By Rebecca Kingston, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto
“Il est encore en Europe un pays capable de legislation; c’est isle de Corse. La valeur et la constance avec laquelle ce brave people a su recouvrer et defender sa liberté, meriteroit bien que quelque homme sage lui apprit à la conserver. J’ai quelque presentiment qu’un jour cette petite Isle étonnera l’Europe.” Du Contrat social, II, x.
A consideration of this famous quote from one of Rousseau’s most famous works should make us pause.
It indicates that not only Rousseau acknowledged that his theoretical conceptions did have some application in the European context, but that it was the case that one small nation, up to that point rather ignored by much of the literati, had actually achieved a state of “liberty” as Rousseau conceived it, despite its precarious status. While it was a late and perhaps hasty addition to the manuscript (it is a reference not found in the previous Geneva manuscript), it is clearly incumbent upon students of the
Atlantic tradition of political theory and of liberty to explore the Corsican example, or at least
Rousseau’s reading of it, in part to help shed light on Rousseau’s conception of liberty.
Three years after publishing Du Contrat social, Rousseau began his “Plan for a Constitution for
Corsica”. It is unfortunate that Rousseau never completed and published this plan, but also surprising, given the circumstances in which the piece was written, that Rousseau wrote as much as he did. We know Rousseau wished to have a better in-depth understanding of the conditions in Corsica when he was contacted by the General Buttafoco in September 1764 to help in the drafting of a new constitution as he indicates as such in his own account in the Confessions as well as in the extant correspondence with Buttafoco. Even with additional information in hand as requested by him and sent to him by the general, Rousseau concluded that it was best for him to go and live there. Personal and political circumstances came in the way of him fulfilling this wish.
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Rousseau’s own circumstances at the time made it difficult for him to embark on such a significant task. As he suggests in the Confessions, 1765 was a particularly difficult year for him. The stoning of his residence in Motiers forced him to leave his place of residence once more and to seek more secure surroundings on the Island of St. Pierre.
1 At the same time, the political situation in Corsica was itself in flux. France entered the conflict more actively and their presence on the island made the future of Corsican independence less than sure. The context of political uncertainty and ongoing civil war in Corsica made the planning of longer term institutional design a tricky matter. Of course,
Rousseau was perfectly right in surmising the outcome of French intervention on the island. It is a sore irony of history that in the 1770’s the French monarchy was willing to embrace and support the struggle for liberty and independence in the case of the American colonies, but only ten years previously the same regime betrayed the same struggle in Corsica (and this against the terms of the existing treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle).
2
Rousseau was by all reports enthusiastic about the project and he completed a sizable commentary (writing the bulk of it between January and September of 1765) before leaving it unfinished in the face of ongoing personal disruption and the eventual triumph of French political designs on the island.
3 Despite his ongoing sense of persecution and the fading hope for eventual independence of the island, Corsica remained a place of interest for Rousseau for the rest of his life.
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What does this text reveal about the political theory of Rousseau? For many commentators, it is suggested or implied that this piece offers nothing new for an understanding of Rousseau’s political theory, and certainly does not offer any new insight into his conception of liberty. This thesis takes a number of forms. For some, while the Corsican analysis suggests a more practical orientation on the part of Rousseau (as opposed to the theoretical approach of Du Contrat social),Corsica represents a particular application of principles that had been articulated previously in Rousseau’s work. From this
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perspective, it is not so much the virtue or skills of Rousseau as a pragmatic thinker, but rather the virtues of the Corsican situation being as close to a natural condition as possible, that makes it possible to apply the established principles of the Rousseauian project here.
5 A second perspective suggests that there is neither prudence nor pragmatism demonstrated in this work. Instead, it is argued that his
Corsican writing is a continuation of an uncompromising war with modernity and commerce, and shows another manifestation of the Rousseauian drive to totalitarian control.
6 Still other interpreters suggest that the work on Corsica is in the main a reiteration of the principles expressed earlier in his “Economie politique” article written for Diderot’s Encyclopedie, and another articulation of his nostalgic sensibilities.
7 In all, while there are clearly differences among these interpretations regarding the overall objective of Rousseauian political theory, they all converge in suggesting that Rousseau’s writing on Corsica reveals nothing that is not already developed in his other work of political theory.
The one partial exception is the reading that sees a more pragmatic orientation in the work. 8 It has been suggested that the text provides a thoughtful application of his political principles, with the implication that this constitutional exercise for Rousseau demonstrates that his theory was not, nor was intended to be, a utopian and unrealizable chimera. Rousseau tailored his political principles to the specific conditions represented by the Corsican context, forcing him to moderate those principles to some degree.
Still, the broad thrust of all these interpretations is puzzling, and for a variety of reasons. In the first instance, given the primary focus of Du Contrat social on matters of political right, and regardless of whether or not we interpret it as the upshot of utopian, nostalgic or even authoritarian designs, it is difficult to see how the work on the Corsican constitution can appear to be in any way a continuation of this same discussion in political right. The work devoted to Corsica discusses neither the right or duty of resistance of individual citizens to tyranny, nor in any depth the type of legitimate constitutional and
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legislative structure that the Corsicans should establish in order to ensure their liberty as a people. Nor does the Corsican piece provide any commentary on how to ensure by procedural means the clear voice of the general will. The most important questions related to an application of Rousseau’s principles of political right as they are expressed in Du Contrat social are notably lacking in his work on Corsica. Yet,
Rousseau does not hesitate to call Corsica at this time a free political community.
An additional puzzle in this is that it is precisely the constitutional provisions of the new Corsican republic that for all intents and purposes would clearly be of intense interest to the author of Du Contrat social. It is something that Rousseau was aware of given that the constitutional documents were no doubt sent to him. Corsica had an unusual and in many ways progressive constitution, with greater political equality than anything else enacted in eighteenth century revolutionary experiments. It also legally entrenched a principle of legislative supremacy, although this was being challenged to some degree in practice.
9 It was a set of issues with which the author of Du Contrat social was quite familiar, yet it is not something he chose to analyse in any detail in his writing on Corsica. So what other features of liberty did he have in mind?
His “Discours sur l’economie politique” offers little discussion of the proper conditions for political founding that ground Rousseau’s discussion in the work on Corsica.
