IAPS 2004 Abstracts of Papers
Anderson, Russell
Breivik, Gunnar
Culbertson, Leon
Dench, Linda Naylor
Dixon, Nick
Eassom, Simon
Elcombe, Tim
Fry, Jeff
Fukasawa, Koyo
Gaffney, Paul
Grassbaugh-Forry, Joan
Hamilton, Mark
Hochstetler, PhD Douglas R.
Hopsicker, Peter M.
Ilundain-Agurruza, Jesus
Kelley, Sean
Kretchmar, R. Scott
Loland, Sigmund
McLaughlin, Douglas
Morgan, Bill
Mumford, Stephen
Nendel, Jim
Pawlenka, Claudia
Reid, Heather
Rintala, Jan
Ritterskamp, Ellyn
Ryall, Emily
Sheridan, Heather
Stoll, Sharon Kay
Beller, Jennifer, Rickel, Karen
Teetzel, Sarah
Torres, Cesar R. &
Peter Hager
Tracey, Jill
Vossen, Deborah P.
Weaving, Charlene
The Holy Shiver: A Spiritual Feature of Sport
The constitution of world and temporality in risk sportsA
Heideggerian interpretation
The Paradox of Bad Faith and Elite Competitive Sport
Female Athletes’ Perceptions of Archetypology and Typology
The Interpretation and Morality of Symbols in Sport
The Sporting Contract
Reason and Technology in Sport:A Pragmatic Criticism and
Reconstruction
Faith, Hope, and Love in Sports
The meaning of competition in sport education: on the
relationship betw een competition and cooperation
The Meaning of Sport: Competition as a Form of Language
Foucault and the Discipline of Sport: Implications for
Female Athletes and Femininity
Post-play or Post-game Festivity in Sport: Making
Distinctions Between Celebration or Partying?
Running and Place: Significance on the treadmill?
The Silent Understanding: Unwritten Rules of Sport and the
Goals of Education
Between the Horns: a dilemma in the interpretation of the
running of the Bulls
From Aesthetics to the Kine-Aesthetic Being: Returning to a
sensory/perceptual understanding of sport participation
Game Flaws
Sex Classes in Sport – An Ethical Analysis
Truth and Certainty in Sporting Contest Resolutions
Sport as a Source of Moral Identity
Watching Sport
Transcendental Surfing
Between Naturalness and Artificiality: The Ban on Doping
in Sports and its Philosophic-Ethical Justification
Apollo vs. Poseidon Can the Ancient Ideal of Justice Survive
Modern Olympic Realities?
Annika at the Colonial: Exposing the Many Meanings of
Sport
Games People Play (And Why They Should Play Them)
Whereof What One Cannot Speak, One Must Remain Silent:
A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Ethics of Genetic
Technology in Sport
Sport and human potential: an ethical discussion
Exercise Adherence? The role that sport philosophy can play
in developing pedagogical practice
Testing for the Genetic Enhancements in Athletes
Justice and Evaluation in Sport: The Case of the Bonus Point
System.
Philosophy In Action: Consulting with Athletes from a
Phenomenological Perspective– Is There Any Other Way?
Grasshopper Versus Grasshoper: Toward a Formal Theory of
Competitive Games
“I’m too sexy for this sport…it hurts”: An examination of the
connection between sex and sport.
1. Anderson, Russell
Bates College, USA
The Holy Shiver: A Spiritual Feature of Sport
In his article “Competitive Sport’s Imitation of War: Imagining the Completeness
of Virtue,” Norman Fischer discusses how sport, by “transformation of the context of a contest,” redefines
and revises the meanings of the features of competition. In this paper, I will follow Fischer’s lead in
addressing a particular phenomenon that occurs in both combat and athletic competition—what the
romantic German poets call the heilige Schauer or “holy shiver.” This phenomenon constitutes a spiritual
element of competition that accompanies the physicality of athletic contests. Some scholars and scientists
seem quick to dismiss athletics and athletic competition as mere physical goods—healthful exercises of
the body and perhaps even the brain. Ask any athlete, however, and most who have engaged in
competitive sports will tell you that the physicality is accompanied by a spiritual component that is, in
fact, an integral part of athletic experience. This component is to be found in experience and is best
addressed phenomenologically. My aim here, then, is to take up a phenomenological description of the
“holy shiver” as experienced within the transformed context of athletic competition as a way of disclosing
this spiritual component and of assessing its import for performance and life.
In his work On Aggression, German psychoanalyst Konrad Lorenz introduced his concept of
“militant enthusiasm” which he used to explain the detached air that can supposedly turn a peaceful man
into a [bloodthirsty] killer in the heat of battle. One component of this strictly scientific theory dealt with
the “rush” of adrenaline known to the German poets as the heilige Schauer or “Holy shiver,” which
seemed to incite heroic bearing and, consequently, heroic actions in men engaged in physical conflict. It
is my intention to suggest that, though this “holy shiver” might have dire results on the lawless battlefield,
it acts as an indicator of a desirable spiritual union between body and soul when experienced in the
controlled environment of competitive athletics. This desirable union can have the dual effect of
enhancing the immediate performance and opening the athlete to another meaning of competition.
As background to my account of the “holy shiver” I define spirit, or soul, in its most
traditional sense as the dynamic force of an individual--“the sum total of those components of ‘self’ that
are neither grounded in the physical nor cognitive capabilities or tendencies of a person.” The self I take
to be more Greek than Cartesian; it is not a duality of mind and body, but a living integration of forces
intellectual, physical, and spiritual. Against this background, the “holy shiver” is to be reduced neither to
mere physical phenomenon nor to sheer mystical mystery. It is a phenomenon both spiritual and physical
that transforms the whole self. The poets first coined the term heilige Schauer to describe the tingling
rush of energy that instilled men with courage and made them capable of great feats in battle. The
description is a succinct but beautiful one, the words carefully chosen. “Holy” the experience seemed, for
it allowed men to do things physically they would otherwise be incapable of, as if they were aided by
some divine strength. In this sense it was deemed a spiritual experience. A “shiver,” on the other hand, is
a very physical experience—it is commonly associated with a natural reaction to cold or described as a
physical manifestation of fear. Thus, referring to this ennobling adrenaline rush as the “holy shiver”
elegantly suggests its integrative nature. Drawing on performances in athletic competition—especially in
baseball and volleyball, I will try to exemplify this integrating and transforming experience.
In developing my phenomenological description of the “holy shiver,” I will draw on
John Stuart Mill’s notion of an “intermediate good,” one that stands between the lower goods that pertain
essentially to the body and the higher goods of the pure intellect. As a spiritual phenomenon, the “holy
shiver” integrates all the elements of the self, mediating among them and enabling the whole self to be
transformed at once. I will also focus on two related theses: 1) that this shiver creates the possibility of
enhanced performance through its transformative work and 2) that, on reflection, it also stands as a source
of potential spiritual insight for the athlete who experiences it. Thus, it not only transforms the self in the
competitive setting but also transforms the self through the act of competing. In both cases, athletic
competition accompanied by the heilige Schauer reveals itself as much more than physical contest.
2. Breivik, Gunnar
Norwegian University of Sport
The constitution of world and temporality in risk sports
A heideggerian interpretation
In my paper I will try to interpret some aspects of sky diving and climbing with some of the
tools and the frame given in Heidegger’s analysis of “being–in–the-world” (Dasein) in Being and Time.
This project may seem both daring and pretentious. I will try to be cautious and modest. There are two
topics that I will concentrate on. One is Heidegger’s analysis of the human daily life condition where tings
are at hand as tools, “Zuhandenheit” in German. I will analyze the first few jumps in sky diving where
things are not at hand, where the void is breaking up “the world” and where one feels deeply confused. In
a sense the “being–in–the–void” is a liminal, extreme case of “being-in-the-world” and therefore worth
using as a test case for the different elements that together forms the “Zuhandenheit” condition. I will
compare this with climbing where the situation is less extreme but where the needed grips and holds may
be out of reach or simply not there. I will try to give a phenomenological description of how the function
of body, tools and surroundings in sports like climbing and sky diving nevertheless constitute a totality, a
“world” in Heidegger’s terms.
In the second part of my paper I will analyse Heidegger’s notion of temporality in relation to
sport. I will use climbing and sky diving as examples since there are interesting differences between these
sports in how the temporality functions. Heidegger sees existential time as a dynamic unity and interplay
of past, future and present. In Heidegger’s analysis the affectedness of the past (Befintlichkeit) is carried
into the projects of future, in our understanding of ourselves in the world (Verstehen). And the future and
our projects, guide us in relation to how we “fall” into our daily activities and get engaged in the present
situation Verfallen). In sky diving we commit ourselves totally when we jump out of the plane. It is not
possible to turn back. In climbing it is possible to turn back to safety in many cases. This means that the
future has a different meaning in the two sports. This again influences how the past is integrated and how
one reacts to the present situation. I will try describe more in detail these variations in temporality and I
will show how temporality for Heidegger is the ultimate structure and “meaning” of the Zuhandenheit
condition.
3. Culbertson, Leon
Edge Hill College, UK
The Paradox of Bad Faith and Elite Competitive Sport
The issues of technology, the scientific manufacturing of athletes, elitism and the performance
principle in sport have received much attention in recent philosophy of sport literature (Miah 2004;
Munthe 2000; Schneider and Butcher 2000; Tännsjö 2000; Tamburrini 2000; Loland 2000 and Hoberman
1992 and 1995). In all this work the issue of the self-deception which both emerges from and facilitates
such practices as the use of performance enhancing drugs in sport, strict adherence to extreme training and
dietary regimes and the adoption of a technological attitude to the sporting body has remained
unconsidered.
In an initial attempt to begin to rectify that omission this paper considers Hoberman’s (1992
and 1995) critique of the technological attitude in elite sport paying particularly close attention to
Hoberman’s use of the work of Heidegger on technology. The paper argues that while Hoberman’s
critique is powerful and of considerable value, it is ultimately incomplete because Hoberman emphasises
the ideological nature of the problem and this leads him to locate the difficulty in the dominance of the
technological attitude and the lack of an adequate alternative. Hoberman does not appreciate the degree to
which athletes are responsible for their own deception.
