partners included the European Union, US, Japan and Brazil,
while foreign debt declined in relation to GDP through the early 1990s (Hudson
1994). Direct military rule ran from 1974 till 1979, then was extended through a
plebiscite in 1978, and then a second plebiscite in 1980 (both suspect in terms of
competitive freedoms) approved a new constitution in 1980 which laid down the
preconditions for future democratisation (Posner 2004). This constitution gave
Pinochet sweeping executive powers from 1980 down through 1990.
However, in 1988 the Pinochet opted for another plebiscite aimed an extension of
his rule for a further 8 years. The election was held partly in response to international
pressures (Hickman 1998), but also because the military assumed that the
improved economy of Chile would allow them to win the election fairly easily.
This turned out not to be the case. This underestimated the effective mobilisation
and strategies of a broad centre and left coalition that had emerged over the
previous decade. Thus, many Chileans were reminded of the atrocities of the military
coupe by the Arpilleras, the protesting women who wove traditional tapestries
protesting the loss of their children and spouses (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p132).
The Catholic Church had also moved to condemn the human rights atrocities of the
regime and to support reform (Hudson 1994). From 1983, in spite of oppressive
clamp-downs, massive protests were made publicly, lead in part by labour leaders
(Hudson 1994). Likewise, the coalition of parties used the strategies of social surveys,
public relations campaigns, and community networking to mobilise a large part of
the electorate, including those living in shantytowns (Paley 2001). This campaign
also involved volunteer consultants on the election, including Chilean and U.S.
volunteers, some from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(Paley 2001). A record 92% of the voting age-group actually registered to vote
(Hudson 1994). When the opposition was for a short time allowed to advertise on
television, it used positive messages appealing to unity, harmony, and a democratic
Chile (Hudson 1994). In effect, opposition to Pinochet had never disappeared, but
simply needed en environment to channel itself politically.
The opposition also promised to continue the broad economic policies that had
boosted growth, as well as promising an improved social welfare net (Paley 2001).
10
Thus the fourteen party coalition (the Concertación) won with a decisive 'no' vote
(55%) against Pinochet (who received a 43% vote for continuation of his rule).
Badly shaken and surprised, Pinochet accepted the vote against him (Hudson 1994),
perhaps because segments of the elite had begun to be unsettled by his continued
autocratic style in decision making.
This did not lead to an immediate return to full democracy. The 1980 constitution
still allowed a role for Pinochet as head of the armed forces (to be continued down
till 1998), and with a number of appointed senators in congress, it also tended to
favour conservative politics. Although a large number of constitutional reforms,
leading to a more open system, were approved in mid-1989, a number of 'mooring
lines' were left to secure a strong voice of the right in politics and the army (see
Hudson 1994; Wilde 2002). Presidential elections in 1989 put the Christian
Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin into power, supporting a centre and centre-left
style government. Aylwin attempted to cautiously prosecute military offices for
human rights abuses, but with the help of rightist elements in Congress this was not
generally successful at that time (Hudson 1994). The military, likewise, assembled in
battle dress in a protest in Santiago in May 1993, protesting against the human rights
prosecutions and reminding the government that they might act (Wilde 2002, p12). In
1993, the Christian Democrats once again won the elections, with Eduardo Frei
becoming president. Chile during this period had strong economic growth (circa 6.7%
growth in GDP), foreign debt was reduced, foreign investment came into the country,
and poverty was reduced (Drake 2000). However, the gap between rich and poor
remained problematic (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p135-136).
A certain fragility remained in the democracy of Chile. Amnesty laws had meant
that the military had not been brought to trial for the events of the 1970s, while
Pinochet, even when he stepped down from being the chief of the army, remained a
Senator-for-Life and thus escaped prosecution as a state official, though later attempts
were made to change this situation (1998-2006, see below). He, along with a small
number of non-elected, designated senators (nine in number), also tipped the Congress
in the direction of limiting radical legislation (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p136; Hudson
1994). There was also a strong social memory that led in two directions: the deep
resentment of the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime, and a need to avoid
sparking off another civil war or direct intervention by the military. Some writers
have spoken of a 'conspiracy of consensus' and 'a widespread aversion to open
conflict' singe 1989 (Wilde 2002, pp4-5; see further below).
This issue was deeply inflamed when Pinochet was arrested during an October
1998 visit to London, on the basis of a Spanish judicial request (supported by
Switzerland and France) that he stand trial for human rights abuses against Spanish
citizens within Chile (Brody 1999). President Frei, afraid of political turmoil at home,
supported the claim of diplomatic immunity (in the basis of Pinochet being a Senator),
and argued that Pinochet was not mentally fit to face a long trial (Skidmore & Smith
2001, p136). The decision by a the High Court for England and Wales that Pinochet
could not be prosecuted for his actions while head of state was soon overturned by the
House of Lords, which argued that immunity on this basis could not be sustained
(Brody 1999). This was again overturned by another meeting of 'Law Lord',
concerned over issues of impartiality, with Pinochet remaining under house arrest
until at least his extradition was dropped on the basis of health problems (for the
Lecture 7: 11
complicated political process, see Wilde 2002, p15). Within Chile, a large number of
people felt that a trial in Europe would infringe the sovereignty and rights of Chile,
while an equal number wanted him tried within Chile (Dorfman 1999). For a time,
the Chilean ambassador was withdrawn from Madrid (Brody 1999). The very
divisiveness of this issue showed that reconciliation was not complete within
Chile, and how the past decisions of Pinochet still affected political life. Thus Ariel
Dorfman can speak of the 'sham reconciliation' that has sought to ignore the events of
the 1970s and 1980s (Dorfman 1999). Britain in the end decided that Pinochet was not
fit to stand trial, and he was returned to Chile.