10 Indeed, much of the focus in his earlier article for Diderot’s Encyclopedie concerns the proper moral economy of a political community, such as the need for a respect for the rule of law, and animating patriotism and a sense of unity in the community. The principles of economic development and taxation are then explored as subsequent to those primary considerations. In the Corsica work, in contrast, the foundational consideration is that of the proper economy to ensure liberty and independence, and it is from there that the other political considerations flow.
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In general terms it would appear that a closer analysis is needed. The purpose of this chapter is to do just that, i.e. to explore the uniqueness of Rousseau’s presentation in his work on Corsica, particularly as it relates to a deeper understanding of Rousseau’s conception of liberty. This uniqueness can be demonstrated not only in relation to Rousseau’s other major political writings, but also in relation to some of the literature circulating in Europe at the time concerning the Corsican situation.
I will argue that in his writing on Corsica, Rousseau demonstrates a clear shift from his arguments in both the “Discours sur l’Economie politique” and Du Contrat social. Furthermore, this shift is characterised by more than just a pragmatic application of his principles. The shift can be summarised as a new focus on republican freedom as the preservation of collective economic independence, and it is this, as opposed to freedom as collective self-rule, and the procedural considerations that it raises, that becomes the fundamental driving force of his recommendations. The dynamic here leads Rousseau to advocate a series of political distinctions that are grounded on relative economic productivity, thereby making citizenship an honour, rather than a right, and leading citizens to greater effort through the positive harnessing of amour-propre. Thus, the Stoic ideal that has been regarded as central to the
Rousseauian moral and political vision is used only as a model at the very highest level of the state, where autonomy is prized, while the day-to-day emotional economy of the community rests on a competition for honour and a recognition of a healthy interdependency.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, I provide a brief survey of some of the literature on or by Corsicans that was circulating in Europe at the time. This outline of the basic lines of debate on the Corsican situation will help to illustrate by point of contrast much of the novelty of
Rousseau’s contribution. In the second section of the chapter I provide a detailed analysis of Rousseau’s work on Corsica, comparing and contrasting both the organizational structure of the essay as well as the
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various themes raised, with his “Discours sur l’Economie politique” and Du Contrat social. In the final part of the chapter I discuss the significance of my analysis.
I.
The Place of Corsica in more general currents of intellectual debate and institutional practice.
There has been a certain amount written on the circumstances under which Rousseau took on the consignment of drafting a constitution for Corsica, but as many things concerning Rousseau, this is not without controversy. What is perhaps more straight-forward, is the account of where general
Enlightenment opinion stood on the Corsican case and how Rousseau himself was positioned in his writing vis-à-vis this body of literature.
As recounted in his Confessions, and verified by his correspondence, Rousseau received a letter from Signor Buttafoco, colonel of the Royal Corsican regiment and confidante of Pascal Paoli, the leader of the insurgent government on the island. There is disagreement concerning the motivations of
Buttafoco in doing so, as well as whether Paoli was aware of this initiative.
11 From the account given by
Boswell after meeting personally with Paoli, it appears that Paoli was clearly both aware and supportive of the enterprise, not to delegate to Rousseau full constitutional authority, but to garner wider sympathy and publicity for the Corsican struggle against Genoa.
12
In-depth knowledge of Corsica was not common among eighteenth-century Europeans, despite the fact that reference to the Corsican case was somewhat of a familiar trope (perhaps akin to how
Canada is often invoked in American political discourse). In 1729 when the Corsicans began their rebellion against Genoa the island was virtually unknown. 13 The notoriety of the pathetic figure of the baron Theodore von Neuhoff, and his caricature in Voltaire’s Candide (1759), sparked some curiosity.
Perhaps the greatest catalyst for a thirst for news about the island across Europe was the return of
Pasquale Paoli to Corsica to head its campaign for independence. He offered to Europeans the image of a charismatic and educated political founder, an image that easily resonated with the classical humanist
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sensibilities of the time. The popularity of Boswell’s account of his meeting with Paoli both fed on and extended this notoriety.
14
The best source of information prior to the publication of Boswell’s account in 1768 was most likely the gazettes of the time, such as the Mercure de France , but as implied by Rousseau’s request for further information about Corsica from his correspondent, these reports offered neither thorough nor accurate information about the practices and way of life on the island, that is, the type of information required to properly reflect on an appropriate set of laws and political institutions. Neither were published accounts of European soldiers who had done service on the island more insightful. 15
Published accounts referring to Corsica reveal some common themes. Corsica is presented as having poor soil, fit for the cultivation of only a few crops such as corn, wine, oil, ill-tasting honey and fruits, as well as for the raising of cattle (typically black) and sheep.
16 Their relative poverty was further exacerbated, in the opinion of some, by unequal trading relations. As Sir James Steuart in his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy states:
The Corsicans have exported, that is sold, the best part of their island to Genoa; and now, after having spent the price in wearing damask and velvet, they want to bring it back, by confiscating the property of the Genoese, who have both paid for the island, and drawn back the price of it, by the balance of their trade against these islanders.
17
He reiterates, in Book IV chapter 12, how the wealth of Corsica had been transferred to foreigners through a constant and longstanding imbalance of trade.
18
In addition to pervasive poverty, traditional accounts of the island did not give a flattering account of the inhabitants. The Corsican people (whose numbers were estimated at somewhere between eighty and one hundred twenty thousand) were presented as a “clownish, rough, stubborn people” who are “naturally brave” but also “unlearned and ignorant” as well as “inclined to Cruelty”.
19
This genre of description was reiterated in the Encyclopedie : “Les Corses sont remuans, vindicatifs, et
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belliqueux.” 20 However, by the early 1760’s a more positive tone entered into the accounts, where these qualities are redescribed as markers of being bold, valiant and suitable for the making of excellent soldiers. 21 Corsicans are praised for their nobility in their struggle for independence.
22 In Boswell’s account, the Corsican propensity for violence is attributed to their strong passions, but he also suggests that these strong passions provide opportunities for greatness.
23 Their reputation for bellicosity is attributed to a history of oppression and their resistance to it. This was a theme that was later to be extended by Henry Kames who laments the eventual suppression of Corsican independence as it extinguished the opportunity for more noble political projects, such as the establishment of a national library and university, projects that would require the will, imagination and motivation fueled by a collective state of intense patriotism generated by the struggle for freedom.
24
There is little question, among observers, of the extreme degree of servitude and oppression experienced by the Corsicans. For David Hume, the Corsican experience was a perfect example of a more general principle that republican or free systems of government (referring to the rule of the
Genoan republic over the Corsican territory) are always more ruinous and oppressive vis-à-vis subjected territories than are monarchies.