The paper argues that the notion of bad faith, a particular form of self-deception, described in
the early work of Jean-Paul Sartre helps us understand the role of the athlete in the forms of self-deception
that are found in elite competitive sport. Any discussion of self-deception encounters a paradox: How is it
possible for an individual to believe that something is true and yet know that it is untrue? The solution
offered by Sartre rests on a complex phenomenological ontology, but it is argued here that close
consideration of Sartre’s use of language can assist in dissolving the paradox.
Is there something about sport that promotes self-deception more readily than other social
practices? While the paper argues (following McFee 1998 and 2004) that there is no essence of sport, it is
maintained that the way much elite competitive sport is conducted does lead to a greater incidence of self-
deception (in the form of bad faith) than other social practices, including those which are overtly
competitive and performance-orientated. It is argued that the dominance of the performance principle and
the accompanying logic of progress found in elite sport, when added to the emphasis on the body,
quantification, competition, and the notions of fair play and the level playing field lead to elite sport
having a rare combination of features which facilitate bad faith.
4. Dench, Linda Naylor
Temple University, USA
Female Athletes’ Perceptions of Archetypology and Typology
The reality that a societal bifurcation of the sexes has created two different experiences of sport
in the Western world has generated empirical inquiry into gender constructs. Societal ascriptions of
instrumental/agentic traits predominately to males, and expressive/communal traits to females have been
challenged, particularly in the domain of sport (Del Rey, 1978; Duquin, 1978; Sandoz & Winans, 1999;
Oglesby, 1978). Some researchers have concluded that sport participation has facilitated the development
of androgyny in women (Duquin, 1978; Oglesby, 1978).
Since its inception, androgyny has been primary in Jungian concept (Jung, 1951; Robertson,
1995, Singer, 1976; Stevens, 1995; von Franz, 1980). A review of the literature of sport psychology and
clinical psychology, however, revealed that analytical principles have rarely been utilized empirically in
sport. In the present study, three areas of Jungian theory have been explored to augment this limited
utilization: 1) archetypology, 2) typology, and 3) androgyny.
Androgyny, a psychological bisociation of masculine and feminine energy, has recently
achieved a measure of societal acceptance. Paradoxically, though some researchers have observed that
misogyny is a dominant value in sport, it has been theorized that the greatest potential for the development
of androgyny in females is through sport.
Additionally, this research has attempted to empirically identify androcentric cultural myths.
Jungian postulates have likewise questioned such myths. Central to Jung’s work has been the hypothesis
of personal psychological growth through the process of individuation. Postulates of the individuation
process are theorized to inform bisociative aspects of integrating dualistic psychological sexual energies.
Phase I involved a quantitative study of fifty (50) to seventy-five (75) female athlete members
of collegiate teams, sport clubs, or who self-identified as an athlete. This original sample completed the
Myer Briggs Typology Indicator (MBTI), the Rank Order of Archetypes (ROA), & the Goddess Within
Questionnaire (GWQ). From this pool, ten (10) athletes were selected for Phase II, consisting of a retest
of the ROA and GWQ, and two one-hour interviews utilizing qualitative methodology.
The interviews were based on postmodern and poststructuralist theories. They probed the
following: 1) feminine archetypology as a lived experience, 2) typology as a phenomenological
experience, 3) gender beliefs and personality, and 4) gender beliefs and archetypology
Consistent with previous research (Ullyot & Myers, 1994), it was anticipated that: 1)
archetypologically, selected female athletes would report an identification with Artemis, distinct from
other archetypes of the feminine, to a statistically significant degree, 2) typologically, female athletes
would report statistically significantly higher sensation and judging functions in the MBTI as compared
with the general population of females, and 3) a strong reported identification with Artemis would
correlate statistically significantly with a reported affirmation of the construct of androgyny. Further, the
qualitative interview would yield rich, psychologically in-depth narratives of selected female athletes’
inner constructions relating to archetypology, typologies, gender and sport.
5. Dixon, Nick
Alma College, USA
The Interpretation and Morality of Symbols in Sport
This paper is an examination of the morality of the use of two kinds of symbols in sport: (1)
controversial symbols of support for teams, including Native American mascots and the Confederate flag;
and (2) the verbal symbols involved in trash talking and other forms of spoken intimidation. For many
Native Americans and African Americans, as well for liberal white Americans, displaying Native mascots
2
and the Confederate flag is deeply offensive. For them, the innocent intentions of people who display
these symbols cannot rid it of its objectionable connotations.
However, in his recent JPS article (Vol. XXVIII, Issue 1, 2001), “Philosophical
Aspects of Sports Symbolism,” C.D. Herrera warns against simplistic criticisms of such symbols. He
argues that adjudicating between the rival connotations of the confederate flag—the school spirit and
southern pride intended by those who display it at athletic events, versus the outrage experienced by those
who associate it with support of slavery—is very difficult. Symbols can change their meaning over time
and the question of which interpretation of their meaning is correct may be unanswerable. In the case of
using the Confederate flag and Native mascots at sporting events, then, what we might call “subjectivism
about symbols in sport” does have some plausibility.
Nonetheless, even if we concede for the sake of argument that whether a particular mascot or
flag is objectively demeaning is indeterminate, we are assuredly not committed to a subjectivist approach
to the morality of displaying such symbols. Given the relatively trivial, easily replaceable pleasures that
sports fans gain from these symbols, compared with the deep offense that they cause to racial minorities,
we should refrain from using them.
Another use of symbols that is widely condemned in the philosophy of sport literature is trash
talking or other types of verbal intimidation. A common defense of the practice by the athletic community
is that athletes don’t really mean to insult their opponents. In the context of a sporting contest, say
apologists for trash talking, athletes understand that it is no more than an attempt, often light-hearted, to
unsettle opponents and gain a competitive edge. Parallel to my critique of offensive mascots and flags, I
will support the conventional critique of trash talking by arguing that the absence of malicious intent
cannot rob demeaning and insulting language of its morally unacceptable connotations. Moreover, in the
case of such language, no plausible case can be made that the meaning of these words has changed over
time, robbing them of their objectionable connotations.
Underlying defenses of questionable symbols in sport may be an even more fundamental
presupposition, namely that sport is a whimsical, playful activity to which it is inappropriate to apply the
same level of moral scrutiny that we apply to more serious endeavors. In response, I will argue that, while
sport does indeed exist in an artificially constrained world, our actions within that world are just as subject
to moral evaluation as those performed in the outside world.
6. Eassom, Simon
De Montfort University, UK
The Sporting Contract
It has become something of a commonplace to discuss notions of justice and fair play in sport
with reference to one or another political philosopher and their particular social contract theory (most
notably, that of John Rawls – see Sigmund Loland’s Fair Play: A Moral Norm System, Routledge, 2002).
In this presentation, the author will examine the case for likening the nature of sporting games with the
idea of a social contract. An assessment of the validity of this analogy will be made in two ways. In the
first instance, the distinction will be made between the classical conception of political philosophy
(exemplified by Plato and Aristotle) and the modern conception (initiated, arguably, by Hobbes) and an
attempt will be made to show how the emergence of modern, rationalised sport in the 18th and 19th
Centuries reflects the modernist conception of governance and its justification. That is, the traditional
view of Plato and Aristotle (that political life is natural to human beings) will be rejected. By denying any
innate desire of humans to be governed, the goal of political philosophy ceases to be the search for a
theory government but instead becomes a justification for accepting or needing government and a
determination of what kind of government best fits humans' natural desires.
The relevance of this for the study of sport will be exemplified by a brief analysis of the
emergence of national governing bodies of sport (in particular, football and its division into various local
and national codes, including rugby, and cricket). There follows an analysis of the various interpretations
of the functions of referees and umpires and a comparison between laws of the game and laws of
contractual dealing.
Second, the analogy of sporting games as implicit forms of social contract will be taken further by
analysing the usefulness or otherwise of Hobbesian social contract theory and its modern extrapolations
(e.g., game theory; the Prisoners' Dilemma; rational choice theory) for an understanding of the nature of
modern sport.
7. Elcombe, Tim
Penn State University, USA
Reason and Technology in Sport: A Pragmatic Criticism and Reconstruction
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, in The Ethics of Authenticity, outlines three cultural
malaises that “flatten and narrow” human existence – a slide to subjectivism, the primacy of instrumental
ends, and the fragmentation of society. Taylor’s expressed concern about the second malaise – an
inordinate focus on instrumental reason and application of technology in contemporary human practices –
is not new. Recent work in the pragmatic philosophy literature similarly laments the economically driven
cultural impulse in modern cultures. Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue, famously criticizes the amoral,
efficiency driven “Manager” stock character. John Dewey, in the early years of the twentieth century,
railed against the “business mind” that dominated American society.
The purpose of this presentation serves to closely examine the cultural malaise identified by
Taylor as the primacy of instrumental ends and its effect on, expression in, and advancement through
sport. To begin, the impact of this cultural climate outlined by Taylor, MacIntyre, and Dewey on sport will
be appraised. Part of this examination will include an overview of the positions Taylor labels as the
“boosters” and “knockers” of instrumental reason and technology from a sport perspective. These two
polar opposite positions will be analyzed for their strong claims and their experiential limitations.
Following this survey of the current climate of sport with respect to instrumental ends, I will
carve out a pragmatic middle position between the “boosters” and “knockers.” In particular, I will present
Taylor’s response and vision of reason and technology enriching (rather than restraining) human
existence. Taylor’s call for the recognition of horizons of significance to guide our use of reason and
technology will be defended and further developed for sport by applying Charles Peirce’s notion of a
developmental teleology and Dewey’s dissolution of means/ends splits.
The failure of sport theorists, including sport philosophers, to adopt a similar approach to
means and ends, I will argue, perpetuates the use of reason and technology in limited and hollow ways.
Taylor’s position, in concert with the pragmatic work of Peirce and Dewey, in contrast, can revitalize the
place of reason and technology in a rich, flourishing sport culture.
