Week 1
“The Comparative Method” – Charles C. Ragin

The distinctiveness of comparative social science
o Comparison provides a basis for making statements about empirical regularities
and for evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical
criteria.
o The goal is to explain and interpret macrosocial variation.
o There are “differences between the orientations of most comparativists and most
noncomparativists.
o “The most distinctive aspect of comparative social science is the wide gulf
between qualitative and quantitative work”.
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The qualitative tradition tends to look at cases as wholes.
The Boundaries and goals of comparative social science
o The boundaries of comparative social science must be coterminous with a specific
usage of macrosocial units

These units are not important in existing as data sets, but in existing as
metatheoretical categories.

This is important in noting the difference between comparativists
and noncomparativists
o Comparativists are interested in identifying the similarities and differences among
macrosocial units
o Units of analysis are ambiguous

Observational units- the unit used in the data collection and data analysis.

Explanatory units- the unit that is used to account for the pattern of results
obtained.

Methodological Consequences
o “But many comparativists, especially those who are qualitatively oriented, are not
often involved in ‘testing’ theories per se. Rather, the apply theory to cases in
order to interpret them.”
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o “the problem of having too few societies on which to test theory is compounded
by the fact that the interests and goals of comparative social science often dictate
the design of studies with a small number of cases- too few to permit the
application of any technique of statistical comparison.

Enter the Comparative Method
o “The method of systematic comparative illustration is what social scientists
traditionally have called the comparative method. It forms the core of caseoriented strategy and is quite different from correlational methods which form the
core of the variable-oriented strategy.

The Logic of Comparative Method
o Studies how different conditions are causes fit together in one setting and contrast
that with how they fit together in another setting.
o It argues that the comparative method is superior to the statistical method

First, because the statistical method is not combinatorial; each relevant
condition typically is examined in a piecemeal manner.

Secondly, applications of the comparative method produce explanations
that account for every instance of a certain phenomenon

Third, “the comparative method does not require the investigation to
pretend that he or she has a sample of societies drawn from a particular
population so that tests of statistical significance can be used.”

Finally, “the comparative method forces the investigator to become
familiar with the cases relevant to analysis.”
o The comparative method is essentially a case-oriented strategy of comparative
research. The focus is on comparing cases, and cases are examined as wholes-as
combinations of characteristics.
* Irving M. Copi, "Introduction to Logic"
I. The Meaning of “Cause”
- importance of making causal connections to understand/control our environment
- necessary vs. sufficient
1. necessary condition = a condition in whose absence an event cannot occur
 used to infer cause from effect
2. sufficient condition = a condition in whose presence the event must occur
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 used to infer cause to effect
3. there may be several necessary conditions for event to occur  all must be
included in sufficient condition
different meanings of the word “cause”  most often used in the sense of necessary and
sufficient
similar causes produce similar effects
many possible causes  cannot infer the cause from the effects
inductive generalization = method of arriving at a general conclusion based on a given set
of facts
1. simple enumeration  establish causal connections
2. confirming instance = various instances of phenomenon X accompanied by
circumstance Y
 greater # of confirming instances  higher probability of causal law
3. PROBLEM: no way to distinguish btwn. confirming instances + mere coincidences
 better for suggesting causal laws, not testing them
II. Mill’s Methods
- John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) = British philosopher, developed 5 methods of inductive
inference
1. Method of Agreement: if 2 or more instances of the phenomenon under
investigation have only 1 circumstance in common, that common circumstance is
the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon
2. Method of Difference: if a phenomenon occurs in one case and not in another, all
other conditions being equal except for 1, the single circumstance in which the
two cases differ is the effect (or cause) of the phenomenon
3. Joint Method of Agreement and Difference: if 2 or more instances in which a
phenomenon occurs have only 1 circumstance in common, while 2 or more
instances in which the phenomenon doesn’t occur have nothing in common
except for the absence of that circumstance, that circumstance is the effect (or
cause) of the phenomenon
4. Method of Residues: when you subtract from any phenomenon the effects of
known antecedents, the “residue” of the phenomenon if the effect of the
remaining antecedents
 Can be used to examine only one case
 Depends on antecedents established by causal laws
 Said to be deductive rather than inductive
5. Method of Concomitant Variation: whatever phenomenon varies in any manner
when another phenomenon varies in some particular manner is either a cause or
effect of that phenomenon, or is connected w/ it thru some fact of causation
(Copi Continued)
Criticisms of Mills’ Methods
-Two general types of arguments against Mill’s Method:
1. They fail to fulfill the claims made for them by Bacon and Mill
2. The five methods do not constitute an adequate account of scientific method
-Scientific methods attempt to allow anyone to discover natural laws and causal connections
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-Mill’s method is said to have created this pathway to allow everyone to create causal
connections
-Not true: Mill’s Method has failed to cure cancer
-Mill claims Methods are discovering and proving / demonstrating connections
-Problems with Discovery
-Shortened Example: man wants to know why he’s getting drunk; he has scotch and soda
one night, gin and soda the next night, and rum and soda another night; he gets drunk
each time and says soda gets him drunk; Mill’s Method of Agreement is insufficient
-Shortened Example: 31 men are excited for a trip; they are told they have to take a test
about their feelings toward foreign peoples; the test takes too long and they miss their
trip; they retake a test and their results are all angry towards foreign peoples despite their
lack of role in missing the trip. Placing causation for new anger on missing the bus is
inaccurate; if missing the bus was inevitable or natural the people would not be angry,
this is a relevant fact that is ignored; Method of Difference is not properly applied.
-Method of Agreement also sees a problem because there are so many situations where
one thing is in common
-Method if Difference is hard to create because it’s nearly impossible to find exact things
with only one difference
-Problems with Demonstrating
-Methods proceed on the basis of antecedent hypothesis about which circumstances are
causally relevant to the phenomenon under investigation; if we miss the actual causal
factor at this beginning stage then the conclusion will place causal effects incorrectly
-No matter how many examples exist, correlation does not mean causation; high winds in
Chicago may be correlated with high birth rates in India – this is not a causal relationship
Vindication of Mill’s Methods
-The above criticisms are harsh; Mill’s Methods need to be used with the hypothesis that only
relevant circumstances are used
-Hypothesis: Either A or B or C or D or E or F or G causes a.
ABCDabcd
AEFGaefg
-we then can conclude that A causes a
-Hypothesis: A or B causes a
ABab
Bb
-we then can conclude that A causes a
-These are controlled experiments only and necessitate control groups
-Pasteur tested animals and gave some a vaccine and others nothing; he then injected all of them
with anthrax; the vaccinated ones lived and all but two of the others died; the vaccine does cause
immunity
WEEK 2
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
By Max Weber
Chapter 1: Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification
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
Weber observes that business leaders and owners, and higher skilled laborers and
personnel, are overwhelmingly Protestant. Weber observes that historically, richer
districts tend to convert to Protestantism
 Freedom from economic traditions might make one more likely to also doubt religious
traditions; however, the Reformation did not eliminate the influence of the Church, but
rather substituted one influence for another that was more penetrating in practice
 Weber argues that there might actually be an "intimate relationship" between capitalist
acquisition and otherworldliness, piety, and asceticism.
 Weber believes that religion can create broader social values and be instrumental in the
creation of social institutions completely unrelated to its own goals and ends
Chapter 2: The Spirit of Capitalism
 “Spirit of Capitalism”  Weber defines the spirit of capitalism by referencing an excerpt
from Benjamin Franklin where he explains that time is money, credit is money, and
money begets money. The tendency of people to pay debts, and be industrious and
trustworthy is the essence of the spirit of capitalism.
 Earning money reflects virtue and proficiency in a calling and this idea of one's duty in a
calling is the basis of the capitalist ethic.
 Weber argues that in order for a manner of life so conducive to capitalism to become
dominant, it had to originate somewhere, as a way of life common to a large number of
people.
 For example, the capitalistic spirit took stronger hold in places like Massachusetts that
were founded with religious motives than in the American South, which was settled for
business motives.
 Weber claims that the biggest opponent the capitalist ethic has had in gaining dominance
has been traditionalism which asserts that "by nature" man simply wants to live as he is
used to living, and earn as much as is necessary to do this.
 Weber observes that capitalistic enterprises can still have a traditionalistic character. The
spirit of modern capitalism implies an attitude of rational and systematic pursuit of profit.
 “putting out system”  rational capitalistic organization with traditional spirit (a
traditional way of life, a traditional relationship with labor, and traditional interactions
with customers)
 While capitalism might have needed religion in order to overthrow the old economic
system, today, there is little connection between religious beliefs and such conduct due to
the prevailing concept of competition
 According to Weber, the "spirit" necessary for successful capitalistic activities is not
natural. According to Weber, when capitalism does prosper, it prospers because people
have embraced and internalized certain values. These values, and not just human nature,
make capitalism possible. Capitalism cannot then simply be a necessary step in the
world's development, because in order for it to emerge, particular values must be present.
Weber thus leaves space for the importance of ideas and culture in the history of human
development.
Weber Chapters 3 and 4
I. Chapter 3: The Concept of the Calling
A. Definition of Calling and its History
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a. calling has religious connotations, esp. Protestant
i. was a new word in new translations of the Bible
ii. transition from Middle Age definition of the calling (fulfilling
secular duties as best as possible) to this new definition
b. Luther’s opinion:
i. the calling was at first “morally neutral” (29)
ii. it became the best path towards “fulfill[ing] of innerworldly
duties” after the corruption of the Church
iii. Weber: this isn’t really the capitalist spirit
B. Practical Life and Its Religious Starting Point
a. Calvinism and Protestant Sects
i. religion, not nationalism, explains the development of the
capitalist spirit
ii. development of capitalist spirit by Calvinist, Puritan sects
b. key question: how much influence did religious forces have in shaping,
spreading the capitalist spirit across the world?
II. Chapter 4: The Idea of the Calling in Ascetic Protestantism
A. The Religious Foundation of Innerworldly Ascetism
a. Asecetic protestanism
a. Calvinism, Pietism, sects from Baptist movement were not separate
from the Church
b. Methodism was the only real sect on its own
c. Moral conduct found equally among them all; connected to the idea of
the beyond
d. People thought this way because it related to their “practical religious
interests” (69)
B. Calvinism
a. Key characteristic: “election by…grace” (69)
b. Effects on culture
a. Seen as a threat
b. Sharpened divisions between Crown, Puritanism
c. Responsible for loss of cultural struggle
d. Important for “Church Militants”
c. Related Contents
a. Chapter IX (of Free Will)
1. man can’t convert himself from sin
b. Chapter III (of God’s eternal decree)
1. some men are predestined for life
2. God chose Jesus Christ for this
3. God is merciful (or not) for everyone else
c. Chapter X (of Effectual Calling)
1. God is pleased w/those he has chosen
d. Chapter V (of Providence)
1. God is not merciful for “wicked and ungodly men” (71), and
turns against them
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d. How the Doctrine Came into Place:
a. Men believed if they were saved, it wasn’t their doing or achievements
that led to it, but the work of “an objective power” (72)
b. The doctrine grew, contrary to Lutheranist beliefs:
1. conceptualized:
a. people are there for God
b. only God knows the purpose of fate
c. that ppl’s actions could influence God’s decision was
unthinkable
d. decrees are fixed forever
e. Effects of the Doctrine
a. Made people immensely lonely
1. nothing could help them, not even God
2. no point in “culture of the senses” (74)
b. made individualistic roots part of “national character” (74)
c. influenced conduct, philosophy of life
f. Calvinist Relationship with God
a. In isolation; it still had to be part of the Church, though
b. Only thought for own salvation
c. Increase God’s praise by obeying God’s commands
1. “Christian calling”: fulfilling God’s duties
g. How the Doctrine Was Treated
a. People questioned if they were “elect”
b. Calvin said you couldn’t tell: important question in Pietism
c. If they thought they were elect, people kept working; if not, they
worked harder
h. Differences Between Calvin’s, Luther’s View of Secular Work  Calling
a. Luther
1. the goal is “unio mystica with the deity” (78)
2. passive, “inwardness of spirit”
3. feeling of sinful unworthiness
b. Reformed Church
1. not inner-directed
2. unite w/God when do actions out of God’s grace
3. “quality of actions legitimiz[e] faith” (78) b/c feelings might
not be real
i. Reformed Church’s Recognition of True Faith
a. Compare one’s actions to the patriarchs in the Bible
b. Work is a sign of election, of certainty of it
1. can’t build up work
2. have to ask oneself: ‘am I elect or not?’ each time
j. Life of the “Saint”
a. “directed towards the transcendental goal of salvation” (80)
w/rationality, constant thinking
b. more ascetic lifestyle
1. no self-torture
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2. goal of self-control as a worker of God
3. more order
k. Diff. Between Calvinist Ascetism and Medieval One
a. Medieval
1. No church advice  innerworldly variety
2. This is not the highest Catholic ideal
3. Indulgences counter to innerworldly ascetism: the monk was
taken out of the picture; monk had been “the example”
b. Calvinism
1. “putting one’s faith to the test in secular working life” (83)
2. eventually led to elect’s hate for sinners  sects created
3. measuring stick was the Bible
a. psalms, proverbs similar to life attitude: rationality
c. Similarity to rational Catholics
1. both kept a log of their progress, sins, etc
2. …but the reformed Christian monitors himself
3. the Catholic has a priest; more like a business
l. Doctrine of Predestination as a Dogmatic Background
a. Held onto even beyond Presbyterian circles (esp. Calvin. Ppl)
b. “Particularism of Grace” – 17th Century
1. “being an instrument of God…executor of his decree” (85)
prevented just works from being done
c. link between “absolutely binding norms” and “complete transcendence
of divinity” (85)
d. “being put to the test” (85) again and again
1. better than being granted gratice amissi bills
2. could be pardoned for sin by being contrite
m. Diff. Between Ethical Standard of Lutheranism and Calvinism
a. Luther doesn’t have as much drive for spiritual checking
b. Calvin had more than predestination as a motive for systematic change
c. Reformed ascetism imitated by other ascetic movements
Ch. 5: Asceticism and the Capitalist Spirit
-
To follow one’s calling is to do one’s duty by God.
Thus, it is not sinful to work for wealth, material things. It is actually morally correct to
work as hard as one can, and be as productive as possible.
Wasting time is the greatest of all sins. One must work hard in one’s calling.
What is reprehensible is “resting on one’s possessions, enjoyment of wealth with its
consequences of idleness and the lusts of the flesh, and particularly of distraction from
the striving for a “holy” life.”
Baxter: author of “The Saints’ Everlasting Rest” and “Christian Directory”
- supporter of asceticism
- saw wealth as dangerous because the temptations that come along with it are infinite.
Striving for wealth is morally questionable in his eyes
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throughout his works, he preaches constant, hard, physical/ mental work
Calvin:
- did not see wealth as a danger in itself
- wealth’s temptations, if man gave in to him, would be the danger
Quaker ethic:
- one’s calling in life should be a constant ascetic exercise
- must pursue one’s calling with care and a methodical approach
Asceticism and the capitalist spirit:
- protestant asceticism is completely against the uninhibited enjoyment of life and its
pleasures
- on the other hand, it liberates the acquisition of wealth from the inhibitions of
traditionalist ethics. Striving for gain is directly willed by God.
- It is not a fight against wealth and profit, but against the temptations associated with
them
- The combination of the restraint on consumption and the freedom to strive for profit
results in the creation of capital through the ascetic compulsion to save.
Stages of Economic Growth
WW Rostow
There are 5 stages: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to
maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption.
Traditional societyLimited production functions due to lack of technology, and pre-Newtonian attitudes towards
science
Fatalism- the assumption that the range of possibilities open to one’s offspring would be just
about what it had been for one’s grandparents.
Central political rule and political power of landowners
Ex. The dynasties of China, Medieval Europe
Preconditions for take-offInitially developed in W. Europe during the late 17th and 18th centuries as modern science began
to affect agriculture and industry
Many cases traditional society persists side by side with modern economic activities,
conducted for limited economic purposes by a colonial power.
The take-offThe forces of economic progress expand and dominate society
New industries expand rapidly
New class of entrepreneurs expands
Economy exploits unused natural resources, and methods of production
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Agriculture is commercialized
The drive to maturityAfter take-off, there is a long interval of sustained if fluctuating progress
Economy drives to extend technology over the whole front of the economic activity
The national economy finds its place in the international economy
MaturityStage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original industries
which powered its take-off and to apply efficiently modern technology over a wide range of its
resources.
The age of high-mass consumptionLeading sectors shift towards durable consumers’ goods and services
Beyond consumptionFocus on family- more babies (the baby boom).
less focus on economics because of a stronger system that provides economic security and highmass consumption.
Lerner, “The Passing of Traditional Society”
I. Modernizing Styles of Life: A Theory
 Modernization occurs through the change of all peoples, regardless of class or society
 However secular enlightment doesn’t occur without difficulty, as it is hard to dispose of
previous ideologies passed on by cultures, religions, and family
 In the West, medieval lifestyles were modernized by what are now known as the Age of
Exploration, The Renaissance, and the Industrial Revolution
 This particular paper will focus on the issues of modernization in the Middle East which
is still riddled will old ideologies
 One of the leading reasons behind this new push for modernization has been caused by
the mass scope which media can now touch; tabloids, newspapers, internet, radio
 The Middle east is a deviation from the Western model of modernization
 However some steps of modernization are relevant in all societies regard less of age:
urbanization —> higher literacy—>increase media exposure—>wider economic
participation in politics
 West is what most Middle Eastern nations strive to emulate
 However what occurred in the West took centuries and the M.E. (Middle East) is trying
to do it its own way which is quicker
 Problem is that the M.E. way stresses ethnocentrism and extreme nationalism
 What M.E. wants are modern institutions but not modern ideology
II. The Mobile Personality: Empathy
 Western life is used to change, through changes in economic status, through migration,
social mobility etc.
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



Westerners encourage rationality, and are less subject to tradition; men are judged by
accomplishment not by religion and beliefs
Mobile person is objective and able to incorporate new demands upon himself; the
mechanisms used for enlarging a mans identity through development is referred to as
empathy
Empathy can be viewed as the capacity to see oneself in another’s situation
Nations need empathy to see themselves changing and modernizing into what they see in
similar societies
III. The Mobility Multiplier: Mass Media
 Historian date beginning of modern era from the Age of Exploration
 Today there is now a greater sense of empathy throughout the world
 Radio, film, TV. all began with creation of printing press and have caused outlets for
informational distribution
 Allows for people to now understand information that would other wise be unavailable,
allowing a simplification of the perception of other nations, cultures, and ideologies
 Shows cultures what to expect and how to react to new changes-> how to modernize
IV. The System of Modernity





However modern media only thrives in societies that are considered modern by other
means
No developed nation can function efficiently without mass media
Conversely media allows a nation’s people to attain the knowledge to break away from
past social and economic boundaries
Before a media system is created nations have what is known as an oral system-where
information is conversed from person to person primarily with the purpose of containing
order and rule in a nation
Main differences and distinctions between Oral and Media Systems
Sector
Media System
Oral System
Socioeconomic
Cultural
Political




Urban
Literate
Electoral
Rural
Illiterate
Designative
Urbanization (often goes hand in hand with industrialization) is a cause for the increase in
literacy rates
Primary social function of literacy is to prevent the waste of time, and allow for the
increase in human productivity (people can understand laws, schedule work, set wages,
through basic human nature, through experience and trail-&-error but the process is a lot
quicker if they are literate)
Urbanization will be slow and often counterproductive if the average citizen is unable to
exist in its simple infrastructure
Also literacy is the basic tool required for the operation of a media system
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
Literacy and written word allows for vicarious experiences, and spread of common
knowledge and skills
V.
The Model of Transition
 How does a country transition from one phase to the next? Why does an urban person
often become literate and participate in media and politics?
 Created a survey in the Middle East to try to find out the answer to the above questions
which was proposed to the traditional man (who lived in rural settings) and modern man,
bring up questions dealing with issues in society, government, and their ideas for
solutions
 Traditional man was incapable of comprehending such questions, they often lacked
opinion and saw such questions as improper
 This exemplified the reasoning that to transition into a modern society its citizens must
opt to participate and be open to societal change
 The survey stratified the participants into 3 groups:
i. Modern-people with opinions, people who participate actively in
government and media, and those living in urbanized settings
ii. Transitional people-see what they want to become and what they need to
change
iii. Traditional-lacks opinions not very open to change
 the primary issue in Middle East is their inability to let go of past (rituals, conduct, and
ideology), and look towards new structures, and once people turn into “transitionals” the
modernizing will finally be possible
Alexander Gerschenkron – Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective
-Countries develop at different rates based on their relative backwardness to their international
neighbors
-Later development faces different factors:
-The greater the relative backwardness of a nation, the greater the pressure to develop
that nation faces
-The people want the same goods and the country needs the same military power
immediately
-There is a benefit to being backwards – a nation can borrow technology to develop,
making the process quicker because you don not need to reinvent the railroad, for
example
-Later industrialization looks different from early development
-More rapid emphasis on heavy industry because neighbors already have it; this means a
nation needs more capital available at the outset then earlier developers
-Need financing and entrepreneurship – laissez-faire ideology not enough
-Development is likely to be bank-led or state-led rather than market-led in order to
make financing and capital more readily available
-Industry will be more centralized because of the influence of these
institutions
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-Because the state plays a greater role, development is likely to be accompanied by
illiberal ideologies or authoritarian regimes; high state power and coercion is necessary to
impose development policies for rapid change
-Examples:
-England – since development occurred extremely early, there was little pressure to
develop quickly, meaning the process was slow and market-led
-Germany – the need to catch up to England meant industrialization had to move more
quickly; thus, development was bank-led and relied a great deal on borrowed technology
-Russia – very late development meant there was extreme pressure to industrialize as
quickly as possible; the government inspired development because of a strong military
interest in rapid development; with few entrepreneurs and a weak to nonexistent banking
system, the state was essential to mobilize capital to the rapid development of heavy
industry, providing loans, subsidies, protective tariffs, and government purchasing
contracts to help grow new industries; the nation was able to go from feudal society to
nuclear power in 100 years
-Important factors:
-Different paths to development:
-Early development  market-led
-Late development  bank-led or state-led
-The path a particular nation takes depends on the historical timing of its development
-The process of development drives ideology, not the other way around like Weber
thought:
-Slow, market-led development  individual liberty and small state
-Late, state-led development  large, powerful state with strong ideology and
coercion
-Optimistic prospects for development:
-Late developers can borrow technology from neighbors and can use other nations
as models for their own modernization
KARL de SCHWEINITZ: Industrialization and Democracy
What are the determinents of successful industrialization in underdeveloped
countries?
NATURAL DETERENTS TO DEVELOPMENT:
1. Culture: underdeveloped countries are outside common European tradition
2. Geographical: disease (eg malaria) between tropics, inconsistent rainfall,
diffcult to irrigate, desert
3. Trade imbalance: underdeveloped countries tend to focus on a small set of
resources (eg oil, coal, lumber) which makes it difficult to advance economy as
a whole
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HANDICAP OF LATE START:
1. Population Growth
a. World economy of grain led to population explosion
b. Growth creates more responsibilities of services for government to provide
2. Demonstration Effect
a. Industrialized nations "demonstrate" an enviable style of living that 3rd
world prematurely attempts to imitate
b. Large populations demand luxuries of industrialized societies
c. Demand for social securities and unions
3. Weakening Industrial Impulse
a. Economy needs capital to build infrastructure of industrialization (eg
railroads, etc...)
b. Early industrializers used increased demand for foodstuffs to drive economy
from agarian to industrialized
c. In modern world economy, rise of 1st world wages do not correspond to a
proportional rise in demand for foodstuffs from 3rd world, thus underdeveloped
countries are starved of industrial impulse for development
4. Technological Choice
a. In order to compete with 1st world countries, 3rd world must adopt same
technology for production
b. Modern technology is prohibitively expensive, 3rd world wastes money
5. Barriers to Migration
a. West could dissipate discontent and create new markets by encouraging
migration
b. Late industrializers have no "new frontiers" to encourage development and
dissipate discontent
WEEK 3
The Development of Underdevelopment
Andre Gunder Frank
Refutes “main precepts of modernizationists: 1. their emphasis on endogenous factors as the
main cause for the region’s undeverdevelopment, 2. the “stages of growth” theory, and the 3.
dualism thesis”
Dualism thesis - traditional society and modern society
This is an explanation of the “stages of growth” theory: “our ignorance of undeveloped
countries’ history leads us to assume that their past and indeed their present resembles earlier
stages of the history of the now developed countries
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Frank’s Thesis: views capitalism as “series of metropolitan-satellite relationships” which
essentially means structure of society is to take resources from satellites (developing countries)
for the benefit of metropolitan center (developed countries)
He writes, “when we examine this metropolitan-satellite structure, we find that each of the
satellites…serves as an instrument to suck capital or economic surplus out of its own satellites
and to channel part of this surplus to the world metropolis of which all are satellites. Moreover,
each national and local metropolis serves to impose and maintain the monopolistic structure
and exploitive relationship of the system as long as it serves the interest of the metropoles
The present underdevelopment of Latin America is the result of its centuries-long participation in
the process of world capitalist development
Chile
An example of a fully indoctrinated country in the “monopolistic, metropolitan-satellite
structure”
The abnormally high inequality is due to this history
Brazil
Four regions grew tremendously economically but it was “neither self-generating nor selfperpetuating” growth and they eventually left “to develop the underdevelopment” of today
Supposedly, the fourth region demonstrates the fallacy of the dualism thesis
3 Major Hypothesis arise
1. “Underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of
capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the
contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which
also generated economic development: capitalism”
2. “Satellites experience their greatest economic development…if and when their ties to the
metropolis are weakest
Evidence: explain the success of “resource-poor but unsatellized Japan” to industrialize so
quickly
Because Japan was not satellized and “therefore did not have its development structurally limited
as did the countries which were so satellized”
Also various examples of regions that are successful but are unsustainable once market is
saturated or more competitve
3. “Regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which
had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past”
Contradicts theory that underdevelopment due to “isolation and pre-capitalistic
institutions”
Two sub hypothesis emerge from this theory
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4. latifundia were created in direct response to the market
5. latifundia which “appear isolated, subsistence-based, and semi-feudal” failed to change
their approach after market demand for them declined
These refute the theory that “historical roots and socioeconomic causes of L.American latifundia
and agrarian intuitions are because of feudal institutions from Europe and economic depression
Governing the Market – Robert Wade
Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization
Pages 1-15
Introduction: During the postwar era, Capitalist East Asia made a “jump” up the economic
hierarchy of nations.
A. Wade claims that by the early twenty-first century Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and
China will probably have as much weight in the world economy as North America or
Europe.
B. Taiwan and Korea are mastering the microcircuit design and production which is at
the heart of innovation in electronics and other electronics-dependent industries.
1. U.S., Japanese, and European multinational companies are beginning to seek
out these firms as equal partners in strategic alliances to develop new products.
C. Taiwan and Korea maybe the first developing countries to join the dozen or so states
in the world “club of innovators,” whose membership has been remarkably stable during
the twentieth century.
D. Some hold the East Asian economic success is to be ascribed to the economic
openness and small government.
1. The limitations of small domestic markets were overcome by exporting
manufactured goods at competitive prices.
E. Others hold that the government intervention was an important factor, but only
insofar as it prompted exports and offset market failures
1. Government interventions “stimulated” an ideal market.\
F. The most popular explanation stresses the importance in capitalist East Asia of a
certain kind of government role in the economy.
G. Some who make the “government leadership” argument say or imply that government
intervention was the principal factor behind East Asian success.
1. Through this mechanism the advantages of markets (decentralization, rivalry,
diversity, and multiple experiments) have been combined with the advantages of
partially insulating producers from the instabilities of free markets and of
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stimulating investment in certain industries selected by government as important
for the economy’s future growth.
H. South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan all have in common an intense and almost
unequivocal commitment on the part of government to build up the international
competitiveness of domestic industry – and thereby eventually to raise living standards.
II. States, Markets, and Industrial Policy
A. In the less developed country (LDC) context economists presented three main kinds
of eveidence:
1. The use of the state to promote import-substituting industrialization during the
1950’s and 1960’s had resulted in inefficient industries requiring permanent
subsidization, with little prospect of achieving international competitiveness.
2. extensive government intervention tended to generate “rent-seeking” on a
significant scale, that is, to divert the energies of economic agents away from
production and into lobbying for increased allocations of government subsidies
and protection.
3. Some of the most successful LDC’s – including Taiwan, South Korea, Hong
Kong, and Singapore – had achieved extraordinary industrial growth by using an
outward-oriented model driven by market incentives and a strong private sector.
B. In the Neoclassical view, the engine of development is not so much capital formation
as efficient allocation of resources
C. If prices reflect social opportunity costs, the underlying argument runs, profit
incentives will drive the economy to its maximum production potential.
D. The key development policy is therefore an outward-oriented trade regime,
characterized by low or negligible impediments to imports, relatively uniform incentives
for different production activities, and incentives for export sale equal to the incentives
for the domestic market sale.
Robert Wade – Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East
Asian Development
Pages 22-47
East Asia Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC’s)
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore’s success is attributed to their reliance
on free markets
Economic performance is due to the actions and efforts of private individuals and
enterprises responding to the opportunities provided in quite free markets for
commodities and labor.
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State intervention is largely absent.
The state provides a suitable environment for the entrepreneurs to perform
their functions.
India, Indonesia, and Communist China, relying heavily on central planning, have
experienced economic stagnation.
Free Market (FM) Theory
East Asia does better than other newly industrialized countries because the East Asian
state interferes hardly at all in the working of the market.
Other countries have been held back by excessive state intervention, especially in
foreign trade.
Silent on the political arrangements needed to support policies.
Simulated Free Market (SM) Theory
Neoclassical economists conclude that the governments did more than just liberalize
markets and lower distortions. They also intervened more positively to offset other
distortions, both those caused by other policies (import controls) and those remaining
from government failure to change distortion-inducing institutions directly (segmented
financial markets).
Silent on the political arrangements needed to support policies.
Export Promotion (EP)
A set of policies which results in the average effective exchange rate for importables
being almost equal to that for exportables.
East Asia countries that have come close to EP have been characterized by
considerable government activity in the economy.
The Far Eastern countries have managed to offset the biasing sales toward the domestic market
by export promotion measures.
The Governed Market (GM) Theory
The economy depends in large measures on private enterprises operating under highly
centralized government guidance. (Korea and Japan)
Japan was the first to recognize that international competitive advantage could be
deliberately created by government.
East Asian economic performance is due in large measure to:
1. very high levels of productive investment
2. more investment in certain key industries that would have occurred in the
absence of government intervention
3. exposure to many industries to international competition
Emphasizes the developmental virtues of a hard or soft authoritarian state in corporatist
relations with the private sector
Chalmers Johnson’s “Capitalist Developmental State”
1. The top priority of state action is economic development
2. The state is committed to private property and the market
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3. The state guides the market with instruments formulated by an elite economic
bureaucracy
4. The state is engaged in the private sector
5. The state bureaucrats do make policy but create space for the bureaucracy to
maneuver and respond to the needs of groups upon which the stability of the system
rests.
Democratic vs. Authoritarian and Pluralist vs. Corporatist
Democratic regimes have rulers chosen by a process influenced much by popular
preferences.
Authoritarian regimes select ruler with little scope given to the preference of the public
Pluralist regimes- interest groups are voluntary organizations
Corporatist systems- the state creates a small number of interest groups
U.S.= pluralist democracy
Korea and Taiwan= authoritarian corporatism
Austria and Switzerland= democratic corporatism
Japan= corporatism combine with “soft authoritarianism”
Corporatist and authoritarian political arrangements of East Asia have provided the basis
for market guidance by:
1. redistributing agricultural land
2. controlling the financial system
3. maintaining stability in some of the main economic parameters (exchange
rate, interest rate, and the general price level)
4. modulating the impact of foreign competition
5. promoting exports
6. promoting technology acquisitions
7. assisting particular industries
sectoral policies lead the market when the government takes initiatives
about what products or technologies should be encouraged
sectoral policies follow when the market adopts proposals of private firms
about new products or technologies
FM and SM imply “small followership”
GM implies “big leadership or big followership”
The Rise of Asia
Wade pp. 297-317, 334-344


Neoclassical approach: efficiency in resource use is main force of economic growth;
supremacy of the market
o According to such, East Asia did better because markets worked better, causing a
more efficient allocation of resources
o 2 variants: free market (FM) and simulated free market (SM) theory
Political economic approach/ governed market theory: capital accumulation is the main
force of economic growth
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


o East Asian success was due to higher level and different composition of
investments due to government actions, carried out by a relatively authoritarian
and corporatist state
o Aim: channel resources into industry based within the national territory → raise
domestic demands for labor.
o Government constraints and rigged prices steer competition into higher wage and
higher-technology alternatives. Constraints include limiting wealth accumulation,
intensify agricultural productivity, control sources of credit so that finance is
subordinate to industry, stabilize investment, modulation of international
competitive pressure, promote exports, invest in technology, and assist specific
industries
Corporatist political arrangements contributed to East Asian success and gave power to
state to govern market by protecting central bureaucracy
Neoclassical interpretation: government followership
o Private firm is developing projector decision → Governments consult with firms
and then puts some resources on projects and made policies to favor them, but
firm would have carried out project anyways →Government associates itself with
firm and its decisions, while distancing themselves from failure
 East Asian governments have based their popular support on economic
growth and, thus, need to appear responsible for such.
 Governments bolster popular support and make capitalists believe that
their interests lie in stability of government
Taiwan
o Consistency with free market and simulated free market variants
 Free market: Free trade conditions, free labor market, minimum wage
legislation, multinational companies; government provides
macroeconomic stability, and heavy investment in education and
infrastructure
 Simulated free market: export promoting, neutral incentives toward
agriculture and industry, high interests rates below curb market rate set by
government, government functional industrial policies, surplus
government budget, public enterprise has contributed significantly to
government revenues
 Low distortion score brought by rapid growth
o Fitting Taiwan to governed market theory:
 Government helped form a class of industrial capitalist, shaping the
“social structure of investment” so that it is more conducive to industrial
development by limiting accumulation of wealth through land reforms
(accumulation in land) and financial system (accumulation in moneylending)
 Government has affected relative prices to enhance industrialists’ profits
and increase investments
1. Protected industries →Not allow union power to raise labor costs,
allowing higher prices and lower costs of production
2. Lowered costs of exports
 Government has used more direct methods to shape investment pattern
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o
o
o
o
o

1. Controls on direct foreign investment
2. Owns banking system and controls foreign exchange → influences
sectoral distribution of investment funds
 Some industries and exports would not have been profitable w/o state
encouragement
Government policies can foment selling products abroad or domestically →
Taiwan is anti-export (against neoclassical approach)
1968-1970: End of surplus labor
 Government was principal influence on investment in heavy and chemical
industries and acted to anticipate changes in comparative advantage →
high investment and rates of growth were seen prior to end of labor
surplus, as opposed to being seen after surplus
All this suggests that government led rather than followed preferences of private
market agents in heavy and chemical industries (1950’s-60’s)
 Government intervention has focused on industries that are expected to
become internationally competitive and on those important for economy’s
future growth (ex: national security)
Government has instruments to exercise market leadership (ex: public enterprises,
trade management, control of foreign investment)
Government initiatives make a difference in the investment and production
patterns of industry. It has exercised also big followership (private agents would
not have made decisions w/o government intervention). Arguing against free
market and simulated free market theories, government assistance has not
hindered and, in many cases, has helped economic growth or international
competitiveness.
Korea
o Authoritarian, Corporatist state
o Some FM/SM elements such as low price distortions
o Governed market
 Government reshaped investment structure through land reform and
publicly owned banking system
 Control of key parameters for stability of long-term investment decisions
 Pushed exports
 Modulated exposure to international competitiveness
 Restricted control of foreign companies
 Exercised leadership in selected sectors
o Similarities with Taiwan:
 Discrepancy between low average income and high sociopolitical
development, result of Japanese colonialism
 Sustained high levels of investments
 Same level of effective protection to manufacturing → dispersion of
resource allocation
o Difference between Taiwan and Korea:
 Size of firms: Korean government promoted growth of giant
conglomerates to concentrate resources on entrepreneurs with proven track
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




records and to encourage technological and organizational economies of
scale
o Automobile industry
 Government launched several policies to develop industry at a quicker
pace and help keep control in hands of Korea, not foreign investors,
protected market (anti-export), and restricted entry of new producers.
o Electronics (semiconductors, telecommunications, and computers)
 Semiconductors→ 1960’s: government encouraged foreign direct
investment (to increase exports) but adopted restrictive stance on foreign
direct investment in general. Then, it acquired its own technological
capabilities and later supported strongly for firms’ initiatives.
 Eight-Year Electronics Industry Development Plan: research, expand
training capacities, and encourage imports through consultants
 Korea Institute of Electronics Technology (KIET) → Enhance
technological capacity by importing, assimilating, and disseminating
foreign technologies
 Government had tight control over technology → used to aid big Korean
firms entry into advanced semiconductors
 At one point, demand and prices decreased → government did not want to
commit to high-risk industry and were reluctant to pour in more money →
however, in 1986 it got more involved again → Korea is now world’s 3rd
biggest fabricator of large capacity memory chips
 *Government took major initiatives and put many resources behind these
initiatives.
East Asia was successful because they created an environment conducive to the viability
of new industries, by shaping structure of investment and control parameters to make for
greater predictability in investments.
o Parameters: 1) protection from international competition, 2) restrictions on capital
outflow to intensify reinvestment in national territory and foment exports of
goods not money, 3) controls of domestic financial institutions.
Importance on exports reflects lack of resources and the sense of external vulnerability.
o Vulnerability helped discipline leaders and bureaucracy.
o Vulnerability due to lack of resources and dense population → forced to decide
between making do with low living standards or exporting manufactured goods in
order to pay for imports of essentials
Export competitiveness has not been attained by greatly liberalizing imports except for
imports to be used in export production.
These governments have a combination of stabilized investment climate, a consistent and
coordinated attentiveness to the problems and opportunities of the designated industries,
and a commitment to industrial competitiveness in world markets.
Taiwan and Korea: Hard states are essential in government-led markets because they are
able to resist private demands and can actively shape economy and society → exert more
control over the effects of their intervention.
o Factors that make for a hard state:
 Massive social dislocation that weaken existing patterns of social control
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
1. Social disorganization because of WWII, migrations, and colonial
limitations on growth of organizations.
 Serious military threats from outside
 Support from international state system
1. US support because of their geopolitical position in the tense area
between USSR, China, and US
 Social grouping with people independent of existing bases of social
control and skillful enough to carry out designs of state leaders
1. By constructing corporatist political arrangements before interests
groups began to gain strength, they could channel and restrain
demands placed upon the state as those demands grew. The
bureaucracy can, thus, more easily demonstrate competence
because it is neither caught between interest groups nor subverted
from above by politics of ruler’s survival.
 Skillful leaders whose ideologies favor state control
Government resources and influences have prompted investments to be undertaken which
would not have been in strictly FM or SM situations → generating production and
investment outcomes
Robert Wade, Lessons Learned from East Asia, pgs 345-381