25 More specific accounts of the effects of Genoan rule were included in the package of texts sent directly from Buttafoco to Rousseau. These included two central texts of political theory justifying the rebellion of the Corsicans against Genoa: Curzio Talliano’s Disinganno intorno all Rivoluzione di Corsica (1736) and abbe Salvini’s Giustificazione della Rivoluzione in Corsica
(1758).
26
According to both Talliano and Salvini, revolt on the part of the Corsicans was justified through basic principles established in natural law theory (drawing on the authority of Aquinas, Suarez, Locke,
Grotius and Pufendorf), where resistance to government is only justified in collective terms.
27 The case against Genoa, that had ruled over Corsica since 1500, and as summarized by Buttafoco in his essay,
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“Examen historique et justificatif de la revolution de l’ile de Corse contre la Republique de Genes,” is that Genoa eroded the very causes of peace, justice and prosperity on which legitimate government rests. In particular, Genoan rulers undertook a systematic campaign to foment divisions and practiced widespread corruption and legal negligence (with over nine hundred homicides left unpunished every year) which had the overall effect of encouraging banditry and practices of personal vengeance and vendetta justice.
28 Genoa’s policy also impoverished the island, pillaging its riches. The inhabitants could only export their produce to Genoa, and at a rate below market price. The tax gatherers engaged in further extortion. As a result, poverty, insecurity and the destruction of the noble class were generalized features of life on the island. Defenders of these arguments, while supporting the cause of rebellion, were not in principle hostile to monarchy, and indeed often called for the reinstatement of social orders.
To illustrate the depths of exploitation, it is significant to note that the practices of revolt in
Corsica actually preceded the act of intellectual justification. As is often recounted, the 1729 rebellion began with a peasant who could no longer afford to give out any more to the tax collector and through his own personal resistance, helped to inspire and galvanise a wider population to give concrete form to their widespread feelings of resentment. The need for organization, the inability of Genoa to put down the revolt and the islanders’ search for external allies eventually led to a more explicit campaign for independence. The arrival of Theodorus Rex in 1736 as the self-proclaimed King of Corsica helped to consolidate a sense of the objective of independence by symbolizing a definitive rupture with Genoa as well as giving the Corsicans the publicity they needed to generate further resources for their war.
29
As one final consideration as part of the background to Rousseau’s reflections on Corsica, we should inquire about the contours of debate concerning the new institutions of Corsica ushered in in the wake of rebellion. With some difficulty, Pascal Paoli was elected president by the Consulta of 1755 and
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shortly thereafter he introduced constitutional reforms to serve as a basis for more stable governmental institutions, in part formalizing longstanding practices of insular governance. As a shift in political argument, the preamble to the constitution justified itself in terms of a principle of popular sovereignty and the right of a people to be free, rather than as a need for resistance to tyranny. 30 The sovereign body was called the Diet (relative of the previous Consulta), a body that named the General and one hundred forty-four councilors (based on principles of regional representation) who constituted the
Council of State as the tripartite executive body, with three councils responsible for justice, military affairs and economic affairs, and meeting twice a year. What was generally perceived as novel in the
Corsican case was the mode by which the Diet was elected as well as the extent of the body’s powers.
The Diet was elected as a representative body by all men over twenty-five with no property qualification, something unheard of in the rest of Europe, but an extension of local practices already in existence on the island (it was only in certain local village assemblies where women who were widows might have the right to exercise the vote as well).
31 The powers of the Diet were extensive ranging from the choosing of the executive, to the making of laws and setting taxes, as well as powers of censure.
Despite attempts by the General Paoli to restrict the size and powers of the Diet over the course of his rule in the 1750’s, in the face of certain aristocratic opposition, it has been suggested that the practice of government in general in Corsica at this time was much more democratic than most any other system of government existing in Europe at the time.
32
Against this institutional background, according to Arrighi, there were three main political currents in Corsica of the 1760’s. One camp (to which Buttafoco belonged) was constituted by those who wished to see Corsica evolve along the model of mainstream Europe, a path that would include the reinvigoration of the aristocracy and the pursuit of a general policy of economic enrichment and the pursuit of luxury through commerce. It was a current of opinion that was not hostile to the instauration of a new monarch over the island.
33 A second camp sought to preserve the community traditions of the
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island and was hostile to any rapprochement with European powers and their models of economic and political development. It was associated with the spontaneous populist revolt in 1729. The third camp was that of Paoli who sought some form of balance between the two with a commitment to some version of democracy and equality allied with a vision of limited economic development.
34 The work La
Corsica ai suoi figlo spells out his vision recognizing the need for a democratic republic on the island centred on the spirit of equality and a firm and impartial justice under the law in opposition to the archaic culture of honour that had flourished previously.
35
Of course, in the longer run, these differences had no effect on the subsequent fate of Corsica.
It became the victim to the worst of international practice as maligned soon after by Kant in Perpetual
Peace: that is, being the third non-consenting party to an international treaty that ceded control over the island to France, and consolidated by the Treaty of Versailles containing a secret clause where
France promised never to allow the Corsicans become independent on their coastline.
36 The fate of the island was sealed.
II.
Rousseau’s discussion of the Corsican case
Given this intellectual, institutional and historical context of the Corsican rebellion to which
Rousseau was invited to enter as a major interlocutor, what is the significance of Rousseau’s own response? It is curious to note that Rousseau’s text is surprising for its silences as well as for its observations.
In the first instance, given Corsica’s clearly progressive institutional framework in allowing for a wider suffrage than any possible throughout Europe, as well as the wide range of legislative power given to the Diet, it is of interest that this was not a focus for Rousseau in this text, particularly given his strong defense of ongoing popular sovereignty elsewhere. Here he is not at all concerned to use the Corsican example to further promote his own defense of sovereignty or to discuss its functioning as an applied
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example of his own theories of legislative dominance and the general will. In this sense, and contrary to a number of commentaries, one cannot read this text as just a more pragmatic application of Rousseau’s previous reflections on popular sovereignty.
In addition, despite the body of literature devoted to the discussion of the justification for rebellion and independence in the Corsican case, it is again curious that Rousseau does not use this writing to focus in any way on the grounds for legitimate political authority, in the way he did, for example, in the opening passages of Du Contrat social. In his Project for a Constitution for Corsica,
Rousseau is reflecting not as a jurist in matters of right, but as a political theorist through considerations of expediency and effective design focusing on the act of political founding.