In sum, the purpose of this presentation will be to examine how we deal with issues of means
and ends in sport from a pragmatic perspective. Appealing to genuine human experience, rather than from
a position denying the place of meaning or by way of cold analytic deduction, will offer a fruitful vision to
deal with the ongoing dilemmas faced by a sport environment delicately balancing human flourishing and
technical progress.
8. Fry, Jeff
Ball State University, USA
Faith, Hope, and Love in Sports
Faith, hope, and love, hold special significance in Christian theology as virtues that depend on
an infusion of divine grace. In this paper I argue that “mundane” versions of faith, hope, and love are also
important virtues for sports. They are in fact metavirtues, in that they are not only excellences in their
own right, but also enabling conditions for other excellences. Given this prominent role, their role in
sports is deserving of careful analysis.
Faith provides a Jamesian disposition that is a necessary precondition for individual and team
success. This faith entails not only a “belief that” but also a “belief in” or trust. Included in this trust is
not only a basic self-trust, but also trust in one’s teammates, coaches, and even a broader sporting
community. Hope too is an enabling condition. When the “chips are down” hope sustains vision and the
effort to realize what is uncertain or doubtful. In a recent book entitled The Anatomy of Hope, Jerome
Groopman explores the biology of hope. Groopman cites experiments that support the claim that hope
influences body chemistry in a way that makes pain more bearable. Hence, hope may be related to what
one can endure in sports. Finally, while love is arguably the preeminent enabling virtue of sports, it is
one which receives scant notice. When success is elusive, the love of sport still invigorates motivation.
Hence love as desire or a kind of eros is an important factor in sports. Love as philia or friendship is also
significant in sport. Yet the obstacles presented to forming friendships in sports can be significant. In
sports we compete for scarce goods.
Faith, hope, and love are powerful enabling conditions for success in sports, and help forge a
connection between sports and the good life. Elements of faith, hope, and love are implicated in what
3
Laurence Gonzales refers to in his recent book Deep Survival: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why as
“Positive Mental Attitude,” which he links to the ability to survive in sporting as well as other endeavors.
But the virtues of faith, hope, and love are not solely achievements of those who exhibit these qualities.
They are part gift and part achievement. My argument that these sporting virtues are also dependent to
some extent on nurture from gracious sources parallels claims made about faith, hope, and love in
theological contexts. Faith, hope, and love encompass players, coaches, and fans in an interwoven
tapestry.
9. Fukasawa, Koyo
U. of Electro-Communications, Japan
The meaning of competition in sport education: on the relationship between competition and
cooperation
The issue of competition and cooperation is often talked about in sport education or physical
education. It would be largely the argument about a negative opinion of competitive nature and its
defense. As long as physical education teachers or educators of sports deal with sports as teaching
material leaving the negative aspect of competition will lead to self-abnegation of their significance of
existence. The paper will explore the background of discussion on competition and cooperation in
educational activities through a speculation about competitiveness of sport.
The essence of negative opinion of competition will be its exclusiveness, which becomes the
target of criticism. On the other hand one of assertions from the defensive stance of competition is social
functionalism that competition promotes the excellence of human kind. It relies on the thought that cull
by competition brings superior person into being. That is a sort of meritocracy. To put it the other way
around, it implies exclusion principle, and, as such, cannot shake off the negative aspect of competition in
principle.
We also know the claim that the concept of cooperation can cover the negative aspect of
competition. This claim has two ideas that the effort to work out competitive game presupposes
cooperation, and that the competition in team sports can introduce the cooperation among team members.
In the former, competitors need the agreement that the aim of competition is to enhance their achievement
each other, and that they have to keep the rules of competition. The goal of this idea, in a certain sense, is
to measure the level of achievement of individuals, competition will be considered the means to make the
comparison of their performances clear. In dual or match-up sports such as tennis, football or basketball,
the error of one player/team likely lead to relatively higher performance of the other player/team. This is
the feature of zero-sum game, it will be difficult to authorize the legitimacy of comparison of
performances in the real sense. In the latter idea, the cooperation among team members is emphasized, we
can find the educationally positive value in competition which stimulate the achievement-oriented
interaction among the members.
As to competitive activities in team sports we should pay attention to specialization of role
and exclusion/isolation from other team members. Modern sports has inclined to technicalize the role or
position in each sports, for example, GK, DF, MF and FW in soccer. To find the position which enables
the individual to take an active part might be appropriate to the policy of respect for personality. But this
is not adjust the thought of all-around education or balanced development. To turn around, experiencing
as many roles or positions as possible, the educatees may learn diverse perspectives and enhance
communications. And the compound eyed thinking will deepen their understanding of sport. For the
isolation from other team members we should keep the possibility of inhibition from cooperation by
rivalry among members in mind. In the case of taking up team sports as teaching material, to take full
advantage of competition, we need to assure the sense of belonging to the team and bringing out
performance of each member sufficiently. If the primary purpose of sport education is based on
enhancement of achievement, we should regard sport competition as means of it and motivate educatees to
achieve a higher level.
10. Gaffney, Paul
St. John’s University, USA
The Meaning of Sport: Competition as a Form of Language
My idea is to explore the idea, suggested by Wittgenstein, that language and games share a
certain structural similarity. His idea, I take it, is that when we learn and use a language we learn to
"move" in well-regulated and coordinated ways, in a manner very much like one does when one learns to
play a game. The analogy is douby revealing: playing games is a form of communication (in the broad
Wittgensteinian sense of the term) that is governed by constitutive rules. Game playing, competition, and
athletic endeavors are forms of life, and therefore can be considered sources of meaning.
I want explore the sense in which competition is meaningful. There are at least two senses in
which sport or athletic competition is meaningful. First, it is meaningful to participants and spectators in
the sense that it is important to them -- for some, significantly defining of the self. That is, athletes gives
the endeavor a great sense of value: it matters if they win or lose, and it matters how they perform, and
how their opponents perform. It is serious, although certain it is by nature leisurely (I would argue). But
there is another sense of meaningfulness that I think is even more important, and actually helps explain the
first -- this will be the real burden of my paper. This is: Competition is meaningful in erxactly the sense
that Paul Grice outlined in his classic discussions of semantic meaning. Meaning is always a coordinated
relation between two intentionalities. There is a double intentionality on the part of the speaker (he or she
intends to induce a belief, and intends that the first intention be recognized and recieved as such) which I
will argue finds a parallel in the relationship shared by competitive athetes. Athletics is important because
it is a profoundly intimate, interactive, and reciprocally constructive relationship. The performances in
athletics are not in themselves important: they take on meaning because they occur in the context of
a well-regulated confrontation with one (or more) other intentionality.
11. Grassbaugh-Forry, Joan
Temple University, USA
Foucault and the Discipline of Sport: Implications for Female Athletes and Femininity
Michel Foucault conducts a genealogical study of the complex of punishment and
discipline in his 1975 work Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. For Foucault, disciplines are
systems of controlling tools and methods that are diffused and exercised in institutions such as schools,
prisons, and military services. Disciplinary practices always affect the body, imposing a relation of
docility-utility on it. Thus, disciplinary practices are modes of regulation, and train the body to be
simultaneously more obedient and more productive. For Foucault, ‘the body’ denotes more then the
physical body. Rather, ‘body’ refers to the physical body and the discursive forces surrounding it, which
includes history, representation and interpretation.
In this paper, I use the intersection of the body and discipline provided by Foucault’s analysis
to examine the ways in which sport functions as a discipline. I show how disciplinary practices employed
in sport serve to regulate active bodies. I address subsequent implications that arise from this analysis,
responding to two questions in particular: Do disciplinary practices differ according to gender? How do
disciplinary practices employed in sport affect female athletes in particular?
I argue that disciplinary practices do differ in application and execution according to gender. I
will use Sandra Lee Bartky’s feminist argument given in her paper, “Foucault, Femininity and the
Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” as a point of departure. Bartky claims that there are disciplinary
practices that are distinctly feminine, and further, these feminine disciplinary practices render women’s
bodies docile in ways that are not applicable to men’s bodies because they are specifically aimed at
producing femininity. Bartky considers three categories of disciplinary practices that accomplish this
production: 1) practices that produce bodies of a certain size, 2) practices that aim to produce a body with
particular movements and gestures, and 3) practices that produce particular bodily appearances through
ornamentation. I argue that some disciplinary practices employed in sport fit into these categories and can
render women’s bodies docile, however, sport practices also function on another level. In addressing
implications for women athletes, I argue that sport occupies a paradoxical position in relation to the
production of femininity. While the disciplinary practices employed in sport can be read as regulating
women’s bodies in a negative way, these sporting practices also create sites of resistance, where
conventional conceptions regarding femininity can be negotiated and challenged. I show that viewing
sport in this way has significant value, especially in terms of gender and identity.
4
13. Hochstetler, PhD Douglas R.
Penn State-Berks/Lehigh Valley College
12. Hamilton, Mark
Ashland University, USA
Post-play or Post-game Festivity in Sport: Making Distinctions Between Celebration or
Partying?
We frequently hear of students celebrating the end of a school week or semester by getting
drunk and carousing. We have all attended wedding celebrations. Athletes celebrate touchdowns, home
runs, and even a tackle or dunk. After a great game it is time to celebrate. But what is the difference
between celebrating and partying? In celebrating we have a clear purpose and one can remember the
celebration and remember the event that is the reason for the celebration. Partying has none of this; it is
done for no legitimate reason. Partying involves no true remembering.
The athlete today plays for the camera and in doing so he imitates the person who legitimately
celebrates but his action is more akin to partying. The Detroit Tigers won their last two games of the 2003
season to avoid tying the Mets for the most losses in a season in baseball history. By losing 119 instead of
120 they avoided the stigma of being the worst team in baseball history. But is that reason to celebrate?
Their post game celebration mimicked the teams winning the World Series. All that was missing was a
parade down the main avenue the next day “celebrating” not being the worst team ever. This type of
activity seems to mock those activities where real championships are earned.