Debate exists about the role of the state in economic development
o Neoclassical side says that relatively little intervention is most successful
o Political Economists say that the most successful states have “heavy” or “active”
intervention
Should other middle-income countries try to govern the market in a way similar to
successful East Asian countries? Must answer three questions:
o 1. Are the conditions of the intn’l economy as favorable to a rapid, forced, and
export-dependent industrialization today as they were for Taiwan and Korea?
o 2. Is there a general economic rationale for governed market (GM) policies?
o 3. Can governments significantly improve their administrative and political
capacity to govern the market?
Conditions of the World Economy
o International factors play a large role in East Asian success—an opportunity
existed for low-cost industrial production to be integrated into the world economy
o Which countries seized these opportunities depend on domestic factors—such as a
pre-existing industrial base
o Location and geopolitical importance also relevant—East Asia had an advantage
b/c the US wanted to be strong due to their location on the West’s defense
perimeter
o Today, may be more difficult to industrialize as there is no longer a high demand
for unskilled labor and raw materials
o International economy is also very volatile—individual governments have a
harder time controlling the economic conditions domestically
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
o The rise in technology and capabilities of machines to perform the tasks of
unskilled labor may facilitate a shift in the location of production back to the
developed countries
The Policies that have been most successful and why:
o 1. Use national policies to promote industrial investment w/in the national
boundaries, and to channel more of this investment into industries whose growth
is important for the economy’s future growth
 The objective is growth and innovation
 Whether Nat’l welfare is actually enhanced by state assistance depends on
the choice of targeted industries and on the effectiveness of
implementation
o 2. Use protection to help create an internationally competitive set of industries
 import protection is a valuable tool, but it can be used incorrectly
 East Asia proved that protection can be used successfully in combination
with other measures
o 3. If the wider strategy calls for heavy reliance on trade, give high priority to
export promotion policies
 East Asia was undoubtedly helped by the rapid growth of exports
 Successful exporting not only depends on getting the right exchange rate
and the right goods, but producing a saleable package with all the right
buyer specifications
o 4. Welcome multinational companies, but direct them toward exports
 Multinationals are the primary source of knowledge about technology and
production
 But foreign firms should be under pressure to direct their sales toward
exports and their input purchases toward local suppliers
o 5. Promote a bank-based financial system under close government control
 A closely regulated bank-based financial system has several advantages in
industrializing countries
 1. Permits higher investment
 2. Encourages mobility and the government directing investment
 3. Helps to avoid bias toward short-term company decision-making
inherent in a stock market system
 4. Provides a political base
o 6. Carry out trade and financial liberalization gradually, in line with a certain
sequence of steps
 The East Asian experience followed:
 1. macroeconomic stabilization before trade liberalization
 2. substantial external financial assistance to ease the transition
from stabilization to liberalization
 3. liberalization of imports should come before deprotective import
liberalization
 4. successful exporting requires a large promotional role for public
agencies
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o 7. Establish a “pilot agency” or “economic general staff” within the central
bureaucracy whose policy heartland is the industrial and trade profile of the
economy and its future growth path
 One or two agencies should steer the formulation and application of the
policy instruments
 Should be fairly small, and recruit from the best and brightest
 Workers should be motivated by the belief that what they are doing
promotes the national welfare—a sense of a Nat’l mission
o 8. Develop effective institutions of political authority before the system is
democratized
 large studies have shown that democratic regimes tend to grow more
slowly than authoritarian ones
 many authoritarian governments do not give high priority to economic
development, as they are preoccupied with the task of excluding most of
the population from power
o 9. Develop corporatist institutions as or before the system is democratized
 Insulation/autonomy is essential as it:
 Makes sure that officials are dependent on the state as opposed to
interest groups
 Makes the officials expertise go to the preference for state action
rather than that of interest groups
o 10. Make piecemeal reforms even in soft states so as to create an institutional
configuration better able to support a modest industrial policy
 the economic bureaucracy must be effective and responsive
Poland and Eastern Europe: What is to be Done? – Jeffrey Sachs
I.
II.
III.
The Basics
a. Eastern Europe have centrally planned economies and there are 2 steps to
transform:
i. Go straight for a western-style market economy.
ii. Western Europe must be ready and eager to work with Eastern Europe,
providing debt relief and finance for restructuring, to bring their reformed
economies in as part of a unified European Market.
Reform and Financial Instability
a. Past attempts at reform in Eastern Europe have had a paradoxical result.
i. The countries that have attempted the most market-oriented reforms are
the very ones now suffering the greatest economic instability.
ii. The basic reason is that although the “market” reforms did indeed end
central planning, they did not create real markets.
The Way Ahead
a. The reforms under communism were necessarily self-limiting, and thereby selfdefeating. But after the democratic revolution of 1989, Eastern Europe can move
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IV.
V.
VI.
beyond the failed “market socialism” and create a real market economy with a
large private sector and free trade.
b. There should be four simultaneous parts to a program of rapid market
transformation.
i. Let prices find market-clearing levels, in part based on free trade with the
west.
ii. Set the private sector free by removing bureaucratic restrictions.
iii. Bring the State sector under control, by privatizing and by imposing
tougher disciplines on such state firms as remain.
iv. Maintain overall macroeconomics stability through restrictive credit and
balanced budgets.
The Need for Speed
a. The transition program can be decisive and rapid for several reasons.
i. Reform is a seamless web
ii. The State of the Bureaucracy
iii. Sheer scale of needed adjustments
iv. The starting point is hyperinflation.
Democratic revolution of 1989
a. They could now create a real market economy with a large private sector and free
trade. States must do the following.
i. Governments should strive to create a set of market-clearing relative
prices
1. No price controls, subsidies reduced, and economy opened to
international trade
ii. Eliminate restrictions on private economic activity.
iii. One of the hardest parts is to discipline state enterprises
iv. Establish price stability or maintain it.
v. They need to do all of this quickly.
The Role of the West
a. Trade liberalization
b. Eastern Europe will also need financial support.
i. The most urgent kind will be grants or loans directed mainly to building
up its foreign-exchanges reserves- rather than increasing imports- to help
stabilize exchange rates and establish convertible currencies.
c. The second kind of support needed will be money to help finance a social safety
net for the region.
d. The third kind of support is cancellation of most of the debt owed to a western
governments and banks.
e. The fourth kind of support needed is long-tern finance for development.
Kiran Aziz Chaudhary
The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers
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The essay examines the growth of the neo-liberal construct of market economies in late
developing countries (LDC’s) and the critique of the state interventionist approach in the market
for LCD’s. It focuses on two points. Firstly, neo-liberal economic theory does not explain why
late developing countries failed to create functioning national market economies. Since this
theory has gained a lot of ground in recent years- liberalization, globalization and privatization
policy seen as the remedy for fast development in LCD’s. Many economists, however, fail to
see its flip side. The author argues that there is a central role for the state in developmental
economics and that state and market building are mutually dependent though conflicting
processes. This is because LCD’s face a unique set of impediments in their development such
that economic liberalization alone cannot lead to an effective economy as is instituted by neoliberal reformers. He says the conflicts between private and collective interest need to be
recognized and solved on the road to development.
Following are the main parts of the description
1. Failure of Internal regulatory processes: The author says that national and market
economies cannot be created without stable and efficient administrative, legal and
regulatory institutions, which are maintained by the State. The govt. plays an important
role in protecting common and public goods, protecting consumers and preventing the
emergence of monopolies. All modernized economies in the world possess stable state
institutions. ( What Adam Smith called a ‘watchman state’ ) However, most LCD’s do
not possess such an efficient state apparatus which makes state intervention seem to
result in failure and the restriction of private sector growth. The capacity of the state to
regulate and enforce property rights, dispense law, collect tax and information is severely
restricted. To create such stable long-term commitments requires time. Europe has
already experimented with this, but the LCD’s have not, it will take them some time
before they are able to develop such institutions.
2. The conflict between capitalist and state growth: Most LCD’s are countries that came
into being after decolonization and global military conflicts (India, Many African
Countries etc). After colonialism, which thrives on a policy of divide and rule and often
creates a weak bourgeoisie (which is the substitute for an underdeveloped capitalist
class), there is an inherent need to unite the divided country. In these countries the aim of
creating national markets often conflicts with the aim of national integration. An
economic policy of import substitution is used for integration but constrains the ability of
the state to use new opportunities. Thus, the task of creating a labor economy at quick
notice or otherwise facing the danger of falling behind leads to an inefficient national
economy. ( National economy is one free the influence of the old bourgeoisie and the
interest of the primordial ‘givens’, which are the remnants of colonialism)
3. The international context: LCD’s grew in a unique international framework and this must
be taken into account when explaining their development. Changes in communications
and technology, integration and liberalization international capital markets and formation
of the IMF led to two ‘waves’ of industrialization in the 1990’s. The first on was between
1973-1983 due to the enormous inflow of wealth to many developing countries in the
form of aid, loans, oil revenues, labor remittances and investment. Foreign Direct
Investment surpassed all other forms of lending as a source of foreign capital in 1988.
The second wave of industrialization that came to developing countries, after the Gulf
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War in 1991, in the form of a foreign crisis that forced them to liberalize their economies
at a domestic juncture when the institutions for managing such a transition were
particularly weak.
4. Conclusion: There are many powerful assumptions made by neo-liberal policy makers in
the case of LCD’s. The special circumstances faced by LCD’s should be taken into
account when discussing economic development in these countries.
Week 4
Week 4 October 10, 12
Section: Notes on Week 4
Dahl Says:
*Contestation and participation
-Measure of this is seen is: universal suffrage/regime change/civil liberty freedoms/governments
willingness to hand over power peacefull
-structural process
-preferences: whether people can formulate preferences, signal preferences to others and the govt
and whether those preferences are reflected in policy outcomes
=something along the lines of democracy
Polyarchy: true democracy is an unrealistic goal but he does want to factor our contestation and
participation (2 levels) he creates a narrower notion of what we should really care about cause
where never going to get completely there
How open is contestation and how open is participation *crucial elements
-He says that u can look from the outside and isolate these 2
Paths to Democracy:
Universal suffrage isn’t enough, a vote that counts
You also need liberalization
Dispersion of Power(who has it and who gets to exercise it) who has a role in deciding policy
outcomes)
=has to do w/ Dem
Dem is not having power consolidated to the hands of the few
Economic Change and Eco growth and the forces that would lead to the dispersion of power:
Lipset: talks about smooth and long term process
Moore:
Urbanization more wealth more political activity because people have a greater stake in the
regime
3 routes
1. eng’s model
2. countires descended into fascism (jap germ italy)
3. peasant rev communism
-Bourgeouis and violence, this empowered bourg seize their power, bloody process (ex. Civil
war US, Eng War, Fr Rev)
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-buildup and 1 group taking power
Hunington: If you’re poor you can’t democraticize, obstacles to eco development are also
obstacles to dem development
-stresses on culture but draws on ec as well
-believes poverty is a separate phenomenon and creates pressure on government
-Religion and culture are the framework of Democratization in 1 way or another takes
-poverty creates such a extreme challenge
-NICS: Dominant party, way of combining cultural aspects that exists w/ democratic values (less
contestation) the party doesn’t change 1 party in power but the ideas they rep can change
-waves towards and away from democratization
Lipset said that middle class that develops out of industrialization is what presses for democracy
because they have money power and resources to press for political rep
All authors say that Democracy is a dynamic that arises from certain pressures, talk about
democracy as a process
Huntington is one of few that talks about reversal movements
Pressures to democraticize
-Huntington said wasn’t right to think about one set of pressures
(ability to change-contestation is more sig)
places that have high rates of voting : ex. South Africa, have a lot to lose or gain
as a democracy we have plateau, now outside world is what can shake/shape our character, our
fall in people’s eyes isn’t because of dem but because ofhte variables in out gov of today
(presidents government individuals etc)
low stakes for power change, but also need higher stakes for wanting to pursue an agenda that u
find meaningful
Robert Dahl, Polyarchy; 1-9, 14-40, 48-61
1) Democratization and Public Opposition
a) Key to democracy is gov’s responsiveness to preferences of citizens
i) It must formulate their preferences, signify these to fellow citizens, and they must
weigh these preferences with all others equally- necessary conditions to democracy
See table 1.1 for ex. Of formulating preferences, signifying preferences, and having
them equally weighed
ii) Scale reflecting breadth of right to participate in public contestations enables us to
cmpare different regimes according to inclusiveness- these two vary somewhat
independently
iii) The presence of universal suffrage is not enough, even the most repressive regimes
offer some sort of vote to their people, therefore a ranking based solely on
inclusiveness with no regard to other circumstances in society is erroneous
iv) Great participation= Greater popularization- is becoming inclusive
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v) Polyarchies- Relatively democratized regimes that have been substantially
popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public
contestation
2) Assumptions
Axiom 1; The likelihood that a gov will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected
costs of toleration decrease.
Axiom 2: The likelihood a gove will tolerat an opposition increases as the expected costs of
suppression increase.
Axiom 3: The more the costs of suppression exceed the costs of toleration, the greater the
chance for a competitive regime
3) Does Polyarchy Matter?
a) Differences between polyarchy and inclusive hegemony are at base negligible- thisi view
of intellectuals who are liberal radical democrats disappointed by the transparent failures
of polyarchies or near-polyarchies, and they have never had to experience life under a
repressive regime
b) Results of transformation from hegemony to a polyarchy:
i) Classic liberal freedoms that are a part of the definition of public contestation and
participation are est.; the Bill of Rights, right to opposition, right to vote and express
one’s opinion
ii) As more and more people vote, the governing body becomes more representative of
the voting body- as the working class gains the right to vote, more working, middle
class representatives show up in Parliament--- It will never be completely
representative but it still makes it less unrepresentative of the voting population
iii) Since politicians seek the vote of the groups that can now vote, they want to make the
voters feel close to the candidates, so they include things in their platform beneficial
to the different segments of society
iv) As the change from one party hegemony to polyarchy takes place, the old parties, that
were based on the social connections among the notables are replaced by the parties
more effective in appealing to the middle classes
(1) These new parties change in structure and organization to reach out to its new
members with orgs at the level of ward, section, cell, and the like- like the parties
developed in the U.S.
(2) The competition for member, adherents, and voters increases the politicization of
the electorate
v) Mixed regime to a Polyarchy increases the number and variety of preferences and
interests represented in policy making
vi) The Consequences of this transition on society is obscure but one thing is for sure and
has been shown: Contestation means that the government is less likely to suppress
the people
(1) Changes of leadership and basic policies in hegemonic regimes frequently entail
considerable bloodshed
(2) Dahl says polyarchies are not more considerate than other regimes toward people
are effectively excluded from the rights of citizens, no better at responding to
citizens beyond their boundaries
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vii) Thrust of Argument: Obvious: Different regimes do have different consequences not
does Dahl assume that a shift from hegemony toward polyarchy is invariably
desirable or historically inevitable because---- conditions most favorable for
polyarchy are comparatively uncommon and not easily created
4) Historical Sequences
a) 2 Aspects: specific path or sequences of transformations of a regime and the way in
which a new regime is inaugurated
B) Path to Polyarchy
a. Three Possible Paths to Polarchy
i. Liberalization precedes inclusiveness: contestation then inclusiveness is
increased
ii. Inclusiveness precedes Liberalization:
iii. Shortcut: A closed hegemony is abruptly transformed into a polyarchy
buy a sudden grant of universal suffrage and rights of public contestation
b. Most popluar path among older and stable polyarchies is the first path, rules
developed first among small political elite and then spread
c. Other two paths are more dangerous: to arrive at a viable system of mutual
security is a difficult matter at best; the greater the # of people and the variety and
disparity of interest involved, the more difficult th tast and the greater the time
required
d. First Path- stable transformation waay from hegemony toward polyarchy--- the
new regimes were not beset by fatal conflicts over legitimacy arising out of
counterclaims set forth by spokesmen for the old regime, yet unlikely to be
followed in the future
e. Second Path- risky because the suffrage is extended begore the arts of competitive
politics have been mastered, thus making this process complex and time
consuming
i. If these arts are not yet accepted by the elites, it is likely that before
mutual security is established one of the competitive regimes will start
another hegemony over the others
f. Summary of Argument about different paths:
i. The first path is more likely thatn the others to produce the degree of
mutual security required for a stable regime of public contestation
ii. Buth the first path is no longer open to most countries with hegemonic
regimes
iii. Hence the liberalization of near-hegemonies will run a serious risk of
failure because of the difficulty, under conditions of universal suffrage and
mass politica, of working out a system of mutual security
iv. The risks of failure can be reduce, however, if steps toward liberalization
are accompanied by a dedicated and elnlightened search for a viable
system of mutural guarantees
5) The Socioeconomic Order: Concentration or Dispersion?
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a) Axiom 4: The likelihood that agovernment will tolerate an opposition increases as the
resources availablel to the government for suppression decline relavrtive to the resources
of a an opposition
b) Key Resources govs use to suppress take two forms: 1. Violent means of coercion 2.
Nonviolent means of coercion-socioeconomic sanctions
i) Axiom 5: The likelihood that a governemtn will tolerate an opposition increases with
a reduction in the capacity of the government to use violence or socioeconomic
sanctions to suppress an opposition
ii) Capacity is reduced if these resources are so widely dispersed that no unified group
has a monopoly over them (including the government)
iii) Hence question is: why beliefs in political nertrality , constitutionalism, and
obedience to civil authority are developed and sustained among military forces only
in certain countries
iv) Worst Case scenario: When military and socioeconomic sanctions exist for a
government to suppress opposition
v) The situation where the government controls neither could happen if a small group of
foreign owners and mangers seize control, but that body would soon cease to be a
government
6) Agrarian Societies
a) Two extreme Types: 1. Most Prevelant- traditional peasant society 2. More egalitarian
and democratic free farmer society
i) Inequality in distribution of land in agrarian society is equal to inequality of
distribution of political resources because land is all that matters
ii) Also the degree of military technology determines much in the future of the agrarian
societies
iii) Traditional Peasant Society- cumulative inequalities of status, wealth, income and
means of coercion mean a marked inequality in politicial resources---a tiny majority
enjoy exceptional power, wealth, and social esteem
iv) Free Farmer society- land is more equally distributed--- U.S.—the musket and later
the rifle helped to provide a kind of equality in coercion for over a century
7) Commercial and Industrial Societies
a) More open to competitive politics than agrarian societies
i) 2 Assumed Equations: 1. Competitive politics---a pluralistic social order-----private
ownership 2. A socialist economy----a centrally dominated social order---- a
hegemonic regime
(a) These meant that you can’t logically choose to have competitive politics
without the choosing to have a competitive capitalist economy
(b) Developments have made these equations false though
(i) The persistence of inclusive polyarchy in countries with mixed
economies- Sweden
b) More Appropriate Advised Equations: 1. Competitive Politics--- Pluralistic Social
Order---- decentralized economy 2. Highly centralized economy--- centrally dominated
social order----- hegemonic regimes
For Nice Summary of 5-7 refer to page 209 in Blue Book (6 reference points for this section)
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Samuel Huntington “Democracy’s Third Wave” pp. 3-25
1) Five Factors of Third Wave
a) Deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian regims in a world where dem values
were widely accepted
b) Unprecedented global economic growth of 60s which expanded middle class
c) Shift in doctrine and activities of Catholic Church
d) Changes in policies of external actors (E.U., U.S, and Soviets
e) Snowballing- demonstration effect of transitions earlier in the third wave in stimulating
and providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization
i) Strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy- Catholic impetus to
democracy exhausted by 1990
2) Role of External Forces
a) Euro Community (EC) played a key role in consolidation democracy
b) Withdrawal by Soviets made democratization possible in Eastern Europe
c) 70s and 80s U.S. was great promoter of democratization- only country left that U.S. can
influence is Mexico, but it still has interestes in Persian Gulf
d) End of 80’s many feared that the “American Decline” represented a failure of democracy
to those looking for a new political regime
3) Snowballing
a) Impact evident in Bulgaria, Romamnia, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Nepal, and Albania
b) This worldwide democratic revolution can produce external environment conducive to
democracy but does little for internal conditions
c) 1990s- Internaitonal Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank could be powerful in
making political democratization as well as economic liberalization a precondition for
economic assistance
4) A Third Reverse Wave
a) Factors
i) Weakness of dem values among key elite groups and public
ii) Severe economic setbacks
iii) Social an dpolitical polarization
iv) Excluison of lower and middle classes by upper and ruling classes
v) Breakdown of law and order
vi) Intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign power
vii) “Reverse Snowballing”
b) Majority of anti-dem movementsw involve either a military coup or an executive coup in
which the democratically chosen leader ends democracy
c) Democracies are replaced by new forms of authoritarian rule
d) Potential Causes of New Reverse Wave:
i) Systematic failures of democracies to operate effectively
ii) Shift to auth. Rule by any democratic or democratizing great power could trigger
reverse snowballing
iii) Nondemocratic state’s power increases and it expands its borders
iv) Old and new forms of authoritarian rule that seem appropriate to the times could
emerge---- Religious Fundamentalism – or another form
5) Obstacles to Democratization
a) More than one hundred countries lacked democratic regimes
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i) Home-grown Marxist-Leninist regimes
ii) Sub-Saharan African Countries
iii) Islamic countries stretching from Morocco to Indonesia
iv) East Asian countries, from Burma through Southeast Asia to China and North Korea
b) Significant political obstacle to future democratization-absence of experience with
democracy—The death or departure from office of leaders that are accustomed to
authoritarian rule could help democracy
c) Communist-one-party regimes have not democratized since Soviets
d) Obstacle in Africa and Middle East- absence or weakness or eal commitment to
democratic values among political leaders
6) Culture
a) Argument: Only Western culture provides suitable base for the development of
democratic institutions, and certain non-western cultures are hostile to democracy
i) Confucianism and Islam
(1) Confucianism’s emphasis on group over individual, authority over liberty, and
responsibilities over rights, and the fact that it provides no legitimace for
authonomous social institutions at the national level are not conducive to
democracy
(a) China’s rapid economic growth produced demand for political reform—met
with theory of “new authoritarianism”, and leadership violently suppressed the
democratic movernmetn
(b) Whereas in Taiwan and Korea rapid economic growth overwhelmed a weak
Confucian culture and called for democracy
ii) East Asian Model
(1) Japan is a democracy with a ruling party that has never been voted out of officespread elsewhere in Asia, but while Japan has met the civil liberties requirements
for democracies other East Asian with similar dominant party systems have not
(2) This Dominant Party System- spanned gap between authoritarian and democracy,
it allowed for competition for power but not alteration from the “mainstream
Party” – this model produced unequalled records of economic success in 60s and
70s
(3) The question now is to what extent the East Asian dominant-party system
presupposes uninterrupted and substantial economic growth- can it survive a
downturn
iii) Islam
(1) While egalitarianism and voluntarism are cental to Islam, it rejects any distinction
between the religious community and the secular community- thus Islam
possesses both concepts conducive and not conducive to democracy
(2) Only country with a Muslim majority that was a democracy was Lebanon---2/37
countries in Muslim world were “Free” –81-90
(3) When there is opposition to authoritarianism in the muslim world, it is led by the
religious fundamentalists and they are the ones who benefit from this movement(
younger ppl too)
(4) Thus liberalization in Islamic countries enhanced the power of important social
and political movement whose commitment to democracy was uncertain
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iv) The Limits of Cultural Obstacles
(1) At one point Catholicism was viewed as an obstacle to democracy yet in the 60s80s Catholic countries became democratic
(2) Cultures are complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and
behavior patterns- therefore it has some elements that are compatible with
democracy
(3) Cultures historically are dynamic, not stagnant, the dominant beliefs and attitudes
in a society change
7) Economics
a) Correlation between wealth and democracy implies that transitions to democracy should
occur primarily in countries at the mid-level of economic development—this “political
transition zone”- countries in which are most likely to democratize
b) Poverty is an obstacle to democracy, economic obstacles also prohibit democracy
c) 3rd Wave of Democ propelled forward by extraorddinaryu global economic growth of the
50s and 60s
d) 1990s- Counties with economies conducive to democratizationj are in the Middle East
and North Africa
i) Middle Eastern economices andsocieties are approaching the point where they will
become too wealth yand too complex for their various traditional, military, and oneparty systems
ii) China- obstacles are political, economic and cultural; Africa they are economic and
in East Asia and in Islamic countries they are primarily cultural
8) Economic Development and Political Leadership
a) 2 most decisive factors affecting future of democracy will be economic development and
political leadership
i) Poor countries will remain undemocratic if they remain poor
ii) 2 reason to temper our hopes for future democracy with caution: 1. economic
development for the late bloomers (Africa) will be more difficult 2. New forms of
authoritarianism could emregein wealthy, info-dominated, tech-based societies
iii) Economic Development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real
(1) Democracy will spread to the extent that those who exercise power in the world
and in individual countries want it to spread
1. Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracy pp. 14-22, 27-32, 4046
1) On Diffusion: How Democracy Can Grow in Many Soils
a) Democracies are thus less the result of cumulative and predictable developments than of
historical busts and booms, global opinion climates, shifting opportunites and contingent
preferences
2) What Democracy?
a) Object of Diffusion is to spread democracy- a set of political institutions and practices,
rules and procedures from which a number of otherwise divers countries we thus call
”democratic” have variously borrowed
b) Ill-advised to conflate democracy with a set of elusive ultimat objectives and normative
standards
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i) Emphasis is on free and universal suffrage in a context or civil liberties, on
competitive parties, on the selection of candidates for office , and the on the presence
of political instiution that regulate and guarantee the roles of government and
opposition
3) What Diffusion?
a) Modern representative democracy was born in corner of Western Europe under
converging circumstances whose uniqueness cannot be overemphasized (Protestantism,
strong entrepreneurial bourgeoisie
b) Just as these were unique a different set of unique circumstances could and account for
the spread of the same democracy- perhaps by diffusion
c) Social progress was originally seen as the cause of democracy- political reform was
expected to produce the social progree that its advent had originally been predicated
d) After WW2- defeat of fascism and decolonization offered the correct internal condition,
democracy returned to these defeated and liberated countries in the West, but many of the
new countries failed to replicate the transition to representative democracy
i) This gave people a more realistic perspective on democracy- its main virtue now
became democracy’s protection against the oppression of arbitrary and undivided rule
ii) If democracy was not key to progress, neither were the alternative regimes that
replaced it, in fact the authoritarian regimes surviving WW2 came to be perceived as
an obstacle to social progress
iii) Beyond the failure in social progress on nondemocratic regimes was the horror that
they were human oppressors and community disorganizers
(1) This brutality revealed why democracy was superior to these other options
(2) It could curb oppression, reassert mutual coexistence, reestablish a sense of
personal worth and public dignity- preferable to dictatorship
iv) Greater appreciation of democracy’s worth and a lowering of expectations in regard
to its material achievements, is beneficial in two ways
(1) Prudential and “satisficing” view of democracy as a system that curbs opprsions
and reestablishes community shattered or left adrift by dictatorship does not
exempt from but encourages political crafting
(a) Greater investment in crafting can open possibilities for democracy in
contexts previously deemed unfavorable
2) One factor that reconciles to democracy reluctant political actors tied to the
previous regime is that in the inaugural phase coexistence usually takes predence
over any radical social and economic programs
3) Democracy’s lack of social progress as a silver lining- given democracy a more
realisitic, more sturdily conscious grounds for claiming superiourity in the eyes of
public opinion and political practitioners- increased interest in democratic crafting
4) Why Transferring Loyalties to Democracy May Be Less Difficult Than We Think
a. Reason to transger loyalties to democracy stems from a better appreciation
of democracy’s original meaning as a system of coexistence in diversity
b. Disprove Democracy’s role as a hothouse plant
5) Transferring Loyalties: Incentives and Requirements
a. Coexistence is basic component of democracy- 2 ways to determine the
chances that a system of mutual security, or coexistence, will develop
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i. Dahl—1. Whether structre of inequalities, subcultural cleavages, or
national traits acto to reduce conflict in a democratic context and
make mutural toleration more likely (concerned with impediments
to coex. And what makes democracy impossible 2. Ask what
makes coexistence attractive ( concerns the choice to overcome
impediments if necessary)
6) Rustow writes “People not in conflict about some rather fundamental matters would have
little need to devise democracy’s elaborate rules for conflict regulation
a) Acceptance of democracy’s rules is not a prerequisites because their elaboration may
well be integral to the transition itself
b) Democracy can rest on its attractiveness relative to its alternatives
c) Democracy as a relative choice is to explore the periphery and their possibilities even
though they may not be ripe for democracy ( therefore certain circumstances for democ.
Are favorable but not necessary)
d) When a struggle occurs in a authoritarian situation, democracy depends on the
emergence of a concretely attractive set of democratic rules that are designed to replace
that struggle with coexistence
e) By choosing democracy, political actors are also choosing a degree of calculated
uncertainty, hence crafting becomes important because it makes institutionalized
uncertainty palatable and indeed reawarding, and hence stable in the long run
7) Democracy as Compromise
a) The weakness of Democracy is its Strength
(i) Democracy’s chances to root itself are weak because it is a compromise, a
set of rules for mediating plural and competing interests
(ii) Democracy is a competitive political market giving contestants failry
equal chances to affect and share in outcomes- its adoption tends to
circumvent the production of fixed and representative outcomes by those
positions
(iii) The essence of democracy is that no single social or institutional
formation should determine outcomes by monopolizing and fusing
institutions or by its sheer social position
(iv) Democracy’s weakness of uncertainty has become a strength- because it is
open-ended and no one wins or loses all the time it emerges as attractive
and convenient for many of its detractors
b) Dahl says that one must accept one must lose to win: “I cannot satisfactorily gain my
own ends unless I allow others an opportunity to pursue their ends on an equal basis
9) How Crafting Can Help the Transfer of Loyalties
a) Crafting helps cope with uncertainty, democratic transitions build presumptive,
legitimacy by outlining in advance the rules of the game, the rules must be certain
b) “Borrowed” Legitimacy- willingness to trust that a fair balance will ultimately eventuate
will itself vary
c) One recurring theme is balancing the rights of the opposition and its prospects of winning
against the right of those currently governing
d) Recalcitrant players make some rules fare better; These players affect democratic
institutions in 2 ways: 1. Greater the number, the less likely the transition to democ will
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succeed; 2. the More recalcitrant the players the more the transition will need to seek
democratic rules that stress coexistence above everything else
e) Yet even if actors are aware of predicaments endemic to transitions and act in their own
interests, they can set in motion a process, that may close with the adoption of
appropriate democratic rules
Political Man
The Social Bases of Politics
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
1981
III.Economic Development and Democracy
-Democracy provides constitutional opportunity for change in gov officials (political aspect)
-The population’s majority has the opportunity to influence through choosing from political
contenders (social aspect)
*Conditions for Democracy (as implied by Weber and Schumpeter)
1. Constitution (body of laws)
2. Set of leaders
3. Peaceful transition of power and new contenders waiting to compete
-These conditions provide:
1. a value system (something Latin America didn’t have)
2. one group in power at a time which allows for a cohesive government with less conflict (3rd
and 4th French Republic didn’t have this)
3. Effective opportunity for keeping power of those leading in check (otherwise it would be a
dictatorship)
*Stable Democracy based on 2 characteristics of a society
1. Economic development and industrialization  capitalism (Lipset agrees w/ Weber)
2. Should not assume that democracy brings social improvement, but only the opportunity for it
in income, education and literacy. (these social improvements then in turn can fortify
democracy) ex. Germany had all the favorable social improvements to foster democracy but
historical events prevented the development of democracy
*A premature democracy needs to further the growth of other conditions that are conducive to
democracy and support it (literacy/private organizations)
-democracy is a rank of complex characteristics
*Lipset classifies countries in categories
1. European Dem.
-same since WWI, 25 years without opposition to democratic ideals, stability
2. Latin Amr. Dem.
-free elections since WWI, constant dictatorial rule (less stringent in definition)
****THE MORE WELL-TO-DO A NATION THE GREATER THE HANCES THAT
ITIWILL SUSTAIN DEMOCRACY- LIPSET
-Speaks to the idea that dem is related to the state of eco development
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-When the level of real poverty is low, citizen participation in politics rises which favors
democracy and reduces the threat of demagogues because the citizens are naturally voting and
acting self-servingly
-Large middle class needed (middle is naturally moderate)
-Higher wealth, degrees of industrialization and urbanization is found in more democratic
nations
-LIPSET compares wealth between democracies and dictorials in the same regions to remove
culture variables (ex. Dem euro nations vs Dictorial euro nations)
*Wealth- industrialization, urbanization democracy, Edu Dem
-LIPSET says that edu is more significant that income or occupation for Democracy
-Ex. In Ger and Fr high levels of edu helped to inhibit antidemocratic forces
-Brazil, Lebanon, Philippines, Japan, US are the most democratic w/in their respective
regions and also have the highest literacy levels
*LIPSET says that industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and edu are all apart of 1 factor: ECO
Development which has the political correlation to Democracy
-He refers to LERNER’s close connection btwn urbanization, lit, vote rates, media consump, and
production, and edu. (urbanization lit  media growth)
- Egypt is the exception: should be 2x Turkey’s lit rate according to Lerner because of
their 2x urbanization, but infact ½ the lit rate (deviant lagging case)
A. Economic Development and the Class Struggle
Economic development produces increased inc, greater ec security, higher edu,  results in
determining the form of the “class struggle”, the lower class has the opp to politically develop
gradually
*The lower the GDP the more vulnerable to communism/socialism
-level of national ec development and the GDP related to the strength of non democratic groups
(this relationship is stronger than religious or ethnic factors)
-LIPSET compares different national incomes within the same religion to see the strength of non
democratic groups within those countries while removing religious variables (ex. Poor Catholic
nations of Europe all of large Comm movements vs the 2 wealthiest Catholic democracies
(Belgium and Luxembourg) have few communists)
*National income vs degree of satisfaction within country, disconent related to economic wealth
-Stable and unexposed people (usually poor) end up conservative due to their lack of exposure to
new ideas
-They lack exposure to the prospects of a better life
-Goes along w/ the Marxist idea that you compare what you have to what is around you but if
you have the same as everyone else you become complacent
-LIPSET says the state unexposed poverty is becoming more rare
-Lower class usually supports party that promises redistribution of wealth
*UN suggests that the fraction of the pop receives a greater proportion of the total income in the
less developed countires
-poor countries have a large gap and unequal slices
-developed countries smaller gap because of the fast growing income of the poor
-distribution of goods more equal as size of national inc rises
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-an increase in national wealth will result in the more adjacent or distant classes sharing in
consumption patterns and standards of living (US/Canada classes vs European classes)
-increase wealth reduces status inferiority as a major source of deprivation
*Increase wealth and edu serve dem by increasing lower class exposure to cross pressures which
reduce their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to extremist ones
which creates moderates in the lower class
-increase in wealth produces a diamond social structure where the largest width is the middle
class (not the pyramid), the middle is moderate
-In pyramid, people at top feel pressured to treat lower class badly and don’t want to share rights
with them; in this case of social structure, the upper class threats democracy by feeding
extremism into the lower class
*If economy is large enough then redistribution is not as necessary, but if not, then there will be
competition for parties to stay in power and benefit from the limited wealth
-Poor countries support nepotism because of this
-increase in national wealth increases civil service
*Tocqueville’s “mass society” groups outside of central state power are key because they 1.
inhibit the state or single source from dominating all political resources 2. source of new
opinions 3. means of communication and opposition ideas 4. train men in political skills
-those who belong to such groups are more likely to have democratic answers to tolerance,
parties, voting, and are more politically active
-high national income gives citizens the leisurely opportunity to join these groups
The Politics of Rapid Economic Development
*Eco development has been pressured w/ notion of ‘rapidness’
-Rapidness produces discontinuous industries (ex. Denmark had slow eco dev and a small left
wing group; Sweden fast and had an aggressive leftwing movement, Norway fastest and had
Federation of Labor)
-Moderates develop from stable industry (ex. Germany had the Marxist L wing from rapid
industries)
-Russian Rev** had rapid industry and working class extremists
-Engels said this socialist movement will decline as transition is completed to industrialization
and proletariat and all is stable
*LIPSET agrees with Weber capitalist eco develop had best chance in Prot society that
emphasized individual
B. Methodological Appendix
Comparisons are being made on a certain level of generalization, referring to the function of the
total system, generalizations applicable to a total society have the same kind and degree of
validity that those applicable o other systems have and are subject to the same empirical test
SEE TABLE ON PG 61 of conditions democracy consequences Ex( literacy demmass
society)
a) George Washington and The Founding of Democracy
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Seymour Martin LIPSET
A. *GW is an underestimated figure
-Rev would have failed w/o him
-Achievements: maintained morale, loyality, and obidence of army, and kept them obident to
civil authority
-Even his enemies (King George III of Eng) praised him as “The greatest character of the age”
and (Duke of Wellington) “the pureest and noblest character of modern time”
-He had ambition for a good reputation, not power and $
Didn’t accept salary, and enjoyed giving up power and returning home
-Was made commander of Continental army only because he attending the meeting looking the
uniform of a colonel in Virginia militia
Didn’t want want to take command
B. *Washington: a founder, man who helped the US to form an ID, institutionalized a
competitive electoral dem, established a republic
1. Lipset believes in The Individual Leader and Individual Greatness
a. Goes against Marxist idea of the society achieving greatness
ex. No Lenin, no Russian Rev, Oct Revolution wouldn’t have happened
b. Can’t make the statement “No GW, no Amr dem repub,” probably would have become a Dem
neways because the pre independent nation did have the prereqs for full dem practice and
participation
c. BUT GW was necessary because of his charisma that flowed from personality and military
leadership; he inspired trust and facilitated the formation of culture and institutions needed for a
stable, legitimate, and effective dem system
C. At beginning of post independence, it is rare that all major players in the nation (military,
economy, and political elites) will all conform to the new regime  this results in Low
Legitimacy
-WEBER says 3 ways that authority can get legitimacy
1. Traditional; people accept the ruler because of familiarity
2. Rational-legal authority; ruler accepted because of the accepted rule of laws that say that
whoever wins office holds office
3. Charismatic authority; rests upon faith in a leader who is believed to be endowed with great
personal worth
*when first 2 are absent, legitimacy can be developed quickly though Charisma
- need legit or the new dems will be short lived (ex latin amr)
-Postrev US had weak legit (the years post civil war saw a lot of different people from NSW
trying to take control) but the US was able to survive this early stage of democracy because of
competitive electoral democracy staying intact made possible by GW
D. Role of GW: Created respect for national authority, bolstered legit of new nation, committed
to a free polity, created allegiance, and respect for new nation
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-Charismatic leader plays several roles: symbol of new nation and political system, embodies
values and aspirations
-Charismatic authority is a transitional phenomenon which induces citizens to observe the
requirements for national stability out of trust in the leader until they are ready to be
impersonally loyal to the regime
E. Charisma w/ Moderation
Charismatic leadership is unstable because the leader is open to all blame
So….What to do!?
**A charismatic leader must make public opp or criticism impermissible, he must transcend
partisan conflict and rake on a role of a constitutional monarch who symbolized the system but is
above the political fray; there must be no organized opp to the charismatic leader (otherwise the
regime can break down because the actor/leader is blamed for adverse outcomes)
-the republic that came from the Amr Rev was legitimized by Charisma
-GW did what was right, set examples, showed dignity, authority, and constitutionalism, was a
model in the way he commanded the army
-GW had to be aloof, he discouraged familiarity, demanded deference, was publicly reserved
(Charles de Gaulle modeled himself after GW)
-kept up troops morale, lived with them, didn’t take vacays to go home when stuff got hard,
didn’t give soldiers reason to lose faith,
-“the army is a dangerous instrument to play with,” – GW (said this when he put down the
potential coup in Newburgh against the congress in phily) GW had an ability to handle people
-Returned to his farm after the Rev (revived the Roman legend of Cincinnatus, legend of farmer
who was called by his nation to save the republic, and once it was all over returned to everyday
life), out of this came the Order of Cincinnatus (The greatest action was to return to being
ordinary citz again)
F. Attended the Constituational Convenction unwillingly. (had wanted to retire from public life
but Shay’s rebellion made him want to attend) He was chosen as the Presiding officer.
-Needed a stronger central government and no one thought that he would misuse his power
because of the reluctance he assumed the poition with
-GW knew his tast was to create respect for the presidential office so that it could survie,
considered the position a symbol of national unity; made the state government (governor john
hancock) realize the precedent of the federal government
= was able to legimize the new system
-he also was pro edu and a national university
-believed parties were intrinsically bad for dem because they were interest-driven
-He quietly sided with Hamilton and Feds who favored a strong central gov but he was careful to
stand above the fray and appear nonpartisan
G. Religion and Race
-integrated minority religion (judiasm) din’t strongly commit to any particular creed
-face immorality of slaves; couldn’t free his wive’s slaves but saved money for them and their
children once for when they would be freed; “gererous with slaves,” but he knew that he couldn’t
free a group of people into the new demoracy who were unskilled, uneducated, and who would
also face discrimination
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H. 2nd term
-didn’t want to serve a 2nd term but did because of the issued btwn Hamilton and Jefferson
-didn’t rule till death like many wanted him to; this was very significant because the country saw
a peaceful transition between leaders; without this move, subsequent presidential successions
would have been more difficult
The importance of GW”s role for dem in the US is summarized in 3 points
1. single-handedly provided the base for unity by commanding the loyalty of the leaders of the
different factions as well as the general population
2. committed to constitutional gov in principle and practice and provided paternal guidance,
stayed in power long enough to permit stability of factions and parties
3. voluntarily retired from office, set a precedent exemplifying a proper republican approach to
the problem of succession
Most leaders can only do the first of the 3
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World
Barrington MOORE, Jr.
The Democratic Route to Modern Society
3 routes to the Modern World:
1. Combined capitalism and parliamentary democracy after a series of revolutions
(Fr, Eng, and Amr all did this with a “borgeouis rev” but all had different societies and starting
points
2. Capitalistic but without the revolution surge  a culmination in Fascism
3. Communism (Russia/china) originated from among the peasants
Moore says that these 3 types are successive historical states and they display a limited
determinate relation to each other. The methods of mod chosen in one country change the
dimensions of the problem for the next countries who take the step. “the advantages of
backwardness” comes into play cause later countries can look to previous modernization
experiences.
Moore: development of dem is a long and incomplete struggle to do 3 things
1. check arbitrary rulers 2. replace arbitrary rules with just ones 3. population has influence in
rules
Moore says that some starting points more favorable to dem that others; says feudalism did
contain certain institutions that distinguished it from other societies to favor democratic
possibilities.
**Most important aspect was the growth of the notion of the protection of certain groups from
the power of the ruler and the right of resistance to unjust rule.
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The persistence of royal absolutism has created unfavorable conditions to democracy of the
Western type. (ex china Russia germany). But atleast such regimes showed where democracy
couldn’t have flourished.
Modern times has shown that a precondition for democracy has been a rough balance btwn
nobility and rulers and peasants. *The pluralist notion that an independent nobility is an
essential ingredient in the growth of democracy is a fact. The ways that this independence has
been hammered out are equally important.
Role Played by the landed upper classes in the creation of fascist governments
1. form of commercial agriculture was just as important as commercialization itself 2.the failure
of appropriate forms of commercial agriculture to take hold at an early point in time still left
open another route to modern democratic
-capitalistic growth important for democracy (ex. Slavery good for cap growth but unfavorable
for the later developed democracy)
-transition to commercial to commercial agriculture is a very important step
-cultural differences aren’t enough to explain economic behavior
-** what is significant is the differences in opportunities to adopt commercial agriculture though
the existence of a market in nearby towns and the existence of adequate methods of
transportation
-When the landlords can use the coerce apparatus of the state in order to sit back and collect
rents, there is no incentive to turn to less repressive adaptations
-the elimination of the peasant ? through the transformation of the peasants into some other kind
of social formation appears to be the best augur for dem
-peasants need to be willing to change and take risks or otherwise markets will lack
so far 2 major variables have been:
1.relationships of the landed upper class with the monarchy
2. and their response to the requirements of production for the market
3. a third important variable for modernization/dem is the relationship of the landowners w/ town
dwellers
-the coalitions and counterco’s that have arisen among and across these 2 groups
constitute the basic framework and enviro of political action, forming the series of opps,
temptations, and impossibilities within which political leaders had to act
-when the interests of the upper strata and country converge against the peasants, the
outcome is unfavorable to democracy
-it is important that the fusion take place in opposition to he royal bureaucracy &
- the condition appears to be that the commercial and industrial leaders must be on
their way to becoming the dominant element in society
3 more important factors:
1. existence of a substantial degree of antagonism between commercial and industrial elements
and the older landed classes
2. the landed classes maintain a fairly firm economic footing
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-both factors prevent the formation of a solid front of upper class opp to demands for reform and
encourage a certain amount of comp for pop support
3. the landed elite must be able to transmit some of its aristoricratic outlook to the commercial
and industrial classes
Moore viewed Dem as a product of class conflict (btwn bourg and landed aristocracy)
-the physical hammering out of the landed elites(their destruction) was significant because the
landed elites hold back potential industrial workforce that leads to the urbanization that is
necessary for dem
-These landed uppers were precapitalist nad had a feudal markert through coersive, non-wage
labor
-These landed elites had ideals that were not favorable to democracy (serfdome, slavery etc) but
necessary for capitalism (similar to lipset’s idea on slavery)
-Kept peasants to the land, peasants couldn’t quit, had to work, and were binded through
serfdome
-to maintain this system of landed workers, the government had to depreive them of all
rights
-this repressive state goes against Dem
Democratization needs this to be destroyed (landed uppers and serfs) but this change can not
happen peacefully
2 things are very critical
1. strong capitalist class (the bourge that makes $ of waged labor and industry)
-has the means to do away w/ landed elite because they are the only group with the resources to
take on the landed oligarchy
“NO Bourgeois NO DEMOCRACY”
2. Violence: historically this has been a violent process
-Eng had a violent war, bloody rev in Fr, and bloody civil war in Amr
*need violent confict (ex. Germany and Japan had weak bourgeois and their development
towards dem was much later) --) ended in fascism
The balance of power and conflicts lead to Dem
Physical dfeat of land owners that hoard potential labor from industry very important
Moore doesn’t view dem as a inevitable process, unlike LIPSET who did
He was pessimistic of Dem outside of the West because of the class tructure and weak bourg
He thought that there was no chance of dem in places like latin amr and India
He was pessimistic of prospects (rest of the world doesn’t’ have the right class structure)
*Moore had a narrow view of the balance of power in classes but most of the class structures are
different in other countries, today it is the imbalance btwn state and society
WEEK 5
Ashutosh Varshney, “India Defies the Odds: Why Democracy Survives.” Pp. 36-50
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1) Despite the fact that India goes against traditional democratic theory (it is impoverished,
widespread illiteracy etc.) its democracy has maintained itself since 1947
a) With peaceful transgers of power, free press, and the judiciary remains independent
b) Experts have predicted its collapse since the 60s, but rising participation by formerly
fringe groups is encouraging, these lower castes mean democracy has worked
c) Dahl cites Inadia a contemporary exception to democratic theory: “India, whre polyarchy
was est. when the population was overwhelmingly agricultural, illiterate…and highly
traditional and rule-bound in behavior and beliefs
2) Why has Indian decomracy survived these adverse conditions?
a) 4 parts to answer: 1. historical aspect 2. economic aspect 3. connects its ethnic
construction to its ddemocracy 4. looks at its political leadership
3) A “Post-Postcolonial Reconstruction”
a) Myron Weiner: political experience that indigenous leaders gained because of their
increased power during colonialism’s last phase helped
b) Gandhi created a nation transforming the Congress party from just a cultural unit into a
cultural-political unit (nation)
i) The strategic interaction between the British authorities and national-movement
leaders laid the foundation for democracy
ii) By the time Congress came to supreme power in 1947 it had had a wealth of
experience
iii) The Congress party itself had been transformed by Gandhi in the 20s to give it the
institutional groundwork of a competitive political party
iv) Ernest Gellner says” nation-building is putting a political roof over one’s cultural
head”
(1) This nation building process began under Gandhi in the early 20th as mass
mobilization took place through the cadre-based party
(2) By the 30s Congress had increased its role in every aspect of Indian lives, and
millions came out to protest British rule and were ready to go to jail
v) India’s nation was built in opposition to the British
(1) Many of the Muslim League’s demands for hallmarks of their consociationalism
needed to be disregarded before the nation could be successful
(2) The Indian Congress wanted to protect minority rights but within the framework
of a liberal democracy
(3) The British did not create this democracy but rather the strategies of the national
movement were tremendously successful
(a) The movement’s nonviolence means prevented the British from squashing the
movement with violence
(b) The national movement even made the British down their own legitimacy to
rule- as a democracy trying to run an empire their liberalism got in their way,
and the Indian movement tried to highlight this paradox of the British
4) Industrialization, Agriculture, and Democracy
a) Moore- Democratization depends on agriculture being commercialized because then it
can provide the necessary surplus of workers, food, and savings
i) The peasantry must also be destroyed
ii) Yet India is an exception because democracy flourished while the peasantry remained
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(1) Cause: technology has made peasant agriculture productive enough to blunt the
contradiction between industrialization and the existence of the peasantry
(2) The early Indian leader Nehru chose democracy over development when he
allowed 20 years of planning to provide the resources for industrialization instead
of rushing it, the resources eventually came from urban savings and foreign aidthis settling for a slower road to industrialization was vital
5) The Ethnic Configuration
a) Ethnic conflict is the main source of political violence in the developing world
i) In India Democracy has endured Muslim-Hindu riots and caste-based strife: Why?
(1) The reason is because the tensions in India are dispersed rather than centrally
focused ethnic configurations (which affect the center)
(a) These dispersed ethnic configurations means that all ethnic cleavages are
regionally or locally specific so while they may be caste riots in one part of
the country, the rest of the country is left unaffected; the insurgencies get
bottled up in one area and do not effect the center
(b) However, the cleavage between the Muslims and Hindus has the potential to
rip India apart, because while the Muslims are only 11% of the country’s
population, their geographic distribution gives them more political
significance
(i) Rising Communalism among the Hindus makes the situation unstableThe Hindu nationalist party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) now heads the
coalition gov in Delhi, they are worried by what they call Muslim
disloyalty to Inida
(ii) If BJP were allowed to enforce their ideologies, India would enter the
dangerous state of “cultural dualism.” Could result in a regulated
democracy with bounds of poltical competition laid down by the dominant
group
(iii)Uncontested Hindu rule is unlikely because caste differences take
precedence over Hindu unity and nonelected institutions (the courts) argue
that secularism is a basic principle of the Constitution
(iv) Since ideological moderation has got the BJP to power, they are unlikely
to abandon it for extremism
6) Institutions, Ambitions, and Ideology
a) Role of leadership: “A democracy cannot function if the institutional logic of the system
is made subservient to the personal ambition or the ideological predilections fo political
leaders.”
b) India’s postcolonial leaders displayed a democratic attitudes: Ex. Nehru did not expel the
dissenters but let intraparty forums resolve the disputes, he used constitutionally
approved amendment processes, and he did not appoint state-level party chiefs leaving
them to be elected
i) His regard for democratic norms was evident in the handling language controversy in
early 50s- despite the fact that he thought there were many more important issues
unresolved (econ development) he dealt with the language issue because his party had
promised to handle it
ii) Nehru’s democratic actions provided a manageable system, and the officials elected
at the lower levels had the support of the people and had control over the state
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iii) India’s history would likely be very different if Bose, who believed in fascism and
violent Muslim repression, had been in power rather than Nehru, but luckily Nehru
was in power
iv) The democratic attitude of India’s early leaders allowed for a building up of a
democratic base, so when Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi attempted to centralize the
system, she was met with a civil society ready to fight for democracy
7) Liberal Hypocrisy?
a) Biggest threat to India is if the party system becomes ineffective and opposition forces
are unable to provide a viable option to the ruling party
i) The BJP emerged as a legit contender to Congress but its Hindu nationalism brought
religion explicitly into public life
ii) Liberal Hyprocrisy- BJP calls it “pseudosecularism”-challenged as religious
nationalism tried to make an open entry into politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s
iii) BJP has come to power in alliance with mainstream parties, the moderates within the
BJP have the upper hand, making the odds that an ideologically pure Hindu
nationalism can win are very low
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave pp. 31-108
Why?
1) Explaining Waves
a) Democratization waves and reverse are manifestations of a general phenomenon in
politics.
b) To explain waves lets say we have 6 countries: with a similar event x, democratization,
happening in each country
i) Single Cause: all six x’s have one cause in the different cause: like a major war or
other important event
ii) Parallel Development: x’s could be caused by similar developments in the same
independent variables manifesting themselves more less simultaneously in all 6
coutnries; like the achievement of a certain GDP that is suitable for democracy
iii) Snowballing: cause for x in one cougtnry may be the occurrence of x in another
country, hence x in one country is increasingly capable of triggering a comparable
event simultaneously in a different country
iv) Prevalining Nostrum: It may be that x in different countries may be a result of the
leaders choosing the same road to solve different problems, this cure-all would be the
prevailing nostrum
2) Explaining Democratization Waves
a) Democratization is the dependent variable, and a change in the dependent variable
usually requires some change in the independent variables (Protestant countries took 200
years to democratize)
b) Cumulative effect of the independent variable over time eventually produces change in
the dependent variable
c) At the the simplest levels democratization involves: the end of an authoritarian regime;
the installation of democratic regime; and the consolidation of the democratic regime
d) Most immediate and significant explanatory variable of democ: the beliefs and actions of
political elites, yet democracy can be creaqted even if people don’t want it
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e) Distinction between independent and dependt variables is clearest if they are of different
orders like when an economic variable is used to explain a political variable
f) Overdetermination- having a multiplicity of plausible theories to explain an event and the
consequent problem of establishing the relative validity of those theories- only a problem
for those evaluating theories not for those developing them
i) Each theory is likely to only have relevance to a few cases, yet these are some general
principles: no one factor is sufficient to explain all democ. 2. No single factor is
necessary to democ. 3. Democ is a result of a combination of cause, and this combo
varies across countries 4. Variable responsible for one wave usually do not cause
another wave 5. Causes of initial regime changes in a democraqtization wave are
likely to differ from those responsible for later regime changes in that wave
ii) Myron Weiner says to explain democratization: look at “strategies available to those
who seek a democratic revolution” this highlights role of leadership--- chain or funnel
of different factors contribute to the facilitation or hindrance of democ.
iii) Ec. Development, indust, urbanization, emergence of middle class etc. all played role
in democratization in northern Euro countries in the 19th century
iv) Political and military factors were clearly predominant in the 2nd Wave of
Democratization (victory of allies in WW 2)
3) Explaining The Third Wave
a) 2 Questions: 1. Why did some auth regimes go democratic and other didn’t. 2. Why did
regime changes occur in 70s and 80s.
b) Different Patterns of regime change
c) Cyclical Pattern- countries alternated back and forth between democratic and
authoritarian systems
i) Under Democracy- radicalism, and corruption reach unacceptable levels and the
military intervenes to popular acclaim to overthrow, but then the military coalition
unravels and democracy comes back
(1) The change of regimes functions like change of parties in a stable democracy
d) Second Try Pattern- auth system shifts to democracy, democracy fails, auth comes back,
but then democracy is reintroduced with success (Germany and Italy)
e) Interrupted Democracy- Democractic regimes exist but conditions force the suspension of
democratic processes (India)—in this case the experience with democracy made it
impossible for the political leaders to do away entirely with democracy
f) Direct Transition- from stable auth system to a stable democracy- this typified the
transition of the 1st wave
g) Decolonization Pattern- democratic country imposes democratic institutions on its
colonies, colony gains independence and maintains its democratic institutions (happens to
former British colonies)
h) Countries of third wave encompass all 5 of these patterns
i) By 1989 3rd wave hit new stage where it affected countries with no previous democratic
experience
j) These transitions were a result of common causes affecting many countries, by parallel
developments in several countries, and by the impact of early transitions on later onesbut this does not explain hwy the shift to democracy in these countries came in 70s and
80s
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k) “What changes in plausible independent variables in the 1960s and 70s produced the
dependent variable, democratizing regime changes in 70s and 80s.
i) Deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems in more and more
democratic world
ii) Unprecedented global economic growth of the 60s
iii) The striking changes in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church
iv) Changes in the policies of external actors (new attitude of Euro Community, U.S. and
Soviet Union)
v) Snowballing or demonstration effects
4) Declining Legitimacy and the Performance Dilemma
a) Principle ideological justification for auth in moder times has been Marxism Leninismprovides rationale for 1 party dictatorship and rule by small self-perpetuating
bureaucratic elite
b) Victory of Allies in WWII and world democratic ethos coming into being removed
arguments against democracy: “For the first time in the history of the world, no doctrines
are advanced as antidemocratic.”
i) Communists and authoritarian regimes often tried to build legitimacy by highlighting
the democratic aspects of their regimes
ii) As these externally enforced authoritarian regimes lost traditional legitimacy reasons
(nationalism, economic performances) they resorted to democracy--- as the
frustrations grew no renewal meant dissatisfaction
iii) Conversely, democracies renew themselves through elections; whereas in a personal
dictatorship, nothing short of reincarnation could suffice for renewal
iv) Some auth regimes came up with something for limited renewal; Mexico- each new
president offered new promise if only because he was different from the previous
president
v) Initial phase after the failure of democracy, auth regimes enjoyed “negative
legitimacy” but it declined, and in the 60s and 70s these regimes were forced to
justify themselves with performancy
vi) Oil price hikes of 70s and 80s helped to weaken auth regimes because it removed
econ. development as a cause for legitimacy, the subsequent mishandling of the crisis
by the auth made the situation worse: Exs.- Phillipines, Uruguay, Portugal, Greece,
and in Brazil, as in the others, the people attributed the deficiencies to the policy
failures of the government
vii) Although the Communist regimes were insulated from the oil price hikes, their poor
economic result was a result of the command econs that Soviet Union imposed, but
this economic stagnation didn’t encourage democratization in the S.U. until the S.U.
allowed it
viii) Military failure contributed to the downfall of 5 auth regimes between ’74-’89, 2
persoanl dictatorships fell because they were fighting internal insurgencies they
couldn’t win (Philippines, S.U.’s Afghan War, Greece and Argentine fell because of
conflicts provoked by military regimes
ix) When an authoritarian regime achieves its promises, it often has nothing else to
achieve, therefore the citizens become disillusioned: By achieving its purpose, it
loses its purpose (Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina)
x) When authoritarian leaders lose legitimacy they can respond in 5 ways:
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(1) Simply refuse to acknowledge their increasing weakness
(2) Regime could become more repressive
(3) Provoke foreign conflict and maintain power by appealing to nationalism
(a) But this has inherent obstacles, usually their armies are too weak to be
successful
4) Attempt to est. some semblance of democratic legitimacy for their regime
b) Early 70s, most auth claimed they would install democracy, but then they faced
problem of whether they could actually win the elections
5) Auth leaders could take lead in ending auth rule and intro democratic system, but
this almost always requires change of leadership in authoritarian system
a) Successor regime doesn’t have to be democratic
xi) Many of the former commi regimes got some form of dictatorship in 60s and 70s, but
these right wing dictatorship s stimulate growth of left-wing revolutionary movements
a) Collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe weakened it as an
alternative to other authoritarian regimes, by the 80s auth regimes were not
considered alternatives to each other, democracy became only alternative
5) Economic Development and Economic Crises
a) Econ factors have big but not determinative impact on democratization, they affected 3rd
wave countries in 3 ways
i) Oil price hikes hurt econs in auth countries weakening them
ii) Many countries had reached econ level that facilitated democracy
iii) Rapid econ growth destabilized auth regimes (no 3rd wave country escaped all three
of these factors)
b) Economic development: Industrialization resulted in a positive correlation between
wealth and democracy- Most wealthy countries are democratic and most democratic
countries are rich
c) In between rich and poor there is a political transition zone that facilitates
democratization- post WWII econ surge put many countries in this zone
i) In 70s this zone was 500-1000 range, 2/3 of democratizers were between 300 and
1,300 GDP
ii) Exceptions: 5 countries in ’76 with GNPs between 1 and 3,000 did not democratize
by ’90- Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia
iii) This transition zone was used in a study by Mitchell Seligson arguing that in Latin
America a GNp of $250 and 50 % literacy meant democracy
iv) The viability of an auth regime appears to be afunction more of the nature of its
society than of the nature of the regime
v) Economic Findings: Wealth from oil does not promote democracy because these
revenues accrue to the state increasing their revenue and reducing the need for
taxation, and hence reducing need for representation
vi) While, econ development from industrialization results in a complex econ that an
auth regime can’t handle
vii) Level of econ well-being in society, sometimes shapes “the values and attitudes of
citizens”. Also econ development increases levels of education in society.
(1) Econ. Development increases resources to distribute amon social groups and
hence facilitates accommodation and compromise
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(2) Econ. Development in 60s and 70s promoted the opening of societies to foreign
trade, and communication, and finally econ dev promotes the expansion of the
middle class, this is significant because in every country the biggest democracy
supporters are the urban middle class; Ex.- in Spain econ dev. Had created “a
nation of the modern middle classes” leading to the peaceful process of bringing
political system in line with society
(a) In China, where urban middle class is smaller or weaker, democratization was
unsuccessful or unstable
d) Rapid Economic Growth in some countries generated dissatisfaction with the existing
authoritarian government because it raises expectations, exacerbates inequalities, and
creates stresses and strains in the social fabric that stimulate political mobilization and
demands for political participation
i) This happened in Spain and resulted in skilled and committed leadership bringing
democratization about relatively quickly and smoothly
ii) In Taiwan and South Korea, where growth rates were among the highest in the world,
the societies were transformed economically and socially
iii) Rapid Econ growth created challenges for auth leaders but did not necessarily lead
them to democracy
e) Summary: Long-term- econ dev lays groundwork for democracy, short-term- rapid
growth can undermine auth regimes
i) 3rd Wave- Combination of high levels of econ dev and short term econ crisis or
failure was the econ formula most favorable to democratic government
6) Religious Changes
a) 2 religious developments promoted democratization in 70s and 80s: There is a strong
correlation between Western Christianity and democracy, as of 1988 Catholicism and
Protestantism were religious in 39/46 democratic countries- plausible to say the
expansion of Christianity meant expansion of democracy
i) Christianity in 60s and 70s expanded in South Korea among the young, urban, and
middle class, in 1974 five bishops led 5,000 Roman Catholics in 1st major
demonstration vs Pres Park’s martial law regime- result of the surer doctrinal and
institutional bsis for opposing political repression that Christianity provided
ii) Korea reversed Weber- econ development promoted Christianity, and these was cause
of democracy
b) 2nd Far reaching change in religious Doctrine- occurred in doctrine, leadership, popular
involvement and political alignment of Roman Catholic Church
i) Before this, Protestantism=Democracy and Catholicism=NO Democracy, 3 reasons
for this
(1) Protestants stress on individual conscience
(2) Cath emphasis on imtermediary role of priesthood epitomized in Latin mass
(3) Prot churches were dem organized where Cath was an auth organization
ii) 3rd Wave of Democratization was predominantly a Catholic one, the most Cath
region, Latin America was the region that democratized most- ¾ of 3rd wave
countries were catholic, but this could just be a result of the fact that most Protestant
countries were already Democracies
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iii) But the main reason was the change in the Catholic Church, after the mid 60s the
Catholic Church began to oppose authoritarian regimes and became a force for
democratic change
iv) Changes in church at 2 levels: 1. Global Level by Pope John XXIII with his 2nd
Vatican Council, which stressed the legitimacy and need for social change, helping
the poor, and the rights of individuals
(1) New streams of grassroots mobilization combined with Vatican 2 changes created
a new church that almost invariably came into opposition to authoritarian
governments
(2) In non-communist countries, the relations between the Church an authoritarian
governemtns tended to move in 3 phases: acceptance, ambivalence, and
opposition
(a) Socialist or “red” strand of Catholic activists preached social justice in a
“liberation theology”, while a moderate strand of Catholics “yellow”
emphasized human rights and democracy
(b) The breaking point between the church and auth regimes came when the
national bishops conference or a top church leader explicitly palce Church in
opposition to regime- this pronouncement was always met with intensified
attacks by regime on different aspects of the Catholic Church creating
martyrs- result was political, economic and ideological warfare between
church and state
(c) The Church brought buildings for support, radio stations, newspapers, and
periodicals articulating the opposition cause as part of the resources they
provided
(d) Sometimes the Vatican influence could even be brought to bear- John Paul II
moved the Vatican to central stage in fight vs. auth, he defined the church as
the defended of freedom
(e) John Paul’s visits always effected the political situation, his greatest impact
being in Poland in 1979 where he convinced the people that if they ceased to
fear the system, the system was helpless, this was the beginning of the end of
Communism in Eastern Europe- this was the beginning of the “gentle crowd
vs. the Party-State”
(f) Church leaders at times would intervene at critical political moments in
democratization process
(i) Most important role played by catholic official in democratization was
Cardinal Sin in the Philippines where he combined to opposition groups
into one party and then mobilized voters for them
g) Catholicism was second only to economic development as a pervasive force
making for democratization in the 1970s and 1980s
7) New policies of External Actors
a) Democratization in a country may be influenced, perhaps decisively, by the actions of
governments and institutions external to that country
b) External actors can be thought of as hastening or retarding the effects of economic and
social development on democratization, in 80s these actors were the Vatican, the
European Community, the U.S., and the Soviet Union promoting liberalization and
democratization
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i) Jonathan Sunshine argues: Before 1830, anti-democ attitude in Europe led to no
democracy; 1830-1930, the neutral attitude allowed for some to become democracies;
Post WWII- Communism stopped democ in Easter Europe and many former colonies
were left with anti-dem conditions
c) European Institutions: European Community membership provoked a lot of countries to
democratize because it was a requirement: Greece, Spain, and Portugal
i) Membership was essential to economic develop, therefore democracy was a
requirement for economic development
ii) 3rd Wave coincided with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), the Helsinki Final Act- 3 elements of this process affected the development
of human rights and democracy in Eastern Europe
(1) Initial and subsequent conferences adopted documents giving international
legitimacy to human rights and freedoms, and this Final Act, set forth “respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief.”
(2) Helsinki Final Act provided U.S. and Western Europe nations with the
opportunity to press the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on their
Helsinki commitments and to call attention to and demand correction of particular
violations of those commitments
(3) Helsinki invlced creation within countries of commissions or watch groups to
monitor compliance with the agreement, these commsions were persecuted by
host countries but they still constituted domestic lobbies for liberalization
iii) Helsinki became an incentive and a weapon for reformers to use in attempting to open
up their societies
d) The United States: American policy toward human rights and democracy in other
countries began to change in the early 70s and evolved in 4 phases from ’73-’89, prior to
this in the 60s the government was preoccupied with Vietnam but in 1974 the U.S. urged
the promotion of human rights as a major foreign policy goal
i) This led them to amend the International Financial Institutions Act, that provided that
no assistance could be given to countires guilty of gross violations of human rights
ii) Second phase of U.S. policy came with Carter in ’77 because he mde human rights a
mojor theme in his election campaign and was a big aspect of his foreign policy
(1) Reagan criticized Cartter because he said he focused on individuals and not the
government systems causing the violations, Reagan downplayed human rights
violations in auth regimes and emphasized need to fight Communism
(2) ’83, 84 U.S. policy entered 4th phase with Reagan moving actively to promote
democratic change in commi and noncommi regimes
iii) In the 3rd Wave the U.S. used a variety of means to promote democracy
(1) Statements by presidents, secretaries of state and other leaders endorsing
democratization in general and in particular countries
(2) Economic pressures and sanctions
(3) Diplomatic Action
(4) Material Support for democratic forces
(5) Military Action
(6) Multilateral Diplomacy
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(a) Most significant affect of actions: make human rights and democracy major
issues in international relations
(b) America’s role in some countries was direct and influential, American
ambassadors at times promoted agreement among opposition groups and
served as mediators between those groups and the authoritarian governments
(c) Basically, under Carter, Reagan, and Bush, the U.S. would not allow the
overthrow of democratic governments in its area
iv) 2 relevant measures of U.S. impact on democratization
(1) Judgements of those whom the policies were designed to benefit (Latin American
democratic processes)
(2) Comes from those who wanted to maintain dictatorship- During Carter and
Reagan, leaders of auth regimes complained bitterly of American “interference”
in their domestic policies
v) Most controversial effect of U.S. on democratization: Passage by Congress over
Reagan’s veto of the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 imposing sanctions
on South Africa
vi) What is certain is that the absence of the U.S. from the third wave would have meant
fewer and later transitions to democracy (Peru, Ecuador, Panama)
e) The Soviet Union: Democratization in late 80s of Eastern Europe was result of changes
in Soviet policy
i) President Gorbachev conveyed to Eastern Euro governments that the Soviet
government would not act to maintain the existing communist dictatorship and
instead favored economic liberalization and political reform- this opened the door for
the selection of officals through competitive elections and helped the move towards
market-oriented economies
f) Gorbachev, John Paul II, Reagan, and Carteer were major promoters of democratic
change in the late 20th century
8) Demonstration Effects or Snowballing
a) This was a fifth factor of 3rd Wave (also known as diffusion, emulation, and domino
effect)- democracy in one country encourages democratization in other countries
b) These effects demonstrated several things
i) Demonstrated to leaders and groups in one society the ability of leaders and groups in
another society to bring about end of authoritarian system and to install democracy
ii) Showed how it could be done
iii) Later democratizers also learned about the dangers to abe avoided and difficulties to
be overcome
c) General Role of Demonstration Effects in the 3rd Wave can be summed up in 3
propositions
i) More important in 3rd wave then they were in first because of the tremendous
expansion of global communication and transportation after WWII (helped along by
communication satellites in the 70s)- by mid 80s a worldwide democratic revolution
became a reality in many minds
ii) Demonstration effects were strongest among countries that were geographically
proximate and culturally similar
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(1) Ex.- Spanish democratization was immensely relevant to and influential to Latin
America, the transitions in Spain and Portugal demonstrated that Iberian cultures
were not ingerently and immutably antidemocratic
(2) Most dramatic snowballing occurredin Eastern Europe because was once Soviet
Union collapsed democ swept through to Hungary, then East Germany, Czech
and Bulgaria, then Romania
(3) Democratization of some countries aroused pride of neighbors pushing them to
try to democratized quicker
iii) Another important aspect of snowballing is that the change over time in the relative
importance of the causes of a democratization wave (made evident by East Euro and
East Asian democratization)
(1) Snowballing cannot, obviously, affect the first democratization, but once these
demonstration effects occur, they help stimulate demands for comparable changes
in neighboring and culturally similar countries
(2) As snowballing went on, it became a sub for the absence of economic and social
conditions, this was evident in that snowballing sped up democratization in
subsequent countries, In Poland it took 10 years, in Hungary it took ten months
and in East Germany it took 10 weeks
(3) But snowballs rolling downhill, while they accelerate and grow, they melt in
unsympathetic environments
(a) It melted in China and Romania- melted in China because of lack of
bourgeoisie and it had no previous democratic experience
9) From Causes to Causers
a) Factors that led to breakdown or weakening of auth regimes in 70s and 80s: prevalence
of dem norms globally; absence of ideology-based legitimacy in auth regimes; military
defeats; economic problems and failures stemming from OPEC oil shocks (for full
summary of causes of 3rd wave see 106-107)
b) Significance of causes varied across regions and regimes, and over time
i) Military defeat, economic development, and oil shocks were prominent causes of
earlier democratization
ii) While External actors, snowballing were significant later
c) General factors make conditions favorable to democracy but do not make it necessary
i) Democratic regimes are installed by people not trends, created by causers not causes,
political leaders and publics have to act
ii) In many cases, democracy may not be the outcome leaders desire most but it may be
the outcome that is least unacceptable
d) In the 3rd Wave, the conditions for creating democracy had to exist, but only political
leaders willing to take the risk of democracy made it happen
Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to
Putin pp. 309-337
1) The Quality of Russian Democracy
a) The end of Communist Rule does not necessarily mean democracy, like Russia was stuck
in between because of the type of transition it underwent
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b) Things that enhance deomocracy also promote its stability, but Russia’s political system
shows signs of persistence without progress to liberal consolidation
c) Many Russian institutions lack liberal qualities
2) Superpresidentialism
a) Russia’s President is often compared with a dictator or a monarchy
b) The system is a delgative democracy- “whoever wins election to the presidency is
thereby entitlesd to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by facts of existing
power relations and by constitutionally limited term of office
i) A vigorous president like Putin can use the enhanced powers to pursue antidemocratic
institutions
ii) This powerful presidency is a result of the type of transition
(1) Push to create powerful Russian Pres was response to concrete political situation
and not result of plotted strategy about need for separation of pwers or check and
balance, in fact the referendum on the presidency had went ahead before the
powers had been delineated
(2) When Yeltsin became first pres the powers were still vague, and he used the 91
coup to get more power, assuming responsibility for all major institutional
innovations and policy initiatives
(3) Polarizatoin between pres and congress grew as the question of who was more
powerful came up, and it produced armed conflict, and Yeltsin’s ’93 victory put
into place superpresidentialism- the acceptance of this by other political parties
(evident in the fact that they participated in elections) helped to legitimate
president
(4) 1993 constitution makes amendment extremely difficult
3) Party System
a) Parties in Russia only play minimal role in interest intermediation between state and
society
b) Propotional representation side of mixed electoral system helped stimulate development
of interest-based, ideological parties within the Duma- led to 4 national parties- all
participated in elctions of 90s, all have well defined political orientations, ¾ have won
approximately same % of vote year in and year out
c) Parties demonstrated little influence in politics outside Duma, yet it had no power over
executives, and a state-based informal network dominated by local ruling elites
dominated politics
d) Even their role in Duma has been threatened, and if they lose this position, they will have
serious difficulties in expanding into any other aspect of Russian society
e) Parties are week because the Communist Party made people hate parties, and the
oraganizations that did develop under communism are a barrier to grassroots party
development because they control people, atomize society, and discourage participation
in real politics
f) Another impediment to parties is that the cleavages present in society are fashioned by
opinions on the type of transition rather that by particular economic or ethnic concerns,
but party Identification has grown
g) Also the Presidential system is less conducive to party development then is a
parliamentary system
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h) Decisions made about the timing and sequence of elections during Gorbachev perios and
First Russian Republic stymied party development
i) Since elections were not held right after the end of the Soviet Union, parties were left
to hang around for 2 years with no political role
ii) Yeltsin assured presidential and parliamentary votes did not occur simultaneously,
also prohibiting party development
rd
i) 3 Trasitional factor hurting party system- organization of Russia’s new “economic
society”
i) Yeltsin’s econ reforms created oligarchic capitalism with wealth concentrated in only
a few sectors, capital is closely tied to state--- this meant interest articulation was
handled by big business not parties and the oligarchs preferred to work with
individuals rather than parties
ii) This created a difficult environment for market entry and hurt start up companies and
small businesses which usually are the backbone and supporters of parties
j) Summary: Party system in Russia, stimulated by proportional component of
parliamentary system is fragmented, Moscow-centric, and peripheral to org and
articulation of interests in Russia’s political system
4) Civil Society
a) Other mass-based groups have not filled vacuumof representation left by Russia’s weak
parties
i) Only 9 % of Russian citizens are in nongov organizations, hence civic groups are
disinterested in and disconnected from the state, seeking instead to pursue narrow
agendas in private sphere
ii) This is the fault of the Commis because they had seeked to destroy all independent
associational life, so civil society had to be rebuilt from scratch
iii) Difficulties of adapting to a new econ system further dampen enthusiasm and limit
financial support for civic orgs
b) Factors unique to Russia’s transition hurt civil society
i) Sustained econ depression
ii) New market-embedded society has not consolidated to support market-embedded
social orgs
iii) Middle class (supporters of civil society) emerged slowly
(1) Foreign funding is temporary solution, but then the civic orgs cater to foreigners
rather than citizens
iv) Suspension of party development from 91-93, served to keep civic groups out of
state politics, political parties saw no electoral benefit from catering to small and
ineffective civic groups
(1) Civic groups are more effective working with Parliaments then with Pres’s
v) Lack of civic groups has allowed state to rule unchecked by societal constraints, and
this lack of state accountability has diminished population’s faith in democracy and
impedes development of democractic culture
5) The Press
a) Russia developed independent media in 90s because of policies pursued by Gorbachev
and Yeltsin
b) Market reforms initially helped to stimulate further growth of independent media,
including first and foremost TV
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c) Over time, media has become less independent and oligarchs gained control of most
major media sources (state is still largest owner)
d) Putin has done much to silence media, and this continued role of state in owning and
managing news sources has diminished their independence
6) The State
a) State is shell of its Soviet predecessor, Moscow’s decisions have little effect elsewhere
i) Mafias, security firms, and private armies have assumed responsibilities for giving
security, challenging state’s monopoly on use of force
ii) Instead state agencies are often use to serve self-interests of those running them
iii) They have done little to reconstucture welfare, they spend a lot by Western Euro
standards, but the neediest in society have not been helped
iv) Polarization at top allows lower level authorities to pursue personal interests, when
the state did come to consensus, it had little capacity left to enforce it
v) Under Putin, state has taken back power from oligarchs, but he has not used this
power to advance democracy
7) Rule of Law
a) Absence of independent judiciary and weak adherence to rule of law constitute additional
barriers to liberal democracy in Russia
b) An independent court has widespread support initially, and a Russian Constitutional
Court in 1991 was created- it ruled on all sorts of issues without the executive power to
enforce their decisions, their decisions meant little
i) Low funding for courts meant corruption
ii) Clash by Constitutional Court and Supreme Court over jurisdiction has allowed lower
courts to ignore federal decisions
iii) Rule of Law became weaker in criminal and civil matters because courts and polic
have fewer resources to devote to law enforcement
(1) Result: feeling of lawlessness has frightened Russians into calling for more
authoritarian action from state
8) Decentralization
a) Lack in clarity of powers of national and subnational governments ahs been barrier to
liberal democracy- federalism has not been institutionalized
b) It is difficult to create a truly federal state from the ruins of a unitary state, the trick is
getting the subnational governments to pay for benefits they already enjoy
c) Ethnic-based republics of Soviet Republic is another barrier to federal development
d) Nature of transition accentuated federal dilemmas
i) By framing struggle against Soviets about sovereignty, Yeltsin threatened to
undermine the territorial integrity of his new state so he could build bigger domestic
coalition
ii) 1993 constitution- permitted practices of asymmetric federalism to continue by
including an article permitting cental government to enter into bilateral agreements
with individual regions
iii) Balance of power between center and republics has remained in flux, and as long as
center remains weak, Moscow will not have an inerest in codifying transparent rules,
because this would encourage regional defiance and therefore expose weakness of
middle
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iv) Even though a stronger center is needed, Putin’s move to recentralize could be bad
for democracy depending on the measures he uses
9) Attitudinal Indicators of Democratic Fragility in Russia
a) Difficult transition helped to undermine support for democratic ideas and norms within
society
b) Majority of Russians clearly support general ideals of democracy, and support democratic
institutions and values (survey results on 331-332)
c) # of people who prefer communist system to new political and economic order has
increased over time, ’98 survey- 72 % approval for pre-Gorbachev regime, 35 % had
positive inclinations toward current regime, 99and 2000 surveys show nostalgia for old
order
d) Scholars argue that citizens must venerate and be willing to fight for democracy for it to
be sustained (democracy not yet venerated in Russia)
i) Poll data suggest that popular resistance would be unlikely should an authoritarian
coalition reemerge within Russia- transitional factors caused this decline in support
for democracy
ii) Failure of economy is big reason for dissatisfaction with current regime
iii) By calling themselves democrats and tehn acting undemocratically, Russia’s
postcommunist leaders have done much to discredit democracy
iv) Biggest Mistake- Yeltsin’s decision to invade Chechnya without popular support
10) Russia’s Flawed Democracy: Transitional or Permanent Scars?
a) Russian system lacks many qualities of liberal democracies, it could be stuck as partial
democracy for a long time
i) Elections to important offices have become less competitive, but illiberal properties
of Russia’s current political system are not unchangeable
ii) Every party has interest in strengthening Parliament
iii) Regional executives, big business, Russia’s oligarchs have interest in weakening
President, but the one powerful actor in favor of a strong pres is the president himself
and with how hard it is to make an amendment, this is a big deal
iv) In long run, party development has more promising future than weakening the
executive
(1) Trajectory appears to be in direction of consolidation not fragmentation
b) As capitalism develops, civic society has hope of expanding and the repetition of
elections will help teach civic groups importance of mobilization and participation
i) Capitalism will create incentives for the development of rule of law
ii) New leadership at top, further weakening of oligarchs, and econ growth are just 3
exogenous shocks that could occur to redress state’s current weakeness
iii) Russia has socioeconomic profile that could sustain democracy for long run
c) While Russia’s illiberal democracy could go on for years, at the same time the illiberal
features do not appear to be permanent features of Russia’s democracy
d) Balance of power suggests that a struggle for liberal democracy in Russia will be even
more protracted than the struggle for electoral democracy
Elections without Democracy
The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way
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I. The post-cold war created hybrid political regimes: regimes with democratic rules with authoritarian
governance
-People have said that they are not democracies, that these hybrid governments were incomplete
governments. But these Mod Theorists had overly optimistic definitions of democracy. They have to
stop thinking that all governments are in a “transitional stage” towards democracy.
-These optimists have labeled such regimes as “semidem, virtual dems, electoral dems, pseudodems,
illiberal dems, semi-authoritarianism, soft auth, electoral auth”
1. but these studies all had democratizing biases, hence the derogatory labels. They also assume
that these regimes are transitioning towards democracy
2. labels are used as residual categories and glosses, they fail to highlight the differences
between nondem regimes; they obscure the crucial differences
II. Defining Competitive Authoritarianism
-Type of hybrid regime: comp auth. In these regimes democratic institutions are used as the principal
means of obtaining and exercising political authority. But, they violate democratic rules and therefore fail
to meet the minimum standards for democracy.
-Many have charatersed these are “diminished” forms of dem but we should really describe them as
“diminished” forms of authoritarianism.
-Definitions: Modern democratic regimes meet all 4 min reqs:
1. Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free and fair
2. Virtually all adults can vote
3. Political right and civil liberties (freedom of press/associate/opp) are broadly projected
4. elected authorities have the real authority to govern
-In comp auths regimes, they violate these 4 enough to create an uneven playing field btwn gov and
opposition
-Competitive authoritarianism also needs to be differentiated from full out auth. Unlike full out auth, they
are more discrete about violating democratic rules, they use more subtle forms of corruption
-They are also different from “façade” electoral regimes where there is no real contestation for power
III. 4 areas of Contestation
-Contestation is made possible in comp auths because of the dem institutions in place
1.
Electoral arena (elections are regularly held, competitive, opp parties participate,
elections are bitterly fought) fraud is limited in this area due to the presence of
international observers.
2.
The legislative arena (in comp auths, the legislature is pretty weak and vulnerable to
moments of opp, there is a lack of strong majority parties behind the incumbents.
3.
The judicial arena (contestation in the judiciary, in comp auth regimes routinely
attempt to subordinate the judiciary via impeachment, bribery, extortion, but the
combo of formal judicial independence (through dem institutions) and incomplete
control by the executive can give maverick judges an opening).
-The court can protect civil liberties and state opposition from persecution.
-the incumbents could just punish the judges that protect opposition, but they would
risk their international democratic “legitimacy” (lipset’s idea)
4.
The Media (the media are often a central point of contention in comp auth regimes;
independent media outlets are legal and influential) the contestation in the media is
allowed through the dem institution of protecting civil liberties.
-You do see subtle media suppression but again, the efforts to repress could be costly to
the regime; they could receive world and domestic criticism, which would lead to protests
etc.
IV. Inherent Tensions
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-Authoritarian govs may coexists indefinitely with meaningful dem instuations as long as the incumbents
avoid public showings of corruption (stealing elections etc). Govs can limit opp challenges to limit
protest or international repudiation.
-but these hybrid regimes are inherently instable. There has to be a balance between the power of the
incumbents and the repression of the opposition. If they repress too much they will be put down by the
world, and if they don’t do it enough, they will lose power if they let dem challenges run their course.
-Succession is not democratization, the removal of autocratic elites creates an important opp for regime
change and even democratization, it does not ensure such an outcome
-Proximity to the West may have had a hand in shaping the paths of competitive authoritarianism of the
1990’s. The closeness to the W had a hand in making the auths comp auths, but where the W was farther,
weak comp auths became full out auths.
V. Paths to Completive Authoritarianism
-3 different regimes paths to comp auth
1. Full out authoritarianism
2. collapse of auth regimes
3. *decay of dem regime
*a lot of transitions of the latter took place in countries with high levels of poverty, inequality, and
illiteracy, weak states and civil societies
-After the cold war, prospects for full out democratization remained but many of the countries were
developing democratic institutions that they saw favorable
-Comp Auths needed to be on good terms w/ the West because they needed economic and military aid
-Full out auths can’t have any opposition (domestic or foreign)
-Some auths have advantages that reduce foreign opposition:
1. oil and the 2. western want for the triumph of democracy
V. Conceptualizing Nondems
1. Thomas Carothers said that Mod Theorists are too optimistic and need to get over the “transition
paradigm”. Many auths of survived the “3rd wave” of democratization (hunington, levitsky believes he
was too optimistc)
2. the post cold war has created a new set of advantages and disadv
The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East
Exceptionalism in comparative Perspective
Eva Bellin (2004)
Why have the Middle East and North Africa remained so resistant to democratization?
-# of electoral democracies in this region has declined, there is stagnation in terms of political
rights and civil liberties; the countries have failed to catch the wave of democratization that has
swept nearly every other part of the world
Explanations suggest
1. Regional Failures:
Weak civil society, ineffective champion of democracy, bad labor unions, corrupt business, no
nongov groups with grounding = all this together doesn’t allow for strong opposition or
participation to stunt civil culture
2. Economy is in the state’s hands
3. Poor people/illiterate people/ inequality, There is no commitment to democracy: the masses
don’t fight for it and the elites are threatened by it. “The champions of dem are few and far.”
4. Geographically, they are remote from the epicenter of democracy
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5. Culture (Islam) makes region different, Islam is inhospitable to democracy
Prerequisites: A Useful Approach?
-Democratization has no single variable that will ever prove to be universally necessary or
sufficient for it. Cumulative failure to achieve the prereqs of dem clearly undermine the
consolidation of dem.
****Main question: Why have the vast majority of Middle eastern and North African states
failed to initiate transition at all? Herein lies the exceptionalism of the region.
Insights from Studies of Revolution: Bellin Refers to the classic work on revolution written by
Theda Skocpol. “the puzzling thin about rev is that although te intuitive prereq for rev (mass
disaffection from the regime in power) is a relatively common phenomenon in human
experience, successful revolution is a relatively rare event. What explains this divergence btwn
cause and outcome? Skocpol argued that the answer lies in the strength of the state and most
important, the state’s CAPACITY to maintain a monopoly on the means of COERCION.
-Bellin applies this to the idea of democratization. She titles this coercion as The Robust
Coercive Apparatus (RCAp) of the state. She believes that the CAPACITY and the
WILLINGNESS of a RCAp can crush democratic transition. Dem transition can be carried out
successfully only when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. The
will an the capacity of the state’s RCAp to suppress dem initiative have extinguished the
possibility of transition. Herein lies the region’s true exceptionalism.
-Patrimonial linkages between the regime and coercive apparatus further enmesh the two
-Authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East
Robustness of the Coercive Apparatus
What shapes the robustness of a regime’s coercive app? Under wat conditions will it lose its
capacity and will to hold on to power and permit society to experiment with democratization?
1. RCAp would give up in will with a decrease in economic health. When the military decreases,
if the military is weak, then it will weaken the RCAp and give chance for a transition
2. RCAp depends on international support networks. There would be a loss of will and capacity
to stop the transition when its lost fiscal support.
3. An increase in institutionalism would cause a decrease in RCAp and a decrease in will and
capacity. They are inversely related. The more institutionalized the security establishment is the
more willing it will be to disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed.
-Bellin refers to some of Weber’s ideas in saying that with institutions, promotion is
based on performance not politics are cronyism vs the patrimonialism (inherited power) that
helps authority.
-Institutionalism will have more tolerance for reform and a commitment to a broader
national mission.
-When the RCAp has institutionalized, it allows for a democratizing transition possible
because the incumbents have acted positively in the nation but seeing over industrialization and
so they are more confident to enter a electoral system, because they feel that they can have a hold
on power.
4. The coercive apparatus’s capacity and will to hold on to power is shaped by the degree of
which it faces a high level of popular mobilization. The level of popular mobilization it faces.
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Suppressing a lot of people could be costly and could jeopardize the legitimacy (lipset idea) of
the government in the world and at home.
The way these RCAps are sustained is through rentier income. But the states pay for themselves
1st. They fund the military and security forces before anything else. These RCApsa re in unique
positions for international support because of their
1. oil
2. the islamist threat, they are seen as buffers
Both of these concerns have provided a compelling rationale to western policy makers to persist
providing patronage to many authoritarian states I n the region. As Roosevelt said about
Somoza, “They may be sons of bitches but a least they are our sons of bitches”
-The W has befriended the auths in the Middle east in hopes of them contain the Islamist threat
and keeping up oil supply to them.
-The auths are playing on the W’s security concerns.
Also, popular mobilization on behalf of political reform remains weak. The costs of repression
are low in the Middle East and so there isn’t really a chance for transition through that venue.
The low level of popular mobilization could also be due to the levels of social prereqs. 
1. political liberalization experiments usually came from colonial domination
2. no prior dem experience, no institutional foundations for popular mobilization
3. Alternatives to lib dem
4. nondemocratic Islamist threat would decrease dem activist and secularism
=low levels of popular mobilization for dem reform in the region
5. The Arab Israeli conflict is a credible threat that gives the RCAp more power.
Without effective state institutions, removal of an oppressive coercive apparatus will lead not to
democracy but to chaos.
To anchor democracy you need:
1. impartial state institutions
2. groups past ethnic lines
3. unite people around economic and culture interests.
An “Arab” More than “Muslim” Electoral Gap
Alfred Stepan with Graeme Robertson
This article takes away this idea of Islam being inhibitive to a electoral competitive. It says that
the Arab-Muslim nations (in comparison to non-arab muslim nations) underachieve in GDP and
in electoral competition.
-Arab countries underachieve, non-Arab countries overachieve in terms of GDP levels
-Areas of Comparison in this article:
1. 1st stage: Arab vs non Arab nations AND muslim vs non muslim nations
=to compare electoral competitiveness
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2. 2nd stage: which of the world’s muslim majority states meets a set of basic criteria for
“electoral comp”
3. 3rd stage: highlight 5 major theoretical and political implications that result in the 1st 2
stages
Definition of electoral comp (what Stepan considers a central factor of democracy):
1. govt sprang from reasonably fair elections
2. elected gov able to fill the most important political offices
TWO ways of ranking countries in electoral competivness:
1. the Polity IV way: -10(strongly autocratic) to + 10 scale(strongly democratic), +4 or higher are
considered “electorally competitive
2. the Freedom House way: 7 point scale of political rights, (1 is the highest, 7 is the lowest) 3 or
better signals that a country is “electorally competiive”
-Non arab nations had 1/3 considered electorally competitive (nations in this category were
considered elec comp for 3-5 year periods)
-of the arab nations, only Lebanon considered elec comp but this was only for 3 years.
-Non arab nations together experienced 97/697 country years of electoral comp but Arab nations
only experienced 3/343 country years of electoral comp
Counterargument: all this could be economically related!
Stepan’s response: “How then do Arab and nonArab muslim majority countries compare when
one controls for GDP?”
(this will be measured in under/over achieving)
-31% of Non-Arab muslim countries (9 countires) have years of political rights and 7/9 of them
are overachievers. More over, 5 of these 9 have less than $1500/capita income
-7 Arab muslim nations (44%) exceed the $5500 GDPpc level but never have achieved
significant political rights. These states are electoral “underachievers”
-While 31$ of the nonArab coutnires with Muslim majorities are electoral “overachievers” not a
single one of the Arab Muslim-majority states is.
=No comparative Muslim gap when it comes to political rights
In the 16 Arab Muslim majority countries, there is strong prima facie evidence that in NONE of
these countries were the most politically powerful positions filled by a government that had
achieved office through a reasonably free and fair vote
We divide these 16 into 3 categories:
1. completely autocratic states
2. *liberalizing but not yet democratizing
3. once showed democratic opening but now have fallen away from becoming electorally
competitive
4. Those that are not now “electorally competitive” but at one time did use free and fair
elections to fill the most politically powerful offices in the state (Lebanon, Jordan,
Yemen)
*This second category has generated excitement and optimism among democrats about the
possibility of political liberalization, as elections have begun to play some role in these countries.
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All this adds up to the authors point that:  We can’t entirely blame Islam for the electoral Gap
in Muslim nations. Islam by itself can not explain the exceptionally low performance.
-Infact that are Koranic ideas that are supportive/beneficial towards democracy:
1. there shall be no coercion/force in matters of religion
2. Shura (consultation)
3. Jihad (independent reasoning
4. Ijma (consensus)
Ideas on Fragmentation: one of the oldest hypotheses in social science (john stuart mill) is that
high levels of ethnolinguistic fragmentation are bad for democracy and “electoral comp”
The Muslim World is split into 3
1. Non Arab electorally competitive
2. Non Arab electorally NONcomp
3. Arab countries (non of which are electorally comp)
Counterargument to ideas on fragmentation: the non arab countries that are electorally
competitive began as politically independent countries with the highest levels of ethnolinguistc
fragmentation of the tree groups and the non competitive arab countries began with the lowest
levels of ethnolinguistic fragmentation
Stepan asks: Maybe it is time to address a new question: What explains the Arab electoral
deficit.
-Look to the political not just the cultural differences of the middle east
-many contemp arab states have relatively new and arbitrary boundies because they were cut out
of the otto emp and were later made into euro colonies. The weakness of their nation state
political Ids have been compounded by the widespread use t throughout the middle east and
north Africa of Arabic as the dominant language. Anyone passingly familiar with the region will
note how commonly used the phrase “the arab nation” (watan) is used
-Also, arab nations’ proximity to Israel is key for leaders of these authoritarian arab states
because the Arab Israeli conflict gives them and their nation Identity.
-These arab nations have stayed in their Authoritarianism and possibly been kept in their
electoral defecit because there is no international need for them to change. For ex. The US
supports these authoritarian nations and leaders by giving $ to the Arab regime to buy peace
from them towards the Arab Israel conflict.
-The Israeli –Arab conflict needs to be solved 1st before they can become electorally competitive.
Democracy Derailed in Russia
The Failure of Open Politics
M. Steven Fish
2005
I. Intro:
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A.This article asks the question: Why didn’t Russia advance to democracy. It was close to
democracy, it had free politics, but it didn’t go to full out democracy. It also didn’t go to full out
authoritarianism either. But w/ putin’s election, experimentation closed
-Russia’s changes after the fall of communism couldn’t be dictated because Russia had the eco,
bureu and military and cultural resources to make its own choices.
-Russia’s the big “independent” case in the postcommunism world, it chartered its own course
-Russia is the core power of the post communist area and its politics affect all other countries in
the region.
-It is one of the world’s 2 great nuclear powers and one of the its top 3 producers of oil and
natural gas
B. This book differs in focus from other studies on postcomm Russia
1. The phenomenon Fish intends to explain is the failure to democratize.
2. Fish does not find that cultural or historical factors provide compelling explanations for the
failure of dem; nor does he think that the ec development is decisive. Fish holds that a deficit
rather of ec liberalization has undermined democratization.
-he also believes that Russia’s endowment of natural resource has inhibited
democratization and he further argues that the choice of a particular institution has compromised
democracy ( week legislature and powerful prez)
C. Failure of Russia’s cvil society attributed to 3 factors:
1. the sequencing of political reforms; the timing of the first comp elections and the decision to
hold elations before political parties were legalized; the electoral openings were too sudden and
too partial; the timing of the reforms encouraged a highly individualistic from of political
entrepreneurship that was very unorganized
2.The character of state agencies: these institutions retained their coercive potential but lost their
capacities to make things happen.
3. State monopoly on Property, production, distribute and employment; people wanted to
therefore express their interests outside the government privately.
-Development of societal organizations dimmed democracy’s prospects (this is different
from previous authors we’ve read that have said that groups etc have allowed for greater
democracy)
II. Systems of the Failure of Democracy
Fish now tracks Russia’s Democracy through its failure to meet all but one of Dahls 7 criterion
points:
1. Control over government is constitutionally vested in elected officials: meets 1st of dahl’s
points
2. The regularity of fraud and coercion in elections prevents Russia from fulfilling Dahl’s 2nd and
3rd
3. Dhal’s 4th point is not in full practice either; a lot of adults find themselves barred from
seeking office
4. The communicative and associational rights that dahls talks of in the 5th 6th and 7th conditions
are sharply circumscribed by Russia.
III. Electoral Fraud
1. In Russia observers don’t need to rely entirely on deduction to assess the extent of fraud; there
is just enough media coverage and other investigation to make induction based on actual
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observation possible (precincts and media report along the way in the election process, there is a
checks and balances)
2. In general international observes of Russia’s post-Sov elections have routinely noted
violations, including serious ones, but then concluded that he elections nevertheless advanced
Russia Dem
3. The OSCE (organization for security and cooperation in Europe) is the largest and most
influential organization that monitors elections in Russia.
4. But, if the OSCE does not declare the eletions valid, it would have to admit that it failed ot
deter fraud, and this would be bad cause the OSCE is al arge authoritative body whose very
presence is supposed to minimize the risk of falsification; so OSCE is unlikely to declare
something invalid because they don’t wanna be at fault. Interantioanl organizations cannot help
but fear the consequences of issuing a fialing grade to the elction process. TO deny elections a
passing grade would be to admit that democratization has failed. OSCE doesn’t favor such
prospects.
IV. Does Falsification Really matter?
-People might assume that there is so much falsification that all the fraud might even out BUT..
-not only does pluralism not neutralize falsification but it also leaves the stain of falsification (ex.
Putin pry didn’t need fraud to win the election but the fraud stained his win)
V. Election-Related Coercion
-A 2nd problem that violates Dahls requirement for meaningful elections and open politics and
election-related coercion is: The Rife in Russia
1. Some forms of coercion are “soft” and don’t involve violence (economic threats, anonymous
fone calls, threats against children, letters being delivered…sketchy shit)
-this soft coercion does amount to coercion and it is not a normal part of politics in
democracies
2. Another form of manipulation that may sway elections w/o violence is government managed
absentee voting (They go up to people’s houses w/ absentee ballots and only give them to people
who say they will vote for them)
-this is a form of the abuse of administrative resources that Russians often cite as one of
the most formidable barriers to meaningful elections
3. While soft coercion and manipulation are staples of Russian elections, so too is Hard Coercin.
Motivated assult and murder are ordinary, and very rarely are people brought to justice
-this goes against dahls 2nd point: “elected officials are chosen in frequently and fairly
conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon
V. Arbitrary Exclusion from Electoral participation
1. Goes against dahl’s #4: in Russia, by law everyone has the right to run but this is not done in
practice (incumbents can get disqualified by the court, but not all disqualifications are violations
of dem, some are legit)
*IN SUM:
several irregularities: falsification, coercion, and the arbitrary disqualification of candidates
characterize elections. Russia holds elections but they regularly include abuses that prevent he
contests from revealing public opinion and determining who governs.
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Week 6
The Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels
Good example of historical materialism (concept founded by Marx)
I. Bourgeois and Proletarians
“The history of all hitherto society is the history of class struggles.”
The epoch of the bourgeoisie is consolidating more and more in only two polar opposites:
bourgeoisie and proletariat
Stress on rapid economic development that revolutionized the feudal system into a
manufacturing one: markets keep growing, demand keeps rising; then the Modern Industry
system (with the invention of steam and machinery) takes manufacturing system’s place
Modern bourgeoisie is the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in
the modes of production and exchange.
Bourgeoisies have left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, callous
cash payment, egotistical calculation and free trade
The bourgeoisie has stripped every occupation of its honor turning it into paid wage laborer
In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency we have inter-course in every
direction, universal interdependence of nations (the wants are not satisfied by the national
production anymore)
It compels all nations, on pain of extinction to adopt the bourgeois civilization
It has agglomerated population, centralized the means of production and concentrated property in
a few hands; also, political centralization
The means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up,
were generated in feudal society
An absurdity in earlier epochs -- the epidemic of over-production
Laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity
Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labor, the work of the
proletarians has lost all individual character
At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their
enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the
petty bourgeois. Thus, the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the
bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie
II. Proletarians and Communists
The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favor of bourgeois property
The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the
abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most
complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class
antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few
Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last
resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion. Capital is
therefore not only personal; it is a social power
The workers have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the
proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the
nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois
sense of the word.
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Bourgeoisie plans to:
1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the banks of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital
and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into
cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a
common plan.
8. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of all the
distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the
country
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its
present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc.
III. Socialist and Communist Literature
1. Reactionary socialism
a. Feudal socialism
b. Petty bourgeois socialism
c. German or true socialism
2. Conservative or Bourgeois socialism
3. Critical-utopian socialism and communism
IV. Opposition Parties to Communists
Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and
political order of things
Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose
but their chains. They have a world to win. Proletarians of all countries, unite!
Toward a Theory of Revolution
By James C Davies
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In addition to predicting that industrial class would eventually reach a point of despair and revolt,
Marx predicted that social tension would result from an improvement in workers’ economic
condition that didn’t keep pace relative to the growth in wealth of elite
Why unrest happens
 “Our desires and pleasure spring from society; we measure them, therefore, b society and
not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction” –Marx (5)
 Revolutions most likely when period of economic development is followed by short
period of steep decline (J curve idea)
 The dissatisfied state of mind rather than the availability of necessities and equality is
what brings unrest
 When people are most miserable they are not very likely to participate in revolution
o “When it is a choice between losing their chains or their lives, people will mostly
choose to keep their chains, a fact that Marx seems to have overlooked”
o “It is when the chains have been loosened somewhat, so that thye can be cast off
without a high probability of losing life, that people are put in a condition of
proto-rebelliousness” (7)
 “The crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of
time will be quickly lost” (8)
Dorr’s Rebellion of 1842
 happened in Rhode Island where a growing number of families was moving to city/
factory work
 When textiles did well, people did very well and expectations were raised but when
textiles suffered depression, workers were destitute
 Also upset about lack of suffrage (MA and Connecticut had recently gained it)
 1841 Suffrage associations organize an election in which all could vote, created a new
constitution, The People’s Constitution
 State supreme court declared it illegitimate and said any attempts to follow through with
it would be treason
o Algerian Law- made it offense punishable by a year in prison to vote in April
election and lifetime imprisonment for anyone who took office under the Peoples
constitution
 May 1832, violence breaks out after state tries to evict People’s legislature and People try
to take over a state arsenal
o After a cannon misfires, People’s gov’t resigns and violence continues for a
month
 “The official legislature called for anew constitutional convention, chosen by universal
manhood suffrage, and a new constitution went into effect in January 1843 (9)
Russian Revolution of 1917
 began in earnest with emancipation of serfs in 1861
o brought increase in rural violence
o evidence of some improvement of conditions in that the size of the peasant
population grew
 some gains were made in factory legislation, improvements to justice system
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Nicholas II lacked the forcefulness of prior tzars
“League of Ddeliverance” coordinated efforts of at least 17 other revolutionary,
proletarian or nationalist groups within the empire
People grew increasingly dissatisfied with tzardom
Two key events in 1905
o Bloody Sunday of January 22, 1905- massacre of peaceful proletarian protesters
 Dispelled myth that tsar was gracious protector with malicious advisors
 Lead to Great October strike in which peasants sided with workers, rioted,
and assaulted landowners
o Major defeat of Russian military by Japan
 Return of hundreds of thousands soliders from war functioned as ugly
reminder of “the weakness and selfishness of Tsarist absolutism”
October 1905- Tsar “renounces absolutism”, grants law-making power to a duma and
guarantees freedom of expression
o He goes back on all of it
“This fifty-six year period appears to constitue a single ong phase in which popular
gratification at the termination of one institution (serfdom) rather quickly was replaced
with risign expecations which resulted from intensified industrialization and which were
incompatible with the continuation of the inequitable and capricious power structure of
Tsarist society” (13)
19160- inflation and scarcity of goods makes workers self-consciously discontented
February 1917- breaking point hit and it spreads into armed forces
Egyptian Revolution of 1952
 began when Egypt got limited independence in 1922
 continuing presence of foreign troops heightend nationalist expectations
 WWI brought industrialization, which opened opportunities for improvement for peasants
and entrepreneurs
 Economic progress continues, somewhat unevenly during WWII
 By 1945- cost of living rises significantly
 Factors that staved off revolution for a while
o High demand, post-war, for cotton exports
o Surge of solidarity with kind following 1948 invasion of Israel
 Defeat humiliated army and solidified them against the bureaucracy
 1950 propaganda against king begins to circulate
 1951 peasant uprisings
 January 1952- uncontrolled riots in Cairo begin revolution and officers coup in July made
it official
Other Civil Disturbances
 Leisler’s Rebellion- occurred in New York in 1689 when British tried to forbid hide
tanning and liquor distillation and embargoed unmilled grain (lasted about a year
 American Revolution- Period of rising economic growth and autonomy was followed by
serious attempt to tighten British control which led to… Revolution!
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French Revolution- growing rural prosperity and peasant ownership of land, some
beginnings of change followed by severe financial crisis that began in 1787 (deficit from
intervening against Brits in American Rev and was bad harvest year). Nobels were
alienated by threat of taxation, peasants lacked food… basically stoppage of all progress
revolution
Great Depression did NOT lead to revolution
o Mood of apathy and despair
o No alienation of upper middle class
o People were so attached to the existing system
o Primary reason, Gov’t visibly worked hard to alleviate it
“The notion that revolutions need both a period of rising expectations and a succeeding
period in which they are frustrated qualifies substantially the main Marxian notion that
revolutions occur after progressive degradation and the de Tocqueville notion that they
occur when conditions are improving” 17/ CP 469
Sometimes rise of expectations can be frustrated via brute force
“there appears to be no sure way to avoid revolution short of an effective, affirmative,
and continuous response on the part of established governments to the almost
continuously emerging needs of the governed” 18/ CP 470s
States and Social Revolutions
Theda Skocpol
Social Revolutions have exerted its influence greatly in modern history.
1. Domestic realm
2. International impact
a. Ramifications of revolutions in France, China and Russia
b. Also affect those in other countries who oppose revolutionary ideals but
are compelled to respond to the challenges or threats.
Characteristic of Social Revolutions and how they differ from rebellions, political revolutions,
etc.
1. the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval
2. the coincidence of political with social transformation.
 In short, social revolutions are unique in that “basic changes in social structure and in political
structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion.” These changes are often brought by
intense sociopolitical conflicts in which class struggles play a key role.
How are social revolutions to be explained?
I. Existing discourses
1. Marxist theory
- Marx sees “revolutions as emerging out of class-divided modes of production, and
transforming one mode of production into another through class conflict.”
2. Aggregate-psychological theories
- Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel
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- key term: relative deprivation.
- political violence occurs when many people in society become angry, esp. if existing
cultural and practical conditions provide encouragement for aggression against political targets.
3. Systems/value consensus theories
- Chalmers Johnson’s Revolutionary Change
- opposing views to aggregate-psychological theories.
- analyzes revolutions from the perspective of a macro-sociological theory of societal
integration and change.
- “when [revolutions] succeed, they change the core value-orientations of a society. and
the purposive attempt to do this takes the form of a value-oriented ideological movement that is
prepared to use violence against existing authorities. “
4. Political-conflict theories
- Charles Tilly’s From Mobilization to Revolution
- revolution is a special case of collective action in which the contenders fight for
ultimate political sovereignty over a population and eventually succeed to a certain degree in
displacing existing authorities.
II. Alternative explanation proposed by Skocpol: structural perspective & comparative historical
analysis
1. structural perspective
a. Skocpol notes the sameness of the image of the overall revolutionary
process that underlies and informs all four approaches
- changes in social systems give rise to grievances, social disorientation,
potentials for collective mobilization  with the aid of ideology and organization,
revolutions develop “purposefully”
b. the problem with the purposive image of revolutions.
i. Skocpol argues that “revolutionary situations have developed
due to the emergence of politico-military crises of state and class
domination. And only because of the possibilities thus created have
revolutionary leaderships and rebellious masses contributed to the
accomplishment of revolutionary transformations”
 in short, she doesn’t believe in the role of powerful leadership/ideology in the
development of social revolutions; revolutions would have occurred anyway with/without
them.
(Skocpol states continued)
International and World-Historical Context
 All social revolutions are closely related to the internationally uneven spread of capitalist
economic development and nation-state formation on a world scale
 European world-economy was the only one to develop in system of competing states,
which prompted colonial expansion, and incessant military conflict
 The will and capacity of states to undertake national economic transformations are
influenced by their military situations and capabilities
 Social revolutions have happened only in countries situated in disadvantaged positions
within the international arena.
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Actors in later revolutions can be influenced by earlier ones
Significant breakthroughs like the Industrial Revolution, or Leninist party organization
may intervene between two broadly similar revolutions
Potential Autonomy of the State
 The state is a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed and
coordinated by an executive authority. It extracts resources from society and uses them to
create and support coercive and administrative organizations.
 These fundamental state organizations are potentially autonomous from direct dominant
class control, and compete to some extent with the dominant class in appropriating
resources from society
 The state performs two fundamental tasks, maintaining order, and competing with other
states
 The need for physical order, political peace or the existence of international military
pressures and opportunities can prompt state rulers to attempt policies that conflict with
or contradict the fundamental interests of the dominant class
 If a state manages to minimally fulfill its fundamental tasks, it will have political
legitimacy, and will remain stable
 A great loss of legitimacy is required for the state to break down
Social Revolutions in the Modern world by Theda Skocpol
Chapter 5
Revolutions and the world-historical development of capitalism
“Events and scholarship since Marx’s time show that there is a need for revised ways of
understanding revolutions in relation to the world-historical development of capitalism”
(120/cp491)
Ideas of Marx that are still very relevant
 That revolutions in different types of societies would have different forms
 Resting analysis on “discerning how revolutionary situations arise out of structural
relations and historical processes outside of the deliberate control of acting groups” (121/
491)
 Class domination very important to social order and class conflict a defining feature of
revolution
Causes
 Marx’s argument: Revolution springs from economic contradictions between social
forces and social relations of production and that such contradictions are internally
generated
 Skocpol’s version- history does not support Marx
o “It is conflict between nation-states in the context of uneven development of
world capitalism that is central to the genesis of revolutions” 122
 Examples
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Japanese Meji Restoration- came from above due to severe
pressures from imperialist capitalist Western powers
French and Chinese- Bourbon and Manchu regimes trapped
between pressure from more economically developed states and
resistance of dominant classes to change
Russian- Tsarists broken down by impacts of WWI
Processes
 Marx’s argument: revolution accomplished through class struggles in which class leading
revolution will emerge as central player in post-revolution world
 Skocpol
o Some revolutions (from above) which have “quite revolutionary” consequences
and were NOT driven by class force or struggle
 Meiji Restoration- led by samurai bureaucrats and established new
centralized state apparatus.
o State building leadership groups have played very central roles
 Leaders tend to come from educated strata
 Leadership has never come from those who controlled means of
production
o “It does not make sense to try to reduce the contribution of revolutionary parties
or bureaucratic military elites to that of merely representing and acting along with
class forces, since these specifically political forces shave been uniquely
responsible for consolidation revolutions by establishing new state organizations”
123
o Revolution about class struggles of peasants against dominant landed classes
Outcomes
 Marx- revs mark transition from one means of production to another and thus class
relations change too
 Skocpol
o State structures change as much if not more than class relations
o “It is a political breakthrough that in turn makes possible the far more gradual
economic process” 124
The State
 state is conditioned, but not entirely defined, by economic and/or class issues
 If this is the case, it makes sense that revolutions from below come from undermining
state while revolutions from above are based on political reorganization within an already
autonomous state
 Russia- agrarian class structure curtailed ability to prepare for effects of WWI
 Revolutions create potentials for breakthroughs in national economic development by
bringing about more centralized and autonomous states
Peasantry
 Revolution more likely when peasants (ie producing class) have sufficient autonomy to
revolt against land lords
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Peasants tend to lack interest/ability to organize parties or armies that can compete for
state power
International State system
 Capitalism is more than just mode of production. It is also world economy with various
zones
 Capitalism is developed through “framework of ‘multiple political sovereignties’”
 All revs have given rise to more bureaucratized and centralized states
 International pressures have played big role in determining outcomes of revolutions
 Revs have not conformed to Marx’s idea of first a bourgeois rev and then a socialist
 Since revs only happen in one country, no single one can totally establish or end
capitalism
 Revolutions, such as Russia and China, can however have a major impact on world
capitalism by placing unusal/ extreme restrictions on flows of international trade and
private capital investment
 “Keep in mind that even if revolutions of some types-such as state socialist- do, relatively
speaking, disrupt world capitalism (ie more than either non-revolutions or non-state
socialist revolutions), this does not mean that they simultaneously build socialism” 130
Skocpol CH 6
France, Russia, China: A structural analysis of social revolutions
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Quotes Huntington and Lenin and states that those two delineate the distinctive features
of social revolutions
Structural element is what separates social revolutions from coups, rebellions, and even
political institutions
Says that France 1789, Russia 1917 and China 1911-49 are the most clear cut instances
‘Revolutions tend increasingly to be viewed not as ‘locomotive of history’, but as
extreme forms of one or another sort of behavior that social scientists, along with
established authorities everywhere, find problematic and perturbing
Revolutions are not just extreme forms of individual or collective behavior, they are
distinctive conjunctures of social-historical structures and processes.
Aimed to explain a) instances of non-social revolution modernization, such as occurred in
Japan, Germany and Russia and b) instances of abortive social revolutions, in particular
Russia in 1905 and Prussia/Germany in 1848
Explaining the historical cases: revolution in modernizing agrarian bureaucracy
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In F, R and C social revolution was a conjuncture of three developments a) the collapse
or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries b) widespread
peasant rebellion, and c) marginal elite political movements.
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An agrarian bureaucracy is an agricultural society in which social control rests on a
division of labor and a coordination of effort between a semi-bureaucratic state and a
landed upper class.
Agrarian bureaucracies are inherently vulnerable to peasant rebellions.
Modernization is best conceived not only as an intra-societal process of economic
develop lagging or leading changes in non-economic institutional spheres, but also as a
world-historic inter-societal phenomenon.
Breakdown of societal controls: Foreign pressures and administrative/military collapse
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From a sociological point of view, a more satisfying approach might focus on the
interaction between a)the magnitude of foreign pressures brought to bear on a
modernizing agrarian bureaucracy and b) the particular structural characteristics of such
societies that underlay contrasting performances by leaders responding to foreign
pressures and internal unrest
What accounts for the failure of the Revolution of 1905 was the Czarist regime’s ultimate
ability to rely upon the army to repress popular disturbances
The Russian Revolution occurred in 1917 because Russia was too inextricably entangled
with foreign powers, friend and foe, economically and militarily more powerful than she
With France, the French system struggled on three fronts throughout the eighteenth
century. Within the European state system, France’s ‘amphibious geography’ forced her
to compete simultaneously with great continental land powers, Austria and (after midcentury) Prussia and with the maritime powers, above all, Britain
Criticizes Tocqueville for “exaggerating the extent to which monarchical authority
already exhibited those qualities before the Revolution.
Talks about Magistrates and Parliaments and how they mattered in this regard
France was helping fight the War of Austrian Succession and the war for American
Independence, but France gained nothing from this
Peasant Insurrections
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Agrarian bureaucracy has been the only historical variety of complex society with
differentiated, centralized government that has, in certain instances, incubated a lowerclass stratum that was simultaneous strategic in the society’s economy and polity.
If peasants are to be capable of self-initiating rebellion against landlords and state
officials, they must have a) some institutionally based collective solidarity and b)
autonomy from direct, day to day supervision and control by landlords in their work and
leisure activities
Because peasants could rebel on their own in France and Russia they did not have to be
directly mobilized by urban radicals
Peasant participation in the Revolutionary drama in France began in the spring of 1789
with bread riots
Given the agrarian situation, widespread peasant rebellions erupted in Russia in 1905
when the Czarist regime simultaneously confronted defeat abroad and an anti-autocratic
movement of the middle classes.
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The Chinese case presents decisive contrasts with France and Russia but nevertheless
confirms our general insight about the importance of structurally conditioned ‘tactical
space’ for peasant insurrection as a crucial factor in the translation of
administrative/military breakdown into social revolution
Radical political movements and centralizing outcomes:
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Such political movements don’t come from the bourgeoisie or from peasants but from
skilled highly educated people who don’t have such prestige or nobility.
In China, as in Russia, radical nationalist modernizers came from the early student
generations of university-educated Chinese
Although historians might call the French Revolution a bourgeoisie one the French
Revolution was remarkably similar to the Russian and Chinese in its basic causes
(although outcome differed)—the failure of Old Regime officials to mobilize sufficient
national resources to promote national economic development and/or counter military
competition or threats from more developed nations abroad and in its structural
dynamics—peasants and marginal political elites against a traditional landed upper-class.
Theda Skocpol, Social Revolution in the Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 1994),
chapter 11 (with Goodwin).
Chapter 11: Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World
Why have revolutions occurred in some third world countries but not in others?
o Examining the political conditions
Myths about revolutions in the third world: Do not explain why revolutions occur where they do
o Destitution is sufficient to precipitate revolutions
o Many Third World countries are poor, but revolutions have occurred in only a few,
not necessarily the poorest
o Leon Trotsky: “the mere existence of privations is not enough to cause insurrection; if
it were, the masses would be always in revolt”
o “Professional revolutionaries,” often backed by foreign powers, subvert Third World regimes
by exploiting the social problems of these societies “for their own nefarious purposes”
o Proessional revolutionaries have helped to organize and lead many insurgencies, but
these groups remain relatively insignificant sects in most Third World countries
o Most political movements are ethnic/sub-nationalist movements rather than
revolutions
B. The real question is when “would-be revolutionaries” proliferate and/or mobilize
o Imperialist Great Powers can easily manipulate local events in Third World countries (i.e.
when revolutions do not occur in poor nations, it is because capitalist powers like the United
States have propped up local agents of capitalist imperialism)
o Great capitalist powers cannot prevent or reverse all Third World revolutions.
o Imperialist interests must operate through local regimes/private agents strongly
influenced by local regimes
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Issues affecting revolutionary movements and transfers of power in the Third World:
 Formation of revolutionary coalitions extending beyond peasants alone
 The relative vulnerability of political regimes to the formation of broad revolutionary
coalitions and overthrow by revolutionary forces
Third World revolutions are not just “peasant wars” or “agrarian revolutions” –
coalitions/alliances cut across urban and rural areas, social classes, and ethnic divides
 Professional revolutionary organizations that organize, arm, and lead many revolutionary
movements tend to be disproportionately middle-class
o Except when peasants live in relatively autonomous villages, they lack the
organization to rebel
o The most successful revolutionary organizations win the support of not just
poor/middle class peasants, but also landless and migrant laborers, rich peasants,
landlords
 Urban groups often join w/broad-based coalitions against dictatorial regimes – essential
to the success of revolutionaries in more urbanized countries
 Revolutionary coalitions tend to form around preexisting national, populist, or religious
disputes that legitimize resistance and attract various social classes
o Nationalism is a powerful force for mobilization, more than class struggle
 Revolutionary movements are not simply ideological movements
o Can win broad popular support to mobilize only after they deliver goods
w/immediate payoffs
 “liberated areas” secure from attack by the incumbent regime
 public education, health services, law and order, economic reforms (tax
and interest reductions), land reform
 Incentives encourage participation in guerrilla warfare
 “Ruling” revolutionary parties – obtain popular support not simply through coercion or
impersonal ideology but through patronage/development of networks of loyal clients
 “proto-state organizations” or “guerrilla governments”
 Revolutionaries are most effective when they organize the social groupings that the
incumbent regime has not incorporated into the political system
Regimes vulnerable to the growth of revolutionary coalitions:
 closed, “exclusionary”, organizationally weak, suddenly weakened authoritarian
regimes
 countries that never established liberal-democratic political systems (contrary to classical
Marxism)
 regimes that never mobilize social groups into politics
o economic grievances of excluded groups become politicized
 regimes that never fully penetrated certain areas, lose control due to war or invasion, are
unable to prevent neighboring countries from harboring revolutionaries, or lack secure
borders
o makes it easier for rebels to operate in peripheral areas and establish an
“administrative vacuum”
Closed authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to revolution because:
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they provide a common enemy for groups/classes with different economic and political
grievances
political legitimacy is undermined when religious authorities do not support them or
when rulers hold fraudulent elections in an effort to justify their power
they radicalize and attack moderate and reformist politicians that try to gradually
transition to a more inclusionary political system (either in competition or alliance with
revolutionary forces)
they valorize the potential oppositional role of armed revolutionaries, since they readily
turn to repression when faced with even moderate political/economic demands
Regimes NOT vulnerable to the growth of revolutionary coalitions:
 multiparty democracies or quasi-democracies, even in poor countries
 “inclusionary” authoritarian regimes – i.e. fascist and state-socialist regimes, singleparty corporatist regimes
o Lack civil rights, but either sponsor mass political mobilization or regulate
representation/bargaining for various social groups, including lower classes
o Impose controlled forms of political participation on key social groups – political
action apart from existing regime becomes difficult
 Regimes that are militarily and organizationally strong with secure borders
o Armed revolutionaries cannot mobilize mass support
Exclusionary and repressive authoritarian regimes especially vulnerable to actual overthrow by
revolutionary movements:
 These regimes are usually unable to bring about conservative change/political
incorporation of newly mobilized groups that weaken existing revolutionary movements
 Neo-patrimonial or Sultanistic dictatorships identified with a foreign power
o Individual dictatorial rulers allow no stable group prerogatives in the polity (not
even collective prerogatives for military officers or upper social/economic
classes)
 1911 Mexico (Diaz), 1959 Cuba (Batista), 1979 Nicaragua (Somoza),
1979 Iran (Pahlavi Shahs)
 Political stability is highly dependent on unrelenting vigilance of
individual ruler
o Personalist dictators are more likely to generate elite/middle class opposition
who resent blatant corruption, tendency to monopolize significant sectors of
economy, control of schools and the press, use of family connections to
monopolize government positions and business/professional opportunities, and
granting privileges to foreign capitalists
o Foreign support is more likely to withdraw support in the face of multi-class
opposition
o Flight of dictator: armed forces tend to be especially corrupt and incompetent
(trained to simply prevent dictator’s overthrow by military coup) disintegrate
when personalist dictators are out of power and open the way for guerrilla armies
to seize power
 Colonial regimes based on direct rule by the colonizing country
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o Colony is governed by metropolitan officials, indigenous elites not allowed to
share power, not ready for sovereignty after colonialism
 French colonies Vietnam and Algeria, Portuguese former African colonies
Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique
 Closely tied to foreign power: political symbols of nationalism and
cultural self-assertion are harnessed by revolutionaries in addition to class
struggle within more inclusive demands for national liberation
o Radicalizes political opponents, undermines moderate and reformist leaderships
o Alienates indigenous upper/middle classes by excluding them from important
business/professional opportunities, upper-level administrative positions reserved
for colonialists
o Colonial power is a common focus of opposition for different groups
o Direct colonial armies are principally loyal to the colonial power, not to
indigenous political groups interested in decolonization
 Sudden withdrawal of colonial armies opens the way for revolutionaries to
seize power
Neo-patrimonial/Sultanistic dictatorships are not always confronted with or overthrown by
revolutionary movements because of counterrevolutionary actions:
 Radical groups may not embrace armed struggle
 Territorial control
o Dictator’s armed forces may manage to control dissidence
 Co-optation or accommodation of elites and middle class
o Elites and middle classes are not always driven into a coalition with
revolutionaries, especially if patronage is granted impersonally and moderate
opposition is not overly oppressed
 Ethnic divisions may be too fractious for revolutionaries to bridge – neo-patrimonial
societies tend to be characterized by ethnic/religious organization and elite
 Removal of an unpopular leader, transition to a more open political regime
o If dictators grant moderates minimal breathing room, civilian-military alliance
capable of removing the dictator may broaden political participation before
revolutionaries become powerful enough
Indirect colonial rule tends to defeat revolutionary movements because:
o It tends to be militarily stronger and capable of transitioning to an independent/inclusive
political system
o Grooms a reliable elite that can take over political power without jeopardizing the
economic interests of the colonizer
o Military officers are recruited from indigenous population, loyal to local society instead
of colonizing power, become linked to broader forces that favor political reform/national
independence
CONCLUSION
Revolutionaries in the contemporary Third World are most likely to succeed when civil society
as a whole can be politically mobilized to oppose an autonomous and narrowly based direct
colonial regime or a Sultanistic neo-patrimonial regime
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o When penetration of national territory is least
o When incorporation of socially mobilized groups is least (most exclusionary)
o When bureaucratization of the state administration and armed forces is least
Patrimonial dictatorships and directly ruled colonies:
o Relatively weak, corrupt, and disorganized civil administration and army
o Political openings difficult: military reformism and civil-military pacts unlikely
o Basis for popular and elite opposition to ruler
o External support more likely to be withdrawn, especially as elite opposition develops
o Probability of state disintegration when dictator or colonial power departs or is removed
Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes and indirectly ruled colonies:
o Stronger and more coherent civil administration and army
o Political openings easier: military reformism and civil-military pacts more likely
o Elite opposition much less likely
o External support more likely to persist, especially following a political opening
o State disintegration less likely during political crises and transitions
Eric Selbin, “Revolution in the Real World: Bringing Agency Back In,” In John Foran, ed.
Theorizing Revolutions (Routledge, 1997), pp. 123-136.
Introduction
 Voluntaristic constructions – symbolic politics, collective memory, and social context of
politics – all necessary for understanding revolutionary processes
o Ideas and actors, not structures and histories, are primary forces in revolutionary
processes
 Revolutions are human creations rather than inevitable processes
 Skocpol’s structuralist perspective – revolutions are not made, they come
o Stresses objective relationships and conflicts among groups, rather than interests,
outlooks, or ideologies of particular actors in revolution
The Brief for Agency and Culture
 Current revolutionaries use figures of previous revolutionary heroes so that populations
can identify with and understand their struggle
o This has lead to a popular culture of resistance, rebellion, and revolution
 Concepts used to arouse people for revolutions:
o Memories of collective action, tool-kits of symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews are resources used by revolutionary leaders
o Revolutions are more likely to be undertaken, receive popular support, and
conclude successfully in societies where the history of revolutionary activities is
celebrated in folk culture.
 Problems with this approach
o These are idealistic, voluntaristic, or ad-hoc forms of explanation
o Various agents and symbols are used differently in each revolutionary case
Agency: ideas, ideals, and learning
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People’s thoughts and actions are the mediating link between structural conditions and
social outcomes
o Structural conditions don’t unconditionally dictate what people do; they just place
limits on people’s actions
o Structural conditions may define why revolutionary insurrections arise or what
options are available after political power is seized, but they don’t explain how
specific groups act and what policies they pursue
Two roles of leaders:
o Organizing the population
o Articulating the vision – ideas and ideals – around which they rally
 Populations respond to these actions, determine how fast revolutionary
processes unfold, and how successful they are.
Leaders invoke, manipulate, and build on timeless conceptions to arouse and mobilize the
population
o Ideals of justice, liberty, equality, democracy, opportunity, and freedom are
powerful in world where many people don’t have any of these
o These ideals carry people through the arduous struggle of revolution
Ideas travel across time and space, transmitted via the people
o People take into account past experiences of other groups/leaders/regions and
factor in new information
o Modern revolutions in Latin America are similar to “classic” revolutions of
France, Russia, Mexico, and China
Culture: stories of resistance and rebellion
 People’s history vs. history constructed from above
o History of people’s everyday lives is articulated in their popular political culture
and does not change fundamentally
 Instruments of popular culture – folk tales, songs, play, etc.
 May determine if high-profile collective action will be possible
 Ability of revolutionaries to create context in which these traditions are summoned,
manipulated, and rewritten
The marriage of agency and culture: the social context of politics
 Political cultures of resistance and opposition, and how these interact with the social
forces that make revolutions
o Culture – system of shared meanings, attitudes, and values and the symbolic
forms in which they are expressed or embodied
 How life is explained, and how it can be changed
o These symbols integrate the past, present, and future into coherent mission
o Popular political culture is a belief system that is less formal than ideology
 Those in power endeavor to invoke/create symbols to maintain their status; opposition
will use the same symbols to overturn the people in power.
o Popular culture, therefore, can become a battleground
 Modernization theorists use political culture to describe the values and beliefs of a
population towards politics
o Civic culture seemed natural to the sustenance of liberal democracy
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o This perspective was structural – people did not have a role in creating their
society, and were captive to its institutions
Collective memory and symbolic politics
 Societal memory is up for grabs – various groups can protect or extend their
interpretations of the past to serve their present purposes
o Provides base to explain past experiences and future guidelines
 Revolutions are perceived as the long process of struggle that many societies hold in their
collective memory.
 People’s history is constantly in the background, and can be brought into consciousness
when it’s needed
o That’s why the past is continuously rewritten to fit the present
Conclusions
 Popular political culture keeps history alive in the form of latent empowerment –
memories are aroused by popular leaders or by populations themselves
WEEK 7
The Russian Revolution by Sheila Fitzpatrick
Chapter 1 – The Setting
The society
 Most lived in traditional villages
 Peasants, not bound by serfdom but by oppressive debt
 Peasants migrating to towns for seasonal work became more literate and exposed to
modern world
 Highly concentrated proletariat: good for revolution; pre-modern working class, not good
for revolution
 Widespread working-class revolutionary sentiment: factories were owned by the state, so
strikes became political
The revolutionary tradition
 Intelligentsia sought to change Russia
 Populists
o believed capitalist industrialization would lead to inequality and should be
avoided (radicals)
o Populists wanted to save peasants’ mir
o Assassinated Czar Alexander II in 1881; response: pogroms
 Marxists
o Capitalist industrialization was inevitable, the mir was already disintegrating, and
this was the only path to socialism
o Ideology of modernization as well as revolution
o Chose urban working class as base of support
 Marxists split into Bolsheviks (Lenin) and Mensheviks (Nevsky)
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The 1905 Revolution and its aftermath; the First World War
 Russo-Japanese War in 1904- disaster for Russia
 Troops fired on Russian protestors
 Nicholas II, October Manifesto 1905 – promised a constitution and create parliament, the
Duma
 But workers form a “soviet,” council of workers’ representatives
 Serious peasant uprisings – but separate from Bolsheviks and Mensheviks
 In World War I, Lenin actively hopes for Russian defeat
 Declaration of war produces patriotism, but mood turns sour quickly
 Bizarre situation of Rasputin and the Empress
 WWI increased vulnerability of regime
CH 2 1917: The Revolutions of February and October
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Feb 1917- gov collapses when faced with mass demonstrations and withdrawal of elite
support
The new Provisional gov’t was inedited to represent elite element of rev while the
Petrograd Soviet would represent the people element
Within 8 months, all hope for Feb rev had collapsed
Bolsheviks greatest strength was “stance of intransigent radicalism” (42)
o Weren’t quite as organized in 1917, had been swamped with new members
February Revolution and ‘dual power’
 In last week of February, caos broke out
o Food shortages
o Strikes and lock outs
o Demonstration in honor of International Womens Day
 By Feb 28, Petrograds Military commander reported that revolutionaries had taken over
many key things such as railway stations, artillery supplies, and basically the whole city
 The Duma recommended that Nicholas abdicate (was eventually executed along with
family in July 1918 by Bolsheviks)
o End of Russian monarchy
 Provisional Government was installed
o Despite lack of electoral mandate, transition seemed fairly easy, at first
o Were major reasons to doubt effectiveness
 Petrograd Soviet was also a self constituted authority
o Provisional gov’t had little state capacity and seemed to exist at grace of Soviet
 March 1- Order No. 1 issued by Soviet
o Was assertion of Soviet’s power
o “stated that no governmental order to the Army was to be considered valid
without the counter signature of the Soviet” (48)
 Enlisted men in Army recognized the Petrograd Soviet while officers
recognized the Provisional government
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Hostility to ‘bourgeois’ Provisional Govt grew in late spring
o People were war weary
o Economic situation in towns was deteriorating
o July- “July Days” demonstration where primary slogan was “all power to the
Soviets"
The Bolsheviks
 During Feb rev, most of Bolsheviks were abroad or in exile
 Lenin returned and was already looking for second part of rev (overthrow of bourgeoisie
by proletariat
o April Theses- predicated that Soviets would be key in that power transfer and
barely acknowledged accomplishments of Feb
 Growing strength of Bolsheviks was evident at grass-roots level amongst factories and
armed services
The popular revolution
 Tremendous loses and war weariness caused rising desertion rate
o Soldiers had seen Feb Rev as implicit promise that the war would soon end
o Despite new democratic structure army still ineffective and suffered same issues
of inadequate supplies
 In first months after Feb Rev, main grievances of workers were economic
o Wages, eight hour days, overtime, protection against unemployment
 Many workers organizations formed in Russian industrial centers after Rev
o “Factory committees” started to take over managerial functions
 Definition of “workers’ control” moved closer to something like workers’
self-management
o Workers’ mood becoming more militant, meaning growingly hostile to
bourgeoisie and were more assertive of workers primacy in rev
 By May, countryside was clearly sliding into turmoil
 Mir petitioned for egalitarian redistribution of lands
o Conducted land seizures on behalf of village communities, not individuals
 The Provisional Government failed by procrastinating on issue of land reform
The political crises of the summer
 Galician offensive, of June and July, failed miserably with 200,000+ casualties
o Morale disintegrated
 “July Days”- Petrograd erupts in mass demonstrations, street violence, and popular
disorder
o People went to Lenin for speech but he offered no advice
o Eventually crowd broke down into drinking and looting and dispersed
o “The whole affair damaged Bolshevik morale and Lenin’s credibility as a
revolutionary leader”
 Provisional Government tries to reassert authority and withdraws “parliamentary
immunity” for politicians
o Orders were put out for Lenin’s arrest and he goes into hiding
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In July, Kerensky takes helm of Provisional Government but still cant really do anything
with it
August- the right led by General Lavr Kornilov attempts a coup
o Coup failed due to unreliability of troops and actions of Petrograd workers (work
stoppages, diverted trains etc)
o Krenskys standing damaged by handling of Kornilov affair
o Relationship between men and officers of military deteriorated further
Bolsheviks “strength was that they were the only party uncompromised by association
with the bourgeoisie and the February regime, and the party most firmly identified with
ideas of workers’ power and armed uprising” (61)
The October Revolution
 August 31- Soviets gain majority in Petrograd Soviet and majority in Moscow Soviet on
Sept 5
 September- Lenin advises Bolsheviks to prepare for “armed insurrection” sometime
before meeting of Second Congress of Soviets
o Some wondered why Bolsheviks should take such action when doing well
through govt and non-violent means
o Although he insisted on insurrection he didn’t leave hiding in Finland right away
 October- Trotsky becomes leader of Bolshevik majority in Petrograd Soviet and also had
doubts about insurrection
 Advance publicity of insurrection put Bolsheviks into position where they needed to act
o Kerensky didn’t take serious counter-measures
 Germans were advancing, and Petrograd was threatened
 Oct 24- insurrection begins night before Second Congress of Soviets and key govt
institutions were occupied
o Little violent resistance was encountered
o Lenin came out of hiding and joined comrades
 It was announced that central govt “function would be assumed by a new Council of
People’s Commissars
o Lenin was govt head and Trotsky was People’s Commissar (minister) of Foreign
Affairs
 Immediate result of October Rev in provinces was that Soviets took power (weren’t all
Bolsheviks)
 In Constituent Assembly elections, Bolsheviks won only 25% of popular vote
o SR’s got 40% do to wide peasant support
o Bolsheviks simply dispersed Assembly when it didn’t go their way
 Maintained assertion that while they didn’t have support of everyone, they
had support of working class and that is what mattered most
Chapter 3. Civil War
Fitzpatrick
Civil war 1918-1920, ended with Bolshevik victory. Civil war: baptism by fire of the new
regime
After the October seizure of power, the Bolsheviks faced anarchic, decentralizing and separatist
tendencies.
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Party slogans: “All power to the soviets,” “dictatorship of the proletariat”
A basic socialist objective: centralized planning of economic development, is in conflict with
the broad powers and independence that proletarian institutions (trade unions, factory
committees) wanted
International context: As part of an international proletarian revolutionary movement, Russia did
not expect to have conventional diplomatic relations with other states. They reassessed that
need only later, when they already were in isolation.
Before the war, Lenin endorsed the principle of national self-determination (for non-Russian
nationalities)
Proletarian internationalism had a disconcerting similarity to the policies of old-style Russian
imperialism. (The case of marching into Poland in 1920’s and the Polish workers resisting
the Russian invasion.)
Brest-Litovsk Peace between Germany and Russia, Russia exits WWI, Jan 1918.
Foreign intervention in the civil war on the side of the Whites created a permanent Soviet fear of
capitalist encirclement.
The underground pre-Revolutionary formative experience of the Bolshevik party was minimal in
comparison to the numbers that joined the Red Army and the party during civil war.
Origins of Stalinist authoritarianism can be traced back to the civil war experience, which
militarized the revolutionary political culture of the Bolsheviks and brought in readiness to
resort to coercion.
Civil War, the Red Army, and the Cheka
Cheka: All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Struggle against Counter-Revolution,
Sabotage, and Speculation, founded in December 1917.
Lenin wanted to sign the Peace, but leftist communists and the leftist SR’s (Socialist
Revolutionary Party) were against it.
Civil war began in summer 1918
White Armies operated without central direction.
Green armies—peasant and Cossack bands that gave allegiance to neither side, but brought much
damage to Whites.
Trotsky became Commissar of War in spring 1918.
Red Army became the largest and best-functioning bureaucracy in early years of Bolshevik rule
The Cheka became an organ of terror during the Civil War; was very open and violent. After
civil war, it was replaced by the GPU (Chief Political Administration), which resembled the
old tsarist police in its secret and discreet measures.
Reds support centralized around the urban working class, Whites support was the middle and
upper classes; the peasantry tipped the balance! The crucial issue was land: the Bolsheviks
redistributed, the Whites were against land seizures.
War Communism
Debate over whether pragmatism or ideology brought nationalization and state distribution (as a
response to war exigencies, or an imperative of communism).
By 1919, 80% large-scale industrial enterprises were nationalized, which exceeded the capacity
of management of the Supreme Economic Council.
By 1920, prohibition of free trade and a virtually moneyless economy. Barter became a basic
form of exchange, and money lost its value. Food crisis, rationing, shortages.
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Bolshevik policy of grain requisitioning (taking the peasants’ produce), but the Whites were also
doing that, and so did every occupying army throughout the ages.
Divide and Conquer policy in villages: formed Committees of the Poor cooperating with Soviets
to extract grains from richer peasants. Complete failure--solidarity between peasants.
Marxist ideology: first revolution accomplished land seizures and egalitarian redistribution, and
the second revolution should put poor peasants against rich peasants. Peasants had a
different idea: that the world was truly a peasant institution, historically abused and has
accomplished already a peasant revolution.
Real interest of Bolsheviks concerning peasants: large-scale agriculture.
Sovkhozy – state farms
Kolkhozy – collective farms
Visions of the New World
Civil war had a great deal of impractical and utopian thinking, even if Soviets thought they are
scientific (Marxism as a social science).
“ABC of Communism” (1919) by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky-very utopian; Lenin was very
pragmatic
Avant-garde artists desired to liquidate traditional bourgeois art; Bolshevik leaders however, did
not associate so closely with this current, were cautious with the classics.
Emancipation of women: by the end of civil war, laws that made divorce easily attainable,
removed the formal stigma of illegitimacy, permitted abortion, mandated equal rights and
pay were in place.
An extremist concept: the family tends to inculcate bourgeois values.
Lenin did not advocate free love and promiscuous sex, although the party supported abortion and
divorce.
Postwar relaxation of morals: older communists had to put up with sex liberation, Cubists,
advocates of Esperanto, nudists.
The Bolsheviks in Power
Authority divided between:
The government (Council of People’s Commissars)
The soviets’ Central Executive Committee
The Bolshevik Party’s Central Committee and its Secretariat, Orgburo, and Politburo
(organizational and political affairs)
Other political parties were outlawed for supporting the Whites or staging revolts, or forced into
self-liquidation in the early years of the 1920’s.
The Bolsheviks described their rule as “soviet power,” but this was not an accurate description:
the October Revolution was a party coup, not a soviet one, and the new central government,
chosen by the Bolshevik Central Committee, had nothing to do with the soviets.
By the end of civil war, the Bolshevik Party’s Central Committee and Politburo were usurping
the powers of the Council of People’s Commissars, and, at local level, party committees were
becoming more dominant over the soviets.
Bolsheviks who disagreed with Lenin left the party; Lenin was a very authoritarian leader,
especially in ideology.
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Class justice concept: it was necessary not only to eliminate the old patterns of class exploitation
but also to reverse them. “For the exploiters, the only right that remains is the right to be
judged.”
The Party believed that the only people who could be trusted with power by the new regime were
proletarians who had been victims of the old one.
The Russian Revolution Chapter 6: Ending the Revolution
I. Transition from revolution to post-revolution
1. The nature of the victory proclaimed by the regime in the 1930s.
A. Successful economic transformation during the First Five-Year Plan.
- nationalized urban economy, collectivized agriculture.
 Russian Revolution succeeded in changing the modes of production.
Yet its official results are very much dubious.
B. Reaction from the Soviet leaders and opposition
i. Despite the debatable economic results and problems associated with singlemindedly driven development, the Soviet leaders firmly believed they were in the
process of achieving something.
ii. Many former Trotskyites left the opposition to support the First Five-Year
Plan.
C. Problems with collectivization.
i. Peasants grew resentful and unwilling to work  led to massive slaughter of livestock,
famine  the state investing more in the agricultural sector.
ii. the rise of “private plot” that was crucial to the peasant family’s survival.
D. Revolution’s political goals
i. Even though the regime’s survival through the anxious months of 1931, 1932, and 1933
seemed victorious enough, the party was in need of something related to socialism to be
celebrated in public.
ii. 1936: Soviet Constitution introduced now socialism was an accomplished fact in the
soviet Union.
iii. Significance of the new Constitution
- Guarantee of equal rights represented a real change from the 1918
Constitution of the Russian Republic.
- Suffrage for everyone.
E. Achievements of the Revolution
i. Trotsky: criticized the Revolution for allowing the bureaucracy to replace the working
class as its main source of social support.
ii. however, Stain argued one of the great achievements of the Revolution had been the
creation of a new Soviet intellegentsia, recruited from the working class and peasantry.
2. Examination on the Thermidorian policies and tendencies of the same period.
A. Great retreat of the 1930s.
B. the Second Five-Year Plan
- marking a transition to sober planning with less sloganeering about unreachable targets
and more rationality.
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C. The Stakhanovite movement
- curious example of the Soviet postrevolutionary ethos and the regime’s ambivalent
attitude towards workers.
D. Change in the manners and style of leadership changed.
E. Education
F. Issues of motherhood and the virtues of family life
 Yet despite all the efforts to return to the era of “normalcy,” the postrevolutionary normalcy
was very much precarious. After the assassination of Sergei Kirov, the Leningard party leader,
the party and its leadership were thrown into spasm.
3. The Great Purges of 1937-1938.
A. Sergei Kirov’s assassination triggers the first show trial of the Great Purges
i. July 1936, the Central Committee sent a secret letter to all local party
organizations blaming the former Oppositionist groups for the murder of Sergei Kirov.
B. Second Trial
i. emphasis was on wrecking and sabotage in industry
ii. chief defendant: Yurii Pyatakov, a former Troskyite
C. the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937
i. signaled the start of the witch-hunts.
ii. for the following two years, top Communist officials in every branch were
denounced and arrested as enemies of the people.
iii. the intelligentsia was also heavily persecuted.
D. the purpose of the great purges?
i. Suspicion of enemies is a standard feature of revolutionary mentality.
ii. the genesis of the Great Purges is the periodic cleansing of membership that the
party conducted from the early 1920s.
4. Legacy of the Russian Revolution
A. the keystone in Soviet national tradition.
B. international legacy
- established a definition of socialism that hinged on the seizure of state power and its use
as an instrument of economic and social transformation.
Farideh Farhi, “State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolutionary Crisis: A Comparative
Analysis of Iran and Nicaragua,” Comparative Political Studies 21, No. 2 (1988), pp. 231-256.
Theories of revolution:
 Role of the state (relationship to dominant classes)
 Intrusion of international factors
 Structure of peasant communities
Applying Skocpol’s hypotheses explaining disintegration of agrarian proto-bureaucracies to dictatorships
in the context of peripheral formations (where international fields are dominated by more economically
integrated nations)
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Skocpol and Social Revolutions
o Structuralist approach (revolutions are not made; they merely happen) – revolutions happen
because of the coincidence of several causal processes
o Incapacitation of administrative and military machineries crucial for revolution
o Administrative autonomy – when the state acts in opposition to the immediate and fundamental
interests of the dominant class and other state-builders
o Potential cause for basic structural change – mode of production and dominant class
supplanted by new one (revolution from above)
o Revolution is launched when a potentially autonomous state disintegrates due to pressures from
internally dominant classes and foreign competitors
o Administrative and military breakdown opens the way for widespread popular revolts,
but in agrarian bureaucracies, only peasants that have institutionally based collective
solidarity and autonomy from landlords and state can rebel
o To make Skocpol’s theory more pertinent to the contemporary world, must take into
account:
 The changing balance of class forces from the uneven development of capitalism
on a world scale (the internal dynamics and external restraints of peripheral states
and the increasing importance of the middle classes in revolutions)
 The role of ideology (ideas, actions, interests) in revolutions
State Autonomy, Foreign Pressure, and State Disintegration
o Revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua: peripheral states (disadvantaged economic position)
o Iran and Nicaragua: pre-revolutionary states autonomous from internal classes
o Prevents growth of strong bourgeoisie, local industrialists unable to retain progressive
role
 Iran: state control over the means of production (land, petroleum) prevented
development of bourgeois class
 Nicaragua: U.S. military interventions created autonomous state based on
Nicaraguan National Guard that prevented formation of coffee oligarchy;
division of cotton bourgeoisie between large/small growers undermined
development of an export oligarchy
o Role of Iranian and Nicaraguan states as major capitalist enterprises enhanced autonomy
from local bourgeoisies
 Create surplus value: control of labor, profit maximization, privileged use of
resources for personnel
 Somoza clan took control of 25% of GNP to become dominant force of
Nicaraguan economy
 Iran: direct control over petroleum production and revenues, capitalist
class dependent on government
o Autonomy in relation to international capital: positions of states within world system is as
important as within social structure
o Skocpol: locates state within competitive intl. states system – intl. competition stimulates
peripheral states to modernize (politically difficult) – triggers potentially revolutionary
crisis
 Ignores uneven development of capitalism – Iran and Nicaraguan revolutions
cannot be explained in terms of military competition
o must consider difficulties of balancing nationalist aspirations and international demands
 peripheral states: difficult to serve national interest when foreign economies
extract surplus, esp. when state was formed by foreign intervention: both Iranian
and Nicaraguan governments constituted w/US help
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