As a third observation, it is curious that Rousseau does not use the text to stick in a strict way to the task that was demanded of him, namely to draft a constitution for Corsica, or at the least to articulate a set of political principles that should govern the application of the constitution. While it is true that Corsica already had a set of institutions and laws, these do not seem to be in any way the centre of Rousseau’s concern.
So how do we make sense of the text? While offering some limited continuities with Rousseau’s previous work, this text on Corsica stands out as something quite new for Rousseau as well as striking for its originality in the context of political debate surrounding Corsica in eighteenth century Europe.
The originality of this piece derives from its radical emphasis on the broad political (as opposed to constitutional) choices and directions needed in order to form a people of a certain quality so as to sustain a well designed constitution. It is a focus on the act of founding, not in the modern sense of a juridical break from the past with the instauration of an indigenously crafted set of laws and institutions, but a much more robust understanding of political founding, something found in the ancients and revised by Machiavelli that perceives a much more powerful and pervasive role for politics in shaping a
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collective ethos at a particularly crucial stage of collective development. For Rousseau that stage had arrived in the case of Corsica.
Of course, there are intimations of this emphasis in Du Contrat social, for instance in Rousseau’s suggestion that the legislator should be capable of changing human nature.
37 But the emphasis in Du
Contrat social is on a generic transformation of an individual in any state with the development of moral features of their personality that coincide with membership in a broader community, that is, if adhered to the general nature of the transformation as described by Rousseau should apply in any truly legitimate form of political community. It is a transformation that should be possible in any properly constituted political community, regardless of the material and historical circumstances. In contrast, in the case of the commentary on Corsica, the transformation discussed is at a different and more specific level. It takes into account the condition of the people at the moment of founding and suggests that there is a particular mode of development more suitable to them if they wish to remain self-governing.
In this sense it actually delimits the contours and possibilities of sovereignty by suggesting that the community can sustain itself in its free and self-governing state with only certain policy choices. In addition, the discussion of the Corsican case posits the particular type of moral and political beings the society can or should envision itself as aiming towards in their political and juridical choices. So, for example, Rousseau suggests that the country should favour the development of agriculture, in part for reasons of encouraging the particular type of moral character that is associated with the cultivation of the soil, namely patient, hardworking and patriotic men. The substantive nature of the political goal as elucidated here suggests that for Rousseau liberty is not fully encapsulated by the positing of procedural conditions such as a strict practice of ongoing popular sovereignty, but also requires key fundamental qualities of character among citizens. However- and this is how the argument of this work differs from his presentation of good citizen character in his “Discourse on Political Economy”- the development of this moral economy good for the practice of citizenship is not thought to be the fundamental
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justification for policy, but rather a felicitous offshoot, or effect, of policy aimed at a much more applied goal: economic independence.
Rousseau begins his discussion by suggesting that the impoverished state of the people, and their vulnerability to hostile naval forces dictates a simple form of administration (that is not too expensive) and that they be self-sufficient in material terms.
38 In this sense, the choice for Corsicans is actually to try to maintain themselves at a level of economic austerity that becomes a material condition for the moral practice of autarchy. “Il s’agit moins de devenir autres que vous n’etes, mais de savoir vous conserver tels. » 39 The effect of centuries of political tyranny as decried in numerous commentaries on the Corsican situation is transfigured by Rousseau as an advantage, at least given the geopolitical circumstances of the island, and as an economic precondition for the exercise of political liberty. In this sense, it cannot be suggested that the Corsicans represent humanity in some primordial untouched state. Their social and economic condition was clearly the effect of longstanding relations with European powers.
Rousseau does not take this to be a passive principle of political action, but rather an active one.
It needs to be combined with policies to increase the population and to increase agricultural production.
It is only through this double strategy, suggests Rousseau, that the country can generate the type of moral character and international presence it needs to defend its autonomy well and can provide the sustenance it needs independently so as to avoid the crippling effects of commerce.
Rousseau endorses the standard Enlightenment descriptions of the Corsican character, indeed repeating the very terms of the article in the Encyclopedie in describing the people as “remuans”.
40 Still, he suggests that a new form of institution, one that not only is controlled only by Corsicans themselves, but one that is also accompanied by good laws, is necessary as a condition, if not a guarantee, of a new direction and ethos directed to peace, rather than the contentious of war.
41
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One of the important differences at the outset between this text of Rousseau and his other writings, most notably Du Contrat social and the “Discours sur l’économie politique” is that Rousseau focuses his analysis on an overriding need in the Corsican case for political independence as the most pressing concern for state security. This is acknowledged to be best pursued through strategies that promote economic self-sufficiency, population growth and a stronger military force , all considerations that point to the need for a largely agriculturally based economy. These in turn dictate certain other measures such as a relatively equal dispersion of the population throughout the territory, and a modified democratic state. More favorable offshoots of these policy measures include the enhancement of a patriotic sentiment.
42 The political system that for Rousseau is said to correspond to this type of economic activity, with the further consideration of geographic size of the territory, is a mixed government, that is a system that incorporates certain democratic elements with people assembling together to rule on basic principles of legislation, but only in sections, and that allows for frequent changes in the executive institutions, a model that he expressly borrows from the system outline by Buttafoco in his 1764 essay.
43 Here the legitimacy of the state cannot be said to depend on a strict exercise of pure democracy.
Still, this arrangement of institutions and economic practices will not always sustain the ultimate goal of political independence. As Rousseau suggests, once the economic situation in Corsica has changed with the successful enforcement of these policies, namely with an increase in population as well as an economic surplus that will allow for investment in other sectors such as culture and industry, it would be necessary to revisit both the institutional structure and the economic priorities of the country.
44 Still, his endorsement of what is basically a barter economy later in this piece suggests that he sees this scenario as highly unlikely.
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In general terms, what appears to be most important for Rousseau throughout this discussion is the maintenance of Corsica’s status as an independent country, or what we might call her liberty vis-àvis other independent states. What is,strikingly, not visible here, is any priority given to the value of liberty as collective and democratic self-government as a necessary compliment and condition for political liberty. Rousseau, here, does not invoke the ‘general will’ nor the need for obedience to the law, as collectively articulated by all the citizens on the basis of political equality, as a necessary or sufficient condition for political freedom, nor indeed as a necessary condition for the installation of legitimate government in Corsica. While espousing a form of mixed government with democratic features in the case of Corsica and his call for various forms of relative social and economic equality, his stringent demands for very particular institutional structures as a minimum condition for political legitimacy, as argued in Du Contrat social, appear to have been put aside. The priority here is on measures to enhance economic equality, itself a basis for social equality, and it is this on which the liberty of the Corsicans is said to rest.