Remember the true spontaneous joy of the 1980 American Olympic Hockey team, or the
experience of Tug McGraw getting the final out in the 1982 World Series. These were true moments of
joy and celebration in sport. There was real reason for celebration. These teams had overcome great
odds, had won great championships and now were celebrating the glorious victories. Even now we see the
exuberance of Carlton Fisk waving the ball fair and feel his spontaneous joy as he bounces down the first
base line in 1975 or of McGraw flinging his glove in the air after the final out of the ’82 World Series. On
the other hand, the contemporary athlete plays as if every move is to be seen later on ESPN. Every action
is choreographed even with rehearsed end zone dances. There is no spontaneous joy here. It is rather,
“Look at ME,” “See what I have done.” How spontaneous is it to pull out a pen or to dig out a cell phone
and pretend to make a call? Clever, yes; theatre, yes; but it is not celebratory. It is a mockery of
celebration and joy. It is parallel to the partying which goes on in culture for no good reason. The images
of celebrating athletes have been so overplayed on ESPN and other highlight reels that these images have
become ingrained in the minds of the contemporary athletes. What happens then is that when they do
something in the game, something not really that noteworthy or celebration-worthy they imitate the image
in their minds of those who have done truly great and meaningful actions. The further effect is that when
an action truly worthy of celebration occurs it is like the boy who cried wolf and it only becomes a modest
or even perverted celebration since no one knows how to truly and meaningfully celebrate. Even in this
instance it becomes reduced to partying and we end up with streets full of fires, overturned cars, and
inebriated out of control juveniles.
Celebration is motivated by a meaningful event good that has happened. Partying is done to
deter boredom. It is an activity done without meaning for no greater reason than to just pass the time or as
an attempt to imitate celebration and try to create meaning in an event which is not really meaningful. In
that case it often succeeds in only drawing attention to the self as an expression of Egoism. Though it is
done for the sake of feeling better for the self, it is also done as a form of crowd activity and is thus done
under the influence of others as a type of mindless activity as has been described in Brantlinger’s book
Bread and Circuses.
This paper will examine the experience of celebration as it occurs in contemporary sport and
draw parallels with the experiences of true celebration and the mockery of celebration in partying that
occurs in general society. The goal will be to establish true criteria for celebrating and encourage our
modern athletes to find meaningful celebrations and distinguish them from experiences that are not worth
celebrating so that true joy in sport and society might be distinguished from imitative joy.
Running and Place: Significance on the treadmill?
A central theme in the writings of William James is “the strenuous life.” In his article “What
makes life significant?” he notes the importance of precipitousness and, when on retreat to Lake
Chautauqua, finds himself longing
for something “primordial and savage.” Recently, leaning on other American philosophers, Ralph W.
Emerson and Henry D. Thoreau, Doug Anderson writes that movement provides the opportunity for
recovering an aspect of our humanity an
“inner wildness.”
In recent years cardiovascular equipment of all sorts treadmills, stair-climbers, rowing and
elliptical machines, stationary bikes, and so forth have come into vogue. These forms of technology, for
some people, have replaced other, more traditional, forms of movement, such as running or walking
outside. Many people use cardiovascular equipment for reasons of convenience, safety, economics, and
perhaps comfort. Indeed there are some individuals who,
if exercise equipment were not readily available, would not move at all (at least in an aerobic sense).
It seems to me, however, that movement in a contrived environment is somehow an inferior
experience. Many people approach their “workouts” on a treadmill with the type of attitude Thoreau
described in his essay “Walking” taking their exercise as they might take medicine. In other words, these
individuals approach moving as means to other ends at the expense of experiencing movement as an end
in itself. The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance of
place in movement. Specifically I will contrast the experiences between running outside in natural
settings with running indoors on a treadmill.
My aim is to use American philosophers James and Thoreau and to examine place in
movement in light of their conceptions of a meaningful life. I will briefly trace the history of the
treadmill, from 18th century British prisons to
present day use in fitness centers. The next section will address several questions, namely: Is running on a
treadmill consistent with “the strenuous life” advocated by James? Is it possible to construct treadmill
workouts that are strenuous in the Jamesian sense? Is treadmill running too tame, too civilized as Thoreau
might ask? Finally, does treadmill running provide the opportunity for recovery of the “inner wildness” of
our humanity?
14. Hopsicker, Peter M.
Pennsylvania State University, USA
The Silent Understanding: Unwritten Rules of Sport and the Goals of
Education
During the 2003 Tour de France, Tour leader Lance Armstrong suffered an unfortunate crash
when his bike handlebar tangled with a spectator’s bag. Upon crashing, Armstrong’s opponents had every
opportunity to attack and cut into his lead. In contrast, they waited for Armstrong to recover before
continuing the chess match known as professional cycling. The cyclists did not wait for Armstrong to
recover because the rules demanded it or for purposes of avoiding a penalty from the Union Cycliste
Internationale. Neither rule nor penalty exists. Rather, they were adhering to an unwritten rule of the
cycling practice: never attack when the race leader crashes.
Why not take advantage of Armstrong’s bad luck and ignore the unwritten rules of cycling, the
same guidelines that had been ignored by other cyclists in similar situations? When the stakes are high,
why not look out for one’s self interest, particularly when no written rule forbids the use of such
strategies? The simple answer is that such actions would violate the moral mores of the professional
cycling practice. However, this leaves much unclear about the force of unwritten rules and the reasons for
such morally praiseworthy decisions.
This ethical dilemma – pursuit of one’s own self interest over adhering to the mores of the
group – highlights the individual judgment needed by athletes when deciding to follow seemingly codified
rules when, in fact, no such rules exist. Athletes thrust into these situations are left to their own judgment
to determine the appropriate courses of action. It is this extremely fragile, unwritten texture of sport
where etiquette (allowing the race leader to recover) and morality (acting appropriately for the good of the
practice) meet – where the uniquely challenging moral actions of sport lie.
5
Much competitive sport, however, is blanketed with third-party officiating and thick rulebooks
that would cover most every eventuality. Much judgment and decision-making is effectively removed
from the hands of the individual athlete. As such, competitive sport does not adequately parallel the
judgment and decision-making processes necessary for life’s often unprecedented and regularly
“unofficiated” navigation. This raises serious questions about the efficacy of sport for ethics education
assuming that one goal of education is to provide the learner with the skills necessary for successful
judgment and decision-making in this mostly “unofficiated” realm of everyday life.
In this essay, I will defend the notion that the decision-making goal of education is provided
more profoundly in the adherence to the unwritten rules of sport than in the adherence to officiating calls
and the dictates of rulebooks. I will begin by framing a definition of unwritten rules in sport and identify
factors that provide them with special pedagogical potential when compared to the written rules of sport. I
will then endeavor to show how the teaching and advancement of the unwritten rules of sport are more
ethically developmental than simply teaching and utilizing the written rules. I will conclude that learning
to obey the officials and follow written rules is an important goal education, but it is not the final goal.
Children should also be taught and allowed to develop their capacities of judgment so that they can
survive those dimensions of life and sport that are insufficiently covered by existing rules.
15. Ilundain-Agurruza, Jesus
U. of New Mexico-Los Alamos, USA
Between the Horns: a dilemma in the interpretation of the running of the bulls
Key words
Running of the bulls, extreme sports, risk, death, interpretations, existentialism.
The event of the running of the bulls—encierro—epitomizes the primeval contest between man
and beast in what is one of most iconic (perhaps even anachronic) events at the turn of the Twenty-first
century. However, its globalization through the mass media has turned what once was an obscure small
town ritual into an international icon of the extreme. In between there is a plethora of conceptualizations
that see it as a rite of passage, a show of manliness or machismo, a foolish undertaking, a pseudo-religious
ritual, a quasi-artistic spectacle, or a sporting event (of the extreme kind most recently).
Those wanting to make sense of the encierro face an interpretive dilemma, given that these
interpretations are all partial, dubiously compatible, and none is unerringly superior. On the one horn, we
face the choice of which interpretation to favor. Since none of the views encompasses the rest nor offers a
metacriterion that justifies it over the others we face a limited and often exclusionary understanding.
(Choosing all concurrently and simpliciter is precluded because of justificatory and compatibility issues.)
On the other horn, we can opt to forsake such hermeneutic enterprise altogether, but then we must face the
beast unable to comprehend its nature and significance. Yet we must choose either some way to
understand it or refuse to do so, which leaves us with the unsavory conclusion that we must be partial and
restrictive in our comprehension or remain clueless. Unless we proffer an alternative that dodges this
charging pair of horns …
I intend to briefly present the most prevalent interpretations to then argue that the best way to
solve the impasse lies in positing a philosophical alternative, an existentialist understanding, that
incorporates the rest—not as mere pastiche—while still retaining its conceptual backbone. This gracefully
slips between the horns rather than “foolishly” attempting to grab them (a more dubious, less interesting,
not to say risky alternative!). Existentialism provides a meaning-conferring horizon that includes itself as
it encompasses the rest—in Jaspers’ sense of the encompassing. Sartre, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Ortega
y Gassett will be steering the charge here, resorting to their views on death for the first two, the Dionysian
life affirmation for Nietzsche, and an aesthetic of life for the latter. This existential framework, sensitive to
the varied, even contradictory, motivations of the participants, organizes a pluralist conception of the
running of the bulls under a canopy where each of the key interpretations complement one another,
placing descriptive limits as well as creating semantic openings that enable us to make sense of the event.
Each of the main sections is prefaced and corresponds to one of the different and distinct
segments of the route. Thus the audience is taken for a virtual running of the bulls. This provides an
“insider’s” understanding, getting the back as close to a pair of horns as feasible without actually having
to do it, while concurrently furbishing the “participant” with the conceptual tools to make sense of it.