This debate continued as presidential elections occurred within Chile. In a run-off
election in January 2000, Ricardo Lagos, a moderate socialist candidate, won the
elections. The election, like others in Chilean history, was a competition between the
right and the centre-left, with the centre and Christian Democrats playing a crucial
role as to who would win (Drake 2000). His opponent, Joaquín Lavín, was a
pragmatic rightist who adopted a more popularist style that earned him a such sizeable
vote (47.52% to Lagos' 47.96%) that they had to go through a second run-off round,
with Lagos winning with 51.3% on the second ballot (Drake 2000). The socialism of
Lagos, moreover, was moderate, attuned to the needs of fitting into the global
economy, and sought consensus and reconciliation rather than confrontation with right
wing. In some ways it fits in with the type of modern social democratic parties, e.g.
the type of middle ground formerly staked out by Britain Tony Blair (Drake 2000). In
general, the political values of Chilean parties had tried to turn towards the
middle ground and consensus (Paley 2001), but this could be undermined if the past
and its perpetrators, and how they should be treated, was used in a divisive way. In
recent years, 'Chile's economic and political stability have been the envy of Latin
America. The country is widely viewed as the region's most successful case of
transition form state-led to market-driven economy and from authoritarianism to
democracy' (Posner 2004). Generally, political elites have accepted the importance of
export-led growth and a supportive environment for a growing and free-market
oriented economy (Faust 2004). Likewise, there has been a tendency for some
reduction in role of grass-roots organisations and popular mobilisation, and a
weakening of local level democracy, with the Centre left channelling most of their
efforts through federal electoral politics (see Posner 2004).
A certain disenchantment with the political system also needs to be avoided, e.g. in
1997 congressional elections, up to 40% of voters annulled or left blank ballots, or did
not attends polls (Paley 2001). However, political process seemed vigorous through
2003-2006. Moreover, the 'Coalition of Parties for Democracy', the base support for
the Lagos government, have been supported by a relatively strong economy, high
international prices for copper, and scandals that have undermined some opposition
figures (Espinoza 2003).
Likewise, a vigorous but peaceful election through January 2006 suggested that
for the time being these tensions have been contained, in part because of the cautious
progress in maintaining a social balance across different interests. Michelle
Bachelet, the Concertacion candidate won on the second round (with a solid 53%
vote) against businessman Sebastian Pinera. It seems likely that President Bachelet
will continue in general terms the policies of Lagos, but with some greater emphasis
on issues such as 'social justice and inequality' (Southern Cone 2006). The result is
12
interesting, since as a woman and a single mother it suggested that Chile has moved
away from conservative political trends, though Bachelet remains committed to a
moderate left-of-centre approach combined with free market economics. Bachelet
was previously minister of health and minister of defence, and she had stated that she
will use strong copper prices and government revenues to improve education and
improve social conditions for the poor (ABC Online 2006a).
It has also been suggest that both Bachelet and Pinera, in the political ground they
chose to occup before the elections, set up a true competition that also helped
normalise current politics: The impetus for normalization came from the right through Pinera, whose National
Renovation Party broke its alliance with the more conservative Democratic
Independent Union, which is rooted in a base of supporters of the Pinochet legacy.
Repudiating that legacy and promising a modern conservatism committed to
democratic practices, Pinera finished second in the first round of the presidential
elections, setting him up to oppose Bachelet in the run-off and forcing the Union to
back him.
As a result of Pinera's move toward the center, Bachelet edged toward the left,
creating a contest in the run-off that resembled the pattern that has become familiar
in Southern Europe. Released from the overhang of Pinochet, the candidates
addressed a broad spectrum of social and foreign policies, offering proposals that
differed in emphasis, yet did not evince deep ideological divisions.(Weinstein 2006)
Selected Time-line 2000-2006 (after BBC 2006a)
1998 - Pinochet retires from the army and is made senator for life but is arrested in the UK at
the request of Spain on murder charges.
2000 March - British Home Secretary Jack Straw decides that Pinochet is not fit to be
extradited. Pinochet returns to Chile. Socialist Ricardo Lagos is elected president.
2000 August - Supreme Court strips Pinochet of his immunity from prosecution. A judge
charges him with kidnapping during the 1973-90 dictatorship.
2001-2002 Pinochet is ordered to stand trial for human rights abuses. But charges against him
are suspended after a court rules that he is unfit to stand trial. The Supreme Court upholds the
ruling in July 2002. Days later, Pinochet resigns from his post as a lifelong senator.
2003 Further attempts to force Pinochet to stand trial and to lift his legal immunity are
blocked.
2004 May - President Lagos signs a law giving Chileans the right to divorce, despite
opposition from the Roman Catholic Church.
2004 August - Supreme Court strips Pinochet of legal immunity over charges related to
Operation Condor, a shared plan by regional dictators to kill opponents in the 1970s.
2005 January - Pinochet is put under house arrest, and later freed on bail, after the Supreme
Court upholds his indictment for alleged rights offences.
2005 May - 45 young soldiers perish in a blizzard, prompting calls for an end to compulsory
military service.
Lecture 7: 13
2005 July - Senate approves changes to the Pinochet-era constitution, including one which
restores the president's right to dismiss military commanders. Pinochet loses legal immunity
over the case of a secret police operation in 1975 in which more than 100 activists
disappeared.
2005 November - Pinochet faces separate charges over disappearances in 1975 and tax fraud.
2005 December - Presidential elections. Socialist Michelle Bachelet gains the most votes but
fails to win more than 50% support, forcing a second-round vote against conservative
billionaire and former senator Sebastian Pinera.