Iran: Shah consolidated power by defeating forces that challenged
control of Iranian oil by foreigners; intl. boycott of Iranian oil made
survival of PM Mossadeq’s govt. difficult in 1953; covert action by US
brought Shah back
Nicaragua: US brought Somoza family to power, est. National Guard;
Somoza family’s power from ties to US policymakers
Prominent Classes and the State
 Skocpol: state disintegration begins when there is intl. pressure and political split between dominant
classes and state Types of relations state has with prominent classes in societies
 Iran and Nicaragua: social space between weak polar classes – “intermediate classes” – strives to
dominate subordinate classes and self-organize through ideologies that influence broad strata of
society
o In social formations w/weak polar classes, intermediate classes (led by “petty bourgeoisie) rise to
prominence, attempt to dominate not only civil society but also state itself and “propertied
classes” (economy, society, state)
Iran: revolution launched through rift between two prominent classes and ruling clique:
1. salaried/professional class
-technocratic and managerial abilities indispensable to civilian bureaucracies
-rose to prominence because state was interested in industrializing Iran
-attempt to utilize apparatuses of state to exert hegemony blocked by Shah’s mode of governance
-high ranking state officials rewarded, but middle and lower ranks of bureaucracy did not
develop into source of support for monarchy
-bureaucrats bought relationship to Shah through opportunities for social mobility opened
by industrialization, but Shah’s restrictions on freedom expression, elections, Parliament,
military/civilian officials prevented members of salaried professional intermediate class
from supporting Shah’s economic and social policies
2. traders, small/medium-sized entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants – petite bourgeoisie
-integrated in bazaars – centers of small commodity production/exchange in urban areas
-class included 90,000 clergymen linked to bazaars through family/financial ties
-did not participate in state/economy-building, but relied on wealth and remained independent of
state
Nicaragua – prominent classes:
-had bourgeoisie that developed independently state, benefited from Somoza’s policies, tied by common
business interests
-but Somoza’s “meddling” w/their businesses made even this group unhappy by mid-70s
-subordinate marginal faction of bourgeoisie – economic opportunities even more restricted
-Nicaragua’s entry into Central American Common Market in 1963 began urbanization that gave rise to
large urban intermediate class
-small entrepreneurs, employers in bank/insurance companies, middle-rank officials
-between marginal bourgeoisie and urban working class
-1973 – 1/5 of 544,000 economically active population
-higher educational standards, blocked by regime in economic, cultural, political aspirations
-discontent with Somoza regime more pronounced after abuses of political and economic power
after 1972 earthquake – leading members of opposition movement from this intermediate class
Permissive World Context
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Prominent classes in Iran and Nicaragua had developed opposition movements before, but did not
succeed in overthrowing the regime
-Iran: Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911 and oil nationalization movement of early 1950s
resulted in reinstatement of monarchy
-Nicaragua: peasant insurrection led by Sandino in 1920s, conservative bourgeois opposition
repeatedly appeased
Timing of revolutionary mobilization and state disintegration
-have to take into account very weak position of peripheral states, not just pressure of international
competition
Iran and Nicaragua:
-post-Vietnam and post-Watergate American foreign policy, US (major power) ambiguous towards
survival of both regimes, closely identified with Somoza and reestablishment of Shah
Iran:
-Shah’s regime dependent on American support since inception
-1970s Iran became increasingly important to American foreign policy – “gendarme” of Persian Gulf
region
-American defeat in Indo-China, direct intervention seen as futile, Nixon doctrine against
communist infiltration
-massive military buildup
-regime couldn’t act contrary to US interest, owed military prospects to American support,
political support to increasingly nationalistic Iranians
-American failure in Vietnam in 1975  defensive, reluctant to engage in 3rd World military ventures
reevaluation of foreign policy, esp. Iran because of heavy military purchases
-debate in US over selling arms to repressive authoritarian regime
-Shah’s concern about intl. image created pressure on the regime
-Carter’s election in 1976 – focus on human rights while also calling Iran “island of stability”
-never wavered in public support of Shah, but Shah’s insecurities caused his confusion about
Carter’s human rights policies – paranoid about foreign control – first signs of state disintegration
Nicaragua:
-Somoza dynasty supported by National Guard (established/trained by SU) and direct US backing (b/c of
anticommunism and ability to maintain order)
-American support continued through mid-70s when Anastasio Somoza secured 80% increase in US
military aid to create elite counterinsurgency force within National Guard after FSLN guerrillas invaded
Managua Christmas party and captured business and political leaders
-supposed to fight FSLN guerrillas in northern Nicaragua, but used to terrorize rural population
instead
-80% of rural population uprooted into resettlement camps
-human rights violations appalled moderates in Nicaragua and rest of the world
-1977 Carter human rights policy targeted Nicaragua
“Questioning of Somoza’s human rights record, and the consequent temporary restriction son military and
economic aid emboldened moderate opposition that had been immobilized by unquestioned American
support”; confusion in American foreign policy weakened basis of regime that depended on solid
American support
*close relationship w/US was destabilizing in the long run, special relationships with individual leaders
helped them detach repressive states from social bases and ignore structural reforms that other
internationally autonomous regimes had to pay attention to
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*when internal pressures to reform intensified, the US did not consistently support the individual leaders
b/c it was more interested in protecting its interests and profitable relations, “cracked open” states that
depended upon their leaders
Urban Mobilization as the Basis of Revolutionary Resistance
Iran and Nicaragua – urban revolutions, unlike most 20th c. revolutions
Skocpol: solidarity and autonomy in poor urban communities, as in peasant communities
-Iran: autonomous, solitary urban enclaves connected to bazaars and religious networks
Urban Communities and the Peripheral State
-central role of state in rapid urbanization, uneven development of capitalism in peripheral formation
-political conflict between state and organized urban groups
-social classes place demands on state, state increasingly intervenes in urban process
-urban conflicts become conflicts between urban classes and the state (which mediates class
relations in the cities), unlike rural conflicts between polar classes
-organizations improving social relations for subordinate classes are usually controlled by the state, but in
revolutionary situations, the state loses its relationship with these organizations and bonds are forged
between subordinate classes and organizations, important
-Iran: religious associations formed important social bonds in poor urban communities
-personalized welfare services
-mobilized urban poor, create alliances with other urban groupings (traditional
intermediate class), religious hierarchy closely connected to organization of community
-Nicaragua: Catholic religious orders organized groups for spiritual growth and community
improvement through social and political action after 1968 L. American Bishops’ Conference and
Managua earthquake
-formed alliance with FSLN – Sandinistas used organization of Christian groups, only organized
urban political groups in 1970s
-political coalition led by bourgeois opposition negotiated with Somoza, failed, alliance led by
FSLN became leader of opposition against the state
Skocpol: autocratic state disintegrates due to pressures from intl. competition and desertion of dominant
classes, state breakdown initiates attack by lower classes on dominant social structure – weakening of
state – initiates wider multi-class attack against the state itself that brings about its collapse
-conceivable that no changes in class structure occur, possible when industrialization makes state
responsible for all problems in urban life
-widespread mobilization can transform social structure – revolutionary elites use multi-class
coalition, organizational capacities affect outcome
The Question of Ideology
Contrary to Skocpol, ideology was important in Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions
-Islamic activism and liberation theology (human will, desired results) – Shi’i Islam moved from
quietist to revolutionary stance in short time
-opposition movement in Iran originally against Shah and US, Islamic Republican Party did not
exist before fall of Shah
-Worldviews are responses to changing social needs and conflicts, individuals reacting to immediate
conditions
-Iran and Nicaragua: religious agenda became broader, brought to center of political conflict,
religious symbols had new meaning in opposition to foreign-dominated repressive states
-ideologies reflected and mediated through culture are diffused throughout civil society
-weak peripheral bourgeoisies, subordinate classes may not be incorporated into dominant value
system
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-subordinate classes reject dominant ideology, religion becomes alternative value system;
religion becomes strategy for coping w/changes in social networks by industrialization
and urbanization
-can promote radical opposition to class inequality
-Nicaragua: growth of non-orthodox Catholic forms of religion among urban poor, institutional change in
the form of Christian base communities, organizational resource for FSLN
-liberation theology part of larger movement for social justice in Central and South America
-never expressed Nicaraguan nationalism or aspired for state power, mobilized to help FSLN
-Iran: call for direct rule by clerics, distinctly anti-Western community, identified with Iranian
nationalism, petty bourgeoisie, mobilized masses
-new radical position – against “western imperialism” – prevent others from usurping state power
Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes
Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives
Richard Snyder
-Students of Revolution are interested in Sultanistic regimes because they are linked to the rare
phenomenon of Social Revolutions (Pahlavi in Iran, Somoza in Nicaragua, and Batista in Cuba)
and
-Students of regime transitions are also drawn to Sultanistic regimes cause they have resisted the
wave of democratization (Haiti) (exception: the Philippines under Marcos: the absence of a
revolution and a moderately successful transition to democracy is very surprising)
Snyder combines struc and volun by uniting a focus on structural factors with a focus on political
action and historical contingency
3pathways from a Sultanistic Regime:
1. Revolution: Iran, Nicaragua, Cuba
2. Non revolutionary Transition to civilian rule: Philippines and Romania
3. Transition to military dictatorship: Haiti
Framework for Explaining Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes
2 steps
1. Snyder defines the actors relevant to transitions from Sultanistic regimes according to
strategic posters rather than by institutional or structural roles
2. He also maps the institutional and social structures in which these actors operate in order
to pinpoint how much room if any, exits for strategic maneuvering
Defining the Actors Who Make Transitions
4 domestic groups are relevant for analyzing the dynamics of Sultanistic regimes:
1. Regime Hard-liners= are unconditionally committed to perpetuating the dictator’s rule
2. Regime Soft-Liners= they perceive their survival to be separable from the dictators and
especially during times of crisis, may come to view their association with him as more a liability
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than a benefit; they may seek to sever their ties with the dictator; this group includes factions of
the military or members of the state’s administrative buereau alienated by the dictator’s
interference with their autonomy and professionalism
3. Moderate opposition= committed to the limited goal of ousting the dictator and his ruling
clique; they are willing to support or join regime soft-liners seeking to overthrow the dictator;
regime soft liners are usually their first choice allies but if they aren’t there these guys may group
w/ the Maximalists; their immediate goal is simply to replace the Sultanistic dictator’s arbitrary
rule with a more predictable institutionalized regime
4.Maximalist opposition = abhors allying with any regime incumbents and is committed to goals
that extend far beyond simply removing the dictator; seek to overthrow the existing regime and
seize control of the state; their agenda involves radically transforming state and society as well;
group consist of revolutionary organizations
 Even when there is the structural space for the organization of one or more of these
groups, actors do not always take adv of structural opps, and when mods, maxes, hards,
and softs do organize, their strategies, strengths and options are shaped by the structural
context in which they operate
Mapping the Structural Contexts of Transitions
Core defining features of Sultanistic Regime:
-the ruler’s maintenance of authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology,
charisma, or impersonal law
-the patronage is the link/spokes between the core, radial dictator and the state and civil society
-sultans are usually clients of foreign powers (super patrons such as US)
3 critical relationships capture the structural dynamics of Sultanistic regimes:
1. ruler vs state institutions
-When state institutions are thoroughly penetrated by the dictator’s patronage network, the
political space for the emergence of regime soft liners is minimal and the ruling clique and the
state are essentially fused into a single hard line actor
-When the state institutions are insulated from the dictator’s patronage network, the structural
potential exits for soft lingers to organize w/in these institutions and oppose the dictator
-how far the ruler has undermined the autonomy of the armed forces through patronage is a
critical variable that differentiates cases of transition from sultanism where the impetus for
political change comes from above from cases where it originates from below, involving societal
actors outside the regime
-when segments of the armed forces have not been thoroughly divided by the dictator and are
capable of autonomous action against him, military coup with or without civilian support may
remove the dictator
-where the military lacks sufficient autonomy to act independently of the dictator, as in IRAN
NICARAGUA AND CUBA, the possibility for political transformation hinges on the efforts of
Maximalists opposition groups with the coercive resources necessary to defeat the dictator’s
loyal military  political change tends to be violent and revolutionary if it occurs at all
Ways to neutralize military coup:
1. (as Duvalier did) transfer primary responsibility for applying state violence to a loyal
paramilitary force, stripping the regular military of virtually all security functions (this
can work over a short time, but could actually create more challenges over the long term
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because the military can easily come to view its survival as independent from the
dictator; the public will see the military as independent from the ruler’s dirty work, which
explains the shouts of “long live the army” in Haiti during the overthrow of the Duvalier
dynasty)
2. undermine the capacity of armed forces to against the regime; to intertwine the military’s
survival with the dictator’s, encourages predator behavior by the armed forces against
civil society and weakens their legitimacy with the population
= these 2 factors increases the likelihood that transitions from sultanism will be violent
2. ruler relationship to domestic social elites
The degree of inclusion of domestic elites w/in the patronage network influences the growth of
both maximalist and moderate oppositions
-when the patronage is inclusive: political space for opp is narrow
-when patronage is excluding: there is an opening for growth of opposition
 Reza Shah, Somoza Debayle and Batista unintentionally encouraged the growth of opp by
excluding dom elites from political power and economic patronage
-the absence of soft liners w/ these regimes pushed the moderates to the Maximalists who
had the military or organizational cap to unseat the dictator and his subservient army
*the ability of maximalists to construct such broad coalitions was a key cause of
revolution in Iran, Nic, and Cuba
BUT: sultan regimes are not always toppled by revolution because organizational difficulties, the
absence of political cultures of opposition, the lack of effective leaders and state repression can
all hinder the emergence of potent opposition movements even in an exclusionary environment;
also maxes don’t’ have to pursue an armed confrontation or they may be incapable of defeating
the dictators armed forces in battle, or there could be soft line segments of the armed forces with
the ability to act autonomously against he dictator, a coalition of moderate civilian opposition
groups and disgruntled segments of the military, may block rev even when a powerful max opp
does exist
ON THE OTHER HAND: Somoza batista and the Shah were toppled by rev. this occurred
because pwrful rev movements emerged against them and the armed forces were unable to act
against the dictator and so because of this the moderates lacked potential soft line allies and
chose to ally with the revolutionaries
TO SUM UP: Sultanistic regimes that effectively co-opt societal elites through patronage
networks can inhibit the growth of both max and mod oppositions. Sultanistic regimes that
exclude elites from patronage and limit it to a small clique surrounding the ruler tend to
encourage the growth of opposition and are generally unstable
REVS is likely to come out of instable case where a coherent rev movement challenges the
dictator and where military soft liners are absent
3. domestic actors (hards softs mods and maxes) to foreign powers
-Sultan dictators are usually dependent on foreign patrons who supply critical military aid and
material resources that can help fuel their domestic patronage networks. Mod and Max groups
opposed to these dictators frequently receive assistance from foreign actors
-the impact of these foreign forces is mediated by the domestic actors and by the willingness of
dom actors to participate in the schemes of foreign powers, foreign powers can influence
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transitions from sultanism by strengthening dom actors by making decisions that can either
increase or decrease their maneuverability
-Iran, Nic, and Cuba’s dictators’s extreme dependence on super power patronage contributed to
the success of the max opps
-Farideh Farhi said that extreme reliance on US support encouraged revolution because this
support promoted repressive regime behavior by providing military and eco resources which
allowed the ruler to detach his repressive state and apparatus from its social base
-US support also frustrated the nationalist ambitions of elites and undermined the ruler’s control
during times of crises because the US insisted on liberalizing reforms and limited coercion
BUT the extreme dependence of a Sultanistic ruler on a foreign power does not necessarily
encourage revolution and may even inhibit it. A superpower patron can inhibit rev by defusing a
crisis that would otherwise strengthen the hand of maxes and provide an opp for them to seize
power
-Iran, Nic, and Cuba= The US was unable to find an acceptable viable alternative to the incumbent dictator
and contributed to its client’s rev overthrow by pursuing a destabilizing “human rights policy” intended to
limited the dictator’s use of coercion through the threat of withholding vital military and economic assistance
TO AVOID the leverage external actors have on them, dictators can diversify sources of foreign
support avoid overdependence on a single patron, when foreign actors have limited leverage over
the dictator, their ability to influence the course of political development is restricted to
supporting the dictators opp or to intervening directly
Alternative Paths of Political Development for Sultanistic Regimes:
REVOLUTION
Factors and make a revolution:
1. high penetration of state by patronage, and high dependence on a single superpower patron
2. lack of soft-liners, low level of moderates, and high level of Maximalists (in levels of strength)
POLITICAL STABILITY
Examples: Haiti and Zaire
Characteristics of Sultan regime that leads to political stability
1. little space for the organization of opposition due to extensive penetration of both state and
society by dictator’s patronage network
2. absence of soft liners and civilian opposition
3. hard liners are the sole players in the domestic political arena
4. hard liners avoid dependence on single super power
Haiti had:
-autonomy of armed forces (Haiti)
-inclousion of middle class in patronage which reduced opp
-insulation from foreign powers
-subordination of the armed forces had minimized the political space for the organization of opp
Zaire had:
-co op of elites
-brutal repression and the exacerbation of ethnic and regional divisions
-state patronage that inhibited max and mod oppositions
-undermining of armed forces’ institutional autonomy which eliminated the political space for
soft line opp
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-extraction of assistance from foreign patrons while limiting the leverage these patrons had over
him
-neutralized the threat of military coup by maintaining close personal control over the armed
forces by encouraging rivalries among officer factions and purging officers deemed
untrustworthy
IN SUM structure changes in ruler-society changes opened space for societal opp which mods
used to organize, the max groups remained weak and soft liners was inhibited
REVOLUTION
Sultanistic regimes are more likely than other types of nondem regimes to be overthrown by revs
Because of overdependence on superpower patron and political exclusion of dom elites, absence
of military autonomy
Structural Causes of Rev in Iran, Nic, and Cuba
-their regimes were all characterized by thorough penetration of state institutions by the
dictator’s patronage networks
-the result was the fusion of the ruling clique w/ the state = little political space w/ which the soft
line opp could develop and stripped the military’s autonomy by the dictator’s patronage network
also eroded its overall competence and organizational coherence making it vulnerable to
disintegration when challenged in combat
-absence of soft liners  led the mod opps to join the rev forces that had the military cap to
unseat the dictator and his subservient army
-all were dependent on US support the external military and eco resources these rulers
received from the US allowed them to dispense w/ domestic coalition building which encouraged
the decoupling of these regime from their societies and the exclusion of domestic elites from
patronage  didn’t have to please their domestic elites/ society because they didn’t need them
-the dependence on US stimulated opp by frustrating the nationalists
SUM-extensive penetration of the state by the dictator’s patronage network, which undermines
military autonomy, minimal extension of patronage into civil society; and extreme dependence
on one superpower
= these don’t necessarily = Rev
Examples of countries w/ same structural characteristics but different outcome:
Zaire
-weak maxes, maybe because of ongoing state repression or lingering fragmentation of civil
society
- IN IRAN CUBA NIC these maximalits effectively tapped into the “cultural idioms” of
nationalism (something that wasn’t supported by the regime) it was these revolutionary ideas
(such as islam) that mobilized support; they took adv of political cultures of opposition as a
necessary cause of rev
Military Dictatorships
Haiti:
-its breakdown led to military dictatorship because soft line factions of the armed forces turned
against Duvalier and filled the political vacuum
-mods lacked the leadership and organization to challenge the dictator
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-the US pushed him out and cleared the way for the military soft liners with whom it had been
secretly negotiation to seize power
-the US encouraged the military conspirators by promising concessions to those who assisted in
the dictators removal
-the absence of both mod and max political organizations allowed the military to seize pwr
unchallenged
Civilian Rule
-cases in which transitions from sultanism elad directly to nonrev civilian rule are characterize by
shallow penetration of the dictatrors patronage network into state and civil society, creating
structural space for the organization of opp in both arenas
Ex. Philippines under Marcos and its transition to Elite Democracy
-this is the only case here in which the full complement of hard liners, soft liners and mods and
maxes were present
-military soft liners and a powerful rev opp alongside the mod opp raises the question y power
was transferred to mods and not to either of the other 2 armed groups
-Marco’s regime had exclusion of elites, growth of max and mod opp, and extreme dependence
on US
 Rev didn’t occur because there were pockets of intrastate autonomy w/ in which military soft
liners organied. The breakdown of sultaism in the Philippines led to a transition to civlan rule
because a powerful moderate opp was able to eschew alliance w/ max and take pwr w/ the help
of mil soft liners who revolted against the dictator
BUT UNLIKE IN IRAN NIC CUB this US support inhibited revolution (Reagan)
“No Other Way Out” : States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 Jeff Goodwin,
Chapter 5
1) The Formation of Revolutionary Movements in Central America
a) Argument: State-centered approach to revolutions can illuminate revolutionary
movement in independent peripheral societies, using Central America as a guideline
b) The explanation of political violence in Central america that centers around economic
dependence on U.S. and class struggle fails to explain the differences in revolutionary
movements between Nicaragua (successful rev) and Honduras (no rev, despite severe
inequity and dependence)
c) Institutional configurations and practices of Central American states best explain both
uneven development and outcome of revolutionary movements
i) Rev movements were strongest in states with militarized yet infrastructurally weak
states that were consistently exclusionary( Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala)
ii) Nicaragua’s FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front), only revolutionary
movement in region able to seize power, did so because it confronted a personalistic,
“neopatrimonal” dictatorship that alienated large sections of the bourgeoisie and
political moderates
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(1) This arguments devalues but does not dismiss the importance of class relations
and economic dependence to revolutions
(a) Instead class relation and external ties, were less important in their direct
effects on revolutionaries than in terms of how they shaped the deployment of
state power, which was more significant for formation and success of
revolutionary movements
(b) Goodwin’s state-centered approach accords with new instituionalims in
emphasizing causal importance of institutionalized practices as opposed to
braod “social forces”
2) An Overview of Central America
a) July, ’79 FSLN overthrew dictatorship in Nicaragua, but the movements in Salv and
Guatemala were unable to seize state power
b) Central America is a “lab for theories of revolution” because its countries share similar
social structures and histories not to mention geo-political situation
i) The value of this regional approach is that it allows one to “control” for a variety of
factors that might otherwise be viewed as causal
c) 10 Important regional similarities of Central American countries
i) Rapid Economic development of export of economies
ii) Transition from traditional haciendas to more purely capitalist “agribusiness”
iii) Rapid population growth
iv) A highly concentrated pattern of land ownership
v) Tradition of political authoritarianism
vi) Fiscally and infrastructurally weak states
vii) Predominance of Roman Catholic Religion
viii) Formation in 50s and 60s and reform oriented grass-roots organs and political
parties
ix) Formation of Marxist Leninist revolutionary orgs that adopted “guerrilla struggle”
x) Attempt by these orgs to gather people under common “world-historical context”,
Communists in Cuba, Church activism, debates in U.S. after Vietnam
d) These similarities led most observers to conclude that social revolutionary was an
inevitable outcome in this regional crisis
e) This suggests that political context is less important than regional characteristics,
Goodwin’s rejects this assertion
3) The Formation of Revolutionary Movements
a) Experts attribute Central America’s revs to extreme poverty, economic dependence,
inequality, etc., but none of these show strong correlation to political fortunes of region
i) Neither extreme poverty nor income inequality are unambiguously associated with
uneven development of rev movements in region
ii) Rapid population growth present in Honduras did not cause a revolution
iii) Nicaragua, where land poverty was least severe, was the only successful rev
iv) Guatemala and Honduras got more U.S. aid then Nicaragua, yet Honduras saw no
revolution and Nicaragua did
b) Argument: Revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemal are
result of during the 60s and 70s the attempt to redress social and political problems
through elections and peaceful orgs was met with authoritarian regimes in those countries
using blatant fraud and violent repression
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c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
i) Result: More people joined armed and ideologically radical guerrilla organizations
Nicaragua’s repression was a result of the dictator’s control of the National Guard, they
also used electoral fraud to stay in power
El Salvador- electoral fraud was also source of repression- When the military leader came
under electoral pressure, the military cancelled the elections and declared the military
candidate the victor
Guatemala- military ruled in an “institutional” fashion- They violently oppressed
opposition and murdered the leaders of the two main opposition parties after the 1978
presidental election
The violence of these countries began to not differentiate between revolutionaries and
reformists, therefore a lot of people were in danger
i) People who would have tried to take a legal route to reform sought the protection that
the guerilla armies provided
(1) IN Nicaragua, when gov thought the FSLN was recruiting teen males, they
executed many teen males
(2) In El Salvador, ORDEN attacked union and political activists working among
peasants and rurlal workers during 70s, they also expelled at least 60 priests from
the country for their role in the revolution
(a) Jan 22, 1980, largest organized demonstration in Salvador’s history was met
with army fire leaving 49 dead
(3) State violence was most severe in Guatemala- 615 disappearances between
mid’78 and nov ‘80
Therefore the “political-militray organizations” leading the revs in Central American
were formed from dissidents from parties whose lives were endangered and were sick of
the electoral fraud and repression
i) A common perception that the only protection from the state could be provided by rev
movements, to join a rev movement became a defensive decision of “life or death”
ii) These repressive regimes had unintentionally recruited new members to the
revolutionary movements, and these political-militray organizations eventually
coalesced in this context of political exclusion and violence
(1) For Example- in El Salvador the revolutionary movement was mainly comprised
of two parts: radicalized religious activists and the former Communist party
iii) The organization of the revolutionary movement was for the purposes of self-defense
and their resistance was result of state repression not the cause
iv) These moderate groups pushed to ally with the guerilla by electoral fraud and
repression provided material aid, political legitimacy and foreign support for the
revolutionary movement
(1) Part of the reason for the success of Nicaraguan movements was that they had a
broad “multi-class populist coalition” that included workers and peasants,
students, middle-class people, and part of the country’s elite
(2) In El Salvador, the guerilla groups were affilitated with a “popular organization”
that brought together a large number of labor and political groupings
v) The legitimacy of the violent means for rev change were a result of the government’s
violent repression of people’s legal redresses for change
(1) Other demands, like higher wages, became the “causes” of revolutions because
specific state structures prevented them from being solved in peaceful ways
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4) The Function of the Little-Known Case in Thoery Formation, or Why Was There No
Revolutionary Movement in Honduras?
a) In this revolutionary region, Honduras has been stable, even with its impoverished and
externally dependent status
b) The revolutionary left in Honduras remained marginalized in 80s- 4 main guerilla orgs
had a combined 600 members
c) Political context is crucial differentiating between Honduras and other countries in the
region- the “semi-openess” of the political regimes in Honduras after the 60s, and during
this period Honduras has alternated between civilian and comparatively moderate
military rule
i) Result of semi-openness, is reformist political currents as well as ideologically
moderate labor and peasant unions have been unusually free to operate and organize
within Honduras, this led to distaste for armed struggle and discouraged ordinary
people from joining or collaborating with small guerrilla groups that attempted to
operate in country
ii) This semi-openness dates back to 1954 strike, where the strikers won principal
demand; legal recognition of trade unions, and shortly thereafter the Labor Party
official was elected president and enacted the first agrarian-reform law, even when
the military took over, the gov still pushed for agrarian reform
iii) In 1969, Honduras was defeated in “soccer war” by El Salvador, this military defeat
dampened political conflict and paved the way for reform in Honduras
iv) Another military gov enacted agrarian reform law—This was very important
“symbolically” because it demonstrated flexibility and reform potential of the
Honduran government
v) Why did Honduran armed forces remain less brutal and less politically conservative?
2 Factors
(1) Honduras never had powerful landowning oligarchy ( this absence is single factor
that best accounts for lack of revolutionary mobilization in Honduras) , therefore
with no oligarchy to protect, Honduras did not develop a professional military tied
to concentrated economic interests and the military did not view its function as
making more or less permanent war on its citizens
(a) 2 Related to points to lack of oligarchy
(i) This factor has dampened revolutionary mobilization in Honduras in an
indirect fashion- through the relative autonomy that it allowed Honduran
state and armed forces
(ii) Absence of powerful oligarchy obviously did very littleto dampen
revolutionary mobilization in neighboring Nicaragua
2) Relatively Plentiful supply of public land- result of Honduras’s comparatively
sparse population and the absence of an oligarchic drive to buy or seize such land for
coffee cultivation
vi) These two factors do not guarantee an open polity, which can be seen by the fact that
Nicaragua, very similar to Honduras, has had an opposite outcome
1) Relationship to U.S. may have been deciding factor: while U.S. has played role
in evolution of Honduran armed forces, it gave Nicaragua the repressive
National Guard
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2) Jorge Arturo Reina summarized principal reasons why there is no violence for
now in Honduras: 1. Social reforms enacted by the government 2. Exodus of
Salvadorans due to the 1969 war 3. The reforms enacted between ’72-’75 4.
Hope that electoral road can bring about changes peacefully 5. Relative
tolerance of military rule compared to the reactionary military regimes
elsewhere in the region
vi) Cycle of civilian and comparatively mild military rule in Honduras prevented
the emergence of a popular revolutionary movement in that country
5) Conclusion
a) Character and practices of Central American states determined whether or not armed and
ideologically radical revolutionaries could mobilize
b) Revolutionary mobilization occurred where political exclusion and state repression werer
the norm during the 60s and 70s
c) Revolutionary mobilization in Central America in 70s and 80s generally a response to
political exclusion and violent repression- the contraction of political opportunities and
the closing down of “political space”
d) State structures and practices helped revolutionary movements by closing off or
destroying for a great many people alternative means of interest representation
e) 5 Distinct Causal Mechanisms: 1. Despotic regimes tend to be blamed for economic
failures of the state 2. Despotic regimes provide common enemy for different people
with different grievances 3. Despotic regimes make it advantageous to join a
revolutionary movement because of the protection they provide 4. Legitimacy is
problematic for authoritarian regimes that can no longer appeal to tradition or religion for
their right to rule 5. Politically repression puts a premium on sorts of goods that revs can
provide including self-defense, and collective or public goods that states promise but
don’t deliver
f) Autocratic capitalism or “reactionary despotism” inadvertently facilitated and even
encouraged, the formation of mass based movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala
No Other Way Out, by Jeff Goodwin
Chapter 6 – Not-So-Inevitable Revolutions: The Political Trajectory of Revolutionary
Movements in Central America
Sonam Velani
Introduction
 Infrastructurally weak authoritarian regimes are cause of revolutionary movements in
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala
o Only Nicaraguan revolution was successful, and occurred very quickly (new
regime was in place within two years)
o El Salvador – decade-long civil war led by unpopular FMLN offensives were
ultimately toppled by the government
o Guatemala – government defeated most URNG guerrillas by cutting them off
from their mass base, but conflict persisted for decades
 Structure of authoritarian regimes determines how they respond to revolutionary
movements that they originally caused.
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o Nicaragua – neopatrimonial (a.k.a. sultanistic) Somoza dictatorship; he was selfdestructive, and therefore state-destructive
o El Salvador and Guatemala – corporate and institutional forms of military
domination that economic elites embraced
Personalistic Versus Institutional Dictatorships
 Neopatrimonial dictatorships are comparatively more vulnerable to overthrow than
institutional forms of authoritarianism
o Neopatrimonial dictatorships – personalistic domination based on coercion by
dictator’s army and distribution of patronage and offices
o Institutional dictatorships – regime is dominated by armed forces, political party,
or collective entity
Neopatrimonial Dictatorships
Elites dependent upon state; lack broad
political influence; disorganized and
demobilized
Competing offices with ill-defined
responsibilities
Appointments based on loyalty; basis for
conflict between dictatorship and economic
elites who don’t have personal connections
Opposition cliques cannot emerge within
state apparatus itself since appointments
based on loyalty
Officials separated from currents of civil
society and foreign states
Capacity for private economic gain,
especially w/varying degrees of
connections to dictator
Institutional Dictatorships
Elites are organized; impersonal with
dictatorship
Single hierarchical bureaucracy with
strictly-defined responsibilities
Appointments based on merit, or perceived
loyalty to institution of army/party; more
predictable and favored by economic elites
There is more “political space” for
development of opposition
Officials have more autonomy to associate
with civil society and foreign states
Salaries are fixed; corruption occurs, but no
single official who is as commanding as a
dictator
The Nicaraguan Revolution: Channeling the Deluge
 Succeeded b/c of neopatrimonial character of Somoza dictatorship:
o Strength and popularity of FSLN
o Growing elite and moderate opposition to Somoza
o International support for Sandinistas / geopolitical isolation of Somoza
o Absence of political opening “from above”
o Inability of Somoza’s National Guard to contain and halt insurrection
 Other factors that developed throughout 1978-79
o Somoza negotiated with moderate opposition group, Broad Opposition Front
(FAO), but broke down after use of repressive techniques, and FAO economic
elites joined Sandinistas
o Carter administration policy – remove Somoza, but keep his army/state instead of
Sandinistas; remove all aid
o Regional support – Costa Rica provided Sandinistas safe haven for arms, Mexico
and Panama broke relations
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
o Bourgeois opposition – business controlled through state power and connections;
earthquake reconstruction efforts in Managua were thwarted
o There was no coup attempt within the National Guard, and revolution was the
only way out.
o FSLN was becoming well-organized, and was able to collaborate between all
social classes around the country
Nicaraguan Revolution was not necessarily inevitable, but the neopatrimonial
dictatorship was a major cause.
o Sandanistas themselves forestalled a regime change and direct U.S. intervention,
taking matters into their own hands
o They did not do so for political opportunities; rather, they wanted to break down
the state itself
Stalemate in El Salvador; Impasse in Guatemala
 Armed forces were able to prevent urban insurrections, which retarded the growth of
revolutionary movements, but didn’t eliminate them
o Opened up “political space” for elections and unarmed social movements
o Implemented socioeconomic reforms
 Therefore, revolutionaries weren’t able to gain domestic (elites) and
international (U.S.) allies
o This resulted in stalemate civil war (El Salvador) and low-intensity conflict
(Guatemala)
 El Salvador military coup
o Reformist elements in the military established military-civilian junta
o Under this junta, armed forces unleashed war against guerrilla groups, but the
Christian Democratic faction associated with Duarte was accepted
 Guatemala military coup
o Led by General Rios Montt, the Christian Democratic leader
o Similar to El Salvador, this coup repressed guerrillas, but established transition to
election civilian government
 These successful coups demonstrate autonomy of the military in an institutional
dictatorship, unlike the close connections of the National Guard with Somoza
 However, there was increase in state-sponsored murders and civil war continued
o Army had to use force to oversee transition to semi-competitive moderate, socialdemocratic parties (not the left, of course)
 This had to occur to get international aid and investments
 Elections for executive and legislative branches in mid-late 1980s
o Christian Democratic parties won initially, raising hope for peace and social
reform, but right wing democrats succeeded them when they didn’t fulfill their
promises
 These rightists, ironically, eventually negotiated settlements with
revolutionaries, after understanding that they could not be defeated
 Despite the problems with the newly elected officials, they were able to prevent further
political polarization
o Armed forces did allow civilian positions, creating perception/hope that social
justice could be peacefully implemented
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