16. Kelley, Sean
U. of Science and Arts of Oklahoma
From Aesthetics to the Kine-Aesthetic Being: Returning to a sensory/perceptual understanding of
sport participation
The notion of modern aesthetic inquiry began when Alexander Baumgarten coined
the term in the latter part of the Eighteenth Century. Unfortunately, his use of the word deviated from the
original Greek intention of the term, and this misguided use has perpetuated a path that has led aesthetic
studies further away from the Greek notion, and has in essence left sensation and perception from
consideration. Over the past century, Aesthetics has become a domain of rational inquiry into what is
“good” or “bad” in the arts, which is limited to the cognitive domain of the observer. Dixon (1995) points
out that Aesthetic arguments are largely paradoxes because they overlook the sensory perceptions and
instead focus on ‘language games’ - a priori investigations that neglect the experiential domain of
knowledge. In essence, aesthetics is perception instead of conception. Eagleton (1990) similarly
questions the notion of aesthetics by looking at how it pertains to body culture. Unlike many of the
aesthetic philosophers, Eagleton defined aesthetic issues from a cultural perspective. In this way,
aesthetics has only a secondary relation to art, and is an issue of social practice and culture, specifically
body culture. Body culture then is “simply the way social harmony registers itself on our senses, imprints
itself on our sensibilities.” This focus on aesthetics ultimately I believe is explained best through
Immanuel Kant’s work Critique of Judgment. where in the Second Moment he discusses aesthetics as
having agreement. Basically, it is a state where the subject is beyond reason or concept, as he says: “the
beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally.” The implications for this are first,
when one makes a claim of beauty one does so purely through the sensory realm, and if this is the case
then no one can disagree, and second, the aesthetic is formed through one’s culture and environment.
My task then is to reconnect aesthetic inquiry as intended by the Greeks with sport or more
specifically with sport culture. With this new focus on the aesthetic I will describe how an examination of
sport shifts from rational aesthetics toward sensory aesthetics. My focus will be threefold. First, I will
examine how sport aesthetics not only includes the positive experiences of movement but also the
negative experiences. Secondly, I will show that athletes develop attitudes, perceptions, and judgments
through these bodily/somatic experiences. Thirdly, I will introduce a concept of what I refer to as the
“Kine-aesthetic Being” - namely an individual who develops him or herself aesthetically through sport
participation by combining aesthetics, morality and spirituality to the sport experience.
17. Kretchmar, R. Scott
Pennsylvania State University, USA
Game Flaws
In the course of playing a variety of games during our lives, we find that some attract us, others
repel, and some have little effect on us one way or the other. At one extreme games become something
like life-long friends. As often as we engage them as players or watch them as spectators, we never grow
weary of their companionship. Other activities, by way of contrast, are tried only once or twice or may
travel with us but for a short period of time before they are discarded with few or no regrets.
Much of this variation is attributed to personal preference or taste. One person likes game X;
another person prefers game Y, and little reason exists for praising or critiquing either decision. Much
like preferences for vanilla or chocolate ice cream, baseball and soccer, for instance, are merely two
sporting flavors that please different lusory palates. Certainly much truth lies in this point of view.
Nevertheless, another perspective can be taken on this phenomenon. It could be that games are
more or less flawed. That is, they embody different numbers and kinds structural defects that can be
identified and analyzed to show how and why they diminish certain functions that games normally serve.
This line of reasoning would suggest that game preference is not only a matter of personal taste but also
one of good judgment.
This analysis will focus on certain natural rules that inform good gamewrighting. One that will
receive particular attention is this. Sound games do not embody contradictory purposes or obligations.
Another one that will be pursued is this: Sound games do not employ methods that cure one flaw at the
expense of creating other comparably serious flaws.
My discussion will have a rough and tumble pragmatic flavor to it, one that depicts games as
fragile enterprises that are in continuous flux. Most, if not all, contemporary games, I will argue, have
6
identifiable structural flaws. I will show that gamewrighting involves processes of balancing different
goods, finding appropriate compromises, and testing new rules for unintended (and deleterious)
consequences. I will trace rule changes in certain sports that were designed to address obvious game
flaws and will show how the delicate web of game problems and skill requirements can be disturbed when
such legislative cures are sought for acknowledged weaknesses.
The upshot of the analysis will be that intelligent discernment is needed in telling a good game
from one of is lesser counterparts. Moreover, pragmatic caution is advised when addressing flaws with
convenient reformations.
18. Loland, Sigmund
Norwegian University of Sport & P.E.
SEX CLASSES IN SPORT – AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS
Historically, sport has been developed by men and for men. In most sports, the gradual
inclusion of women has been based on sex segregation. Men compete with men, and women compete with
women. Whereas this development is understandable based on the socio-cultural context of which sport
has been a part, classification of competitors according to sex does not seem to have any critical,
philosophical rationale. Actually, authors such as Tännsjö (2000) and Tamburrini (2000) claim that from a
normative point of view, sex classification in sport cannot be justified at all.
Based on a particular interpretation of fairness, and with the help of practical examples, this
paper aims at sketching a critical framework for evaluating the rationale for sex classifications in sport.
The argument builds on Loland’s (2002) definition of fairness in sport as a prescription on
equality of opportunity to perform by the elimination of, or compensation for, non-relevant inequalities
with potentially significant impact on performance. Non-relevant inequalities are defined as inequalities
that individuals cannot control or influence in any significant way and for which they cannot be claimed
responsible.
Inequalities in sex are non-relevant inequalities in this sense. Hence, in sports in which sex has
significant impact on performance, there should be sex classes. In sports where this is not the case, there
should be no sex classification. A systematic discussion of various sports is carried out. A continuum is
presented where sports with no rationale for sex classification are placed at the one end, and sports with
obvious rationale are placed at the other end. The figure demonstrates the rather radical consequences of
the fairness principle for sex classification as it is found in current sport.
Summing up, it is argued that in light of the individualization processes of modern societies,
future classification systems in sport will be based to a larger extent on actual inequalities between
individuals such as height and weight, and to a lesser extent on statistical generalisations such as those
describing inequalities between the sexes when it comes to performance potential.
References
Loland S (2002) Fair Play in Sport – A Moral Norm System. London: Routledge
Tamburrini C (2000) “The Hand of God”. Essays in the Philosophy of Sport. Gothenburg: Acta
Universitatis Gothoburgensis
Tännsjö T (2000) “Against Sexual Discrimination in Sports”, in Tännsjö T and Tamburrini C (eds):
Values in Sport. London: E & F N Spon
19. McLaughlin, Douglas
California State Universtiy, Northridge USA
Truth and Certainty in Sporting Contest Resolutions
What is the purpose of sporting contests? Try as sport philosophers might, we are
hard-pressed to explain the purpose of sporting contests in terms other than attempting to determine the
relative difference between two contestants. In short, the main purpose of sporting contests is to
determine a winner and a loser. To suggest otherwise would be to misrepresent the nature of sporting
contests as well as to undervalue the rich and fertile possibility that contesting provides us.
Still, such an emphasis on winning and losing seems in many ways unsavory. The prevalence
of “winning at all costs” mentalities, or at least the accusation of such attitudes, makes defending winning
a thorny endeavor. Often other values and goods of contesting are trumpeted in defense of sporting
contests. And even when a defense of winning itself is mounted, it generally fails to take into account the
complex possibilities that are present in contest resolutions.
What do we know at the conclusion of a sporting contest? What participants and spectators
hope for from a contest is a true and certain result. A true result to a contest is one in which the team that
played better actually wins. A certain result to a contest is one in which the relative difference (as
typically represented by a score) is accurate and meaningful. Sometimes, however, at the conclusion of a
contest, the resolution is neither true nor certain. At the very moment when the answer to the sporting
question should be resolved, there is rather ambiguity. This ambiguity demands a more thorough account
of contests themselves and the range of stories that contest resolutions represent.
The complexity and range of sporting contest resolutions are made intelligible through a testing
family. Not only do they share an interest in a sporting practice, but they also share the stories, history,
and interpretations of how their contests can be resolved. It is within the testing family that scores are not
merely numbers. Rather, scores represent particular contests while demanding elucidation of how that
score was derived. It is through the shared history and common stories that interpretations are forged and
made intelligible. It is through the testing family that the nuances and the complexities of contest
resolutions are fully appreciated.
This paper is an attempt to flesh out the complexity of contesting resolutions. It will address
how winning and losing can be understood in their full complexity. It will address how truth and certainty
are not guaranteed in contesting and how to reckon ambiguity in contest resolution. It will explore how
contesting resolutions are made fully meaningful from the perspective of a testing family. Finally, it will
explore what implications this more nuanced and delicate understanding of contest resolutions has for
sporting practices.
20. Morgan, Bill
Ohio State University, USA
Sport as a Source of Moral Identity
I set two aims for myself in this paper: first, to sketch out a coherent anti-realist moral account of sport,
and second, to show that such an account is rationally and normatively superior to rival normative
accounts of sport. My argument will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly characterize the four types of
evaluative inquiry typically employed in moral analyses of sport (formalism, conventionalism,
subjectivism, and what Simon calls “broad internalism” or simply interpretivism). I will argue that
Simon’s broad internalism account of sport has strengths going for it that the other three alternative
normative approaches do not. Next, I will follow Dixon’s insightful lead that Simon’s account can be
strengthened further by considering it against the backdrop of the debate between moral realism and antirealism. Contra Dixon, however, I will argue that moral anti-realism rather than moral realism is the more
promising way to fortify Simon’s interpretivist approach. My defense of moral anti-realism in this paper,
however, will be restricted to showing that moral anti-realism is not to be confused with conventionalism,
something even certain of its adherents on occasion seem guilty of doing, and so that it is not adverse to
rational argument as such but only to certain overreaching conceptions of rational argument.
21. Mumford, Stephen
University of Nottingham, UK
Watching Sport
Most philosophy or sport is focused on the sporting event itself or participation in such an
event. Yet most people’s experience of sport is that of a non-participant spectator, either at the event or
through the media. Is there anything of philosophical interest in the watching of sport? And does it have a
unique and characteristic function that cannot be served by watching drama or looking at art?
I look at a number of areas in which the watching of sport has a philosophical dimension.
7
Sport as an aesthetic experience: Superficially, we can see that sport provides many good
examples of aesthetic experience, broadly construed. There is the obvious grace and beauty of gymnastics,
in which perfect human forms are exhibited. But there can be a more abstract, higher-level beauty in
something like a style of play or particular move in football. Sport provides the transcendence from one’s
self that is the benefit, according to Schopenhauer, of aesthetic experience. In sport, one is able to lose the
sense of self almost completely and immerse one’s conscious in contemplation of the object.