2006 January - Michelle Bachelet wins the second round of presidential elections to become
Chile's first woman president - and the fourth consecutive head of state from the centre-left
Concertacion coalition.
From 1998 there was also a shift in the way law was applied to human rights
cases. Prior to this, the 1978 Amnesty Law was often applied routinely to dismiss
such prosecution, but from 1998 the Criminal Bench of the Supreme court suggested
that 'Chile's international treaty obligations' demanded that investigations would need
to go ahead to determine 'individual responsibility' (Wilde 2002, p17). Successively
stronger efforts were made to deal with the Pinochet under the Lagos government by
passing the issue on to the judiciary: Prosecuting Judge Juan Guzman accumulated charges and in August, Chile's
Supreme Court confirmed by a 16-4 vote an Appeals Court decision stripping
Pinochet of immunity from prosecution, thus opening up the possibility of a trial. In
December, Guzman issued an indictment and order for the general's house arrest,
but this was struck down on a technicality - Pinochet had not been interviewed as
required under Chilean law (Bearman 2001, p72).
We can thus ask, is 'Chile entering the new century as an "untrammelled democracy
. . . ?" (Drake 2000). The current government offers both continuity in general
policies, but also has a major challenge: It also offered Chile the opportunity to experience a Socialist presidency that
promised to avoid confrontation and economic turmoil. The outcome confronted
Lagos with the challenge of both modulating and meeting his supporters
expectations, especially pent-up hopes from leftists (Drake 2000).
However, we should note that the current stability in part has been achieved by a
certain convergence between the main parties, a relatively strong economy, and
the ability to avoid a head-on conflict over the Allende and Pinochet legacies (Reuss
2001). Certain features of the democracy remained unusual until recent reform: the
lack of control over campaign funds (Drake 2000), the appointed senators, and the
implicit recognition that the army does have a special political role in the nation, in
part through the National Security Council - the Cosena, the fact that the President
could not directly dismiss military commanders until this law was reformed in July
2005 (Hudson 1994; BBC 2006a; Bearman 2001, p72).
In 2002, Chile's courts ruled that Pinochet was unfit to stand trial due to dementia
(UPI 2004b). In 2003 a Chilean judge ordered the arrest of five intelligence officials
from the Pinochet period, undercharges of the murder of a former General Carlos
Prats, head of the army under former President Allende (BBC 2003b), but attempts
14
again to have Pinochet tried failed in October 2003. Through early 2004, there were
also signs that citizens in France might consider pressing separate charges against
Pinochet, though these have not yet been developed into official requests, though
France's foreign minister has expressed interest in pursuing the matter (UPI 2004b).
In May 2004 Manuel Contreras, former head of secret police, was jailed over
disappearance of a journalist in 1974, while in August 2004 the 'Supreme Court strips
Augusto Pinochet of his immunity from prosecution, confirming lower court ruling'
and January 2005 Pinochet was placed under house arrest, 'after Supreme Court
upholds his indictment for alleged human rights offences', with appeals under way
through February 2005 (BBC 2005a). Pinochet lost his immunity in the July 2005
proceedings over a case in 1975 in which over 100 'activists' lost their lives, with
separate charges under way for tax fraud (BBC 2006a). This was confirmed through
further charges for diverting public funds (totalling around $28 million) into private
accounts, a process in which the Santiago Court of Appeals argued that Pinochet did
not have immunity and that he was well enough (though 90 years old) to stand trial - it
remains to be seen whether this will upheld by the Supreme Court (Associated Press
2005; his wife and younger son have also been indicted on tax evasion). The gradual
but persistent effort to prosecute and pursue these human rights issues now suggests a
certain confidence in the robustness of the democracy, and the relative control of
the military by government. In large measure, it may also have suited that these issues
be dealt with at home, and not in foreign courts or before international institutions.
Likewise, the economy, though still growing, has slowed to some degree. It has had
somewhat modest real growth in 2001-2003 of 2.2-3.7%, and stronger figures of 6.1%
in 2004 and 5.8% in 2005, but with unemployment around 7-9% (DFAT 2003-2005).
In general terms, there has also been a strong decline in government relations with
grass roots organisations, the labour movements and unions, with a shift towards
stronger support for liberal policies (Frank 2002; Kurtz 2001; Posner 2004). There
has been some decline in peasant ownership of land, though seasonable agricultural
labour demands remain quite strong (Kurtz 2001). Although understandable in the
current international climate, in the worst case scenario this could lead once again
lead to political polarisation and increased political violence (see Barrett 2001).
It should also be noted that after political reforms Chile joined the Rio Group (of
18 Latin American Countries) in 1990, playing 'an active role in promoting
democracy within the inter-American system' (Hudson 1994; see further Atkins
1999). Chile was also active in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA),
the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the United Nations (Hudson 1994),
and later on negotiated open trade relations with the U.S. and with Mercosur. Thus,
through 2004-2005 it has been of the leaders of the UN mandated peace-keeping
forces in Haiti. It has sought to play a role in an open regional system, engaging with
fairly open trade with Argentina and the United States, with cooperative agreements
with Mercosur, and the prospect of joining the FTAA after 2005 if the project does
indeed go ahead.