Distinct from the arguments of Du Contrat social that advocated measures to ensure strict equality before the state, backed up by moderate controls on the division of wealth in the community, here in the text for Corsica Rousseau constructs an order where quite a strict form of economic equality is brought about through the maintenance of a subsistence agricultural economy (with exchange enacted largely through the principle of barter), but supplemented by a hierarchy of political classes regulated by the state (Citizens, Patriots and Aspiring citizens) with greater political rights granted to those men who are married (or widowed) with two children, a house and a plot of land large enough to provide for their family’s needs.
45 The very names of the classes of citizens proposed by Rousseau, and particularly that of the ‘aspirants’, suggests that he came to acknowledge a need to more effectively harness the powers of amour-propre in the realm of politics to build a strong sense of the collective or common good. The establishment of a family and the achievement of economic independence become
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in this legal structure reasons to prize and honour the privileges of citizenship. So Rousseau actively downplays the place of legal and political equality that had characterized his traditional vision of the legitimate state, due to the powerful motivating force of honour , so as to serve, in the end, the goal of freedom now reconstrued in its essential nature as independence, or non-domination. The motivating power of honour is also acknowledged in his praise of a fully agricultural economy, as he suggests that agricultural production will become competitive and a matter through which personal honour and accomplishment will be measured, replacing a dynamic of economic stultification brought on by Genoa’s policies. 46 He even here sings the praises of luxury, quite uncharacteristic for Rousseau, but luxury redefined as increased production and abundance in a largely moneyless economy. « De nombreuses familles bien nourries et bien vétues en feront honorer les chefs et l’abondance reelle étant l’unique objet de luxe chacun voudra se distinguer par ce luxe-là. Tant que le cœur human demeurera ce qu’il est de pareils établissemens ne produiront pas la paresse. » 47
Still, the economy of honour defended by Rousseau has a very distinct form and does not extend to an embrace of traditional aristocratic distinctions. Rousseau acknowledges his departure from much of the existing commentary on the Corsican situation, both in the various treatises calling for independence as well as in the essays written by Buttafoco, regarding the place of the nobility in the social order. While the destruction of the privileges of the nobility was generally regarded as part of the grievances laid against Genoa, Rousseau suggests that these policies, while perhaps the appropriate grounds for a grievance, should not be regarded in their effects as a misfortune, but rather as an advantage.
48 It is precisely the destruction of a system based on false reasons for honour that allows for the introduction of social distinctions that enhance the overall prosperity and collective good.
Distinctions and honour can only be encouraged insofar as they are instrumental to the more fundamental objectives of the political union.
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By these arguments, Rousseau departs from his analysis in the article “Discours sur l’économie politique” where he envisaged the task of politics as replacing destructive ‘amour-propre’ with a more expansive and useful sense of patriotism and an attachment to the idea of the common good. Instead, here, the instilling of a love of the whole in the public is not an immediate goal of public policy. The rhetoric of patriotism is abandoned in this text, and citizen motivations are seen as more directly an outcome of material and economic circumstances. Thus, the agricultural economy is said to produce more hard-working and disciplined citizens. With chances for prosperity through hard work these citizens will no longer be drawn to the practice of banditry for gain, the only source of economic hope for some under the rule of Genoa.
49 It is the pursuit of honour and pride through production, as opposed to accumulation, that for Rousseau becomes the foundation for an alliance of liberty and prosperity. The capstone of this system is the denial of inheritance. Each new generation will be similarly motivated to establish themselves as independent producers so that they can merit and enjoy the status of citizen. Citizenship then, is not seen as a birthright, but a mark of accomplishment and success.
It is also through the same logic that Rousseau defends an economy that depends as little as possible on commerce through the circulation of coinage, as this encourages a greater division of wealth and a move away from an agricultural economy.
50 Instead, he suggests that the commerce of agricultural goods be done in kind, even if this sort of trade were to take place with other nations.
III.
Significance of Rousseau’s structure of argument
It might be suggested by some that in the end there is perhaps little of significance in the theoretical differences that emerge in a study of the text of Rousseau’s writing on Corsica. For surely what is most important for Rousseau is that people follow a political path that rejects the dominant European model, given its broad association with dysfunction, unhappiness, corruption and social unraveling. The
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Corsican case represents for Rousseau a model of an undeveloped society that still might have an opportunity to embark on a project of political development standing as an alternative to that of France.
In the end here, as in many of his other works, Rousseau is basically choosing Sparta over Athens, the happy savage over the unhappy civilized man, the self-regulating Stoic-like autonomous being over the dependent, conflicted and un-centred citizen of modern times. How he frames his position might differ, but the substantive argument is the same.
While it is clear that at this general level of analysis there is a certain truth in this position, it also ignores some of specifics of Rousseau’s position outlined here where he does make some original contributions and where he deviates from his previous writings.
What is most important about the approach taken by Rousseau in his discussion of the Corsican case, is the centrality of political economy, or the idea that the foundation for political liberty is first and foremost a type of economic organization that seeks neither strict poverty nor economic leveling, but which harnesses amour-propre to the enjoyment of worthy goods in increased production and action. It is a departure from his previous writings by the subordination of constitutional, institutional and citizenship concerns to economic ones, and by his acknowledgement that economic organization should not be structured so as to promote full material equality, relative poverty and be driven directly by a concern to generate patriotic sentiment. It would appear that here Rousseau acknowledges how economic production as driven by amour-propre can be made compatible with good citizenship and liberty in its long term effects. The economic evil is not property per se, as he suggests in the Second
Discourse, but the circulation of money that allows for excessive inequalities of wealth.
In general, then, we find both a more radical and more moderate Rousseau in this piece. Rousseau tempers his earlier demands for strict economic equality as a condition for good political community, and acknowledges that the institution of private property itself does not need to be noxious to the
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practice of liberty. Yet, he provides a strong indictment of a largely monetary economy. In the case of
Corsica, liberty is first and foremost understood as non-domination, or freedom from European control.