o Duarte in El Salvador gained support of labor and peasant groups, allowed for
nonviolent protest against his administration, and decreased army violence to
receive international aid
o Cerezo in Guatemala disbanded intelligence branch of the police, replaced
military officials, and carried out minimal land reform
o These political openings only posed a minimal threat to the elite, and therefore,
they remained semi-loyal to new electoral regimes
 In fact, elites could use the political openings to build their own coalitions
and become elected officials and manipulate the state
International Aid and Legitimacy
o Counterinsurgency wars wouldn’t be possible without aid, mainly U.S.
o Carter didn’t intervene in Nicaragua to stop Sandinistas, but did in El Salvador
and Guatemala to prevent another Central American revolution
o Revolutionaries also didn’t have safe haven in Costa Rica or Honduras, as the
Sandinistas did. Their numbers declined considerably.
El Salvadorian and Guatemalan attempts at revolution were unsuccessful because of
institutional military domination
o Armed forces removed ineffectual rulers, oversaw political openings, and
therefore obtained international aid for counterinsurgency effort
WEEK 8
TERMS 8.1
TERMS 8.2
Geertz, “Interpretations of Culture”

Case Study: India, Maylasia, Congo, Indonesia, Morocco, Etc.
o Religious contrasts: communalism in India
o Malaysia: racial contrasts
o Congo: tribal contrasts
o Indonesia: regionalism
o Ceylon: Tamil minority/ Sinhalese majority by religion, language, race, region,
and social customs
o Iraq: Shiite minority, set off from dominant Sunnis, Intra-Islamic differences
o Africa: largely race and tribalism

Ambiguity surrounding terms: “Nation”, “Nationality”, “Nationality”
o “Nation” & “loyalty” do not always coincide
o More refer to communes of groups rather than to nation itself

People have desire to “matter”
o Desire to be recognized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and
opinions “matter”- being “somebody”
o Need for identity, need to exist
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o Tension is a central driving force in the evolution of a new state, but at the same
time, one of the greatest obstacles to revolution.