It has also sought to diversify trade and diplomatic relations into the Asia-Pacific
and East Asia, having been among the most successful of Latin American countries
to do this, thereby avoiding further 'peripheralisation' within the global economy
(Faust 2004). It is also been involved in the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC,
a primarily business organisation), is a member of PECC (Pacific Economic
Lecture 7: 15
Cooperation Council), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process), and the
Forum for East Asian and Latin American Cooperation (FEALAC) (Faust 2004). It
has tried to diversify its trade into the Pacific region, with growing trade with China
(which took 8.6% of Chile's exports in 2003) and through 2002-2004 efforts to
improve trade with China, South Korea, Singapore and New Zealand via bilateral free
trade agreements, with prospects for Thailand and Indonesia to also consider such
agreements (UPI 2004a; DFAT 2004; Faust 2004). It has also developed strong export
capacities in copper, agricultural products, timber, and fisheries, though there has
been some lag in improving the strength of manufacturing exports (see Kurtz 2001;
Faust 2004). Essentially, Chile has hoped to position itself as a natural bridge
between Mercosur economies and the Asia-Pacific.
In general terms, Chile has sought both a peaceful Southern Cone system in South
America (thereby improving relations with Brazil and Argentina), and has sought to
promote continued development within Latin America as a whole. Chile thus has a
progressive foreign policy, even as it deals with political legacies at home. Through
March 2003, it signalled its independence from U.S. foreign policy by resisting
pressure to support military intervention against Iraq (both Chile and Mexico were
sitting as (non-permanent) members of the UN Security Council) (Hall 2003).
However, tensions with Bolivia have continued in recent years, while through early
2004 Bolivia (a landlocked country) once again laid claims to coastal zones and
ports controlled by Chile (territory on during the 19th century War of the Pacific),
with rising Bolivian nationalism fuelling 'anti-Chilean sentiment' (Arostegui 2004a).
Bolivia wants the Chilean border to be demilitarised and mines to be removed form
the frontier, and also threatened to re-route trade to Peruvian ports (Aristegui 2004a;
Xinhua 2004a). The issue was exacerbated by the proposed natural gas pipeline (now
on hold) from Bolivia that would have earned some $6 billion for the poor country,
but would have to be routed through Chilean-controlled territory (Gentile 2004). The
public dispute between Bolivia and Chile was not solved in the January 2004 Summit
of Americas, and Mexico's offer of mediated was declined by Chile (Gentile 2004).
The problem was still viewed as part of the need for wider reform of regional
cooperation through mid-2004: Bolivian President Carlos Mesa reiterated . . . that his country will export natural gas
to Chile only on the condition that the latter grants Bolivia a sovereign access to the
sea, said reports from La Paz, capital of Bolivia.
Bolivia will sell natural gas to Chile only after a "definitive solution" to the Bolivian
"landlockedness," Mesa told foreign correspondents in La Paz.
Mesa said the dispute between the two countries is more complex than a simple "sea
for natural gas" swap because integration must be promoted between southern Peru,
western Bolivia and northern Chile.
This would comprise "energy integration, economic complementarity, and the
development of specific poles in the three regions," said Mesa.
Mesa said the eventual solution to the territorial dispute with Chile would contribute to
the possible exports of Bolivian natural gas to the neighboring country, which has
suffered fuel shortages.
Bolivia demands a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean on the Chilean coast in
order to end the "condition of a landlocked nation," which has affected Bolivia since
16
the end of the 19th century after jointly with Peru losing the War of the Pacific against
Chile. (Xinhua 2004b)
Through 2004, Bolivia moved to approve a greater role for government in controlling
energy exports, opened up exports routes to Argentina, and in August 2004 signed
a deal which allowed gas exports through a Peruvian port. The deal further
supports the mutual development of 'a bilateral commission to work on developing a
special economic zone on Peru's Pacific coast from where Bolivia will be able to
export its gas' (Hennessy 2004).
In general, Chile, then, combined a successful economic transition with an
enhanced foreign policy. However, reconciliation over the past, plus some
tendency a drop in democratic participation, will need careful watching if Chile is
to remain a 'democratic success' story.
4. Argentina: Military Rule and Re-democratisation
We can briefly assess the difficult path to democracy in another great regional power,
Argentina (see lecture 2). Argentina declared independence in 1816 and managed
to back this with effective resistance against Spain during the 1820s. However, the
future direction of the country economically and politically soon led to conflict: The competing groups came from different regions. Once faction was made up of the
"unitarians," mainly from the province (and city) of Buenos Aires. They wanted to
nationalize the port city of Buenos Aires: strip it of its autonomy, then make it into a
base from which to reduce provincial barriers to trade and thereby open the entire
country to international commerce.
The second group were the "federalists," who were from the interior. They
agreed on the need to nationalize the city of Buenos Aires because they wanted the
city's customs receipts distributed to all the provinces. At the same time, they wanted
to maintain provincial autonomy, especially the ability to levy interprovincial tariffs and
this protect local industries.
The third group were also called the "federalists," but they were of a very
different kind: they were from the province of Buenos Aires and opposed
nationalization of the port city of Buenos Aires, since that would mean loss of their
province's existing monopoly over the city's customs revenues. They also wanted free
trade. (Skidmore & Smith 2001, pp68-69)
These issues would cause conflict down through the 1830s and 1840s, with the
dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas rising to subdue regional caudillos, leading to a
strong federalist country dominated from Buenos Aires (Skidmore & Smith 2001,
p69). From 1853 Argentina adopted a constitution based on that of the United States,
with a two-house congress and an elected president. However, the problem of an
overly strong and wealthy Buenos Aires, and different cultures and conditions of
the urban and rural sectors would continue to be one of the features of Argentina
through the 20th century (for an account of the culture of Cordoba, Argentina's second
biggest city, see Florine 1998; Walter 2000). Likewise, the role of the military and
political 'strong men' would undermine many of the features of this democratic
system. Organised urban labour would also be key a political actor through much of
the twentieth century (Brennan & Pianetto 2000).