This is seen as both political independence as well as economic independence, and the latter, Rousseau argues, requires economic autonomy through self-sufficiency. A free Corsican citizen, for Rousseau, is one who competes for honours within their society, as a means to encourage productivity that sustains overall economic autonomy, and who actively engages in a system of interdependent relations. Some degree of political participation is acknowledged, but only for those deemed to have merited it through their action and through a patchwork of local councils with no provision for a general assembly of citizens. It would appear that for Rousseau at this time, economic autonomy was a major feature of political liberty. In doing so, he severed the traditional demand for a strong sense of devotion that had been traditionally associated with republican forms, at least since the work of Montesquieu.
51
Unwittingly, and despite the traditional association of Rousseau with a somewhat radical rejection of
Enlightenment, the decoupling of freedom and intense virtue in the self-governing republican regime in his analysis of Corsica offers one step towards the post-Revolutionary theorizing of the modern republic.
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1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions. Vol. 5 of The Collected Writings of Rousseau eds.
Christopher Kelly et al. (Hanover and London: Dartmouth College Press, 1995), 544.
2 The Annual Register of a View of the History, Politicks and Literature for the Year 1768
(London: Dosley, 1768), 2-3.
3 C.E. Vaughan, Political Writings, vol. 2 as cited in Sven Stelling-Michaud, “Introduction au
Projet de Constitution pour la Corse,” In Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes, t. 3, eds.
B. Gagnebin et al. (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), ccvii.
4 Mme de Nadaillac and abbess of Gomer-Fontaine, to whom Rousseau had entrusted a number of papers after 1768, told Rousseau’s executor that Rousseau had communicated to her that he would be needing those papers. For Stelling-Michaud this suggests that Rousseau had not fully abandoned his project. See his “Introduction,” ccix.
5 Jeffrey A. Smith, “Nature, Nation-Building and the Seasons of Justice in Rousseau’s Political
Thought,” The Review of Politics vol. 68(2006), 20-48.
6 Julia Simon-Ingram, “Rousseau and the Problem of Community: Nationalism, Civic Virtue,
Totalitarianism,” History of European Ideas, vol. 16, n. 1-3 (1993), 23-29.
7 See Raymond Polin, La Politique de la solitude (Paris: Sirey, 1971), 132 as well as Jean Marie
Arrighi and Olivier Jehasse, Histoire de la Corse et des Corses (Paris : Perrin Colonna Editions,
2008), 335.
8 Ryan Patrick Hanley, “Enlightened Nation Building: The ‘Science of the Legislator’ in Adam
Smith and Rousseau,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 52, n.2 (2008), 219-234; Ethan
Putterman, “Realism and Reform in Rousseau’s Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica,”
Political Studies, vol. 49 (2001), 481-494.
9 As Dorothy Carrington states: “[Paoli’s] constitution had a liberal character rare in a period when the rule of absolute monarchs, aristocracies and oligarchies, was general throughout
Europe. The principle of equality inherent in the system is what makes is most remarkable.
The law, emanating from the Diet, applied equally to all citizens, nobles and clergy included; taxation was moderate and equitable, consisting of a uniform hearth-tax and exceptional levies, proportional to property; restrictions on franchise and accession to office were always based on age, not on birth or on wealth, while almost every position of authority, from ‘Father of the
Commune; to Councillor State, was to be won by some form of election.” “The Corsican
Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769),” The English Historical Review 88, n. 348(July 1973),
500. It appears that some more recent historiography questions Paoli’s commitment to the democratic institutions he initially helped to entrench. See Dorothy Carrington, “Pascal Paoli et sa ‘constitution’,” In La Constitution de Pascal Paoli, 1755, ed. D. Carrington (Ajaccio: La
Marge, 1996), 28.
10 “Discours sur l’Economie politique,” In Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, eds. B. Gagnebin et al.
(Paris : Gallimard, 1964), 241-278.
11 The position that this was purely an initiative of Buttafoco’s is attributed to Antonetti and
J.D. Selche by Philippe Castellin and Jean Marie Arrighi in their Projets de Constitution pour la
Corse (Ajaccio: La Marge, 1979), 25. This is also supported by Sven Stelling-Michaud in his
Introduction to the piece in the Pleaide edition. “L’idee d’une demarche aupres de Rousseau ne semble donc pas etre venue de Paoli, ainsi que le bruit en fut repandu a Paris par Grimm et par Bachaumont et comme Buttafoco le laissa entendre-d’une maniere ambigue-dans ses
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lettres. En realite, cet aristocrate corse, imbu des prejuges de sa caste, avait pris l’initiative de s’adresser a l’auteur du Contrat afin d’obtenir de lui un plan de constitution dont il pensait pouvoir suggerer les principes au philosophe et qu’il esperait utliser pour faire piece a la politique democratique et egalitaire du general. » Stelling-Michaud, “Introduction au Projet de
Constitution pour la Corse,” Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, ccii. There is a suggestion here that given Buttafuco’s ideological disagreements with Paoli concerning the future development of the island as well as Paoli’s more centralized style of governance, he enlisted Rousseau to provide greater ideological support for his own position to counter that of Paoli. Still, there is a great deal that does not make sense in this account, particularly the fact that it is difficult to imagine why Buttafoco could think that Rousseau would be supportive of his wish to strengthen the aristocratic class in Corsica and to defend a model of social and economic development that appeared to mirror that of mainstream European monarchies.
12 James Boswell, An Account of Corsica. The Journal of a Tour to that Island and Memoires of
Pascal Paoli, ed. J.T. Boulton and T.A. McLoughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 209-
210.
13 Thadd E. Hall, ‘The Development of enlightenment interest in eighteenth-century Corsica,”
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, vol. 64 (Geneva: Institut et Musee Voltaire,
1968), 166.
14 Boswell, An Account of Corsica.
15 As noted by Hall, when the Mercure de France began reporting on Corsican affairs in 1730 the source of the reports were rather dubious and there were often errors and misspellings in the text. However, over the course of the century the quality of the reporting improved and became a sizable component of non-domestic news. He suggests, “despite the incomplete nature of its reporting, the Mercure was a significant source for information about the island.”