Sense of self remains bound-up in actualities of blood, race, language, locality, religion,
or tradition
o People use sovereign state to get what they want (further dev. of state)
o People’s sense of self and desire to matter coincides with political aims.
o Source of political ID (differences)

Double-Edged Feeling
o Uniligual state more stable because of fellow feelinf (oneness)
o Binds people (ignore eco./soc. Differences) but at the same time severs them of
other kind. Longing not to belong to another groups= foundation for
stable/democratic state

Problem- Tribalism, Parochialism, Communalism
o Longing not to belong to any other group= cause
o Disaffection based on race, language, or culture threatens partition- redrawing of
state’s limits
o Blood-ties (Nigeria, Congo, Sub-Saharan Africa, nomads of Middle East-Kurds,
Baluches, Pathans, India-Nagas, Mundas, Santals
o Race (Chinese in SE Asia, Indians and Lebanese in Africa)
o Language (India, Iran, Philippines, Lebanon)
o Region in geographically heterogeneous areas (East/West Pakistan= now
Bangladesh and Pakistan)= territorial discontinuity
o Religion (India, Lebanon, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria)
o Custom (India, Indonesia, Arabs in Morocco, Ethiopia)
o People long to escape established state and reunite politically divided primordial
community

Patterns of Primordial Battles
o Single dominant, usually larger, group set over single strong minority (Ex:
Cyprus- Greeks and Turks)
o One central group and several mediumly large and at least somewhat opposed
peripheral groups (Ex. Javanese vs. Outer Islanders in Indonesia)
o Bipolar type- one of 2 nearly balanced major groups (Ex. :Malays and Chinese in
Malaya) also (Christians and Muslims in Lebanon)
o Pattern of relatively even gradation of groups in importance , from several large
ones through several medium sized to a number of smaller, no clear dominant and
no sharp cut off points (Ex. India, Nigeria, Kenya, Philippines)
o Simple ethnic fragmentation= multiple small groups (much of Africa)

Political modernization tends initially not to quiet sentiments, but o quicken them
o Country’s attainment of independence is also attained by every little citizen (
“mean something”)
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
Case study: Ceylon
o First definite move toward a resolute, popularly based, social-reform govt. led,
therefore not too heightened national unity, but reverse- increasing linguistic,
racial, regional, and religions parochialism
o Groups see discontent with government as opportunity to react

Education/ Schools= Major battle ground
o Linguistic conflicts (Chinese and Malay)
o Religious conflicts (Muslim countries- conflict over reform of traditional Koranic
schools toward Western forms)
o Social statistics are often censored because they are known to cause uprisings and
social discontent
o Pessimistic about resolution of tensions between primordial sentiments and civil
politics probably cannot be entirely dissolved
o Believe countries must reconcile differences by neutralizing the apparatus of the
state in relationship to primordial differences, and by channeling discontent
arising out of their dislocation into political rather than parapolitical forms of
expression
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretations of Culture, pages 306-310: “The Integrative
Revolution”
 This article examines the “modernizing process” and its effect on the relationships among
discrete ethnicities in a given state

Integrative Revolution—“modernizing” ethnicities in a country, bringing them
together and avoiding ethnic conflict

Key Question: How can we explain the “chronic tension in new states between the
need to maintain a socially ratified personal identity and the desire to construct a
powerful national community”?

Thesis Paragraph: “The emergence of a nationwide system of ‘ethnic blocks’ engaged
in ‘total relations with one another’ sets the stage for a direct clash between personal
identity and political integrity in the new states. It allows one to continue to claim public
acknowledgement of one’s existence and import in terms of the familiar symbols of
group uniqueness, while at the same time becoming more and more drawn into a political
society cast in a mold wholly different from the ‘natural’ community those symbols
define. But, on the other hand, it also simplifies and concentrates group antagonisms” and
adds a political significance to quarrels between the groups.

On a personal level, most are unaware of this modernizing process and change in the
ethnic structure. So, changes cannot be understood on a personal level.
On a political (more macro level), have been examined but the true cause of the changes
is not known:
o “The stages through which a modern sense of political community arises out of a
traditional one have been at best but impressionistically traced, and thus both the

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roots and character of civility remain obscure.”

Therefore, the only way to understand the integrative revolution is to watch it happen and
learn what does work and doesn’t work.

Some lessons already learned:
o “The high degree of governmental immobilization resulting from the attempt to
reconcile divergent primordial groups is everywhere apparent”
o But, the alternatives are worse – breaking up into different states or violently
suppressing one ethnic group.

For a list of examples of countries undergoing the integrative revolution, see the first
paragraph of the reading
Isaacs: Basic Group Identity – The Idols of the Tribe

Basic group identity: the identity derived from belonging to what is generally called an
“ethnic group”; made up of what a person is born with or acquires at birth
o the ready made set of endowments and identifications by the chance of the family
into which he is born at that given time in that given place
 1. BODY- physical characteristics
 2. NAME- individual and family name, group name; the history and
origins of that family
 nationality, language, religion, value system
 the conditions of status: relative wealth or poverty, how much it
effects the family, political conditions in which the family or group
is held

two key ingredients in every individual’s personality and life experience (what makes
every case unique; where the blurring from the expected takes place)
o 1. Sense of belongingness
 he/she is not alone; it is an identity he might want to abandon but it is the
identity that no one can take away from him
o 2. The quality of his self-esteem
 includes self-acceptance, self-respect; all necessary to live a tolerable
existence
 for some people, their individual personalities are enough; others have to
rely on their group associations to enhance them
 the need for self-esteem (to acquire it, feel it, assert it) has in our own time
upset orders and become on e of the major drives behind our volcanic
politics
 example: the force behind the national/racial chauvinisms that have
characterized both the Russian and the Chinese revolutions
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BODY
 the most palpable element of which identity – individual or group – is made
 there is not much one can do to change his body (nowadays, it is becoming easier)
 old doctrine of thought: held that the spirit or soul is temporarily housed in his body and
survives when the body wastes away; the soul has an independent existence
 more modern doctrine: the “single whole”; the soul is not more than the body; the
features of civil society may reflect those of our individual body
o body image is a social phenomenon: our own body image is never isolated,
always accompanied by the body images of others
 physical characteristics serve as a badge of identity
o example: “whiteness” and “nonwhiteness” (although physical characteristics can
mean more than skin color)
o people who are the products of mixed marriages cross lines of distinctiveness (can
be rejected by both groups…)
o the degree of mobility between groups in societies depends heavily on the degree
of physical difference between them
 clothes also become a secondary identifying badge in all cultures
 body is for all groups the main basis for its standards of beauty: begins with what is
perceived as sexually attractive
 physical element of identity is also associated with place, land, soil to which a group is
literally, historically, or mythically attached
o territory is a critical factor in maintaining group separateness
The Politics of Cultural Pluralism pp. 29-39, 47-59
Crawford Young
I. Pluralism in the Beginning
A. Cultural pluralism began with the classifications made by foreign visitors
1. explorers applied collective labels to human groupings they visited
i. exploration of Atlantic slave trade led to 3 categories of classifications
a) shipping point on African coast where slave cargo was
purchased: “Calabari,” “Congo,” or “Angola”
b) name of political entity that provided slaves: “Oyo,” or “Fon”
c) generalized linguistic term for anyone from specific area:
“Bamara” or “Susu”
B. European colonies
1. communal; shared common order, participated together in ritual
observance, had kinship bonds, united for defense/security
2. not isolated; conflicted/exchanged w/ neighboring groups/trading communities
3. expanded through state formation, long-distance trading, universal religion
C. Ottoman empire
1. had Turkish core but never sought enforcement of cultural assimilation
D. Moroccan dynasties sought recognition of sultanate, not central culture
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E. Inca empire imposed linguistic unity further than most historical states
1. Quechua became royal language and spread to non-Quechua speaking areas
2. Aymara remained major separate language despite Incan subjugation
F. emergence of trading diaspora group: development of trading networks help expand
scale of social identity patterns
1. specialized group in long-distance trade across cultural/political zones;
2. banking system cannot solve problems of payment/exchange/credit, no legal
support to enforce contracts or protect property
G. Universal religions provide significant social identity where penetrated
1. Islam in precolonial Africa and Asia had powerful identity-reinforcing
mechanisms through rituals, socialization, and religious obligations
H. most rural populations under subjugation to European empires only had local
community in command of active membership and loyalty; nationalism had not emerged
I. Cultural integration policies designed as mechanisms to perfect sociopolitical control
II. The Illusion of “Tribe”
A. alterations of social/political environment during early colonialism brought nationalism
1. determined changes in contemporary cultural conflict that redefined cultural groups
B. basis of contemporary cultural pluralism:
1. moblization of populace vs. nationalist struggle to take control of political states
2. accelerating urbanization
3. improving communications system
4. spread of formal education and extension of literacy, not monopolized by clergy/gov
5. rise of leaders in support of nationalism and cultural mobilization
C. standard anthropological investigation of tribe:
1. choosing area near assumed cultural core of group
2. ensuring the ethnographic data is representative
3. inferring similar patters extending outwards from boundaries
D. Identity lacked strong ideological content bc. constant migrations, conquest, coexistence, etc.
E. Southall’s conclusion: connecting importance of interlocking/overlapping multiple collective
identities = one of the most important messages of social/cultural anthropology
F. “Tribe” expanded through concept of “detribalization”
1. immigrants from homeland tribe to new city left tribal system, were “detribalized”
2. confuses structure w/ identity
III. Identity as Social Role
A. cultural pluralism exists bc. individuals add culturally defined identities to their social roles
1. involves conscious sense of belonging to a given collectivity
2. each individual culturally undefined roles, selected in response to given situations
pp. 47-59
I. Types of Cultural Differentiation: ethnic, race, religion, caste, region groups
A. Ethnicity
1. language, territory, political unit, or common cultural symbols/values
a. common language: communication system
b. territory helps delineate identity except for urban ethnic groups
c. political unit can divide w/out past political structure to incorporate
d. common cultural symbols/values become general but risk redundancy
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2. ethnicity=subjective phenomenon
B. Race
1. stepchild of prejudice; legacy of stereotypes developed by Europeans
a. based on the physical (skin pigmentation/facial characteristics)
b. once established, it becomes systematic misperception of facts
2. categories and stereotypes:
a. Euorpeaus albus: lively, light, inventive, ruled by rights
b. Americanus regesceus: tenacious, contented, free, ruled by custom
c. Asiaticus luridus: stern, haughty, stingy, ruled by opinion
d. Afer niger: cunning, slow, negligent, ruled by caprice
3. racialism became elaborated cultural ideology in 19th cent
a. Darwin’s Origin of Species theories= major turning point
i. allowed hierarchical view of racial accomplishment/civilization
-Europeans= highest evolution, followed by
Asians/Indians, then Africans
b. Black racial solidarity has become powerful ideology
i. became common cultural tradition w/ unique virtues
ii. African racial self-awareness originates from common
subjugation, subordination by Europeans, linked to idea of
racial superiority
c. least “primordial” of cultural differentiation bases
C. Religion
1. offers comprehensive world view and social identity
2. as element in cultural pluralism, limited to great world religions:
a. Christianity, has political role as symbol of nationality
b. Islam= political religion, sometimes contributes to state formation
-internal subdivisions can overlap w/ other patterns of cultural
identity
-major cleavage between Shi’ite and Sunni interpretations
c. Judaism = non-converting faith (do not seek to convert others)
-Yiddish used to reinforce distinctiveness, replaced by Hebrew
-Jewish identity= significant cultural/political phenomenon
-political focus: survival of Israel, no constitution has developed
bc. of issues over legal definition of religious basis of state
d. Buddhism: diverse system of beliefs/practices related to Buddha
-3 main variants: Theravada, Mahayana, Tantrayana
-as a political identity, has played major role in nationalism
-divisions can overlay other cultural cleavage, crosses different
castes
e. Hinduism: most diffuse of all religious frameworks but provides very
detailed regulation of social life through caste and behavioral codes
-became political identity system, later a basis of communal
militant movements
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Modern Hate
Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph
 India is the 2nd largest Muslim country in the world after Indonesia
 “Ancient hatreds” are made as much as they are inherited
 They are not primordial forces and thus outside the realm of human agency and history
 Intellectuals, writers, artists, and politicians “make” hatreds
 Films, videos, texts, and textbooks certify stories from the past and thus shape our
collective memory which shapes our attitudes and perceptions
Hinduism
 “Hinduism” originally a word used by outsiders to describe a place and a people, not an
institutionalized religion
 No standard version of Hinduism until recently
 Replaced its “diversity, multivocality, and generativity with a monotheistic Ram cult”
 History of storytelling
o Originally Ramayanas told differently in many villages in various languages
o In time, the stories became consolidated
o During the 19th century the recitations of the Ramayana became the vehicle for
the “rise of eternal religion” and through the manas the Hindus became a “people
of the book”
o In January 1987, an 18 month long serial of the Ramayana based on the manas
began airing on prime-time state-run TV
o Most popular program ever shown
o Local village productions of the Ramayana stopped being performed as many
found them amateurish by comparison to the programs
o Other Hindu mega-series followed, stamping out diversity and localism and
replacing them with a national, standardized version of Hinduism
Whose Country is it Anyways?
 Expectations of people in India exceed available opportunities
 Mobility is unhinging a severely hierarchical society, creating social stress bred of envy
and resentment
 Newly rich Muslims have elbowed their way ahead rather than lagging respectfully
behind
 Prospects that the aspiring poor might receive another boost from government action
helped precipitate the Ayodhya crisis
 Upper-caste students who were fearful of lost job opportunities protested the proposed
job reservations for Backwards Classes
 The making of “ancient” hatreds, such as in Lebanon, Bosnia, former Soviet republics,
Iraq, Israel, and South-Central Los Angeles, have turned neighbors and friends into
foreigners and enemies
 Identities that become relevant for politics are crafted in benign and malignant ways in
print and electronic media and all places and ways that self and other, us and them, are
represented in an expanding public culture
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Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary
Africa
Robert H. Bates
 Emphasizes the rational basis for ethnic competition
 Ethnic groups represent coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to
secure benefits (desired and scarce) created by the forces of modernization
 More modern countries attain higher levels of: education, per capita income, and
urbanization (when using the term in this essay)
 Ethnic competition  the striving by ethnic groups for valued goods which are scarce in
comparison to the demand for them
 Ethnic groups are distinguished from other groups by their use of specific types of
symbolism
 Ethnic groups contain persons from every stage of life and every socio-economic level
People Compete
 Struggles over income and the resources that create it: land, markets, and jobs
 Tensions exacerbated by the expansion of the production of educated employable people
at a faster rate than the expansion of job opportunities
 Individuals tend to be evaluated along the dimensions of modernity
The Basis for the Formation of Ethnic Groups
 Where modernization takes place often largely determines who gets modernized
o Modernization takes place in a “node” and tends to diffuse outwards, with the
level of modernity sloping downwards with increased distance from the center
o Members of an ethnic group tend to cluster in space
 Administrative and ethnic areas often coincide
o Colonial powers designated administrative boundaries along “tribal” lines
o In the interest of the constituents to organize ethnic grouping in order to gain
control over the administrative mechanisms which control the modernization
process.
o Local councils began to function as ethnic organizations, legislating so as to
restrict ownership to members of local ethnic groups and to divest “strangers” of
rights of permanent tenure
 It is often useful for those engaged in the competition for modernity to generate and
mobilize the support of ethnic groups
o It is often those who are better off due to their occupations in the modern sector –
the clerks, cash croppers, and traders – who form ethnic unions
o Later “ethnicity” is exported to the rural territories whose names they often bore
o Perception by moderns that they must organize collective support to advance their
position in the competition for the benefits of modernity
Social and Ethnic Competition and the Formation of Groups
 the less favored members of a privileged ethnic group put immense pressure on their
more advantaged brothers to share the benefits derived from their advanced positions
 a sense of obligation resembling that usually extended to immediate kin is extended to
fellow village dwellers and ever persons from other villages and districts
 the creation of an “ethnic” group creates among members of other groups and the general
population a sense of threat and disadvantage, especially in the competition for jobs
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
Perceive that their individual progress is closely determined by the collective standing of
their group
Political Competition
 Control over the distribution of modernity
 Ethnic appeals are useful for politicians
 Because ethnic groups contain people of all occupations, socioeconomic backgrounds,
lifestyles, and generations, the appeal of common ethnicity can result in unified support
whereas other issues would be divisive
The Persistence of Ethnic Groups
 Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services from
the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members
 By satisfying member demands, ethnic groups gain their support and loyalty
 Modern elites blame local leaders for “tribalism” in government because they feel that
they are at the center of enormous social pressures to serve parochial interests
 Demands for material resources: financial contributions from the moderns for the
construction of new facilities and the creation of educational funds as well as demands
for the use of the skills of the moderns including technical, educational or political on
behalf of “their people”
 Ethnic groups make the acquisition of skills contingent upon ethnic service
 Prestige as an inducement
 Ethnic groups possess strong sanctions against moderns, especially the capacity to
withdraw elite status
 The Luo, Sukuma, and Lozi have turned out of office several of their most renowned
political leaders, including some of cabinet rank, for failing to serve local interests
 For many moderns, prestige is still defined in terms of traditional criteria
Conclusion
 Usefulness of ethnic organization and rationality of coalition-building
 Exclusion is desirable if the benefits are fixed in size
 For political competition it is generally useful to be bigger
 The uniformity of language within groups and the difficulty of communicating across
linguistic lines means that, for a limited set of resources, organizers will prefer intragroup
organizing to organizing across groups
 Minimum winning coalition  big enough to secure benefits in the competition for
resources but small enough to minimize the per capita value of those benefits
 Boundaries of ethnic groups are subject to repeat redefinition (situational analysis)
 Ethnic competition will not disappear with modernization nor with higher levels of
education
 Attempts to stop ethnic conflict should have an institutional approach that focuses on
exploiting the nature of ethnic competition so as to channel and diffuse it
 Instrumentalist view of ethnic behavior
 Consummatory behavior would lead to ethnic conflict over issues other than material
advantage and conflict even when “it didn’t make sense”  when the costs exceed the
benefits to the party concerned
o Concummatory model makes ethnic behavior constant, whereas it is actually
variable
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o Ethnic behavior is controllable and can be organized and disorganized
Joane Nagel, “The Political Construction of Ethnicity,” pages 93-111
 Nagel is associated with institutional constructivism—certain political institutions encourage
people to organize around ethnicity



“Subnationalism” (or separatism) became widespread in the closing decades of the 20th
century in the face of the “presumed” integrating effects of political and economic
development.
o Examples: Biafra, Katanga, Kurdistan, Eritrea, the Basque region, Quebec, Northern
Ireland, Southern Sudan, Azerbaijan, and Bangladesh.
Therefore, “the process of state- and nation- building had failed to manufacture national
identities out of local linguistic, cultural, or religious affiliations.”
In fact, the opposite occurred: ethnic identity and organization clearly appeared to be
strengthening in the face of economic and political development.
Small scale identifications seemed to be replaced with large-scale langustic identifications.

Thesis: “To the extent that ethnicity is a relevant and available basis for group
organization, political and economic modernization should increase the likelihood that
successful ethnic mobilization will occur along broader rather than narrower
subnational identities. In a sort of social selection process, the boundaries around
smaller affiliations dissolve in favor of larger affiliations, thereby accounting for the
current decline and growth in ethnicity, and so the puzzle is solved.”


New ethnic mobilization can be resurgent or emergent (enacted by newly-formed groups).
Nagel’s view of ethnicity and its fluidity:
o “Ethnicity is largely an ascribed status that is situationally activated.”
o Ethnic boundaries are “flexible” and “permeable”
Ethnicity is both an antecedent and a consequence of the political process.
Main Point: The recognition and the institutionalization of ethnicity in politics:
 Increases the level of ethnic mobilization among all ethnic groups.
 Determines the boundaries along which ethnic mobilization and/or
conflict will occur by setting down the rules for political participation and
political access




Nagel specifies two categories of mechanisms in which ethnicity is politically constructed:
the structure of political access and the content of political parties
Political Access: In a state, ethnic mobilization is more likely with the structure of political
access and participation is organized along ethnic lines.
o Regionalization: ethnic mobilization occurs within geographic political boundaries (ie
within the borders of a country). This either reinforces an existing ethnic group or
creates a new one:
 Reinforces when boundaries of a state correspond to the historical boundaries
of culture, religion, or language
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


Creates new ethnic identities when tradition “kinship boundaries” are not
broad enough so new, broader “administrative” boundaries are instituted
 Example: Nigeria, American Indians
o Participation: If the political process is organized along ethnic lines than the
participators will have to be mobilized along ethnic lines.
 Ethnic groups become interest groups and ethnicity is politicized.
o 2 paths to an ethnicity structured political process
 constitutional—ethnicity as a basis for constitutional representation, a certain
number of seats are set aside for a group
 Belgium, Fiji
 Regionalization—de facto, while a certain number of seats are not set aside,
regions from which representation is drawn are constructed along ethnic lines
Conclusion: “Official recognition of ethnicity as a basis of political representation
legitimizes, institutionalizes, and renders more permanent prior ethnically organized
political participation.
o Although often conceived as a resipe for plural harmony, these systems often lead to
ethnic divisions by cementing ethnicity in the political process.
Political Policies: Ethnic mobilization is most likely when policies are implemented
that recognize and institutionalize ethnic differences.
Three areas are examined:
o Official Language Policies
 An official language policy when causes and maintains conflict (and social
division) along language lines.
o Land Redistribution Policies
 Categories: forced migration, refugee camps, economic industries in a certain
place that attract a particular culture of workers
o Official designations for special treatment along ethnic lines (ie political
appointments) or recourse acquisition (ie loans)
 Singling out a specific group for special treatment
 Ie--Affirmative action legitimizes “Hispanic” over other more narrow
groups
 Ie—scholarships and low-interest loans to the Untouchable class in
India
Nationalization of politics has lead to a nationalization of ethnic organizations
o Some countries change to proportional representation where, in a national election,
citizens vote for a political party. The number of votes that party gets nationally
determines the number of seats they get in the parliament.
 Parties in this system appeal to subnational loyalties like ethnic groups
Week 8: The Causes of Internal Conflict
by Michael E. Brown
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Brown rejects the widely held view that causes of internal conflict are “simple and
straightforward.” He argues that serious scholars reject explanations of conflicts as the result
of ancient hatreds. These simplistic explanations are inadequate because they fail to explain
why some ethnic grievances break out in violent conflict (such as conflicts between Serbs,
Croats and Bosnian Muslims) but others do not (French-speaking vs English-speaking
Canadians, Cz
echs and Slovaks, Ukrainians and Russians, etc.)
He looks at a variety of causes of internal conflict, differentiating between long term causes
that make some situations more predisposed to conflict, and short term causes that trigger
violent conflict. He also looks at the specific role of the domestic elite in activation violence.
I.
The Underlying (long-term) causes of Internal Conflict:
a. Structural Factors:
 Weak States:
Weak states lack political legitimacy, sensible borders and institutions capable of
controlling the territory. They often encounter intense power struggles between
politicians, and strong militarized regional leaders. Criminal organizations are
powerful and pervasive, cross border movements of arms, drugs, refugees, etc are
hardly controlled and they often face massive humanitarian problems such as
famines and epidemics. Wide-spread human rights violations often take place.
o
States that are born weak: states that are artificial constructs, usually
states that were carved out of colonial empires in Africa and Southeast
Asia, or states that came into being after the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
o
States that become weak: external reasons: reduction in foreign aid,
drops in commodity prices. Internal reasons: corruption, administrative
incompetence, inability to promote economic development.
 Intra-state security concerns
As a result of weak states, individual groups may feel the need to provide security
for themselves. Groups make independent military preparations and, in taking
steps to defend themselves, they often pose a threat to other groups. This leads
other groups to take steps to protect themselves as well, resulting in heavy
militarization.
 Ethnic Geography:
States with ethnic minorities are more prone to internal conflict than others.
In some states ethnic minorities are confined to separate regions or provinces of
the country, while in others, they are heavily intermingled in the population. In
states where ethnic minorities are isolated separatist movements are more likely;
if warfare develops, it is usually conventional in character. However, when
separatist movements do develop in inter-mingled societies, guerrilla warfare,
ethnic cleansing and genocide may result.
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b. Political Factors:
 Discriminatory Political Institutions
Closed authoritarian systems are likely to generate resentment over time. So can
democratic systems in which some groups are inadequately represented in the
government, courts, military, etc. If oppression is used by the government,
conflict is more likely to occur.
 Exclusionary National Identities
Conflict is more likely when ethnic conceptions of nationalism prevail over civic
conceptions. Civic nationalism depends on citizenship and institutions, while
ethnic nationalism depends on culture.
 Inter-group politics
Violence is more likely in countries where groups (religious, ethnic, ideological,
political…) have incompatible ideologies, are strong and determined, and
perceive change as achievable.
 Elite Politics
Ethnic conflict is often provoked by elites in times of political and economic
turmoil in order to fend off deomestic challengers. Mass media and propaganda
are often used for these purposes.
c. Economic/ Social Factors:
 Economic Problems
Economic problems contribute to intra-state tensions. Unemployment, inflation,
and resource competitions, especially for land, contribute to societal frustrations
and tensions, and can provide the breeding ground for conflict. Even if the
economy is growing but it is not keeping up with societal demands it may breed
conflict.
 Discriminatory Economic Systems
Unequal economic opportunities, unequal access to resources (land, capital) and
vast differences in standards of living that are discriminatory in basis of class or
ethnicity breed frustration prone to the generation of violence. Sometimes
economic growth worsens the situation because it widens the gap between
privileged and poor.
 Economic Development and Modernization
Some of the effects of modernization (urbanization, migration) cause great social
changes and undermine traditional political institutions. Also higher literacy rates
and more education tend to raise awareness of where people stand in society, and
raises political and economic expectations, which leads to frustrations when they
are not met.
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d. Cultural/Perceptual factors:
 Cultural Discrimination against minorities:
It includes inequitable educational opportunities, legal and political constraints on
the use or teaching of minority languages, and constraints on religious freedom.
 Problematic Group Histories:
Groups often have legitimate grievances against others for crimes commited in
the distant or recent past, but they also tend to whitewash and glorify their own
histories, and they often demonize their neighbors, rivals and adversaries.
II.
The Proximate Causes of Internal Conflict
Brown divides proximate, or triggering causes of conflict into four categories best represented by
this matrix:
Internally Driven
Externally Driven
Elite-Triggered
Bad Leaders
Bad Neighbors
Mass-Triggered
Bad Domestic Problems
Bad Neighborhoods
Conflicts generated by internal, mass-level phenomena such as rapid economic development, and
modernization or patterns of political and economic discrimination. In the chart those are “bad
domestic problems”
Mass level but external conflicts are caused by swarms of refugees or fighters crashing across
borders, or radicalized politics sweeping throughout regions. This “spillover effect” is caused by
“Bad neighborhoods”
External but elite level triggers for conflict are the discrete, deliberate decisions by other
governments to trigger conflict for political, economic or ideological purposes of their own. Such
“bad neighbors” can only have an effect when conditions for conflict already exist in a country.
Internal and elite level proximate causes for conflict include power struggles involving civilian
or military leaders, ideological contests over how a country’s political economic, social ad
religious affairs should be organized (Algerian, Peru), and criminal assaults on the state
(Colombia). Such conflicts are triggered by “bad leaders”.
III.
The Importance of Domestic Elites
Brown argues that the importance of voluntarist approaches cannot be underestimated by simply
focusing on larger social, economic, political trends. The decisions and actions of domestic elites
are the proximate causes of many conflicts, and they can be classified into three general
categories:
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IV.

Ideological struggles, driven by the ideological convictions of various
individuals. Some are defined by economic or class terms such as Marxism,
while others are fundamentalist religious crusades guided by theological
frameworks

Criminal assaults on state sovereignty, which are driven primarily by the
economic motivations of drug traffickers, who amass enough economic and
military power to challenge the state and control some territories. After the
end of the Cold War, many ethnic and political movements have turned to
drug trafficking to finance their activities.

Power struggles between and among competing elites, which are driven by
personal, political motivations. These are the most common of the three.
Policy Implications
1. Conflict prevention should be guided by a two-track strategy. One track should be a
series of long-term efforts aimed at the underlying conditions that make violent conflicts
more likely. Particular attention should be paid to economic problems, distorted group
histories and patterns of political, economic and cultural discrimination. A second track
should focus on the proximate causes of internal conflict.
2. No single set of preventive actions will suffice. (must take into consideration mass vs.
elite, internal vs. external triggers)
3. Conflict prevention efforts should focus aggressively on actions of the domestic elites.
The international community is not as helpless as widely thought, conflict are often
triggered by discrete problems (elites) that can be targeted for action. They are not
immune to international pressure.
WEEK 9
Mihailo, Crnobrnja. The Yugoslav Drama. pp.16-33



This text served basically to provide a bit of historical background and other general
information about Yugoslavia and the 6 republics of Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Montenegro. The author provides this information as it
serves to provide context for the ethnic conflict which tore apart Yugoslavia.
“Yugoslavia has seven neighbors, six republics, five nations, four languages, three
religions, two scripts, and one goal”
Two alphabets in use
o Latin
o Cyrillic
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
Problems only arose when politics used the fact that half the population used one script
and the other half used the other script to raise the issue of national loyalty. “The choice
between scripts then offered an additional opportunity for some to politicize cultural
differences.



Three religions
 Greek Orthodox Christianity-has the largest number of followers. More
solidly followed the more south and further east one goes in Yugoslavia.
 Roman Catholicism-just over a quarter of the population of Yugoslavia.
Generally more solidly in the north of Yugoslavia.
 Islam-just under a fifth of the population of Yugoslavia. Most prevalent in
Bosnia in the center of Yugoslavia.
 Four languages- though there is contention over whether or not to consider the Serbian
and Croatian languages as one Serbo-Croatian language.
 Serbian
 Croatian
 Slovenian
 Macedonian
 Also Albanian and Hungarian spoken by national minorities.
o Language “proved to be one of the important battlefields on which the fight for or
against Yugoslavia was waged. So if the existence of four languages was in itself
not enough to add to the complexity of the Yugoslav scene, the disputes about
their numbers and the relationship of one language to another tended to make the
linguistic situation extremely difficult to manage
Five nations
 Serbs
 Croats
 Macedonians
 Slovenes
 Montenegrins
 Seriously disputed because some Montenegrins believe they are Serbs
but living in a different state while others claim a different nation
altogether.
 Muslims
 Normally considered a religious group, in Yugoslavia they are
considered a Muslim “nation”.
 Also lately there is also a dispute driven by Albanians that they should be
treated as a nation of Yugoslavia.
Six Republics
o Bosnia and Herzegovina-as of 1991
 44 percent Muslims, 31.5 percent Serbs and 17 percent Serbs with 5.5 percent
declaring Yugoslavs
 This population also lived in regions of mostly mixed nature, in other words
there weren’t too many homogenous regions in BiH.
o Croatia was the second largest republic
 78 percent Croats, 12 percent Serbs, 2.2 percent Yugoslavs, and 1% Muslims
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

The Serbs of Croatia as a group form three different ethnic living
arrangements with the Croats which become major points of contention.
o Macedonia
 65% Macedonians, 21% ethnic Albanians, with a smaller percentage of Turks,
Roms, and Serbs.
 Its main ethnic concerns are with the concentration of a large and growing
Albanian minority who use their own language, Latin script and are
predominantly Muslim, while Macedonians use Cyrillic, speak Macedonian,
and are Greek Orthodox
 The poorest of all Yugoslav republics
o Montenegro
 The tiniest of the former Yugoslav republics
 62% Montenegrins, 15% Muslims, 9.5% Serbs, 6.6% ethnic Albanians, and
4.5% Yugoslavs.
 Was the first among the nations of Yugoslavia to gain post-medieval freedom.
o Slovenia
 Ethnically the most homogenous with 90 Slovene
 Slovenes are nationalistically proud of maintaining their language and culture
under great Germanizing pressure.
 Almost all Roman Catholic, use the same Slovenian language, and use the
Latin script.
o Serbia
 The largest of all the former republics by size and population.
 65.8% Serbs, 17.2% Albanians, 3.5% Hungarians, 3.2% Yugoslavs, 2.4%
Muslims, 1.4% Montenegrins, and 1.1% Croats.
 Contains the region of Kosovo which remains a point of contention between
Serbia and Albania.
 A diversity of languages spoken.
The author presumably provides these facts about the different scripts, religions, languages,
nationalities, and republics along with facts about each republic’s manufacturing capability
and manufactured products, energy, agriculture, and other resources to show that there are
very many possible areas of contention in each republic and Yugoslavia as a whole. This is
presumably the reason which accounts for the horrible intensity of ethnic violence in
that/those area(s).
The Yugoslav Drama—A Country of Diversity
Mihalio Cronbrnja


Yugoslavia a country of condensed diversity
o Seven neighbors, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, tow
scripts
Two alphabets in use in Yugoslavia: Latin and Cryllic
o Latin alphabet beginning to take over b/c of openness to Western influence
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




o Choice between scripts could offer an opportunity to politicize cultural
differences
For several centuries the area of Yugoslavia was occupied by two vastly different
occupiers
o The north and west occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire
o The east, south, and central parts controlled by the Ottoman Empire
Three major religions: Greek Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Islam
o Orthodox church has the largest number of followers
Up to five or six languages are present in Yugoslavia
Several nations within Yugoslavia, but some groups do not have their own nation
o Muslims can define themselves as a member of a separate nation
o Not a specific “Yugoslav” nation—citizens have to define themselves more
specifically
Six republics in Yugoslavia:
o Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Called “little Yugoslavia” b/c it mirrored the diversity of the entire
republic
 Economically less developed than other republics—needed developmental
aid from other republics
o Croatia
 Second largest Yugoslav republic, the 1991 war was fought on Croatian
territory
 Not all Croats live in Croatia
 Centuries long domination by the Austro-Hungarian Empire led the Croats
to work for the highest degree of autonomy possible—still seen today
 Relatively well-developed
o Macedonia
 Poorest of the republics
 Advantage of using one script, one language, and one religion
 Tensions increasing lately with the growth of the Albanian minority
o Montenegro
 The smallest republic—long history of independence
o Slovenia
 Most homogenous republic—more than 90% Slovene
 Best developed republic
o Serbia
 The largest republic
 Had two autonomous provinces
 Many Serbs lived outside Serbia
BALKAN TRAGEDY
“The Yugoslav Drama”
Mihailo Crnobrnja, Pages 93-106, 115-127
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I. The New Wave of Serbian Nationalism
A. Background
1. 1981-student uprising in Kosovo subdued by joint effort of all Yugoslav
nations
2. 1987-Economic crisis
3. 1987-Political system incapacitated with power shifting from federation to
republics
B. Serbia
1. Kosovo: poorest part of Yugoslavia, poorly developed industrial
structure, highest rate of population growth in Europe
2. Albanian majority in Kosovo with fifteen percent Serb and Montenegrin,
on which the former was applying pressure to move out of Kosovo with
the purpose of making it more ethnically homogeneous
3. Kosovo and Vojvodina, though parts of Serbia, had such a high level of
autonomy that they were equal to the republics. This weakened Serbia,
since the two provinces were not integrated into the Serbian legal and
judicial system; they had political equality and full representation in the
federal bodies. The two provinces could block Serbia’s passage of laws
for the entire territory but Serbia could not block them on their territory.
Both provinces had veto power over any constitutional change.
4. Leadership of Serbia reluctant to move on this issue on a more decisive or
assertive way
5. Predominant nature of the struggles was that of a quest for bureaucratic
power between Serbian and Vojvodinian leaders, and not authentic
national or ethnic strife.
6. Lack of political will to accommodate Serbia’s complaints irritated many
in Serbia and fed nationalist sentiment
7. Autonomous provinces had full cultural and educational autonomy.
Although they did not have equal representation in the parliament, this did
not matter. The principle of national consensus said that just one regional
representative could exercise veto power.
C. Croatia
1. Serbs overrepresented in politics and institutions (media, police, army)
2. Serbs more likely to obtain positions of influence since they were major
partisan force in WWII and the majority in the Communist Party
3. At the same time, reduction of cultural autonomy of Serbs
4. Croatia and Slovenia took side with autonomous provinces in Serbia to
preserve old Titoist structure
D. Stages of the new wave of national awakening in Serbia
1. First stage
a. Members of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts write a
“Memorandum on the Position of Serbia in Yugoslavia.” 1986.
This contained critical views on the failure to transform the
economic and political system of Yugoslavia. It claimed that
Slovenia and Croatia had accomplished their national programs
because they had control of federal leadership, while Serbian
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nation had not been able to do the same. The Memorandum called
for
i. The sovereignty of the people (classless society)
ii. Self-determination of nations (Serbs should be in an equal
position as nation)
iii. Human rights
iv. Rationality (plea for more centralized federal structure)
The document mentioned the “anti-Serbian coalition” said to have
included all the other federal units. Critical of Serbian leadership
which had agreed to pay contributions to the fund for lessdeveloped republics in spite of the fact that Serbia was lagging in
its own economic development. It emphasized concern that Serbia
did not have a state of its own.
2. Second Stage
a. Scholars’ ideas accepted and transmitted by a group of patriots,
who take it upon themselves to convey national thought to the
wider population
b. Task performed by Slobodan Milosevic
3. Third stage
a. National homogenization stage (1987-1989)
b. Campaign for Serbian unity brought millions to the streets and
made Milosevic a hero
E. Milosevic
1. Performed a typical communist coup d’etat
2. Called for administrative unity of Serbia to be achieved by reduction of
the autonomy of the two provinces
3. Intervened in a rally where the Albanian police used force and prohibited
the police from beating the Serbs. This made him a national hero
4. He didn’t use nationalism as pretext to gain power, since he did not want
to be divisive. Rather, he made his rise to power an “anti-bureaucratic
revolution” attacking the previous Serbian leader
5. Third stage began with gathering of popular support for confrontation with
the two political leaderships in the two provinces
6. Rallies to convince people that Serbian minority in Kosovo was not really
a minority since they were part of Serbia; instead, Albanians should feel
like the minority, although they were in fact the majority in Kosovo
7. Borisav Jovic was president of the Constitutional Commission after the
“Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution.” His inflexible negotiating position won
him the nickname “Absolutely Unacceptable.”
8. Serbian tactic was to topple the leadership of Vojvodina first, to
completely isolate the Albanian leadership of Kosovo. Vojvodina was
predominantly Serbian. This tactic worked
9. Leadership of Vojvodina “voluntarily” resigned and was replaced by one
loyal to the Serbian cause. Albanians of Kosovo were isolated but more
supported by Croats and Slovenes
10. Albanians rallied and principal Albanian leader, Vlassi, was detained
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11. Albanians responded to pressure and voted in favor of constitutional
amendments proposed by Serbia
F. Results
1. Serbia was more equal than others now since it still had three votes. (No
federal constitutional amendment had been made)
2. nationalistic wave swept across republican borders
3. Montenegrin government fell bringing new leadership supportive of
Milosevic
4. No more “anti-Serbian coalition.” Now it was four-against-four
5. In Serbia there was total lack of democratic structure, shortage of wisdom,
and no desire to seek actively an acceptable solution. Milosevic sought to
remedy this by feeding Serbs with nationalism, achieved by the start of a
Communist political bureaucracy
II. The Supporting Cast
A. The Intelligentsia
1. Uncharacteristic. Intellectuals played role of chief ideologues for the
nationalist movements and the spreading of mutual hatred. Dobrica Cosic
was leader of Serbian nationalist movement and one of the creators of the
Memorandum; popularity brought him to the position of president of the
left-over Yugoslav federation. Milosevic had him brought down.
2. Intelligentsia was primitive, provincial, narrow-minded, following Cosic
in expanding the mythical component of a self-conscious Serbian
population instead of designing coherent strategies advocating democratic
traditions of citizenship
3. Nationalistic streak in the Slovenian intelligentsia was stronger than in
other parts of the country (the Slovenian national identity centered on the
question of Slovenian language and culture)
4. Croatian intelligentsia mute for a long time; nationalism picked up
momentum led by intelligentsia later
5. intelligentsia was not typical of democratic societies because it was taking
revenge for anti-intellectualism that had prevailed when the Communist
Party was in power
B. The Media
1. First only a supporting role, controlled, one-directional, nationalistic
2. Milosevic took control of Serbian newspapers and television while still
Communist Party boss of the city of Belgrade.
3. All principal antagonists (Serbs, army, Croats, Slovenes) joined in the
propaganda warfare. Antagonism escalated from confrontation to conflict
and eventually a full-scale war.
4. Most bizarre incident: both Serbian and Croatian got hold of independent
television footage showing dead bodies being loaded on to a wagon.
Croats reported bodies as those of Croat heroes. Serbs recognized bodies
as innocent Serbian civilians.
C. The Army
1. Called “JNA”
2. ended up disliked by all sides, weak, demoralized
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3. one of the strongest fighting forces in Europe
4. Territorial defense: element of the armed forces installed by Tito as a
supplementary component of the armed forces. It was under the command
of the republics and formed the embryo of the nationalist armies that
would eventually turn and fight the JNA
5. Titoist and devoted to preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Yugoslavia
6. accepted Communism as its official ideology
7. Serbs were most numerous members, followed by Montenegrins, for
traditional rather than political reasons
8. Slovenes and Croats perceived army as possible opponent
9. politically and militarily unprepared for an attack from within
10. Serbs financed army’s existence
11. Factors leading to the collapse of the army:
a. Loyalty to disappearing structure of Titoist Yugoslavia, which
made army take sides as crisis deepened
b. Lack of clear strategic objective
c. “stop and go” tactics
D. The Foreign Actors
1. After Tito’s death, both East and West helped to maintain the unity and
preserve the stability of Yugoslavia
2. during the build-up of the crisis, Yugoslav nations had no external powers
trying to impose their will
3. foreigners tried to play a constructive role generally, insisting on the unity
of the country
4. exceptions to this rule:
a. Austria, Albania, Hungary
5. once the crisis broke, foreign involvement became important
6. Foreign actors influenced events through the way their supposed role was
perceived by the Yugoslav parties. Perception derived from the false
belief that Yugoslavia was as important had been during the Cold War and
under Tito
7. popularity of conspiracy theories which mobilized nationalist sentiment
8. European Community jolted by internal divisions over the issue of
Yugoslavia
9. United States entered conflict at a later stage and with no decisive stand
lost credibility
10. Conclusion: responsibility for breaking Yugoslavia apart rests with
Yugoslavs alone
Yugoslavia (9.1) Case Study

Yugoslavia’s Cultural Diversity
-state institutions fell under control of some ethnic group
-made up of 6 republics
-culturally diverse: each republic had ethnic minorities within them
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-4 major languages (Serbian, Croatian, etc.
-3 major religions (Greek Orthodox, Catholicism, Islam)

Historical Background
-most of Slavic origin
-some settled during Roman Empire, others during Byzantine Empire – empires split into
Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox regions
-promoted diversity
-coexisted peacefully until dominant empires began to crumble
-as Ottoman empire weakened, Serbians rebelled – Balkan Wars – defeated Muslim
Turks (first religious war)
-In 1918, after WWII, kingdom of Serbians & Croats emerged and changed name to
Yugoslavia. Serbs dominated Yugoslavia monarchy from 1919-1941
-emergence of Ustashi – Croat revolutionary group. Group was put into power in 1941 by
Nazis. Created a fascist regime and performed ethnic genocide on Serbs (Jews, gypsies,
etc.). 300,000 are killed between 1941-1945.
-Emergence of anti-Fascist groups:
*Chetniks = Serb nationalists
*Partisans = communist party – rejected ideas of ethnic identity which allowed
them to gain support from all groups. They were the dominant force in the
resistance movement and were lead by Tito. Tito took power after WWII and
ruled until death.
-Postwar Yugoslavia (Communism):
*did away with ethnic identities and formed a federalist system
* decentralized government and formed a semi-autonomous republic
*army = only truly Yugoslavian institution
*Tito tries to subsidize poorer by redistributing resources
*Tito makes a collective presidency
* policy decisions made by a consensus
*economy booms during ‘50s and ‘60s
*ethnic divisions began to fade. Intermarriages grow in number.

The Breakup of Yugoslavia
-Tito dies. Economy falls apart. Unemployment skyrockets. Spending cut.
-living standards cut in half by 1989
-growing calls for democracy
-’86 – memorandum on position of Serbia in Yugoslavia
*Serbia is at a disadvantage politically, economically, and are under threat
*Serbia gets a good deal of help from Yugoslavia
*Albania attacks Serbs. Local Serbs ask for government protection, government
refuses.
-Slobodan Milosevic arrives in Kosovo in 1989.
*Rallies thousands with speeches.
*Takes power as president.
*Marks 600th anniversary of Battle of Kosovo.
*Publicly sympathizes with Serbs using nationalist appeals.
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*allowed Serbian communities to keep power (only place in world)
*overwhelmingly wins elections
-Slovenia – anti-communist movement in 1986
*also opposed to Slovenia’s appearance in Yugoslavia
*Slovenian youth don’t like being drafted into army
*Milan Kucan uses nationalist appeal as well. Wins 1990 election.
-Croatian nationalists challenge against Serbs is led by Franjo Tudjman
*independent Croatia would threaten Serb minority
*state-owned media threatens genocide
*Tudjman wins 1990 election. Steps up nationalist rhetoric. Wanted to purify
Croatian language by purging Serbs. Croat thugs smash Serb businesses. Croats
rename streets and buildings after Ustashi leaders. Serbs arm to defend
themselves.
*Serbs want to create their own state within Croatia (Krajina). Croats forms their
own militia.
-Bosnia votes along ethnic lines as well
*Muslim president names Alija Izetbegovic but no clear leader in power
-Elections brought nationalists to power causing the Yugoslavian states to collapse and
quit the communist party. Yugoslav army becomes defacto Serbian army
-Yugoslavian state no longer effective and neutral.
-Police force is Croat
-No more effective state in Croatia – only army left
-In June of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declare independence
*Slovenia allowed to leave with no contest.
*Croatia has a large Serbian population is NOT allowed to leave. Croatia
experiences civil war.
- Serbs arm people in Krajina. Serbs are strong due to weak Croats. Carve
out territory by using ethnic cleansing.
-By 1992, Serbs control 30% of Croatia. Yugoslav army agrees to leave.
Shakey peace.
-Bosnia carved up as well, part given to Serbia and part to Croatia – Muslims are left out
(have no state).
-Croats and Serbs are well-armed.
-1991 – Bosnian Parliament proposes a declaration of independence. Serbs in Bosnia
prepared to break away. Serbs Republic declares themselves independent from country.
In order to declare place their own, both the Serbs and the Croats had to make territory
homogeneous of their own group. Tanks roamed streets, people were shot, tortured, and
raped. Literally removed groups to establish their own.
-In 1992 peacekeepers help refugees but cannot engage in conflict.
-War in Bosnia last 3 years. 100,000 are killed and 2 million are made into refugees. The
Serbs controlled 70% of the land. Croats and Muslims control only 10%.
-Siege of Sarejero
*Serbs wanted capital of Republic
*wanted to divide it along one ethnic line
-End of the War
*Muslims and Croats drive out Serbs
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*May of ’92, UN Security Council places sanctions on Serbia
*Milosevic loses support
*blockade on weapon shipments to Bosnia
-Dayton Accord
*Bosnia named independent state with 2 autonomous states
*60,000 NATO troops in former Yugoslav
-End of Croatian War
*1995 – Croatian army moves to Krajina – more ethnic cleansing – takes out 88%
of Serbs.
-War in Kosovo
*Albanians forced to go underground
*Ibrahim Rugova preaches non-violence
*Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) gains support
*Albanians taken apart – arms depot raided
*KLA arms itself
*1998 – guerilla warfare launched
*Serb military arms as well
*US demands Serbs to pullout – Milosevic refuses – NATO begins 22-day
bombing spree
*Serbs back out in June of 1989
*Spiral of violence follows
The Yugoslav Drama (141-173) , Crnobrnja
The Crisis
 Prime Minister Ante Markovic made a final effort to save unity of Yugoslavia with
international support, but Serb/Croat/Slovene forces were too strong
 Serbs carried out “rallies for truth” for all Yugoslav republics to hear about terror and
genocide to which Serbs of Kosovo were subjected

-had great impact in Krajina
 Croatian (Communist) leadership thought a deal with Serbia still possible, offering
autonomy for Serbs w/out declaring autonomous province of Serb regions in exchange
for less pressure and more independence for Croatia
 Attempt to organize rally in capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana, led Serbia to announce
political proclamation, asking Serbian business community and population to stop buying
Slovene goods
-Serbs were first to introduce econ sanctions into Yugoslav drama
 Milosevic secured hold of Serbia by having early presidential elections and close political
allies appear as “opposition” candidates so he would win
-elections proved Milosevic’s disinterest in gaining/holding power democratically
 central issue: Milosevic insisted on maintaining “democratic centralism,” maintaining his
own power to outvote/pressurize in-party opposition, but Slovenes wanted looser alliance
w/ CPY
 agreement was never reached, and CPY remained as a group of communist die-hards that
had profound influence over life of Yugoslavia for years
 end of CPY= end of Communist era in Yugoslavia, succeeded by nationalism not demo
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

first free multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia brought about nationalist appeal
unity and homogenization along national lines produced significant and dangerous
political power; Serbian nationalism incited/required “defensive” nationalism against
other nationalities in Yugoslavia
 Milan Kucan became first democratically elected president of Slovenia but DEMOS
(centre-reight coalition in parliament) won majority seats
 Franjo Tudjman: first elected president of Croatia
-immediately made sure Croatia would constitutionally become state of Croats
-advocated anti-Serbianism and did everything to nourish Croatian nationalism
 Macedonian leadership tried moderating the Serb/Croat/Slovene confrontation in vain
 Key issues: whether to change parliament before bringing in new constitution or
changing constitution before electing new parliament
-Serbs favored parl. before const., but Slovenes (backed by Croats) opposed
-Slovenes wanted parliament w/out a lower chamber, only appointed delegates
 main issue: character of Yugoslavia
-Serbs and Montenegrins wanted modern, efficient, and functional federation
-Croatia and Slovenia wanted confederation
-Macedonians and Bosnians leaned toward federal option
-struck a middle ground between the two extreme positions, yet both sides
were unyielding and uncompromising while guided by nationalism
 media spread lies to increase distrust and hatred between different nationalities
 Ante Markovic became most popular Yugoslav political figure after removing controls
on hard-currency savings of citizens, boosting hard-currency reserves
 Markovic pushed anti-inflationary package through federal parliament, reducing inflation
to nearly 0 in 1 year
 Greater attempts were made to integrate Yugoslavia into the European Community
 Markovic’s Western support was only verbal, so he looked bad for not having any real
international support—made Yugolavia unification more remote
-criticized by Slovenes and Croats for being too centralist and pro-Serb
-Serbs criticized him for his speed/methods of implementing process of
liberalization/orientation towards the markets; reforms were anti-Serb bc. Serbian
ec would suffer most
 Markovic wanted multi-party democracy, not supported by Serbs
-formed his own all-Yugoslav Reform party after anti-inflationary program
worked well—big mistake
-criticized for abusing prime ministership to form polit party
-supported in Macedonia/Bosnia, sympathizing most for Yugoslav future
 Tudjman declared Croatian state continuity, scared Serbs in Croatia that this could lead to
old fascist policy of genocide vs. Serbs
-fear grew stronger when new Croatioan leadership restored old symbols of the
state responsible for mass murders of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and others
 Serbs in Krajina responded violently, proclaiming self-rule and self-policing
 Top secret plan to form Slovenian army lasted a full year before war broke out in
Slovenia
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
Croats began arming themselves, and in autumn 1990 the republics openly abandoned
agreement for reform, which led to a cancellation of privatization, and nationalization of
social property; incomes grew exponentially and gov had to carry out 2 devaluations
 Final blow in Jan. 1991: Serbia broke monetary discipline taking billions from federal
monetary reserve system
 Slovenian parliament published declaration of independence Dec. 1990 to proclaim
independence if solution were not reached in 6 months but it suspended all federal laws
on its territory 1.5 months later, followed by Croatia the next day
 War broke out in early 1991 and Markovic’s reforms were considered dead
 Markovic tried to organize economic transition to post-federal state of affairs and create
solution to political problems
 Bora Jovic had led Presidency since May 1990, insisted on disarming paramilitary and
militia formations, but he was outvoted and then resigned and came back 2 days later
 Slovenes wanted to leave Yugoslavia and form its own army
 Serbs wanted to all live in one country and preserve unity of Yugoslavia
 Croats felt Croatia belonged to them as a sovereign/independent state, created army
 Yugoslavs wanted constitution upheld and said it would use live ammunition for defense
 First use of military force in Serbia even though hot points of drama were in Slovenia,
which wanted to leave, and Croatia w/ eruption of conflict between Serbs and Croats
 March 1991: large demonstration in Belgrade demanding media attention
 Violent ethnic confrontation erupted between Serbs and Croats in all areas where they
lived or their territories touched
 Yugoslav national leaders engaged in negotiations just to pacify internat. public opinion
but had already decided that confrontation would solve national problems
 Serbs wanted war to gain territory, Croats wanted to gain recognition
 Slovenes were careful not to fall into category of ‘secession,’ unpopular internationally,
said ‘disassociating’ from Yugoslavia
 Slovenian war for independence lasted exactly 1 week
 Use of force agitated Slovenes in trying to keep it in Yugoslavia; the force and
propaganda seemed more terrible , shifting European public opinion to Slovenian side
 Croats did not take immediate all-out confrontation as Slavs did, more cautious
 Many direct battles occurred in Vukovar, which became symbol of Serb-Croat ethnic war
 Fighting went on for 4.5 months until U.N. negotiated precarious cease-fire
 New breed of fighters emerged in nationalistic turmoil called “technicians of violence,”
intimidated the other side and made ethnic cleansing easier
-ex: Branimir Glavas, led “Glavas Unit,” famous for ethnically cleansing Serb
villages
and killing Croats who maintained good relations w/ Serbs
 Vukovar became symbol for both sides: for Croats a symbol of defense of
independence/territorial integrity; for Serbs a symbol of Serbian determination to
help/promote Serb cause in Croatia
 Both sides declared victory: Serbs won control of town and Croatia won Vukovar
 Near end of the year over 30% Croat territory was under Serb control
 Both sides lost motive to keep fighting so ceasefire took hold, signed to move away from
direct/violent conflict
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
Bosnia became new focus to gain territory for Serbs and Croats by destabilizing state
structure
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation
By Laura Silber and Allan Little
Chapter 10—The Descent into War—Croatia and the Serbs—February-June 1991
pp. 134-146
-
By the spring of 1991, Pakrac (in Slavonia but a Croatian territory) was taken over by
Serbs.
o Then Tudjman, the leader of Croatia, fought back. Then Kadijevic sent in the JNA
to separate the two squabblers. The Croatian police ended up with control.
o “It was to become a familiar pattern of event: Krajina Serbs provoking the
Croatian authorities into conflict, the army stepping in to “separate the two sides”
and, in effect, protecting renegade Serb areas from the Croatian authorities’
attempts to bring them back under Zagreb’s jurisdiction. Under a cloak of
impartiality, the Federal Army was now another step closer to becoming the army
of Greater Serbia” (p. 135).
-
More power struggles: Plitvice
o Serb nationalists thought that the Croatians were trying to take control of a park
by setting up a police station there. Milan Martic (a political and military leader of
Serb nationalist uprisings) supported the demonstrators with armed militiamen
who took over the park.
o Armed conflict between Croatian police and Serbian militia. Two men killed.
-
Blood shed = further polarization of public opinion in Croatia and Serbia, the dominant
nations in Yugoslavia.
-
At this point, the Serbs of Croatia are united and armed.
o But they still “feel unprotected and at extreme risk…and we are calling on the
whole of the democratic Yugoslav public to raise its voice against the
unprecedented terror of the Croatian constabulary” (p. 138).
-
Krajina on edge with Serbs arming up and intimidating the Croatians.
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o Rumor spread that Serbian President said that if the JNA did not act against the
Croatian police in Plitvice, then they would be driven out.
-
Atmosphere of foreboding hangs over Croatia.
-
Slavonia divisions between old settlers and new. Regardless, influenced by Plitvice,
Croatians and Serbian in Slavonia begin to arm themselves against each other and to
make barricades.
o Susak fired a rocket into a Serbian village = unprovoked act of aggression =
excuse for Serbian villagers to strengthen their resources.
o Josip Reihl-Kir is the regional police chief. He tries to promote negotiation
between Croatians and Serbs. In a way, he is a representation of the old
Yugoslavian state.
o Croatians try to replace the Yugoslavian flag with Croatian flag. This makes the
Serbs angry and when the Croat policemen come back to the Serb village, the
Croats injure two.
o Then a busload of Croat policemen drive to Serb village (Osijek), which is
heavily guarded by Serbs and are massacred.
o Serbs are an enemy within. Croates are convinced that Serbia (not just in Croatia)
is attempting full sovereignty of Yugoslavia.
o Tudjman declares that he will take all measures that will be necessary for
defending the Republic of Croatia.
-
Pavrac and Plitvice. Now Croatian National Guard attacks Borovo Selo, and Serbs
leaders complain that they are not supported by outside Serbian help
-
The representative of Yugoslavia… Kir was ready to leave. He was murdered. “Kir’s
moderation, his conciliatory approaches to the Serbs, had cost him his life, while Susak’s
activities [Susak is the one who fired two rockets into a Serbian village], stroking tension
and provoking conflict, were to win him on of the most prominent places in Tudjman’s
government” (p. 144).
-
Yugoslavia was finished. Now Milosevic and Tudgman decide that they need to split it
into three states, but the question is, how do you divide the territory? The war in 1991
was based around getting more land.
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o Milosevic and his advisor will protect territories from Croatians and Bosnians if
Serbs want to remain there.
o When Croatia was aggressive in Krajina, Milosevic decided to provide arms aid
to the Serbs living there.
L Silber & A Little , Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation 205:230
Part Four: Bosnia
15 – Before the Deluge, July 1990 – March 1992