Argentina built its economic strength during 1880-1914 on exporting beef and
agricultural products to 'the North Atlantic industrial world' (Skidmore & Smith
Lecture 7: 17
2001, p70). Immigration from southern Europe (especially Spain and Italy) and
investment (at first mainly from Britain, followed by France and Germany) would
help develop the country, and also 'give Argentina a distinctly European quality, with
the resulting tension among the Argentines as their real national identity', as well as
discounting in the large measure the influence of the Indian and the gaucho (the
horsemen of the pampas) in national life (Skidmore & Smith 2001, pp70-73, though
the gaucho would become an important literary image, e.g. in Ricardo Rojas' poem
Martín Fierro). During the 19th century and first half of the 20th century Argentina
was one of the fastest growing economies in the world and through 1945 the peso was
a one of the strongest currencies in the world backed by huge gold reserves (Falcoff
2000). For a time, its GDP per capita was higher than European countries (Carlin
2002), and it was viewed as an emerging power within South America. Some relative
decline in this economy over the last five decades has been postulated as due to
public sector inefficiencies created under the regime of General Peron (1946-55),
decline in agricultural exports as the European Union became more self-sufficient,
and loss of markets after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was a major
importer of cereals (Falcoff 2000). At a social level, it is possible that a certain 'getrich-quick' mentality may have permeated the aspirations of many Argentines, leading
later on to intensified political and economic instability (Carlin 2002).
Argentina - Selected Political Timeline 1916-2000 (based on BBC 2002)
1916 - Hipolito Yrigoyen of the Radical party is elected president. He introduces a minimum
wage to counter the effects of inflation.
1930 - A coup involving all services of the Argentine armed forces and led by General Uriburu.
1932 - Civilian rule is restored.
1939 - Outbreak of World War II. Argentina proclaims its neutrality, even after 1942
1943 - Military regime seizes power. One of its leading figures is Colonel Juan Peron.
1944 - Argentina breaks diplomatic relations with Japan and Germany and declares war on
them in 1945.
1946 - Peron wins elections for the presidency. He had promised workers higher
wages and social security. His wife, Eva Peron ('Evita'), is put in charge of labour relations.
1949 - A new constitution strengthens the power of the president. Regime opponents are subsequently
imprisoned, independent newspapers are suppressed.
1951 - Peron is re-elected president with a huge majority.
1952 - Peron's wife dies of cancer. Peron's support begins to decline.
1955 June - An attempted coup by the Argentine navy is crushed as the army remains loyal to Peron.
1955 September -Coup by all three branches of the armed forces succeeds after three days of fighting,
during which thousands are killed. Peron resigns and takes refuge on a Paraguayan gunboat.
He subsequently goes into exile in Paraguay, and later in Spain. The federal constitution of
1853, based on that of the United States, is restored.
1966 - Military rule is imposed again with a coup led by General Juan Carlos Ongania.
1973 - The Peronist party wins elections in March. Hector Campora is inaugurated president. Argentina
is wracked by terrorist violence. Peron returns to Buenos Aires in June. Campora resigns and
Peron becomes president in September.
1974 - Peron dies in July. His third wife, Maria, succeeds him. Terrorism from right and left escalates,
leaving hundreds dead. There are strikes, demonstrations and high inflation.
1975 - Inflation rises to more than 300%.
1976 - A military junta under General Jorge Videla seizes power. Parliament is dissolved. Opponents
of the regime are rounded up in the 'Dirty War', which is to see thousands of people
'disappear'.
1981 - General Leopoldo Galtieri heads the military regime.
1982 April - Argentine forces occupy the British-held Falkland Islands, which Argentina calls Islas
Malvinas and over which it had long claimed sovereignty. The United Kingdom dispatches a
force to re-take the islands, which it does in June. More than 700 Argentines are killed in the
fighting. Galtieri is replaced by General Reynaldo Bignone.
18
1983 - Argentina returns to civilian rule. Raul Alfonsin becomes president. Argentina begins to
investigate the 'Dirty War' and charge former military leaders with human rights abuses.
Inflation is running at more than 900%.
1989 - Carlos Menem of the Peronist party is elected president. He imposes an economic austerity
programme.
1992 - Argentina introduces a new currency, the peso, which is pegged to the US dollar.
1995 - Menem is re-elected.
1997 - A judge in Spain issues orders for the arrest of former Argentine military officers on charges of
participating in the kidnapping and killing of Spanish citizens during the 'Dirty War'.
Argentine amnesty laws protect the accused.
1998 - Argentine judges order arrests in connection with the abduction of hundreds of babies from
women detained during the 'Dirty War'.
1999 - Fernando de la Rua of the centre-left Alianza opposition coalition wins the presidency, inherits
114 billion-dollar public debt.
2000 - Strikes and fuel tax protests. Beef exports slump after an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.
Soya exports suffer from concerns over the use of genetically modified varieties. The IMF
grants Argentina an aid package of nearly 40 billion dollars.
From 1918, Argentina, when economic problems hit the lower classes, suffered from
strikes and the formation of ultra-right paramilitary organisations, leading to political
violence and somewhat unstable governments (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p82).
Argentina's somewhat difficult experiment with 20th century democracy began to
unravel in 1930, when a 'coalition of military officers and civilian aristocrats' set up a
provisional regime, with relatively unstable civilian governments being restored from
1932 onwards (Skidmore & Smith 2001, pp82-85). From the 1940s Argentina's
political culture began to turn in a particular direction: elements in the military sought
to stay out of the World War, and at the same time revamp the political system,
including the dissolution of Congress. Workers, in turn, were highly organised and
highly literate, but lacked 'effective political representation' (Skidmore & Smith 2001,
p85). The stage seemed set for another round of political confrontation.