Sport as a moral guide: Many use sport as a moral guide to life. It offers lessons: endeavour
produces reward; adversity builds character; preserve dignity through bad luck and defeat; cheats harm
themselves most; keep a cool head during bad times. Drama also displays such lessons. But sport has the
key characteristic of being unscripted, just like our lives, so it allows us to see and assess the reactions of
real people to life’s vicissitudes. It shows that adversities can be overcome, unlike a work of fiction where
a character’s fate is fixed. Sport provides a moral guide in a narrow sense but it may also be a guide in a
broader sense, providing practical life-lessons on how best to conduct oneself.
Sport as a focus of emotion: Sports characteristically foster intense emotional attachments.
These can be to teams or to individuals. The basis for the attachment can be wide-ranging: sometimes
geographical but other times ideological or simply from personal admiration. Sport enriches our emotional
life in many different ways. But sport can often provide a distinctively simple and asymmetrical
relationship that is appealing to many of us. We expect our team to do their best to give us joy, yet often
we give little in return. This emotional experience can become a commodity. It is unlike the complexity of
personal relationships that involve obligations on both sides. Some sporting allegiances may be selected
on the basis of which team will best meet one’s emotional needs. Hence one may choose a very successful
team if one can face only good emotional experiences. Some favour a more mixed emotional package,
perhaps because of the training for life it provides.
It is a reasonable hypothesis that these three aspects satisfy human needs: aesthetic experience,
moral guide and emotional investment. The popularity of watching sport is in some part due to its unique
position to meet all three needs, sometimes in a single experience: watching one’s favourite team play a
beautiful game to overcome their unworthy and immoral opponents.
22. Nendel, Jim
Eastern Washington University, USA
Transcendental Surfing
Americans often refer to high moments in sport as transcendent experiences. Philosophers such
as Emerson and Thoreau would describe these encounters as experiences that are rooted in history, and
everyday experience but have the power to transform us and transcend the common toward something far
more meaningful. Coaches and proponents of sport often use the ideals of sports and games as an allegory
for teaching lessons about life. We like to speak of how sport has the ability to transcend the boundaries of
our athletic fields and courts to instruct us about deeper meanings of life. However, with the rapid
commercialization of sport into a gigantic business venture the transcendental essence of what Ralph
Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau championed is more often than not lost in our pursuit of sport.
That is not to say that economically-driven sport does not offer moments of
transcendence, or that high pressure sport and transcendental philosophy share no common ground. Some
activities would seem to have an advantage in serving as venues for transcendence. Both Emerson and
Thoreau noted some of these. Sailing, back country skiing, and hiking are obvious candidates. In this
paper I will look at surfing and at some of the originators of the modern sport such as Duke Kahanamoku
and illustrate how the Hawaiian style of surfing fits cleanly with the ideals of both Emerson and Thoreau.
Surfing is an ancient Hawaiian sport that in its Hawaiian roots and style holds strongly to a transcendental
nature. It possesses the ability to encompass the absolute freedom, wildness and self-reliance which
Emerson and Thoreau believed were consistent with transcendental thought concerning nature and the
richness of life.
Conversely, I will look at the sport of surfing as practiced by the more dominant mode of the
Californian and Australian beach cultures and demonstrate how they have lost some aspects of the
transcendental qualities of surfing as it has emerged into an International sport, thriving on technological
and economic advances.
I believe that an investigation of surfing provides us with a unique view into the thought and
ideals of transcendental philosophers in an venue that is familiar to our modern approaches to sport. I
assert that the Transcendentalists would critique us for losing not only the joy and essence of sport and
play but also for turning our back on its ability to transform us into better human beings. We have bought
into a progressive utilitarian mode of sport that sends us walking into the woods without our spirit and
without an honorable purpose. Through sports such as Hawaiian surfing, there remains an open window of
possibility for transforming encounters, but we must intentionally retreat to the venues that allow for
growth and development of our complete humanity to understand the transcendental nature of those
sports.
23. Pawlenka, Claudia: Naturalness versus Artificiality – Doping in Sports
Within the context of the discussion on doping, probably no concept is more controversial than
‘naturalness’. Despite the skeptical-critical responses to the use of this concept, primarily from
sociological and philosophical perspectives, one finds a conspicuous, staunch adherence to premises of
naturalness, albeit ones formulated on a speculative and intuitive basis.
The issue of doping is looked upon as the most crucial and as yet unresolved problem in sports
science. The problem consists in determining what constitutes doping and why it is forbidden. For over
fifty years, up to the time when the most recent “Lausanne Declaration” was issued by the IOC in 1999,
this task has consisted in applying what has become a classic criterion, the crucial question being whether
artificial or unnatural enhancement of sports performance is involved or not. These concepts have been
persistently criticized for being poorly defined, however, and as a result, so-called pragmatic definitions,
or negative lists have been introduced which define doping as that which involves use of the forbidden,
performance-enhancing substances to be found on such lists. In light of the imminent use of gene
technology in sports, the obvious lack of sound premises required to legitimize the worldwide fight
against doping is becoming more and more of an issue. In the following I will contend that
(a) when determining what constitutes doping and proscribing it, premises on naturalness are
indispensible and have the capacity to tackle the problem; and that
(b) the doping controversy involves asking whether to accept a risky practice (risky for sports
and for those involved in sports).
This forms the basis for a five-step argument. First of all the task will be to clarify the dual
function – descriptive and evaluative – fulfilled by assumptions of naturalness for determining what
constitutes doping. Secondly, the apriori normativity of naturalness in sports will be demonstrated in terms
of its artificial genesis. The further steps will be to address questions concerning the ontology of sports
performance, sports as a special realm of action and the inapplicability of a (general) criticism of
naturalness as well as the fundamental significance of a universal-nature (“common body”) in sports.
24. Reid, Heather
Morningside College, USA
Apollo vs. Poseidon
Can the Ancient Ideal of Justice Survive Modern Olympic Realities?
At a famous moment in Book I of Plato's Republic, a rambunctious Thrasymachus,
fed up with the philosophical ramblings of his companions, boldly defines justice as "the advantage of the
stronger" and promptly asks for applause (338c). What he gets instead is a very long discussion designed
to disabuse him and anyone else who will listen of this popular and practical view. And so begins the
philosophical elevation of justice from the practical reality of "might makes right" to a heavenly ideal that
promises the peaceful thriving of human communities. The Ancient Greeks' philosophical interest in
justice was reflected in the cultural phenomenon of competitive sports such as the Olympic games. And
so as the philosophical ideal of justice developed, it has been paralleled in sport by the conception we call
fair play. This ancient connection between justice and fair play seems to have inspired the founders of the
8
Modern Olympic Games to use sport as a means of modeling global justice and fomenting world peace.
But is such a plan defensible, much less effective?
In this paper I will argue that the ideal of justice is manifest in Olympic sport and does have the
potential to inspire social justice, even in the modern world. I begin by surveying the development of the
philosophical ideal of justice from Plato to Aristotle and on through such moderns as Immanuel Kant and
John Rawls. From this survey, I distill three common principles of justice: equality, impartiality, and
moral reciprocity. Next, I show how these principles manifest themselves in sport as the fair-play
principles of equal opportunity, reward according to merit, and an attitude of moral respect. In this phase I
draw heavily from Sigmund Loland's book Fair Play, and from other works in contemporary philosophy
of sport. I then focus in on Olympic sport, identifying justice as part of the Olympic Ideal, with reference
to the modern Olympic Charter as well as examples from the ancient Olympic games. Finally, I examine
the question of whether fair play in Olympic sport has and can continue to inspire justice around the
world. In this section I will analyze examples and anecdotes from the modern Games, looking back at
such challenges as amateurism and sexism, and looking forward to such challenges as performanceenhancing technologies and economic disparities among countries.
Far from claiming that Olympic sport can somehow save the world, I do believe that the
Games have the potential to cultivate and present a model of justice in which diverse individuals with
competing interests are able to pursue their goals in an atmosphere of peace and mutual respect. I argue
that this was a key part of their purpose even in ancient times. Just as Plato's Republic attempts to define
the ideal of justice, the Olympic games have a responsibility to model that ideal by sticking to just
principles, both in the movement's own conduct and its administration of sporting events.
25. Rintala, Jan
Northern Illinois University, USA
Annika at the Colonial: Exposing the Many Meanings of Sport
In the early spring of 2003, it was announced that Annika Sorenstam had accepted a sponsor’s
exemption to enter the Colonial Invitational Golf Tournament in Fort Worth, TX. In doing so, she would
become the first woman to compete in a men’s professional golf tournament since Mildred “Babe”
Didrikson Zaharias competed in the Los Angeles Open in 1938. This announcement ignited a firestorm of
media coverage related to whether Annika, or any woman, should compete in men’s professional sport.
While the commentaries in the popular media were not done at a philosophic level, they exposed various
assumptions about sport which can be examined philosophically. Several of the comments raised
questions about both the meanings and the purposes of sport, as well as “who is professional sport for?”
Much of the commentary centered on why Annika would want to participate. This dialogue
seems to be based on assumptions related to the purposes and meanings of sport. Sorenstam herself based
her explanation on sport as opportunity for self-discovery and meaningful challenge. She wanted to test
herself against the best in her sport, and she considered the men’s professional tour as providing that
challenge. Some of those who questioned her involvement seemed to see the tournament as primarily a
competition, not an individual test or challenge, and if she did not have a legitimate chance to win, she
should not play—or perhaps not be allowed to play. Another position, related to this latter question,
centered on the tournament being essentially a means of making a living for the men on the tour. Since
the field is limited, her participation resulted in denying someone from the men’s tour the opportunity to
try to earn a check that week. With the significance of total earnings on one’s continued eligibility to be a
member of the tour or compete in other events, this could have serious implications for someone. Infused
throughout these discussions were underlying assumptions regarding gender in sport.