Three major ethnic political parties – Muslims, Serbs, Croats
o Izetbegovic of the Muslim Part of Democratic Action (SDA) was a staunch
Communist who was fairly powerful in the 1970s, but lost his stature when war
came against the Serbs.
 He wanted Bosnia to be a Muslim state, and the Serbs and Croats
emphasized this against him.
o Serbs and Croats said that Muslims were never a separate ethnic community, and
had only succumbed to pressures under the Ottoman Empire and converted to
Islam
 Therefore, Serbian and Croatian expansionism was legit
o Tito’s 1974 Constitution granted Muslims the status of a separate nation, and
Izetbegovic wanted to see this happen in Bosnia
The fundamental difference among the three national groups was the collective
perception of their historical experience.
o The Serbs regarded the Ottoman period as an age of occupation, whereas the
Muslims thought it was a period of prosperity for their elite.
Karadzic of Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was strong proponent of Bosnian Serbs and
felt that they should have equal cultural, religious, and economic rights
Croats formed a Bosnian branch of the HDZ, and were infuriated by Izetbegovic’s
proposal for a one man, one vote system (so that Muslims would have majority), but the
republic’s constitution made each of the three groups constituent nations and no major
decisions could be carried out without consensus
At the same time, the Prime Minister Markovic was very popular – his economic policies
were successful, but these didn’t translate into political vision
o He lost the elections
o Over 90% of the seats in Parliament went to the nationalist candidates (SDA,
SDS, HDZ). These leaders vowed to go against the Communists.
o However, their coalition government failed with Izetbegovic as President, the
Serb Krajisnik as Speaker of Parliament, and the Croat Pelivan as Prime Minister
Abdic, a member of the SDA from northwestern Bosnia, gained support from Muslims,
in addition to crossing party lines, in contrast to Izetbegovic.
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



o Abdic, who did not have enough support within the SDA, traded his position as
head of the presidency in exchange for naming his friend, Delimustafic, as
Interior Minsiter.
 Later, Abdic would become Izetbegovic’s biggest opponent, declaring his
region independent of the rest of war-torn Bosnia.
In Croatia and Serbia, nationalism reigned and spread to Bosnia
o Serbs wanted to remain a part of Yugoslavia, Croats wanted to leave what was
left of the Federation, and Muslims wanted sovereignty
SDS undermined government institutions, and this strengthened coalition between the
Croats and the Muslims, but the alliance was merely tactical.
In 1991, Serbia launched the Belgrade Initiative, which proposed that Bosnia remain in
new Yugoslavia, without the Croats and the Slovenes.
o Izetbegovic complained that this was Milosevic’s attempt to divide Bosnia’s
Muslim leadership so that he could control Bosnia.
o The SDA and HDZ deputies called for Bosnian sovereignty and rejected the
Belgrade Initiative, and the SDS left Parliament and created their own Serbian
Republic of Bosnia-Herzogivina.
The European Community began to recognize Croatia as an independent nation, and
Izetbegovic decided that Bosnia should be recognized, also.
o Under pressure from the EC, the three leaders emphasized Bosnia’s existing
borders and endorsed national territorial units within Bosnia.
 However, Izetbegovic was opposed to such a partition, despite his
agreement
16 – The Gates of Hell, The Outbreak of War in Bosnia, April 1-10, 1992


Two days after the EC recognized Bosnia’s independence, war broke out
o Serb and JNA forces held the towns of Zvornik and Bijeljina
o The Serbs then moved into Sarajevo, capturing the police academy and all the
ammunition that came with it
Izetbegovic’s call for mobilization was not the cause of the war
o Karadzic and Krajisnik had always said they wouldn’t live in an independent
Bosnian state. They had the support of the Belgrade regime and the Sebianized
JNA.
o Izetbegovic and Krajisnik met one last time, but Izetbegovic refused to accept a
proposal to divide the city of Sarajevo and the war continued.
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation
By Laura Silber and Allan Little
Chapter 18 – The Cleansing: The Summer of 1992
Pp. 244 – 257
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-
In May of 1992, a new term was coined in the international political vocabulary: ethnic
cleansing
o It had been practiced the previous year in Croatia; came to define the Bosnian
conflict
-
Large number of refugees fled to Croatia in April and May 1992
-
These refugees were not escaping war zones, they had been banished from their homes
because of their nationality: “They were not the tragic by-product of a civil war; their
expulsion was the whole point of the war” (p. 244)
-
Serb paramilitary hit-squads had launched a campaign through northern and eastern
Bosnia in the spring and summer during which they took control of the region without
much opposition and rid the areas of Muslims
-
A common feature of the cleansing was the systematic elimination of community leaders
(prominent people, intellectuals, members of the SDA, the wealthy)
-
The Serb paramilitaries carried with them lists of names (of prominent local Muslims);
these lists inspired intense terror in neighboring communities, once the atrocities became
widely know, and many who were in a position to be targeted fled before they were
attacked – “the conscious elimination of an articulate opposition…the destruction of a
community from the top down” (245)
-
Sometimes the cleansing only involved random beatings, other times it involved mass
killing; humiliation, terror, and psychological cruelty were used everywhere
o Instruments of torture included forcing the Muslims to sing Serb nationalist songs
to their killers, being told their wives and children had been raped and killed,
being forced to perform atrocities against each other, e.g. physical and sexual
mutilation and murder, being forced to dig mass graves and then collect and bury
the bodies of their families and neighbors; sometimes the diggers would then be
killed and thrown on top of the bodies
-
The torture had a political purpose: more than merely driving hundreds of thousands of
Muslims out of Bosnia, the ethnic cleansing was calculated to make the region forever
“ethnically pure” by inspiring a hatred and fear between Muslims and Serbs that would
keep them from ever living together again
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-
Ethnic cleansing was most concentrated in northwestern Bosnia (700,000 Muslims lived
there) and in the Drina valley (Muslims were an absolute majority)
-
In northern Bosnia, ethnic cleansing was more difficult, because Muslims, Croats and
Serbs lived in highly integrated towns and cities, like in Sarajevo
-
The Serbs terrorized non-Serbs by having them fired from their jobs, harassed in the
street, blowing up their businesses and attacking their homes; also incorporated robbery
into the process
-
Every major metropolis in northern Bosnia had a “Bureau for Population Exchange,”
which carried out ethnic cleansing with the eventual consent of the victims: Muslims and
Croats could not leave without first signing away all their future property rights
-
Hundreds of thousands chose to give up their homes, capital and all their possessions to
save their lives and escape the Serb death squads
-
Most of the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia fled to Croatia, but Croatia could hardly
handle this influx of refugees after taking in half a million of its own people displaced the
previous year
o By the end of July, Croatia announced that it would take no more refugees and
turned to western nations to start taking more
-
International aid agencies ended up unintentionally aiding the ethnic cleansing process:
the local Bosnian Serb authorities had promised that the Muslims were leaving on their
own volition, so UNPROFOR and UNHCR troops and aid-workers accompanied 7,000
refugees from northwestern Bosnia to Karlovac, a Croatian city; only once they had
reached Karlovac did the UN workers understand the atrocities they had left behind
-
When Croatia refused to take any more refugees, the situation worsened for the Muslims
stuck in northern Bosnia; the escape route now led south into government-held central
Bosnia; women and children were forced to travel along mountain roads, shot at, beaten
and harassed by whatever Serbs they encountered along the way
-
The Serbs had established mass detention camps for Muslim men in northern Bosnia,
brought to the international community’s attention by Roy Gutman, a writer for Newsday
o Gutman’s first article was published on July 3rd, a series of interviews and on July
19th his first story about the camps that caught the attention of the international
public
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o Gutman revealed to the world that Bosnia’s “prisoner-of-war camps” were in fact
concentration camps; many of the prisoners there had not even taken up arms
-
On August 2nd, Newsday published a cover story called “The Death Camps of Bosnia”;
for the first time Bosnian Serbs “were accused not just of mass detention, but of
organized extermination” (249)
-
Conditions of the concentration camps were abominable: men were kept in metal cages
and deprived of food, sanitation, and exercise. The prisoners comprised entire cultural
and political elites of communities. One cage about 700 square feet large held 300 men.
The cages were stacked four on top of one another; the prisoners had to live in their own
excrement, which dripped through the grates; the camps were as bad as it gets
o There were four large detention camps that became globally infamous
-
On August 18th, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee received a staff report
which implied that western governments and the U.N. heavily delayed their responses to
early reports about prison camp atrocities, the ethnic cleansing operations, and mass
killings, and could have prevented much of the dying if they had acted earlier.
o The report also concluded that the ethnic-cleansing had been more or less
achieved.
o Through mass killing and atrocities, an almost all Serb-inhabited territory next to
Serbia, comprising 70% of Bosnia, had been established
-
The main western powers’ delayed responses to the Bosnian Serbs’ atrocities
demonstrates a consistent feature of these countries’ foreign policy: without the impact of
television media coverage, those governments would not have been pushed to serious
intervention
-
By the end of 1992, almost two million Bosnians, almost half the population, had been
driven from the country
-
Sarajevo, meanwhile, was under siege from the Bosnian Serbs; on April 23rd, Lord
Carrington, a peace envoy from the U.K., met with President Izetbegovic (of Bosnia)
-
Izetbegovic wanted to force the international community to intervene militarily on
Bosnia’s behalf; Carrington told the president that he would not receive military support
and should therefore negotiate a ceasefire with the Bosnian Serbs, which Izetbegovic
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argued was impossible due to the fact that the Serbs’ demand was the destruction of
Bosnia as a nation
-
While none of the major western powers supported Izetbegovic’s plea for international
aid, all major western governments recognized the need for a humanitarian response to
mediate the suffering in Sarajevo, which, should such a response be withheld, would soon
have its citizens dying from starvation
-
On June 8th the UN Security council agreed on a plan to take control of the Sarajevo
airport and airlift in humanitarian aid, a plan which illustrated another key feature of the
West’s reaction to the Bosnian conflict: the west viewed the Bosnian war as a
humanitarian crisis, like an earthquake or other natural disaster, relieving the symptoms
of the war without addressing its causes
Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation 345-363
L Silber & A Little
Summer of 1995
Split among Serbs and emergence of Croats as real army gave Croats advantage
Croatian President coordinated with Muslim counterpart under green light from Washington
Srebrenica
-One of the six UN designated “safe areas” in Bosnia
-Muslim populated and in eastern Bosnia
-Taken over with little international involvement
-Showed lack of international commitment by UN and others
-US had already decided it was unsustainable
-Serbs began bombing Srebrenica July 6 despite it being “demilitarized” in 1993
-Used June Muslim attack as pretext for Bosnian Serbs to mass around Srebrenica
-Milosevic approved of this but claimed it was equaling the Muslim attacks rather than
overrunning Srebrenica altogether
-Srebrenica is geographically important to creating a large Serbian state as it is a buffer zone in
Eastern Bosnia
-Muslims saw Srebrenica as a symbol of Bosnian resistance
-Oric and other Muslim leaders had been evacuated in April and forbidden to return to
Srebrenica
-Serbs had no problem on July 6 as Muslims were without leadership
-Serbs took Dutch hostages and told everyone to leave in 48 hours
-NATO did not provide air strikes and proclaimed they were “too dangerous”
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-The reality is that the UN force commander knew there was no point in trying to save
Srebrenica
-Serbs went on killing for days
-NATO air strikes happened on the 11th but they were ineffective
-Serbian leader Mladic had taken control and embarrassed international community and the
Dutch UN force commander on television by showing complete power
-15,000 people had escaped to the forest, many killing themselves, many murdered by Serbs,
many killed by mines
-International community had watched large mass murder with no action
-to make matters worse and show lack of shame, it seemed the world wasn’t concerned as now
the borders could be more easily drawn and defined after the mass murder and conquering
US Involvement
-France and Britain had been main troop contributing nations
-Neither, however, knew what the mission was once arrived (follow own agenda or the UN’s)
-US now had either put up or shut up with its policy
-US took role of leading the UN
-French backed up US and claimed they would put troops in Srebrenica to retake what the Serbs
had just conquered
-UN met and the memory of hundreds of hostage UN soldiers charged the meeting
-Strong boundary lines were drawn and action plans were created if and when the Serbs
pushed too far; air strikes were approved
-July 22nd US engineered a meeting between Izetbegovic and Tudjman that concluded with the
plan to “defend Bihac”
-Croatians easily take Serb towns of Glamoc, Bosansko Grahovo and Knin
Very summarized – there are tons of details here that are really unnecessary in the text
-The Krajina Serbs were easily taken over by the Croats
-The Croats overtook the land and forced the Serbs to flee while murdering many they found
-The population of Krin went from 35 to 40 thousand to just 500 or 600 in just 24 hours
-Largest displacement of people in Europe since WWII
-Martic and Babic (Krajina Serb leaders) had dropped off the face of the earth
-Serbs were encouraged to surrender and stay in the homes but they all fled
-Croatian army began hitting the road that refugees were taking
-Martic resurfaced and claimed that the Serb army had not lost a single battle or lost and major
manpower; that only some settlement had been abandoned – not true
-Krajina was solidly taken over by the Croats very quickly and they got their revenge on the
Serbs with the help of western involvement
-Serbs continued to be killed after the takeover and 20.000 homes were burned to the ground
-Bosnian Serbs watched as Krajina collapsed and the Serbian compatriots went down
-Karadzic accused Milosevic of abandoning his dream of the Greater Serbia
-Croats knew Milosevic would do nothing in response to their attack
-Milosevic knew he had to sacrifice Krajina for the peace in what he already had
-Tens of thousands of Krajina Serbs arrived in Serbia on their tractors
-Croatia was the counterbalance to Serbia and was backed by the west
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-Tudjman had failed to appease Clinton in 1994 and paid the price in the end
-As a result the US cooperated with Zagreb and signed a pact to favor the Croats and Muslims
against the Serbs
-The cocky and ignorant Serbs that believed in the superiority were repaid for their original
aggressiveness as the borders of greater Serbia were cut down dramatically.
Balkan Ghosts
Chapter 1. Croatia: “Just So They Could Go to Heaven”
Kaplan primarily discusses the religious history of Croatia and the notorious schism between
Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats in this chapter with a focus on the WWII era. The incident
regarding Archibishop Stepinac is given much attention in this chapter as the confused and
embattled legacy of Archibishop Stepinac and the facts surrounding his career as a wartime
archibishop are worth paying attention to in order to understand the nature of conflict.
“Since Croats are ethnically indistinguishable from Serbs—they come from the same Slavic race,
they speak the same language, their names are usually the same—their identity rests on their
religion.”
 the significance of the role that religion plays in this particular case of ethnic conflict.
1. 1930s – 1940s: Before and After WWII
o Catholic Croat vs. Orthodox Serb
- The divisions were already evident in the city of Zagreb in 1930s and early 1940s.
o Arrival of the Nazis
- The Nazi occupation detonated the already existent tensions.
- The massacre in Catholic Croatia and neighboring Bosnia-Hercegovina of orthodox
Serbs.
2. The Stepinac Incident
“ Elemental symbol of the Serb-Croat dispute, around which every other ethnic hatred in this
now-fragmented, the largest and most definitive of Balkan nations, is arranged.” (p.15)
- On April 10, 1941, the fascist Ustashe proclaimed the birth of “Independent State of Croatia”
on the dawn of the German and Italian invasion. Archibishop Stepinac’s reaction was “joyful”
as he welcomed the “creation of a free Croatia” more than anything.
- Stepinac failed to realize that Croatia under the Ustashe was nothing but a puppet state divided
between Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.
– He didn’t trust the Germans yet feared communism most. He thought of that ideology in
connection with the Orthodox church in Russia and with the Orthodox church in Serbia.
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- He remained oblivious to the early states of the state-organized atrocities against orthodox
Serbs and Jews yet at the midway through the Holocaust, accused the Ustache of their wrong
doings but without severing ties with them.
- Jews, Serbs and resistance figures thought of him as a lone ally in the midst of hell yet Stepinac
was “bearing responsibilities he hadn’t sought.” In the end, one is left feeling disgruntled that he
was not quite great enough for his role.
- Tito and communism made Stepinac into a martyr for the Croats and staged show trial as a war
criminal in 1946.
Balkan Ghosts, Chapter 2 “Old Serbia and Albania: Balkan “West Bank””
Robert Kaplan
Old Serbia
 Turkish imperialism destroyed “Old Serbia,” also known as Out There, was founded by
the Nemanjic dynasty
 June 28, 1389  June 1989 marked the 600th year anniversary of Serb defeat to the Turks
 Knez (Prince) Lazar, defeated Serb leader (1389) is a national hero, considered a martyr
 Serbs were marginalized by Tito (half-Croat, half-Slovene) in Communist Yugoslavia to
appease Croatians and Albanians
 Saint Sava, founded and organized Serbian Orthodox Church
 Later descendant, King Milutin, built Grachanitsa, famous historical Serbian monastery,
one of the “crowd symbols” for Serbs (pg. 35 two crowd symbols)
Albania
 Prishtina, Albanian dominated slum capital of Kosovo is depicted
 “Albanians descend from ancient Illyrian tribes that by some accounts came to Balkan
Peninsula before the Greeks and more than a thousand years before the Slavs
 Albanian language, Shquip, bears no relation to any known tongue, dervies from Illyrian
tribes
 Albania historically forgotten, overlooked at Yalta Conference, and not seen as
independent entity due to neighbors constant invasion and portioning of Albania i.e.
Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians
 After WWII, 7.3% of Albanians died or were crippled or on the brink of starvation,
bridges and factories were destroyed
 Today, it is a primitive service economy, has little imports and no factories for massproduction of clothing
 Azen Vlasi, seen as Albanian leader, charged as treasonous by Serbian Slobodan
Milosevic
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V P Gagnon , Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict
VP Gagnon:
The Basics: instrumentalist framework on ethnic conflict  ethnic conflict stems
from ethno-entrepreneurs who manipulate the people along ethnic lines to gain
power. Ex. Milosevic was a political entrepreneur who capitalized on ethno-national
identities since with Communism falling, his position as a mid-level Communist
nobody was not leading him anywhere. However, this argument is limited since as
theorists like Selbin point out, culture can also play an important role in creating and
shaping ethnic conflict.
More Detailed:
Ethnic violent conflict provoked by elites in response to shifts in structure of
domestic political and economic power (internally dynamics, not ethnic sentiments /
ancient ethnic hatreds nor external security concerns)
- Elites ensuring ethnicity becomes only politically relevant identity helps to
fend off domestic challengers trying to mobilize population against status
quo
- Positions elite to deal with future challenges.
Rationale of Elites
-Ruling elites will thus focus on preserving these domestic bases of power
-Persuasion = most effective / least costly way to influence domestic politics.
-Ethnicity plays key role as instrument of power and influence
-Conflict over ideas is an essential characteristic of domestic politics. Elites must
express interests in “language” of collective interest.
In order for conflict to escalate to ethnic violence, wider population has to be
involved in political decision making, and political participation in the past has been
deined in ethnic terms
Case of Serbia:
- Ethnic violence in former Yugoslavia was purposefeul and rational strategy
planned by those most threatened by changes to structure of economic
and political power being advocated by reformists within ruling Serbian
communist party
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-
-
Wide coalition (Serbian party conservatives, local and regional party elites,
orthodox Marxist intellectuals, nationalist writers, orthodox Marxist
intellectualists, nationalist writers, and parts of Yugoslav army) - provoked
ethnic conflict.
Coalition moved to destroy Yugoslav state and create new, Serbianmajority state (ethnic nationalism)
Coalition deflected demands for radical change and allowed the ruling elite
to reposition and survive, even when old Yugoslavia only 39% Serb
Conclusions:
- Conflict described in ethnic terms and taking place along ethnic lines may
not be caused by ethnicity or irrational acts of the masses, but by
purposeful and strategic policies of political actors.
WEEK 9
Key Terms
main points / case studies:
I.
Yugoslavia’s Cultural Diversity
a. Long-term primordialism or brought about by ethnic entrepreneurs?
II.
Historical Background
a. Slavic Origins
i. But large minorities, four different languages, 3 major religions: Greek
Orthodox, Catholicism, Islam  potentially 6 different countries.
ii. But connection was that most were SLAVIC. All shared common
race/language/culture @ some point. But Rome influenced Croats,
Serbians fell into orbit of Byzantine empire  reason for Catholics vs.
Orthodox.
b. The Middle Ages: Statehood and Absorption into (Ottoman/Austria-Hungary)
Empires
i. Croatia had own state, Serbs had own kingdom in 11th century, but
gobbled up by larger empires.
ii. Battle of Kosovo – Serbia
iii. When empires fell apart, conflict ensued. Serbia in Balkan wars against
Turks; first large-scale violence against Muslims
iv. WWI Ended Austria-Hungary, left Croatia stateless.
c. 19th Century statehood and the formation of Yugoslavia
i. After WWI, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slavs created  Yugoslavia.
d. The Interwar Period and WWII
i. A Serb-Dominated Yugoslavia (1919-1941)
1. Centralized regime, Serb government discriminated against other
groups. Resentment, especially among Croats. Proudct: emergence
of Ultra-national organization
ii. The Ustashi Regime in Croatia and the Mass Killing of Serbs (1941-45)
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III.
1. Saught independent Croatia. Never very popular, but when
Yugoslavia occupied by Axis, created puppet state & made
independent Croatia: fascist regime, w/genocidal violence against
Jews/gypsies/Serbs
2. Chetniks – nationalists, Serbs who resisted
3. The Partisans – led by Communists, led by Tito, rejected
ethnic/national majorities. Worked w/all ethnic groups. Built
support amongst all areas of Yugoslavia. Broad coalition allowed
to become dominant force of resistance. Tito and Partisans gained
control of Yugoslavia.
e. The Communist Period: federalism, ethnic peace, and relative prosperity
i. Aimed at preventing re-emergence of ethnic conflict. Federalist system
created:
1. highly decentralized. Semi-autonomous republics created. Had
own language/culture: Serbia/Croatia/Slovenia, and provinces
created within Serbia based on ethnic make-up. (but protection just
institutes…). Army would be truly Yugoslavian institution: 1 state
institution that transcended authority of republics, along
w/Communist party
2. Tried to reduce inequality among republics: the wealthy republics
would subsidize poorer republics. Resource transfer
3. created collective presidency. Each province (republic) would hold
seat in collective presidency. But meaningless because he
dominated politics. But after death, all major decisions would have
to be made across presidents
4. Yugoslavia stable: economy boomed as fast as Japan, high living
standards compared to Communist world. Became westernized,
cosmopolitan. Ethnic divisions seemed to fade, intermarriage.
Breakup of Yugoslavia
a. The Post-Tito Crisis and The Rise of Serb Nationalism
i. Economic crisis and the emergence of anti-communst opposition
1. Poor econ, so had to cut spending dramatically. Public discontent
growing. Also, wave of anti-communism spread as elsewhere in E.
Europe
2. intellectuals wrote memorandum of Serbia. It was getting a raw
deal out of Yugoslavia. Said Serbs under threat. Kosovo: Serbian
province in which 80% Albanian, muslim. Kosovo poor, minority
normally repressed by Serbs. Albanians grew vocal in their
discontent.
3. Milosevic, Communist bureaucrat sent to calm down the ethnic
conflict. He was pragmatist and had never shown nationalism…
ii. Milosevic’s 1987 speech in Kosovo: ethnic entrepreneurship?
1. arrived in Kosovo, addressed crowd of Serbs who felt mistreated
by provincial government. Albanians had beat the Serbs. Instead of
calming down, Milosevic enraged and sympathized with Serbs
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(nobody should ever beat you). The crowd cheered, he became one
of most popular leaders in Serbia.
a. Traveled country & lead “truth meetings”, aimed @
publicizing plight of Serbs in Kosovo. Nationalism spread.
Old songs & slogans that were banned under Tito became
widespread
iii. The mobilization of mass support, 1987-89
1. Battle of Kosovo’s 600 year anniversary. Milosevic built up,
connected battle then to battle now. Made him extraordinarily
popular. Displaced Tito. He became president, popularity allowed
Serbian Communists to hold onto power, despite rejection of
Communism in rest of E. Europe. State control media. Nationalism
helped them rebuild base of support. Free elections in 1989
resulted in overwhelming Communist win.
2. Similar dynamic in other republics:
a. Slovenia: anti-communist movement in 1986. But also
opposed to Slovenia’s position in Yugoslavia. Opposed
redistribution of Slovenia’s taxes. Opposed being drafted
into Yugoslavian army.
i. Milan Kucan (Communism) converted to
Nationalism; attacked Yugoslavia’s redistribution as
unfair, withneld Slovenia’s tax to fed. Government.
Politically successful.
b. Croatia: Nationalist opposition challenged Communist rule.
Franjo Tudjman led; promised Croats 1,000 years of
statehood. ALSO, large Serb minority which grew fearful
of nationalism in Croatia  In independent Croatia, Serbs
wouldn’t have Yugo army to protect. Didn’t want another
genocide. Serbs thought Tudjman fascist; fear. May 1990;
Tudjman won election. His government began nationalism,
pulled away from Yugoslavia. Threatened/bullied Serbs.
Cyrillic alphabet taken down. Serbs purged from police
force, Croats didn’t stop violence against Serbs. Refused to
distance itself from Ustashi past; renamed streets/buildings
to honor Ustashi leaders
i. Frightening for Serbs. So Serbs started to arm
themselves. Did so in Krajina, where majority of
Serbs lived. Serbs planned to carve Krajina if
Croatia succeeded.
ii. Formation of Serb militias triggered fear in Croats.
Feared Yugo army, mostly Serb, would side with
Serbs. Scary.
c. Bosnia: elections in 1990, no majority because no ethnic
majority. Serb-Croat-Bosnian alliance, Muslim won. Alijia
Izetbegovic won (Muslim).
b. Rise of Nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia
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i. Ethnic minorities, insecurity, and formation of militias
ii. Move to independence and collapse of Yugoslav state
1. Croatians, Slovenians, Macedinians withdrew from federalism.
Deserted army en masse  army turned into de facto Serbian
army. Yugoslavian stuff became Serbian de facto. CRUCIAL.
State was NOT neutral. Croatians abandoned army, purged police
of Serbs. Police seen as Croat, army seen as Serb  both ceased to
be neutral institutions. If Army was leaving and was protector of
country, no more effective state.
2. Slovenia departed from Yugoslavia. Croatia tried, but different
because had LARGE Serbian minority. Helped them carve out
Krajina.
c. Descent into civil war in Croatia
i. Militias on both sides. Serbs – Chetniks, Ustashi – Croats. State as neutral
arbiter nonexistence. Serbs had huge advantate: support of state and army.
Croats had new state, so weak. Used military advantage to carve out huge
chunk of Croatia. Did this using ethnic cleansing – emptying territory of
minorities so you could claim that territory as your territory. Would
shoot/burn down people/houses. Serb army bombarded entire towns. By
1992, Serbs controlled 30% of Croatia. Arrived @ shaky peace:
Yugoslavia would leave Croatia, but now 1/3 country controlled
autonomous region, state within a state
d. Ethnic cleansing and genocide in Bosnia, 1992-95
i. Tried to lay low, but as Yugoslavian country collapsed, Serbs/Croats
talked of split. Part would got to Serbia, part to Croatia. Muslims just left
out. Muslims had no state, weaker than others. President (Izetbegovic)
decided only option was to declare independence, and that hopefully
international community would arrive and stop carving up of state.
ii. This put Serbs into situation similar to Croatia. Like Serbs in Croatia,
Serbs prepared to break away. Walked out of Parlaiment, created Serb
Republic, independent of Bosnia. Croats also annexed large territory,
prepared for independence. Carving of territory led to ethnic clensing.
1. each wanted most territory; to claim, had to show that this area
homogeneously of your group. How do you do this in an integrated
country like Bosnia? Only by ethnic cleansing. Need to physically
expel members of rival ethnic group. Exactly what
Serbian/Croatian militias did
2. No Bosnian army, so government powerless. Anarchy, overrun by
ethnic, armed forced. UN peacekeepers mandated only to secure
safety of regufees; couldn’t engage in conflict: often stood by as
ethnic cleansing took place.
3. Muslims reduce to 10% of territory, despite being 40% of
population. Serbs had upper-hand. Brutal attack: Serb 17 month
siege of Sarajevo. Multi-ethnic. Serbs wanted to divide city in 2
and capital of Serb Republic. But was thoroughly integrated. Had
to ethnically cleanse city of 400,000. Lay siege to Sarajevo.
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Trapped in city for a year. Int’l community did little but help
refugees. Bombing from NATO, but Western powers unwilling to
make ground-troop commitment.
e. Milosevic’s about face, Dayton Accords, and end of war in Bosnia
i. Muslims/Croats eventually got stronger and united against Serbs. United
and drove out of Serb territory.
ii. May 1992, UN Security council imposed sanctions on Serbia, in response
to Sarajevo. Serbian economy went to hell; Milosevic began to lose
support @ home. He changed tactics:
1. Now that war threatening hold on power, announced blockade on
armed shipments to Bosnia. Serbia would no longer send arms to
Serbia. After 3 years of backing armies in Bosnia, just cut them
off.
2. In Dayton Ohio, Milosevic, Izetbegovic, Tudjman signed Dayton
Accords. Left Bosnia as independent state. But would have Serb
Republic, & Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Semiautonomous republics
3. Changes in Croatia
a. Serbs had 30%, declared autonomous republic of Krajina.
In 1995, Croatians moved into Krajina, launced another
round of ethnic cleansing. Croatia “cleansed” of 80% of its
Serbs
f. War in Kosovo
i. Albanian majority wanted independent state, but had no army and was part
of Serbia. Would be crushed by Serbian army. Serbians had converted
Kosovo into police state. But went underground and elected Ibrahim
Rugova as shadow-president. Hoped to use worldwide vilification of
Milosevic to peacefully bring support. But KLA opted for armed struggle.
Kosovo Albanians peaceful until 1995.
1. Dayton accords said Kosovo part of Serbia, cart of the deal that
Milosevic liked. Int’l community liked Dayton accords, meant
wouldn’t give Kosovo independent state. After Dayton, KLA
began to pick up support
2. 1997, in Albania country imploded for reasons unrelated. Anarchy
and amidst chaos, major arms depots were raided.
Hundreds/thousands of guns became available for cheap prices.
Allowed KLA to arm itself. In 1998, KLA launged serious
guerilla.
a. Serb minority got scared, so armed itself. Milosevic @ first
restrained in response, but Kosovo BIG deal to Serbs.
Milosevic looking weak on Kosovo would have destroyed
him politically, so he supported movement. Albanians were
displaced from homes.
b. Though 80% Albanian, Serbs wanted to cleans entire
province. Clinton government promised not to go as
slowly, demanded that Serbia pull out of Kosovo. But
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Milosevic refused to back down. Bombed Serbia for 78
days. Albanians fled country. In June 1999, Serbs
withdrew, NATO declared de facto region of Kosovo under
UN. Milosevic forced out of power after tried to steal
election. Died in prison.
ii. CONCL:
1. Some real historical greivences Ustashi, Muslim oppression in
Kosovo.
2. Economic crisis, Communist government attempting to maintain
power. Thus incentives for ethnic entrepreneurship.
3. Collapse of state is what really explains. Minorities had been
protected by armies. But federal state crumbled and ethnic
minorities felt vulnerable so armed themselves. Formed states
within states; needed ethnically “pure” territory  violence.
4. Muslims had no state/arms, reason why they were victims
(Serbs/Croats had arms, so not victims)
Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama
Chapter 1: A Country of Diversity
I.
Yugoslavia = the country of the South Slavs
a. Much diversity on such a relatively small territory (256,000 square kilometers and
just over 23 million in population)
b. 2 alphabets are in use (both official): the Latin alphabet and the Cyrillic alphabet:
i. Latin alphabet was used commonly for official documents, among
intellectuals and university graduates
ii. Problems over alphabets only arose when the differences were exploited
for political purposes, to separate people who were loyal to the “national
cause” and who betrayed the nation
c. Territories and people of Yugoslavia were for a number of centuries dominated by
two different occupiers and cultures:
i. The Austro-Hungarian Empire: ruled over the north and the west of the
country
ii. The Ottoman Empire: ruled over the east, south, and central parts of
Yugoslavia
d. Three major religions:
i. Greek Orthodox Christianity: the further east and south
ii. Roman Catholicism: the further north and west in Yugoslavia
iii. Islam: mostly in Bosnia
iv. In the central part of the country, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is where the
three religions meet and mingle
e. Languages: the number of languages in the country is continuously disputed over
i. Serbian and Croatian:
1. Very similar languages: identical grammar structure
2. Government policy wanted to promote the idea of a single SerboCroatian language
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II.
3. Many Croats, more than Serbs, challenged this idea and
emphasized the differences in the two languages
ii. Slovenian and Macedonian:
1. Very different from Serbian and Croatian, as well as from each
other
iii. Other languages of national minorities, for example the 2 major ones:
1. Albanian
2. Hungarian
3. Others: Italians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Turks, etc
f. Number of nations in Yugoslavia: another issue of contention
i. 4 nations are considered authentic: Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes
ii. Fifth nation is disputed: Montenegrins Serbs living in a different state,
or a different nation altogether?
iii. Muslims: the notion of a Muslim “nation” as introduced by the
constitution of 1963
iv. Albanians: claim that they should also be treated as a constitutive nation of
Yugoslavia, that Kosovo should become a republic
v. Undecided people: according to the latest census taken in 1991, almost
half a million people were nationally “undecided”
The 6 republics of Yugoslavia:
a. Bosnia and Herzegovina:
i. Centrally located
ii. 44% Muslim, 31.5% Serbs, 17% Croats
iii. History:
1. Independent state in the middle ages
2. from around 1489 to 1878: part of Ottoman Empire (Turks)
3. Six months later: part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
4. Between the two world wars: integrated into the new state of
Yugoslavia
5. WWII: became a part of the Independent State of Croatia, a puppet
state of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy Tito’s headquarters and
his elite partisan troops operated from BiH for two and a half years
(1942 to mid-1944)
iv. One of the economically less developed republics, recipient of
considerable development aid
v. Practically land-locked
vi. Self sufficient in energy but not in agriculture
vii. High proportion of the armaments industry
b. Croatia
i. Second largest republic
ii. 78% Croats and 12% Serbs
iii. In many opstinas (neighborhoods?), Croats had a relative majority, but in
few, Serbs had an overwhelming majority
iv. History:
1. 10th and 11th century: independent, medieval Croatian State
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2. 12th century: lost its independence to the Hungarian Koloman
dynasty
3. from then until WWI: subject of Hungarian or Austro-Hungarian
rule
v. Vojna Krajina: territory that separated the Hungarian lands from the
Ottoman Empire Serbs settled these lands and were given free and
autonomous status  the Croats attempted to regain political sovereignty
over these territories, and the Serbs never yielded now, Serbs are settled
on territories that were the heart of the medieval Croatian kingdom
vi. Relatively well-developed republic: its GNP per capita stood about 25 to
35 percent above the Yugoslav average, and Croatia paid contributions in
to the fund for less well-developed republics
vii. Self-sufficient in agriculture and had 75% of Yugoslavia’s production of
crude oil, and a net importer of energy. Manufacturing sector is
diversified. Lot of income from tourism
c. Macedonia:
i. Total populationL just over 2 million, 65% Macedonians, 21% Albanians,
small percentage of Turks, Rom (Gypsies) and Serbs
ii. Main ethnic concerns: concentration of a large and growing Albanian
minority and the Bulgarian contention that Macedonians are actually
Bulgarians
iii. History:
1. Ruled by Bulgarians, Turks, Serbs, Greeks
iv. Poorest of all republics: GNP per capita varied between 55 and % of the
Yugoslav average
v. Use one script (Cyrillic) and belong to one religion (Orthodox) – but lately
threatened by Albanians with their own language and predominantly
Muslim religion
d. Montenegro
i. Tiniest of all republics
ii. 62% Montenegrins, 15% Muslims, 8.5% Serbs, 6.6 ethnic Albanians, and
4.5% Yugoslavs
iii. History:
1. Independent state in the 11th century
2. Part of the medieval Serbian state for almost 2 centuries
3. Under the rule of Venetians and Turks
4. 18th century: total independence
iv. Proud of their outstanding record on the field of battle
v. A disproportionately high number of them joined Tito’s partisans, and an
even higher proportion achieved the rank of commanding officers and
generals Montenegro became one of the constitutive federal republics in
post-war Yugoslavia
vi. Rocky, mountainous land
vii. Less well-developed economically, its GNP per capita reaching 80% of
national average, recipient of federal development aid
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viii. Not self-sufficient in agriculture, does not offer a rich base of raw
materials for mining and manufacturing
ix. Tourism is becoming the most important industry
e. Slovenia
i. Ethnically the most homogeneous: more than 90% Slovene
ii. Never had a medieval national state and were for over a millennium
subject to constant pressure and division by mostly German and Austrian
rulers
iii. Best developed republic: GNP per capita of almost 60% above average
iv. Self-sufficient in agriculture, self sufficient in energy, Tourism is an
important source of income
v. Historically, experienced no territorial or ethnic disputes with Croatia, but
now, starting to have issues
f. Serbia
i. Biggest of all former republics both in size and in population
ii. 65.8% Serbs, 17.2% Albanians, etc
iii. Complex history:
1. Medieval state centered in and around Kosovo, the province that
today is 90% Albanian
2. Under Turkish rule
3. Serbian autonomy in 1830
4. Fought three regional wars: first and second Balkan war, defeat to
Bulgaria
iv. Economy is diversified but not very efficient or productive: GNP per
capita was somewhat below average, but still among the better developed
republics and contributed aid to the less well-developed republics
v. Relative levels of development within Serbia are different: Kosovo has a
very low GNP per capita
vi. Self-sufficient in agriculture and energy and was the main exporter of both
to other republics. Broad manufacturing base that is neither very
productive or efficient
vii. Diversity of languages – need for the coexistence of both scripts
Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History
 not very historical, but rather a more literary account of the narrator’s observations, feelings,
etc.
Croatia: “Just so they could go to heaven”
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Zagreb: the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia
o In 1937: people are so absorbed in their own divisions, of Catholic Croat versus
Orthodox Serbs, that they were “phantoms” even before the Nazis arrived”
o Croats and Serbs still argue over numbers: numbers of how many people were
killed by the Croatian Ustashe, etc.
o Extreme poverty
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o The conflict was gradually building up- the international community just was not
paying any attention: the pressure of the discontent was being released
horizontally, in the form of one group against another, rather than vertically
against the communist powers in Belgrade
o Conflict is more complex: not just the battle between communism and capitalism
or Croats versus Serbs, but Catholicism against Orthodoxy, Rome against
Constantinople, the legacy of Habsburg Austria-Hungary against that of Ottoman
Turkey, West against East
Bishop Josip Strossmayer: Croatioan patriot (in the 19th century)
o Accepted the equality and legitimacy of the Serbian Orthodox church
o Wanted to unite the catholic and orthodox churches in Croatia
o Denounced by his fellow Catholics in Austria-Hungary and the Vatican
A new sprit of Christian unity (1937): Alojzije Stepinac
o Different from Strossmayer: very piously catholic: wanted the “schismatic Serbs
to return to the true faith” and tried to carry out mass conversions before they
were killed
o Source of conflict between Croats and Serbs:
 Croats consider him a hero
 Serbs consider him a war criminal—tried to convert Orthodox Serbs
before their execution by the Croatian Ustashe
o Cultivated an obsessive fear of capitalism
o Very naive, confused, unaware and blind to political situations (according to
author)
o Until a certain point, supported the Ustashe dictator Pavelic, but gradually became
overwhelmed by reports of mass killings and stopped supporting him
o Midway through the Holocaust, started publicly confronting the Ustashe. Was
distrusted by the fascists and hated by the Communists
o Tito and Communism made Stepinac into a martyr for the Croats:
 Ignored his early statements of support for the Ustasche and the open
collaboration of many Catholic priests with the murderers at the Jesonovac
concentration camp
 Tito met with Stepinac twice and attempted to coerce him to form a
“national Catholic church” independent of the Vatican which would be
subservient to his Communist regime
o Eventually arrested by Tito’s prosecutors, found guilty on all accounts and exiled
o Role of the catholic church: Pope Pius XII made Stepinac a cardinal, Vatican
embraced him as a hero against communism
While Ukrainians and others openly apologized for their actions against Jews during the
Holocaust, Croatian groups only issued denials (to the Serbs, etc.)  Why? According to
the author, because the war in Yugoslavia (the struggle for survival) postponed the selfexamination of Holocaust history in Croatia
Conflict between Croats and Serbs: a conflict between the West and East
o It didn’t matter that Serbs and Croats were fellow Slavs. The Serbs were Eastern
Orthodox, and therefore, part of the East
o Differences in western vs. eastern ideologies and religions
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o No matter how exploitative the Habsburg Austrians were, the glitter of Vienna
has always been symbolic in Croatia of the west and of Catholicism (Croats
identify with the West) for this reason, they have forgiven the Habsburg
dynasty for all its sins
o On the other hand, Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated the Habsburg heir apparent
Franz Ferdinand, was a Serb from Bosnia
o Due to centuries of Habsburg rule, Croats were convinced that they were
culturally superior to the Serbs when the Serbian royal house of
Karageorgevitch was given authority over the Croats in the newly created state of
Yugoslavia after WWI, communal hate started building and the ethnic tolerance
of the past slowly disintegrated
Old Serbia and Albania: Balkan “West Bank”
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Serbian monastery of Grachanitsa: “a spot where Asia met Europe”
o Serbian culture=Eastern influences
o The legacy of the Old Serbia, the Nemanjic dynasty (founded toward the end of
the 12th century by a Stefan Nemanja)
 Stefan Nemanja’s son founded and organized the Serbian Orthodox
Church
 A later decendant, King Milutin, expanded Serbia into a great Orthodox
Christian Empire at the beginning of the 14th century, richer even than the
Byzantine Empire at the time
The influence/authority of the Ottoman Empire was never as complete in Serbia as it was
in either Bulgaria of Greece, but in Serbian legend, the Nemanjic kingdom sacrificed
itself to the Turks in order to gain a new kingdom in heaven, rather than one on earth
Conflict between Serbs and Albanians:
o Serbs consider themselves superior: on the whole much more well-off and
developed, also more culturally superior (Nemanjic dynasty, past)
o Conflict over region of Kossovo:
 What used to be “old Serbia,” where the great Nemanjic kingdom was
born
 Now Albanians occupy this region
 To many Serbs, Tito’s Yugoslavia signified another anti-Serbian
plot, because Yugoslav nationalism, as Tito defined it, meant
undercutting the power of the numerically dominant Serbs in order
to placate other groups, particularly the Croats and the Albanians
 When Tito placed the province of Kossovo within the jurisdiction
of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, Serbian partisans were
murdering large numbers of Kossovo’s ethnic Albanians. So Tito
gave the Albanians their own autonomous province Kossovo 
Serbs became even angrier, because Kossovo was the “historic
heartland” of their nation
 1987: Milosovic stirred up the Serbian community and led a revolt against
the Yugoslav federation  tried to strip Kossovo of its autonomous status,
increased violence
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Kossovo: symbol of defeat for Serbs
 Albanian capital of Kossovo is named Prishtina
 Prishtina is poor, dirty, underdeveloped, full of people who are
unemployed and alcoholic – violent and conflict ridden as well
 A few impressive buildings that seem out-of place: buildings that
Tito had built, to keep the Albanians from hating the Serbs
Albanians:
o Descend from ancient Illyrian tribes that by some accounts came to the Balkan
Peninsula even before the Greeks did, and more than a thousand years before the
Slavs
o Albanians too had their national development arrested by the Turks
o Also ruled by Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians, then invaded by Serbian forces and
then by forces of Habsburg Austria-Hungary
The conflict between Serbs and Albanians had been building up for a long time – but in
1898, Yugoslavia did not even exist on the world’s consciousness
WEEK 10
The Imperative of State-Building—Francis Fukuyama
-State-building is the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing
ones
-Weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s problems:
-AIDS: can be treated with drugs, but must be administered carefully by a strong public
health infrastructure; many African countries lack such institutional
capacity
-Drug trafficking
-Human rights disasters with hundreds of thousands of victims in the 90s in
Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor
-Controversy over size and strength of the state:
-Beginning of 19th century: liberal international order; small, limited states
-After WW1, Depression, WW2, liberal order crumbled; more centralized and
active
state model became prominent
-Extreme right (fascist) and extreme left (communist) branches of centralized
state
models came to an end after WW2 and after the Berlin Wall, respectively
-80s and 90s saw a resurgence of liberal ideas throughout the developed world in light of
the inefficiencies of the big state and the reaction against communism
-Washington Consensus and policy of the 80s and 90s focused on reducing the size of the state
sector in the former communist world and former authoritarian countries in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa
-Washington consensus heavily criticized, but the problem was not in economic liberalization:
people focused on state reduction and neglected state-building
-The state needed to be cut back in certain areas yet strengthened in others, and simply
cutting back across the board deprived states of important institutional
capacity and
effectiveness
-The key is the distinction between state size/scope and state strength
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-Size/scope is the different functions and goals taken on by governments
-Strength is the ability to plan and execute policies and enforce laws cleanly and
transparently (a.k.a. state capacity)
-The essence of state-ness is enforcement: “small” states can still be extremely strong, like the
U.S.
-See pages 858-859 in Volume 2 for graphs on state scope and strength
-From an economic standpoint, the best state is limited in scope with strong effectiveness
-If state is too small in scope, it will fail to perform minimal functions such as
protecting property rights
-If state is too large in scope, it will become too interventionist and stifle the
economy, according to neoclassical economics
-European-style socialism argues that an American style of limited state scope comes at a price
of social justice and prefer larger scope
-Worst combination is overambitious scope with low effectiveness, which incidentally defines
most developing countries
-Some examples of transitions:
-USSR 1980 to Russia 2000: extensive scope of moderate strength to narrower scope
and poor strength
-Japan 1980-2000: decrease in scope and strength; some economic liberalization but
also deterioration in quality of government bureaucracy
-New Zealand 1980-1995: reduced scope and liberalized economy, then strengthened
remaining state
sectors (optimal transition)
-The problem for many countries was that in the process of reducing state scope, they decreased
state strength and/or generated demand for new capabilities that were weak or absent
-Africa: neo-patrimonial regimes used “cutting back” as an excuse to cut away
even
more of the state sectors for the public good and focused power in their own
inner spheres;
this type of behavior was largely ignored by the Washington
Consensus’ ideal of
liberalization above all else
-Privatization requires institutional capacity to perform well; information and assets must be
properly identified and transferred
-Economy requires state capacity to function
-Experiment: took 10 months and $1,000 to get business license in Peru; 2 days in
U.S. or Canada
-The “New Conventional Wisdom” is that state and institutional strength is more important than
state size; “Institutions Matter” has been slogan since late 90s
“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” by Charles Tilly
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Protection rackets represent organized crime → war making and state making are largest
examples of organized crime
War makers and state makers → coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs
European states were created in large part by coercive exploitation.
Essay explains interdependence of war making and state making.
o War makes states
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o Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing, and war making are on the same
continuum
o Mercantile capitalism and state making reinforced each other
Double-edged protection:
o Protection can mean: 1)shelter vs danger (someone provides aid w/o control over
the danger), 2)racket where strong forces another through threats (someone
provides both the danger and the shield → racketeer)
o Many governments operate as racketeers, protecting citizens vs imaginary threats
or against threats that are consequences of their own actions.
o How do racketeer governments acquire authority and legitimacy?
o Governments are defined as organizations that hold monopoly of means of
violence and, when they do, they claim to use it to provide protection
o Legitimacy → probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions
of a given authority, very likely to happen when a given authority controls
substantial force for fear of retaliation and desire to maintain a stable environment
o Many people believe that the government’s other services outbalance the large
cost of their monopoly of force.
o War making, extraction, and capital accumulation shaped European state making
but not with the purpose of creating states. They warred in order to check or
defeat competition and enjoy the advantages of power within a secured territory.
To war effectively, they needed capital which they acquired by conquest, selling
assets, or coercing accumulators of capital. They established regular access to
capitalists who supplied credit and imposed taxes on people under their control
→Development of an interest in promoting accumulation of capital
o States were, thus, created in an effort to monopolize violence within a delimited
territory adjacent to a power holder’s base.
Violence and government:
o Early in the state making process, many parties (bandits, pirates, tax collectors)
had right to use violence. As time passed, the distinction slowly began to be
drawn between legitimate and illegitimate use of violence where legitimate was
the one where states used it on a large scale, more efficiently, more effectively,
with support and assent from population and other authorities.
 Ex: Tudors → consolidated royal monopoly of violence → growth of a
police force consolidated monopoly and made it effective by
demilitarizing the great lords
 France: Louis XIII, under Richelieu’s advise, began the disarmament in
1620’s and destruction of great rebel lords
o Late 18th century: most European monarchs controlled permanent, professional
military forces that rivaled and exceeded neighbors and those organized within
their territory → monopoly of large-scale violence
o Before, monarchs relied on local magnates to rule territory, magnates that were
also potential enemies. Now, they reduced their reliance on indirect rule through:
 Extending officialdom to local community
 Encouraging creation of a police force subordinate to the government
o Magnates were made dependent on the maintenance of the existing power
structure.
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Protection as business:
o Economic historian Frederic Lane (neoclassical theorist) said that governments
are in business of protecting people, not to bring peace, but as a result of desire to
expand power.
 Monopoly profit/tribute: owner of means of producing violence receives
tribute as a result of the difference between production costs and the price
taken from “customers”
 Protection rent: rent added to customers who receive effective protection
against outside competitors. Government generates protection rent for its
merchants by attacking their competitors (racket)
o Government can be autonomous or subordinate to a dominant class
 If subordinate: maximize monopoly profits for dominant class and tuning
protection rents to class’ economic interests
 If autonomous: maximize manager’s wages and its own size, w/o regard to
protection rent
o Lane discussed four stages of capitalism:
1. Anarchy and plunder
2. Tribute takers attract customers and establish monopoly
3. Merchants and landlords gain more from protection rents than governors
did from tributes
4. Technological changes surpassed protection rents as sources of profit for
entrepreneurs
o Modern economists say that stages 2-3 are crucial for sustained economic growth
because protection overwhelms tribute
o Richard Bean says that military innovation promoted the creation of large,
expensive, well-armed national states.
 However, these innovations came to late to have caused the increase in the
viable size of states.
History talks:
o Following Bean’s proposal, different military formats have different costs and
provide different ranges of control over domestic and foreign opponents.
 After 1400, European pursuit of larger, permanent, and more costly
varieties of military organizations increased princely budgets, taxes, and
staff → princes with more costly military organizations could conquer
new territories.
o Until 18th century, greatest powers were maritime states (naval warfare was
important to international position) → ex: Venice, Genoa, Spain, Holland,
England, US (New York)
 Land transportation was very expensive
 These were major ports, centers of commerce, outstanding mobilizers of
capital
o Importance of capital accumulation to military expansion → behind every
successful European dynasty was an array of opulent banking families
o Great capitalists played crucial role in borrowing and paying interests as
 Principal sources of royal credit
 Most important contractors in collection of royal taxes
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o Examples
 France’s national debt began in the reign of Francis I in the midst of the
war vs Charles V.
 England’s national debt originated and grew due to major wars. From the
17th century, debt and taxes rose as a result of the increasing costs of war
making. Even when not in war, taxes remained high to pay off debts
contracted during war time.
What do states do:
o Different uses of state-controlled violence:
 War making: eliminating/neutralizing rivals outside territories
 Yields armies, navies, and supporting services
 State making: eliminating/neutralizing rivals inside territories
 Produced durable instruments of surveillance and control
 Protection: eliminating/neutralizing rivals of clients
 Relies on organization of war and state making + an apparatus in
which the protected call forth the protection that was their due
through courts and representative assemblies
 Extraction: acquiring means to carry out the first three
 Brought fiscal and accounting structures
o These uses may reinforce the other (war making vs commercial rivals also offers
protection to clients)
o All these uses depend on the government’s tendency to monopolize the means of
coercion
o The more costly the activity, the greater the organizational residue (increased size
of structure) → ex: Brandenburg-Prussia
o In extraction: the less resources and the less commercialized the economy, the
more difficult to obtain resources to sustain war and other governmental activities
(more expensive fiscal apparatus)
o In state making: a heterogeneous territory (w/ many great lords or religious
groups) has a larger costs on a conqueror
o Cost of protection increases with the size of the territory
o Size of government varies directly with efforts devoted w/ four uses of violence
but inversely w/ commercialization of economy and extent of resource base.
o ***Great lord warred effectively so as to become dominant in a region → War
making led to extraction, thus war capacity increases capacity for extraction →
Extraction entails eliminating local competitors and creating organizations such as
tax-collection agencies, police, courts, etc (state making) → in the process,
managers of states formed alliances with specific social classes that provided
resources , services, and compliance of others in exchange of protection →
growth of a distinctive state apparatus***
How states formed:
o Popular resistance to war and state making → authorities made concessions →
concessions constrained war and state making (checks and balances)
o Balance among war making, state making, protection, and extraction affected
organization of states emerged
 If war making predominated, military forces dominated (ex: Spain)
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If protection prevailed, oligarchies dominated (ex:Venice, Holland)
If state making prevailed, disproportionate elaboration of policing and
surveillance emerged (ex: Papal States)
o This structure neglects influence of external relations. Influences that connected a
national state to European network of states were:
 Flow of resources like loans and supplies (especially devoted to war
making)
 Competition among states for hegemony in disputed territory →
stimulated war making
 Creation of coalitions of peace** and of war
War as international relations:
o War became normal condition of international system of states and normal means
of defending or enhancing a position within the system because it was the way a
lord extended or defended the territory where he monopolized violence and
increased his tribute
o History of European state making as three stages:
1. Success of a power in external struggles differentiates internal from
external deployment of force
2. External competition generates internal state making
3. External compacts among states influence the form and locus of particular
states
o Internal struggles produced important organizational features of European states.
o States outside of Europe developed differently → most telling feature is the
difference in military organization
 Europe: built up military apparatuses as a result of sustained struggles and
extension of protection while agreements on protection constrained rules
themselves
 States that have come into being recently by decolonization or relocation
of territory of dominant states have acquired their organization from
outside, w/o forging mutual constraints between rulers and ruled. These
outside military organization harbor great power and offers great
advantages → incentives to seizing power by means of the military
o Europe never experienced disproportion between military organization and other
organizations that seems the fate of these new emerging states
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy, ch. 3
STATES
THESIS
The juxtaposition of developmental and predatory states allows for the analysis of the variation
of developmental outcomes in relation to policy and structural choices of a given state.
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“Is predatory behavior associated with an excess of bureaucracy…or with scarcity?” (44)
I. Predatory States: A state that “preys on its citizenry, terrorizing them, despoiling their
common patrimony, and providing little way of services in return.” (45)
1. Zaire
a. Politics
i. Warlord Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko takes control in 1965
ii. Loots vast mineral wealth of copper, cobalt, and diamonds
iii. Amasses personal wealth at the expense of state
iv. Weak state, “despotic power” undertakes any action without “
institutionalized negotiation with civil society” (45)
v. Although seemingly bureaucratic, the only functioning bureaucracy is the
state’s repressive capacity
b. Economy
i. Government looting led to GNP decline at a rate of 2% yearly
ii. State has little capability of influencing economic and social structures
iii. Market forces undermine state with violence underpinning the extraction
of natural resources
iv. “Everything is for sale…holding any slice of public power constitutes a
veritable exchange instrument” (46)
c. Society
i. Death squads employ repression as reprisals to dissent
ii. No rule of law
iii. No “autonomy” in the sense that autonomy implies the “ability to
formulate collective goals” (45)
“Zaire demonstrates that it is not bureaucracy but its absence that makes the state
rapacious” (47)
II. Developmental States: A state with the “ability to facilitate industrial
transformation…fundamentally rooted in coherent, competent bureaucratic organization”
(51)
1. Japan
a. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
i. Demonstrated “willingness of state financial institutions to back
industrial debt/equity rations…critical ingredient in the expansion of
new industries” (48)
ii. Regulated competition in industry
iii. Concentration of highest level bureaucrats in Japan
b. Proof of “Weberian hypothesis”
i. Effective bureaucracy essential for capitalism
ii. Informal bureaucracy (e.g. University of Tokyo Alumni networks)
reinforce internal coherence of formal bureaucracy
iii. External networks connect state and civil society together, reinforcing
market economy
2. Korea
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a. Bureaucracy under Rhee Syngman
i. Institutionalized exam-based civil service recruitment but largely
bypassed
ii. Highest positions filled on the basis of special appointments and not
merit
iii. “Rhee’s regime was more predatory than developmental” (52) due to
his dependence on individual business people for resources
b. Revitalization
i. Single “pilot agency”, Economic Planning Board (EPB) functions like
Japan’s MITI.
ii. Korea under Park begins to “embed” society from the top down, as
were particular families who led a few large firms favored to lead
industrialization
iii. “Relative absence of links to private capital…threatened state’s ability
to secure…private sector for effective implementation” (54) of market
economy
3. Taiwan
a. Transformation of Kuomingtang (KMT)
i. Largely predatory on mainland
ii. When regime’s landlord constituency was wiped out by civil war,
KMT transformed corrupt and factionalized party organization
b. New bureaucracy
i. Creation of small elite economic organizations such as Council on
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) and Natural Resources
Commission (NRC)
ii. State-Owned Enterprises drove economy
iii. “Less dense set of public-private network ties than Korea or Japan”
(56)
c. Beginnings of Embeddedness
i. “Private capital, especially private capital organized into tight
oligopolistic networks, is unlikely to provide itself with a competitive
market” (57)
ii. KMT under Yin began “entrustment scheme” which filled supply gaps
in the economy with private firms.
“Embeddedness…implies a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and
aggressively to particular social groups with whom the state shares a joint project of
transformation” (59)
III. Intermediate States: States with “some semblance of bureaucratic organization, but not
the degree of corporate coherence enjoyed by developmental states” (60)
1. Brazil
a. Politics
i. Executive enjoys extensive powers of political appointment
ii. Lack of meritocratic recruitment leads to ineffective bureaucracy
iii. “Reform by addition makes strategic [political] selectivity harder” (62)
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iv. Wasteful, segmented, divided, and fragmented agencies result from
incoherent policy of development
b. Economy
i. State concentrates on creating “pockets of efficiency”
ii. “Modernization by addition rather than transformation” (61)
iii. “Pockets” were surrounded by a sea of ineptness and thus required the
protection of individual presidents
c. Society
i. “Reactionary rural elites were never dramatically swept from the stage as
in East Asian cases” (62)
ii. Embeddedness made impossible by the division of traditional oligarchic
power and bourgeois class
iii. Business leaders verbally abused by government
2. India
a. Bureaucracy
i. “Venerable bureaucratic tradition” (66)
ii. English endowed India with the Indian Civil Service (ICS) which was
succeeded by Indian Administrative Service (IAS)
iii. Recruits educated, but education centered on generalist western ideas
instead of contemporary Indian political realities
b. Societal Context
i. “ In a subcontinental, multinational state, state-society relations are
qualitatively more complex than in East Asian cases” (67)
ii. Role of rural powerholders very prominent
c. Economy
i. State antithetical to business, leading to a “license, permit, and quota raj”
(68)
ii. All state-private interactions were inundated with micro politics.
iii. State investment in infrastructure and capital allowed for some
technologically adventurous industries
Peter Evans , “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an era of Globalization.”
World Politics 50 (October 1997), pp.62-87.
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Nettl believed that “stateness” or the institutional centrality of the state varied in
important ways among nations
He argued that political behavior and institutions could only be understood only if the
state were brought back into the center of political analysis
Current debates are less about the form of public institutions than about the extent to
which private power can or should be checked by public authority
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A reinvigorated political faith and the efficacy of markets combined with a rediscovery of
a civil society creates a substitute for public institutions
Lagging development of political and administrative institutions resulted in a state
capacity gap
It was much harder to ignore the state in the 1990’s than it was in the 1960’s
The arena that Netl saw as securing stateness is now seen as transcending the power of
the nation-state
Economic transactions that cross national boundaries have has undermined the power of
the state
Stateness can no longer be treated simply as a feature of Anglo American culture
It must now be dealt with as a dominant global ideology and potential institutional reality
The danger is not that states will end up as marginal institutions but that more repressive
ways of organizing the state’s role will be accepted as the only way of avoiding the
collapse of public institutions
The structural logic of globalization and the recent history of global economy can be read
as providing rationales for high stateness and low stateness
The absence of a clear logic connecting economic globalization to low stateness makes
the normative and ideological side of the global order a key determinant of how
globalizations affects stateness
Theoretical perspectives on stateness are both sources of insight into the nature of the
contemporary global order and influential shapers of the political and ideological face of
that order
There is a dominate notion that state authority has leaked away and in many cases
evaporated
Transnational economic relations have created a more constraining context for state
action
Wealth and power are increasingly generated by private transactions that take place
across the orders of states rather than within them
Sates are no loner the key in actors in the international arena
Unlike Nettl’s arguments that likened the international arena to a society in which states
were the people, now the most economically “empowered’ citizens of the international
arena are transnational corporations
Trade is being organized globally rather than nationally
Unlike other times in history, nowadays in a global economy were there is a surplus of
labor, control over large amounts of territory and population can be more of a burden
than an asset
Information and communication systems have played a key role in undermining
nationalist territorial ambitions
Fred Block has called this phenomena “the dictatorship of international financial
markets”
Countries that are most exposed to trade have bigger governments
In a study conducted by Dani Rodrik, he found out that the degree of openness during
the early 1960’s was a very good predictor of the expansion of government over the
subsequent three decades
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The East Asian case is an example that portrays the implications of the evolution of
stateness
East Asian countries have used various strategies in which the state played a central role
that dramatically changed the role East Asia played in the international context
Even though in diverse ways, all these states present a new variety of high stateness
The East Asian success forces us to question the notion that effective participation in a
globalized economy is best achieved by restricting state involvement in economic affairs
Instead, such cases suggest that successful participation in global markets is best
achieved through more intense state involvement
Singapore is the most obvious case
It has a highly internationalized economy but it is also renowned for the capacity and
power of its state bureaucracy
East Asia contests the current belief that the institutional centrality of the state is
incompatible with globalization
Even if state involvement does undermine the benefits a country receives from the global
economy, in the current Anglo-American order, individual states must commit
themselves to the rules of the game or risk becoming economic pariahs
The effect of global ideological consensus (Washington Consensus) goes well beyond the
constraints imposed by any structural logic of the international economy
The “dictatorship of international finance” is closer to a mutual hostage situation
Accepting the prevailing global ideology constrains the ability of government to protect
ordinary citizens
The economic logic of globalization does not in itself dictate eclipse
Globalization makes it harder for states to exercise economic initiative but it also
increases the potential returns from effective state action and the costs of incompetence
Neoclassical political economy and a renewed fascination with civil society are two
examples of the new global order built on Anglo American visions on statelessness
The most incorporated perspective into the public political debate is the “neoutilitarian”
version of neoclassical political economy
Reconceptualizing the state as a vehicle for rent seeking made it much easier to
characterize state intervention as pathological
If the negative effects of state policies were a logical consequence of the nature of public
institutions, the better information, more competent officials, and more knowledgeable
advisers were not remedies
The only rational solutions were reducing the resources allocated by these perverse
institutions and replacing reliance on norms of public service with the hard constraints of
market like incentive systems
Neoclassical theories offer a rational for eclipse (the state was seen as unnecessary and
even hurtful to the economy). Evans disagrees. He claims that although powerful
transnational actors may have an interest in limiting the state’s ability to constrain their
own activities, they also depend on a capable state to defend their returns. (this is
especially true for intangible assets –ideas- that need the protection of copyright laws, etc
–think Disney, Microsoft, Music companies, etc)
The interests of ordinary members of civil society are also for the preservation and
expansion of state capacity. A move towards less capable and involved states makes it
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more difficult for civic associations to achieve their goals and results in diminished
incentives for civic engagement
The ideal form of statehood would find a balance of “mutual empowerment” between
state institutions and a broadly organized civil society
Guillermo O’Donnell—On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems
(Latin America)
-Definitions:
-States are interwoven with their respective societies, and this influences whether
democracy will consolidate or break down
-State is a set of social relations that establishes a certain order of norms and
expectations and backs it with a guarantee over a territory
-Such order is not equal or impartial; both under capitalism and socialism
it inevitably produces asymmetric power relationships in order to have
power of enforcement
-Social relations based on effectiveness of law; expectation that the law
will be enforced
-State is an ideological basis for a nation; social predictability is the supreme
collective good and equality of citizenship must be guaranteed for democracy to
function
-State imposes public dimension (accountability to public state) on private associations
(critical, see last point)
-Breakdown of various kinds of authoritarian systems has led to emergence of a type of
democracy (polyarchy) that is not representative or institutionalized
-Countries Argentina, Brazil, Peru:
-Crisis in three dimensions: state capacity, effectiveness of law, state orientation
towards public good
-Many other countries (Spain, Portugal, S. Korea, Taiwan, Chile) evaded such crises with a lean
but powerful state
-Most developing countries have states too large; the antonym is not just small but lean—state
must be smaller yet more effective in the remaining sectors at the same time
-A strong state must effectively establish legality and not be construed as an arena
for particularistic interests
-Most attempts at reducing the size of the state also destroy the effectiveness and
ideological legitimacy of the state
-Critical assumption often incorrectly made: state scope is homogeneous in function and territory
-Effectiveness of law coexists with autonomous, territorial spheres of power
-“Private circuits of power,” “neo-feudalized regions” or “brown areas” deprive
citizens of the public, lawful dimension of the state, and give politicians and
parties
rallying power to take disproportionate power
-Consequence: fragmentation of the state, disparity between public good and
interests of politicians
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-Thus, eliminating “authoritarianism” in the regime is not the same as eliminating it in the state;
“democratic” regimes with brown areas become contaminated with authoritarianism in core
areas
-In order to close private circuits of power and to have functioning democracy with equality of
citizenship, state must have universal application of rules even against itself
Reno: Clandestine Economics, Violence and States in Africa
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Opening quote and main point: “Rulers have intervened in local economies in informal
ways that diminish overall economic well-being and undermine the bureaucracies that are
critical to sustaining economic growth.”
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In recent decades, disorder in Africa – primarily wars – have contributed to the loss of
state capacity which offers opportunities for “entrepreneurs” to conceal illicit transactions
and avoid regulations.
o The governments themselves are sometimes the ones who are involved in these
illicit activities.
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Main Point: Clandestine commerce accompanies armed conflict and plays an
important role in provoking and prolonging much of the warfare in Africa.
General Outline: Reno develops a model of clandestine economies as they operate in
parts of modern-day Africa. The model explains:
o How clandestine economies contribute to the strengthening of political
authority in chaotic parts of Africa
o How a range of activities that are commonly defined as corruption and
evasion of government authority, or as consequences of bad policies or
incompetent administration, actually grow out of purposeful strategies by the
leaders.
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Describing The Shadow State
o A form of personal rule
o State is constructed behind the façade of laws and governmental institutions
o Ruler manipulates external actors’ access to markets, both formal and
clandestine, in such a way to enhance their power (and usually profit)
o Rulers recruit and arm youths to help intimidate opponents in economic
markets and politics…some even attack rivals
o Internal problem: “Freelancing” makes these violent coalitions tenuous and
volatile – many of the leaders’ workers keep profits for themselves and have
their own interests in mind.
o In order to solve this problem, Shadow State rulers seek out foreign partners
who use the “sovereignty” of the state as an excuse to legitimize profitseeking (yet unethical) activities at home and abroad. They rely on the
willingness of outsiders to recognize the façade of formal sovereignty.
 Paradox—in the process of making profits, leaders sometimes lose
control of some of their territory yet as long as they remain in control
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of the state, then they can use the legitimacy and sovereignty of their
state to legitimize business practices at home and abroad.
o The basis for these regimes derives from similar (but not as violent) colonial
administrators who were very decentralized.
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Section 2: The Withering Away of the State
o African rulers – cognizant of the history of state institutions being composed of
self-interested “strong men” – prefer weak states over states that they are not
going to be able to control. They can use weak administrative control elsewhere
to promote their own interests.
o This fear of enterprise among officials helps explain why many African rules
have placed very low priority on bolstering the formal bureaucracies of their
states.
o Some rulers – in order to maintain power in certain areas – buy the loyalty or
compliance of powerful individuals or groups.
o Shadow states face a trade off between building up the state bureaucracy
(thus providing social services) and keeping money for themselves.
 They have to do enough of the former to stay in power.
o Rules don’t provide everyone basic public goods so people have more incentives
to get on their side and provide them with money – a skewed view of good
governance but in the self interest of the rulers
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Section 3: The Advantages of Violence
o “Lacking any program of social transformation or economic growth, the
ruler of a Shadow State moves to disrupt any coherent interest group that
might emerge as a competitor for power and seeks to encourage dependence
on his favor. He cultivates precisely the societal disorganization and
weakness of government agencies that are to cause of Africa’s economic
crisis.
 Violence quickly and cheaply helps to disorganize opposition groups
while keeping the leader’s private economic activity in tact.
o If the Shadow Governments permit citizens to obtain for themselves means or
tools to achieve their own goals, these citizens might use these opportunities to
organize against the government.
o In shadow states, there can be no civil rights or the rule of law, because the
aim of the ruler is to subordinate individuals or groups to their personal
protection in exchange for compliance or payment.
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Section 4: Youth, Violence, and the Shadow State
o As mentioned before, the leaders use armed youth as the enforcers of their
violent, destabilizing policies
o Motivations – access to wealth and protection
o Create an environment where peaceful protests are rarely effective.
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Section 5: Commerce and the Privatization of Sovereignty
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o External income is a large factor in keeping irresponsible regimes in power
 During the Cold War, international aid served this purpose
o The production of goods and services is not conducive to shadow states because
there are no legal protections of property rights
o Natural recourses can be used by foreign companies and lead to large profits for
the corrupt leaders (ie the diamond industry in Africa.)
o The international legitimacy and sovereignty of the “Shadow States” makes
it easier to remain in p
o
o ower and make a profit.
 Ie—Senagal sold passports abroad for money.
o The way to reform these states is to convince foreign investors that they will stop
investing.
 Overthrowing the ruler leader to violent anarchy – worse than Shadow
State.
FOR A NICE SUMMARY OF THE READING, READ THE CONCLUSION ON PAGE
930 OF THE READER/
The Organization of Warlord Politics in Liberia- William Reno
Introduction
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Liberia is a hotbed of violence and war because warlords use commerce to establish a
base of political power consisting of themselves, businessmen, and freedom fighters
Charles Taylor, essentially the warlord with the most power, controls the gold, diamond,
timber, and rubber markets, and hence wields the most clout in the country
These warlords are not recognized globally as leaders
Previous elite groups who controlled Liberia essentially created political alliances that
gave these strongmen the ability to wield power, devoid of an actual state
The Patrimonial Basis of Strongman Independence
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In 1980, Doe overthrew President Tolbert in a coup, and brought down a government that
seemingly was controlled by Americo-Liberians to promote a “native” culture
Doe’s government did not have the power to fulfill their dream of making the
government controlled by “pure” Liberians, and a large elite group of strongmen (who
practiced Americo-Liberian culture) still controlled much of the economy
To please the elite, Doe appointed many Americo-Liberians into his cabinet
Earlier regimes tried to commercialize agriculture, and gave elites the power control large
areas of land to do this. The relationship between these elites and foreign buyers made it
difficult to eliminate their power.
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Doe’s government needed money, and hence caved in to the current elites
Doe’s Strategy of Internationalization
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Doe could not develop state autonomy, so he tried to control current networks
He executed high officials from the previous state to convince the people that he was
creating a new order
Many issues of corruption arose via state-owned corporations (he stole funds, and
diverted humanitarian aid for his own profit) since he didn’t control key resources
Rather than providing a foundation for a state, this allowed the warlords to thrive and
create secret arrangements to outlast Doe
The U.S. saw him as a harbinger for multiparty democracy in Libya and funded him in
the early 1980s
The End of Doe’s U.S. Alliance
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The U.S. defaulted from Doe when he decided to stand in the election, and jailed
individuals in the opposition party, giving him an unfair advantage
When doe continued to stash U.S. funds, they decided to monitor Liberian government
finances
Tried to get citizens to fund a $7 million military debt he owed to US
Lack of US alliance weakend Doe’s regime, and he could no longer counterbalance the
elite that still controlled much more resources and international trade than his regime did
Doe still received some military aid, from Israel and other countries, and attempted to
mix mining and logging industries with military operations
Many businesses were attracted to his flexible enforcement of laws
Doe still could not control regional trade networks
Doe essentially decentralized the state in Liberia, elites manipulated their control of
regional trade networks, and most Liberians chose not to support Doe’s regime since it
did not directly help them. This caused his demise.
The Political Economy of Power in Taylorland
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Taylor appeared in Nimba County, Liberia in 1989 as head of the national Patriotic Front
Ethnic conflict arose, and in the end, Taylor garnered more respect since his ethnic
coalition was broader than Doe’s
Intervention forces, specifically the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) prevented him from taking over the capital; but Taylor
essentially controlled most of Liberia (although not recognized)
Since he was not given sovereign authority internationally, he could not get any aid from
outside sources. So, he was forced to control local resources
Hence, Taylor controlled the strongmen himself, creating a warlord league
Taylor ended up creating many multiple alliances with different tribes and groups
Even as an unrecognized warlord, Taylor still brought Liberia’s economy closer to global
networks and privatized markets
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Taylor’s Commercial Alliances
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Taylor began building arms by creating a “bank” that worked with foreign arms dealers
Continued to fund military operations via logging operations, and fusing the industries
based on natural resources with the government and military
All firms essentially understood that they would serve Taylor’s military, and none of the
other militaries of other warlords
Took control of many industries to gain more prowess, especially internationally with
countries such as Ivory Coast, but through private arrangements
Also gained access to exchange market by requiring workers pay fees in US dollars
Was involved in trading outside of Liberia, individuals from other countries essentially
took part in his “economy” and “government”
Still could not build a true empire since he was not formally recognized
Fixed Foreign Investments and Warlord Organizations
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Taylor worked with many large corporations, such as Firestone Tire Company, and this
allowed him to launch operations against ECOMOG in Monrovia
Although it is surprising that many of these firms did business with Taylor, he
manipulated ethnic identities (portrayed himself as pro Francophone) to gain the support
of French corporations
Generally interacting with these intl companies built his reputation, but in the end, he
could not attract enough large firms to “Taylorland” to have true supremacy over similar
warlords
The Limits of Warlord Politics Without a State
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All these other groups that opposed Taylor, such as the United Liberation Movement for
Democracy, had been involved in state politics or international networks
ULIMO’s rise was similar to Taylor’s takeover. Whoever had the most connections to
economies within and outside Liberia essentially won the game.
Kromah, ULIMO’s leader, similar to Taylor, had ties to several groups and allowed him
to use all these ties to further his dreams of controlling Liberia
Many parts of what was once Doe’s government ended up backing ULIMO
Esssentially, ULIMO and many other groups that were vying for power ended up
fractionalizing, and today (or more like when this article was written), warlords are still
fighting for control of Liberia
Global Recognition of Warlords?
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Factional struggles continue, and peace agreements seemed futile at best (as of 1997)
In general, the giant debt of Liberia deterred other powers from giving it aid, and a
legitimate government struggled to take control
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A civil war lasted from 1999 to 2003, and at the end, a provisional government was
appointed
This government had elections in 2005 and Ellen Johnson-Sileaf is now the President of
Liberia. She is still trying to punish criminals from the civil wars, and most importantly,
Charles Taylor.
Note: These last two points are not from the reading. I figured, since this article is outdated, that
people should know how the factionalism in Liberia has been resolved (albeit very temporarily).
WEEK 11
Samuel P. Huntington’s “Political Order in Changing Societies” (Week 11 Reading)i
I. The Political Gap
A. Degree of govt., not form of govt. distinguishes one country from another
a. Latin America’s “shortage of pol. community, of effective govt.” vs. US pol. system
B. Gap between developed, under-developed pol. systems has broadened
a. it’s similar, but not identical, to the economic gap
i. pol., econ. underdeveloped countries are in the same place in the 20th century
1. Latin America, Asia, Africa
b. post-WII decades saw an increase in violence, ethnic conflict, and disorder
i. an increase in insurgencies
ii. a decrease in political authorities, effectiveness, etc.
C. Thesis: Rapid social change and mobilization of new groups into politics combined with the
slow development of political institutions led to post-WII violence
a. equality of pol. participation is growing faster than “art of associating together”
b. social, economic change broaden participation, undermine pol. institutions
D. America: an exception to this rule
a. America’s economic, social, and political stability led it believe that “all
good things come together”
i. resulted in American belief that econ. development was necessary for pol.
development, stability
1. in reality, econ. and pol. development are separate
2. social reform and pol. stability are not necessarily related
b. America’s lack of a need to found pol. order led to its indifference to political
developmentii
i. resulted in its anti-govt. stance, belief in a restricted govt.
E. Modernizing countries: a different story
a. they need political organization first
i. “authority has to exist before it can be limited”
ii. communist government not lacking in authority, govern well
II. Political Institutions: Community and Political Order
A. Social Forces and Political Institutions
a. relationships between social forces, political institutions determine level of political
communityiii
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i. the more complex a society is, the more “the maintenance of political
community become dependent upon…political institutions”
ii. “distinction between a political institution and a social force is
not…clear-cut”
iii. level of political development depends on the extent to which pol. leaders
identify with pol. institutions
b. political institutions can hold a society together
i. degree of community in a society depends on strength, scope of pol. institutions,
esp. in a complex society
c. political institutions come from interactions between social forcesiv
d. when social forces diversify, pol. institutions become “more complex and
authoritative”
B. Criteria of Political Institutionalization
a. the scope of support for orgs. and their level of institutionalization determine the
strength of the institutionv
b. institutionalization
i. process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability
ii. level of institutionalization defined by its organization’s level of:
1. adaptability-rigidity
2. complexity-simplicity
3. autonomy-subordination
4. coherence-disunity
c. adaptability
i. direct relationship between level of institutionalization, level of autonomy
ii. the more challenges in an environment, the more adaptable it is
iii. is measured by the number of challenges met, which is measured by age
1. age is measured
a. chronologically: how long has it been in existence?
b. by generational age: how many successful, peaceful successions
are there?
iv. adaptability can also be measured in functional terms: what does it do?
1. functional adaptability is higher in a more developed org.
2. org. vary greatly in their functional adaptability
a. eg. industrialization for Communist Russia
d. complexity
i. direct relationship between level of institutionalization, level of complexity
ii. the more multi-purpose an organization is, the better it can adjust itself
1. more complex, traditional systems more likely to adapt (eg. Japan)
iii. multi-person political systems are more stable
e. autonomy
i. political institutionalization involves formation of autonomous groupsvi
ii. autonomy is the result of competition between social forces, groups which have
their own interests
iii. “political procedures also have varying degrees of autonomy”
1. a lack of autonomy is a sign of corruption
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2. these kinds of govts. are vulnerable to influence from their own country
and from others’ (inside and outside forces)
iv. in a developed pol. system, “autonomy is protected by mechanisms that
restrict…the impact of new groups”
1. pol. system “assimilates new groups without sacrificing…integrity” by
having people filter through a system to the highest positionsvii
f. coherence
i. direct relationship between level of institutionalization, level of coherence,
unity
1. “consensus must extend to active participants in the system”
ii. “autonomy becomes a means to coherence”
1. “prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces”
iii. unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in govts; people have to
sacrifice their private interests for the common good
C. Political Institutions and Public Interest
a. “the capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests”
b. public interests must be articulated
i. what’s good for the President may not be good for the people
ii. more highly developed institutions articulate these interests better
iii. public interest is the interest of the institution, which represents the people
1. institutional interests differ from the interests of the individuals who are
in the institution
c. “govt. actions are legitimate…[if] they accord with the ‘public philosophy’”
i. if they represent outcome of compromise in which all interested groups have
participated
ii. or if they reflect the interests of governmental institutions
1. “interest of the President coincides with…no one else”
2. he is powerful because he doesn’t represent anyone’s interests
d. trust must exist (in the culture of society) for political institutions to formviii
i. “distrust…limits individual loyalties to groups that are intimate and familiar”
ii. mutual distrust leads to little organization
1. politically developed institution measured by number, size, and
effectiveness of its organizations
2. “if social and economic change undermine…traditional bases of
association”, getting high pol. institutionalization depends on
“capacity of the people to form new degrees of association”
e. development and modernization depend on ability to form new, complex orgs.
NOTES
I borrow Huntington’s language liberally; I have put direct quotes in quotations, but I have used most of the text
without citing it. I have also put somewhat important facts in footnotes (they’re important because they may help
clarify a point, but they themselves are not the most major points); otherwise, they make the outline crowded and
difficult to read
America’s govt. was imported from England; therefore, it did not really need to establish political order
Social force: ethnic, religious, territorial, econ., or status group (8)
This happens when: i. small, homogenous ruling class is broken up
ii. social forces are diversified
iii. “increasing interaction among such forces”
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Scope: “extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society” (12); our class
definition is much better.
That is, not just a reflection of the public’s interests
See first paragraph of p. 22 for more information
Huntington points to Latin American and Arab countries as ones with less trust; he also says that there is less
associational organization in Latin America
“The Perils of Presidentialism” by Juan Linz
Argument: Parliamentarism is more conducive to stable democracy than presidentialism
Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems
parliamentary regime - regime in which the only democratically legitimate institution is
the parliament; usually led by a prime minister elected by the members; sometimes a
president by direct election but prime minister holds more power
presidential system includes an executive who is elected directly by the people and who
has a term separate from that of the legislature; he controls the administration and is
symbolic head of the state
2 things stand out about president
1. strong claim to democratic legitimacy
problem: legislature also has claim to democratic legitimacy; if the two branches
are of different ideologies - who has the better claim of being the people’s
representative?
2. fixed term in office
problem: leads to discontinuous transfer of power; in case of death, a vice
president not directly elected can take charge or a member of parliament of a different
ideology
paradoxes of presidentialism
parliamentarianism imparts flexibility to the political process
presidentialism makes it rigid
zero-sum election
when parliament is elected, usually no party has an absolute majority, so it must form
coalitions with other smaller parties and makes compromises
when a president is elected, he represents one party and because he shares power with
no one he feels entitled to act without the approval of other parties, even his margin of
victory was small
the spanish example
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in 1977, parliamentary elections allowed Adolfo Suarez to stay in office
his Union del Democratico won 34.9 % of vote
Socialist Party with Felipe Gonzalez 29.4 %
Communists 9.3%
rightist Alianza Popular with Manuel Fraga won 8.4 %
a parliamentary system forced these groups to work together and prevented the
socialists from implementing all the radical reforms they desired
a presidential system, however, would have divided the groups, who all thought they
were more powerful than they actually were, and pushed Spain far to the Left
the problem of dual legitimacy
cabinet ministers are less independent under presidentialism because their power
stems from the executive, the president may also shield ministers from criticism
the president may claim that the legislature represents local petty interests, while he
represents the national will
on the other hand, he might represent traditional, rural electorates and rule against the
modern, urban sectors of society
the issue of stability
some argue that government crises and leadership changes of parliaments is a
weakness, but these changes allow corrupt, or unpopular leaders to fall quickly from
power
unlike a president, who even when hated by the people, may stay in office, until the
legislature has gone through the necessary procedures to remove him
the succession of a vice president, after the death or removal of a president, may prove
difficult as the vice president could represent an ideology different from that of the
president;
such a process could be harmful to budding democracies
time factor
the political capital that a president accumulates only lasts as long as his term in office,
once his term ends his career is over
so, the president may rush to implement his programs, and so doing, polarize the
country
in a parlimentary system, leaders may know that their coalition will win reelection so
they do not make haste
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parliamentarism and political stability
not all presidential systems are unstable, the US is the most stable democracy in the
world
but more likely that parliamentarism is the best option for budding democracies.
The Centrality of Political Culture by Seymour Martin Lipset
Argument: parliamentarism may not be more stable than presidentialism
a prime minister is stronger than a president, he affects every aspect of the government
members of the coalition must vote a certain way, otherwise the government falls a new
election is called
less independence of MPs
in presidential system, members of legislature can vote according to constituencies’
desires
in parliamentary system, MPs must vote with prime minister
a comparison of US presidential system and Canadian parliamentary system
the US has been more stable
Canada has seen the rise of six important “third parties” since 1921
the cultural factor
anglophone, Protestant countries seem more conducive to democracies than Latin,
Catholic countries
former British colonies more successful at democracy than other European former
colonies
Protestant nations (like Canada) more successful than Catholic regions (like Quebec)
Islamic nations almost completely authoritarian
correlation b/n former British rule and stability of democracy
Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism
Giovanni Sartori
 Presidentialism defined by three criteria:
o Head of state is popularly elected for a fixed time span
 Directly or quasi-directly elected – open-ended
o Parliament can neither appoint nor remove the government
o Head of state is head of government
 With the exception of the United States, all presidential systems have been intermittent
o Most countries, especially Latin American ones, have had broken or unstable
presidential systems, many of them not being reestablished until the 1980s
o Is the problem not the countries but presidentialism itself?
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This does not mean that the “good alternative” to presidentialism is parliamentarism – this
may fail just as much and just as easily
Some endorse parliamentarism over presidentialism on the grounds that presidential systems
are “rigid” while parliamentary systems are “flexible” and that flexibility is preferred to
rigidity
The argument of those who endorse presidentialism is that effectiveness is to be preferred to
paralysis, and that parliamentary systems are immobilist and inefficient
Pure presidentialism, like in the US, hinges on the division and separation of power between
the president and congress
o Presidentialism does not provide for effective government – it draws on the worst
possible structural arrangement (divided power defenseless against “divided
government”) and fails to realize that the American systems works in spite of its
constitution rather than because of it
Sartori’s stance: semipresidentialism can improve presidentialism and that semiparliamentary
systems are better than plain parliamentary ones
Proportional representation and coalitions are essential safety devices for “difficult” societies
Stable democracy is not undermined by unstable governments but rather by impotent or bad
government
Government stability represents mere duration, and governments can be both long lived and
impotent: their duration is by no means an indicator of efficiency or efficacy
Parliamentary democracy cannot perform unless it is served by parliamentary fit parties, or
parties that have been socialized into being relatively cohesive or disciplined
Brazil: highly antiparty in theory and practice – people switch parties, vote against their party
line, and refuse party discipline – they are therefore powerless and volatile entities and the
president is left to float over a vacuum
Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela might conceivably afford a switch to parliamentarism, in
terms of their party systems
Sum up: popular, direct election of presidents provides no safeguards and no buggers against
a disastrous election of the primus solus
The case against the two extremes, pure presidentialism and pure parliamentarism, is a strong
one, but the case for semipresidentialism is not strong
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy
Scott Mainwaring
 Choices of political institutions are especially important during transitions to democracy
 Little scholarship on presidentialism outside the US was produced between the 1960s and
mid 1980s – this has started to change (Linz, etc)
 Only 4 of 31 stable democracies have presidential systems
 The fact that multiparty presidential democracies have a particularly poor record has not
received attention – non of the world’s 31 stable democracies has this institutional
configuration and Chile is the only one that did (1933-1973)
 Multiparty presidentialism is more likely to produce immobilizing executive/legislative
deadlock than either parliamentary systems or two-party presidentialism
 Two party systems are also likely to be more compatible with presidential democracy
because ideological polarization is less likely with only two parties
 The combination of presidentialism and multipartism is complicated by the difficulties of
interparty coalition building in presidential democracies
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Defining Key Terms
 Democracy must meet three criteria:
o Open, competitive elections that determine who governs
o Nearly universal adult suffrage
o Guarantees of traditional civil liberties
 Presidential democracy has two distinguishing features:
o Head of government is essentially popularly elected and the president is the head of
government
o The president is elected for a fixed time period
 Dominant party system: a situation in which the same party continuously wins a majority of
seats over a period of several decades, or one in which, during a shorter democratic interlude,
the largest party wins at least 70% of the seats
 Two party system: larger party has a majority of seats, but alternation in government takes
place
 Two and a half parties: two parties dominate electoral competition and one sometimes has a
majority, but often the largest party does not have a majority
Presidentialism and Stable Democracy
 Stable democracy is defined here strictly on the basis of longevity – 25 years of uninterrupted
democracy
 Out of 31 counties that have had continuous democracy since at least 1967 only 4 had
presidential systems
 Only 7 of 31 presidential democracies have endured for at least 25 consecutive years,
compared with 25 of 44 parliamentary systems, 2 of 4 hybrids, and 2 of 3 semipresidential
systems
 Greatest liability of presidential systems is their difficulty in handling major crises – they
offer less flexibility in crisis situations because attempts at deposing the president shake the
whole system
 The timetable of presidential elections also has disadvantages for presidents who get the job
done – in most systems presidents are turned out of office even if the general population,
political elites and parties, and other major actors continue to support them
 Another liability is a greater likelihood of executive/legislative deadlock, which stems from
the separate election of the two branches of government
 Third problem stems from the direct popular election of presidents  political outsides with
little experience in handling congress can get elected
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Stable Democracy
 Among stable presidential democracies, the virtual absence of multiparty systems is striking
o Multipartism increases the likelihood of executive/legislative deadlock and
immobilism
o It increases the likelihood of ideological polarization
o Presidents need to build interparty coalitions to get measures through the legislature,
but this is more difficult and less stable than in parliamentary systems
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Immobilism
 Presidential systems lack means of ensuring that the president will enjoy the support of a
majority in congress
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
The presidential role is marked by ambivalence and ambiguity – they monopolize the policy
agenda, but when their legislative support erodes, they still cannot implement their agenda
because of congressional opposition
 In multiparty systems, the president is likely to lack stable legislative support so pushing
policy measures through is apt to be more difficult
 Likelihood of immobilism is lower in two-arty presidential and parliamentary systems
o Two party system increases chance that president will have a majority backing in
congress
 Parliamentary systems are also generally better at providing stable support for governments
than multiparty presidential systems
 Multiparty presidential systems are more apt to generate deadlocks, and they have no
institutional means of resolving such deadlocks
 Presidents cannot dissolve congress and call new elections – they are sitting ducks if their
congressional support dissipates
 They therefore try to pass constitutional amendments that expand their powers
 While presidents have difficulty implementing their programs, they have enormous and
growing responsibilities – yet they are too busy cultivating public support so they have less
actual time to oversee administrative activities than do prime ministers
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Ideological Polarization
 Two party systems have drawbacks, but their high entry barriers limit extremism and their
centripetal tendencies generally encourage moderation
Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Party Coalitions
 In multiparty systems, coalition building is essential for attaining a legislative majority
 Three factors make building stable interparty coalitions more difficult in presidential
democracies than in parliamentary systems:
o Party support for the government tends to be more secure in parliamentary systems
because of the way executive power is formed and dissolved
o In presidential systems, the commitment of individual legislators to support an
agreement negotiated by the party leadership is often less secure
o Incentives for parties to break coalitions are stronger in presidential systems than in
many parliamentary systems
Conclusions
 Multipartism may not adversely affect prospects for democracy in parliamentary systems, but
it appears to with presidentialism – institutional combinations make a difference
 This is not to say that the combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes it
impossible for democracy to function well – see the case of Chile from the 1930s to the later
1960s
 The two-party system and exceptionally limited ideological polarization have contributed to
making the US a viable presidential democracy, but these conditions have been difficult to
reproduce
 What can be done in terms of constitutional/institutional reform in multi-party presidential
democracies?
o Switching from a presidential system to a semipresidential or parliamentary system
o Taking measures to reduce party-system fragmentation
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
The advantages of bipartism, however, diminish where there are sharp social or political
cleavages; under these conditions, reducing party system fragmentation is still viable, but
creating bipartism is not
I borrow Huntington’s language liberally; I have put direct quotes in quotations, but I have used most of the text
without citing it. I have also put somewhat important facts in footnotes (they’re important because they may help
clarify a point, but they themselves are not the most major points); otherwise, they make the outline crowded and
difficult to read
ii
America’s govt. was imported from England; therefore, it did not really need to establish political order
iii
Social force: ethnic, religious, territorial, econ., or status group (8)
iv
This happens when: i. small, homogenous ruling class is broken up
ii. social forces are diversified
iii. “increasing interaction among such forces”
v
Scope: “extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society” (12); our
class definition is much better.
vi
That is, not just a reflection of the public’s interests
vii
See first paragraph of p. 22 for more information
viii
Huntington points to Latin American and Arab countries as ones with less trust; he also says that there is less
associational organization in Latin America
i
WEEK 12
Carey: Institutional Design and Party Systems
Introduction
 Implicit in the work of much of the data centered comparative politics approaches to
examining political parties are two assumptions
o Majorities are critical because institutions operate by majority rule
o Party label is the most important predictor of how individual politicians will
behave and what sorts of coalitions they will enter.
 He doesn’t reject either of these assumptions but says that they should tell us more
o Institutional analysis should tell us more about political parties than the aggregate
data than
 Thesis: institutional design tell us quire a bit about the policies and coalitions
legislators will value and about the capacity of legislators to act collectively on those
values
 Outline
o Discusses how the effects of institutional design on party systems affect the two
issues critical to the consolidation of new democracies: regime support and
governability
o Review main results of the institutional analyses of party systems – the rules that
contribute to ways parties develop.
o Examines institutions and the politics within a party
Part 1: Regime Support and Governability
 Formal rules affect the acceptance of new regimes and their ability to govern
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o Even if representation is accepted by all, governability can be undermined if
parties cannot form stable coailitions and act devisively to make policy
Major Focus: Governability’s root in institutional design
o Minority executives are weak and in conflict with legislatures
o Affects parties internally also
 Large parties have internal disagreement and are unable respond quickly
to crises or form a cohesive message
 When party leaders impose discipline on elected politicians,
responsiveness to minority groups and local interests is necessarily
compromised.
Modern institutions that are developing must strike a balance between government
decisiveness and deliberation—design of institutions contributes to the degree of both of
these
Part 2: The impact of electoral systems on party systems
 Duverger’s Law—single member district plurality elections encourage a two party
system
 Duverger’s Hypothersis--Proportional representation allows for a multi party
system
 Crucial structural aspect is number of seats per district
o Larger the number of seats per district, large number of parties
 Minimum percentage threshold for gaining seats  larger it is, fewer parties and the
increased likelihood that one party will get a majority in the legislature
Executive Electoral Formulas
 The way the executive and the legislature are elected affects the other. The timing of
each is also important.
 2 types of formula
o plurality
o majority runoff—encourages a greater number of participants, thus, more
fragmentation
 impact on legislature—people care more when presidency is involved,
happen during the first election so more parties get elected to congress
(more divided government)
 the irony here is that one of the principal arguments in favor of
MRO has been that it would ensure the election of a president
with a mandate from a majority of votes. To the extent that
MRO contributes to fragmentation of the legislative party
system, however, it makes legislative coalition building even
more difficult and this undermines the president’s ability to act
 Potential compromises
o lowering the first round hurdle from 50 to 45 or 40 percent
o Double complement rule--weight vote total and margin of victory
 Complicated see page 1032
Part 3: The Electoral Cycle
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Timing of legislative and executive elections is very important
2 aspects to this impact
o first effect is the impact on the number and composition of the parties
o second impact is the relationship between the president and the legislature due to
a coming election
conclusions are on page 1033 of the reader (page 76 of the reading)
main conclusion is that the data shows that in concurrent systems parties running strong
presidential tickets are rewarded
o Why? Voters vote on party lines and president is highly popular when getting
elected so his party is popular too
Presidents do well in congressional elections earlier in their terms (especially in France)
Relations between the president and the legislature have a lot to do with the arbitrary
timing of elections
“Three sets of institutional factors are most important in shaping party systems at
the aggregate level: assembly electoral rules, executive electoral rules, and the
electoral cycle
o Conclusion: plurality presidential elections decreases party fragmentation
and increase the chances of presidential majorities
 The effect is most pronounced when the elections are concurrent
o Cycles of presidential popularity effect assembly elections; presidents’
parties do well concurrent and honeymoon but do worse thereafter
Part 4: Politicians and Parties
 Discussion turns to the kind of leadership legislators provide once they get to office.
How do different systems affect that leadership?
 Critical distinction is between systems that encourage representatives to cultivate
personal reputations with their constituencies versus those that put the collective
reputation of the party first.
o In the second situation, however, reps are more likely to become experts in a
certain area of policy
Part 5: Regime Type and Electoral Rules
 Parliamentary systems produce more cohesive parties
 The “efficient secret” of parliamentary systems is that once a ruling party is in power,
they are more inclined to support the executive because if he/she fails in the parliament
the party may lose the executive.
 4 critical variables determine the relative incentives for legislator to cultivate personal
versus party reputations
o the degree of control that party leaders exercise over the use of the party label
o the number and type of votes citizens cast in any given election
o the degree to which votes cast for a given candidate from a party contribute to the
party’s electoral fortunes more generally
o district magnitude
Part 6: Intrapartisan Competition
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