At this stage, Juan Perón, a Colonel who had been part of GOU, (Grupa Obra de
Unificación, dissident officers who wanted a stronger political role), entered the
political scene from 1943, first as a secretary of labor, from which he began to build
political support among industrialised workers (Florine 1998; Skidmore & Smith
2001, p86). He won the 1946 elections with a 54% majority, and thereafter moved
to position the government as arbiter of all social disputes, and to set up a state-guided
capitalist system. Thus, for example, he would sometimes encourage strikes so that
the government could be seen to settle them (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p87). He also
moved to buy out foreign interests in the Argentine economy (British in the railways,
the U.S.-controlled ITT, and French in the docks), and in July 1947 declared that
Argentina had paid of its entire foreign debt (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p87).
Moreover, Perón's popularity was greatly aided by his charismatic wife, Evita, who
set up social foundations that helped the poor (the descamisados) and women (Walter
2000, p162). She soon had her own following and as viewed almost as a national icon
or saint. Her death from cancer would greatly undermine Juan Perón's popularity.
Indeed, with the 1951 change of the constitution, and his re-election with 67% of the
vote, he went on to create the Peronist party, whose Tribunal of Party Discipline was
the beginnings of a much more authoritarian state system (Skidmore & Smith 2001,
p87). Peron had based his rule partly on pragmatic economic returns, but also on a
notion of corporatist stability that tried to embrace both the unions and the
Lecture 7: 19
military. Peron established a comprehensive propaganda campaign that included
elements of personality cult, and Argentine nationalism (see Foss 2000; Walter 2000).
The Peron regime cast a certain spell over the national aspirations of many
Argentines, leading to the later survival of Peronist political parties (Sweeney 2002):
The reason that Juan Domingo Perón and his wife Evita came to power . . ., remained
there for ten years and have never left the hearts of at least half the Argentinian
population is that they offered to make true the Argentine Dream. Vote for us, went
their message, and all of you - every single one of you - will win the Lottery. And
indeed, for a while, Argentina, brimming with beef and grain, reaped a post-Second
World War peace dividend. (Carlin 2002).
However, emerging problems in the economy, an increasingly arbitrary rule, and
opposition from parts of the military emerged from 1954, with the military finally
ousting Peron in September 1955. He went first to Paraguay, then to Spain, where
he bided his time, hoping to return.
The following governments did not achieve stability. After the elections of 1957
and 1958, President Frondizi attempted a developmentalist model based on
boosting agriculture and exports, with extensive state intervention in the economy. In
the end, however, Frondizi had to turn to the IMF to help stabilise the economy, as
well as being subject to pressure on his policies from the military (Skidmore & Smith
2001, p91). Instability in the economy led to strikes, and increasing support for
Peronist parties after 1962. The military intervened in the electoral process in 1962
and 1963, and eventually staged a military coup in 1966, thereby taking direct control
of the government and setting up a 'bureaucratic-authoritarian' state (Skidmore &
Smith 2001, p93). The military under General Juan Carlos Onganía sought to crush
opponents, control and split labour organisations, and mobilised technocrats and
foreign investors to improve the economy. But the result was another wave of
intensified violence: There was also a shocking rise in political violence, such as clandestine torture and
execution by the military government and kidnapping and assassination by the
revolutionary left. The Onganía coup began in violence and all normal legal
guarantees were suspended. The labour policy soon came to depend on coercion.
This had happened before, but now there was a difference. The left decided to reply
with its own violence. Splinter revolutionary groups sprang up, kidnapping prominent
businessmen and ransoming them for huge sums. (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p95)
Later military leaders only partially stabilised this situation, and General Alejandro
Lanusse announced that Perón would be allowed to return. Elections were held, with
the Peronists first being led by the 'stand-in' figure of Héctor Cámpora, who was
elected President in 1973 but soon stood down in favour of Perón. The Peronists
moved to try to create a 'grand bargain' between the main elements of Argentine
society, called the 'Social Compact', though the government soon turned against the
radical left. Whether this social compact could have lasted is not known, since Perón
died in 1974. His wife Isabel tried to continue his policies, but she lacked both the
intelligence and charisma of Evita. With the economy in shock through the mid1970s, Argentina once again had to turn to help from the IMF.
20
No one was surprised when another military coup occured in 1976. Thereafter
General Jorge Rafael Videla led a 'Dirty War' which sought to purge all political
opponents and subversives. Perhaps between 10,000 and 20,000 people were killed,
with up to 10,000 simply 'disappeared', becoming the desaparecidos (Skidmore &
Smith 2001, p97). The military penetrated all levels of society, controlling the media,
disbanding the main unions, and controlling the economy. Partly in order to boost the
popularity of this repressive government, in 1982 General Leopoldo Galtieri urged a
nationalist war to take the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands from the UK. Although the
islands were seized for a short time, Britain, surprisingly launched a large military
expedition, and bested both the Argentine navy and land forces in a bloody campaign
(see Aldea & Darnel 2002). The Argentine air force performed well, but soon found
itself short of the missiles it needed to threaten British ships. Likewise, Galtieri may
have hoped for the implicit support of the U.S., or at least its tolerance, but in this he
was wrong, while most of the Organization of American States voted in
opposition to the Argentine attack (discussed further in later lectures).
When the Argentine forces had to surrender, this led to the end the military
government. Massive patriotic protests turned into anti-military mobilisation.