In Hall, “The Development of Enlightenment Interest in Eighteenth-Century Corsica,” 169. We can only surmise that it is probably from this source that Rousseau garnered enough knowledge of the country so as to add the famous phrase in the final stages of preparing Du Contrat social,
“Il est encore en Europe un pays capable de legislation; c’est isle de Corse. L a valeur et la constance avec laquelle ce brave people a su recouvrer et defender sa liberte, meriteroit bien que quelque homme sage lui apprit a la conserver. J’ai quelque presentiment qu’un jour cette petite Isle etonnera l’Europe.” Oeuvres completes, vol.3, 391. Still, on receiving the request from Buttafoco, Rousseau did not yet feel adequately informed about the situation on the island. As he states in his response to Buttafoco: “par rapport a la chose, il me manque une multitude de connaissances relatives a la Nation et au pays; connaissances indispensables, et qui, pour les acquerir, demanderont de votre part beaucoup d’instructions, d’eclaircissement, e memoires, etc.; de la mienne, beaucoup d’etudes et de reflexions.” In particular, Rousseau suggests that Buttafoco sends him a copy of the legal code. See Projets de Constitution pour la
Corse, eds. Castellin and Arrighi, 32-33. In a subsequent letter, Rousseau makes of list of the documents he requires to devote himself to the project. These include a good map of the island, an exact description of the island including its natural history, the situation and nature of the cities, the nature of its commerce, arts, industry, navy, fortresses, the number and customs of the clergy and its position vis-à-vis political life, the status of the nobility and the nature of municipal privileges, the customs of the people and the nature of its military practices and a full
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account of the history and current institutions of public administration, including the system of taxation. Buttafoco promised to send several packages with the information he requests.
Rousseau acknowledged receipt of some documents in his letter of 24 March 1765, but there appears to be no precise inventory of the actual documents that were sent to him. Still, we can be sure that Tulliano’s Disinganno intorno all Rivoluzione di Corsica was included along with
Salvini’s Giustificazione della Rivoluzione in Corsica and a couple of essays drafted by Buttafoco himself for presentation at a recent meeting of the Consulta. See P. Castellin and J.M. Arrighi, eds. Projet de Constitution pour la Corse, 36-41.
16 There are some exceptions to this. In Pierre Anquetil’s Precis de l’histoire universelle (1797) we are given quite a different tone suggesting a wealth of minerals in the island, as well as good soil and an abundance of produce. Indeed, it is suggested here that it is the abundance of the chestnut and other produce that leads to the indolence of the inhabitants. A Summary of
Universal History in Nine Volumes, exhibiting the Rise, Decline and Revolutions of the Different
Nations of the World (translated from the French),vol. 7 (London: Robinson, 1800), 541-543.
17 James Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy. Being an Essay on the
Science of Domestic Policy in Free Nations (London: A. Millar, 1767), vol.1, Book 2, chapter 29,
419. Boswell disputes this suggesting that the impoverished situation of Corsica had nothing to do with imprudence and everything to do with the rapacity of the Genoans. Boswell, An
Account of Corsica, 141.
18 Steuart, Inquiry, vol. 2, Book IV, chapter 12, 173. In his survey of the state of nations published in
1769 Tobias Smollett suggests that the population of the island stood at one hundred and twenty thousand, though Montesquieu only several decades earlier suggested that there were eighty thousand inhabitants on the island.
19 See n.a., A General Account and Description of the Island of Corsica, 2 nd edition (London: C.
Corbett, 1739), 2-3. A later account provides a similar description of the topography and agriculture: “The island being for the most part mountainous, woody, dry and stony, has little arable land. Some of the low grounds and vallies, however, yield corn, wine, figs, almonds, chestnuts, olives and other fruits. Here is also a good breed of cattle and horses, and the woods and forests abound with deer, and other game, together with honey and wax. There are also some salt-works and hot baths on the island, with crystals, iron and alum. In the surrounding seas are caught abundance of fish, especially those called from the neighbouring island, Sardines, and a kind of sturgeon. Coral also is often found in these seas, especially in the
Straits of Bonifacio. Notwithstanding all this, it is but thinly peopled, by reason of its barren soil, and indifferent air, the oppression and tyranny of the Genoese, while they were masters of the island and the continual war the inhabitants have been engaged in, in defence of their liberties, since they shook off the Genoese yoke.” Tobias Smollett, The Present State of all
Nations containing a geographical, natural, commercial and political history of all the countries in the known world, vol. 6 (London: R. Baldwin, 1769), 464-465. It is Smollett who estimates the population at 120,000. Montesquieu, somewhat earlier in the century, gave the more conservative estimation.
20 The full, and surprisingly tiny, entry for Corsica in the Encyclopedie reads as follows: “ île très-considérable d'Italie, dans la mer méditerranée, appartenante à la république de
Genes. Les Corses sont remuans, vindicatifs, & belliqueux.” As suggested by Hall, it
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demonstrates that even by the mid-eighteenth century the general interest in Corsica was not overwhelming and that educated opinion on the whole was very wary of the people. See
L’Encyclopedie de Diderot and d’Alembert, online at http://diderot.alembert.free.fr/C.html
, date searched January 28 th , 2010 and Hall, “The Development of Enlightenment Interest” In
Studies of Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century. This entry is also cited in Boswell, An Account of Corsica, 130.
21 “A Succint Account of the Island of Corsica,” The Royal Magazine (June 1762), 273-276.
According to some, it was precisely Rousseau’s invocation of the Corsican struggle in his
Contract social that led to the revision of the image of the people. See Pierrette Geoffroy-
Faggianelli’s L’Image de la Corse dans la Litterature Romantique francaise (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1979), cited in Philippe Castellin and Jean Marie Arrighi, eds. Projets de Constitution pour la Corse (Ajaccio: La Marge, 1979), 15.
22 “A Succint Account of the Island of Corsica,” 274.
23 “…they are no doubt a people of strong passions, as well as of lively and vigorous minds.
These are the materials, of which men are to be formed either good or bad in a superior degree. I always remember an observation which M. Rousseau made to me, one day, in the Val de Travers, when we were talking of the characters of different nations; said he, ‘J’aime ces caracteres ou il y a de l’etoffe.’ It was well said. A poor feeble spirit is unable to support the weight of great virtues. It is only where there is strength and fire, that we can hope to form characters of worth and dignity.” Boswell, An Account of Corsica, 130.
24 Henry Kames, Sketches of the History of Man (Edinburgh: A. Strahan, T. Caeell and W.
Creech, 1788), vol. 2, 322-324.
25 David Hume, “Politics A Science,” Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (London: A.
Millar, 1768), 13.
26 These works are mentioned and discussed in P. Castellin and J.M. Arrighi, eds. Projets de
Constitution de la Corse, 36. Talliano is also sometimes referred to as the abbe Natali.