party leaders’ dominance over the party and role in choosing its candidates varies across
countries largely independent of political sturucture
As M (number of reps per district) increases, the party become more important and the
individual less
Part 7—Mixed Electoral Systems
 Different incentives for different legislators in the same assembly
 Strong political parties are unpopular globally
 Russia is an example of the mixed systemleads to a Duma that lacks unity between
parties and between SMD (many of whom are independent) and PR reps
 In short, the nature of political parties under mixed electoral systems depends on
the extent to which party organizations and leaders command the resources
necessary to win election in the SMDs, versus the extent to which SMD candidates
act as individual political entrepreneurs.
Part 8: The Current Research Agenda
 Main idea:
o Policy preferences and power of partisans are affected by representation,
constitutional and electoral system design.
o Political rules establish political winners that have a stake in keeping the
institutions that have helped them get into office in place regardless of if they
are working
Nice short summary concludes page 87
Andrew Reynolds—Constitutional Medicine
Description of the paper: (The entire paper is an analogy between constitutional design science
and medical science: diagnosis, prescription, treatment; physical examination and medical
history, clinical methodology, etiology (what is causing the condition), differential diagnosis
(ranking the causes), diagnostic test, prognosis). Asides from the analogies, there are a ton of
examples. The generalizations are not so useful, but the examples are varied and fit many things
we studied.
Constitutional expert looks at the long term health of the polities, defined as robust levels of
peace, prosperity, and free self-government, but also at short term symptom abatement for some
of the most dysfunctional polities.
Third wave of democracies that have appeared since mid 1970’s in South America, Africa and
parts of Europe.
The diagnosis leads to six propositions that should be further tested:
1) Failed political institutions in divided societies often result from misdiagnosis. Where does
the country stand at the time of constitutional intervention? The debate between
consociationalism (a radical therapy that may lead to deepening divisions in society) and
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moderation based incentivism. Symptoms—state failure or interethnic conflict, for instance—
can be similar even though the underlying illness may differ.
Example: Central African state of Malawi, after 30 year dictatorship of Banda, first multiparty
elections in 1994. The institutional design continued in the form of
Westminster-style majoritarianism (Malawi had been a British colony) and a strong presidency.
However, under the surface was lurking a new form of identity politics: regionalism (Central,
South, North Malawi strongly divided).
2) The sequencing of constitutional therapies should follow the medical continuum of
emergency medicine, convalescence, and long-term health management. The institutions
negotiated or imposed—say in Bosnia in 1995, Sierra Leone in 1996, or Afghanistan in 2002—
are often forms of first aid, applied during a time of crisis. What often happens is that the firstwave institutions become barriers to subsequent reform and progress.
Example: In South Africa’s 1994 elections for its transitional Constitutional Assembly, they used
a proportional-representation (PR) system based on large districts and closed lists of candidates.
This arrangement maximized representativeness and participation along the lines of ideology,
ethnicity, language, and gender—a crucial goal in the first days after apartheid—but at a high
downstream cost in accountability, since the tie between representative and voter was so indirect
and since party bosses were left in charge of most lists.
Consociationalism in Bosnia decided at the Dayton Accords divided Bosnia into the
Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and an entity called the Federation, which takes up 51 percent
of the land and contains a mix of Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosniaks; the national Parliament
has allotted seats for each of the ethnicities, and the three-person national presidency were
necessary to stop the fighting, but were also identity freezing and not calling for any compromise
but deepening the ethnic divisions and encouraging extremism.
3) Institutional Alignment. Political institutions must be properly aligned with one another.
Institutions as needing to fall into a proper overall pattern both horizontally (in terms of their
relations with other institutions) and vertically (in terms of the various institutions’ relations with
the society whose flourishing as a free, self-governing entity they are supposed to promote). This
is what students of institutions mean when they speak of “holistic complementarity.”
Example: Small and ethnically divided Pacific nation of Fiji, whose misbegotten 1997
constitution contributed to democratic breakdown. Polynesian and Melanesian population has
long insisted on monopolizing political power even as Indo-Fijians (also indigenous, but
descended from plantation workers) surpassed them numerically in the 1980’s. When the 1999
balloting resulted in an Indian-led party and two moderate “indigenous” parties forming a
governing coalition, numerous Fijians of Polynesian and Melanesian extraction rejected it and
backed a May 2000 coup. New elections held in 2001 restored Polynesian and Melanesian
dominance. Ethnic hegemonism had pushed out democracy.
4) The national patient must not be released from treatment prematurely—as has too often
happened—if democracy is to endure.
Example: The donor community rightly came down on President Robert Mugabe for stealing
Zimbabwe’s 2002 elections, but ignored neighboring Zambia’s equally flawed election the year
before, and positively encourages Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, who until fairly
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recently has categorically rejected the very idea of multiparty voting and still has yet to embrace
it despite recent signs that he might be tilting in that direction.
5) Limits of therapy. There are limits to how much help and protection constitutions can offer a
fragile and threatened polity.
Example: Lebanon’s power-sharing scheme kept the peace among Shi’ites, Sunnis, Druze,
Catholic Maronites, and Arabic- speaking Greek Orthodox Christians for nearly thirty years until
it collapsed amid civil war and regional intervention in 1975. Rwanda had a Hutu-Tutsi nationalunity government, but still saw one of history’s most intense genocides in the spring of 1994.
Even the best formal constitution will be hard-pressed to counteract the inherent fragility that
haunts states such as Afghanistan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
6) Directly Advertising to Consumers. Western experts, who increasingly advertise their
preferred medicines directly to developing-world consumers of political institutions, often fail to
take local contexts and conditions sufficiently into account.
Advisors tend to recommend what they know and consciously or unconsciously “sell” their own
domestic brand of democracy. This holds true for Americans who often advocate versions of
federalism and the separation of powers, British experts who favor SMDs and “first-past-thepost” voting rules, Australian advisors who believe in the virtues of alternative-preference
voting, or Germans who press for federal units that look much like länder and elections that
feature both SMDs and party-list PR.
Plural Societies and Democratic Regimes
Arend Lijphart
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
It is very difficult to maintain a democracy in a plural society
However, with consociational democracy, it can be achieved. Elite cooperation is the
primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy.
Consociational democracy is both an empirical and a normative model. In the first place,
it serves as an explanation of the political stability of a number of smaller European
democracies. These countries are now retreating from their high point of consociational
development. They reached their apogee of sharp plural divisions and close elite
cooperation in the late 1950s and have been declining since them-not as a result of failure
of consociational democracy, but because consociationalism by its very success has
begun to make itself superfluous.
I. A challenge to democratic pessimists
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
By their success in forging stable democratic regimes in severely divided societies, they
constitute deviant cases not only in European politics but also on a world scale.
II. Definitions
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
A plural society is a society divided by what Harry Eckstein calls “segmental cleavages”
“This exists where political divisions follow very closely and especially concern lines of
objective social differentiation, especially those particularly salient in a society.
Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural,
racial, or ethnic nature.
Democracy defies definition but we must use it here as “polyarchy” as full democracy is
not possible to a great degree.
Consociational democracy: segmental cleavages and political cooperation of the
segmental elites
Plural societies and democracy in the first world


Almond’s topology: The Continental European systems are plural societies. Britian and
the United States exemplify the first, non-plural type where they are homogeneous and
have a secular political culture, and Weimar Germany, France and postwar Italy are
different.
According to Almond the Continental European type is unstable and even has
“totalitarian potentiality” whereas the Anglo-American model is more versatile.
Plural Societies and Party systems

Almond argues that a two party system is better than a multi-party system as it is stable
and easier to maintain.
Deviant Cases

Smaller European nations like Scandinavian countries are different because they neither
multi-party nor two party but rather somewhere in the middle
Plural Societies and Democracy in the Third World


Two major characteristics in the third world: 1) Pluralism is based on religion/ethnic
divisions in the third world 2) Pluralistic society was maintained by the non-democratic
means of colonial domination.
Not as much homogeny in the Third World
Overdrawn contrasts between the first and third world
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
First, the fundamental error committed by much of the theoretical literature on political
development is to exaggerate the degree of homogeneity of the Western democratic
states.
The second serious error in which political development theorists since Furnivall have
persisted has been to ignore the fact that several plural societies in Europe have achieved
stable democracy by consociational methods.
Consociational Democracy

Consociational democracy can be defined in terms of four characteristics. The first and
most important element is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all
significant segments of the plural society. This can take several different forms, such as a
grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system, a “grand” council or committee with
important advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other top
officeholders in a presidential system. The other three basic elements of consociational
democracy are: 1) the mutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule, which serves as an
additional protection of vital minority interests 2) proportionality as the principal
standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation of
public funds, and 3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal
affairs.
III.Grand Coalition

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
IV.