Civilian rule was returned in 1983, but had to face numerous problems including
high levels of inflation, the problem of the disappeared, the problem of whether the
military could be prosecuted (several generals were convicted but those less than of
general rank were not), the long-term security of Argentina, and the issue of huge
levels of foreign debt. In 1989, the Peronists party won under the leadership of Carlos
Menem, who began an austerity program, restructuring of debt, and privation
program that for a time improved the national economy. President Menem also made
it clear that he had no wish to tackle the army head on: he issued pardons for minor
revolts, and then, amid considerable controversy, decided that 'there would be no
continuing sentences or prosecutions for human-rights offences committed in the dirty
war' (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p104). The mothers of the disappeared, however,
continued protests through the 1990s in which they demanded an explanation of
where the 'lost' had gone.
Economic growth, IMF structural adjustment, foreign-policy alignment with the
U.S. (including a rebuffed effort to join NATO), cooperation with Brazil and
Mercosur were key elements of Menem's policies (McSherry 2000; Skidmore &
Smith 2001, p106). However, issues of corruption, ongoing joblessness (for
mobilisation of the unemployed, see Petras 2002), a growing gap between rich and
poor (called 'savage capitalism', see McSherry 2000), fears over the continued
security role of the army which had been widened under incremental constitutional
reforms (see McSherry 2000), and a downturn in the economy in 1999, showed the
limits of both economic and political reform (see Hudson 1999). Thus: In the late 1990s Argentina was engulfed in a social crisis and a crisis of legitimacy of
the neoliberal state. Democratic procedures provided an escape valve in 1999 voters
were expected to vote out the Peronists and vote in a social-democratic party alliance
that called for promoting human rights and 'humanizing" the neoliberal model. But
Argentina remained subject to the requirements of international financial
organizations and global financial markets. In essence, the type of state demanded
by international actors was distinct from the type of state demanded by the Argentine
population (McSherry 2000).
Lecture 7: 21
This led to the election of Fernando de la Rúa of the centre-left Alianza
opposition coalition in 1999. Inheriting high levels of foreign debt, a lack of
confidence in the banking system, a public distrust of the political system, Argentina
would again be plunged into renewed social crisis with slow stabilisation through
2003-2005 (explored briefly in lecture 2).
In part, the problems of Argentina were based on an overly strong currency (tied to
the U.S. dollar), the slightly earlier de-linking of the Brazilian currency to the dollar,
and to problems in maintaining strong agricultural exports. However, in large
measure, the governance of the country (both in terms of national governments and
international governance) failed to avert a combined economic and political crisis.
Many ordinary Argentines do not trust their governments and leaders, in spite of the
return to civilian rule, leading to a lack of confidence in measures taken to stabilise
the economy. Corruption has also been a major problem, operating at all levels.
Furthermore, for some two decades Argentina had become hooked on the political
benefits of international credit: To satisfy various political needs and pressures, the government (at all levels) has a
persistent tendency to spend significantly more than can be raised in taxes. When the
government can finance its excess spending with borrowing, it borrows domestically
or internationally from wherever credit is available. When further borrowing is no
longer feasible (either to finance current deficits or roll over of outstanding debts),
recourse is found in inflationary money creation and/or explicit defaut and
expropriation of creditors. (Mussa 2002, p10).
When the crisis deepened it affected the entire banking system, including the wealth
and debts of all depositors. The impact soon emerged through February 2002, with
depositors losing up to 40% of their savings as the peso devaluation hit: Before devaluation, when the government guaranteed that one peso was worth $1,
most Argentine business loans, home mortgages and bank deposits were
denominated in dollars. Under the government's "pesofication" program, most
businesses and workers who borrowed dollars from banks and whose income is in
pesos were getting a break by being allowed to repay their loans in the same amount
of pesos as they owed before.
The measure helped spare thousands of Argentine debtors, but in return the
banks demanded that Argentines with deposits in dollars had to pay a price, too.
Depositors were barred from withdrawing their dollars and instead have effectively
been forced to convert their dollar savings into devalued pesos at a fixed, belowmarket exchange rate - or risk having them turned into government bonds of even
more dubious value that take up to 10 years to mature. (Faiola 2002; the loans
involved in the one-to-one ratio were those up to $100,000, see Strategic Comments
2002).
Likewise, there may have been some disillusion among ordinary citizens with
political processes. These factors have pointed to a deep institutional crisis within
Argentina: While elections are generally free and fair and the country has a thriving free press,
democracy has yet to be consolidated. The political system has been undermined by
corruption and abuses, giving rise to a deep-seated distrust of politicians, courts and
institutions. For many, the country's difficulties can be simply explained in terms of the
venality of its leaders. The poor example set by the elite is cited as a reason for the
high level of tax evasion, itself an important factor in the crisis in the public finances.
Disillusionment cuts across parties: at mid-term congressional elections in October
22
2001, one-quarter of the electorate failed to carry out their legal duty to vote, while of
those who did, just over one-fifth spoilt their ballots. (Strategic Comments 2002)
From January 2003, debt with international institutions was restructured, with
the IMF deal giving "Argentina an eight-month 'breathing space': a rollover on
US$3.8bn of debt owed before 31 August, plus a new credit line worth US$2.9bn to
cover debts owed to the Fund in that period. Most of the rescheduled debts come due
in 2004,when Argentina must now pay the Fund close to US$8.9bn." (Newsroom
2003). Furthermore, the financial pressure on government has greatly increased
poverty: through late January 2003, the World Bank approved $600 million in loans
to support poor and unemployed groups, unemployment has reached 21.5% (BBC
2003), and hundreds of thousands of people have defaulted on bank loans may their
homes (for a critical view of the IMF and World Bank approaches, see Palast 2003).