27 Jean Marie Arrighi, “Textes theoriques de la revolution corse,” Pasquale Paoli. Aspects de son oeuvre et de la corse de son temps, ed. J.M. Arrighi et al (Albiana: Universita di Corsica,
2009), 42-59.
28 Buttafoco, “Examen historique et justificatif de la revolution de l’ile de Corse contre la
Republique de Genes,” In Projets de Constitution pour la Corse, eds. P. Castellin et J.M. Arrighi,
82.
29 Jean Marie Arrighi et Olivier Jehasse Paris, Histoire de la Corse et des Corses (Paris: Perrin
Colonna Editions, 2008), 308.
30 Arrighi and Jehasse, Histoire de la Corse et des Corses, 318.
31 “Contrairement a ce que l’on dit souvent, ‘les femmes’ en general ne votent pas. Certaines le font dans le cadre d’assemblees de village, quand le vote se fait par famille et que, veuves, ells representent la leur. Leur role est donc déjà plus grand que dans bien des Etats d’alors, mais c’etait déjà le cas avant Pascal Paoli.” Arrighi and Jehasse, Histoire de la Corse et des
Corses, 319.
32 “La Constitution de 1755 et la pratique paoliste du pouvoir sont a juger par rapport au contexte: elles vont bien plus loin dans le sens democratique que tout ce que l’on connait a l’epoque. Elles contribuent a demontrer a l’opinion mondiale que la democratie n’est pas
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qu’un systeme du passé, ‘fait pour des anges’, mais un regime possible, meme si le modele se situe dans un Etat petit et pauvre.” Arrighi and Jehasse, Histoire de la Corse et des Corses, 321.
In this sense, the significance of the Corsican example far outweighs both its relatively small size as well as its ultimate demise in the wake of the French conquest of the island.
33 Buttafoco sent to Rousseau an essay that he had written and submitted to a meeting of the
Consulta in spelling out some of his political ideas related to the current exercise of political power in Corsica, recommendations that include increasing the limits on executive power, reducing the number in the Council of State to nine, restoring the privileges of the old aristocracy, and restoring to the country a drive for industry, economic growth and commerce.
“Memoire au sujet de la constitution politique a etablir dans le royaume de Corse,” In Projets de Constitution pour la Corse, P. Castellin et J.M. Arrighi, eds., 65-90.
34 Arrighi, “Textes theoriques de la revolution en Corse,” 44.
35 Arrighi and Jenasse, Histoire de la Corse et des Corses, 333.
36 Arrighi and Jenasse, Histoire de la Corse et des Corses, 336.
37 “Celui qui ose entreprendre d’instituer un people doit se sentir en etat de changer, pour ainsi dire, la nature humaine; de transformer chaque individu, qui par lui-meme est un tout parfait et solitaire, en partie d’un plus grant tout dont cet individu receive en quelque sorte sa vie et son etre; d’alterer la constitution de l’homme pour la renforcer; de substituer une existence partielle et morale a l’existence physique et independante que nous avons tous recue de la nature.” Du Contrat social, In Œuvres completes, vol. 3, Book II, chap. 7, 381.
38 “Constitution pour la Corse,” In Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 902-903.
39 “Constitution pour la Corse,” In Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 903.
40 “Constitution pour la Corse,” In Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 903.
41 “ Il faut de bonnes loix, il faut une institution nouvelle pour retablir la concorde dont la
Tyrannie a detruit jusqu’au desir. La Corse assujettie a des maitres etrangers dont jamais elle n’a porte patiemment le dur joug, fut toujours agitee. Il faut maintenant que son people fasse une etude nouvelle; et qu’il cherche la paix dans la liberte.” “Constitution pour la Corse,” In
Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 903-904. It would appear that the reference to ‘peace’ here is meant as a signal of the possibility of a complete transformation of the Corsican character previously described in the Encyclopedie article as ‘belliqueux’.
42 “Constitution pour la Corse,” Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 904-905.
43 “Constitution pour la Corse,” Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 907.
44 “Quand le pays est sature d’habitans on n’en peut plus employer l’excedent a la culture, il faut occupier cet excedent a l’industrie, au commerce, aux Arts, et ce nouveau systeme demande une autre administration. Puisse l’etablissement que la Corse va faire, la mettre bientôt dans la necessite d’en changer ainsi. Mais tant qu’elle n’aura pasplus d’hommes qu’elle n’en peut nourrir, tant qu’il restera dans l’Isle un pouce de terre en friche, elle doit s’en tenir au système rustique et n’en changer que quand l’Isle ne lui suffira plus. » « Constitution pour la
Corse, » Œuvres completes, vol. 3, 907.
45 « Constitution pour la Corse, », Œuvres completes, vol. 3, 919.
46 “Constitution pour la Corse,” Oeuvres completes, vol. 3,
47 « Constitution pour la Corse, » Œuvres completes, vol. 3, 925.
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48 “[Les Genois] se sont encore appliqués a detruire la noblesse, a la priver de ses dignites, de ses titres, a eteindre les grands fiefs; il est heureux pour vous qu’ils se soient charges de ce qu’il y avoit d’odieux dans cette enterprise que vous n’auriez peut-etre pu faire s’ils ne l’avoient faite avant vous. N’hesitez point d’achever leur ouvrage ; en croyant travaller pour eux ils travailloient pour vous. La fin seule est bien differente, car celle des Genois etoit dans la chose meme et la votre est dans son effet. Ils ne vouloient qu’avilir la noblesse et vous voulez annoblir la nation. » « La Consitution pour la Corse, » Œuvres completes, vol. 3, 908.
49 “La Constitution pour la Corse,” Oeuvres completes, vol. 3, 918.
50 “Je regarde si bien tout systeme de commerce comme destructive de l’agriculture, que je n’en excepte pas meme le commerce des denress qui sont le produit de l’agriculture. Pour qu’elle put se soutenir dans ce système il faudroit que le profit put se partager egalement entre le marchand et le cultivateur. Mais c’est ce qui est impossible parce que le negoce de l’un etant libre et celui de l’ature force le premier fera toujours la loi au second, rapport qui rompant l’equilibre ne peut faire un etat solide et permanent . » « La Constitution pour la Corse, »
Œuvres completes, vol. 3, 920.
51 I refer here to Montesquieu’s definition of a republic as a regime animated by a strong sense of virtue, or love of the republic. See L’Esprit des lois (1748).
26