Leaders working together in a plural environment, unlike the British system in which
there are only two main opposition parties.
“Size principle” is important in Grand Coalition where “participants create coalitions just
as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger”
In real political life, the zero-sum conditions (of size principle) limits the application of
the size principle to coalition-building in two kinds of societies: 1) homogenous societies
with a high degree of consensus where common advantages are taken for granted and 2)
their polar opposites, societies marked by extreme internal antagonisms and hostilities. In
other words, the size principle applies when the participants in the political process
perceive politics either as a game or as all-out war.
Varieties of Grand Coalitions
Switzerland and Austria offer the best examples of the grand coalition in its prototypal
form. In recent years, the Swiss seven-member federal executive body, the Federal
Council, has been composed of members of the four main parties in proportion to their
electoral strengths: two Radicals, two Socialists, two Catholics and one member of the
Peasants’ party. However, the “magic formula” was not achieved until 1959, when the
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under-representation of the Socialists was corrected by the addition of a second
representative of this party to the Federal Council.
In Belgium and the Netherlands, the shifting cabinet coalitions were complemented by
grand coalitions in other organs: permanent or ad hoc “grand” councils and committees
with formally not much more than an advisory function, but actually often decisive
influence.
There are many variations as well: parliamentary versus presidential systems, and
republics versus monarchies (for example, the aspect of monarchy in a plural society is
the degree to which it is a symbol of national unity and thus serves to counterbalance the
centrifugal effects of segmental cleavages.)
Characteristics of Consociational government:
3) Mutual Veto
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
The most important method of consociational government-the grand coalition in one
form or another-is complemented by three secondary instruments: mutual veto,
proportionality, and segmental autonomy. All four are closely related to each other, and
they all entail deviations from pure majority rule. The mutual veto represents negative
minority rule.
To ensure democracy and uphold the views of the minority such minority veto is vital,
however it can also lead to minority tyranny, which may strain the cooperation in a grand
coalition as much as the outvoting of minorities.
2) Proportionality
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Proportionality serves two important functions. First, it is a method of allocating civil
service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of government subsidies
among the different segments. It can be contrasted with the winner-taking-all principal of
unrestrained majority rule.
Proportionality, as a neutral and impartial standard of allocation, removes a large number
of potentially divisive problems from the decision-making process and thus lightens the
burdens of consociational government.
There are two varieties of principle proportionality that entail even greater deviations
from majority rule: the deliberate overrepresentation of small segments, and parity of
representation.
3) Segmental autonomy and federalism


The final deviation from majority rule is segmented autonomy, which entails minority
rule: rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern.
Segmented autonomy may also be regarded as a generalization of the federal idea.
Secession and Partition
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
Federalism as well as segmented autonomy in general may encourage the breakup of the
state: “The combination of territorially distinctive segments and federalism’s grant of
partial autonomy sometimes provides additional impetus to demands for greater
autonomy” and when these demands are refused “secession and civil war may follow”
V. Disadvantages of Consociational Democracy

Two kinds: Consociational democracy may be criticized for 1) not being democratic
enough and also 2) for being insufficiently capable of achieving a stable and efficient
government.
Ethnic Groups in Conflict
Daniel Horowitz
Pgs 568-600
Perspectives on Ethnic Accommodation
Varying Views on Ethnic Groups
most literature has focused on nation building centered on loyalty and community
politicians wanted to make nation building a rapid process
many ethnic groups remained separatist and opposed to these movements
- attempts to ban such groups contributed to insecurity
the building of elite groups to build a political architecture can often fail, as in the case of
Cyprus or Lebanon
consociationalists versus maximalists
- consociationalists want to live with ethnic divides rather than get rid of them
- must start at the top with group leaders for long term effects
- consociationalists place heavy emphasis on formal federal institutions
consociational democracy main characteristics
1. coalition of ethnic groups
2. veto power in legislative decisions
3. proportional representation of ethnic groups in offices
4. ethnic autonomy (federalism)
consequences
- may vary according to surroundings and situations
- many of these aforementioned views don't take into account potential consequences
- these are most pronounced when European models or examples are attempted to be
transferred to Africa and Asia
political party difference is different in Europe than in Africa
even though differences are more ascriptive, there is less hatred
less separation and extremism between groups
less hostility between groups because they are tied together many other ways
thus conflicts are less severe, less intense, and less exclusive
**is fluidity of European cleavages because of consociational systems or is that fluidity a
cause of consociational systems
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**how do leaders decide to enter these consociational agreements?
- Often, they are not deliberate but accidental
- “leadership often has limited freedom to choose its own path”
consociational assumptions and realities
- some assume that different ethnic groups are neatly organized around leaders
- their coalitions are often arbitrary and irregular
- “a principal limitation on interethnic cooperation is the configuration of intraethnic
competition, both present and anticipated”
“grand coalition” that forms the basis of any consociational agreement between leaders of
various ethnic groups
they are unlikely because of competition within various groups
unlikely in severe conditions such as in Africa
in most cases, presidentialism is incompatible with consociationalism
Motives, Timing, and Technique
Background
- what policies are adopted is a good gauge of success
- motives of policymakers is important
- settlements achieved by concessions are also important
Policy Motives and Evaluation
- motives of consociation are not easy to assess
**were they formed to make something or to prevent something else from
happening?
- Evaluation of consequences is best
- often one group may be favored in order to prevent further conflict
reciprocity is useful in this situation
thus policies and decisions are linked together and must be judged as a whole
package rather than individually
Timing and Technique
- most accommodations are achieved after violence or on the eve of independence
- independence can usually create packages or reciprocal agreements
- more violent events tend to create entirely new systems
- reciprocal concession
examples include Lebanese National Pact, Indian “Regional Formula” in 1956
reciprocity in each of these cases solved a very difficult ethnic problem
proved the grand settlement as a technique
- extremism in these situations often produces likely reciprocity where exchange across
extremists would be unlikely if there were a center ground
- easier to make them give up something than convince them to join a center coalition
- characteristics of divided societies that make reciprocity the best bet
1. ethnic division of labor
(each group offers something advantageous to the labor market)
(each group can be promised that this advantage will be preserved)
2. territorial concentration of ethnicities
Malaysian constitutional bargain
- Chinese granted Malaysia political autonomy and civil service
in exchange, Chinese got citizenship and economic power
- used the division of labor and time as strategies of convincing both sides
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Indian Punjab
- here the territorial separation played a key role
- state was divided into two language zones along with national assembly
- had to respect each other’s autonomy in order to get anything done
reciprocity is possible even without division of labor or territorial separation
(Lebanese National Pact where Sunnis and Christians reached pact;
each group retained autonomy while dividing offices and representation;
each side had faith in the proportionality principle)
push for independence linked to concessions often helps
role of political leaders and their initiative is key
some of these agreements failed because of some natural dangers associated with them
~portions of these notes were contributed by M. Pacult~
WEEK 13
Making Democracy Work
Chapter 1 (3-16)
 Main question: Why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail?
 What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative
institutions?
 15 new regional governments were established simultaneously in Italy in 1970 with
essentially identical constitutional structures and mandates
 5 special regions had been established a few years earlier with somewhat greater
constitutional guaranteed powers
o Boarder areas that had been threatened by separatist movements at the end of
WWII
 Looks at all 20 regions for evidence
 On paper, the 20 institutions were virtually identical with the same potentials for power
 By 1990s, the new governments were spending nearly one tenth of Italy’s GDP
 Social, economic, political and cultural contexts of the governments were very different
 Differences of political tradition and amounts of migration
 Fundamental points of institutionalists:
o Institutions shape politics – they shape actors’ identities, power, and strategies
o Institutions are shaped by history – they have inertia and “robustness”
 Italian regional experiment
1. taking institutions as an independent variable, explore empirically how institutional
change affects the identities, power, and strategies of political actors
2. taking institutions as a dependent variable, explore how institutional performance is
conditioned by history
 practical performance of institutions is hypothetically shaped by the social context in
which we operate (mostly ignored)
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




o which features of social context most powerfully affect institutional performance?
Institutions are devices for achieving purposes, not just agreements
o We want the government to do things, not just decide things
Conception of institutional performance in this study:
o Societal demands  political interaction  government  policy choice 
implementation
A high performance democratic institution must be both responsive and effective
o Sensitive to demands of constituents and effective in using limited resources to
address those demands
Dynamics of institutional performance:
o Institutional design – constitution building
 Proper arrangement of its formal parts would serve in the absence of good
luck
 Dilemma of collective action that threatens “common pool resources” like
water supplies
o Socioeconomic factors
o Sociocultural factors
Examines the link between institutional performance and civic life
Making Democracy Work
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
Chapter 2 Outline
Main Question: To what degree does changing a government’s institutions change its political
culture and the way it actually works? To what extent is “New Institutionalism”, which states
that changing institutions has a large impact on how the government functions, an accurate
theory?
Case Study: Italy and its move towards Devolution and Regionalism in the post WWII Years
I.
Creating Regional Government
a. Traditionally Italy had always had strong local and regional identities, but once
the county was unified by the Piedmontese Monarchists, there was a strong
pressure for centralized national control at the expense of regional autonomy and
influence
b. However, having strong centralized institutions didn’t ensure an end to local
political influence. In reality, there was only a limit to what the institutional
change could do to impact the country’s political culture and so a sort of
compromise arrangement was reached btw the national and the regional
governments through “transformismo”
i. Transformismo-patronage deals were struck by the national government
with local notables so that the locals still maintained some control-more
than they had in law
c. After WWII pressures for regionalism reemerge
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d.
e.
f.
g.
i. Constitution of 1948 calls for directly elected regional governments but
this only happens quickly in 5 “Special regions”—in the remaining 15
“ordinary regions” nothing happens for 20 years-so here again we see that
there’s a limit to what institutional change can do
ii. Intense Social and Economic Change in the post WWII years political
change slowly follows
iii. Many reasons for supporting Regionalism, including increasing
participatory democracy, enhancing administrative efficiency, and
producing a “new way of doing things”
Regionalists express an Institutional View
In reality still large limits to regional power loss of optimism
But then…having the institutions with the knowledge that things haven’t really
changed creates additional pressure for regionalism—so in fact changing the
institutions does have an impact because it creates additional pressures –creating
the institutions creates pressure for more legislation and real change
i. Formation of the “regionalist front”-regionalist governments of various
kinds getting together to promote regional interests
ii. Law 382
2 Forms in which the Regional-Central Conflict Played out
i. One-on-one: Central govt usually wins
ii. All-on-one: More effective
h. Strategies
i. Inter-regional cooperation, grass roots organization, less formal
ii. Horizontal (North) and Vertical (South)
i. Impact
i. Regional Govts get much more funds
ii. 616 Decrees
j. What do these new regional governments do?
i. In early years mostly just distributing funds
ii. But some do introduce substantive reforms in areas like urban planning
iii. Sometimes regionalism did have significant positive effects
II.
The Regional Political Elite “A New Way of Doing Politics”
a. Interaction btw institutional change and the political elites
i. Montesquieu: at the birth of new politics leaders mold institutions but ate
that institutions mold leaders
b. Who were the new regional leaders?
i. Professional politician-well trained upwardly mobile, self-made, and
ambitious, middle-aged-similar to those in the national govt-many
eventually go to it-social origins in btw those of city official and national
officials, 95% men
ii. Sees his post as a full time job, an indicator of increased
institutionalization
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iii. Regional govt attracts serious politicians
c. Regional govt transformed elite political culture-rightward convergence of views
and move towards moderation by the leftists-narrowing of the gap btw the parties
on the L and R-decrease in extremists—increased inter-party tolerance-budding
mutual respect where had once been extreme tensions
i. Partisan animosity actually increasing among ordinary Italians till the 80sso depolarization is “elite-led”
ii. Partisan warming by elites makes it easier to reach practical decisionsgotten less ideological too
iii. Civic loyalty over party loyalty
iv. Pragmatism, technical, compromise
v. Has led to generally temperate regional politics where politicians trust
their colleagues
vi. Italian politics and elite political culture has changed in under a decade
1. 3 possible reasons why
a. Electoral replacement-the ideological ones got voted out
b. National politics-getting more moderate and consensus
minded too
c. Institutional Socialization-the Institutional explanationbeing involved in regional politics changed the elites
i. Electoral replacement had no effect, national
politics had a small effect, institutional socialization
had the largest and a substantial impact
vii. Some regionalists mourn loss of ideology fearing bland technocracy
III.
IV.
The Deepening of Regional Autonomy
a. To what extent have the regional political institutions developed their own values
and interests?
i. Regional institutional autonomy has flowered since 1976
ii. Growing authenticity
iii. More reluctant to toe the national party line
iv. Regional candidates are voted on as individuals rather than just as
referenda on the national party-they’re perceived to have their own distinct
and important impact
v. Regional elites are less fearful for regional autonomy than before
b. Relations btw the regional and central authorities improved in the 80s but have
been replaced by conflicts btw the local and regional conflicts- a system of
triangular intergovernmental relations have emerged that’s more complicated-a
multi-cornered struggle btw the 3 levels and even private agencies-division of
responsibilities is less clear-not yet an “era of good feeling”
Putting Down Roots: The Region and it Constituents
a. As evidence of the importance of the regional govts, community leaders have
heavy ties with them and have more frequent contact with them than either
national or local officials
b. Efficacy of the new govts?
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c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
V.
i. Negative
1. Problematic administratively-poor public management-takes
forever to get an answer
2. Poor quality of civil servants-transferred from the national govt
and aren’t the most qualified or tailored to the regions-but likely
would still be problems even if chosen by the regions
ii. Good
1. Accessible-much more so than the central govt-both because of
propinquity and because the regional leaders are more democratic
2. more stable-2x as much as national and stability is increasing
Good on the “input” bad on the “output”
Public awareness of the new regional institutions spread slowly-lack the media
attention and the immediacy
Less critical of regional govts when compare them to the alterative of really
centralized govt
People want the regions to be stronger not weaker-want them to be more effective
Northerners more satisfied than southerners-northerners trust the local levels
much more than the national levels-southerners distrust them all-they see it as an
unfamiliar evil even worse than a familiar evil—thus one negative consequence of
regionalization is that it has increased the tensions btw the north and south that
have always characterized the political culture of Italy-but even southerners want
regional reform they just aren’t satisfied with their particular regional govts-still
see it as Bette than the national govt though
German ex suggests that public support will likely increase with time
Conclusions
a. Need to be patient
b. Regional reform has really changed grassroots politics in Italy
c. Sub national govt has become much more important on major issues of public
policy since the 70s
d. Efficacy of these govts?
i. Good
1. New institutions are closer to the people
2. Provide multiple laboratories for policy innovation
3. Help to nurture a moderate, pragmatic, tolerant style o policy
making
4. Gradually getting approval
ii. Bad
1. Administrative efficiency hasn’t materialized-maladministration
2. exacerbated tensions btw north and south
iii. But is there any better realistic alterative?
Chapter 3: Measuring Institutional Performance (63-82)
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o Democratic theorists – “the key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens
o A good government also acts effectively on those demands
o Any serious measure of government must meet four tests:
1. it must comprehensive
2. it must be internally consistent
3. it must be reliable
4. it must correspond to the objectives and evaluations of the institution’s protagonists
and constituents
o For each regional government, Putnam seeks to evaluate 1. policy processes; 2. policy
pronouncements; and 3. policy implementation
o 12 indicators of institutional performance:
1. Cabinet stability
2. Budget promptness
3. statistical and information services
4. reform legislation
5. legislative innovation
6. day care centers
7. family clinics
8. industrial policy instruments
9. agricultural spending capacity
10. local health unit expenditures
11. housing and urban development
12. bureaucratic responsiveness
o a surprisingly high correlation among the 12 diverse indicators of institutional
performance
o across 6 national surveys, approval of the activities of the regional government is
uncorrelated with any of the standard sociological categories: wealthy vs. poor, urban vs.
rural, young vs. old, men vs. women, business men vs. housewives vs. farmers vs. bluecollar workers
o conclusions
o some regional governments have been consistently more successful than others
 more efficient in internal operations
 more creative in their policy initiatives
 more effective in implementing those initiatives
o some governments are better governed than others, even when the governments
involved have identical structures and equivalent legal and financial resources
Making Democracy Work, Chapter 5
Tracing the Roots of Civic Community
Italy in the Medieval Period
 Southern Italy
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
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o Norman feudalism centered in Sicily, and while the great kings, notably Roger II
and Frederick II were in power, Sicily became very rich, advanced, and wellorganised
o It was a mix of feudalism, bureaucracy and absolutism, and remained strictly
autocratic, communal autonomy was stamped out wherever it appeared
o When the power of the monarchy faded, the barons were no longer kept in check,
and steep social hierarchy set into place, with a landed elite with feudal powers,
masses of peasants, and a small, impotent middle class
Northern Italy
o Communal republicanism developed in the city states, dependent on horizontal
collaboration
o City councils, guilds, professionalized public administration, minimal
ecclesiastical authority, and the rapid growth of commerce led to an
unprecedented level of participation in and commitment to civic life
In the 14th century, the republics of the North weakened, due to factionalism, famine, the
Black Plague and the Hundred Years War. The regions of Italy became, from South to
North:
o Feudal monarchies in the Mezzogiorno
o Mixture of feudalism, tyranny and republicanism in the Papal States
o Heartland of republicanism
o Signorial rule in the farthest north
This mirrors the distribution of civic norms and networks in the 1970’s
Italy after Unification
 Southern Italy
o Traditions of authoritarian rule remain, few associations or mutual aid, few
economic bonds, and great recourse to patron-client ties and the mafia
o Socioeconomic development has lagged well behind the North
 Northern Italy
o Cooperatives, mass-based political action, mutual aid societies, and “Social
Catholicism” spread widely
o Socioeconomic modernity linked to strong civic traditions
 “Economics does not produce civics, but civics does predict economics, better indeed
than economics itself”
Putnam Ch. 6
Social Capital and Institutional Success
Dilemmas of Collective Action:
“In the tragedy of the commons, no herder can limit grazing by anyone else’s
flock”  No one person can limit the actions of others and by limiting his own
actions, is at a disadvantage
“A public good, such as clean air or safe neighborhoods, can be enjoyed by
everyone, regardless of whether he contributes to its provision”  Essentially
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people who do not contribute to the public good can still benefit off of others,
minimizing the incentive to contribute
“In the dismal logic of collective action, every worker would benefit if all struck
simultaneously, but whoever raises the strike banner risks betrayal by a wellrewarded scab, so everyone waits, hoping to benefit from someone else’s
foolhardiness.”
“In the prisoner’s dilemma, a pair of accomplices is held incommunicado, and
each is told that if he alone implicates his partner, he will escape scot-free, but if
he remains silent, while his partner confesses, he will be punished especially
severely.”
(In these instances, collective action benefits the parties involved)
 It is both necessary in instances of collective action to trust others while also believing
that one is trusted by others
Social Capital, Trust, and Rotating Credit Associations:
 A Society’s success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action is greatly dependent on
“the broader social context within which any particular game is played.”
 Voluntary cooperation amongst a society is easier in a community that has substantial
social capital (Social capital (def.) features of social organization, such as trust, norms,
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions)
 Spontaneous cooperation is facilitated by social capital. (Ex. Rotating Credit
Organization. Rotating Credit Organizations are successful because they use pre-existing
social connections between individuals to help avoid problems of flawed information and
enforceability)
 Most forms of social capital, such as trust, are “moral resources” and increase with use
and diminish with disuse
 Unlike conventional capital, social capital is ordinarily a public good and thus tends to be
undervalued and scarce amongst individuals
 Trust is the essential component of social capital, and in its absence, there can be no
“certainty in contracts and hence no force to the laws”
Norms of Reciprocity and Networks of Civic Engagement:
 Social Trust in complex modern settings usually arises from (1) norms of reciprocity (2)
networks of civic engagement
Norms arise when “an action has similar externalities for a set of others, yet
markets in the rights of control of the action cannot easily be established and no
single actor can profitably engage in an exchange to gain rights of control.”
 Reciprocity, an important norm, consists of two forms (1)balanced simultaneous
exchange of items of equivalent value (2) generalized continuing relationship of
exchange that is at any given time unrequited or imbalanced, but that involves mutual
expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future. (The norm of
generalized reciprocity is a highly productive component of social capital)
 Networks of civil engagement {horizontal= agents of equivalent status or power}
increase potential defector in any individual transaction, fosters robust norms of
reciprocity, facilitate communication, and improve the flow of information about the
trustworthiness of individuals.
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
A vertical network { unequal agents} no matter how dense and no matter how important
to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation and are often less reliable
than horizontal flows
 Kinship ties aid in resolving dilemmas of collective action because these ties are similar
to horizontal flows, however, family is more universal
History and Institutional Performance: Two Social Equilibria:
 Dilemmas of collective action hamper attempts to cooperate for mutual benefit, whether
in politics or economics
 Force and family provide a primitive substitute for the civic community and is tragically
evident in the history of southern Italy
 Attitudes and practices constitute a mutually reinforcing equilibrium; however, social
trust, norms of reciprocity, networks of civic engagement, and successful cooperation are
mutually reinforcing
Lessons from the Italian Regional Experiment:
 In Italy, the North and the South have historically followed contrasting approached to the
dilemmas of collective action that trouble all societies. In 1970, regional reform was
introduced and the contrasting social contexts plainly affected how the new institutions
worked. Because the North had more civic engagement, the North flourished and attained
great advantages in human and physical capital. (North had substantial social capital) The
South, however, did not have substantial social capital that extended beyond family ties
and thus was not as successful.
 “Social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions”
 Civic community has deep historical roots and most fundamental to the civic community
us the social ability to collaborate for shared interests
 “Changing formal institutions can change political practice”
 In order for democracy and development to be successful in Southern Italy, it is
necessary to build a more civic community by locally transforming local structures rather
than reliance upon national incentives
 Building social capital is the key to democracy
Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.” World
Politics 53 (April 2001), pp. 362-98.
Civil society and ethnic violence are linked
1) interethnic networks of civic engagement promote peace; if there are only intraethnic
networks, ethnic violence is likely
2) although “everyday forms of engagement” (quotidian) help to promote peace, “associational
forms of engagement” (organized), if interethnic, are better at resisting politically-motivated
ethnic polarization
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India: 2 aims of national movement – political independence from British and social
transformation of India (Hindu-Muslim unity, abolition of untouchability, “swadeshi,” later
women’s/tribal/labor welfare, prohibition, etc.)
Shift in national politics in the 1920s  associational civic structures constrained politicians
I. Clarifying Concepts and Terms
ethnic – in the narrower sense, racial or linguistic; in a broader sense, “ethnicity is simply the set
to which religion, race, language, and sect belong as subsets in this definition”
ethnic conflict – institutionalized conflict (conflicts over resources, identity, patronage, policies,
etc. waged through institutions), doesn’t necessarily lead to violence
ethnic peace – institutionalized channeling and resolution of ethnic conflict; absence of violence,
not absence of conflict
civil society –
Varshney challenges the conventional concept that civil society 1) exists between the family and
the state, 2) makes interconnections between individuals or families possible, and 3) is
independent of the state; also, that it is associational and modern/voluntaristic, not ascriptive
“Both informal group activities and ascriptive associations should be considered part of civil
society so long as they connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, and facilitate the
exchange of views on matters of public concern – economic, political, cultural, and social.”
II. Why Civil Society? A Puzzling Feature of Ethnic Conflict
Studying civil society as causal factor in Hindu-Muslim conflict
Explaining empirical variation: some places remain peaceful despite ethnic diversity, whereas
other places experience enduring violence; some places with ethnic peace suddenly explode into
violence
Hindus and Muslims rely on demography in explaining communal conflict and violence, but
doesn’t explain variation among similar places
III. Resolving the Puzzle: The Role of Civil Society
Two mechanisms connecting civil society and ethnic conflict:
1) civic networks promote neighborhood-level peace by promoting routine communication and
engagement between members of different religious communities in times of tension
2) associational forms of engagement serve and connect the interests of Hindus and Muslims
(explains why they are sturdier)
Villages: everyday engagement is normal and formal associations are virtually nonexistent – has
not been primary site of communal violence
Cities: associational life flourishes – overwhelming majority of deaths from communal violence
in India 1950-1955
The higher the number of people, the more links connecting them need to be made, therefore
cities need associations to maintain the same level of civic engagement as informal and everyday
interaction in villages
IV. Evidence that Civil Society Matters
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Similar Provocations, Different Responses
1989-1992, Hindu nationalist agitation to destroy Baburi mosque in Ayodhya led to
unprecedented violence in much of India, both Aligarh and Calicut experienced rumors and
tension
Calicut – local administration maintained law and order, peace committees
Aligarh – horrendous violence, press incited rumors, exploited by political organizations
for polarization (had only intrareligious peace committees)
The Variety of Civic Networks
Calicut – BJP was unwilling to initiate polarizing process (would be blamed for undermining
decades-long peace), although it would be in its political interest
Hindu-Muslim civic integration runs deep; if a party destroys Hindu-Muslim peace by
polarization, it will be punished by the electorate
Aligarh – had been more integrated, but in the 1930s politicians began to use thugs to spread
violence, neighborhood-level intimacy unable to withstand the shock
Differences in economic, social and educational civic settings:
Calicut – many associations and clubs, many interreligious and nondenominational organizations
Economy based on merchandise trade, almost everyone joined a trade association,
associations refuse to align with any particular political parties,
Hindus/Muslims/Christians included, contracts based entirely on trust (no formal
contracts); trade unions and book clubs
Aligarh – traders association fought over joining a political party, split into secular and
nonsecular (BJP and Muslims), no intercommunal dependence, only intra-Muslim societies; no
trade unions, less newspaper-reading by Muslims
V. Endogeneity and the Underlying Causation
Before Gandhi, civic structure quotidian; after Gandhi/national movement – associational
“a transformative ideological shift in national politics, seeking to address social evils and to
reorient the fight for independence, was the cause of a systematic organizational effort. In the
short to medium run, however, the organizational civic order, instituted by the national
movement, became a constraint on the behavior of politicians….the civic constraint on politics
was especially serious if building or destroying bridges between Hindus and Muslims was the
object of politicians' strategies.”
VI. Concluding Observations
“trust based on interethnic, not intraethnic, networks is critical”
“Everyday interethnic engagement may be enough to maintain peace on a small scale (villages or
small towns), but it is no substitute for interethnic associations in larger settings (cities and
metropolises). Size reduces the efficacy of informal interactions, privileging formal
associations.”
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Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital
1) Introduction
a) America is key example of country where civil society has contributed to institutional performance and
strong democracy, but evidence that vibrancy of civil society in America is declining
b) Civic engagement affects performance of social institutions, quality of public life, industrial development,
and representative government (his Italy experiment)
c) Social capital = features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits
2) Whatever Happened to Civic Engagement?
a) Decline in turnout in elections over the past three decades
b) Fewer Americans attending public meetings, political rallies, committees, working for parties  direct
engagement in politics has fallen even though average education level has risen
c) Theory that political tragedies and scandals since 1960s has triggered disgust for politics among Americans
and motivated their withdrawal  limited
d) Investigating Organizational Membership in America
i) Religious affiliation (most common associational membership)  becoming less tied to institutions
and more self-defined, decline in churchgoing and church-group membership
ii) Labor unions  membership falling
iii) PTA (parent-teacher association)  participation falling
iv) Membership in civic and fraternal organizations (women’s groups, Boy Scouts, Red Cross) declining
 serious volunteer work overall declining
v) More Americans are bowling today than ever before, but bowling in organized leagues has dropped 
bad for bowling industry, bad for social interaction
3) Countertrends
a) Perhaps traditional forms of civic organizations (“secondary associations”) that have been declining have
been replaced by vibrant new organizations
b) New mass membership organizations (environmental organizations, feminist groups, AARP—retired
people) are part of different category  “tertiary associations”
i) Ties are to common symbols, leaders, and ideals—not to each other
ii) Does not create the same social trust and social connectedness, or social capital
c) New nonprofit organizations, especially service agencies, are usually not secondary associations
d) New support groups  do represent important form of social capital, but do not play the same role as
traditional civic associations, individuals focus on themselves in the presence of others
e) OVERALL, total associational membership declined between 1967 and 1993  more Americans than ever
before are in social circumstances that foster associational involvement (higher education, middle age) but
nevertheless total associational membership is stagnant or declining
4) Good Neighborliness and Social Trust
a) Family = most fundamental form of social capital, evidence of loosening bonds within family  consistent
with social de-capitalization
b) Proportion of Americans who socialize with neighbors has steadily declined
c) Proportion of Americans saying that most people can be trusted has fallen
d) Close correlation between social trust and associational membership is true across time and across
individuals, but also across countries
i) America still ranks high on both dimensions of social capital, but has gone down
5) Why is U.S. Social Capital Eroding?
a) Movement of women into the labor force
i) Reduced time and energy available for building social capital
ii) Decline in women’s groups happened before men’s groups, but aggregate declines are equal
b) Mobility: the “re-potting” hypothesis
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i)
Residential stability and homeownership are associated with greater civic engagement; mobility
disrupts root systems, takes time to develop new roots
ii) But residential stability and homeownership in America have risen modestly
c) Other Demographic Transformations
i) Fewer marriages, more divorces, fewer children, lower wages  married, middle-class parents are
generally more socially involved than others
ii) Changes in scale (i.e. supermarket replaced corner grocery) could have undermined material and
physical basis for civic engagement
d) Technological Transformation of Leisure
i) Technological trends individualize our use of leisure time (TV, movies)
6) What is to Be Done?
a) Sort out dimensions of social capital
b) Investigate impact of electronic networks, development of social capital in workplace
c) Costs and benefits of community engagements (related changes in discrimination, intolerance)
d) Explore how public policy impinges on social capital formation
Sheri Berman – Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic
I.
Refutes Putnam’s claim that democratic government is strengthened with a vigorous
civil society
a. Sets out to prove that a robust civil society actually contributed to the downfall of
the Weimar Republic in Germany
b. Claims that political institutionalization is more important than civil society
II.
Associational life in Germany
a. Flourished in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
b. Fragmented rather than united German society
i. Weak political institutionalization, rather than weak civil society, that was
Germany’s main problem
III.
Neo-Tocquevillean Theories
a. 50s and 60s claimed that “mass society” (estranged citizens caused by
industrialization and modernity) explained disintegration of democracy and rise of
totalitarianism
b. Neo-Tocquevilleans said that civil society was antidote to the afflictions of mass
society
i. This theory is unable to account for the central features of the Weimar
case
ii. German associationism, unlike British and American, didn’t lead to
responsive citizenship or liberal/democratic values
IV.
Civil Society in Early Germany
a. Spurts of associationism in mid-1800s and 1870s
i. Growth of associations during periods of strain
ii. Citizens turned away from political institutions and toward civil society
b. Explosion of civil society in pre-WWI Germany
V.
Civil Society in Weimar Germany
a. “feverish associational activity”
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VI.
VII.
i. signaled the breakdown of democratic values
ii. weakness of bourgeois parties and national political structures drove
citizens to civil society, which was organized along group lines and not
across them
iii. further undermined and legitimized political structures
b. At start of Great Depression, Germany had weak political institutions and
fragmented but highly organized civil society
Nazis
a. Nazis concentrated on attracting bourgeois joiners who had become disillusioned
with traditional party politics
b. Also deliberately infiltrated activists into a wide range of bourgeois organizations
in order to eliminate potential opponents from positions of power within them
i. Bridged gap between bourgeois civil society and party politics with
creation of an effective political machine and a true cross-class coalition
Conclusions
a. Instead of helping to reduce social cleavages, Germany’s weak and poorly
designed political institutions exacerbated them
i. Strong civil society drew public interest away from parties
ii. Reinforced the divisions within German society
b. Dense network of German associations enabled Nazis to create a dynamic
political machine across class divisions in a remarkably short period of time
c. Perhaps associationalism should be considered politically neutral: neither
inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent on the wider political
context.
WEEK 14
The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective by Eva Bellin
 Bellin asks whether democracy can be imposed by force from the outside
 argues that this assumption is driving America’s intervention in Iraq and is a potential new
pillar of ambition for U.S. foreign policy elsewhere
 Bellin’s point: we should be careful about drawing lessons from postwar Germany and Japan
to guide our endorsement of military occupation today
 according to Bellin, postwar Germany and Japan had a set of endowments not replicated in
Iraq, and which military occupation cannot guarantee
 “Historical experience suggests that although military occupation may increase the likelihood
of democratization, and wise policy choices certainly improve its chances, the outcome is largely
shaped by factors, both domestic and international, that cannot be controlled by military
engineers operating within the confines of current cultural norms and conventional limits of time
and treasure” (595)
 Bellin argues that it is highly problematic to use the military occupation of Japan and
Germany as the standard of comparison for Iraq: the starting conditions that characterize these
three cases are dissimilar in ways crucial for democratic outcomes
 Bellin identifies 8 factors that make for crucial noncomparability of these cases and that
counsel wariness about drawing historical lessons too hastily:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
Dramatically different levels of economic development
Dramatically different levels of ethnic homogeneity
Differential endowment with effective state institutions
The degree to which the country cases have had prior experience with meaningful
democracy
5. Differential endowment with leaders of national stature (with elites) capable of
sponsoring the democratic process
 so far, 5 factors that differentiate the cases—level of economic development, ethnic
homogeneity, strength of state institutions, historical experience, and elite leadership—are all
factors that democratic theory would anticipate as key to shaping the success or failure of
democratization
 there are three additional differences that sprang from the particular time and place of the
German and Japanese occupations that favored democratic outcomes in these countries and are
not easily replicable today
1. The psychological state of the occupied at the time of occupation
a. Accounts of Japan and Germany in the immediate postwar period was the sense
of utter defeat and desperation that pervaded their societies.
b. Iraq had not experienced that same shock of utter defeat and crisis. America’s
victory over the Iraqi military was complete, but the war was relatively short and
produced limited civilian casualties
2. Different level of commitment on the part of the occupiers to seeing their occupation
project through
a. In Japan and Germany, the U.S. was in it for the long haul. In the case of
America’s intervention in Iraq, we see a much slimmer commitment to seeing this
political project through. The pairing of ideal to our realpolitik interests in the
country is much more tenuous. The U.S. is committed to a much shorter
intervention in Iraq that was the case in Japan or Germany. The administration
was intent upon handing over sovereignty to the Iraqis by June 2004, after 14
months, not 6 years, of occupation. America’s association with colonial
domination and its illegitimacy in the Arab world taint any of its political projects
for the region, no matter how well intentioned
3. Dictatorial freedom of occupation
a. In the occupations of Japan and Germany, the occupation forces enjoyed a
relatively free hand in imposing policy on the conquered country
b. Such dictatorial control is unimaginable today, especially with contemporary
technological advances: the postcolonial world is less accepting of unilaterally
forcing people to be free
 cases that are better matched to Iraq in terms of initial endowments crucial to democratic
outcomes suggest less reason for optimism
 Haiti is one such case.
1. The U.S. occupied Haiti in 1994 with rhetorical commitment to establishing democracy
there despite the disastrous state of affairs. The Haitian case shares with Iraq many key
initial conditions:
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2. Haiti had ineffective state institutions and limited prior experience with democracy,
suffered from economic underdevelopment, and shared with Iraq the fact of limited U.S.
commitment to the goal of democratization
a. The Clinton administration wanted to get out of Haiti quickly, and most U.S.
troops were withdrawn from the island within six months of the initial occupation
b. The consequences of this limited intervention combined with unfortunate initial
endowments are the chaos and instability that continue to characterize Haiti today
 Bosnia is another important case for comparison, because Bosnia shares with Iraq the
challenge of building a democracy in a country deeply riven by ethnic cleavage, and, like Iraq,
has limited prior experience with democracy.
1. The most important difference between the cases is that the occupation of Bosnia has
been carried out under UN auspices by multinational forces executing a treaty that was
negotiated among the different Bosnian communities themselves
2. Also, the occupiers in Bosnia have made a long-term commitment to see this occupation
through to democratization
3. The Bosnian case has much to say, however, about the difficulty of delivering democracy
in a democratically inexperienced, ethnically divided society. Ten years after the Dayton
accord, ethnic tensions remain strong in Bosnia, and the leaders of the Muslim, Croatian,
and Serbian communities continue to refuse to cooperate with each other
4. Bosnia is still not a “‘sustainable economic and political entity’” (605)
 in a study that tracks 17 cases of military occupation carried out by the U.S. in the 20th
century, only four of these cases (Japan, Germany, Grenada, and Panama) have given rise to
stable democracies
 the Japanese and German cases are useful in that they put to rest pessimistic assumptions
about several factors reputed to hinder democratization in conquered countries that were
previously authoritarian
1. first, the cases of Japan and Germany suggest that indigenous “authoritarian” culture, or
our misinformed perceptions of it, need not be an insurmountable obstacle to implanting
democracy
2. second, the German and Japanese cases suggest that imposition if a political system need
not necessarily spell its failure
3. the occupation forces were able to corral local interests behind these reforms and get key
leaders to identify with the project and endorse it.
4. the allies quickly fixed both Japan and Germany in a web of international organizations
and institutions (Nato, Gatt, etc.) that paired their economic and security concerns with
the democratic project, taking democracy beyond its ideological appeal and bolstering it
with interest
Lessons:
 the lesson for Iraq is that political institutions don’t have to be of indigenous origin to be
acceptable. So long as the innovations are perceived as serving key interests and don’t come at
the expense of national identity, then institutions of foreign design may survive
 another lesson is that economic take-off and prosperity need not be immediate to ensure
public endorsement of political change. Germany did not begin to see its economy take off until
1948, three years after the occupation started. Japan did not see its economy take off until five
years into the occupation
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 although both Germany and Japan had received a great deal of aid to prevent starvation and
social unrest, it took three to five years for the economy of these countries to prosper
 fourth and finally, the case of Japan suggests that the support of historically non-democratic
leaders can be key to successful democratic transition. No one would have expected Emperor
Hirohito to be the champion of democracy in Japan, but, in fact, his endorsement of the process
was key to its success. Similar figures may be equally useful in Iraq.
 the value of this historical perspective is that it encourages us to take the longer view on
developments in Iraq. Compared to Japan and Germany, Iraq is ahead of schedule. The country
has already recovered to prewar conditions in many areas of the economy and sufficient
momentum remains
 in conclusion, military occupation can have added value for democratization. It can foster
transition by rebuilding state institutions, jumpstarting economic development, and structuring
economic and political incentives in ways that make elites favor democracy- clearly the lesson of
Germany and Japan
 extended intervention with democratic intent = essential to steering both countries toward
democracy; at the same time, military occupation cannot make democracy out of whole cloth
 “although we ought to recognize the successes of the German and Japanese occupations and
draw lessons from them, we must also be careful to avoid a selective reading of history that
ignores more prevalent patterns and disregards the specificity of time and contact in shaping
political outcomes” (608)
Dawisha and Dawisha: How to Build a Democratic Iraq
The Shape of Things to Come
 Iraq possesses several features that will facilitate the reconstruction effort
o Democratic institutions are not alien to the country: political parties existed under
the Hashemite monarchy, parliament debated ideas, there were independent
newspapers to a certain extent
 Yet Iraq’s history is also filled with authoritarianism, tribalism, and ethnic and sectarian
violence
 What should the blueprint for a future democratic Iraq look like?
Let’s Get Federal
 Having factions zealously check each others’ power could promote democracy
 So there would have to be a federal system
o Both Baghdad and the regions should be equal guardians of the constitution
o A strong judiciary would monitor the rights and arbitrate disputes
o The system would divide power to raise and distribute revenues between the
capital and the periphery (mainly concerns Iraq’s petroleum)
 Local governments should have widespread control over their territories: should be
responsible for all in a region, not just a specific ethnicity
 Should not just create three ethnically based federal units- would entrench divisions
o Instead should maintain the current 18 units; each should elect a local government
and send representatives to the upper chamber of a new parliament (based on
regional representation)
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Who’s In Charge
 Two usual options
 1. Unified in a single, strong presidency combining the powers of the head of state and
the head of government
o depends on the character of the individual president
o prone to corruption, repression, and self-aggrandizement
 2. Divided between a head of state (a president or monarch) and a head of government (a
prime minister)
o best chance of sustaining democracy
 Iraq might consider the Bosnian model: a shared presidency, in which each ethnic
community received a seat on a presidential triumvirate
o Leaders still only care about the ethnicity they represent
 Iraq also might consider restoring the Hashemite monarchy under strict constitutional
limits
o Well connected with tradition which would make it a stabilizing force during a
time of uncertainty and a barrier against extremism
o In the Arab world today, the monarchies are leading in democratic reform
Getting Ready to Choose
 How should the president be chosen?
o 1. Direct elections: the entire population votes
 favor populist and antidemocratic candidates
 could be expected to shift the political balance away from the Sunnis (the
minority, but traditionally dominant)
o 2. Indirect Elections: choice of the upper house of parliament
 would make him dependent on another democratic body
 Prime minister: generally the leader of the parliamentary majority in the lower house
 Electoral boundaries should give greater influence to city dwellers: decreases the
possibility of rural domination of the lower house
 Should be multimember districts (MMDs)
o Allows a district’s diversity to be more clearly mirrored in parliament
o Increase representation of the professional middle class
 Mixed system of voting in which half the seats in parliament would be chosen by
elections in MMDs and half would be chosen by party list
o Would allow voters to have direct contact with their local representatives while
also encouraging the development of nationwide parties
o Each of Iraq’s 18 federal units would constitute one MMD with the number of
representatives per district determined by that district’s population size
Democratizing the Middle Class
 A substantial and highly educated middle class has persisted in Iraq
 Democratic theory holds that independent and self-sustaining middle class create the
basis for democratic civil life
 Iraq’s middle class remains directly dependent on the state
o Government revenues come mainly from oil sales and not taxation
 The current size of the bureaucracy needs to be reduced (to lessen dependency on state)
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
Inefficiency and corruption would be diminished if entry into the civil service were based
on merit alone
o A civil service college could be established to train future civil servants in
democratic values and practices
Setting the Standard
 The US and its allies cannot shrink from setting Iraq on a democratic path
 Putting in place democratic political institutions that function properly, meet the
particular need of a given society, and deliver the goods can rather quickly produce
“habituation”: democratic habits in the population will become entrenched and resilient
(an INSTITUTIONALIST approach)
The End of Iraq
Peter Galbriath
Chapter 9: Civil War
I. Iraq: change in power. April 2003
-first time in 1300 years Shiites gain political power, Shiite majority 80% vote.
-Sunni did not except authority.
-Shiite, exclusive towards Sunni: division culturally, politically through religious claim.
-Sunnis made minority and considered inferior “second-class status”(1190).
II. Iran, a dividing factor
-Shiites most powerful political figure Iranian.
-Sunni consider Iran a threat to Iraq’s Arab identity
-strife between Sunni and Shiite Arab long-lasting conflict, at least to 1920s
III. Civil War hot bed
-Shiites power trip on political rule, Sunni distrust and feelings of Shiites will to destroy
prior Sunni Iraq, Shiite fear of Sunni temptation to follow Hussein’s path of the killing of Shiites.
-
two possible starting dates to civil war, August 29, 2003 or March 2, 2004-----by middle 2004 killing full effect. Many deaths.
- state police, not in existence, more Shiite power troops.
- American invasion discovery of Sunni prisoners, blamed on Iraq’s Interior
Minister---thus Sunni feared Iraqi authority.
Civil war most previlant in areas of mixed community: Kurbs, Sunni, and Shiite.
Deaths numbers highest in areas with most diversity.
Iraq has diversity, but distinguished by land boundaries, rare life-mingling of ethnicity.
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commonality of weapons. US never gained knowledge of Sunni insurgency.
President of US did not have control of arms and could have restricted
violence by limiting weapons.
US fault of Iraqi terrorist rise and chaotic Iraqi state…
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-
Saddam regime fell---insurgency formed used American cash left in Baghdad
after past leaders fled.
Sunni resistance resulted from past US actions
Bush Admin. Poor protection of Iraqi weapon depots
IV. Ba’athist and Sunni Arab
Ba’athist and Sunni Arab similarity---enemy Americans and Shiites; however different political
incentives. Old system vs. Islamic state.
- both see Shiites as the withstanding threat, American will eventually leave.
- Ba’athists support civil war, drive Americans away.
V. Kurds
-Kurdistan tight boarders shielding terrorist, Kurds escape Iraqi turmoil even in Iraq(for
the most part).
- issues have appeared in Tigris which divides Sunni Arab from Kurdish, American
played favorites creating tension. Mosul city, tension because of a potential expansion of
Kurdish boarders.
VI. Kirkuk: known as Kurdistan’s Jerusalem.
Not a particularly debatable city, however world’s largest oil field…underneath.
- Saddam never disputed Kurds’ control, Arab Iraqi not loosen control, for fear
the oil would give Kurdistan independence through wealth.
- 2005 Kurds won majority on Kirkuk Governorate Council, thus would vote to
join Kurdistan
Issue:
-bring Arabs against Kurds, and potential of involving Turkey. (Turkey does not favor
Kirkuk for Kurdistan.)
Kurds separate from Iraqi conflict, however if brought in through the claim of Kirkuk will have
no choice but to fight for independence.
US will now not give more advanced arms to Iraqi military for fear that they will use them in
civil war.
Iraqi military corrupt, divisions are done in terms of population, Baghdad only mixed unit and
Sunni and Kurds, not interested in officer corp,
Military not effective, no trust, miscommunication.
VI. January 2005 Elections
- Shiite and Kurdistan alliance. Dawa leader, PM: interior , oil, finance.
Kurdish leader, President: foreign affairs.
- Sunni Arab, defense minister. Kurd, chief staff of Iraqi Army.
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Attempting to mix power and control.
Kurd power weighted importance, never before any control or input.
Kurd and Shiite deal: Baghdad not interfere with Kurdistan, Kurds let Shiites
run Arab Iraq.
MISCOMMUNICATION: US tried to persuade Kurds to form a new Iraq,
Kurds not interested in Iraq, only Kurdistan.
Kurd-Shiite coalition not effective. Clashed.
Sunni Arabs boycotted elections, three-way coalition hardly plausible.
America would not extend constitutional deadline---three groups struggled to form a constitution
within time constraint, no agreement.
Chapter 10: The Three State Solution
Deadline extended one week. President Bush not understand complications on Iraqi relations,
Bush told Hakim to add something on women’s rights, different ideas on what that implied…
President ineffective, US ambassador to Iraq, Khalilzad, helped in the formation of consitution.
Khalilzad two obstacles:
Absence of common ground and incoherent US policy.
Process rocky. Deadline rushed. Bush wanted to show progress would not allow another six
months.
American mistakes continued with Kurds, offended them. Kurds tried to have 4th of July
celebration, Bush Administration no appreciation, because Kurds flew Kurdistan flag.
Kurdistan minimal set of demands for constitution: “supremacy of Kurdistan law, continuation
of peshmerga, Kurdistan control of natural resources, referendum to settle Kirkuk, future right to
self-determination”(1214-1215).
Shiite common agenda on relgion and state, Islamic state, Sharia law, marjah recognized in
consitution, legislation conformation with Islam.
Al-Hakim proposed Shiite governaorates form single region comparative to that of the Kurds.
(would make for very strong, controlling Shiite force.)
DEAL: Kurds received federalist requests, Shiites Islamic requests. Agreed to exclusive powers
of federal government to : foreign affairs, defense policy, monetary policy, fiscal policy, postal
policy, management of water, conducting consuses, regulating measures and weights. Taxes by
region.
Religion, human rights, gender: regional laws declare.
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Stregths of constitution. 1. Structure for Shiites and Sunni Arabs to form own government. 2.
Formula to provent the worsening of Iraqi Civil War.
Sunni Arab disapproved to federalism, this would mean Shiite control, and disapproval could
possibly ruin constitution.
Constitution forces Kirkuk resolution 2007. Peacefully? Probably not.
Constitution, oil guidelines. Iraq oil is power. “old oil, new oil” compromise, “equitable
distribution of revenues for several decades.”(1221)
Constitution helps resolve Baghdad scenario, dividing power, but not the “problem of Baghdad
city, a city that is 60/40 percent Shiite-Sunni and is the front line of Iraqi’s civil war”(1221).
Constitution actually divides society more allowed Sunni and Shiite to create own selfgovernments. (1223)
Potential of country dissolution. 3-state split difficult to manage. This division of Iraqi state not
well-liked by Americans, but better than many other options, should help continue creating
divided self-governments instead of starting again.
Chapter 11: How to Get Out of Iraq
US has same number of troops now as when invaded Iraq three years previous. No clear route to
take, no easy resolution.
Changing a leaders, US influence, Maliki PM candidate, US approval because UIA spokesman,
actually don’t know much about Maliki. Maliki no government experience, spent whole life in
exile. Talabani, President. Mehdi, one of VP. Hashimi, the other VP, a strong Sunni Arab.
Speaker of Souncil of Representativesm Sunni Arab,al- Mashhadani. Iraqi government coalition
actually has no power over, Kurdistan, Shiite south, Sunni Arab heartland or Baghdad. Green
Zone only safe area. US has hastened the end of Iraq. Ineffective federal government and
extreme cultural boundaries and 3-way longlasting opposition.
Adeed Dawisha and Larry Diamond, Iraq’s Year of Voting Dangerously
1) 2005 Elections  decisions about electoral design had to be made in order to manage and contain potentially
polarizing divisions
a) Selection of system to elect Transitional National Assembly, then National Assembly
b) Most systems eliminated early on because the Iraqi administration would not have time, resources, census
data, or political credibility to draw boundaries of individual districts
c) Iraqi voter is not that well educated, so forcing voters to rank candidates might be too complicated
d) PR  compelling choice
i) Fit with power-sharing, consociational logic of institutional design, each group would have share of
power roughly proportional to weight in society
ii) Would reinforce Shi’ite and Kurdish weight in the political system and give them more control on who
would run on party label, so Shi’ite and Kurdish leaders liked
iii) Easier to ensure women’s representation (25% minimum quota of females in parliament)
2) What Kind of PR?
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Minimum threshold for entry into parliament?  logic of inclusion and desire to have as many moderate
and independent voices as possible, leaned toward having no threshold
b) District-based or national-list system?  proposals for two-tiered system: most votes from electoral
districts (corresponding with provincial boundaries), others from national list
c) Carina Perelli (chief of UN Electoral Assistance Division) made the decision in the end:
i) Chose single nationwide district because it was the easiest to administer: no challenge of apportioning
seats to districts, no concerns over where people would vote; and easier for dispersed communities to
accumulate votes
ii) Consequences:
(1) In absence of districts, elections became based on national identity, no local component
(2) Lack of minimum threshold for representation led most Sunni parties to boycott elections
3) The First Two Votes
a) January 30, 2004: Elections to choose Transitional National Assembly
i) Job was to write a permanent Iraqi constitution, hold a referendum to approve it, and prepare the
country for general elections
ii) Sunnis (20%) tried to thwart and delegitimize elections by boycotting them, belittling them
iii) Shi’ites (60%) and Kurds (20%) had suffered under Saddam and had incentives to vote, so even
without Sunnis, 58% turnout
iv) Three blocs emerged:
(1) United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), 140 seats: Shi’ite parties and individuals led by Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
(2) Kurdistan Alliance, 75 seats: coalition of two major Kurdish parties
(3) Iraqi List, 40 seats: secular group of politicians
v) Iraqis voted overwhelmingly in accord with ethnic and sectarian identities
b) Harsh wakeup call for Sunnis, who had expected election to fail, but instead lost miserably and were left
out of political bargaining  Americans realized that Sunni political inclusion was essential to diminish
insurgency so agreement to add Sunni delegates to committee
c) Constitutional committee produced compromise document that had 53 articles not yet resolved and that
Sunnis refused to validate
d) Sunnis feared division of Iraq into Kurdish region in the north and Shi’ite region in the south, together
controlling oil and gas wealth and leaving Sunnis with bad central region
e) Shi’ite and Kurdish leaders consented to demand of largest Sunni party, Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) for
additional article calling for new constitutional committee to implement amendments
f) Referendum  Constitution was passed
4) The December General Elections
a) Election of a four-year National Assembly that would put in place a Presidency Council, a prime minister,
and a cabinet
b) Change in electoral system  employed two-tier system
i) Sunnis actually voted, because regardless of how many people actually went to the polls in their
provinces, Sunnis were guaranteed certain bloc of seats
ii) First, votes in each district proportionally distributed to 80% of seats
iii) Remaining seats  one went to a party that did not win seats on provincial level but accumulated
enough votes to reach “national electoral quota”
iv) The rest were distributed among all participating parties in accord with proportion of votes they
received
c) Five coalitions claimed most seats:
i) UIA (Shi’ite), Kurdistan Alliance (Kurd), Iraqi National List (secular), Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni), and
Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Sunni)
d) Localization of campaign
i) Divided along ethno-sectarian lines, each alliance focused on getting support among its own base and
protecting it from intrusions by other alliances,  prevented serious competition
ii) So groups that were less localized and depended on national campaigns at disadvantage
e) Wave of assassinations and armed attacks  limited party leaders freedom of movement, had to campaign
through media
f) Campaign rhetoric dominated by concerns over security, basic services, and economic opportunity
a)
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i) Allawi harshly criticized UIA-led transitional government of incompetence and corruption
ii) Sunni coalitions attacked transitional government for encouraging Shi’ite militiamen to assassinate
innocent Sunni men in retaliation for atrocities committed by Sunni insurgents
iii) Debate over federalism
(1) Kurds wanted loose federal structure to ensure their autonomy
(2) UIA leader proposed creation of Shi’ite super-region in south
iv) Role of religion in politics
(1) Iraqi National List and IIP (Sunni) advocated separation of religion from politics
(2) Shi’ites defended inseparability of religion and politics
(3) Ayatollah Sistani, senior Shi’ite cleric, was neutral but used by Shi’ites as symbol to promote
religion in politics
v) Parties were consistent in desire to end U.S. occupation eventually
g) Election
i) 77% of registered voters turned out
ii) Observers and monitors to ensure integrity of elections
iii) When victory of UIA announced, Sunni complaints, but results were confirmed
iv) Results also showed clear ethno-sectarian loyalties and no vote to separate religion from state (Allawi
and secular party lost half the seats that it had received in January)
h) Why did the change in electoral system have no effect in diminishing sectarian voting?
i) Electoral terrain was strongly defined by January elections and old system
ii) Amidst widespread violence, many candidates didn’t even reveal their identities, so no emergence of
local and independent candidates
iii) Only list that transcended ethnic sectarian cleavages was led by Allawi, who had been prime minister
under unpopular government
iv) Shows that when pressures and constraints are powerful and entrenched, change in electoral design
cannot do much
5) The New Policy-Making Institutions
a) Since no party received majority, National Assembly will have to cross ethno-sectarian lines to get things
done
b) Alliance-building might be made easier because of divisions that exist within parties on certain issues
(though not on identity), e.g. UIA = SCIRI, al-Da’wah, al-Fadhilah, and Sadrists
Week 14: Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq”
In this essay, Larry Diamond, a former Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) in Baghdad, explains a number of things that went wrong with America’s occupation of
Iraq.
Diamond begins by noting the current state of affairs in Iraq: “endemic violence, a
shattered state, a nonfunctioning economy, and a decimated society,” all of which have
diminished the prospects for democracy. He points to the coalition’s failure to provide ample
security as the primary cause of our inability to establish a working state and government.
Though America’s Army Chief of Staff advised that hundreds of thousands of troops would be
needed to secure the country post-invasion, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld rejected
these calls, opting for a much smaller force. Furthermore, the troops we do have in Iraq are
largely untrained for urban patrols, peace maintenance, and stopping the flow of foreign
terrorists across the borders.
Diamond explains that rebuilding a country requires four things: political reconstruction
of the state, economic reconstruction, social reconstruction, and the provision of general security.
Although these elements all depend upon one another to a degree, the fourth is most important,
and a necessary precursor to the other three. In other words, our failure to provide security is
handicapping our efforts in every respect. In addition to the lack of troops, Diamond also points
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to the incompetence of the new Iraqi police force. The result of this security failure had
implications for the political rebuilding: foreign officials and contractors could not move around
the country, and they were unable to confront political threats posed by the heads of militias.
He goes on to note that many of the challenges to the country’s security had their roots in
internal political problems. Sunnis turned against the occupation out of a belief that they were
politically excluded, young Shiites were unable to find jobs, there existed tensions between
Kurds and Arabs, and the US was unable to dismantle militias while building up the new army.
To meet these challenges required the creation of a political system that would include the many
ethnic groups within the country.
The failure to create such a system resulted from a variety of factors. To begin with,
Iraqis were deeply suspicious of America’s motives, and large segments of the population were
still loyal to Saddam. The CPA also made a number of errors. They launched an over-extensive
de-Baathification campaign to remove members of Saddam’s Baath party from involvement in
the new state, and dissolved the army, thus endangering the country’s security and driving many
former soldiers to the insurgency. The CPA also faced a legitimacy gap that was worsened by
their unwillingness to increase international participation in the political administration of the
country and their failure to put legitimate Iraqi leaders in leadership roles. While holding
elections would have helped to alleviate the second problem, they were wary of doing so for a
number of reasons, including their fear that elections would be swept by radical Islamists. As an
initial compromise they formed representative councils, but failed to give them any real power.
The Iraqi Governing Council was also somewhat ineffective and controversial. Finally, the
process of drawing up a constitution presented a host of problems with regard to dividing power
between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Despite these challenges, Diamond is cautiously optimistic
that with international assistance – “political, economic, and military” – democracy in Iraq is
possible.
“Squandered Victory” by Larry Diamond, 2005
Chapter II: Can Iraq Become a Democracy?
Larry Diamond, who worked in the original transitional government (the CPA, or Coalition
Provisional Authority), describes in this chapter some of his frustrations with the “bad situation” in Iraq
as well as his hopes for its “good people,” enumerating the conditions he believes must be met in order to
achieve some sort of democracy in Iraq.
Diamond discusses the daunting challenges of creating system where power is shared in the right
balance by the majority and minority groups when groups are so religiously and ethnically polarized. He
mentions four important, immediate goals: the development of a National Guard, development of a
workable system for sharing power, thwarting Iran’s penetration of the Shiite Islamic party within Iraq,
and a political accommodation with the bulk of the Sunni population.
In the first section of the chapter, Diamond uses the “genetic view” of democracy (which states
that democratization is primarily concerned with procedure rather than substance) and offers suggestions
for such a procedure. Diamond believes that while most Iraqis do not understand all the intricacies of a
democratic system, they “yearn for some kind of democracy and rule of law.” He explains, however, that
competing groups in Iraq are unlikely to choose constitutional democracy “out of idealism or
magnanimity;” instead, the incentive for choosing democracy must be an understanding that the group has
a real stake in the system- basically, self-interest. It is not necessary that all groups value democracy as
the best form of government, but what “concrete steps they are willing to take” towards a democratic
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goal. While pure structuralists would be very cynical about Iraq’s possibilities for democratization, this
institutionalist/voluntarist view allows us to be more hopeful.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on the three conditions necessary for a “democratic
evolution to unfold”:
1. Increased inclusiveness of minority groups in the political arena
 The majority (United Iraqi Alliance) needs to be more inclusive of Sunni and
Baathist groups as well as a wide range of other actors.
 Whether or not this happens may depend somewhat on the moral guidance of
religious leaders such as Ayatollah Sistani.
2. A balance of power among political forces in Iraq
 Hopefully, eventually, the solidarity of various ethnic and religious groups will erode
and be replaced by crosscutting political parties.
3. Pragmatism and flexibility on the part of Iraq’s major politicians
 It is critical that the Shiite politicians of the ruling alliance choose to underutilize
their power, ensuring Sunni and Kurdish satisfaction and representation in
government.
Diamond concludes with a qualification of his original optimism for Iraqi democracy and reminds
that “pragmatism and accommodation” are key to progress toward democratization, however slow.
Afterword
Larry Diamond’s afterword describes in some detail the mess that was Iraq in 2005 and the
beginning of 2006, including the difficulties of power sharing in the transitional government that took
office in 2005, the Iraqi’s intense frustration with increasing waves of insurgent violence, the intense
difficulties surrounding the drafting of the permanent constitution, several major mistakes that were made
(including the US’s insistence on meeting the August 15 deadline for the draft of the Constitution), and
repeated major problems with political gridlock between ethnic groups. While the Constitution is a
“pretty good document,” and represents an enormous step toward liberal democracy for the Arab world,
many on both sides of the Sunni-Shiite divide remained unsatisfied at its completion and were
disillusioned with the political process in general. The role of Sunni groups in Iraqi politics, the
distribution of oil rights, and the role of the United States were, of course, major concerns.
Following the creation of the constitution, Iraqi politicians commenced “the electoral marathon of
2005,” which finally brought Sunnis into the political arena but “offered no assurance of a reduction in
the insurgent violence.” This was another election in Iraq that turned out to be more of a census than
anything else, and Shiites prevailed by sheer force of numbers. Concerns arising during and after the
election included the boundaries of regional groups and the creation of one large Shiite region, a
proposition that was vehemently opposed by Sunnis and other minorities.
Diamond discusses a few causes for hope despite the horrible situation at the end of “Squandered
Victory,” including the emerging possibilities for pluralism. The one real conclusion we can make is that
while there is, perhaps, a chance for democracy in Iraq, there is a long way to go and politics in Iraq must
proceed with utmost attention to the needs of all Iraqis.
Week 1
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