We can see, then, the Argentine political system has swung back and forth under
different social and economic pressures. Even though 're-democratisation' was
successful, it needed a strong economic base (and solid financial management)
from which all could benefit. In this context, we need to turn to the broader context
of democracy within pattern of regional development and globalisation. Events in
Argentina, in particular, showed that political reform was not enough. A lack of sound
fiscal management, little real control of debt, pressures from the international
financial system, and unwise use of two currencies in credit and banking systems, and
some lack of sound IMF advice would compound rather than resolve the crisis.
Through 2003-2005 Argentina has re-negotiated interest payments with its
international debt with the IMF and other creditors, but has made it clear that it is
not willing to put debt payment ahead of the funds needed to assure social stability.
However, it has managed to avoid any clear default that might trigger another round
of economic crisis, with President Kirchner currently negotiating over what
proportion of debt that might be written off, within perhaps up to 66-70% being
written off (see Arostegui 2004b; Economist 2005a). At the same, democratic
processes are relative entrenched, including effective elections and transfer of
governmental leaders and the operations of courts, have been sustained even during
the period of economic crisis. None the less, the lesson is clear that accountable
governments also need to find economic and developmental formula that meet
domestic and international demands.
5. Democracy, Neo-Liberalism and Economic Crisis
As we have seen, it is not enough to simply have elections to guarantee a stable
democracy. The background conditions, economic and cultural, that sustain
democratic processes and ensure that they are respected also need to be in place.
Further, even a true democracy, when undergoing conditions of economic turmoil,
will find it difficult to meet the needs and interests of the citizens it is supposed to
represent and support. Transparent control of resources, wealth, and legal rights and
their partial re-distribution also remain a core aspect of government even when
providing the framework for a free-market economy. Unless government are
perceived to tackle such issues, it will be very hard for even elected governments to
retain legitimacy and the strong participation of its population. Under such conditions,
variations of popularism, presidentialism, military rule, or corrupted democratic
systems can develop.
Lecture 7: 23
What this suggests that in the broader context that there needs to be a stronger
commitment both to democracy (including real protection of liberty and human
rights) as well as to the conditions of broadly-based growth, both in terms of
international policies as well as policies within Latin American countries (see
Llosa 2001). Without this support, there will be a tendency to trade off support for
democracy in terms of a narrow "neo-liberalism" that is more concerned with an
economic dogma that supports short term gains for particular groups in the
international economic system (Llosa 2001). There are lessons that have been
partially learnt in Chile and Argentina. Democratisation remains an ongoing
struggle to achieve political fairness and economic stability within a free contest
for political power under current global conditions (McSherry 2000). Simple redemocratisation is not enough to build stable communities within the Latin American
context.
6. Bibliography and Resources
Resources
One World Net has a wide range of short articles on Latin America and related
areas of global foreign policy, located at http://www.oneworld.net/ Their articles
can be viewed by country or theme.
NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs) Access
Democracy has a useful search engine with documents monitoring elections,
democracy and human rights, including pages on Latin America, at
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/basic.asp
A range of useful information on value systems and political processes will be
found in the World Values Surveys, who webpage is found at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
SELA, Sistema Económico Latinoamericao, the Latin American Economic
System webpage, provides a number of reports on the efforts to coordinate and
improve converging economic performance in the Latin American region,
with reports in English and Spanish via http://www.sela.org/
A useful specialised news service can be found in the Latin American
Newsletters Newsroom, with update coverage from Latin America at
http://www.latinnews.com/newsroom.htm
Further Reading
BARRETT, Patrick S. "Labour Policy, Labour-Business Relations and the Transition to
Democracy in Chile", Journal of Latin American Studies, 33 no. 3, August 2001
[Access via Infotrac Database]
BARROS, Robert "Personalization and Institutional Constraints: Pinochet, the Military
Junta, and the 1980 Constitution", Latin American Politics and Society, 43 no.1,
Spring 2001 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Country Watch Chile Review 2006, Chile Country Review, 2005-2006 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
24
FAUST, Jorg "Latin America, Chile and East Asia: Policy Networks and Successful
Diversification", Journal of Latin American Studies, 36 no. 4, November 2004,
pp743-770 [Access via Infotrac Database]
LLOSA, Mario Vargas "Global Village or Global Pillage? The Need for Democracy and
Liberty in a Time of Globalization", Reason, July 2001 [Internet Access at
www.findarticles.com]
HENDERSON, Errol A. "Mistaken identity: testing the clash of civilizations thesis in
light of democratic peace claims", British Journal of Political Science, 34 no. 3, July
2004, pp539-554 [Access via Infotrac Database]
KORNBLUTH, Peter The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability,
N.Y., The New Press, 2003
KURTZ, Marcus "State Developmentalism Without a Developmental State: The Public
Foundations of the 'Free Market Miracle' in Chile", Latin American Politics and
Society, 43 no. 2, Summer 2001 [Access via Infotrac Database]
MUSSA, Michael Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy, Washington, DC,
Institute for International Economics, 2002 (Reserve section of Library).
PALAST, Greg "Resolved to Ruin: The World Bank/IMF Takeover in Four Easy
Steps", Harper's Magazine, March 2003, pp48-51 [Access via Ebsco Database]
POSNER, Paul W. "Local Democracy and the Transformation of Popular Participation
in Chile", Latin American Politics and Society, 46 no. 3, Fall 2004, pp55-81 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
SKIDMORE, Thomas E. & SMITH, Peter H. Modern Latin America, Oxford, OUP, 2000
(see especially chapters 2, 3, and 4)
WEINSTEIN, Michael A. "''Chile Enters Period of Political Normalization'', PINR, 25
January
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[Internet
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Lecture 7: 29