So far, these points focus on differences in the purpose of sport for the participants, and are
partially based in the dialogue regarding internal and external goods of sport. There were other discussion
threads, however, that essentially bypassed the athletes themselves and focused more on the value of her
participation to the sponsors, media, and spectators. Were the invitation and her acceptance simply
publicity stunts? Would her involvement make the event better or turn it into a circus? The unspoken
question here is “who is sport—or a sporting event—for?” This paper will examine the philosophical
issues and assumptions underlying the discussion presented in the popular media coverage of Sorenstam’s
participation in the Colonial Invitational in 2003. Sport philosophy literature will be used to unpack these
issues and assumptions.
26. Ritterskamp, Ellyn
U. of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA
GAMES PEOPLE PLAY
(AND WHY THEY SHOULD PLAY THEM)
Goodness is a way of life, if we want it to be so. Putting goodness into practice requires effort.
That effort is made more tolerable with a spelled-out philosophy that explains why goodness is worth
striving for. A philosophy is a particular perspective on life, on the universe, and on ourselves. A personal
philosophy is one in which we blend the perspectives of others into one which makes sense to each of us.
Philosophy of sport is an attempt to consider an element of society that has been often overlooked by
thinkers. Plato mentioned wrestlers, horse handlers, and soldiers as athletes he held in high regard. But
only in the past half century or so have philosophers begun to systematically acknowledge that sport is an
aspect of society to which we attach values, and that those values are worth studying.
Many people have pointed out the evils associated with modern sport, especially those
associated with professional and college-level sport. My purpose here is to provide a counterpoint to that
viewpoint, with a more idealistic vision of what sport can be. When we criticize a college for recruiting
violations, it is because we believe that it has strayed from the correct path, the path that is fair to the
recruit and to the competing schools. When we condemn a professional athlete for deliberately injuring
another athlete, it is because we believe in a code of conduct from which that athlete has deviated. Deep
down, we believe that there is a right way to behave. When someone dodges that code, we are offended.
We feel moral outrage. We are outraged because we are moral creatures at heart.
Many things about living in society have corrupted that essentially moral nature, but we can
reverse this course. The first step is simple awareness of the trend. The second, in our example of sport as
something that has become corrupted, is an effort at appreciating all that is good about it. The final step is
taking action on our ideal, so that we may produce change. In this essay, I emphasize the second step,
defining virtue in sport. I consider how justice and fairness play themselves out over time, and how our
experiences of time affect our experiences of sport. Finally, I consider how baseball defines particular
cultures and how it defines American culture in particular.
Sport is good for us. It gives us ways to be social, to be solitary; ways to learn lessons about
ourselves and about each other; ways to think about space and place and time; ways to work out our
values. Sometimes we’re just practicing for how we’ll act in real life, and sometimes the way we act in
games is real life.
27. Ryall, Emily
De Montfort University, UK
Whereof What One Cannot Speak, One Must Remain Silent: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the
Ethics of Genetic Technology in Sport
The issue of genetic modification in sport is one that the World Anti-Doping Agency believes
will become an applied technology within the next decade. Leaving the practical administration and
science of this technology aside, the matter is fundamentally an ethical one with the central question being
whether the use of this technology ought to be allowed or prohibited. The traditional method used to
discuss such questions focuses upon the issues of equality and fairness, what is natural, the definition of
human, the concept of sport, and the distinction between freedom of choice and obligation to prevent
harm. These are perennial issues yet have still not been resolved. The argument I will attempt to provide is
one maintaining that ethics is an area that we should not be tempted to speak about – for it is a futile and
misdirected task. This paper will bring into play Wittgenstein’s remarks on the value and purpose of
philosophical thought in its attempt to provide enlightenment on ethical matters. It will seek to show that
pursuing philosophical (and that implicitly includes ethical) questions by following the scientific method
is a misguided temptation and, in Wittgenstein’s words, “leads philosophers into complete darkness.” 1
Wittgenstein maintained that the desire to approach philosophy in this way is due to a confusion brought
about through our language and that the only role that the philosopher can play is one that untangles the
knots in our thinking and lays everything clearly before us. I hope to provide some indication of what
9
Wittgenstein might have meant when he warned us not to let our intelligence be bewitched by the means
of language. Primarily, this paper will look at the use of metaphor with a focus upon the media
presentation and comment regarding genetic modification in sport. The implications of taking such a
stance does not necessarily lead to a position whereby we shrug our shoulders and turn away from
addressing this pertinent ethical issue, rather the opposite in that ethics is about action in contrast to
abstract theory. This presentation will lead to a conclusion that seeks to show that resolving the issue of
genetic modification in sport (and other ethical issues) can only be a duty that one must reach in oneself
and not the formulation of a categorical imperative as so often has been attempted.
Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, p18
28. Sheridan, Heather
University of Glouestershire, UK
Sport and human potential: an ethical discussion
In this paper I explore the idea that technology can be used as an efficient means to ‘releasing
undiscovered potential’ (Rechnitzer, 1989: 68) of athletes. It is undeniable that technology and scientific
research has had a profound impact on modern elite sport. Equally, it is clear that there have been
benefits: safer equipment can allow athletes to develop new skills and techniques; and many areas of
training and conditioning can also be performed both more effectively and more safely. Nevertheless,
there is also a sense in which the athlete’s body has become a laboratory specimen, the structure and
potential of which can be calculated in clear-cut quantitative terms. Because the typical scientific focus is
on understanding the performance, the human is all too easily reduced to a set of data points on a
computer spreadsheet. The human and the human aspect of sport are neglected.
The aim of this paper is to challenge the dominant view that human potential is a given, to be
exploited by scientists and technologists (physiologists, psychologists, biomechanists, engineers, and
pharmacologists) alike. First, I outline and explore Scheffler’s (1985) Aristotelian-inspired account of the
traditional misconceptions of human potential: (i) fixed potential, (ii) harmonious potentials, and, (iii)
uniformly valuable potentials. I argue that sports scientists failure to recognize these misconceptions and
damaging normative practices are powerfully at play in their approach to developing human potential in
sports. Then, I reflect critically on the nature of human potential in sports in terms of a type of complex
human activity as outlined in MacIntyre’s (1985) thesis, After Virtue, which is grounded in a virtue-based
practice-tradition model. This includes reference to the place of the virtues in the concept of a practice,
the narrative unity of a human life and the concept of a tradition. I conclude that technology and the
practices and attitudes it encourages, obscures the proper focus on human capacities and skills given a
particular shape by each sport. Rather, ethics and the notion of the good life ought to define the
boundaries of what it means to develop human potential in sport. The focus will then be on the wholly
human rather than on the reduced picture of physical potential.
References
MacIntyre, A. (1985) After virtue: a study in moral theory, (2nd ed), London: Duckworth.
Rechnitzer, P.A. (1989) Physical activity and our human potential: a contemporary perspective,
Canadian Journal of Sport Science, 14, (2), pp68-73.
Scheffler, I. (1985) Of human potential, London: Routledge.
29. Stoll, Sharon Kay, Rickel, Karen & Beller, Jennifer M.
University of Idaho, USA
Exercise Adherence? The role that sport philosophy can play in developing pedagogical practice
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the professional responsibility of sport philosophers to
be Aapart of@ and engaged in applications and solutions to exercise adherence. This paper presents a
practical, historical challenge and obligation of IAPS members to participate in the applied sport world.
From its inception, IAPS has favored a brand of scholarship that lies closer to the discipline of theoretical
philosophy, which is reflective in the high quality scholarship that is seen in the IAPS Journal and which
would pass muster in any academic work of the parent discipline (Kretchmar, 1997, p. 197). However,
such a perspective has often left society members with the realization that other academics view us, as the
late Jan Broekhoff said, Aslightly annoying but harmless curiosities.@ (1976, p. v). This is not to say that
the theoretical should be denied, but it is to say that sport philosophers should be engaged in more active
practice and participation which is more interdisciplinary, more flexible, more interested in sport, and
other forms of human movement, [but] still be rigorous... (Kretchmar, 1997, p. 198).
To address the above concern and offer examples of how this can be done, this paper will first
trace how sport philosophy can be an important factor in developing fitness pedagogical practice.
Kretchmar (1993) has argued that too often individuals partake in exercise only for the objective benefits,
which in and of itself will not support a lifetime commitment. Today, approximately half of those who
begin exercise programs drop out within the first six months. Commonly cited reasons include lack of
time, inconvenience, expense, physical discomfort, embarrassment, poor instruction, inadequate support,
and loss of interest. We believe that much of the problem of exercise adherence has to do with personal
perspective of what it means to exercise. In other words, personal exercise philosophy is driven by such
objective reasons as: controlling weight, delaying aging, and improving one’s figure or physique.
Unfortunately, the truth of the matter is that such an objective perspective for exercise, results
in exercise drop out. Combine that with the increased caloric intake of average Americans, and the result
is an obesity epidemic.
We believe that exercise adherence should be based on, as Kretchmar (1993) stated, a stronger
subjective personal life narrative. We developed an exercise adherence protocol in which we brought
together exercise specialists, health professionals, and sport philosophers to develop a narrative driven
theoretical construct that should lie at the base of any exercise program.
Our paper will discuss the important concepts of a narrative approach to philosophic construct,
the application of that construct into teaching pedagogy both in the classroom as well as supplemental
teaching. The relationship of the narrative to the objective can culminate in a service to the greater health,
fitness community.
Our model is unusual but not unwarranted. We believe that exercise as well as all science that
is done in the absence of reflection is dangerous and that there is much we sport philosophers should be
doing in taking our theoretical to the applied fields. (Kretchmar, 1997, p. 197). This active engagement in
interdisciplinary scholarly study and application is a bold response to why sport philosophers “should not
be dispassionate observers” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964), but rather return to
... Aristotle=s market place where educated people with inquiring minds, common sense, a
thirst for truth, and normal language abilities can communicate fruitfully with one another and
make philosophic progress on practical human problems, p. 197, Kretchmar.
At this time in America, there is no greater practical human problem than commitment to
exercise.
Broekoff, J. (1977). Preface. In Harper, W.A., Miller, D.M., Park, R.J., Davis, E.C. The philosophic
process, Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, p.5.
Kretchmar, R.S. (1997). Philosophy of sport. In J.D. Massengale and R.A. Swanson (1997). The history of
exercise and sport science, Champaign-Urbana: Human Kinetics Press, pp. 197-198.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). Primacy of perception, Ed. J. Edie, Translator W. Cobb. Evansville:
Northwestern University.
30. Teetzel, Sarah
University of Western Ontario, Canada
Testing for the Genetic Enhancements in Athletes
In this paper, I will argue that recent developments in gene transfer technologies have created
the need for more stringent testing procedures in sport, but many of these new detecting methods raise
serious ethical issues. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) demonstrated its commitment to taking a
proactive stance in preventing athletes from using gene-based therapies to enhance their performances by
hosted a conference on Genetic Enhancement of Athletic Performance in March 2002. Leading scientists
presented their research on gene transfer therapies and explained how transferring genes into the body can
optimize the performance of the cardiovascular and respiratory systems, improve neurological
functioning, increase the strength and endurance of muscle tissues, and expedite the healing of damaged
bones, cartilage, and ligaments. All of these enhancements were designed with the intention to benefit
patients suffering from diseases and disorders, but it is possible to see why athletes seeking to enhance
10
their performances might find these procedures particularly attractive. For this reason, WADA is
commissioning several of the researchers who are developing the gene transfer procedures to design
methods of detecting the presence of exogenous genes in athletes.
Detecting gene transfers in athletes constitutes a considerable challenge and seems nearly
impossible without utilizing invasive procedures or equipment that is currently not available in standard
drug testing facilities. What makes detecting gene transfer so challenging is the need to distinguish the
exogenous genes from the genes that the body produces naturally. Detection methods under investigation
include monitoring magnetic resonance images (MRI) of athletes’ muscle volumes; using polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) tests to detect the presence of a gene-expressing virus in the body; producing images
of the genes using computer technology and radioactive compounds in positron emission tomography
(PET scans); detecting the presence of viruses containing transferred genes using enzyme-linked
immunoassays, and comparing the levels of different isoforms in the body to see if gene expression is
taking place. While these procedures are possible to perform, many are quite invasive and can cause
considerable discomfort to the athlete. For example, to detect a gene transfer using a PCR test, one must
remove a small tissue sample from the exact area where gene expression takes place, and detecting the
presence of gene transfer in the nervous system requires a sample from a spinal nerve.
Whether it is ethical to subject athletes to the tests used to detect gene transfer is up for debate.
I will argue that despite the invasiveness of many of the current testing procedures and the infringement
upon athletes’ autonomy that they constitute, it is nonetheless morally acceptable for doping control
agencies to carry out the majority of these tests. I will support this argument by demonstrating that such
tests are comparable to the blood and urine tests that doping control agencies currently perform.
31. Torres, Cesar R. & Hager, Peter F.
SUNY College at Brockport, USA
Justice and Evaluation in Sport: The Case of the Bonus Point System
In the 2003 Rugby Union World Cup, the International Rugby Board implemented
a bonus point system that awarded one additional tournament standings point to teams that either scored
four or more tries and/or lost by less than seven points. The new system, which was employed only in the
initial round robin stage of the tournament, was rationalized as a way to encourage try-scoring and reward
teams that lost close contests. Although it was proposed as an innovation that would decisively impact the
rankings determining which teams advanced to the final phase of the tournament, critics argued that the
system widened the gulf between less developed teams, whose players were primarily amateurs, and
stronger teams that featured professionals.
Due to the controversy surrounding the bonus point system and its uncertain future
in the Rugby Union World Cup, a thorough analysis of this addition to the sport's evaluation system is
warranted. In addition, this case may further serve as fruitful terrain from which philosophic lessons
concerning the rationale and organization of just evaluation systems can be drawn.
Thus, the purposes of our paper are twofold. First, we will evaluate whether or not
the bonus point system is a commendable change by briefly reviewing competing theories of sport, and
vdetermining which one provides the most effective tools for analyzing the case. In the end, we will adopt
an interpretivist stance, articulating the proposed change with an uncontroversial view of the central
purpose of sport. This analysis will demonstrate that the bonus point system is compatible with this view,
and that the new evaluation system honors the sport of rugby more fully than its previous system.
Second, based on our previous analysis, we will draw principles that will assist in
the design and implementation of evaluation systems that more accurately reflect and reward what
happens during a contest. This examination will reveal that just evaluation systems account for not only
the result of the game, but also the quality of play, display of skill, and embodiment of the internal goods
of the sporting practice. All of these elements blend together into a well-crafted and fair evaluation
system that rewards other markers of excellence in addition to victory.
32. Tracey, Jill
Wildrid Laurier University, Canada
Philosophy In Action: Consulting with Athletes from a Phenomenological Perspective
– Is There Any Other Way?
Sport participants and athletes from various levels and disciplines seek assistance from sport
psychology consultants for a variety of reasons; part of which is desired performance improvement. Too
often in applied sport psychology the applied part seems to be neglected, if not ignored when consulting
with athletes. Sport psychology could benefit greatly if more attention was paid to the experience of the
athletes. By this I mean, if more attention was paid to philosophy and the important and relevant richness
of experience from a phenomenological perspective, perhaps a powerful and more meaningful sport
experience may be realized. In the spirit of the philosophical counseling tradition, a responsible sport
psychology consultant would add a much needed and much improved component to counseling athletes if
an alternative framework was incorporated. The framework was forwarded by William James and is
related to the ideas grounded in pragmatism and existential phenomenology.
The purpose of this presentation is to examine some relevant issues athletes seek guidance for
and to discuss the philosophy of experience as opposed to the philosophy of abstract ideas. I will take a
Jamesian view of basing counseling on the experience itself and to recognize and encourage the
individual’s unique way of understanding the world and his or her place in it may be of tremendous
benefit for athletes. Additionally, working with athletes to assist in determining central values, ideas, and
beliefs has practical implications for overall performance in sport and in other aspects of the athletes lives.
Sport psychology often seeks to downplay or ignore athlete’s emotions and experiences in an
attempt to provide a quick fix or to arm her with yet another technique. While I recognize that there are
times when an issue is easily resolved by the implementation of a technique, we should not ignore the
larger issue – assisting athletes with many of the issues they wrestle with – and doing it with a wider lens,
if you will. In this vein I attempt to explore the very emotions and experiences that are the richness of
athletes’ lives and to assist athletes I work with to empower them by actively working through their
experience of sport within a philosophical counseling framework.
33. Vossen, Deborah P.
St. Francis Xavier University, Canada
GRASSHOPPER VERSUS GRASSHOPPER:
TOWARD A FORMAL THEORY OF COMPETITIVE GAMES
In “The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia,” Suits introduces the Grasshopper whose
purpose is to play games. In his ramblings just prior to death, the Grasshopper reveals to his Disciples the
content of a dream which suggests that everyone is really a Grasshopper in disguise. Upon his death, his
Disciples find themselves left with a tangled web of riddles about play, games, and the good life.
After much discussion, the Disciples are afforded the opportunity to speak to a resurrected
Grasshopper about the solution to his riddles which involves a Utopia including achievement-type
activities traditionally viewed as personal instrumental work. The substance of this solution entails a
demonstration that all such activities can be games because it is possible for them to conform with the
formal definition: “To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [pre-lusory goal],
using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favor
of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where such rules are accepted just because they make
possible such activity [lusory attitude].”
Given that the essence of the Grasshopper’s lessons is inclusion of personal challenge
activities, it is not unreasonable to suggest that his teachings are biased toward non-competitive games. In
other words, since the Grasshopper’s vision includes the incorporation of personal activities that are not
typically referred to as games, it is reasonable to suggest that his lessons are primarily directed toward
such inclusion rather than the description of competitive activities already commonly recognized as such.
The broad-based nature of the Grasshopper’s theory prompts a concern and that is that it does
not provide a clear conceptual foundation for competition. This lack of clarity is demonstrated in the fact
that the Grasshopper seems to forward differing representations of the pre-lusory goals of several
competitive games. For example, the pre-lusory goal of long-distance racing is suggested to be “to cross
the finish line ahead of the other contestants,” “to cross the finish line first,” and merely “crossing a finish
11
line” or “crossing a line drawn upon the ground.” Accordingly, the Grasshopper’s failure to offer a
comprehensive account of competitive games represents the focus of this essay.
This focus grounds the following research question: If the presence of an opponent represents
an essential feature of competitive games, where in the Grasshopper’s general theory is this presence
properly accounted for? It is reasonable to assume that when the scope of discussion is narrowed from
games in general to competitive games as a sub-category therein that any features unique to this subcategory ought to be recognizable upon mere perusal of the features essential in defining them (i.e., the
pre-lusory goal, lusory means, constitutive rules, and/or lusory attitude). Prompted by the Grasshopper’s
lack of clear direction, my intent is to derive a comprehensive Grasshoppian theory of competitive games.
More specifically, my purpose is to demonstrate that opponent presence ought to be jointly declared
within the pre-lusory goal and constitutive rules of all competitive games.
34. Weaving, Charlene
University of Western Ontario, Canada
“I’m too sexy for this sport…it hurts”: An examination of the connection between sex and sport.
At the last IAPS conference, I attempted to argue an analogy between sport and
prostitution. Building on this theme, I wish to discuss the strong connection between sex and sport from a
feminist North American perspective. I will maintain that there is a significant gap in the sport philosophy
literature with respect to the relationship between sport and sex. I hope to contribute to Paul Davis’s
article “Sexualization and Sexuality in Sport,” and focus on the sexual objectification of women athletes.
Based on theories from feminist philosopher Martha Nussbaum in Sex and Social Justice, I will argue that
sport is unfit to be considered unsexual. Moreover, our language in sport seems to involve many sexual
innuendos, and likewise, I will argue that discussions surrounding sex appear to possess a certain degree
of sport affiliation and sporting clichés. Downhill skiing is a great example of a sport that contains such
prominent associations with sex. More specifically, some ski magazines, such as Ski Presse, stress how
searching for the perfect ski turn is comparable to the search for the perfect orgasm.
Once I have established the sex-sport relationship, I will focus on its implications in
the sexual objectification of women athletes. I will argue that because of unequal power relationships
between men and women, it should be morally objectionable to sexually objectify female athletes despite
sports intense relationship with sex.
12